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|Philosophical Thesis
|Type Identity
|Realism – Pain is real.
|Materialism – Pain is neurophysiological.
|Minimal Reductionism – Pain is nothing more than neurophysiological mechanism.
|Identity – Pain is identical to a
neurophysiological mechanism.
|Naturalistic – Philosophies of pain are both metaphysical and scientific theories.
|Theoretical – Metaphysical theories of pain can
be assessed according to their theoretical virtues (e.g., simplicity), and competing empirical predictions.
Polger, T. W. (2011). Are sensations still brain processes? Philosophical Psychology, 24(1), 1-21.
The personal experience of pain produces a reliable effect on facial behavior in humans and in nonhuman mammals. Why should pain have a face? What is it for? I will attempt to head towards answering this question by invoking a theoretical framework: polyvagal theory (Porges, 2001, 2006).
1 Polyvagal Theory
According to polyvagal theory (Porges, 2001, 2006), evolution of neural control within the autonomic nervous system (ANS) has tracked three stages, each revealing a specific behavior, and a specific function:
In the first stage, the ancient unmyelinated visceral vagus nerve that enables digestion could respond to danger and pain only by reducing metabolic output and producing immobilization behaviors.
In the second stage, the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) made it possible to increase metabolic activity and inhibit the visceral vagus nerve, thus allowing fight/flight behaviors following perceived threat or pain.
The third stage, which is uniquely mammalian, involves a myelinated vagus that can rapidly control cardiac and bronchi output to enable spontaneous interaction (i.e., engagement or disengagement) with the environment. The interaction of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) with the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, nervous and immune systems change to maximize response to stressors such as nociception. During nociception, the ANS operates together with nervous, endocrine and immune systems to produce stress (Chapman et al. 2008; Porges, 2001, 2006). In terms of polyvagal theory, pain facial expression is a dynamic autonomic response caused by noxious signaling. In terms of polyvagal-type identity mechanistic theory pain facial expression is a type of behavior that is identical to a type of neurophysiological mechanism; namely, the phylogenetically recent brain-heart-face mechanism.
The expansion of cortex in the third stage increased innervation and neural control of the mammalian face: upper face innervation is bilateral and arises from the supplementary motor area (M2) and the rostral cingulate motor area (M3). Lower face innervation is contralateral and arises from primary motor cortex (M1), ventral lateral premotor cortex, and the caudal cingulate motor cortex (M4) (Morecraft et al. 2004). Human pain facial movements of the eyebrows and upper lip are type identical with negative emotional aspects of pain and activation of M1, M2, M3, whereas facial movements around the eyes are type identical with somatosensory aspects of pain, and activation of M2 and M3 (Kunz et al. 2011). Thus, evolution of cranial anatomy enabled a highly integrated facial representation of the multidimensional experience of pain.
2 Why Pain Should Have a Face
In clinical and experimental settings, the pain face is observed to rapidly appear following noxious stimulation, and diminish concurrent with cessation of the noxious stimulus, or when analgesics are administered (e.g., Craig & Patrick, 1985). The brain-heart-face mechanism is an integrated system with both a somatomotor part controlling the striated facial muscles and a visceromotor part controlling the heart through a myelinated vagus nerve (Porges, 2001, 2006). When the vagal tone to the cardiac pacemaker is high, the myelinated vagus acts as a brake or restraint limiting heart rate. Rapid inhibition and disinhibition of vagal tone to the heart supports the rapid mobilization of facial muscles and formation of the pain face concurrent with pain onset. In humans and nonhuman mammals, the main vagal inhibitory pathways in the myelinated vagus originate in the nucleus ambiguus.
The vagal brake supports the low-metabolic requirements involved in the rapidly appearing and disappearing pain face. Withdrawal of the vagal brake is strongly correlated with the rapid appearance of the pain face; reinstatement of the vagal brake is strongly correlated with the rapid diminishing of the pain face. These correlations are not unique to pain facial expression; similar relationships hold with regard to the vagal brake and the timing and duration of aversive, but non-noxious emotional facial expressions (e.g., Pu et al. 2010), and positive emotional facial expressions (e.g., Kok & Fredrickson, 2010).
In terms of the function of rapid pain face onset and offset, the vagal brake makes it possible for the individual in pain to quickly disengage from source of wounding and pain, concurrent with the rapid appearance or diminishing of pain facial expression, which may offer temporary access to additional metabolic resources to aid healing, recovery and self-soothing behaviors, with likely involvement from care givers.
Concerning aid from others, the vagal brake reliably maps onto specific interaction types observed in mammalian pain events. In pain events comprising the individual in pain and care givers, mammalian behavior is typed according to interpersonal communication through facial expressions, vocalizations, head and hand gestures (Hadjistavropoulos et al. 2011; Porges, 2001, 2006; Williams, 2002). A relevant feature is the rapid 'switching' of temporary engagement to temporary disengagement behaviors between the individual in pain and care givers. This interaction type may involve care givers speaking to the one in pain, and then quickly switching to listening; for the one in pain, looking into the face of the care giver, and then quickly switching to vocalizing (Craig et al. 2011; Hadjistavropoulos et al. 2011; Porges, 2001, 2006; Williams, 2002). The brain-heart-face mechanism thus allows the one in pain and the care giver to get the timing right. Some philosophers and neuroscientists claim that evolutionary neurobehavioral solutions to timing problems such as these are implicated in the origin of empathy and ultimately consciousness itself (Churchland, 2002; Cole, 1998; Engen & Singer, 2012; van Rysewyk, 2011).
However, if pain is severe or chronic and the vagal brake is withdrawn (or dysfunctional), the concurrency of increased pain facial expression, cardiac output, and other mobilization behaviors (i.e., increased SNS and HPA output), means that, if care giving is to succeed in promoting healing and recovery, the care giver's vagal brake must be dynamically reinstated. By applying their own vagal brake, care givers may regulate their own visceral distress and thereby succeed in allocating valuable metabolic resources to communicate safety to the one in pain (and themselves) through calming facial and head behaviors, eye gaze, and prosodic vocalizations (i.e., increasing the vagal brake decreases SNS and HPA output). Since the vagal brake of the person in pain has been provisionally withdrawn, the care giver is effectively an integrated external brain-heart-face mechanism (cf. Tantam, 2009, the 'interbrain').
Thus, the pain facial muscles function as neural timekeepers detecting and expressing features of safety and danger that cue the one in pain to quickly disengage from the source of wounding and pain, simultaneous with the rapid appearance or attenuation of pain facial activity, and also cue others who can help.
Chapman, C. R., Tuckett, R. P., & Song, C. W. (2008). Pain and stress in a systems perspective: reciprocal neural, endocrine, and immune interactions. Journal of Pain, 9(2), 122-145.
Churchland, P. S. (1989). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Cole, J. (1998) About face. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Craig, K. D., & Patrick, C. J. (1985). Facial expression during induced pain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48(4), 1080-1091.
Craig, K. D., Prkachin, K. M., & Grunau, R. E. (2011). .The facial expression of pain. In D. C. Turk, & R. Melzack, Handbook of Pain Assessment, 2nd Edition (pp. 117-133). New York: The Guilford Press.
Engen, H. G., & Singer, T. (2012). Empathy circuits. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 23, 1-8.
Hadjistavropoulos, T., Craig, K. D., Duck, S., Cano, A., Goubert, L., Jackson, P. L., Mogil, J. S., Rainville, P., Sullivan, M. J. L., de C. Williams, Amanda C., Vervoort, T., & Fitzgerald, T. D. (2011). A biopsychosocial formulation of pain communication. Psychological Bulletin, 137(6), 910-939.
Kok, B. E., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2010). Upward spirals of the heart: Autonomic flexibility, as indexed by vagal tone, reciprocally and prospectively predicts positive emotions and social connectedness. Biological Psychology, 85(3), 432-436.
Kunz, M., Lautenbacher, S., LeBlanc, N., & Rainville, P. (2011). Are both the sensory and the affective dimensions of pain encoded in the face? Pain, 153(2), 350-358.
Morecraft, R. J., Stilwell-Morecraft, K. S., & Rossing, W. R. (2004). The Motor Cortex and Facial Expression: New Insights From Neuroscience. The Neurologist, 10(5), 235-249.
Porges, S. W. (2001). The polyvagal theory: phylogenetic substrates of a social nervous system. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 42(2), 123-146.
