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|December 6, 2019
A. Executive summary
Democratic and economic transition in Georgia have been stalled since 2001. In its response to internal splits and the emergence of an uncontrollable opposition, the performance of the Shevardnadze government deteriorated in nearly all policy areas. Even though the country had previously been known for its liberal climate, harassment of politically active NGOs and independent media outlets became a new norm in Georgia. Though the government made the manipulation and transgression of democratic rules a new habit, it stopped short of abolishing these rules altogether. Progress toward a market economy was severely hampered by pervasive corruption and declining fiscal and budgetary discipline. The notorious failure to consolidate state finances alienated the international donor community, which finally decided to withdraw support in 2003, thus breaking the backbone of the Shevardnadze government.
The success of the so-called Rose Revolution added a decisive twist to the development of Georgia. The new government has made tremendous efforts to revamp stalled structural reforms and dismantle systemic corruption. After one year in office, progress has been made in many areas, including in fiscal performance and law enforcement. The government has contributed to a strengthening of state structures and the reemergence of a rudimentary trust in official institutions. The adoption of a new tax code is expected to result in the creation of an environment conductive to investment and business development.
The challenge of consolidating democracy lies still ahead, however. To secure the success of early achievements, more efforts are needed to overcome the heritage of a deeply entrenched clientelistic culture. There is still no party system in place that is capable of articulating and aggregating social interests. Most civil society organizations are donor driven advocacy groups, far removed from the social groups they claim to represent. Local government bodies still lack the resources and the competencies necessary to function effectively. So far, the current government is backed by a rather vague popular sentiment. It cannot rely on organizational structures for support. The ruling party is a rather fragile umbrella movement, consisting of the personal entourage of its three leading figures and is thus highly vulnerable to internal fragmentation. It still does not have any appeal at the local level and does not serve as a recruitment pool for local administrators. Against the backdrop of all these institutional deficiencies, destabilization remains a viable possibility.
B. History and characteristics of transformation
Political and economic transformation in Georgia clearly lacks a linear dynamic toward the consolidation of democracy and a market economy. Under the heavy burden of two unresolved ethnic conflicts and sharp economic decline aggravated by pervasive corruption and extremely weak state structures, Georgias development has been marked by a series of interruptions and setbacks.
The first breakthrough to a democratic political regime in Georgia was accomplished with the parliamentary elections of October 1990, won by a heterogeneous umbrella movement under the leadership of former dissident Zviad Gamsachurdia. Despite his landslide victory in the May 1991 presidential elections, he failed to consolidate his rule. His power rested mainly on charismatic mobilization. He missed the opportunity to build up a coherent political organization. As a result, he was easily driven from office by a violent coup d'état at the beginning of 1992.
The brief interlude of chaos that ensued after the ouster of Gamsachurdia was terminated with the return of former party head Eduard Shevardnadze, who assumed the newly created position of head of state in March 1992. In the first three years of his rule, Shevardnadze was mainly occupied with the restoration of public order. He tried hard to get rid of the competing gangs of criminals that had originally placed him in power. The adoption of a constitution and the successful organization of elections in 1995 signaled a fragile consolidation. Notwithstanding quite impressive achievements in terms of ending violence and introducing the formal requisites of democratic statehood, and despite massive international assistance, Shevardnadze did not succeed in basing his rule on stable institutions. His political survival depended heavily on the application of two strategies, both of which placed certain constraints on the consolidation of democracy.
Firstly, he used access to administrative resources and to international development funds as a means to accommodate fluid clientelistic networks. The government thus never acted as a coherent team. Severely weakened by frequent reshuffles, the government gained notoriety for its fierce competition over the distribution of spoils between different ministries. With few exceptions, parliament fell short of fulfilling its oversight functions. Many of its members took part in corruption games by using their regulatory power as a means to grant exemptions to interested clients.
Secondly, Shevardnadze manipulated and frequently changed procedural norms regulating access to power. The only continuous feature was a clear dominance of the executive, which was firmly controlled by Shevardnadze. In contrast, the shape of parliament was adapted to varying needs. Until 1995, the abolishment of any kind of threshold ensured a highly fragmented legislature. After the creation of the Civic Union of Georgia (CUG) in 1993, which was designed to serve as Shevardnadzes party of power, the introduction of a barrier bestowed a stable majority on the CUG. Pluralism was thus mainly confined to intra-elite competition inside the ruling party, which was composed of former Soviet apparatchiks and a group of young reformers.
These two strategies ceased to function effectively after 2001. The distribution of official fiefdoms among the different cliques of the elite severely hampered economic growth and thus gave rise to popular unrest. As the international donor community became aware of the increasing gap between legal fiction and corrupt practices, it demonstrated a growing reluctance to continue funding assistance programs. Confronted with a decline in its authority, the ruling party was compelled to adopt authoritarian measures, a move that provoked an internal split. The attempt to crack down on the independent TV station Rustawi 2 in October 2001 became a turning point. Prominent representatives of the young reformers, headed by Saakashvili, Zhvania and Burjanadze, formed a new opposition that assumed power in the aftermath of popular protests against the rigging of parliamentary elections in November 2003.
The relative ease with which Shevardnadze was overthrown can be explained partly by the existence of democratic facades erected under his rule. A dense network of NGOs, which had mushroomed during the 1990s, carried out parallel vote counts and organized public protests. Independent media outlets, which had never experienced serious threats to their existence, supported popular mobilization by providing uncensored information. An independent judiciary, established under the influence of the young reformers, canceled the officially announced results.
After the peaceful revolution, the triumvirate of Saakashvili, Burjanadze and Zhvania rushed to stabilize the situation. With Saakashvilis overwhelming victory in the January 2004 presidential elections and with control of 90% of the seats in parliament, the new elite was awarded with a more than comfortable starting point. Control over the executive and the legislative branch of government makes implementation of the far-reaching reform agenda a much easier job. However, the reformers have still failed to translate the nearly charismatic legitimacy they enjoy into organizational capacity. Despite outstanding achievements in terms of curbing corruption and strengthening weak governance structures, it is far too early to speak of a successful consolidation of stateness.
C. Assessment
1. Democracy
1.1. Stateness
Georgia's stateness is cast into doubt by the total loss of control over the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. To date, all efforts achieve a resolution to these conflicts have failed. In addition, the political stalemate in the unrecognized Republic of Abkhazia following the disputed presidential elections of October 2004 and the resulting political vacuum are likely to produce a spillover effect in the neighboring regions of Samegrelo and Imereti in western Georgia. The personal representatives of President Saakashvili have made anti-corruption efforts in both regions a high priority. Despite some successes, raids often fail because of the collusion between local law enforcement agencies and criminal groups. Similar problems exist in Shida Kartli, the eastern Georgian region bordering South Ossetia. Attempts to crack down on smuggling have triggered a violent response, including a car bombing at the administrative center of Gori in January 2005. This situation exposes the underlying weakness of Georgia's regional political institutions, which lack a popular mandate.
In the territory controlled by the Georgian state, all citizens have the same civil rights. The integration of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian population, however, remains a problem as the people of those territories do not accept Georgian rule.
Though there is a separation of church and state, the Orthodox Church enjoys special treatment. Its status is regulated by a controversial concordat signed in October 2002, which provides for various privileges, such as the provision of religious education in schools and broad powers to decide on the status of other religious communities. This degree of influence enabled the Orthodox Church to prevent the signing of an agreement between the state and the Catholic Church. Georgia is the only former Soviet Republic without a law defining the rights and obligations of religious communities.
There is a set of administrative structures in place, but despite some tangible improvements, the efficiency of these structures is still hampered by a heritage of corruption, the sheer size of the shadow economy and a lack of funds.
1.2. Political participation
There are no restraints on free and fair elections at the national level. On the local and regional level, elections have been delayed and representatives are appointed by the central government.
The governments effective power to rule is not constrained by visible veto powers. However, its ability to ensure implementation of decisions is still disputed.
There are no restrictions on freedoms of association and assembly, although there have been some reports of the excessive use of force by police to breakup demonstrations.
Though freedom of press and opinion is formally institutionalized, there are deep concerns regarding massive intervention by the state in the media sector. Numerous reports cite examples of reprisal against journalists and media outlets. For example, immediately after presidential elections in January 2004, three independent TV stations cancelled their late night talk shows, all of which were well known for their critical commentary on political events. The TV station Rustavi 2, which gained prominence for the active support it provided to the leaders of the so-called Rose Revolution, appears to enjoy preferential treatment, including receiving a generous offer by the state to reschedule its debts. Other stations suspected of having close ties to the Shevardnadze regime, however, have been subjected to government raids on the basis of accusations of tax evasion, for example. Despite these shortcomings, the existence of a pluralistic media scene is not under threat.
1.3. Rule of law
Even though the powers of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government are institutionally differentiated, the proper functioning of a system of checks and balances is hampered on two different levels. On the one hand, the amendments to the constitution adopted on February 6, 2004 have decisively enhanced the authority of the executive. The amendments granted the president the right to dissolve parliament if legislators fail to approve the state budget in three successive votes and as well as the right to appoint judges. On the other hand, the stable majority of the pro-presidential National Movement Democrats, which controls 90% of the seats in parliament, acts as a constraint on the legislatures ability to exercise its oversight functions. The establishment of an upper chamber of parliament has been further postponed until the settlement of the unresolved conflict with the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The decision of the Supreme Court to cancel the results of the rigged parliamentary elections of November 2, 2004 serves as proof of the independence of the judiciary. However, a draft bill presented by the president in December 2004, which calls for the possibility to dismiss Supreme Court and Constitutional Court judges before the expiration of their terms, hints at serious attempts on the part of the executive to regain control over the judicial branch.
