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Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980)
Lewis v. United States
No. 78-1595
Argued January 7, 1980
Decided February 27, 1980
Held: Even though petitioner's extant prior state court felony conviction may be subject to collateral attack under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, it could properly be used as a predicate for his subsequent conviction for possession of a firearm in violation of § 1202(a)(1) of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Pp. 445 U. S. 60-68.
(a) The plain meaning of § 1202(a)(1)'s sweeping language proscribing the possession of firearms by any person who "has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State . . . of a felony," is that the fact of a felony conviction imposes firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action. Other provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce its broad sweep, and there is nothing in § 1202(a)(1)'s legislative history to suggest that Congress was willing to allow a defendant to question the validity of his prior conviction as a defense to a charge under § 1202(a)(1). Moreover, the fact that there are remedies available to a convicted felon -- removal of the firearm disability by a qualifying pardon or the Secretary of the Treasury's consent, as specified in the Act, or a challenge to the prior conviction in an appropriate court proceeding -- suggests that Congress intended that the defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress' purpose to keep firearms away from persons classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous. Pp. 445 U. S. 60-65.
(b) The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since Congress could rationally conclude that any felony conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. And use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for imposing a civil firearms disability, enforceable by criminal sanction, is not inconsistent with Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109; United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443; and Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473. Pp. 445 U. S. 65-67.
591 F.2d 978, affirmed. chanrobles.com-red
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J.,and STEWART, WHITE, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and POWELL, JJ., joined, post, p. 445 U. S. 68.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a defendant's extant prior conviction, flawed because he was without counsel, as required by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), may constitute the predicate for a subsequent conviction under § 1202(a)(1), as amended, of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1). [Footnote 1]
In 1961, petitioner George Calvin Lewis, Jr., upon his plea of guilty, was convicted in a Florida state court of a felony chanrobles.com-red
for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. See Fla.Stat. § 810.05 (1961). He served a term of imprisonment. That conviction has never been overturned, nor has petitioner ever received a qualifying pardon or permission from the Secretary of the Treasury to possess a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.App. § 1203(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
In January, 1977, Lewis, on probable cause, was arrested in Virginia, and later was charged by indictment with having knowingly received and possessed at that time a specified firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1). [Footnote 2] He waived a jury and was given a bench trial. It was stipulated that the weapon in question had been shipped in interstate commerce. The Government introduced in evidence an exemplified copy of the judgment and sentence in the 1961 Florida felony proceeding. App. 10.
Shortly before the trial, petitioner's counsel informed the court that he had been advised that Lewis was not represented by counsel in the 1961 Florida proceeding. [Footnote 3] He claimed that, under Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, a violation of § 1202(a)(1) chanrobles.com-red
could not be predicated on a prior conviction obtained in violation of petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court rejected that claim, ruling that the constitutionality of the outstanding Florida conviction was immaterial with respect to petitioner's status under § 1202(a)(1) as a previously convicted felon at the time of his arrest. Petitioner, accordingly, offered no evidence as to whether, in fact, he had been convicted in 1961 without the aid of counsel. We therefore assume, for present purposes, that he was without counsel at that time.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed. 591 F.2d 978 (1979). It held that a defendant, purely as a defense to a prosecution under 1292(a)(1), could not attack collaterally an outstanding prior felony conviction, and that the statutory prohibition applied irrespective of whether that prior conviction was subject to collateral attack. The Court of Appeals also rejected Lewis' constitutional argument to the effect that the use of the prior conviction as a predicate for his prosecution under § 1202(a)(1) violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Because of conflict among the Courts of Appeals, [Footnote 4] we granted certiorari. 442 U.S. 939 (1979). chanrobles.com-red
Four cases decided by this Court provide the focus for petitioner's attack upon his conviction. The first and pivotal one is Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, where the Court held that a state felony conviction without counsel, and without a valid waiver of counsel, was unconstitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That ruling is fully retroactive. Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U. S. 847 (1971). chanrobles.com-red
The second case is Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967). There, the Court held that a conviction invalid under Gideon could not be used for enhancement of punishment under a State's recidivist statute. The third is United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972), where it was held that such a conviction could not be considered by a court in sentencing a defendant after a subsequent conviction. And the fourth is Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972), where the Court disallowed the use of the conviction to impeach the general credibility of the defendant. The prior conviction, the plurality opinion said, "lacked reliability." Id. at 405 U. S. 484, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 381 U. S. 639, and n. 20 (1965).
We, of course, accept these rulings for purposes of the present case. Petitioner's position, however, is that the four cases require a reversal of his conviction under § 1202(a)(1) on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
The Court has stated repeatedly of late that, in any case concerning the interpretation of a statute, the "starting point" must be the language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 442 U. S. 337 (1979). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 442 U. S. 568 (1979); Southestern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 442 U. S. 405 (1979). An examination of § 1202(a)(1) reveals that its proscription is directed unambiguously at any person who "has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State . . . of a felony." No modifier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction on the scope of the term "convicted."
"Nothing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage to persons [whose convictions are not subject to collateral attack]."
United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 435 U. S. 373 (1978); see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 441 U. S. 772 (1979). The statutory language is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is chanrobles.com-red
relieved of his disability by some affirmative action, such as a qualifying pardon or a consent from the Secretary of the Treasury. [Footnote 5] The obvious breadth of the language may well reflect the expansive legislative approach revealed by Congress' express findings and declarations, in 18 U.S.C.App. § 1201, [Footnote 6] concerning the problem of firearm abuse by felons and certain specifically described persons.
Other provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce its broad sweep. Section 1203 enumerates exceptions to chanrobles.com-red
1202(a)(1) (a prison inmate who by reason of his duties has expressly been entrusted with a firearm by prison authority; a person who has been pardoned and who has expressly been authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm). In addition, § 1202(c)(2) defines "felony" to exclude certain state crimes punishable by no more than two years' imprisonment. No exception, however, is made for a person whose outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be invalid for any reason. On its face, therefore, § 1202(a)(1) contains nothing by way of restrictive language. It thus stands in contrast with other federal statutes that explicitly permit a defendant to challenge, by way of defense, the validity or constitutionality of the predicate felony. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (dangerous special offender) and 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2) (recidivism under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
When we turn to the legislative history of § 1202(a)(1), we find nothing to suggest that Congress was willing to allow a defendant to question the validity of his prior conviction as a defense to a charge under § 1202(a)(1). The section was enacted as part of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, 82 Stat. 236. It was added by way of a floor amendment to the Act, and thus was not a subject of discussion in the legislative reports. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 442 U. S. 120 (1979); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S. 563, 431 U. S. 569-570 (1977); United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 404 U. S. 344, and n. 11 (1971). What little legislative history there is that is relevant reflects an intent to impose a firearms disability on any felon based on the fact of conviction. Senator Long, who introduced and directed the passage of Title VII, repeatedly stressed conviction, not a "valid" conviction, and not a conviction not subject to constitutional challenge, as the criterion. For example, the Senator observed:
"So, under Title VII, every citizen could possess a gun
until the commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction, however, Title VII would deny every assassin, murderer, thief and burglar of the right to possess a firearm in the future except where he has been pardoned by the President or a State Governor and had been expressedly authorized by his pardon to possess a firearm."
114 Cong.Rec. 14773 (1968). See also id. at 13868, 14774. Inasmuch as Senator Long was the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his statements are entitled to weight. Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 435 U. S. 13 (1978).
It is not without significance, furthermore, that Title VII, as well as Title IV of the Omnibus Act, was enacted in response to the precipitous rise in political assassinations, riots, and other violent crimes involving firearms, that occurred in this country in the 1960's. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 76-78 (1968); H.R.Rep. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968); S.Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 22-23 (1968). This Court, accordingly, has observed:
"The legislative history [of Title VII] in its entirety, while brief, further supports the view that Congress sought to rule broadly -- to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that 'they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.'"
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. at 431 U. S. 572.
The legislative history, therefore, affords no basis for a loophole, by way of a collateral constitutional challenge, to the broad statutory scheme enacted by Congress. Section 1202(a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms, against misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to require the Government to prove the validity of the predicate conviction.