Porges, S. W. (2006). Emotion: An Evolutionary By‐Product of the Neural Regulation of the Autonomic Nervous System. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 807(1), 62-77.
Pu, J., Schmeichel, B. J., & Demaree, H. A. (2010). Cardiac vagal control predicts spontaneous regulation of negative emotional expression and subsequent cognitive performance. Biological Psychology, 84(3), 531-540.
van Rysewyk, S. (2011). Beyond faces: The relevance of Moebius Syndrome to emotion recognition and empathy. In: A. Freitas-Magalhães (Ed.), 'Emotional Expression: The Brain and the Face' (V. III, Second Series), University of Fernando Pessoa Press, Oporto: pp. 75-97.
Williams, A. C. D. C. (2002). Facial expression of pain: an evolutionary account. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(4), 439-455.
The official scientific definition of pain was initially formulated in the 1980s by a committee organized by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP). This definition was updated in the 1990s by the IASP to reflect advancements in pain science and has since been widely accepted by the scientific community:
Pain: An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.
Note:The inability to communicate verbally does not negate the possibility that an individual is experiencing pain and is in need of appropriate pain-relieving treatment. Pain is always subjective. Each individual learns the application of the word through experiences related to injury in early life. Biologists recognize that those stimuli which cause pain are liable to damage tissue. Accordingly, pain is that experience we associate with actual or potential tissue damage. It is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional experience. Experiences which resemble pain but are not unpleasant, e.g., pricking, should not be called pain. Unpleasant abnormal experiences (dysesthesias) may also be pain but are not necessarily so because, subjectively, they may not have the usual sensory qualities of pain. Many people report pain in the absence of tissue damage or any likely pathophysiological cause; usually this happens for psychological reasons. There is usually no way to distinguish their experience from that due to tissue damage if we take the subjective report. If they regard their experience as pain, and if they report it in the same ways as pain caused by tissue damage, it should be accepted as pain. This definition avoids tying pain to the stimulus. Activity induced in the nociceptor and nociceptive pathways by a noxious stimulus is not pain, which is always a psychological state, even though we may well appreciate that pain most often has a proximate physical cause (IASP-Task-Force-On-Taxonomy, 1994: 207-213).
An apparent immediate and inconvenient fact facing pain reductionism is that pain stubbornly resists identification with only the brain. The original pain identity statement, 'Pain = C-fibre activation' (Place, 1956), neglects two essential features of pain observed in contemporary pain science: (1) Conscious awareness of wounding is multimodal and is correlated with integrated visual, kinaesthetic, and enteric sensory modalities in addition to noxious signalling (e.g., Chapman et al. 2008); (2) Wounding is typically part of overall bodily awareness that is correlated with multiple reciprocal nervous, endocrine and immune states (e.g., Chapman et al. 2008; Lyon et al. 2011; van Rysewyk, 2013; Vierck et al. 2010). Convergent lines of evidence demonstrate that wounding followed by pain is strongly correlated with endocrine and immune operations as well as sensory signaling that together exert an extensive non-neural impact. These operations interact and comprise a defensive stress response to wounding [1].
A consideration of the higher structures of the central nervous system (CNS) alone reveals an extraordinarily complex picture of pain. Unimodal functional brain imaging studies of nociceptive transmission, projection and processing show that signals of wounding reach higher CNS levels via the spinothalamic, spinohypothalamic, spinoreticularpathways (i.e., the paleospinothalamic tract) including the locus caeruleus (LC) and the solitary nucleus, spinopontoamygdaloid pathways, the periaqueductal gray (PAG), and the cerebellum (e.g., Burstein et al. 1991; Price, 2000). The thalamus (THA) projects to limbic areas including the insula and anterior cingulate, which have been identified with the integration of the emotional and motivational features of pain (Craig, 2002, 2003a, 2003b). Noradrenergic pathways from the LC project to these and other limbic structures. Accordingly, pain reveals extensive limbic, prefrontal and somatosensory cortical components. A meta-analysis of the literature described brain operations during pain as a complex network involving THA, primary and secondary somatosensory cortices (S1, S2), insula (INS), anterior cingulate (ACC), and prefrontal cortices (Apkarian et al. 2005). Thus, the brain engages in massive, distributed, parallel processing in response to noxious signaling.
The mechanisms of multimodal integration pose a formidable challenge for pain scientists. Hollis et al. (2004) examined how catecholaminergic neurons in the solitary nucleus integrate visceral and somatosensory information when peripheral inflammation is present. Pre-existing fatigue, nausea, intense physiological arousal, and a systemic inflammatory response induced by proinflammatory cytokines (e.g., Anderson, 2005; Eskandari et al. 2003) are all correlated with sensory signalling in the experience of pain. In addition to Craig (2002, 2003a, 2003b), an increasing number of studies have investigated the integration of information from multiple sensory modalities and central operations correlated with emotion and cognition in pain (e.g., Bie et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2011; Neugebauer et al. 2009). The more we are able to delineate the qualia of pain and map these experiences onto specific multimodal physical operations, the closer we come to identifying pain with those operations.
So, why has Place's (1956) original pain identity statement survived in philosophy of mind? One reason is that the use of 'C-fibre activation' by identity philosophers is merely a placeholder for whatever the eventual mechanisms of nervous systems prove to be. We now know that wounding is identical to specific endocrine and immune operations in addition to sensory signaling. These operations interact and in concert comprise a defensive stress response to wounding. However, the purpose of calling it the identity theory of mind is to separate it from philosophical theories that identify mental states with states of immaterial souls or minds (dualism), abstract machine systems (functionalism), or those theories that reject the reality of mental states (eliminativism). It is not to make any substantive assumption about the sensory modality. This is why Place's (1956) pain identity claim of C-fibre activation has survived, despite being explanatorily incomplete.
[1]In clinical settings, problems of acute and chronic pain do not easily conform to pain-brain type identities. The persistence of chronic pain as a major problem in medicine may indicate that identifying pain with the brain ('pain in the brain') has failed to inform clinicians toward curative interventions (e.g., Chapman et al. 2008).
Anderson, J. (2005). The inflammatory reflex-introduction. Journal of Internal Medicine, 257(2), 122-125.
Apkarian, A. V., Bushnell, M. C., Treede, R. D., & Zubieta, J. K. (2005). Human brain mechanisms of pain perception and regulation in health and disease. European Journal of Pain, 9(4), 463-463.
Bie, B., Brown, D. L., & Naguib, M. (2011). Synaptic plasticity and pain aversion. European Journal of Pharmacology, 667(1), 26-31.
Burstein, R., Dado, R. J., Cliffer, K. D., & Giesler, G. J. (1991). Physiological characterization of spinohypothalamic tract neurons in the lumbar enlargement of rats. Journal of Neurophysiology, 66(1), 261-284.
Chapman, C. R., Tuckett, R. P., & Song, C. W. (2008). Pain and stress in a systems perspective: reciprocal neural, endocrine, and immune interactions. The Journal of Pain, 9(2), 122-145.
Craig, A. D. (2002). How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 3(8), 655-666.
Craig, A. D. (2003a). A new view of pain as a homeostatic emotion. Trends in Neurosciences, 26(6), 303-307.
Craig, A. D. (2003b). Pain mechanisms: labeled lines versus convergence in central processing. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 26, 1-30.
Eskandari, F., Webster, J. I., & Sternberg, E. M. (2003). Neural immune pathways and their connection to inflammatory diseases. Arthritis Research and Therapy, 5(6), 251-265.
IASP-Task-Force-On-Taxonomy (1994). IASP Pain Terminology. In H. Merskey & N. Bogduk (Eds.), Classification of Chronic Pain: Descriptions of Chronic Pain Syndromes and Definitions of Pain Terms (pp. 209-214). Seattle: IASP Press.
Liu, C. C., Shi, C. Q., Franaszczuk, P. J., Crone, N. E., Schretlen, D., Ohara, S., & Lenz, F. A. (2011). Painful laser stimuli induce directed functional interactions within and between the human amygdala and hippocampus. Neuroscience, 178, 208-217.
Lyon, P., Cohen, M., & Quintner, J. (2011). An Evolutionary Stress‐Response Hypothesis for Chronic Widespread Pain (Fibromyalgia Syndrome). Pain Medicine, 12(8), 1167-1178.
