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That the history and the philosophy of science have been united in a form of disciplinary marriage is a fact. There are pressing questions about the state of this union. Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science is a state of the union address, but also an articulation of compelling and well-defended positions on strategies for making progress in the history and philosophy of science. The positions taken in the book take their inspiration, whether sympathetically or more critically, from the philosophy of Michael Friedman. This volume demonstrates that Friedman's work on history and philosophy of science, and on the history of philosophy more generally, is a particularly strong and fruitful basis for a renewed discussion of the way forward. Mary Domski and Michael Dickson have assembled an exceptional roster of contributors, all of whom have engaged significantly with Friedman's work. Beyond that, most of the essays in this volume are ambitious, well crafted, and tightly argued -- and some, in particular, are a joy to read. Friedman's concluding essay is an amazing synthetic work that brings all the threads together, but that also presents and defends a reworked version of the dynamic and constitutive a priori. The result is a volume that presents the state of the art in the discipline and that will stimulate and inform work on these subjects in the years to come. Moreover, the volume overall does not restrict itself to providing a Festschrift for Friedman, though that word is used. It is a Manifestoschrift, as the subtitle suggests: the aim of the book is to give new direction and vigor to the history and philosophy of science.
Friedman has defended a number of innovative and influential positions on the history and philosophy of science, always, as he says here, from a revised Kantian standpoint. There are many landmarks in the philosophical landscape that we owe to Friedman, including a most plausible elaboration of the logical reading of Kantian geometry, consistent with Beth and Hintikka, and a thoroughgoing appreciation of the significance of Newton and of Kant's positions in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to the study of Kant's philosophy, as defended in Kant and the Exact Sciences. The Dynamics of Reason, Friedman's account of the rationality of scientific theory change and theory building in response to Thomas Kuhn, is perhaps most relevant to the methodology of history and philosophy of science.
Domski and Dickson present a framework for learning from history, via the notion of "synthetic history." Domski's and Dickson's conception of synthetic history is intended explicitly to show that one need not accept the (neo-)Kantian framework of the dynamic and relativized a priori in order to pursue a broadly Friedmannian project in history and philosophy of science (16). Rather, they identify several key features of Friedman's approach that are shared by the contributors to the volume, even by those who do not agree with Friedman's (neo-)Kantian framework:
1. There is a difference between the descriptive claim that philosophy has interacted with the sciences and the normative claim that philosophy ought to engage with the sciences and their history. Friedman makes the latter claim (7). Here, as the editors point out, Friedman engages with the historical thought of Richard Westfall, Thomas Kuhn, and Ernst Cassirer (9). The editors note that one need not accept Kantian or neo-Kantian claims in order to accept that, as Norwood Russell Hanson put it, philosophy of science without history of science is empty.
2. The editors present a shared set of compelling questions for historians and philosophers of science about the differing methodologies and approaches of historians and philosophers. These questions were put forcefully by Ronald Giere (1973) in his "History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?" Such questions, not limited to Giere's own, might include: Do the methods employed by historians of science -- "focused, more or less, on the specific events, contexts, and influences surrounding the development and acceptance or rejection of a concept or theory" -- provide material to draw useful philosophical lessons, without further argument (2-3)? On the other hand, does reading an episode in the history of science as an illumination of a philosophical problem, such as induction or scientific realism, illegitimately impose the concerns of the present on the practices and arguments of the past? Giere suggests that historians and philosophers of science take the burden of proof on themselves, and this volume contains an impressive set of arguments on this score.
3. A final position, implicitly held in common by the contributors to this volume, is a commitment to anti-Whiggishness. As the editors urge, we ought not take history to be a list of failings that lead ineluctably to the glorious present. Rather, history is a teacher, and her teachings allow us to take a more nuanced position on how we should best move forward (17).
One note before moving on: I will not assess Friedman's concluding essay separately, but rather will discuss it in relationship with the essays in the volume.
Parts I and II: "The Newtonian Era" and "Kant"
In his Afterword, "Synthetic History Reconsidered," Friedman treats the Newtonian era "in relation to Kant and Kantian themes" (574). Friedman focuses on Kant's relationship to Newtonian physics and, by extension, on Kant's engagement with the differences between Cartesian, Leibnizian, and Newtonian physics. Friedman pays significant attention to the influence of the theological tradition in the work of Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz; here, he takes his cue from Stephen Menn's excellent study (Menn 1998). Owing to the clear connections between the projects of the two Parts, I will discuss them together.
History of science and methodology of history and philosophy of science
The three essays here are by Domski, Domenico Bertoloni Meli, and William R. Newman. The essays share a focus on historical techniques and methodologies for philosophy and science. In consequence, they address, if implicitly, Giere's challenge for history and philosophy of science. But the essays here go beyond that, to defend controversial and remarkable positions on alchemy, on the place of Newton in the early modern tradition, and on the axiomatic method in history.