The current government is displaying serious intentions to address the problem of pervasive corruption. A number of high profile arrests serve as proof of these intentions. However, some Georgian NGOs have expressed concern that the authorities are selectively targeting certain individuals for political reasons and that the law is not being applied equally to all.
To some degree, civil liberties seem to be negatively affected by the revolutionary style of implementing far-reaching reform measures. Particularly in the context of the struggle against corruption, the limits set by laws are not always respected. Examples of this include allegations of due process violations including torture and ill-treatment.
1.4. Stability of democratic institutions
Existing democratic institutions still have to strive for stabilization. The fragility of Georgias democratic institutions are underscored by the series of re-organizations since the inauguration of President Saakashvili in January 2004, frictions between different government ministries on questions such as the proper strategy regarding the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and ongoing rumors about rising tensions inside the pro-presidential camp, which have been aggravated further by the mysterious death of Prime Minister Zhvania in January 2005.
The existing democratic institutions are mostly accepted by all relevant political and social players. Some NGOs do take a critical stance with regard to the strengthening of executive powers. The downsizing of government agencies, the anti-corruption drive and the attempt to curb smuggling has encountered some resistance on the part of those being targeted by these measures. This is, however, counter-balanced by widespread popular support.
1.5. Political and social integration
The existing party system is still marked by a high degree of fluidity and a low level of social entrenchment. Deprived of access to administrative resources, the Civic Union of Georgia, which had dominated the political scene between 1993 and 2001, has ceased to exist. The bloc For a new Georgia, cobbled together by Shevardnadze in 2003 in a desperate attempt to regain control through a merger of former rivals, fell apart immediately after the Rose Revolution. The ouster of Adzarian strongman Abashidze in March 2004 has inflicted the same fate on the coalition of parties grouped around his Union of Democratic Revival, which polled second in the parliamentary elections of 1995, 1999 and 2003.
The only parties with a longer record of existence to gain representation in the new parliament elected in March 2004 are New Rights and Industry will save Georgia, which united in a single bloc called Right Opposition and gained 7.56%. In contrast, the components of the ruling coalition National movement - Democrats, which heavily dominates the current legislature with a share of 90% of the seats, emerged only in the wake of the highly contested elections in November 2003. However, due to a quite high threshold of 7%, the fragmentation of the existing party system is effectively restricted. Its main feature is a lack of social rooting and a high degree of voter volatility. With the exception of the Right Opposition, which represents the interests of a small layer of entrepreneurs, the existing political forces do not reflect social interests but rather quite vague popular sentiments. Since the CUG and UDR have dissolved, none of the remaining political parties has the organizational structure to reach local levels.
The influence of classical social interests groups is close to zero. Trade unions do exist, but with the possible exception of the solidarity organization of schoolteachers, they are hardly visible. This is primarily due to high rates of unemployment and self-employment. As the few bigger entrepreneurs still prefer informing bargaining to promote their interests, organizations representing business interests are of no real significance. Civil society organizations in contrast form a dense network. However, their capability to act as mediators between society and the state is severely constrained by their lack of social rooting. Moreover, since the Rose Revolution and the appointment of many of their most active members to government positions, they have experienced a kind of brain drain. Thus, the consolidation of democracy and even the development of a sustainable reform strategy are still hampered by the fact that large social interests remain underrepresented.
Popular support for democracy is quite high. In an opinion poll carried out in 2003, 73% of respondents agreed to the statement that democracy is better than any other form of government. However, the fact that freedom of speech and self-rule ranked quite low among the items associated mostly with democracy raises some questions with regard to the sustainability of this strong commitment.
Due to a deep-rooted culture of clientelism, until recently reliably reproduced by an institutional incentive structure that gave priority to informal bargaining over the distribution of spoils, vertical bonds of dependence are still regarded as the most effective means of pushing through ones interests. The emergence of authentic forms of social self-organization is thus severely impeded by widespread distrust. Until recently, anyone who claimed to represent broader societal interests was immediately suspected of simply pursuing his own narrow agenda of personal interests. The existence of NGOs does not in and of itself dispel this common perception as their emergence is mainly donor driven. Moreover, most NGOs resemble advocacy groups staffed by urban intellectuals whose bonds to the interests of those they claim to represent are very loose.
2. Market economy
2.1. Level of socioeconomic development
The level of socioeconomic development is remarkably low even in comparison to average CIS standards. With $830, GNI per capita amounts to less than one third of the respective Russian value. Despite considerable growth rates of up to 8% in previous years, the Georgian economy has still not recovered from the deep shock it experienced following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the civil wars of the early 1990s. By 2002, the economy had contracted to 38% of its adjusted GDP purchasing power in 1989. Fifty-four percent of the population lives below the poverty line and approximately 15-17% are extremely poor. Poverty is unequally distributed throughout the country. In many cases, higher poverty levels correlate with geographical isolation and low density of arable land. Structural causes of poverty include a high rate of unemployment and obstacles to the growth of the agricultural sector, which employs more than 50% of the physically active population but contributes only 21% to the GDP.
2.2. Organization of the market and competition
The institutional foundations of a market economy were established in the early 1990s. The price system is fully liberalized, subsidies to state enterprises have been abolished and restrictions to foreign trade were removed with the introduction of uniform custom duties before Georgia joined the WTO in 2000. However, until recently, informal practices as well as formal regulation contributed to a massive distortion of competition. On the one hand, pervasive corruption had ensured selective application of ostensibly uniform rules. Entrepreneurs closely linked by personal ties to members of the political elite were regularly granted exemption from enforcement of a wide range of regulations. Examples include an astonishingly high degree of tolerance toward tax arrears and overdue payments to state-owned utilities. On the other hand, a contradictory tax code, which listed 21 different taxes and provided for a lot of exceptions valid only under highly specific circumstances, created the loopholes necessary for granting privileges to some while penalizing others. Consequently, the share of the informal economy had surpassed 67% of all productive activities according to even conservative World Bank estimates.
Despite the existence of anti-monopoly legislation strongly prohibiting the creation of market access barriers, individual entrepreneurs were successfully shielded from competitive pressures for many years.
Notwithstanding a substantial liberalization of the formal regime, the ability to engage successfully in foreign trade activities was generally confined to a privileged class. Politically influential business circles gained advantages through informal exemptions from the payment of customs duties. Moreover, the issuing of licenses, required for the import of certain goods, provided yet another possibility for state intervention in favor of certain clients.
Against the backdrop of such a poor starting point, the ambitious reform agenda launched by the new government surely needs time to produce tangible results. However, initial progress in terms of giving all businesses fair opportunities to compete is already visible. Widespread smuggling, tax evasion, bribery and other forms of abuse of power are being combated through harsh sanctions. In terms of structural improvements, the adoption of a simplified tax code, which would reduce the number of taxes from 21 to eight, is expected to reduce the level of corruption as well as the scope for arbitrary action on part of the tax officials.
Reform of the banking sector began in 1995. The state has largely divested itself of banks. The National Bank of Georgia has assumed a supervisory role and increasingly imposes stringent reporting requirements on commercial banks. Despite these steps, the banking sector continues to display a number of structural deficits. It remains focused on short-term lending rather than on long-term finance. At 7.5%, the share of non-performing loans was still quite high at the end of 2003. Moreover, nine banks compromising one-tenth of total bank assets were rated CAMEL 3 or worse. The fact that only 3% of Georgians have bank accounts reflects widespread mistrust in the financial stability of the institutions.
However, regulatory and supervisory measures taken by the current government have already started to improve the health of the banking system. In less than one year, the share of non-performing loans in the total portfolio declined by 2.1%. In compliance with statutory requirements and in line with European standards, banking institutions are mandated to raise their capital to at least 12 million lari by the end of 2008. Whereas these steps will probably suffice to facilitate further consolidation of the system and to filter out weak and financially non-viable banks, the most salient problem the lack of incentives for the issuing of long-term credits still has to be addressed.
2.3. Currency and price stability
Since the crisis of the early 1990s, macroeconomic stabilization has been a top priority for all Georgian governments. In the last few years, external debt never dropped below 50% of GDP and the fiscal deficit constantly hovered around 2.5% of GDP. However, the generally prudent and stringent interventions of the National Bank the independence of which has never been questioned kept inflation under control and ensured stable currency exchange rates.
Since Saakashvili took office in January 2004, Georgia has adopted a clearly marked tendency toward more fiscal and budgetary discipline. Improvements have been put into place in all steps of the budgetary process. They include institutional safeguards that will render any relapses into old habits more difficult. Efforts to strengthen tax administration and the crackdown on tax evasion resulted in a 37% increase in tax receipts. A new law on the budget systems, which took effect in January 2004, has increased transparency in the execution of the budget through the introduction of a single treasury account. The law also extends the application of commitment controls to extra-budgetary funds. As a result, for the first time since independence, the year 2004 ended with an overall fiscal surplus of 2.1% of GDP - compared to a 1.8% deficit in the same period of 2003.