Neugebauer, V., Galhardo, V., Maione, S., & Mackey, S. C. (2009). Forebrain pain mechanisms. Brain Research Reviews, 60(1), 226.
Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
Price, D. D. (2000). Psychological and neural mechanisms of the affective dimension of pain. Science, 288(5472), 1769-1772.
van Rysewyk, S. (2013). Pain is Mechanism. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Tasmania.
Vierck, C. J., Green, M., & Yezierski, R. P. (2010). Pain as a stressor: effects of prior nociceptive stimulation on escape responding of rats to thermal stimulation. European Journal of Pain, 14(1), 11-16.
The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) defines pain as 'an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage' (Merskey & Bogduk, 1994). The IASP definition of pain is unique in that it explicitly recognizes that pain is an experience that can be understood in itself, in an internal way, in contrast to prior definitions (Sternbach, 1968; Mountcastle, 1974) that defined pain in terms of external causal stimuli that are correlated in some way with pain feelings and sensations.
External characterizations of pain based on neuroscientific findings remain influential in the pain literature. For example, according to a leading theory, pain feelings and sensations are externally related to a brain image of the 'afferent representation of the physiological condition of the body' (Craig, 2003). Interpreted philosophically, this view of pain is analogous to the traditional rational-metaphysical presupposition that feelings are but 'sensations or emotions of the soul which are related especially to it,' as Descartes put it, and thus are features only of the self and not of the world.
But pain is not only a personal feeling adhering to the self but that through my pain I am connected to a felt reality of the world. This world is not a world of causal reasons but a world that tonally flows in a certain direction and manner (Smith, 1986). When a sharp object is painfully cutting me, I experience a feeling of wincing back and away from the object, and in correlation with this feeling-flow the sharp object is felt to have a tonal-flow of flowing forwards, towards and into me in a piercing manner. When pain makes me fearful, I experience a feeling-flow of retreating backwards and away from the existent that is threatening me. The feeling flows backwards in a shrinking and cringing manner; I have the sensation of 'shrinking and cringing back from' the threatening existent. When my pain presents the quality of anxiety, my experience does not flow backwards as a 'retreat from', but has the directional sense of being suspended over an inner bottomlessness. The feeling flow of anxiety during pain is a flow that hovers before the possibility of flowing in a downward direction. When pain presents angry retaliation, I feel an angry 'striking back' towards the pain-affected body-part, and as such flows forwards, towards the limb at which I am angry. It flows forwards in a violently attacking manner. By virtue of correlated tonal and painful flows, the world and I are joined together in an extrarational and sensuously appreciative way.
Instead of only describing the external things to which pain is externally related, it is also possible to describe pain internally by noting other internal determinations of the feelings and sensations with which it is united. Joint internal-external characterizations of pain very roughly map onto neuroscientific evidence showing that our cutaneous nociceptive system differentiates into interoceptive and exteroceptive causal features, such that our interoceptive nociceptive system signals tissue disorders that are inescapable, and causes homeostatic responses, and our exteroceptive nociceptive system extracts meaningful information about events in the world in order to effect behaviors that protect the organism from external threats (Price et al. 2003).
Craig AD (2003). A new view of pain as a homeostatic emotion. Trends in neurosciences 26(6): 303–307.
Merskey H, Bogduk N (Eds) (1994). Classification of Chronic Pain (Second Ed.). IASP Press: Seattle, pp 209–214.
Mountcastle VB (1974). Pain and temperature sensibilities. Medical Physiology 13(1): 348–391.
Price DD, Greenspan JD, Dubner R (2003). Neurons involved in the exteroceptive function of pain. Pain, 106(3), 215–219.
Smith Q (1986).The felt meanings of the world: A metaphysics of feeling. Purdue University Press.
Sternbach RA (1968). Pain: A psychophysiological analysis. Academic Press: New York.
Dear Philosophers,
I invite you to complete a 5 minute survey to assess the status of the mind-brain identity theory in current professional philosophy. It is open to philosophy faculty members and philosophy graduate and undergraduate students.
In the survey, the mind-brain identity theory is represented as a list of 9 philosophical claims adapted with permission from Thomas W Polger's paper 'Are Sensations Still Brain Processes?' (2011), and which correspond to claims philosopher Jack Smart defended over fifty years ago in his paper 'Sensations are Brain Processes' (1959).
In the survey, each claim in the list is a binary 'yes/no' question. There are 9 questions. I will publish the results on my webblog and in an article.
Please click here to take the survey, thank you!
Simon van Rysewyk
Abstract. Functionalism of robot pain claims that what is definitive of robot pain is functional role, defined as the causal relations pain has to noxious stimuli, behavior and other subjective states. Here, I propose that the only way to theorize role-functionalism of robot pain is in terms of type-identity theory. I argue that what makes a state pain for a neuro-robot at a time is the functional role it has in the robot at the time, and this state is type identical to a specific circuit state. Support from an experimental study shows that if the neural network that controls a robot includes a specific 'emotion circuit', physical damage to the robot will cause the disposition to avoid movement, thereby enhancing fitness, compared to robots without the circuit. Thus, pain for a robot at a time is type identical to a specific circuit state.
UC Berkeley psychologist Tania Lombrozo has responded to the Annual Edge Question for 2014, 'What scientific idea is ready for retirement?', with a piece entitled 'The Mind is Just the Brain', in which she argues for the rejection ('retirement') of mind-brain identity theory.
Using a baking analogy to illustrate her case against reductionism, she writes:
But a theory of baking wouldn't be very useful if it were formulated in terms of molecules and atoms. As bakers, we want to understand the relationship between—for example—mixing and texture, not between kinetic energy and protein hydration. The relationships between the variables we can tweak and the outcomes that we care about happen to be mediated by chemistry and physics, but it would be a mistake to adopt "cake reductionism" and replace the study of baking with the study of physical and chemical interactions among cake components.
But if you are interested in the project of explaining, predicting, and controlling the quality of your baked goods, then you'll need something like a baking theory to work with.
Rejecting the mind in an effort to achieve scientific legitimacy—a trend we've seen with both behaviorism and some popular manifestations of neuroscience—is unnecessary and unresponsive to the aims of scientific psychology.
In these passages, Lombrozo makes a common anti-reductionistic mistake of thinking that mind-brain identity makes mental experiences somehow unreal or even disappear. Her reasoning implies that a correct explanation of mental phenomena cannot involve scientific reduction of mental phenomenon to neurobiological mechanism. This misunderstanding trades on a peculiar view of reduction, where it is expected that in neuroscience, mind-brain identities eliminate mental experiences. I think this expectation is incorrect.
Temperature was ontologically reduced to mean molecular kinetic energy, but no person expects that temperature therefore ceased to be real or became scientifically disrespectable or redundant. Visible light was ontologically reduced to electromagnetic radiation, but light did not disappear. Instead, scientists understand more about the real nature of light than they did before 1873. Light is real, no doubt; and so is temperature. Some expectations about the nature of temperature and light did change, and scientific progress does occasionally require rethinking what was believed about phenomenon. In certain instances, previously respectable states and substances sometimes did prove to be unreal. The caloric theory of heat did not survive rigorous experimental testing; caloric fluid thus proved to be unreal. A successful mind-brain identity of mental phenomenon such as pain means only that there is an explanation of pain. It is a reduction. Scientific explanations of phenomenon do not typically make them disappear [1,2,3].
It is critical to clear-up a further common misconception about mind-brain identity theory. This is the misconception that mind-brain identity theory is equivalent to reductionism. The truth is that whereas identity theory is compatible with a wide range of reductionistic philosophies, it is not equivalent to all of them. Here are some illustrative examples [4]:
1) Identity theory is reductionistic in the sense that it denies minds are ontologically independent of brains and uniquely self-guaranteeing, in line with functionalist and realization (physicalist) philosophies of mind. But functionalism and realization physicalism are not equivalent to the identity theory, so identity theory is not uniquely reductionist in the sense of (1).
2) Identity theory is reductionistic in the minimal sense that it claims, in line with functionalist and realization (physicalist) philosophies, that mind is 'nothing over and above' the brain, but since identity theory and functionalist and realization philosophies are not equivalent, identity theory is not equivalent to reductionism. A philosopher could be a reductionist without being an identity theorist.