The very structure of the Omnibus Act's Title IV, enacted chanrobles.com-red
simultaneously with Title VII, reinforces this conclusion. Each Title prohibits categories of presumptively dangerous persons from transporting or receiving firearms. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and (h). Actually, with regard to the statutory question at issue here, we detect little significant difference between Title IV and Title VII. Each seeks to keep a firearm away from "any person . . . who has been convicted" of a felony, although the definition of "felony" differs somewhat in the respective statutes. But to limit the scope of §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1) to a validly convicted felon would be at odds with the statutory scheme as a whole. Those sections impose a disability not only on a convicted felon, but also on a person under a felony indictment, even if that person subsequently is acquitted of the felony charge. Since the fact of mere indictment is a disabling circumstance, a fortiori the much more significant fact of conviction must deprive the person of a right to a firearm.
Finally, it is important to note that a convicted felon is not without relief. As has been observed above, the Omnibus Act, in §§ 1203(2) and 925(c), states that the disability may be removed by a qualifying pardon or the Secretary's consent. Also, petitioner, before obtaining his firearm, could have challenged his prior conviction in an appropriate proceeding in the Florida state courts. See Fla.Const., Art. 5, § 5(3); L'Hommedieu v. State, 362 So.2d 72 (Fla.App. 1978); Weir v. State, 319 So.2d 80 (Fla.App. 1975). See also United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 (1954). [Footnote 7]
It seems fully apparent to us that the existence of these remedies, two of which are expressly contained in the Omnibus Act itself, suggests that Congress clearly intended that the defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress' purpose "broadly to keep firearms away chanrobles.com-red
from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous." Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212, 423 U. S. 218 (1976).
With the face of the statute and the legislative history so clear, petitioner's argument that the statute nevertheless should be construed so as to avoid a constitutional issue is inapposite. That course is appropriate only when the statute provides a fair alternative construction. This statute could not be more plain. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 430 U. S. 378, and n. 11 (1977); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 422 U. S. 122-123. Similarly, any principle of lenity, see Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 401 U. S. 812 (1971), has no application. The touchstone of that principle is statutory ambiguity. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 415 U. S. 832 (1974); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 121-122. There is no ambiguity here.
We therefore hold that § 1202(a)(1) prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds.
The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is
"some 'rational basis' for the statutory distinctions made . . . or . . . they 'have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.'"
Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 414 U. S. 422 (1974), quoting from McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 410 U. S. 270 (1973), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, 383 U. S. 111 (1966). See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 440 U. S. 97 (1979). [Footnote 8] chanrobles.com-red
Section 1202(a)(1) clearly meets that test. Congress, as its expressed purpose in enacting Title VII reveals, 18 U.S.C. App § 1201, was concerned that the receipt and possession of a firearm by a felon constitutes a threat, among other things, to the continued and effective operation of the Government of the United States. The legislative history of the gun control laws discloses Congress' worry about the easy availability of firearms, especially to those persons who pose a threat to community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus between violent crime and the possession of a firearm by any person with a criminal record. 114 Cong.Rec. 13220-(1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings); id. at 16298 (remarks of Rep. Pollock). Congress could rationally conclude that any felony conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. See, e.g., United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 891-892 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976). This Court has recognized repeatedly that a legislature constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities far more fundamental than the possession of a firearm. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24 (1974) (disenfranchisement); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144 (1960) (proscription against holding office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898) (prohibition against the practice of medicine).
We recognize, of course, that, under the Sixth Amendment, an uncounseled felony conviction cannot be used for certain purposes. See Burgett, Tucker, and Loper, all supra. The Court, however, has never suggested that an uncounseled conviction chanrobles.com-red
is invalid for all purposes. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (1979); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 482, n. 11 (plurality opinion).
Use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for imposing a civil firearms disability, enforceable by a criminal sanction, is not inconsistent with Burgett, Tucker, and Loper. In each of those cases, this Court found that the subsequent conviction or sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because it depended upon the reliability of a past uncounseled conviction. The federal gun laws, however, focus not on reliability, but on the mere fact of conviction or even indictment, in order to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous persons. Congress' judgment that a convicted felon -- even one whose conviction was allegedly uncounseled -- is among the class of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing firearms because of potential dangerousness is rational. [Footnote 9] Enforcement of that essentially civil disability through a criminal sanction does not "support guilt or enhance punishment." See Burgett, 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 115, on the basis of a conviction that is unreliable when one considers Congress' broad purpose. Moreover, unlike the situation in Burgett, the sanction imposed by § 1202(a)(1) attaches immediately upon the defendant's first conviction.
Again, it is important to note that a convicted felon may challenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm. We simply hold today that the firearms prosecution does not open the predicate conviction to a new form of collateral attack. See Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, chanrobles.com-red
76 Colum.L.Rev. 326, 338-339 (1976). Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U. S. 307 (1967).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Section 1202(a) reads in full:
"Any person who -- "
"(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or"
"(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, or"
"(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or"
"(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or"
"(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States,"
"and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both."
The indictment also charged petitioner With a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1). That statute reads in pertinent part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person -- "
"(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;"
"* * * *"
"to receive any firearm . . . which has been shipped or transported in interstate . . . commerce."
Petitioner was acquitted on the § 922(h)(1) charge, and it is not before us here.
Petitioner's counsel stated that a Florida attorney had advised him that the court records in that State showed affirmatively that Lewis had no lawyer. He noted also that Lewis had been charged with the same offense as had the defendant in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), and that petitioner had been tried in the same State about six months before Gideon was tried. App. 2-3.
Compare United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165 (CA7 1972) (use of an underlying felony conviction unconstitutionally obtained to support a conviction under § 1202(a)(1) is reversible error), with the Fourth Circuit's ruling in the present case, and with United States v. Maggard, 573 F.2d 926 (CA6 1978); and United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (CA3 1977) (en banc) (claim of constitutional error in the underlying conviction may not be raised). The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between a claim of constitutional invalidity in the underlying conviction, which it has held may be raised, and a claim that the underlying conviction has been, or should be, reversed on other grounds. Compare United States v. O'Neal, 545 F.2d 85 (1976), and United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417 (1976), with United States v. Liles, 432 F.2d 18 (1970). See also United States v. Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (CA9 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964 (1979) (underlying conviction in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) may not be challenged on nonconstitutional grounds).
The identical issue that is presented in this case has also arisen in the context of challenges to convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) (proscribing shipping or transport of a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce by a person under indictment for, or convicted of, a felony) and 922(h)(1) (proscribing receipt of a firearm shipped in interstate or foreign commerce by such a person). Compare United States v. Scales, 599 F.2d 78 (CA5 1979); Dameron v. United States, 488 F.2d 724 (CA5 1974); Pasterchik v. United States, 466 F.2d 1367 (CA9 1972); and United States v. DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (CA2 1970) (underlying conviction may be attacked as unconstitutional), with Barker v. United States, 579 F.2d 1219, 1226 (CA10 1978) (underlying conviction may not be so challenged in prosecution under § 922 (h)(1)).
The Courts of Appeals have treated the issue somewhat differently in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (prohibiting the falsification of one's status as a convicted felon in purchasing a firearm). Nonuniformity has prevailed nonetheless on the question whether a defendant charged with violating that statute may challenge the constitutionality of the underlying felony conviction. Compare United States v. O'Neal, supra, and United States v. Pricepaul, supra, (permitting the challenge), with United States v. Allen, 556 F.2d 720 (CA4 1977); United States v. Graves, supra; and Cassity v. United States, 521 F.2d 1320 (CA6 1975) (holding that the challenge may not be made). The Eighth Circuit has stated that it will not permit a challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying conviction where the defendant is charged under § 922(a)(6), while reserving the question under § 1202(a)(1) and §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1). United States v. Edwards, 568 F.2d 68, 70-72, and n. 3 (1977). See also United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 83-88 (Garth, J., and Seitz, C.J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part) (the Government need not prove the validity of the underlying conviction in a prosecution brought under § 922(a)(6), but it must do so in a prosecution under § 1202(a)(1)).