2.4. Private property
Formally, property rights are protected by law and there are legally prescribed procedures for the acquisition of property. However, there are problems with these rights in terms of implementation. Under Shevardnadze, property rights were often infringed during raids carried out under the pretext of tax evasion investigations. Contract enforcement through court decisions suffered as a result of extraordinarily high fees, which on average amounted to one-third of the debts value. Privatization of state-owned property was rarely transparent. Many transactions were marred by the practice of clearing enterprise or state debt with the price charged for sale.
In 2003, the opposition fiercely attacked the Shevardnadze government for selling off parts of the countrys energy sector to Russias Gazprom and RAO EES. The new government has been praised for its promise to streamline procedures in accordance with official rules. It stepped back, however, from its original promise to renationalize those plants that had been sold at suspiciously low prices to individuals close to Shevardnadze. There have also been allegations of deviation from prescribed regulations with regard to the current sale of the Georgian Shipping Company and the manganese mining factory of Chiatura.
Private companies are permitted in Georgia, but currently more than 180,000 people (or nearly one-quarter of the workforce) are still employed by 1,800 state-owned enterprises. However, the new government unveiled a massive privatization plan, according to which all of these state-owned companies will be privatized by 2007.
2.5. Welfare regime
The social security system is not able to mitigate widespread poverty. There is no state support for the unemployed. Pensions and assistance paid to the approximately 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are far from sufficient for survival. Until recently, this form of assistance was also typically paid only after significant delay. The main problem facing the welfare system is not only a lack of funds, but also the governments failure to target the most vulnerable segments of the population. In view of the scarcity of resources, the maintenance of uniform rates for pension and IDP allowances appears to be rather dysfunctional as it complicates attempts to reach the neediest. Additionally, corruption has distorted the effectiveness of the welfare system. Examples include embezzlement of allowances by state officials and trade in IDP documents.
Equality of opportunity is far from assured. The overall high level of poverty and unemployment deny some segments of the population equal opportunities. Typical high-risk groups include the elderly, families with a large number of children, orphans and persons with disabilities or chronic illnesses. People living in the poorest districts or remote areas with weak or no access to infrastructure and basic services are also at risk. Outside the capital, there are quite a number of places completely cut off from energy supplies during the winter months. Women have equal access to education, but are underrepresented in the political system.
2.6. Economic performance
Measured in terms of GDP growth rates, which have increased annually by more than 5% since 2000, the Georgian economy has performed quite well. This has been achieved mainly through extensive foreign investment in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The is figure contrasts, however, with a poverty rate that rose from 51.8% to 54.5% in the same period and with a negative trade balance that never dropped below 11% of GDP. Economic growth driven by single events rather than by structural improvements did not translate into a reduction of unemployment rates.
2.7. Sustainability
Ecological concerns are raised from time to time by environmental NGOs. The construction of the BTC oil pipeline, which is suspected to have a negative impact on a nature reserve near Borjomi, provoked protests by the local population. Given the heavy dependence on this project for economic growth, however, these concerns have been largely ignored by the government.
Due to years of neglect and under-financing, the education system Georgia inherited from the Soviet Union is at the verge of breaking down. State-run schools and universities not only suffer from a deteriorating physical infrastructure, but teaching staffs also earn extremely low wages. High rates of absenteeism among pupils are the norm. Bribery and the outright sale of diplomas is widespread, especially among university teachers. As a result, the quality of education is in sharp decline. There is a growing tendency toward the recruitment of individuals with university degrees from Western countries for elite positions.
3. Management
3.1. Level of difficulty
The level of structural difficulties faced by the political elite is quite high. One of the few advantages, the presence of a well-educated labor force, does not really pay off in the absence of reasonable expectations for economic recovery. Serious obstacles to economic growth include the interruption of transportation lines connecting the country to its main markets of sale and the loss of control over its borders. Both obstacles are hard to remove without a resolution to the conflicts in the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As long as Russia does not abstain from the old strategy of exercising influence by means of backing the secessionist governments in Tskhinvali and Batumi, an effective solution to the problem is unlikely.
Notwithstanding the existence of a great number of NGOs, there is no authentic tradition of civil society in Georgia. A high degree of distrust in public institutions, which has resulted from a long history of foreign domination, acts as a severe constraint on the emergence of effective governance.
The level of conflict intensity is quite low at the moment. The social structure lacks stable and clear-cut cleavages. There are no organizations capable of mobilizing broader constituencies. There is the possibility for the re-emergence of entrepreneurs of violence with an interest in stirring up conflicts to their advantage.
3.2. Steering capability
The so-called Rose Revolution, which occurred in November 2003, marked a turning point in the political development of Georgia. Because this watershed event deeply affected the management capabilities of the administration that followed, the periods before and after the ouster of former President Shevardnadze will be treated here separately.
Whereas the Shevardnadze administration not only lost the ability to formulate a long-term policy, but also the organizational coherence to achieve its short-term goals of strengthening its grip on power by authoritarian means, the new government of Saakashvili succeeded in consolidating its rule. After having taken power through a peaceful revolution, Saakashvilis government also took decisive steps toward the formulation and implementation of a highly ambitious reform agenda. Despite some shortcomings in terms of implementation, these measures were generally consistent with the aim of consolidating democracy and strengthening effective governance structures. Nevertheless, the continuing lack of vision for long-term economic recovery represents a weak point.
In the last phase of his rule, Shevardnadze was mainly concerned with a desperate struggle for political survival and consequently neglected implementing any kind of reforms. In the wake of the parliamentary elections in November 2, 2003, he hastily implemented ad-hoc measures primarily aimed at weakening the new opposition. Appealing to a population frustrated by economic hardship, frequent breakdowns of power supplies and pervasive corruption, the opposition movement gained in strength and was thus able to pose the first real challenge to Shevardnadzes claim to power since 1995.
Forced to act under the conditions of authentic pluralistic competition, the former president openly violated democratic norms without properly calculating the possible consequences in terms of losing international support and provoking popular protest. The relapse into an authoritarian style of rule clearly overstretched the capacity of a government bereft of coherent and efficient power agencies. The decision to target the vibrant NGO sector and independent media outlets, which were increasingly subjected to physical harassment, bureaucratic impediments and legal sanctions, served only to accelerate the galloping loss of credibility. In addition, the attempt to ensure electoral victory by means of organizing massive fraud served only to verify the shortsightedness of a government that failed to take into account the ability of the opposition to carry out parallel vote counts and mobilize popular protest.
The ease with which Shevardnadze was driven out of office on November 23, 2003 thus once more revealed the underlying weakness of his rule. Having honed his skills in the manipulation of organized pluralism between 1995 and 2001, Shevardnadze fell victim to authentic opposition forces that had blossomed behind the democratic facades erected under his rule. In this situation, he was neither able to regain popular and international support by the implementation of an effective reform policy, nor was he capable of adapting to changing circumstances by returning to authoritarianism. The steady loss of any kind of steering capability thus contributed heavily to his downfall.
After their rise to power, the new political forces under their charismatic leader Saakashvili launched an ambitious reform agenda aimed at restoring good governance and ensuring territorial integrity. The results are so far mixed. The government has taken important steps to improve public administration. In accordance with policy recommendations formulated by international donor agencies, it has begun to curb corruption, to crack down on smuggling, to downsize government agencies and to simplify a contradictory tax code.
The successful ousting of local strongman Abashidze has contributed to a solution to the strained relations and fiscal problems with the autonomous Republic of Adjara, which had been refusing to make fiscal payments into the central budget for years. As a result, state revenues have been raised significantly enabling the government to repay arrears in pensions and wages. Despite these impressive achievements, the Saakashvili administration has so far failed to invest in the build-up of legitimate and coherent institutions capable of reaching the periphery. This applies to both regional and local structures of governance as well as to the organizational structures of the ruling party. Deprived of a popular mandate and organized support, centrally-appointed politicians at the regional and local level are severely hampered in their fight against informal criminal groups that act partly in collusion with corrupt officials.
Emphasizing the urgency of necessary reform measures and making use of the charismatic legitimacy he enjoys, Saakashvili has so far given priority to strengthening his presidential powers. He has thus missed an opportunity to create a set of institutions that would be stabilized by procedural legitimacy and capable of mediating conflicts. As evidenced by the fate of the first Georgian President Gamsachurdia, this always entails the danger of falling victim to highly volatile public opinion, which may easily turn against Saakashvili as soon as unrealistic expectations are disappointed. In the realm of economics, the government has still not managed to design a long-term strategy to overcome structural deficits.
The Shevardnadze government displayed an astonishing low level of learning capabilities in the period under review. Despite a growing loss of credibility and a simultaneous increase in the strength of the opposition, it adhered to a harmful policy designed to keep it in power but actually contributed to its sudden downfall. The Shevardnadze government did not even respond to the alarming withdrawal of international support.
It is still too early to assess the flexibility of the Saakashvili government, which took power only one year ago and thus has had little time to reflect on its mistakes. Looking at the two top priorities of the current leadership, the evidence at hand is so far rather mixed. The successful combination of carrots and sticks in the fight against corruption is clearly indicative of innovations. With regard to the restoration of territorial integrity, the results are less impressive.