3) Identity theory is not reductionistic in the sense that it asserts 'micro-reductionism'. Mental phenomena might be identified with innate genetic or molecular mechanisms (John Bickle), but this is optional, not required. The core metaphysical commitment of identity theory is that mental states are numerically identical to brain states. Nothing is expected in this core claim about the precise mechanistic nature of brain states, which is a scientific question, anyway.
4) Identity theory is not reductionistic in the sense that it asserts that (e.g.) psychology reduces to neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience reduces to molecular neuroscience, or philosophy of mind reduces to quantum mechanics. One can assert identity theory without asserting epistemic reductionism.
Positively, I entirely agree with Lombrozo when she says:
But if we want to know—for instance—how to influence minds to achieve particular behaviors, it would be a mistake to look for explanations solely at the level of the brain.
Understanding the mind isn't the same as understanding the brain.
Understanding the mind requires first-person descriptions of mental states and experiences, and third-person scientific descriptions of associated brain states, and a method to integrate them, such as the experiential-phenomenological method [5]. So, Lombrozo is right: 'Understanding the mind isn't the same as understanding the brain.' More precisely, I argue that her correct thesis implies that the subject matter of psychology is brain mechanism as related to mental phenomena. For example, the subject of pain science is brain mechanism as related to pain phenomena (e.g., acute pain, chronic pain, fetal pain, empathy for pain, dreamed pain, near-death pain, and so on). Pain research aims to discover the brain mechanisms subserving conscious pain experiences accessible only through introspection, which means that pain research is entirely reliant on the first-person point of view and on using first-person investigative methods. This necessarily includes introspection together with third-person methods (e.g., neuroimaging). Since pain research aims to know which experience types are generated by which brain mechanism, researchers must naturally know when specific pain experiences occur and what their personal qualities are.
The history of scientific pain research shows that introspection has been extensively used. For example, pain psychophysics typically uses subject pain verbal-report or non-verbal behavior (e.g., facial expressions) to infer the presence of pain. That is, pain psychophysics is committed to subject introspection. It is also important to remember that the validity of pain-related neuroimaging was established by the correlation of brain images with self-report of pain [6]. Pain psychophysics, like psychology, preserves an epistemological dualism in its subject matter while rejecting metaphysical dualism.
How then is mind-brain identity theory positioned relative to the indispensability of introspection in mind science? Personal introspection is a direct way of coming to know about personal experiences and their qualities. It is epistemological. Still, despite appearances to the contrary, what introspection reveals to us may be utterly mechanistic. It may be that what scientists study through third-person methods is numerically identical with what is personally experienced through introspection, that is, brain mechanisms of the appropriate type. There is only one type of activity in question: the brain mechanism with all and only physical properties. Thus, mind-brain identity theory is preserved in the study of the mind.
[1] Churchland PM (2007). Neurophilosophy at work. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
[2] Churchland PS (1989). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-brain. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
[3] van Rysewyk S (2013). Pain is Mechanism. PhD Dissertation, University of Tasmania.
[4] Polger TW (2009). Identity Theories. Philosophy Compass, 4(5), 822-834.
[5] Price DD, Aydede M (2006). The Experimental Use of Introspection in the Scientific Study of Pain and its Integration with Third-Person Methodologies: The Experiential-Phenomenological Approach. In M Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, pp. 243-275. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[6] Coghill RC, McHaffie JG, Yen YF (2003). Neural correlates of interindividual differences in the subjective experience of pain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA, 100, 8538-8542.
The trend in the literature on fetal pain is to approach the question of consciousness in the fetus in terms of conscious states of pain. That is, first define what makes a pain a conscious mental state, and then determine being a conscious fetus in terms of having such a state. Thus, the possibility of a conscious fetus is thought to rely on theories of conscious pain states. Call this the state approach to fetal pain.
Two state approaches to fetal pain are present in the literature. One approach looks at the brain structure(s), pathways and circuits necessary for conscious pain states and then seeks to establish whether this substrate is present and functional in the fetus. There is broad agreement among researchers that the minimal necessary neural pathways for pain are in the human fetus by 24 weeks gestation [1, for review]. Some researchers argue that the fetus can feel pain earlier than 24 weeks because pain is enabled by subcortical brain structures [4,5,6].
Another phenomenal approach is to consider the subjective content of a conscious experience of pain, and to ask whether that content might be available to the fetus [1,2,3]. Based on this approach, some researchers argue that the fetus cannot feel pain at any stage because it lacks developmental abilities and concepts such as sense of self necessary for pain [1,2,3].
Although both state approaches are presented as opposites in the literature, they share the determination of fetal pain based on specific levels or degrees of complexity, whether of the brain structures and the relationship they have to the conscious state of pain, or of the subjective contents that constitute that state.
An alternate approach to understanding fetal consciousness that has not been explored in the literature on fetal pain is the extent to which pain is based on the arrangement of certain brain structures (or experiential contents), rather than a result of maturation or increase in complexity achieved by growth of the brain substrate which below a certain size does not enable consciousness [7,8]. Thus, whether the fetus is excluded in this regard is not due to its simplicity, but because its lack of certain brain arrangements necessary to enable consciousness.
According to this alternate view of fetal pain, a living creature's subjective contents may differ greatly in complexity. To convey the range of conscious possibilities, consider the Indian 'scale of sentience' (cited in [8]):
'This is so.'
'I am affected by this which is so.'
'So this is I who am affected by this which is so.'
The possibilities in this consciousness scale range from simply experienced sensation ('This'; 'This is so') to self-consciousness ('I am affected by this which is so'; 'So this is I who am affected by this which is so'). Each stage in this scale presupposes consciousness. Any experience, whatever its degree of complexity, is conscious. It follows that to see, to hear, and to feel is to be conscious, irrespective of whether in addition a creature is self-conscious that it is seeing, hearing, and feeling [7]. To feel pain is to be conscious of that experience regardless of whether in addition one is self-conscious of being in pain. Self-consciousness is just one of many contents of consciousness available to big-brained living creatures with complex capacities: it is not definitive of consciousness [7,8]. The point of saying this is that it circumvents the logical mistake of misidentifying attributes unique to a specialized form of consciousness (e.g., self-consciousness) as general features of consciousness itself.
With this alternate view of consciousness now sketched in, we should determine where the fetus and where pain fall in the Indian scale of sentience. The possibilities in the scale extend from mere sensation to self-consciousness–where does the fetus fall in?
[1] Derbyshire S, Raja A. (2011). On the development of painful experience.Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18, 9–10.
[2] Derbyshire SW. (2006). Controversy: Can fetuses feel pain?. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 332(7546), 909.
[3] Szawarski Z. (1996). Do fetuses feel pain? Probably no pain in the absence of "self". BMJ: British Medical Journal, 313(7060), 796–797.
[4] Anand KJ, Hickey PR. (1987). Pain and its effects in the human neonate and fetus. New England Journal of Medicine, 317(21), 1321–1329.
[5] Anand KJ. (2007). Consciousness, cortical function, and pain perception in nonverbal humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(01), 82–83.
[6] Lowery CL, Hardman MP, Manning N, Clancy B, Whit Hall R, Anand KJS. (2007). Neurodevelopmental changes of fetal pain. In Seminars in perinatology (Vol. 31, No. 5, pp. 275–282).
[7] Merker B. (1997). The common denominator of conscious states: Implications for the biology of consciousness. Available at: http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk.
[8] Merker B. (2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex, a challenge
for neuroscience and medicine. Target article with peer commentary and author's response. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 63–134.
In this first post of a series, I describe and challenge several criticisms of reductive materialism, or mind-brain identity theory [5,6,7,8,9,10], made by psychologist Max Velmans. My focus in this post concerns Velmans's arguments against mind-brain identity theory as presented in 'What non-eliminative materialism needs to show' in Appendix I of [4]. Future posts will address his other arguments against mind-brain identity theory as presented in the same work. My intention here is not simply negative, but also positive: using the first-person third-person distinction Velmans appeals to, I propose that the first-person point of view (introspection) and first-person methods are necessary to consciousness science. In developing this view, I focus mostly on pain.