One might argue, of course, that the language is so sweeping that it includes in its proscription even a person whose predicate conviction in the interim had been finally reversed on appeal, and thus no longer was outstanding. The Government, however, does not go so far, Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30, 37-40, and though we have no need to pursue that extreme argument in this case, we reject it. We are not persuaded that the mere possibility of making that argument renders the statute, as petitioner suggests, unconstitutionally vague. And unlike the dissent, post at 445 U. S. 69, we view the language Congress chose as consistent with the common sense notion that a disability based upon one's status as a convicted felon should cease only when the conviction upon which that status depends has been vacated.
We note, nonetheless, that the disability effected by § 1202(a)(1) would apply while a felony conviction was pending on appeal. See Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 76 Colum.L.Rev. 326, 334, and n. 42 (1976).
"The Congress hereby finds and declares that the receipt, possession, or transportation of a firearm by felons, veterans who are discharged under dishonorable conditions, mental incompetents, aliens who are illegally in the country, and former citizens who have renounced their citizenship, constitutes -- "
"(1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce,"
"(2) a threat to the safety of the President of the United States and Vice President of the United States,"
"(3) an impediment or a threat to the exercise of free speech and the free exercise of a religion guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and"
"(4) a threat to the continued and effective operation of the Government of the United States and of the government of each State guaranteed by article IV of the Constitution."
This being so, § 1202(a)(1) does not attach "what may amount to lifelong sanctions to a mere finding of probable cause," as has been argued by one commentator. See Comment, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 1790, 1795 (1979).
These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties. See United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 307 U. S. 178 (1939) (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm t.hat does not have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia"); United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288, 1290, n. 5 (CA7 1974); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (CA4 1974); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (CA8), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972) (the latter three cases holding, respectively, that § 1202(a)(1), § 922(g), and § 922(a)(6) do not violate the Second Amendment).
The dissent's assertion that Congress' judgment in this regard cannot rationally be supported, post at 445 U. S. 72, is one we do not share. Moreover, such an assertion seems plainly inconsistent with the deference that a reviewing court should give to a legislative determination that, in essence, predicts a potential for future criminal behavior.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE POWELL join, dissenting.
In disagreement with every other Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue. [Footnote 2/1] the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, by a divided vote, that an uncounseled and hence unconstitutional felony conviction may form the predicate for conviction under § 1202(a)(1) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Today, the Court affirms that judgment, but by an analysis that cannot be squared with either the literal language of the statute or controlling decisions of this Court. I respectfully dissent.
Two longstanding principles of statutory construction independently mandate reversal of petitioner's conviction. The first is the precept that,
"when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite."
United States v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 344 U. S. 221-222 (1952). The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this "rule of lenity." See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6, 435 U. S. 14; United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 404 U. S. 347-349 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 401 U. S. 812 (1971); 355 U. S. 177 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81 (1955). Indeed, the principle that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity" has previously been invoked in interpreting the very provision at issue in this case. See United States v. Bass, supra.@
The Court declines to apply this established rule of construction in this case because, in its view, "[t]here is no ambiguity here." Ante at 445 U. S. 65. In light of the gloss the Court places on the literal language of the statute, I find this to be a curious conclusion. By its own terms, § 1202(a)(1) reaches "[a]ny person who has been convicted . . . of a felony." The provision, on its face, admits of no exception to its sweeping proscription. Yet, despite the absence of any qualifying phrase, the Court concedes -- as it must -- that the statute cannot be interpreted so as to include those persons whose predicate convictions have been vacated or reversed on appeal. Ante at 445 U. S. 60-61, and n. 5.
It thus appears that the plain words of § 1202(a)(1) are not so clear after all, and we therefore must determine the section's reach. Two alternative constructions are offered: the first is the Government's -- that § 1202(a)(1) may be read to permit only outstanding felony convictions to serve as the basis for prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30. The second is petitioner's -- that the predicate conviction must be not only outstanding, but also constitutionally valid. Because either interpretation fairly comports with the statutory language, surely the principle of lenity requires us to resolve any doubts against the harsher alternative, and to read the statute to prohibit the possession of firearms only by those who have been constitutionally convicted of a felony.
The Court nevertheless adopts the Government's construction, relying on a supposed legislative resolve to enact a sweeping measure against the misuse of firearms. But however expansive § 1202 was meant to be, we are not faithful to "our duty to protect the rights of the individual," Dalia v. United States, 441 U. S. 238, 441 U. S. 263 (1979)(STEVENS, J., dissenting), chanrobles.com-red
when we are so quick to ascribe to Congress the intent to punish the possession of a firearm by a person whose predicate felony conviction was obtained in violation of the right to the assistance of counsel, "one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 304 U. S. 462 (1938). Petitioner has once already been imprisoned in violation of the Constitution. In the absence of any clear congressional expression of its intent, I cannot accept a construction of § 1202(a)(1) that reflects such an indifference to petitioner's plight and such a derogation of the principles of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). [Footnote 2/2] chanrobles.com-red
The second maxim of statutory construction that compels a narrow reading of § 1202(a)(1) is the "cardinal principle" that,
"if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, . . . this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 285 U. S. 62 (1932). Accord, Schneider v. Smith, 390 U. S. 17, 390 U. S. 26 (1968); United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 345 U. S. 45 (1953); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 335 U. S. 120-121, and n. 20 (1948). And doubts as to the constitutionality of a statute that could predicate criminal liability solely on the existence of a previous uncounseled felony conviction are indeed serious, for a trilogy of this Court's decisions would seem to prohibit precisely such a result.
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967), held that a prior uncounseled felony conviction was void, and thus inadmissible in a prosecution under a Texas recidivist statute. Burgett stated:
"To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense . . . is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused, in effect, suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right."
Id. at 389 U. S. 115 (citation omitted). United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972), and Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972), respectively, prohibited the use of uncounseled felony convictions as a factor to be considered in sentencing, and to impeach the defendant's credibility.
Burgett and its progeny appear to control the result in this case. The clear teaching of those decisions is that an uncounseled chanrobles.com-red
felony conviction can never be used "to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense." Here, petitioner could not have been tried and convicted for violating § 1202(a)(1) in the absence of his previous felony conviction. It could not be plainer that his constitutionally void conviction was therefore used "to support guilt" for the current offense. The Court's bald assertion to the contrary is simply inexplicable.
The Court's attempt to distinguish Burgett, Tucker, and Loper on the ground that the validity of the subsequent convictions or sentences in those cases depended on the reliability of the prior uncounseled felony convictions, while, in the present case, the law focuses on the mere fact of the prior conviction, is unconvincing. The fundamental rationale behind those decisions was the concern that according any credibility to an uncounseled felony conviction would seriously erode the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Congress' decision to include convicted felons within the class of persons prohibited from possessing firearms can rationally be supported only if the historical fact of conviction is indeed a reliable indicator of potential dangerousness. As we have so often said, denial of the right to counsel impeaches "the very integrity of the factfinding process." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 381 U. S. 639 (1965). Accord, Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333, 435 U. S. 341 (1978); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 407 U. S. 31 (1972). And the absence of counsel impairs the reliability of a felony conviction just as much when used to prove potential dangerousness as when used as direct proof of guilt. Cf. Loper v. Beto, supra, at 405 U. S. 483 (opinion of STEWART, J.).
Finally, it is simply irrelevant that petitioner could have challenged the validity.of his prior conviction in appropriate proceedings in the state courts. Nor can the existence of such a remedy prohibit him from raising the unconstitutionality of that conviction as a defense to the present charge. chanrobles.com-red
In the first place, neither Burgett nor Loper imposed any requirement that a defendant collaterally attack his uncounseled conviction before he faces prosecution under § 1202(a)(1); in both cases, the Court held the use of the prior invalid convictions impermissible even though the defendants had taken no affirmative steps to have them overturned. More to the point, however, where the very defect in the initial proceedings was that the accused did not have the assistance of counsel in defending the felony charges against him, it simply defies reason and sensibility to suggest that the defendant must be regarded as having waived his defense to the § 1202(a)(1) prosecution because he failed first to retain counsel to seek an extraordinary writ of coram nobis.