In "Newton as Historically-Minded Philosopher," Domski focuses on the distinction between Cartesian and Newtonian methods and arguments in the foundations of geometry. According to Domski, as Friedman points out, "the main target of Newton's rejection of 'relationalism' in favor of an 'absolutist' metaphysics of space is Descartes" (575). In the case of geometry, instead of beginning from Cartesian first principles and clear and distinct ideas, Newton "takes the certainty" of ancient mathematics as his "given" (67). Domski urges, as well, that we take Newton's methods seriously as an attempt to replace Cartesian methods, as an historical form of argument, not as a mere "appeal to authority."
Meli's "The Axiomatic Tradition in Seventeenth-Century Mechanics" explores the "Archimedean tradition" of seeking "principles to which the mind naturally consents, such as symmetry, or principles based on generalized experiences describing the normal course of nature," as opposed to the method of "contrived experiments" often associated with Mersenne, Boyle, and Mariotte (23). Meli sees in Stevin, Galileo, Torricelli, and Huygens a "common concern for establishing knowledge about nature in an axiomatic fashion" (37).
In "The Reduction to the Pristine State in Robert Boyle's Corpuscular Philosophy," Newman argues that "it is precisely the absence of an approach like Friedman's," which provides "an awareness of the interaction between scholastic natural philosophy and empirical practice," that has led scholarship to become "simply adrift in a sea of unrelated facts that lend themselves all too easily to the facile misinterpretations populating past and current surveys of the Scientific Revolution" (43). It is this lack of a coherent narrative of the relationship between natural philosophy and empirical practice "that has led both historians and philosophers to overlook one of the major reasons for the move to corpuscular matter theory in the early modern period" (43). Newman concludes that "It was the field of chymistry [a corpuscularian strain of alchemy] that supplied Boyle's primary ammunition against early modern scholastic matter theory as taught in the universities" (44).
Descartes, Leibniz, Lambert, Newton, Kant
The essays I focus on here are by Andrew Janiak, Alison Laywine, Daniel Sutherland, and Daniel Warren. Collected, these essays give an excellent perspective on the interaction between Kant and the early modern tradition.
An instructive comparison is the recently published (2008) Kant and the Early Moderns, edited by Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse. In that volume, Anja Jauernig argues against an "influential and popular story about Kant's philosophical development and about his relationship to Leibniz," which has it that Kant, after an "eye-opening" reading of Newton's Principia, at first tried to reconcile the Newtonian picture with the Leibniz-Wolff metaphysics, but was gradually led, over time, to "the total rejection of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason" (Jauernig 2008, 41). To Jauernig, this reading "tends to overemphasize Newton's influence in Kant's gradual emancipation from Leibniz-Wolff" (Ibid., 42). She cites Friedman's Kant and the Exact Sciences as one source of this story. She goes on to argue that it is much more likely that, in many cases, Kant was motivated by reasons internal to the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy.
The essays here take their cue from Friedman's work, and the perspective they offer goes well beyond any simple story of the transition from Kant's early work to the reform of metaphysics in the later work. In the context of these narratives, it appears that the dichotomy set up by Jauernig -- In developing the Critical system, was Kant responding to Newton or to internal tensions within Leibnizian metaphysics? -- is too limiting. What about Descartes? What about other figures whom Kant had read and with whom he was in correspondence? While several of the contributions to this volume begin from the thesis of external, Newtonian influence, they by no means suggest that that influence was the only one.
The essays in this section argue for several related claims. First, that Kant's defense of dynamism is traceable to his defense of Newton against Cartesian mechanism (Warren and Janiak). In "Newton's Forces in Kant's Critique," Janiak proposes a way to read the Critique that resolves the tension between Kant's arguments regarding attractive forces in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection in the first Critique, and Kant's abstract, transcendental form of argument there. Since attractive forces are empirical, it would appear they cannot be given a pure treatment. Janiak goes on to give an account of how Kant's account of forces can be read as part of his overall defense of the Newtonian dynamic picture over the Leibnizian monadic one, and that this context goes some way to resolve the apparent tension.
Second, in "Kant on Attractive and Repulsive Force: The Balancing Argument," Warren too argues that reading Kant's arguments in the context of the defense of dynamism aids in understanding. However, Warren argues that, while Kant thought that we could make substantive claims a priori about the necessary conditions for avoiding the collapse or dispersion of matter, problems arise with his arguments for these "necessary conditions" when they are taken out of the context of the Cartesian mechanism and Newtonian dynamism with which Kant was engaged.