Velmans is a long-time critic of materialist theories of phenomenal consciousness [1,2,3,4]. Following philosopher CD Broad, Velmans distinguishes three versions of materialism: radical, reductive and emergent. He writes [4]:
Radical materialism claims that the term "consciousness" does not refer to anything real (in contemporary philosophy this position is usually called "eliminativism"). Reductive materialism accepts that consciousness does refer to something real, but science will discover that real thing to be nothing more than a state (or function) of the brain. Emergentism also accepts the reality of consciousness but claims it to be a higher-order property of brains; it supervenes on neural activity, but cannot be reduced to it. [4,20]
Velmans begins his argument against mind-body identity theory:
Let us assume that, in some sense, our conscious experiences are real. To each and every one of us, our conscious experiences are observable phenomena (psychological data) which we can describe with varying degrees of accuracy in ordinary language. Other people's experiences might be hypothetical constructs, as we cannot observe their experiences in the direct way that we can observe our own, but that does not make our own experiences similarly hypothetical. Nor are our own conscious experiences "theories" or "folk psychologies." We may have everyday theories about what we experience, and with deeper insight, we might be able to improve them, but this would not replace, or necessarily improve the experiences themselves. [4,20-21]
In this passage, Velmans denies that our conscious experiences are 'theories' or 'folk psychologies.' However, since that is a central claim made by radical materialism ('eliminativism') [5,6], not reductive materialism (mind-brain identity theory), Velmans is in error to attribute it to the latter. Like mind-brain identity theory, eliminativism accepts the claim that conscious states are 'nothing over and above' brain states (minimal reductionism), but it rejects type identity. This is because eliminativism denies that conscious states are real, and do not exist [10]. By contrast, mind-brain identity theory is realist about mental states and experiences [10]. Mind-brain identity theory is not equivalent to eliminativism [10] (1).
The final sentence in the quote above reads: 'We may have everyday theories about what we experience, and with deeper insight, we might be able to improve them, but this would not replace, or necessarily improve the experiences themselves.'[my italics] Critics of mind-brain identity theory, like Velmans, believe that a successful scientific reduction of consciousness would make all conscious experiences somehow unreal or even disappear [e.g., 17,18]. Using this conception of reduction, it is then reasoned that because it is observably obvious that a conscious experience like pain is real, it cannot be reduced by science to neurobiological mechanism. This misunderstanding trades on a peculiar view of reduction, where it is expected that in science, type identity claims make conscious experiences disappear. I think this expectation is incorrect.
Temperature was ontologically reduced to mean molecular kinetic energy, but no person expects that temperature therefore ceased to be real or became scientifically disrespectable or redundant. Visible light was ontologically reduced to electromagnetic radiation, but light did not disappear. Instead, scientists understand more about the real nature of light than they did before 1873. Light is real, no doubt; and so is temperature. Some expectations about the nature of temperature and light did change, and scientific progress does occasionally require rethinking what was believed about phenomenon. In certain instances, previously respectable states and substances sometimes did prove to be unreal. The caloric theory of heat did not survive rigorous experimental testing; caloric fluid thus proved to be unreal. Thus, a successful type identity of pain with mechanism means only that there is an explanation of pain. It is a reduction. But, scientific explanations of phenomenon do not typically make them disappear [5,6,10].
Velmans continues his argument:
In essence then, the claim that conscious experiences are nothing more than brain states is a claim about one set of phenomena (first-person experiences of love, hate, the smell of mown grass, the colour of a sunset, etc.) being nothing more than another set of phenomena (brain states, viewed from the perspective of an external observer). Given the extensive, apparent differences between conscious experiences and brain states this is a tall order. [4,21]
By characterizing mind-brain identity theory as a 'tall order', Velmans is in danger of begging the question. It is possible that science will never understand how brain structures such as neurons and protein channels produce pains, emotions and thoughts. The reality of the brain may be forever closed to us. Still, that the problem of consciousness is scientifically tractable or intractable, solvable or insolvable, is impossible to tell simply by noting appearances, since problems do not rank level of difficulty on their sleeves. Why should the problem of consciousness be any different?
Besides, things change. Over time, the nature of a problem may alter shape as new knowledge and understanding arrive. A problem may come to be viewed in novel ways as a result of reciprocal developments in technology, scientific methods and theory. For example, the composition of stars was regarded by scientists as an intractable problem. The problem was that it was impossible to get close enough to collect a star sample without burning up. However, with the unexpected discovery of spectral analysis, this problem proved tractable. The elements of stars were found to produce a type of fingerprint when heated to incandescence, easily observed when light produced from a source is passed through a prism.
In the early twentieth century, the copying problem in molecular genetics was thought to be intractable. This problem, however, was solved in the decades following Watson and Crick's 1953 publication that DNA is a double helix. By contrast, the problem of how protein molecules fold into their 3D shape once made, believed by many scientists to be solvable in the mid-twentieth century, remains entirely unsolved today despite many decades of effort. Moreover, contributing solutions to twenty-first century problems can come from surprising and novel sources that may challenge conventional thinking. What seems apparently true or observably obvious during immediate experience or armchair reflection is sometimes a poor guide to reality.
Velmans again:
Instances where phenomena viewed from one perspective turned out to be one and the same as seemingly different phenomena viewed from another perspective do occur in the history of science. A classical example is the way the "morning star" and the "evening star" turned out to be identical (they were both found to be the planet Venus). But viewing consciousness from a first- versus a third-person perspective is very different to seeing the same planet in the morning or the evening. From a third-person (external observer's) perspective one has no direct access to a subject's conscious experience. Consequently, one has no third-person data (about the experience itself) which can be compared to or contrasted with the subject's first-person data. [4,21]
It is unclear what Velmans means by 'From a third-person (external observer's) perspective one has no direct access to a subject's conscious experience.' I presume he intends that what I experience during a conscious episode cannot be available to you or indeed any one else in the way it is directly available to me. I occupy a uniquely privileged position concerning my experience that no one else can occupy. But if so, then he is intuitively characterizing the problem of consciousness in terms of method of access, and in terms of a privileged mode of access at that, namely, 'direct' personal introspection, which is question-begging.
This intuitive take on the problem of consciousness also results in a misrepresentation of what science is really up to, since the scientific enterprise relies on the intersubjective availability of its subject matter, in that no one is privileged with regard to collecting evidence about the object of the study. This means that no one has any special epistemic authority over evidence that others cannot in principle understand. In principle, must a successful reduction of pain produce a scientific explanation and pain? Obviously, no – scientific pain research aims to explain pain; it is not in the business of spontaneously concocting the phenomenon in question. To think otherwise is to misrepresent the limits and possibilities of science [5,6,10].
Now, there is a positive characterization of Velmans's appeal to the first-person and third-person distinction I wish to show. Velmans's description of the consciousness landscape should be taken to imply that the subject matter of consciousness research is brain mechanism as related to conscious phenomena. For example, the subject of pain science is brain mechanism as related to pain phenomena (e.g., acute pain, chronic pain, fetal pain, empathy for pain, dreamed pain, near-death pain, and so on). Consciousness research aims to discover the brain mechanisms subserving conscious experiences accessible only through introspection, which means that consciousness research is entirely reliant on the first-person point of view and on using first-person investigative methods. Contrary to Velmans's view, this necessarily includes introspection together with third-person methods (e.g., neuroimaging). Since consciousness research aims to know which experience types are generated by which brain mechanism, researchers must naturally know when specific conscious experiences occur and what their personal qualities are. Which means that introspection is indispensable to consciousness research.
The history of scientific pain research clearly shows that introspection has been extensively used. For example, pain psychophysics typically uses subject pain verbal-report or non-verbal behavior (e.g., facial expressions) to infer the presence of pain. That is, pain psychophysics is committed to subject introspection. It is also important to remember that the validity of pain-related neuroimaging was established by the correlation of brain images with self-report of pain [19].
Finally, Velmans:
Neurophysiological investigations are limited, in principle, to isolating the neural correlates or antecedent causes of given experiences. This would be a major scientific advance. But what would it tell us about the nature of consciousness itself? [4,21]
I will respond to Velmans's question with my own: how is mind-brain identity theory positioned relative to the indispensability of introspection to consciousness research? As Velmans notes, introspection is a direct way of coming to know about personal experiences and their qualities. It is an epistemological activity. Still, despite appearances to the contrary or personal conviction, what introspection reveals to us may be utterly mechanistic. It may be that what neuroscientists study through third-person methods is type identical with what is personally experienced through introspection, that is, brain mechanisms of the appropriate type. There is only one type of activity in question: the brain mechanism with all and only physical properties.