See, e.g., Dameron v. United States, 488 F.2d 724 (CA5 1974); United States v. Lufman, 457 F.2d 165 (CA7 1972); United States v. DuShane, 435 F.2d 187 (CA2 1970); United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654 (CA9 1970). See generally Comment, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 1790 (1979).
As the Court has previously observed, § 1202 "was hastily passed, with little discussion, no hearings, and no report." United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 404 U. S. 344 (1971).
"In short, 'the legislative history of [the] Act hardly speaks with that clarity of purpose which Congress supposedly furnishes courts in order to enable them to enforce its true will.'"
Id. at 404 U. S. 346 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 340 U. S. 483 (1951)). It is thus little wonder that the Court finds no explicit support in the statute's legislative history for petitioner's construction.
Nor do the few signposts that do exist in the history and structure of Title VII point unambiguously to the Court's conclusion. That Congress included provisions within the Omnibus Act whereby a convicted felon could have his disability removed by a qualifying pardon or the Secretary's consent, see §§ 1203(2) and 925(c), does not mean that Congress intended them to be exclusive remedies. Indeed, these provisions were clearly designed only to provide a mechanism for those persons with valid felony convictions to seek relief from the prohibitions of § 1202.
Similarly, a comparison between the scope of Title IV and Title VII is unenlightening on the question before us. Simply because the former Title imposes a disability on any person under a felony indictment, it by no means follows, a fortiori or otherwise, that Congress intended by the latter Title to impose a somewhat harsher disability on those persons with unconstitutional felony convictions. Cf. ante at 445 U. S. 64. Significantly, the restrictions attaching to an individual under indictment are necessarily temporary, while those imposed on the basis of a previous conviction are indefinite in duration. Moreover, Congress' failure to include persons "under indictment" within the proscriptions of § 1202 more plausibly signals its desire to demand a greater indication of potential dangerousness than would be provided by the mere fact of indictment -- or, for that matter, by an uncounseled felony conviction. In fact, in a slightly different context, Congress has expressly rejected the proposition that an invalid prior conviction is a reliable indicator of "dangerousness." See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (dangerous special offender).


text:
Real Probe Needed
Do you still believe the Bush administration's 9-11 conspiracy theory?
It is truly amazing that some Americans still look at the most horrendous attack on our country with stubborn, closed minds and refuse to use the common sense God gave them. They believe everything and anything the government tells them and believe the 9-11 "cover-up" Commission actually did a real and complete investigation.
Consider the following, one of the thousands of still unanswered issues, if you come across one of the stubborn closed-minded people who still believe the Bush 9-11 conspiracy theory.
Engineers over-designed the towers to stand even after a direct hit by a large jetliner. One of the designers even stated that he believed the towers could withstand multiple hits by jetliners. The Twin Towers had oxygen starved relatively "cool" fires confined to a few floors. Most floors were undamaged and at full design strength and each of those undamaged floors were designed to support all the floors above.
Basic Newtonian physics equations prove a bowling ball dropped from the top of either WTC tower would hit the ground in 9.22 seconds. However, that "free-fall" time is only possible if the ball accelerates to maximum possible velocity through a complete vacuum with nothing below it.
On 9-11, both towers collapsed straight down at "free-fall" velocity through the path of greatest resistance taking 10 seconds for WTC2 and eight seconds for WTC1. How is it possible that both towers collapsed at "free-fall" times and velocities? To put that into perspective, the towers fell at a rate that is equivalent to a 10-story steel framed building collapsing to a pile of dust in just one second. Can you imagine a massive 10-story steel framed building in front of you then, within a blink of your eyes, one second later it is a pile of dust on the ground? Such "free-fall" velocities can only be achieved when objects fall in a vacuum with zero resistance.
In other words, gravitational "free fall" times and velocities can only be achieved when there is absolutely nothing below the falling object that offers any resistance. Yet on 9-11, WTC 1, WTC 2, and WTC 7 all fell straight down directly through the path of greatest possible structural resistance. All three buildings fell at "free-fall" times and velocities as if the massive structural steel frames and concrete did not exist.
To believe the Bush administration's conspiracy theory, you would have to believe that fires confined to a few floors somehow caused global structural failure in both towers so that the 47 massive steel core columns and the 240 steel perimeter columns on each of the undamaged floors simultaneously and uniformly failed and offered zero resistance and zero structural strength.
That would mean on 9-11 common sense and the laws of physics did not exist.
Next, Bush's 9-11 conspiracy theory will ask you to believe a UFO landed behind the grassy knoll and aliens shot JFK.
There are many questions, a real investigation, not another cover-up, is needed.
George Benton
Ocean City
Thanks from the Noel Community
The Noel Community extends a thank you to those who graciously contributed to our annual Christmas dinner.
The Noel Community celebrated our 10-year anniversary with overwhelming participation from places of worship, individuals, businesses, and civic groups. We are especially grateful to Father David Dingwall and St. Paul's by-the Sea; to the many businesses and civic groups for supplying food, making generous monetary donations, and sponsoring toy and food drives; to the local media for publicizing our event; to all the individuals and churches for donating toys, food, desserts, toiletries and monetary gifts; and to everyone for volunteering their time.
The Noel Community served 1,500 free meals this year, including carry-outs and deliveries to individuals who otherwise would be lonely or hungry. We provided toys, toiletries, socks, hats, and clothing to those in need. We prepared hot meals for police officers, fire personnel, and other public servants working on Christmas day.
The Noel Community appreciates the generous support from Ocean City, Ocean Pines, Berlin, and surrounding neighborhoods allowing us to make the Christmas celebration special for many in our community.
We will continue to expand our community outreach beyond Christmas Day serving free lunches at a local food pantry with the leftover supplies and funds. Thank you again.
The NOEL Committee
County Penalties Must Fit The Crimes
The Grandview farms development had all the undergrowth, many trees of all sizes and all the remaining trees were limbed up to 10 feet from the ground for around a half mile along Paw-paw Creek. This was done in the critical area buffer zone that is required to remain untouched, as anyone owning land containing these areas know.
The county penalty response is merely to replace trees at a 3-to-1 ratio. The damage is already done and that will not restore this area to its natural state, and the cost of remediation is just swept up as a minor item in the whole landscaping budget. The developer reported to the papers that he was not aware of these violations. Thousands of man-hours of work not authorized? Who checks the work orders and billing?
The developer now has land in a beautiful location, cleared wonderfully for people that can afford a $350,000 lot. Job well done.
I believe it is up to the County Commissioners to institute real penalties for those who ignore consciously or by neglect the current statutes, instead of the current wrist-slap. This is not an isolated case on Delmarva or the last. W
ith the increasing number of people, we have to protect the waterways that attract them here. A 100-foot buffer is not much to ask, in fact is too small for the MacMansion developments with golf-course lawns.
Hans Van Den Bosch
Laura D. Stidham
Snow Hill

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Friday 18 May 2012
Chris Gayle: Grace, Bradman
The two were connected, but laterally rather than literally. Gayle was not yet on the roof of a municipal building negotiating to release his hostages if only Ernest Hilaire would agree to stop Skyping him. His carnage was of the more usual kind - he'd just hit Bhuvneshwar Kumar for four sixes in five balls, in the process re-emphasising the hold he has on his board and on the game.
Next year, professional T20 cricket will be ten years old. It has distorted thinking more than Bodyline did, reshaped finances more than Packer could, demanded the most complete revolution in technique since Grace began hitting across the line, offered players a new career model beyond central contracts. Chris Gayle's employers have included the Barisal Burners, the Matabeleland Tuskers, Sydney Thunder, Royal Challengers Bangalore, West Australia, Kolkata Knight Riders, Jamaica and of course the immortal Stanford Superstars, and they have had value for their coin. If not T20's Bradman, then Gayle is its WG, its Ranji. In its infant years, he is a conceptual force, its vision of the future.