While the half-hearted decision to launch a small-scale invasion of the conflict zone near Tskhinvali in August 2004 may be interpreted as a relapse into the Shevardnadze style of politics, the renewed peace initiative of President Saakashvili suggests the opposite. For example, Saakashvili declared in January 2005 his readiness to grant the unrecognized Republic of South Ossetia greater autonomy within Georgia than the Republic of North Ossetia has within the Russian Federation. However, it is difficult to determine whether this move really means that the leadership has learned a lesson from its failed attempt to repeat the successful reintegration of Ajara under the completely different circumstances of South Ossetia or whether it only delineates another round in a policy characterized by permanent tactical shifts.
3.3. Resource efficiency
The resource efficiency of the Shevardnadze administration significantly deteriorated in the last phase of its rule. The near total breakdown of all reform efforts triggered not only a massive budget crisis but also severely strained relations with international financial organizations. The World Bank and IMF suspended their respective aid programs. In response to bureaucratic interference, the strategic investor AES Telasi which owned 16% of Georgian power generating capacities and managed 23% of the distribution networks, decided to leave the country. The subsequent decision to sell the heavily underfinanced Georgian energy sector to Russias Gazprom and RAO EES provoked not only fierce attacks from the opposition, which feared the expansion of Russian influence, but also threatened to undermine Georgias perspectives of becoming a strategic link in the energy corridor linking the Caspian Sea basin to Western markets.
Since the new government under Saakashvili assumed power, the situation shows clear signs of improvement. The massive downsizing of government agencies, which amounted to the dismissal of 19,000 police officers, 2000 tax inspectors and 1500 custom officers, not only removed a heavy burden from the state budget, but also contributed to a reduction of a bureaucracy that had served as an ideal breeding ground for corruption and heavy interference into business activities. The results achieved so far are impressive and were rewarded with the renewal of international financial assistance and a rescheduling of foreign debts. In the first half of 2004, tax revenues increased by 35%, non-tax revenues by 280%. Beyond these measures which aimed primarily at the mobilization of additional state revenues, the adoption of a new tax code, which abolished a number of excessive fees and introduced a flat rate for income taxes, is expected to contribute to an improvement of the business climate.
Despite these outstanding accomplishments, the current leadership has so far missed an opportunity to tackle some structural problems. In terms of administrative reforms, this refers firstly to the formulation of a comprehensive decentralization policy capable of empowering local legislatures to fulfill their oversight functions in relation to regional and local executives. Due to the fact that the existing system of local self government is not able to make local and regional executives accountable to strong legislatures, the central state is doomed to permanent interventions, which may greatly test its capabilities. At the level of central government, Saakashvili is criticized for relying too heavily on a small circle of close allies.
To cite one prominent example, Saakashvilis Irakli Okruashvily has served as prosecutor general, as minister of internal affairs and as minister of defense. In these different functions, he was charged with those tasks that received priority at a given moment, i.e. the arrest of high profile officials of the former government, the reorganization of the notoriously corrupt Georgian police, the preparation of a small scale intervention in South Ossetia and the completion of far-reaching reforms in the Georgian military as a precondition for its possible integration into NATO. The government has yet to propose a viable long-term economic strategy. The most urgent need is for an action plan for the agricultural sector, which employs more than 50% of the population. The lack of a long-term economic strategy can be linked to the undue priority given to the unrealistic goal of achieving a fast solution to the two unresolved ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Mainly occupied with its political survival, the Shevardnadze administration demonstrated little inclination toward policy coherence and thus failed to ensure the efficient use of resources. Shevardnadzes government was known for the fierce competition between the different ministries, which were rooted in a struggle for the distribution of spoils.
After the Rose Revolution, the successful implementation of an overall reform agenda has been to a certain extent limited by internal divisions within the central government. Most visibly, policies toward South Ossetia suffered from an unresolved conflict between the so-called hawks, who favored a forceful resolution, and a peace camp, which gave priority to improving the economic situation as a means to making reintegration into the Georgian state attractive to the secessionists. As both camps are represented by Irakli Orkurashvili and Ghia Baramidze, two cabinet members regarded to be the protégés of President Saakashvili and Prime Minister Zhvania respectively, a clear-cut solution could endanger the power sharing agreement and the still fragile coalition between these two leaders.
A similar, though more latent, conflict exists over privatization policies. Whereas former Finance Minister Nogaideli gave priority to increasing state revenues, former Minister of Economics Bendukidze was interested in accelerating the whole process regardless of the possible budgetary gains. Prime Minister Zhvania intervened in the most prominent cases. President Saakashvili has addressed these political conflicts by twice reorganizing his government, largely to readjust the balance of forces in favor of his supporters.
However, the real test has just come with the mysterious death of Prime Minister Zhvania. According to some local observers, Zhvanias death may be somehow connected with the above mentioned conflicts. Saakashvilis decision to appoint Nogaideli, a close ally of Zhvanias, to the post of prime minister points to his growing cautiousness. Given Nogaidelis lack of political experience, it is less than clear to what extent a return to a politics of balances will be efficient. Highly problematic in terms of achieving policy coherence seems to be the fact that compromises rely more on personal approaches than on factual questions.
During Shevardnadzes rule, corruption crippled economic development and stifled attempts at reform. It deprived the government of urgently needed revenues, which never exceeded 15% of BIP. Corrupt officials, provided with plenty of legal loopholes, severely frustrated possible investors. Open collusion between the ministries and criminal groups engaged in smuggling, trade in weapons and kidnapping for the extortion of ransom, greatly contributed to the emergence of an unstable environment. The open misappropriation of resources in the energy sector caused frequent breakdowns of the power supply.
Despite a framework of anti-corruption legislation and the existence of government agencies charged with tackling the problem, prosecution for corruption had been extremely rare. In fact, the government was known to buy the support of public servants by tolerating corrupt practices. Corrupt deals increasingly influenced even important decisions like the adoption of a parliamentary resolution in February 2003, which led to the invalidation of the licenses of Turkish Airlines and British Airways. Consequently, in 2003 Georgia ranked 124th out of 133 countries surveyed in the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International.
In contrast, Saakashvilis government launched a massive attack on corruption, making quite efficient use of resources through the skillful combination of different strategies. Publicly announced, high profile arrests of officials charged with corruption and abuse of power instilled a new level of credibility into the law enforcement agencies. Significant pay rises for police officers, financed partly by staff reduction and partly by donor money, decreased their vulnerability to bribes. The recent passage of a law offering financial amnesty to those who have corrected their infractions set positive incentives for the legalization of business activities. Performance efficiency could have profited from greater transparency and from the inclusion of broader segments of society, such as NGOs or local councils. Allegations of due process violations, including suspicions of torture and ill-treatment in the case of Molashvili, a former chairman of the control chamber, have raised concerns that the new authorities are selectively targeting certain individuals for political reasons while turning a blind eye toward their own misdeeds.
3.4. Consensus-building
In their public statements, all major political actors are committed to the cause of building democracy and a market economy. With regard to the Shevardnadze government, these commitments were cast into doubt by a highly dubious practice that, in the end, provoked massive protest.
By contract, Saakashvili successfully argued for the urgent need to overcome the emergency situation caused by the omissions of the previous government and was thus able to build up a broad coalition of support for his reform drive. However, he failed to translate this rather vague support into a stable power base.
Neither Shevardnadze nor Saakashvili faced the challenge of excluding or co-opting anti-democratic veto-actors. Shevardnadze failed to absorb the democratic opposition, which had emerged inside his own ruling party.
Thus far, Saakashvili enjoys massive popular support, which is rooted in somewhat unrealistic expectations concerning his ability to improve the existing situation. As is shown by previous experiences, this does not preclude the possibility of destabilization brought about by a minority of well organized actors.
For quite a long time, the politics of manipulating the fluid networks of patronage dominant under Shevardnadze had prevented political cleavages from surfacing. Conflicts were kept latent and dispersed through a strategy of distributing administrative spoils among rivaling patrons. As a result, the landscape of political forces frequently changed its shape. In 2003, however, the emergence of an opposition that rejected this kind of politics as a matter of principle and was successful in mobilizing popular protest against the anti-democratic nature of the Shevardnadze rule led to an escalation of the conflicts. As the existing system was not prepared to deal with these kinds of actors or with real political conflicts, its accommodation capabilities proved to be of little use and it broke down entirely. Shevardnadzes readiness to reject the use of violence ensured a peaceful handover of power.
Due to the comfortable majority he currently enjoys in parliament and in view of his broad presidential powers, Saakashvili has not yet really felt the need to engage in the management of political cleavages, which have hitherto been concealed by a wave of popular enthusiasm in support of his leadership. At a time of crisis and in the absence of institutional channels for the expression and reconciliation of conflicting interests, this omission may easily backfire.
Paradoxically, the Shevardnadze government managed to combine an openly corrupt style of politics with an active tolerance for the emergence of one of the liveliest NGO scenes in the post-Soviet region. This seeming miracle can be explained at least partly by the lack of social entrenchment characteristic of most of the NGOs. Their contribution to the build-up of authentic social trust ought to be questioned.
Even after the Rose Revolution, which seem to have signaled an end to the previously dominant atmosphere of cynicism and widespread distrust, the potential of the third sector to function as a mediator between the state and broad sectors of the society remains underdeveloped. While the revolution was mainly carried out by an urban and young intelligentsia, the majority of the rural population is still alienated from national politics.
Beginning in 2002, the attitude of the government grew hostile toward NGOs. Organizations that became involved in public protest activities and played an important role in bringing about the Rose Revolution, such as Open Society Georgia Foundation, were occasionally subjected to physical harassment.