Mind-brain identity theory follows a long line of identifications that have marked progress in knowledge: water is H2O, light is electromagnetic energy, lightning is electrical discharge, influenza is a viral infection, and so on. Each of these identities is part of a larger theory that was accepted because it provided a better explanation of the evidence than rival theories. To illustrate this claim, take the conventional example of the type identity of fire and rapid oxidation. Why is this type identification descriptive (i.e., informative)? The first step is to conduct a qualitative investigation of fire. The flame is the visible part of fire, it releases heat and light, is normally sustained by a continuous supply of fuel, and so on. Some qualitative facts about fire are easily observed and others take further investigation, for instance, facts about the reactions that make fire explode. This provides a provisional description of fire. These qualitative descriptions (facts) about fire are then matched with qualitative descriptions (facts) about the operation of rapid oxidation, which is the sequence of chemical reactions between a fuel and an oxidant, such as oxygen or fluorine gas. These facts are harder to describe but essential. When sufficient information is at hand concerning the parts and operations of fire and the parts and operations of specific chemical reactions (rapid oxidation), we can describe how the structure of fire delineates its qualitative chemical properties. The multilevel mechanistic description of fire type identifies it with a specific mechanism type, rapid oxidation, and describes its behavior in terms of the behavior and composition of this mechanical operation. Fire is rapid oxidation.
The type identification of fire and rapid oxidation is only enabled if other substances are also type identified with other molecules, and if elements are type identified with chemical types, and so on. That is, the type identity of fire and rapid oxidation works because it is framed in the broader descriptive context of chemistry and physics. Those general framework theories imply the type identifications. Of course, the type identification of fire and rapid oxidation might be faulted as an incorrect description, perhaps because the physical operations involve activity in a broader range of physical processes. But that criticism merely asserts a different type identity description, and does not challenge type identity claims per se. It is conceivable to ponder whether fire is correctly type identified with rapid oxidation rather than with some other operation; but within the framework of chemistry and physics as they are understood, it is not reasonable to ponder whether fire might fail to be any type of mechanical operation at all.
In the same way, mind-brain identity theory is part of a rich theory that aims to explain conscious and unconscious mental phenomena such as perception, memory, reasoning, addiction, and disease. The personal experience of pain is multidimensional and involves specific sensory, emotional and cognitive features. I think there is a well established multilevel view of the physiological mechanisms that best describes pain qualities. This mechanistic description is framed within the context of advancing theories of the nervous, endocrine and immune systems and their complex functional interdependencies. There are also complex adaptive system-based descriptions of pain experience. Taken together, these descriptions reveal how pain is type identified with mechanism [10].
Although empirical progress in the understanding of pain is typically gradual and piecemeal, the type identification of pain with brain mechanism does not proceed in an additive manner. Pain scientists do not discover one pain type identity at a time and then add them together. Rather, what justifies claims to have type identified the mechanisms of pain is the way the entire multilevel mechanistic package coheres [10].
1. Briefly, the central argument for eliminativism is the idea that we use a theoretical framework to explain and predict human behavior [11], usually called the theory-theory (TT). TT views folk psychology (FP) as comprising specific theoretical claims and generalizations (and laws), described by our everyday common-sense psychological (i.e., mental) words such as 'belief', 'desire', 'recognition', 'fear', 'anticipate', 'memory' or 'pain'. FP generalizations are thought to describe the diverse causal regularities and relations of FP claims.
TT claims that FP generalizations and claims operate in FP much like the generalizations and laws of scientific theories. However, the laws of FP are acquired more informally than scientific theories, as part of normal human development [e.g., 12,13,14,15]. For example, children who observe their parents showing fear and behavioral avoidance to back-stressing tasks, such as lifting heavy objects, may adjust their understanding of that situation ('back-stressing tasks are dangerous and can cause pain') and the behavioral effects ('avoidance of back-stressing tasks generally reduces pain') based on the generalization 'Since back-stressing tasks can cause pain, and avoidance of these tasks generally reduces pain, it is best to avoid such tasks' [16].
[1] Velmans, M. (2000). Understanding Consciousness. London: Routledge/Psychology Press.
[2] Velmans M. (2001a). A natural account of phenomenal consciousness. Consciousness and Communication, 34(1&2), 39-59.
[3] Velmans M. (2001b). Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology: A dialogue with Dan Dennett. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/17/95/index.html.
[4] Velmans M. (2002). How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9(11), 3-29.
[5] Churchland PM. (2007). Neurophilosophy at work. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
[6] Churchland PS. (1989). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind-brain. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
[7] Place UT. (1956). Is Consciousness a Brain Process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50.
[8] Polger TW. (2004). Natural minds. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
[9] Smart JJC. (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes. Philosophical Review, 68, 141-156.
[10] van Rysewyk S. (2013). Pain is Mechanism. PhD Dissertation, University of Tasmania.
[11] Sellars W. (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, 1, 253-329.
[12] Churchland PM. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90.
[13] Hardcastle VG. (1999). The Myth of Pain. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[14] Roth M. (2012). Folk psychology as science. Synthese, 189(4), 1-12.
[15] Stich S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
[16] Goubert L, Vlaeyen JW, Crombez G, & Craig KD. (2011). Learning about pain from others: an observational learning account. The Journal of Pain, 12(2), 167-174.
[17] Chalmers D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[18] Searle JR. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
[19] Coghill RC, McHaffie JG, Yen YF. (2003). Neural correlates of interindividual differences in the subjective experience of pain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA, 100, 8538-8542.
There is broad agreement among researchers that the minimal necessary neural pathways for pain are in the human fetus by 24 weeks gestation [1, for review]. However, some argue that the fetus can feel pain earlier than 24 weeks because pain can be enabled by subcortical brain structures [2,3,4,5]. Other researchers argue that the fetus cannot feel pain at any stage of gestation because the fetus is sustained in a state of unconsciousness [6]. Finally, others argue that the fetus cannot feel pain at any stage because the fetus lacks the conceptual postnatal development necessary for pain [7,8,9]. If a behavioral and neural reaction to a noxious stimulus is considered sufficient for pain then pain is possible from 24 weeks and probably much earlier. If a conceptual subjectivity is considered necessary for pain, however, then pain is not possible at any gestational age. According to [1], much of the disagreement concerning fetal pain rests on the understanding of key terms such as 'wakefulness', 'conscious' and 'pain'.
A motivation for thinking conceptual subjectivity is necessary for pain is the idea that subjective experiences such as pain cannot be reduced to or identified with the objective features of the brain [7,8,9]. All pains are personal experiences and therefore entirely subjective; all brain states are physical events and therefore entirely objective. There is a fundamental divergence between pain and the brain. Thus, pain cannot be in the brain. The basic argument:
1. Pain experiences are subjective.
2. Brain events are objective.
Therefore, since pain experiences and brain events fundamentally diverge,
3. Pain experiences are not identical to brain events.
Is this a good argument? Let's examine its first premise – 'pain experiences are subjective.' On a reasonable interpretation of its meaning, to state that 'pain experiences are subjective' is to state that pain experiences are knowable by introspection. However, since brain events are not knowable by introspection, pain experiences cannot be identical to brain events. Here is the argument:
1. Pain experiences are knowable to me by introspection.
2. Brain events are not knowable to me by introspection.
Therefore, since pain experiences and brain events fundamentally diverge,
3. My pain experiences are not identical to any of my brain events.
Once the argument is represented in this form, it is clear that it is fallacious. This can be clearly observed if we compare the argument with the following example:
1. Ibuprofen is known to me to relieve pain.
2. Iso-butyl-propanoic-phenolic acid is not known by me to relieve pain.
Therefore, since ibuprofen and iso-butyl-propanoic-phenolic acid fundamentally diverge,
3. Ibuprofen cannot be identical to iso-butyl-propanoic-phenolic acid.
The premises in the example are true, but the conclusion is known to be false. The argument is fallacious because the core idea of the argument – 'fundamental divergence' – makes an erroneous assumption; namely, it assumes that a thing must be known by somebody. But the property 'being known by somebody' is not a necessary feature of any thing, much less a property that might establish its identity or non-identity with some thing otherwise known. The truth of the premises may be due to nothing else but my ignorance of what turns out to be identical with what. These considerations challenge the assumed epistemology in the conceptual subjectivity view of pain.