Even to those looking towards us from the not-so-distant 1990s, the limp times after the Windies and before Waugh introduced four an over to Test cricket, Gayle would seem like Kubrick's Obelisk, dressed in his space-garb, his gold pads and his gridiron helmet, his muscle shirt tight on his giant shoulders, beefed-up bat in his shimmering gloves, a quarter of a billion people watching on TV as his blade scythes through...
One in every nine deliveries that Gayle has faced in T20 cricket has been hit for six. One in nine. It feels like a key indicator of how he is shaping a format in which we are really not sure what the prime stats should be. Certainly the side that hits the most sixes usually wins. But even measured in the old-school way, Gayle is getting ahead of the rest by the sort of percentages that Bradman did. By the blunt tool of average, his mark of 43.81 is miles beyond those who can reproduce his strike rate (155.48), while those who can come within five of that average cannot approach his speed: Kieron Pollard strikes at 161.34, but averages 28; Sehwag 159.83 but averages 29; Kallis averages 39.64 but strikes at 113, Sachin 37.48 but at 123. Or consider this: Gayle has as many T20 centuries as Kallis, Pollard, Pietersen, Warner, Sehwag and De Villiers added together.
Lots of other batsman can do what Gayle does once or twice, it's just that Gayle does it so often. His last nine innings in the IPL have been 87, 4, 86, 71, 26, 82 not out, 57, 6 and 128 not out. He has the most runs at the highest average, as he did last year, and it is over that period that Gayle has really separated himself from the rest. Because the T20 game is shortened and heightened, his refinements are harder to spot, but they are there.
His 128 not out from 62 against Delhi illustrated perfectly his current thinking. He didn't score from his first eight deliveries, and by the end of the first powerplay had 10 from 17. In his 'berserk' 57 from 31 against Pune, he had four from his first eight deliveries and 17 from his first 16. In his 82 from 59 against Delhi in the match before that, he had two from his first ten and 22 from his first 19; in his 71 from 42 against Kings XI, it was 21 from his first 19; in his 86 from 58 against KKR he had 23 from his first 25.
The other half of the equation is that the acceleration, when it comes, is unprecedented. Gayle's strategy is not just to hit boundaries but to clear the ropes. He has hit more sixes than anyone in T20 cricket, his 279 put him 81 ahead of the next best, Kieron Pollard. And he is ratcheting it up; in this year's IPL, he has 57 in 14 games. A loose study of his boundary counts shows that he tends to hit fours in his first 20 or so deliveries and then moves on to sixes.
It would be fascinating to hear him talk about it, but he is deliberately enigmatic. His Twitter stream is a flow of emoticons. He rarely gives interviews and when he does, like his mate KP, they tend to yield the wrong kind of headlines. He sees no benefit in demystifying himself, and in truth it is adding to his legend.
All of this makes that lateral connection between those cricinfo stories. Players have always been exiled by boards, but Gayle's illuminating brilliance in T20 cricket, on a global platform, is a mirror that reflects the WICB's own stupidity back at them.
Cricket will reach its agreements with T20, and years from now people will recall its first quaint decade and smile at how old and proper it all looks. A few sages, cryogenically preserved, will be able to say they saw Chris Gayle bat, this format's Grace, this format's Bradman. WG would certainly approve of how little he says, and of how little he runs.
9 comments:
- Tony said...
Key indicator? Key performance indicator, please.
- 18 May 2012 at 18:36
Normally, with big hitters like Gayle, we would normally be happy for them to play a good innings once every 3-5 innings, since, when they play a good innings, they make it count. However, Gayle's consistency is plain baffling, to say the least. He seems to have such confidence in his batting abilities that he is willing to take his time during the first 6 - 8 overs, before going hammer-and-tonks in the latter part of the innings.
The term 'legend' is normally bandied about for any person who plays just a solitary good innings, but I truly feel that Gayle deserves legendary status for how consistent he has been in a format where unpredictability is king!
All hail King Gayle! - 18 May 2012 at 20:23
Oh how we were looking forward to seeing him smash Somerset to the T20, but no - Cricinfo: Gayle said of his decision to break the Somerset contract: "I made it clear to them that my decision was made because of my commitment to West Indies cricket and to West Indies cricket fans."
His 'mate KP' is showing his commitment by playing in the Lords test NOT the IPL. Will we see Gayle at Trent Bridge?
Undoubted talent yet a questionably committed anyone except himself - 19 May 2012 at 08:05
To give Gayle his due, why would anyone want to be playing test cricket in May when they could be playing T20 in India? He likes hot weather. Most of the West Indies players must hate how cold it is here.
Wait till the Aussies get so crap that they are only acceptable for test cricket over here in May, then you'll really hear whinging about the weather to end all whinging.
KP has lived here for years. He probably doesn't even notice how bloody cold it is, he puts on another sweater.
Plus the ECB pay him properly. - 19 May 2012 at 11:27
- Graeme said...
have you thought about the possible historical parallel with the impact that Constantine had on the Lancashire Leagues in the 30s?
- 21 May 2012 at 10:33
- Online Web Games said...
Just can't imagine what he does to the ball, hitting sixes for him is just like drinking a glass of milk... so effortless hitting by him he is such a power house and a great entertainer....
- 28 May 2012 at 03:51
- Deshi Boy said...
Watch Sri Lanka vs Zimbabwe Live Stream ICC World Twnety20 1st Match Online Cricket On Pc>>>
http://sachin1tendulkar.blogspot.com/2012/09/watch-sri-lanka-vs-zimbabwe-live-stream.html - 17 September 2012 at 23:15
- price per head said...
Chris Gayla was such a good batsman I remember when I used to watch him on TV with my dad, since them I started to admire him as batsman and as person
- 9 January 2013 at 19:39
- Eman Sherkawy 1 said...
نقل العفش والتخزين
شركة نقل عفش بالمدينة المنورة
شركة نقل عفش بالمدينة المنورة
شركة نقل عفش
ارخص شركة نقل عفش بالمدينة المنورة
شركة نقل عفش بالقصيم
شركة نقل عفش بخميس مشيط
شركة نقل عفش بابها
شركة نقل عفش بتبوك
شركة نقل العفش بالمدينة المنورة
- 18 December 2021 at 13:29


text:
Debosyon (Alvin Yapan, 2013)
English Title: Devotion
Debosyon (Devotion) is Yapan's visually sumptuous observation on cultural and religious phenomena. In the film, he frames his explorations within the strangest of romance, one between a young man and a creature of mythology. Mando (Paulo Avelino) is a fervent devotee of the Lady of Penafrancia, a wooden Marian statue that is famed for the miracles it grants to its devotees. While searching the forest for orchids, he chances upon a solitary flower on top of a tree. He falls while attempting to get the flower. He wakes up to Salome (Mara Lopez), a mysterious woman who lives alone inside a hut in the middle of the forest, who nurses him back to health. They fall in love, only to be hindered by Salome's revelation, one that shakes Mando's religious devotion to its core.
Yapan tells the story with admirable patience, allowing his story to really take root in the landscape that features very heavily in his elegant visuals. The forest where Mando meets Salome is a character itself. Its trees bleed when axed. Deep in its heart is a pond pristine enough to wash the gravest of doubts. From its hills, one can see the perfect but solitary Mayon volcano, an image of absolute beauty and loneliness amidst plains and farmlands. Yapan understands the topography of Bicol. His narrative makes use of it in a way that it is intertwined with the romance and the mysticism. The beauty of the film is not intended to simply be pleasurable to tired eyes. It is meant to enamour, to give a semblance of the irresistible allure of the land. It is meant to make one fall desperately in love.
From the geography comes the native songs, the lyrics of which speak of loving desperation or pained longing. Mando sings one of the love songs Salome learns from a previous love as an act of courtship. Struggling to learn the song with only a guitar at hand and Salome's memory for guidance, the song may very well be an expression of devotion, a pleasant tribute from a mortal to a woman whose beauty is venerated. At another point, Mando is warned by roving rebels of the forest witch that eats the souls of the men who are beholden by her charms. He desperately races to find Salome, presumably to see if the rebels' warnings are true. In the background, another song is heard, lamenting of the hurts one bears for love. Yapan intelligently places the various songs in the vital points of courtship, directing the viewer to understand and digest the familiar lyrics along and melody within very specific contexts ranging from absolute adoration to enduring doubt.