With Saakashvilis rise to power, the strained relations with civil society organizations were eased at least in the beginning. The NGO sector even became an important resource pool for the recruitment of government personnel. However, though the government leadership sometimes seeks to convene with NGO representatives for an exchange of ideas, the influence of NGOs on political decisions seems to be rather low. The governments ignorance toward concerns raised by some NGOs with regard to the hasty adoption of constitutional amendments, bureaucratic harassment of independent media outlets under the pretext of tax evasions or human rights violations in the case of former officials charged with corruption and held in pretrial detention, suggests the honeymoon period has ended.
During Shevardnadzes rule the only political forces to be regularly excluded from all power games were the followers of former President Gamsachurdia, who had been ousted in the course of a violent coup detat at the beginning of 1992 and subsequently launched an uprising in 1993 before being killed in what was probably an officially sanctioned murder. Though marginalized in national politics, the Zviadist have enjoyed some support in Samegrelo, the region of Gamsachurdias birth, where the situation remained tense.
In contrast to Shevardnadzes reluctance to deal with the problem, in one of his first appointments, Saakashvili named Guram Absandze, a former member of the Gamsachurdia government, Deputy Prime Minister for National Reconciliation.
3.5. International cooperation
While relations with international organizations experienced a sharp deterioration in the last phase of Shevardnadzes rule, Saakashvili quickly declared his governments readiness to cooperate with the international donor community.
In 2003, the leaderships increasing inability or reluctance to fulfill the IMFs and the World Banks policy prescriptions, which had included demands for decisive steps toward budget consolidation, active measures against pervasive corruption and reforms of state regulation of water and electricity supplies, led to a suspension of their respective aid programs. Annoyed by persistent reform failures and especially by Shevardnadzes unexpected decision to sell strategic parts of the Georgian energy infrastructure to Russian investors a decision that cast into question Georgias reliability as a partner in U.S.-led projects for the construction of an energy corridor linking the Caspian Sea basin to Western markets Washington declared its intention to reduce bilateral aid.
Due to its inconsistent and contradictory policy, the Shevardnadze government not only lost desperately needed sources of income. It also pushed the international donor community and particularly U.S. aid agencies to take the side of the opposition. The frequent high profile visits of American diplomats virtually ensured the passage of amendments to the election law to the advantage of the opposition. Massive financial support, training and consulting provided mainly by the Soros foundation, NDI and IRI strengthened the mobilization and organizational capacities of the emerging protest movement and contributed to the successful ouster of Shevardnadze.
The new leadership under Saakashvili did its utmost to regain the trust of the international donor community. Impressive efforts at re-launching stalled reforms in accordance with international policy recommendations were accordingly rewarded with massive financial aid. At a joint European Council/World Bank conference held in Brussels in June 2004, bilateral and multilateral donors pledged 850 million euro.
However, despite this generous expression of confidence in the new leadership, European governments stopped short of encouraging Saakashvilis aspirations to join the European Union and NATO in the near future. Possibly due to persistent instability in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which entails the risk of triggering wider destabilization, the perception of improved performance in Georgia still did not translate into increased foreign investment.
While Georgian efforts at developing cooperative relations with its neighbors were always limited by Russia, which is determined to use its influence in the secessionist territories as a means to prevent stabilization and thus regain influence, the abilities of different governments to handle these structural constraints varied to a certain degree. Shevardnadzes less than prudent policy, his reluctance to withdraw hidden support from the Georgian partisans and to clear the Pankisi gorge from Chechen terrorists further increased Georgias vulnerability to Russian pressure.
Saakashvili, on the other hand, renewed attempts to normalize strained relations with Russia, paying the first visit of Georgian head of state to Moscow and proposing the establishment of a joint border patrol on both sides of the Pankisi gorge. These initial steps of rapprochement were to be rewarded with Russian agreement to oust Abashidze and return Ajara to the control of the Georgian state. However, an assault led by Tskhinvali-born Interior Minister Irakli Okruashvili on an area near the South Ossetian capital in August 2004 led to renewed confrontation with Russia.
4. Trend of development
The assessments in the following chapter will refer exclusively to the period following the Rose Revolution of November 2003.
4.1. Democratic development
Though on a formal level the core institutions of a democratic system had already been established in Georgia before the period under review, their proper functioning had been severely hampered by pervasive corruption and the constant manipulation of existing rules to the advantage of entrenched elites. The year 2003 saw a sharp deterioration in the governments respect for democratic norms, culminating in the massive election fraud of November 2. In many respects, the Rose Revolution marked a new beginning for Georgia. The new authorities carried out presidential and parliamentary elections that were widely accepted as being free and fair. They launched a massive attack on corruption and smuggling, thus contributing to the strengthening of state institutions, and they expressed the intention to restore the rule of law in many areas. But to a certain extent, their commitment to democratic norms is questionable given the limited progress made with regard to freedom of the press and respect for the human rights of prisoners.
As the ability of the newly elected authorities to implement far-reaching reforms rests primarily on the charismatic legitimacy they enjoy, the level of democratic consolidation has not yet changed significantly. Georgia is still vulnerable to destabilization, which may be brought about either by an externally supported minority of well-organized entrepreneurs of violence or by a sudden shift in popular attitudes.
4.2. Market economy development
The socioeconomic situation improved slightly in the period under review. GDP growth was achieved mainly through extensive foreign investment in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and thus did not translate into tangible gains for the vast majority of the population. Though it did allow for the repayment of pension and wage arrears accumulated by the state in previous years, the considerable increase of state revenues in 2004 did not ease social tensions as current incomes are still far from sufficient to cover even the minimum costs of livelihood.
Table: Development of macroeconomic fundamentals
Source: IMF; UNDP
Nevertheless, the economy is expected to profit from the current reform drive over the long term. Although current reforms do not imply significant changes in the institutional framework, the promise to impartially and equally implement rules has the potential to enhance predictability, a necessary precondition for economic recovery. Moreover, the new tax code adopted in 2004 introduced a new incentive structure that is much more favorable to profit-seeking business activities.
D. Strategic perspective
Georgia clearly stands at a crossroads. The reforms initiated by the current government promise to combat corruption, improve law enforcement and strengthen weak governance structures. The restoration of a public order capable of assuring predictability through the application of uniform rules undoubtedly has the potential to contribute to economic recovery. The realization of this could still be endangered from two sides.
On the one hand, all those who had gained substantial profit from the predatory modus of rule in the Shevardnadze era have strong incentives to impede the progress of reforms. They may become allies of the Russian government, which has an interest in cultivating instability in Georgia as a means to regain regional influence.
On the other hand, the government itself may decide to deviate from its course of reforms. Some indispensable but costly measures like increases in energy and water tariffs to a level of cost-efficiency still lie ahead. The new authorities may easily shrink back from decisions that are highly recommended by international organizations but are loaded with the risk that they may lose the confidence of a frustrated population. Because it has thus far failed to translate somewhat vague popular support into more stable support backed by organizational capacity, the current leadership is quite vulnerable to sudden shifts in public opinion. As has already been demonstrated, this may easily give way to the temptation to distract attention from economic hardship by engaging in adventures in South Ossetia.
In such a situation, the donor community should abstain from any kind of softening of the terms of conditionality. Moreover, it should shift its emphasis from rewarding policy outcomes to sponsoring a change in politics. Primarily, it should press for structural change in two areas: strengthening of local government and introducing recruitment procedures based on meritocracy in all branches of civil administration. Accordingly, the donor community should keep an eye on the old habit of reshuffling government agencies and administrative bodies too frequently.
|©2004 Bertelsmann Stiftung


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Virginia Republicans say Tim Kaine broke campaign pledge not to raise taxes
The Republican Party of Virginia was ready to roll when Democrat Timothy M. Kaine recently announced he will run for the U.S. Senate next year.
The GOP posted on its website a list of unflattering numerical milestones from Kaine's term as governor from 2006 to 2010.
One item particularly grabbed our attention.
Under the subhead "7 days," the GOP wrote that's "How long it took Tim Kaine to break his campaign promise not to raise taxes."
Kaine indeed asked for a tax increase on his seventh day in office. On Jan. 20, 2006, he proposed a $1 billion-a-year transportation package that called for higher levies on vehicle sales and insurance as well as increased traffic fines and registration fees.
Whether he broke a campaign promise is more complicated. Kaine held a murky position on taxes during the campaign.
So how do the Republicans justify their claim that Kaine promised not to raise taxes?
Garren Shipley, the communications director for the state GOP, pointed us to a gubernatorial debate on Oct. 9, 2005. Jerry Kilgore, the Republican nominee, charged that Kaine had a history of supporting tax increases that guaranteed he would try to raise levies as governor. Kilgore portrayed himself as a tax cutter.
"There you go again, Jerry, just making stuff up," Kaine retorted.
Shipley said Kaine's response "very strongly" implies he would not propose tax hikes.
Perhaps. But a review of the debate transcript shows Kaine could have been responding to a variety of charges and claims Kilgore made in a minute-long barrage. In any event, Kaine's reply hardly constitutes a no-tax vow.
Shipley offers a second argument that is more complex. Kaine repeatedly promised he would not seek a tax hike for transportation unless he could guarantee the revenues would be sequestered and never used for any purpose other than improving roads, rail and public transportation.
Shipley says Kaine broke his campaign vow by introducing the transportation plan without the guarantee.