They also challenge the related claim made by proponents of conceptual subjectivity that any description of a pain given in objective scientific terms will necessarily always exclude the personal experience of that pain [7,8,9]. The argument made here is by now familiar: since descriptions of pain in personal subjective terms are different from scientific descriptions of pain, it follows that a pain and its private subjectivity cannot be identical with a brain event and its public objectivity. Only persons can feel pain – brain cells and protein channels can't. Clearly, the argument begs the issue in question: whether or not the subjective features of a pain I personally experience are identical with some objective features of my brain that might be discovered by neuroscience is precisely the question at issue [10,11].
Besides, in order to understand a scientific explanation of pain, neuroscience does not require of a person that he both understands the explanation and feels pain as a condition of understanding. Neuroscience aims to explain pain, that is its main purpose. Too much is demanded of neuroscience if, in addition to formulating an explanation of pain, it is meant to re-create pain in somebody as a requirement of understanding [10,11]. This expectation is therefore much too strong.
[1] Derbyshire SWG, Raja A. (2011). On the development of painful experience.Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18, 9–10.
[2] Anand KJ, Hickey PR. (1987). Pain and its effects in the human neonate and fetus. New England Journal of Medicine, 317(21), 1321–1329.
[3] Anand KJ. (2007). Consciousness, cortical function, and pain perception in nonverbal humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(1), 82–83.
[4] Lowery CL, Hardman MP, Manning N, Clancy B, Whit Hall R, Anand KJS. (2007). Neurodevelopmental changes of fetal pain. In Seminars in perinatology, 31(5), 275–282.
[5] Merker B. (2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex, a challenge
for neuroscience and medicine. Target article with peer commentary and author's response. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 63–134.
[6] Mellor DJ, Diesch TJ, Gunn AJ, Bennet L. (2005). The importance of 'awareness' for understanding fetal pain. Brain research reviews, 49(3), 455-471.
[7] Derbyshire SWG. (2012). Fetal analgesia: where are we now? Future Neurology, 7(4), 367-369.
[8] Derbyshire SWG. (2006). Controversy: Can fetuses feel pain? BMJ: British Medical Journal, 332(7546), 909.
[9] Szawarski Z. (1996). Do fetuses feel pain? Probably no pain in the absence of "self". BMJ: British Medical Journal, 313(7060), 796–797.
[10] Churchland PS. (2002). Brain-wise: V: Studies in Neurophilosophy. MIT press.
[11] van Rysewyk S. (2013). Pain is Mechanism. PhD Dissertation, University of Tasmania.


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|"V.Narayanan (JIRA)" <j...@apache.org>
|[jira] Updated: (DERBY-2604) Implement Clob support for locators
|Sat, 26 May 2007 16:23:16 GMT
[ https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2604?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ] V.Narayanan updated DERBY-2604: ------------------------------- Attachment: ClobLocatorWork_v5.stat ClobLocatorWork_v5.diff This patch addresses the bugs that were found during the process of enabling Clob support for locators. It contains within itself the changes made in v4 and the changes as explained in the comments above. The following are the details of the details of the files modified and their import apropos the context. M java/client/org/apache/derby/client/am/ClobLocatorWriter.java writeCharacters(line no 162) method was using c.length as the length of the string transmitted to the server using the clobSetString stored procedure. This should use len instead. M java/client/org/apache/derby/client/am/Clob.java The PositionX method on the client that accepts a Clob had not been converted to use locators. This has been done. Added buffering for InputStreams by wrapping ClobLocatorInputStream in a BufferedInputStream and ClobLocatorReader in a BufferedReader. M java/client/org/apache/derby/client/am/CallableLocatorProcedures.java The stored procedure call to CLOBGETPOSITIONFROMSTRING was sending the original string instead of sending it in chunks. This has been changed to send the chunks instead (stringToBeCompared). M java/client/org/apache/derby/client/am/ClobLocatorInputStream.java M java/client/org/apache/derby/client/am/ClobLocatorReader.java Converted the locator streams to use maxPos in the same way this is done in BlobLocatorInputStream. I have not run junit All on the patch yet. I will run the tests and revert back with the results. Please consider v5 for reviews and comments. > Implement Clob support for locators > ----------------------------------- > > Key: DERBY-2604 > URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2604 > Project: Derby > Issue Type: Sub-task > Components: Network Server > Reporter: V.Narayanan > Assigned To: V.Narayanan > Attachments: ClobLocatorWork_v1.diff, ClobLocatorWork_v1.stat, ClobLocatorWork_v2.diff, ClobLocatorWork_v2.stat, ClobLocatorWork_v3.diff, ClobLocatorWork_v3.stat, ClobLocatorWork_v4.diff, ClobLocatorWork_v4.stat, ClobLocatorWork_v5.diff, ClobLocatorWork_v5.stat, ConnectionLocatorWork_v2.diff, ConnectionLocatorWork_v4.diff > > -- This message is automatically generated by JIRA. - You can reply to this email to add a comment to the issue online.
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Free Shipping all bay area of San Francisco, San Jose, Fremont, Tracy, Stockton, Los Angeles, Orange County, San Diego and some nearest bay area.
Delivery FREE IN HOME is available on all of our items. Our professional two-man team will deliver your order into the room of your choice. You tell us where to place the item and we will do it for you free of charge.
We do assembly for extra $40 no matter how many pieces you buy
Can you ship to APO / FPO addresses?
Sorry we cannot ship to APO / FPO addresses. Our cartons are too large. You may want to ship to a friend or relative who can then forward your shipment.
All Products are covered under the manufacturer's warranty. Please contact us for help with warranty issues for products you purchased through our company. We strive to carry quality furniture that will very rarely require utilization of the manufacturer's warranty.
What if My Shipment Arrives Damaged?
Very rare situation that you experience damage in your shipment, please be sure to note it on the delivery paperwork you sign and contact us as soon as possible. If the carton is obviously severely damaged, please refuse the shipment from the freight company. We will arrange for a replacement or replacement parts to be rushed out. We will take the quickest route to remedy the situation. In the event a replacement is delivered to you before original shipment is returned, you are responsible for cooperating with the return of the item. Failure to return the damaged item will cause us to charge your credit card for the non-returned item.
What is the Cancellation Policy?
If we are able to cancel your order before it is produced and/or shipped, there is not a charge for the cancellation. If the product has been shipped, you will be responsible for all inbound and outbound shipping charges. These charges will be deducted from your refund.
Cancellations or returns must be authorized in advance.
Please contact us for cancellation or return for merchandise
What is the Return Policy?
Generally on all items the return policy is that you are responsible for round trip freight if the furniture has already been shipped or produced. Please contact us and we will assess your situation. A 20% re-stocking fee is also deducted from your refund. Since our products are offered with free shipping, please be aware that if you return one of these products our actual outbound shipping costs will be deducted from your refund. Please be careful when ordering your furniture and let us know if we can be of assistance in selecting the right furniture for your situation. Always measure the space you are placing the furniture. Sorry we cannot accept returns for assembled merchandise. Any returns must be in their original packaging. Items will not be authorized for return after 15 days from the delivery date. Your credit card will be refunded once the manufacturer receives the returned item.
Are finish colors accurate?
We do our best to accurately show the finish colors of each piece we carry, however colors can vary by personal perceptions, monitor type and age, video card differences and printing variations.
Contact number 510 541 8602


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To our clients, family and friends AAA wishes you all a wonderful holiday season and very Happy New Year!
To our clients, family and friends AAA wishes you all a wonderful holiday season and very Happy New Year!
If you just incorporated in Wyoming, or are doing some preliminary research, below are some helpful links to guide you. We encourage you to call us at any time if you have any questions or if you need assistance.
Videos regarding obtaining an EIN, Banking, Taxes, etc.
Why Did You Incorporate- for Asset Protection, Tax Savings or both?
The number one reason people incorporate is for asset protection. However, nearly 60% of businesses are in jeopardy of having their
corporate veil pierced because they do not have a Corporate Record Book and are not maintaining corporate records. Read about how this can effect your business.
Establishing a Presence and Building Your Business
We understand the importance of asset protection and putting your money to work for you. Read about our Executive Suite Program, which will help you establish a Wyoming presence and how we can help you build your business with sales support.
1099 vs. W2- What You Need to Know
Tax Benefits of a Medical Reimbursement Plan
Your Corporation can provide you with many benefits. One that is often overlooked is a Medical Reimbursement Plan.