More than just a love story, Debosyon seems to be an ode to Yapan's native Bicol. It dissects a psyche that has been cultivated by a distinct landscape and the history that has taken place in it. Its mythologies, its songs, its undying devotion to the image of the Penafrancia idol, are to Yapan's mind, products of a love affair between its people and the mystical land they live in. Religion hardly matters in the film. It is simply not its point, but just a starting to point to uncover a cultural feature. Yapan seems to be more interested in the psyche that resulted in the religiosity that is as intense and involving as romantic passion. Debosyon is profound allegory, a story that puts in a clear perspective a culture of devotion that is more rooted in a people's pre-colonial conscience than the actual charms of Catholicism.
Yapan ends Debosyon with a summation of both the love story and the allegory. The lovers make passionate love, Mando heavily caressing the serpentine figure of his unlikely partner. People express their love to the Marian image, their little candlelit boats floating along the banks of a serpentine river. Despite the differences, the two images sit comfortably alongside each other. The country's unique Catholic practices are but reiterations of a cultural devotion that has been shaped by the forests, the mountains, the rivers. "I saw your eyes in the eyes of the Virgin of Penafrancia," whispers Mando when asked by Salome about his desire that seems defiant of reason and logic. In a few words, Yapan commits the impossible and marries religious fervor with the most primal of human urges.
(Cross-published in Twitch.)


text:
Snarlers that don't Snarl
Sunday, April 14th, 2013Andrew John (no I didn't reverse his names) responded to our Good Word snarl with this thought:
"In NZ the word snarler does not usually mean something that snarls. In my experience when Kiwis use the word snarler they mean a sausage, particularly when it is on a BBQ. Which makes me wonder if its use is derived from hot-dog?"
My response:
A snarler usually refers to a dog (or human) that snarls. Could the transfer of this sense of "dog" to "hotdog" be justified? Or is it more likely that, because they tend to curl when heated, they seem to become entangled?
There is also another sense of snarl used in metal-working. A snarling-iron is used to "raise up the projecting part". Whether this is used for curling or not, I don't know. (I'm not metal worker.)
Does anyone out there know what a "snarling-iron" does?


text:
Access Data Using Categorical Arrays
Select Data By Category
Selecting data based on its values is often useful. This type of data selection can involve creating a logical vector based on values in one variable, and then using that logical vector to select a subset of values in other variables. You can create a logical vector for selecting data by finding values in a numeric array that fall within a certain range. Additionally, you can create the logical vector by finding specific discrete values. When using categorical arrays, you can easily:
Select elements from particular categories. For categorical arrays, use the logical operators
to select data that is in, or not in, a particular category. To select data in a particular group of categories, use theismember
function.For ordinal categorical arrays, use inequalities
, or<=
to find data in categories above or below a particular category.Delete data that is in a particular category. Use logical operators to include or exclude data from particular categories.
Find elements that are not in a defined category. Categorical arrays indicate which elements do not belong to a defined category by
. Use theisundefined
function to find observations without a defined value.
Common Ways to Access Data Using Categorical Arrays
This example shows how to index and search using categorical
arrays. You can access data using categorical
arrays stored within a table in a similar manner.
Load Sample Data
Load sample data gathered from 100 patients.
load patients
Name Size Bytes Class Attributes Age 100x1 800 double Diastolic 100x1 800 double Gender 100x1 11412 cell Height 100x1 800 double LastName 100x1 11616 cell Location 100x1 14208 cell SelfAssessedHealthStatus 100x1 11540 cell Smoker 100x1 100 logical Systolic 100x1 800 double Weight 100x1 800 double
Create Categorical Arrays from Cell Arrays of Character Vectors
The cell arrays Location
and SelfAssessedHealthStatus
contain data that belong in categories. Each cell array contains character vectors taken from a small set of unique values (indicating three locations and four health statuses respectively). To convert Location
and SelfAssessedHealthStatus
to categorical
arrays, use the categorical
Location = categorical(Location); SelfAssessedHealthStatus = categorical(SelfAssessedHealthStatus);
Search for Members of a Single Category
For categorical
arrays, you can use the logical operators ==
and ~=
to find the data that is in, or not in, a particular category.
Determine if there are any patients observed at the location, Rampart General Hospital.
any(Location == "Rampart General Hospital")
ans = logical
There are no patients observed at Rampart General Hospital.
Search for Members of a Group of Categories
You can use ismember
to find data in a particular group of categories. Create a logical vector for the patients observed at either County General Hospital
or VA Hospital
VA_CountyGenIndex = ... ismember(Location,{'County General Hospital','VA Hospital'});
is a 100-by-1 logical array containing logical true
) for each element in the categorical
array Location
that is a member of the category County General Hospital
or VA Hospital
. The output, VA_CountyGenIndex
contains 76 nonzero elements.
Use the logical vector, VA_CountyGenIndex
to select the LastName
of the patients observed at either County General Hospital
or VA Hospital
VA_CountyGenPatients = LastName(VA_CountyGenIndex);
is a 76-by-1 cell array of character vectors.
Select Elements in a Particular Category to Plot
Use the summary
function to print a summary containing the category names and the number of elements in each category.
County General Hospital 39 St. Mary's Medical Center 24 VA Hospital 37
is a 100-by-1 categorical
array with three categories. County General Hospital
occurs in 39 elements, St. Mary's Medical Center
in 24 elements, and VA Hospital
in 37 elements.
Use the summary
function to print a summary of SelfAssessedHealthStatus
Excellent 34 Fair 15 Good 40 Poor 11
is a 100-by-1 categorical
array with four categories.
Use logical operator ==
to access the ages of patients who assess their own health status as Good
. Then plot a histogram of this data.
figure() histogram(Age(SelfAssessedHealthStatus == 'Good')) title('Ages of Patients with Good Health Status')
histogram(Age(SelfAssessedHealthStatus == 'Good'))
plots the age data for the 40 patients who reported Good
as their health status.
Delete Data from a Particular Category
You can use logical operators to include or exclude data from particular categories. Delete all patients observed at VA Hospital
from the workspace variables, Age
and Location
Age = Age(Location ~= "VA Hospital"); Location = Location(Location ~= "VA Hospital");
Now, Age
is a 63-by-1 numeric array, and Location
is a 63-by-1 categorical
List the categories of Location
, as well as the number of elements in each category.
County General Hospital 39 St. Mary's Medical Center 24 VA Hospital 0
The patients observed at VA Hospital
are deleted from Location
, but VA Hospital
is still a category.
Use the removecats
function to remove VA Hospital
from the categories of Location
Location = removecats(Location,"VA Hospital");
Verify that the category, VA Hospital
, was removed.
ans = 2x1 cell
{'County General Hospital' }
{'St. Mary's Medical Center'}
is a 63-by-1 categorical
array that has two categories.
Delete Element
You can delete elements by indexing. For example, you can remove the first element of Location
by selecting the rest of the elements with Location(2:end)
. However, an easier way to delete elements is to use []
Location(1) = []; summary(Location)
County General Hospital 38 St. Mary's Medical Center 24
is a 62-by-1 categorical
array that has two categories. Deleting the first element has no effect on other elements from the same category and does not delete the category itself.
Test for Undefined Elements
Remove the category County General Hospital
from Location
Location = removecats(Location,"County General Hospital");
Display the first eight elements of the categorical
array, Location
ans = 8x1 categorical
St. Mary's Medical Center
St. Mary's Medical Center
St. Mary's Medical Center
St. Mary's Medical Center
St. Mary's Medical Center
After removing the category, County General Hospital
, elements that previously belonged to that category no longer belong to any category defined for Location
. The categorical
elements that do not belong to any category are undefined, and display <undefined>
as their values.