Kaine did promise not to seek a tax increase for transportation unless the money was "locked up." He objected to a legislative practice of siphoning money from state transportation fund during lean times to help pay for schools, prisons and health care. The practice led to the 2002 defeat of local referendums that would have raised taxes for roads in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads. Polls showed many voters in those regions did not trust state politicians to keep their promise that the revenues would never stray from transportation.
Kaine solidified his position in a July 16, 2005, gubernatorial debate while answering a tax question posed by Bob Holsworth, a political scientist.
"I have pledged, Bob, as you said, that I will not support any increase in transportation taxes or revenues so long as the Transportation Trust Fund is unlocked," Kaine said. "I don't think I can look voters in the face and ask them for more money for transportation if there is a hole in the bucket and money is going to drain out."
Kaine at first advocated that road money be locked through passage of a state constitutional amendment shielding transportation money from raids. But enacting a constitutional amendment is a three-year process. Business leaders in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads weren't willing to wait that long to ease traffic congestion.
So Kaine, in August 2005, altered his position to open the possibility of raising taxes during his first year in office. While still endorsing a constitutional amendment, he gave himself wiggle room by saying he was also open to locking the transportation money through other means. Kaine was short on details.
Days after his inauguration, Kaine offered specifics in his State of the Commonwealth address. He said that in lieu of a constitutional fix, he would amend any new transportation tax or revenue laws to ensure they would expire if the money was shifted to other programs. He also promised to veto any budget that diverted transportation money.
Kaine's protections would not have made the funds tamper-proof, however. The General Assembly was empowered to override any amendments or vetoes Kaine might use to safeguard the money. And future governors would not be bound by any commitments Kaine made to shield funds.
When he unveiled his transportation plan on Jan. 20, the GOP criticized Kaine for breaching his campaign pledge not to raise taxes for transportation without a lock. The Richmond Times-Dispatch noted, however, in its following-day story, that Kaine as a candidate "refused to rule out new road taxes."
Kaine's bill died in the Republican-led House of Delegates, which has been and remains opposed to raising taxes. The 2005 House also killed 10 bills that would have placed before voters a constitutional amendment to put a lock on transportation money.
Let's review:
The Republican Party of Virginia says that within a week of becoming governor in 2006, Kaine broke a promise not to raise taxes. Kaine indeed proposed a $1 billion transportation tax increase on his seventh day in office.
There's no evidence Kaine made a no-tax pledge during the 2005 campaign. To the contrary, Kaine set conditions under which he would seek a tax hike for transportation. Kaine did, however, leave himself open for criticism by compromising those conditions once he got into office.
We rate the GOP claim Barely True.
Editor's note: This statement was rated Barely True when it was published. On July 27, 2011, we changed the name for the rating to Mostly False.

subset: commoncrawl


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If you are suffering from diseases like chronic joint pain, then there is nothing better than consuming herbs. Such a pain may occur due to a lot of reasons, namely, wrong body postures or due to some stretch.
The good thing about herbs is that there are no side-effects of herbs and the culture of consumption of herbs to cure joint pains and even to improve immunity, in general, has seen its traces in ancient past, since the time of Ayurveda. Have a look at the best four herbs that are potent joint-pain relievers:
Herbs That Relieve Joint Pain
Burdock is a dark-green plant, having large leaves. If one is suffering from irritating joint pain, then having Burdock roots in the food may help. It is the best herbal remedy available in the market. Burdock's root contains large amount of phytosterols, which helps in reducing swellings caused by any injury and is well known for relieving any kind of joint pains in the body.
Cats Claw
Nature has given us so many gifts; it depends on our use of them, whether or not we use them for our benefit. Cat Claw is one of those natural gifts. It was in the year 1957 that doctors realised that Cat Claw is truly effective in stabilizing any kind of swellings and joint pains. Cat Claw is found in the stems of pineapple. It directly contacts with the central nervous system of our body and helps in reducing joint pains. This herb forms a constituent of the ingredients of not just Ayurvedic medicines, but certain homeopathic and allopathic joint pain relieving medicines, too.
Arnica is another herb which possesses the natural qualities of a potent join-pain reliever. Due to its softness and its yellow-orange look, it looks quite similar to the sunflower plant. Medical sciences across the globe have reached the consensus that Arnica is an absolutely harmless herb which is truly effective in curing joint pains among humans. It is assumed that an improvement in and the regulation of blood circulation of the body may lead to a considerable decline in joint pain; the good news is that Arnica does exactly this – regulating blood circulation.
A handsome portion of the world population consumes turmeric on a daily basis and turmeric forms the basic ingredient of their everyday food, in almost every dish – be it cooked vegetables or sweet-dishes. The Ayurvedic benefits of turmeric have been known for thousands of years now. Mix half a spoon of turmeric in a glass of hot milk to get rid of not only joint pains. Its anti-inflammatory property makes it a favourite herbal medicine to cure common bruises on skin, cuts in the flesh or injuries which cause swellings and joint-pains. It contains antioxidants and, as a result, works as an antiseptic in even serious injuries and helps at the time of bleeding.
Using herbs is an absolutely harmless yet effective way of getting rid of joint pains. One can, without any hesitation or apprehensions, try out the above-mentioned conveniently available and easily consumable remedies and see the instant positive effects thereof.


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Dallas, TX
(972) 432-1440
Mr. Fischer joined NGP in 2017 and serves as an Associate. He concentrates on NGP's efforts in sourcing investments, transaction analysis, and execution as well as the monitoring of active portfolios.
Prior to joining NGP, Mr. Fischer was an Investment Banking Analyst with Scotiabank's Global Energy Group, focusing on financing and merger and acquisition transactions in the oil and gas industry.
Mr. Fischer received a B.B.A. in Finance in 2014 from the University of Texas at Austin.


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On his latest release, Unexpected, Grammy winner Jason Crabb enlists the help of a few high profile friends, including Jay DeMarcus (Rascal Flatts) as producer and Gary LeVox (Rascal Flatts) as a duet partner on "You Chose To Be My Friend." Pop singer Kaya Jones also guests on the tender "Let It Be Love."
As someone known for his southern and country roots, however, Crabb's most surprising collaborator may be Disco Queen Gloria Gaynor ("I Will Survive") who struck up a friendship with the Kentucky native on Twitter. During his debut solo performance at Carnegie Hall, Crabb invited Gaynor onstage to sing, helping her mark off a bucket list item.
In that song and throughout the release, Crabb sings about his love for God, family and friends. Other highlights include the rousing "Washed By The Water" the southern rock opener, "Expect the Unexpected," and the touching ode to children, "Short Are The Years," which will evoke emotional responses from sentimental parents.
With his powerful vocals on display and a highly enjoyable blend of memorable tracks, Unexpected is an enjoyable and inspirational listening experience. It is sure to please Crabb's longtime listeners and earn many new ones in the process.
See Jason and Gloria sing together here:


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Format: Audiobook, eBook
Find Her by Lisa Gardner
Narrator: Kirsten Potter
Length: 12 hrs and 16 mins
Date Read: February 2016
Genre: Police Thriller, Thriller
More Information:
Flora Dane is a victim.
Seven years ago, carefree college student Flora was kidnapped while on spring break. For 472 days, Flora learned just how much one person can endure.
Flora Dane is a survivor.
Miraculously alive after her ordeal, Flora has spent the past five years reacquainting herself with the rhythms of normal life, working with her FBI victim advocate, Samuel Keynes. She has a mother who's never stopped loving her, a brother who is scared of the person she's become, and a bedroom wall covered with photos of other girls who've never made it home.
Flora Dane is reckless.
. . . or is she? When Boston detective D. D. Warren is called to the scene of a crime—a dead man and the bound, naked woman who killed him—she learns that Flora has tangled with three other suspects since her return to society. Is Flora a victim or a vigilante? And with her firsthand knowledge of criminal behavior, could she hold the key to rescuing a missing college student whose abduction has rocked Boston? When Flora herself disappears, D.D. realizes a far more sinister predator is out there. One who's determined that this time, Flora Dane will never escape. And now it is all up to D. D. Warren to find her.
Publisher: Dutton
Also by this author: Maggie's Man, FaceOff, Crash & Burn, 3 Truths and a Lie br> br>
Read for Review/Listened for Fun (NetGalley/Audible)
Overall Rating: 4.25
Story Rating: 4.50
Character Rating: 4.00
Audio Rating: 4.50 (not part of my overall rating)
First Thought when Finished: Having read this once and listened once, I can say Find Her is one of those thrillers that actually hold up on reread!
Quick Thoughts: There isn't much that I can say about the story without giving things away. So I am going to be a little general! At first, I wasn't sure if I was going to like Flora's POV but it ended up being oh so important. The parallel figuring out of who was behind the crime was scary good. The twists and turns are exactly what you expect from Lisa Gardner. In other words, don't get to comfortable in thinking you figured it out. She is likely to pull the rug out from under you at least once. I also love that her endings are not predictable. I love DD, she is an excellent cop. Though, in this case, I love that Lisa made her not likable at times because it really showed some character growth. She learned a lot this story about team work and knowing limitations. Find Her definitely delivered on all levels.
Audio Thoughts:
Narrated By Kirsten Potter / Length: 12 hrs and 16 mins
Kirsten nailed this performance. The Flora sections were chilling and very vivid. Her pacing difference between Flora and DD was spectacular. I can't recommend listening to this enough. You really need to feel the emotions that Kirsten nails. Crazy Good!