Special Permits for your Wyoming Entity
Some frequently asked questions regarding permits, tax requirements, etc.
Elite Bookkeeping & Tax Services
Internal Revenue Service
Electronic Federal Tax Payment System (EFTPS)
Wyoming Department of Workforce Services
U.S. Social Security Administration
Government Services Administration
Disclaimer: AAA Corporate Services, Inc. are not attorneys or accountants and we do not offer legal or accounting advice. If you need legal or accounting advice, you should contact an attorney or accountant. We do work with attorneys and accountants all over the U.S. If you would like for us to refer you to someone, please contact our office.
In case you missed it, for the fifth year in a row Wyoming grabbed the top spot as the best place to do business according to the Tax Foundation's 2017 State Business Climate Index.
According to a recent article by the Wyoming Business Council, "The Tax Foundation analyzes over 100 tax variables to determine a state's ranking. "
Some of the reasons Wyoming received this ranking are:
To view our package options, use the links below:
As you'll notice we also offer services to help establish a presence in Wyoming. If you're ready to fully launch your business in Wyoming and would like to have our staff assist with fielding calls, handling your mail, etc., we recommend that you look at our Platinum Package.
For a description of our services CLICK HERE.
If you have any questions, give us a call at (800) 891-5987 or (307) 635-8700.
Wyoming is moving forward with online filings, starting with reinstatements. When an entity is dissolved/revoked for failure to file the annual report and has no other delinquencies and wants to reinstate within 2 years, may now do so online. This is great news for those who forget to file the annual report in a timely matter.
For foreign or out of state entities this is especially significant. In the past if a foreign entity was revoked it would have been required to re-file. AND the $5000 penalty (that could have been applied for doing business when revoked) now only applies to entities that have never filed and are found to be doing business in Wyoming.
Spring 2016 will bring online filing of Articles. The Secretary of State has no details yet on how that will be executed. As a Wyoming registered agent these changes are very important. Look for updates in our newsletters, or contact our office.
We do our very best to remind our clients about filing Annual Reports so as to not be administratively dissolved. It's important to keep your contact information updated with us at all times so that we may reach you.
We wish you and your family a very Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!


text:
Niccolo Lollini
DPhil Student
St Peter's College
Thesis: Back-to-the-land migration and agricultural development in rural Japan
Research: My research explores the recent rise of back-to-the-land migration in Japan and its implications for Japan's declining agricultural sector. Together with the motivations, values, and goals of an urban youth choosing to relocate in rural areas to pursue a career in agriculture, this ethnography focuses on rural migrants' experiences and the obstacles encountered along their transition. In particular, emphasis is placed on the unfolding of support schemes for new agricultural entrants and how institutions articulate values, knowledge, and behavioural models.


text:
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Be the first PennLive.com user to add photos or videos of Department of Health & Human Services
Department of Health & Human Services can be found at Main St 701. The following is offered: Government. The entry is present with us since Sep 9, 2010 and was last updated on Nov 14, 2013. In Towanda there are 15 other Government. An overview can be found here.


text:
David Sedaris Quotes About SchoolQuotes about: School
As I searched the atlas for somewhere to run to, Hugh made a case for his old stomping grounds. His first suggestion was Beirut, where he went to nursery school. His family left there in the midsixties and moved to the Congo. After that, it was Ethiopia, and then Somalia, all fine places in his opinion. 'Let's save Africa and the Middle East for when I decide to quit living,' I said.
I was first published in the newspaper put out by School of The Art Institute of Chicago, where I was a student. I wince to read that story nowadays, but I published it with an odd photo I'd found in a junk shop, and at least I still like the picture. I had a few things in the school paper, and then I got published in a small literary magazine. I hoped I would one day get published in The New Yorker, but I never allowed myself to actually believe it. Getting published is one of those things that feels just as good as you'd hoped it would.
I would start by writing to an adult, maybe a high school teacher, or maybe an aunt or uncle, and writing and telling them why you want to go to a particular university. That's probably what you would actually sound like. Then write your letter to the university, and put those 2 versions in front of you, and look at the difference between those 2 things.
And one of the things I noticed pretty early on in art school was that my classmates had no notion of an audience. Right? I mean, growing up with the mother that I did, I learned that when you walk into the dry cleaners, there's an audience waiting for you. You know, maybe it's just the person behind the counter.
There's no such thing as a folk writer. There's no such thing as somebody who's never read a book before suddenly sitting down one day and writing one. You have to learn how to captivate a reader. Right? And I don't mean you have to go to school for it. But if you're - if you pay attention, you can learn it by reading books. And so I feel like I learned a lot by reading books.
David Sedaris
- Born: December 26, 1956
- Occupation: Humorist
- Cite this Page: Citation


text:
By Anonymous - / Saturday 8 September 2012 17:27 / United States - Sandy
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Top comments
By jarockstar27 | 10
I hate it when parents pick the boyfriend/girlfriend over their own children. Its irresponsible and selfish. Im sorry OP i hope things get better.
JocelynKaulitz | 28
If that were me, I would have just beat the shit out of the boyfriend. Regardless if my mom were to pick him over me, I wouldn't let anyone mess with her.
copy125 | 0
Hold on now, maybe OP's like 34 and his mother is just doing this to get her "kid" to move out lol you never know
ydi_4_suking | 20
maybe 40 is right, but we need a lot more details on this. Try talking with your mom OP and if you can't get through to her maybe in the long run she will see that she was wrong
Ghostlyness | 7
I had the same thought as you 40. Something about the wording makes me think the guys a grown man not a kid. In which case it's a whole different story. Who knows.
coolbrony12 | 3
Ahem, what goes around comes around. It didn't really make sense the way you worded it.
XxDevilxXGt | 26
Now this is an actual fml. I hope you find some way to sort it all out eventually.
walmartpaysme | 15
If OP is homeless he won't win even if his mom does end up miserable!
MrsDruidess | 23
I am sad to see everyone thumbs down all the ones saying that its possible that OP is too old to be living at home pulling this me or him stuff. It's entirely possible, and if OP is a grown ass man, he needs to find his own place and let his mom move on with her life. Its entirely possible that moms new guy is a good guy but don't like the way OP leaches off his mom. . . Theres way too much her to fully judge. . . not saying that we can't offer advice, just don't thumbs down those thinking that maybe its not all cut and dry.
sorry OP but if your grown, YDI. If however you are young and this guy is bad news, sorry buddy that blows and you might be better off in the long run without her. If she is not going to pick you now, she never will.
sorry OP but if your grown, YDI. If however you are young and this guy is bad news, sorry buddy that blows and you might be better off in the long run without her. If she is not going to pick you now, she never will.
By NothernNightmare | 18
I am so sorry your mother can't see the destructive relationship she has put her self in, and is disregarding you because of it. :(
habibiiiiiii | 2
Sounds like op's mom is too desperate for "love" and is willing to kick out a person who will have unconditional love for her. Awful.
frokeyman92 | 9
It's kinda like girls who date douch bag bf's. Oh, wait..
habibiiiiiii | 2
You don't say
Irrelevant comment is irrelevant
DarkMarkInTheSky | 9
Probably the best relevant comment ever. :)
walmartpaysme | 15
If you don't understand sarcasm, innuendo, or references to old tv commercials, please stop commenting your ignorance all over FML
mollyjynxjax | 28
@157 they made a series of animated movies called "The Wacky Adventures of Ronald McDonald" or something like that in the 90s that featured Hamburglar, along with Birdie, Grimace, Ronald's dog Sundae, and various other characters as well
wholikesbacon | 9
How dare you!!! My mum has had her boyfriend for SEVEN YEARS and he is the sweetest man I could have ever wished for her!
DeadxManxWalking | 27
11- oh sorry. Thanks thought. Read too fast
PYLrulz | 17
1. Son
2. You don't say!
2. You don't say!
hopsinlove17 | 26
1. Redundant
2. You don't say-_-
1. Redundant
2. You don't say-_-
The_F3rris | 11
Thats sweet. So the son called out another man for being sexist. If only all men stood up for women.
By jarockstar27 | 10
I hate it when parents pick the boyfriend/girlfriend over their own children. Its irresponsible and selfish. Im sorry OP i hope things get better.
theluckyones | 10
Unfortunately, By the time she see's that it will be too late.
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