Use the function isundefined
to find elements of a categorical
array that do not belong to any category.
undefinedIndex = isundefined(Location);
is a 62-by-1 categorical
array containing logical true
) for all undefined elements in Location
Set Undefined Elements
Use the summary
function to print the number of undefined elements in Location
St. Mary's Medical Center 24 <undefined> 38
The first element of Location
belongs to the category, St. Mary's Medical Center
. Set the first element to be an undefined value so that it no longer belongs to any category. You can create undefined elements in a categorical
array by assigning ''
, ""
, '<undefined>'
, string(nan)
, or missing
as elements. When you assign such values to elements of a categorical
array, it converts them to undefined values.
Location(1) = "";
St. Mary's Medical Center 23 <undefined> 39
You can make selected elements undefined
without removing a category or changing the categories of other elements. Set undefined elements to indicate elements with values that are unknown.
Preallocate Categorical Arrays with Undefined Elements
You can use undefined elements to preallocate the size of a categorical
array for better performance. Create a categorical
array that has elements with known locations only.
definedIndex = ~isundefined(Location); newLocation = Location(definedIndex); summary(newLocation)
St. Mary's Medical Center 23
Expand the size of newLocation
so that it is a 200-by-1 categorical
array. Set the last new element to be an undefined element. All of the other new elements are also assigned undefined values. The 23 original elements keep the values that they had.
newLocation(200) = "";
St. Mary's Medical Center 23 <undefined> 177
has room for values you plan to store in the array later.
See Also
| categories
| summary
| any
| histogram
| removecats
| isundefined
Related Examples
- Create Categorical Arrays
- Convert Text in Table Variables to Categorical
- Plot Categorical Data
- Compare Categorical Array Elements
- Work with Protected Categorical Arrays


text:
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Whether you're in the skate park or cruising city streets, make a statement in one of your favorite DC Shoes men's sweatshirts. We know you're not the type of guy that likes to follow the crowd, and at DC Shoes we're the type of brand that will make sure you're the one leading the latest trends. Our collection of sweatshirts and hoodies features a range of quality, comfortable designs that will keep you looking sharp regardless of what your personal swagger style is.
Stay Comfortable In DC SHOES Sweatshirts
When designing our DC Shoes men's sweatshirt collection, we sought to provide optimal comfort levels with edgy street style designs. Keep your street style vibes alive this winter in one of our sherpa lined hoodie or sherpa sweatshirt styles. The weather outside doesn't have to be cold for a sweatshirt to be in style, try one of our lighter sweatshirts or cotton hoodie styles any time of year to keep your outfit looking fresh. Whatever your preference, DC Shoes sweatshirts for men provide high quality materials that will keep you feeling and looking great every day.
DC SHOES Men's Sweatshirts : Don't Compromise Your Style
We are firm believers that cool hoodies are a wardrobe necessity. They're versatile, and can add some personal style to any outfit. DC Shoes men's sweatshirts and men's hoodies come in a mix of colors and designs, allowing you to find one that best completes your outfit. You can never go wrong with a classic black hoodie, and we've got plenty of options to fill that space in your drawers. If you're looking to pop your style against the pavement, try one of our blue hoodie or red hoodie styles. Fly under the radar with a simple white sweatshirt or a stealthy black sweatshirt. Embrace your loud and expressive side by repping one of our DC Shoes graphic sweatshirts or graphic hoodies. Any one of our cool sweatshirt styles will step up your street cred each day of the week. When it comes to dressing for the day, you do you and let our sweatshirts do the rest.
DC SHOES Men's Sweatshirts Fit Your Lifestyle
Baggy or fitted? Everyone rocks their own shape when it comes to sweatshirts, and DC Shoes offers a variety of options so you can find yours. A hooded sweatshirt is great for cooler days and nights when you want a little extra warmth. A crew neck sweatshirt offers a clean cut that pairs seamlessly with any outfit. Give your look a bit of edge and go against the grain with a stand up collar sweatshirt.
DC Shoes' men's hoodies are relaxed and confident all at the same time. Quality hoodies hold a place in any outfit whether you're out on your skateboard, lounging around the house, or going out with friends. Their versatile nature makes hoodies a must-have for every closet. DC Shoes' line of hoodies for men offers styles that are designed to be appropriate for any occasion, ensuring that you look as confident as you feel.
Our selection of sweatshirts for men and hoodies for men offers a variety of styles of pullover sweatshirts and full zip up hoodies. Full zip hoodies give you the freedom to loose your comfort layer quickly when you're on the fly. Just looking for some easy ventilation? Try adding a half zip sweatshirt or even a quarter zip sweatshirt into your wardrobe rotation. If you're into keeping your look fresh and unique, snag a side zip hoodie to keep things interesting.
Let's Get Comfortable - Buy Your Sweatshirts Today
Don't waste one more minute stuck in anything less than the quality of comfort that DC Shoes provides. Step up your style game and shop online today to buy the DC Shoes men's sweatshirt or hoodie that is right for you. DC Shoes' convenient online store and great customer service make it easier than ever to get the sweatshirts you want without the hassle so you can get back to doing the things you love.
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Griswold v. Connecticut
Supreme Court of the United States
Griswold v. Connecticut
Appeal from the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
No. 496 Argued: March 29-30, 1965 --- Decided: June 7, 1965
Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute, as applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. An intermediate appellate court and the State's highest court affirmed the judgment.
1. Appellants have standing to assert the constitutional rights of the married people. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, distinguished. P. 481.
2. The Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Pp. 481-486. [p480]
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
Public domainPublic domainfalsefalse


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Democratic lawmakers said Sunday that military-style assault weapons should be banned and that a national commission should be established to examine mass shootings in the United States.
The proposals were among the first to come from Congress in the wake of Friday's school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut.
"Assault weapons were developed for the U.S. military, not commercial gun manufacturers," independent Sen. Joe Lieberman, a former Democrat, said before a vigil Sunday night in Newtown.
"This is a moment to start a very serious national conversation about violence in our society, particularly about these acts of mass violence," said the Connecticut senator, who is retiring next month.
Gun rights activists remained largely quiet on the issue, all but one declining to appear on the Sunday talk shows. Meanwhile, Democrats vowed action and said it was time to hear from voters — not gun lobbyists — on how to prevent the next shooting.
The time for "saying that we can't talk about the policy implications of tragedies like this is over," said Democratic Rep. Chris Murphy, who won a Senate seat in the November elections.
Speaking Sunday night at a vigil in Newtown, President Barack Obama did not specifically address gun control. But he vowed, "In the coming weeks I'll use whatever power this office holds to engage my fellow citizens, from law enforcement to mental health professionals to parents and educators in an effort aimed at preventing more tragedies like this."
He added: "Are we really prepared to say that we're powerless in the face of such carnage, that the politics are too hard? Are we prepared to say that such violence visited on our children year after year after year is somehow the price of our freedom?"
Obama and Senate Democrats haven't pushed for new gun controls since rising to power in the 2008 national elections. Outspoken advocates for stricter laws, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein, say that's because of the powerful sway of the National Rifle Association.
But advocates also say the latest shooting is a tipping point that could change the dynamic of the debate dramatically. Feinstein said she will propose legislation next year that would ban big clips, drums and strips of more than 10 bullets.
"It can be done," she said Sunday of reviving the 10-year ban that expired in 2004.
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg said Obama could use executive powers to enforce existing gun laws, as well as throw his weight behind legislation like Feinstein's.
"It's time for the president, I think, to stand up and lead and tell this country what we should do — not go to Congress and say, 'What do you guys want to do?'" Bloomberg said.
Lieberman supports such a ban but said there should also be a national commission to scrutinize gun laws and loopholes, as well as the nation's mental health system and the role that violent video games and movies might play in shootings.
"There are a lot of serious questions here about what is the impact of violence in the entertainment culture on everybody," Lieberman said. "There is a vulnerable population out there and I'm afraid this young man was obviously one of them. How do we identify shooters before they shoot and make sure they get the mental health help that they need, and then what about gun control?"