Part of my Read It, Rate It, File It, DONE! Reviews
|Overall Rating
|Story Rating
|Character Rating
|Narrator Rating
Felicia S
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Understanding The Process Of Pressure Washing
Pressure washing is considered as one of the best ways of refreshing the look of a property. The process of pressure washing includes cleaning of dust and grime from your home's siding, decking and several other surfaces.
Whether it is the outer walls, patio or shed driveway, when dust and grime gets accumulated on your house, the visual value of your home get reduced. Therefore the pressure cleaning comes out to be the best solution that will make your place look completely new.
This particular task can be performed either by yourself or with the help of pressure washer contractors Long Island wide. The first step is to get a quality pressure washer. It is the equipment with the help of which one can continue pressure washing on a place that you want to clean.
Hiring a professional company for handling the cleaning task of your house is the best idea. Before moving further with pressure washing, there are certain factors that need your consideration:
You must first understand the type of junk that you need to wash out. This is important since pressure washing can remove the grime, dust, mud, mold and dirt. Adjusting the nozzle of the pressure washer is essential as it will make sure that all the dirt has been removed from the required place.
If you are not experienced in handling pressure washing, you must hire the pressure washing services Long Island to get the things done in the right way.
You must be able to comprehend and identify when the pressure is too low or too high. High pressure can cause damage to brick, wood and paint and if the pressure is too low, the surfaces will not get completely clean.
You may read more about pressure washing and its techniques via the internet.


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K7 Total Security 2018 Crack is a software developed which helps keeping the computer operating system safe from the threats and dangers that we can get online. This software is made by the company known as the Total Security. This company has tried giving protection to many people around the world with the use of this application. This is best known for the protection that it provides over the online activity of the computer user. There are many viruses and dangers that could attack our computers and have impact on the working of it. So, it is best to have an application like this in the computer.
K7 Total Security 2018 Crack + Serial Key Free Download Latest
This software is designed for the personal computers. It allows the user to use such tools which will help him in the fight against any type of virus. That virus may get into the computer through an online source or may be offline source. Thus, it does not matter what the source of virus has been. The important thing is that measure that we take to prevent our computer from it. The viruses could in the way of our daily routine workings and the work could get stopped due to it. It can also cause total malfunctioning of the system which is not a good thing. This software is very helpful in detecting any type of problem and dealing with it.
The software of K7 Total Security provides us with the features and tools which will scan through the whole computer system at once and look for a virus of any kind. Even a small virus could many problems in the system. Therefore, we need serious things to handle it. This will also look for any type of malicious and malware content or file in the computer and helps the user in its eradication. The termination of viruses from the computer has been very important. We depend on computers and systems very much these days for our work. Therefore, the care of computers in this regard is vey necessary.
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While using the computer for online processes, there is a chance that the user might reveal his real identity to someone. There are many hackers out there which could find the real ID of the user and steal the precious data from his computer. Many security software packs will also have a chance to show the identity but not in the case of this software. It keeps the real ID protected from all sort of websites. In this way, whenever we are dealing online, it remains safe. There are many websites that are used for phishing. These are very real threat on the online working. This software keeps us saved from these kinds of sites so that our data and identity remains saved in all cases.
The user can have total control of the system using this software. The software also works according to the wishes of the user. It will not work regardless of his demand. The user will be able to fix the timing of scanningthe whole computer on a routine. The timing of the scan could be fixed and then the user will have nothing to be worried about as all will happen on its own. Confined files are managed through this software. The regular scan of the system will help in the easy going of the system and its better working. The total control of the software is given to the user.
The username and identity of all kinds are hidden using the features of this application. this application is famous for its easy features. Those will help in the safe internet activity. The dealings of the bank where the account numbers, user names, passwords are involved, they are all saved by the software from falling into the wrong hands. This is one of the other remarkable features of this application.
The good thing about this software is that it is very easy to be used. this software does not require any experience for the workings. The user can have a very friendly interface. The software will be easy to download from the internet. It is very easy to be installed in the same case. The user will have no difficulty in the understanding of mechanism of this software. It is also the best one to be used for the children. The area of their searches on the internet could be limited so that they will not end up in being on the wrong side. The activity of the child over the internet could also be tracked using this software. Thus, it is an all in on software for protection of system. That is because, this software is being by so many people around the world and it has been receiving more praise and love.
K7 Total Security 2018 Crack + Serial Key
Main Key Features:
- Best software to protect the system from threats of online activity
- It is very easy to be used
- The software comes with a friendly interface
- It can be downloaded easily from the internet
- Optimizes the computer for best usage
- Does not consume much resources of the computer
- The scanning timings of the computer can be decided
- The online activity could be viewed
- It can help us in securing the browsing of our children
- Saves the computer from all types of viruses
- The malware content is immediately found and terminated by the software
- The viruses over the internet are blocked
- Saves the user from harmful sites over the whole internet
- Keeps the identity of the user secured and hidden
- The software updates automatically for the best protection
- One of the best software in handling the system security
- This does not come up with any effect on other software of computer
- Does not consume much memory over the system
- The hardlyhas any harm effects on the computer. It does not have any kind of problem and works smoothly on the system.
System Requirements:
- It is the latest version which works with windows
- Windows 7,8.8.1, and 10
- HDD Space 6.8-MB
- 500-MB Ram
- 1-GHz Processor Sufficient
How To Crack This Software:
- Download it from the link in the page
- Run the setup file and let it install
- After completion of installation open the installation folder
- Copy the crack from the downloaded folder and move it in the installation
- Use the Crack to unlock the premium features
- Now enjoy a full and free version


text: I'll tell you this: ever since I was born in the 1970s, Buffalo had been stagnant and/or declining. Hundreds of thousands of people left the city for dead. But like a phoenix rising from the ashes, Buffalo is tangibly on its way back-to-life in amazing ways. If you haven't been to downtown Buffalo, here's the news: it has changed a lot since the last time you were there, complete with new streetscapes, buildings, cranes and activity. While still "in development" at the present moment, it's definitely becoming a hot spot for the whole region, as many older buildings, long vacant, are being rehabbed, refreshed and/or made new. Buffalo is a city in positive transition. The doom-and-gloom cloud that lingered over it for decades has gone away. Despite challenges, or perhaps because of them, Buffalo– including downtown Buffalo– is finally rising again! –Mark Weber


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Developing User Interfaces for Android LiveLessons teaches developers how to develop beautiful and effective user interfaces for their Android applications.
In this video training, Adam breaks down Android user interfaces. He starts with an overview of Android user interfaces, and the components that make them up. Next, he dives down the discuss Android user interface widgets and then works his way back up, showing how widgets are organized into layouts and screens, and finally how good applications organize and consistently navigate between different application screens. Each step in the training video features extensive walkthroughs of Android source code, including new components available only in the Android "L" release. After watching this video, developers will understand how to design and build usable and effective Android user interfaces - from the ground up.
Adam Porter, Professor of Computer Science at the University of Maryland, has over 30 years experience as a computer scientist, consultant and programmer. He has published extensively in the areas of software engineering and is the designer and instructor of the largest online Android course ever created (with approx. 1/4 Million students for one offering) - Programming Handheld Applications for Android Handheld Systems.
Skill Level
What You Will Learn
Who Should Take This Course
Course Requirements
Table of Contents
Lesson 1: Mobile Application User Interfaces
1.1. Summarize how mobile devices differ from traditional computers
1.2. Define user interface concepts and terminology for mobile applications
Lesson 2: Introducing Material Design: Android's New User Interface Metaphor
2.1. Summarize the goals and principles underlying the Material Design metaphor
2.2. Recognize the stylistic choices made by the Material Design metaphor
2.3. Understand how motion supports the Material Design metaphor
Lesson 3: UI Widgets
3.1. Summarize basic Android UI widgets
3.2. Handle UI interactions using the Listener pattern
3.3. Handle text input using the virtual keyboard
3.4. Summarize advanced Android UI widgets
3.5. Display data sets using Adapters and AdapterViewsLesson 4: UI Layouts
4.1. Compose user interface components using Layouts
4.2. Define layouts using the Container Model
4.3. Summarize common Android Layout classes
4.4. Create custom user interface layouts
4.5. Encapsulate design choices using styles and themes
Lesson 5: Android's Application Classes
5.1. Use the Activity class and its lifecycle
5.2. Use the Fragment class and its lifecycle
5.3. Create an app for multiple, differently-sized devices
Lesson 6: User Notifications
6.1. Present information using Toast messages
6.2. Interact with users via dialogs
6.3. Present commonly-used actions via menus
6.4. Inform users of events using Notification Area notifications
Lesson 7: Android App Design Patterns and Guidelines
7.1. Recognize an application's activity structure
7.2. Implement back and up navigation using the Action Bar
7.3. Use tabs and tab swiping to navigate between UI screens
7.4. Support general navigation using the Navigation Drawer
LiveLessons Video Training series publishes hundreds of hands-on, expert-led video tutorials covering a wide selection of technology topics designed to teach you the skills you need to succeed. This professional and personal technology video series features world-leading author instructors published by your trusted technology brands: Addison-Wesley, Cisco Press, IBM Press, Pearson IT Certification, Prentice Hall, Sams, and Que. Topics include: IT Certification, Programming, Web Development, Mobile Development, Home and Office Technologies, Business and Management, and more. View all LiveLessons on InformIT at: http://www.informit.com/livelessons


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Spotted: Brand New Elandra Palm Joins LSC's Ranks
Latvian Shipping Company's arm LCS Shipmanagement has expanded its fleet with a newbuild Elandra Palm. In today's spotted we present you this new tanker that will transport oil and chemical substances.
Tanker Elandra Palm is the second out of three new ships being built by the South Korea-based shipbuilding company SSP Shipbuilding. The first of the three ships, Elandra Spruce, was received on January 11, while the final fleet addition from the series is expected in May with the delivery of Elandra Oak.
"LSCSM adds the next ship to the fleet under its management to reach its maximum petroleum and chemical substance transportation capacity," Robert Kirkup, Latvian Shipping Company's Chairman of the Management Board says.
The 50,300 dwt Elandra Palm has a length of 183 meters and width of 32 meters. According Marine Traffic, its current position is North China.
Latvian Shipping Company has 22 ships in its fleet.


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Things are stirring in the land of the headhunters. Nestled just beneath the majors of global executive search firms – Egon Zehnder, Korn Ferry, Russell Reynolds, Spencer Stuart and Heidrick & Struggles – are DHR International and CTPartners.
DHR, owned by the Hoffmann family of Chicago, made a cash takeover bid recently for the Wall Street firm CTPartners. This means DHR, which went belly-up in Australia in 2013 – or at least alleges it went belly-up – is likely to swallow the CTPartners operation in Australia some time soon.
This should be interesting; a bunch of creditors and liquidator John Vouris are chasing Chicago mob DHR for – how do we phrase this? – the racy nature of their departure from these shores, or apparent departure. Was it a real departure?
In November 2012, DHI, the Australian subsidiary of the Chicago mob, withdrew $293,264 from its bank account and sent it offshore. By March the next year things were said to be going all right. Directors signed off on the financial statements – solvent, they said.
However, only a month later they axed the staff. And after receiving a breach notice from the landlord in March, a Hong Kong entity controlled by the Chicago mob, DHR International Asia, removed the company's plant and equipment from the premises.
They shipped it to South Korea. A former insider told Fairfax Media they "shipped the Korean microwave back to Korea and even shipped the jar of peanut butter". The computers and legal records went too.
By June, administrators were appointed. Mr Vouris, of PKF Lawler, turned liquidator in July. He is now seeking orders for a court examination of directors and staff.
Insiders say it was a phoenix job – that is, the assets were stripped and the business is operating now under another name. The Australian entity DHI had headhunting clients in Australia who creditors say were transferred to another DHR entity in Hong Kong. These included a contract with paint-maker Wattyl.
Executives of this entity were contacted for comment but declined to speak. One hung up on your humble essayist but not before saying she could not talk because legal claims were afoot.
This director, and others working for DHR, have Australian phone numbers but, like the latest-greatest digital play Uber the taxi service, there is no corporate entity in Australia. Despite assignments for Australian clients searching for Australian candidates for an Australian-based role, there is no living Australian corporate incarnation of DHR any more, only the entity in the tax haven of Singapore.
Needless to say, creditors are not thrilled with this situation, and not just because the peanut butter disappeared so abruptly. The great thing about going into administration is that one's obligations can be extinguished rapidly, assuming there is no action by regulators or a lawsuit by the liquidator.
So it is that if one attends a creditors meeting one is likely to see a representative of the Australian Tax Office nearby looking quite bored and world-weary. They attend many such meetings.
In the case of the Chicago mob, the staff might have been paid out, were it not for the transfer of the assets before the demise of DHI. Instead – and this is the broader angle – the Chicago mob is trying to rely on the Australian taxpayer to fund its employee entitlements.
A letter to the corporate regulator from a big creditor says: "DHR's course of action whereby the major shareholder transferred assets to itself rather than paying employees and instead sought to rely on the Australian Fair Entitlements Guarantee". This government guarantee, formerly known as the GEERS scheme, pays company staff when there is nothing left in the estate.
Ergo, the taxpayer is picking up the bill for a mob from Chicago, which claims to be the fifth-largest company in its sector in the world, which still operates in Australia (although claiming to operate in Singapore) and which is about to buy the seventh-largest headhunting firm in Australia after going bust only two years ago – thanks to its own actions in stripping out cash before it bit the dust and called in administrators.
An email to Australian employees from one of the Chicago mob, Kevin Kummer, dated April 20, 2013, says: "As of April 2nd DH International ceased operations and terminated all employees. As such we want to make sure we take the correct legal steps to shut down the business to ensure all former employees are properly paid either by DH or by the Australian government scheme Fair Entitlements Guarantee". FEG, que?
Bear in mind these instructions from the Chicago mob were made after the peanut butter, and other things like records, had been decided to be shipped to Korea.
Now, loathe as one is to be populist, we call upon readers now to consider whether their taxpayer dollars should be deployed in this exercise of paying out employees of what is ultimately a large Chicago firm, which has already obliterated its obligations to the Australian Tax Office via an administration, but which is poised to arise phoenix-like from the ashes of its predecessor as one of the big players in the world of executive recruitment.
Meanwhile, the prey of the Chicago mob – that is, CTPartners – is looking quite vulnerable because its stock price went into freefall in the wake of reports in the US media that its chief executive Brian Sullivan and other executives stripped naked in front of female employees at a staff gathering, "formed a rugby-like scrum and ran into the ocean".
Now the matter is before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.


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group is a topic covered in the Taber's Medical Dictionary.
To view the entire topic, please sign in or purchase a subscription.
Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary Online + App from F.A. Davis and Unbound Medicine. Find 65,000 medical and nursing definitions. Download to iPhone, iPad, and Android. Explore these free sample topics:
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(groop )
A number of similar objects or structures considered together, e.g., bacteria with similar metabolic characteristics. Atomic molecules and compounds with similar structures or properties are classified with certain groups.
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Venes, Donald, editor. "Group." Taber's Medical Dictionary, 23rd ed., F.A. Davis Company, 2017. Taber's Online, www.tabers.com/tabersonline/view/Tabers-Dictionary/738684/all/group.
Group. In: Venes D, ed. Taber's Medical Dictionary. 23rd ed. F.A. Davis Company; 2017. https://www.tabers.com/tabersonline/view/Tabers-Dictionary/738684/all/group. Accessed December 16, 2019.
Group. (2017). In Venes, D. (Ed.), Taber's Medical Dictionary. Available from https://www.tabers.com/tabersonline/view/Tabers-Dictionary/738684/all/group
Group [Internet]. In: Venes D, editors. Taber's Medical Dictionary. F.A. Davis Company; 2017. [cited 2019 December 16]. Available from: https://www.tabers.com/tabersonline/view/Tabers-Dictionary/738684/all/group.
* Article titles in AMA citation format should be in sentence-case
TY - ELEC T1 - group ID - 738684 ED - Venes,Donald, BT - Taber's Medical Dictionary UR - https://www.tabers.com/tabersonline/view/Tabers-Dictionary/738684/all/group PB - F.A. Davis Company ET - 23 DB - Taber's Online DP - Unbound Medicine ER -


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Over the last decade, dentistry has evidenced an increase in use of full arch metal implant supported prosthetics as a replacement for missing teeth in edentulous patients. Nevertheless, rising patient demands for metal free restorations, and improved comfort, as well as clinician demands for improved biomechanical performance are shaping the future of dental prostheses.
Understanding these parameters and developing solutions that can meet these needs will not only shape the future, but will lead to the total transformation of the dental prostheses market as we know it.
In interview, Dr Rajesh Vijay (BDS) shares his experiences of using the JUVORA Dental Disc as an alternative to metal and the benefits he believes it is bringing to his patients. Dr Vijay is clinical director at Evodental clinic and honorary clinical teaching fellow in dentistry within the faculty of medical and human sciences at the University of Manchester.
Some of the key highlights of the interview include:


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Not everything we do is about fashion and style (although most of it is!), so I wanted to bring you a little list of some of our favorite happenings this holiday season.
I am obsessed with ice skating! What is more beautiful than ice skating outdoors in downtown Raleigh!? Check out Raleigh Winterfest.
The Nutcracker at Memorial Auditorium at Duke Energy Center for the Performing Arts. Starts December 20. Next to ice skating, The Nutcracker is a holiday tradition for many of us!
This is the last weekend to have tea with Santa at The Umstead. Take your little one and have a moment with Santa before things really heat up next week!
Chapel Hill
Learn how to make amazing holiday cookies with your kids at Southern Season. December 22.
Afternoon tea at The Carolina Inn. A fancy way to celebrate the holidays!
Free weekend parking in downtown Chapel Hill! Make it easier on yourself this holiday season by enjoying free parking when you come see us on Franklin St.
Miracle on 34th St. at Armour Street Theater. A holiday classic brought to life in Davidson, NC!
Come see Santa in Birkdale Village–Friday through Tuesday only. Get in your wish list while there's a little time left.
Holiday Light Safari!? Drive your own vehicle through nearly 100 acres magically decorated with millions of twinkling lights, dazzling holiday themes, light sculptures, plus herds of live animals. Hollywild.
Make sure you follow us on Facebook and Instagram to stay tuned in to what's happening with Uniquities!