Democratic Sen. Dick Durbin said he would support such a panel, adding that it was time for a "national discussion" that included school safety.
"This conversation has been dominated in Washington by — you know and I know — gun lobbies that have an agenda" Durbin said. "We need people, just ordinary Americans, to come together, and speak out, and to sit down and calmly reflect on how far we go."
Congress has frequently turned to independent bipartisan commissions to try to solve the nation's worst problems, including the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Iraq war and the failing economy. But ultimately, lawmakers are often reluctant to act on the recommendations of outsiders, especially if they think it will cost them support in their home states.
Still, Lieberman defended the idea of a national commission as the only way to ensure that the "heartbreak and anger" of the Connecticut shooting doesn't dissipate over time and that other factors beyond gun control are considered.
"We've got to continue to hear the screams of these children and see their blood until we do something to try to prevent this from happening again," he said on "Fox News Sunday."
Gun rights advocates appeared reluctant to make their case against tougher gun laws while Connecticut families and the nation were still in the earliest stages of grieving. David Gregory, the host of "Meet the Press," said NBC invited all 31 "pro-gun" senators to appear on Sunday's show, and all 31 declined. All eight Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee were unavailable or unwilling to appear on CBS' "Face the Nation," host Bob Schieffer said.
Republican Congressman Louie Gohmert was the sole representative of gun rights' activists on the various Sunday talk shows. In an interview on "Fox News Sunday," Gohmert defended the sale of assault weapons and said that the principal at Sandy Hook Elementary School, who authorities say died trying to overtake the shooter, should herself have been armed.
"I wish to God she had had an M-4 in her office, locked up so when she heard gunfire, she pulls it out and she didn't have to lunge heroically with nothing in her hands. But she takes him (the shooter) out, takes his head off before he can kill those precious kids," Gohmert said.
Gohmert also argued that violence is lower in cities with lax gun laws, and higher in cities with stricter laws.
"The facts are that every time guns have been allowed — conceal-carry (gun laws) have been allowed — the crime rate has gone down," Gohmert said.
Gun control advocates say that isn't true. A study by the California-based Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence determined that seven of the 10 states with the strongest gun laws — including Connecticut, Massachusetts and California — are also among the 10 states with the lowest gun death rates.
"If you look at the states with the strongest gun laws in the country, they have some of the lowest gun death rates, and some of the states with the weakest gun laws have some of the highest gun death rates," said Brian Malte of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence.
Murphy spoke on ABC's "This Week." Durbin spoke on "Fox News Sunday." Bloomberg and Feinstein spoke on NBC's "Meet the Press."


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The world's economy is still reeling from the traumas of September and October.
F1 sponsors give $300m to F1 teams each year – but more and more of those companies are reporting huge profit falls and staff cut backs. Some are even falling back on their national governments for financial support.
Could we soon see a major reduction in F1 sponsorship? Here's a look at how some of the biggest names in F1 sponsorship are faring in the growing global recession.
AMD – Electronics
AMD began to experience problems before the economic downturn, beginning with its $5.4bn purchase of ATI. It has posted a loss for eight consecutive quarters and cut staff, but in October announced $8.4bn of investment from Abu Dhabi.
Etihad Airways – Airlines
The very high oil prices earlier this year put huge pressure on airlines, forcing 30 to close this year. Those prices have now fallen but reduced demands for passenger seats and cargo continues to squeeze airlines. However the emerging Asian airlines like Etihad are in the strongest position, and in July the company made one of the largest aircraft purchases ever, worth $20bn.
Santander – Financial services
Reported a 4.7% increase in profit in the third quarter of 2008. Writing in the comments last month, Shostak explained why Santander are weathering the global financial crisis better than their rivals:
Emilio Bot?�?�n, as he says, only buy a bank which he knows very well. This is his policy. Spanish banks only give credit to people with solid guarantees. European banks have gone bankrupt while not a single Spanish bank is in that situation.
The bigger concern for Mclaren about Santander was that they might take their sponsorship to Ferrari along with ex-McLaren drivers Fernando Alonso. But with Alonso now committed to Renault, who are already backed by another financial institution, that now seems less of a threat.
Intel – Electronics
Intel's stock price has fallen by half since December. But it still dominates the global market for computer chips and CEO Paul Otellini has said that although sales will be down in 2009 he believes Intel has cut costs sufficiently to be able to bear them.
Dell – Electronics
The Texan computer giant has stopped hiring staff in the USA and asked employees to take a week's unpaid leave. Techcrunch estimates Dell has shed 8,900 jobs so far.
Credit Suisse – Financial services
Credit Suisse lost significant amounts on the loans it held and reported a third-quarter loss of $1.1bn on Thursday.
ING Group – Financial services
ING's sponsorship of Renault is due to end after 2009. However the Dutch bank has received ?����?�10bn ($12.73bn) in support from the Netherlands government, which may lead to questions about whether it is appropriate to continue its sponsorship of F1, which extends beyond Renault to include the title sponsorship of several Grands Prix.
Panasonic – Electronic goods
Despite quarterly profits falling 19%, Panasonic still claims it will achieves 8% profit growth for the entire financial year. It is taking over Sanyo in a deal worth a reputed $8.8bn.
Hamleys, Mydiamonds, All Saints, – Toys, jewellery, and fashion
These three companies are owned by Icelandic company Baugur. Iceland's economy has been hit especially hard by the recession, with its government taking control of three three largest banks. Bauagur has weathered the storm for the time being, but still has �1bn of debt.
Royal Bank of Scotland – Financial services
RBS, like ING, has received aid from its national government, and its sports sponsorship may now be seen as inappropriate given its support from the British taxpayer.
Lenovo – Electronics
Lenovo, the world's fourth largest computer manufacturer, yesterday announced its earnings had fallen by 78% in the second quarter of the year. Its share price fall by 20% on the news, and it is cutting its global workforce of 23,200.
Air Asia – Airline
As with Etihad, Air Asia competes in a market under great pressure, but Asia is the stronger area of that market at present.
Allianz – Financial services
Yesterday Allianz posted a net loss of ?����?�2.02 billion ($2.56 billion) for the third quarter of the year. Much of this was losses incurred by Dresdner Bank, which Allianz then sold, amounting to ?����?�2.6bn in losses.
Force India F1 Team
Kingfisher – Airline
Facing similar circumstances to Etihad and Air Asia, but the difference here is that Kingfisher is owned by Force India boss Vijay Mallya.
Samsung – Conglomerate
Samsung's investments extend beyond the realm of electronics for which they are well-known. Although that side of the business has recently given up its attempt to expand by taking over SanDisk, other areas are still very strong. Its shipbuilding business recently posted its largest ever profit.
Honda, Red Bull and Toro Rosso
These teams have few prominent sponsors. For the past two years Honda has used its livery to promote its environmental awareness message. Red Bull and Toro Rosso are used to promote Red Bull soft drinks.
What else
This is not a complete list of F1 sponsors – see the forum for more details on the major companies pumping money into F1. How are they coping with the crisis? Leave your comments below.
More on F1 and the economic crisis


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Thor Arm Chair Black
34.5"w x 28"h x 33.5"l
Stylish and functional, the Thor arm chair features a modern design with smooth leatherette fabric on sleek profile and accented with slim chrome frame. USB panels on each outside arm are added for easy access in charging electronics. Each port houses three USB ports for all your charging needs. Perfect for events, public spaces or anyone who appreciates the ease of charging their electronics why relaxing in style.


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On their recent trip to the UK, which included a blistering appearance on Later... With Jools Holland, Mastodon's Brann Dailor and Troy Sanders sat down with Roadrunner UK to declare their love for Rush, and explain why the legendary Canadian trio continue to be so influential.
7 November sees Rush release Time Machine 2011: Live In Cleveland on CD, DVD and Blu-ray. Click here for more details and to see an exclusive clip of Working Man from Time Machine 2011: Live In Cleveland.
Pre-order Time Machine 2011: Live In Cleveland here.
Visit Roadrunner UK for more on Rush and Mastodon.