The essays by Laywine and Sutherland support the view that Kant intended a thoroughgoing reform of metaphysics. They present a nuanced picture of this intended reform, based partly on Kant's evolving views on the role of mathematics, especially geometry, with respect to metaphysics. Sutherland's essay, "Philosophy, Geometry, and Logic in Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early Kant," focuses on the pre-Critical period, in particular, on the Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality. Sutherland gives a very clear account of Kant's early rejection, in the Inquiry, of Leibniz's universal characteristic, but also of Kant's later willingness to "entertain the possibility" of an ars combinatoria based on the categories (185).
Laywine's "Kant and Lambert on Geometrical Postulates in the Reform of Metaphysics" takes as its goal to "make one concrete suggestion: [Johann Heinrich] Lambert gave Kant the interesting idea that geometrical postulates in Euclid's sense were somehow essential to the reform of metaphysics they both sought" (114). As Friedman observes in tracing this line of reasoning, Laywine's "very illuminating" contribution makes several intriguing further suggestions (599).
Laywine cites evidence that Kant, unlike Lambert and Wolff, did not take mathematics as a model for metaphysics. Kant thought, nonetheless, that "thinking about the function and significance of postulates" can help philosophers to better understand problems in metaphysics (122). Laywine's essay traces the role Kant's thought about postulates may have had as a background to the Transcendental Deduction. The key to understanding this, Laywine suggests, is in reading the use of "the constructive postulates of geometry" as suggesting an answer to the question Kant raised in his letter to Marcus Herz of February 1772: how is it possible for the intellect, a "faculty that represents objects a priori without being affected by them", to represent objects at all? "The answer apparently depends on being able to establish some kind of relation" between the intellect's representations and their objects (125). The constructive procedures of geometry establish a relationship between geometrical concept and geometrical object. Why not make the case, then, that the understanding can carry out similar constructive procedures that explain how the intellect can represent objects a priori? Laywine concludes by making the interpretive suggestion that the project of the transcendental deduction could be to show that the "logical functions of the understanding … are indeed constructive procedures" (129).
In his concluding essay, Friedman links Laywine's project to his reading of the notion of construction in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (599ff). These discussions, along with Frederick C. Beiser's essay for this volume, make a persuasive case that an understanding of Kant's conception of construction, whether mathematical or philosophical, is necessary for a complete understanding of Kant's projects in the Critique and in the Metaphysical Foundations.
Kant's Immediate Reception
Beiser's essay, "Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel," picks up the train of Sutherland's and Laywine's narratives. Instead of considering the relationship between the pre-Critical and Critical Kant, Beiser focuses on Kant's reception in Schelling and Hegel. Beiser begins by emphasizing a question Laywine raises as well: what is Kant's considered viewpoint on the relationship between mathematics and philosophy (243)? Beiser observes that this key question is not much discussed in studies of post-Kantian philosophy. His essay traces the notion of mathematical construction in Schelling and Hegel and its role in allowing for the possibility of "intellectual intuition" (248). Beiser, like Friedman, sees a method of construction at work in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations and sees this method as an inspiration for Schelling's Naturphilosophie. (On this count, see also Friedman's Afterword, 621ff.)
In his "Two Studies in the Reception of Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic", Charles Parsons evaluates two early receptions of Kant's work on arithmetic, by Schultz and Bolzano. Readers familiar with the Friedman-Parsons debate on Kant's philosophy of geometry might imagine that Parsons's goal is to vindicate his own reading over Friedman's, by arguing that early readers of Kant, including Kant's disciple Schultz, read Kant in a way consistent with Parsons's reading and not Friedman's. But, to Parsons's credit, that is not the goal of this study. Parsons's essay, instead, is a compelling argument that unappreciated problems with Kant's philosophy of arithmetic emerge from close discussion of Bolzano's and Schultz's readings of Kant. (Readers who are interested in the current moves in the Parsons-Friedman debate from Friedman's perspective should turn to Friedman's concluding essay, 585ff.)
Parts III-V: "Logical Positivism and Neo-Kantianism", "History and Philosophy of Physics", and "Post-Kuhnian Philosophy of Science"
The many essays in these three sections deal directly with Friedman's history and philosophy of science, including: his account of the split between analytic and continental traditions, his responses to logical empiricism and to Kuhn's account of scientific change, and his arguments concerning coordination and meaning in modern physics.
Ernst Cassirer and Rudolf Carnap
Friedman's A Parting of the Ways is a penetrating examination of the history of the split between the analytic and continental traditions in philosophy. Friedman identifies three philosophical paths: Carnap's search for "the underlying logical forms" of "the objectivity found in natural scientific knowledge", Heidegger's rejection of this pursuit in favor of a phenomenological "essential analysis", and Cassirer's problematic but promising middle way (Friedman 2000, 148-150).
As Richardson observes in his essay for this volume, some readers "may have been shocked to discover that the real hero of the tale … is not Carnap but Cassirer" (282). Friedman is responsible for the increasing appreciation of Cassirer as a significant figure in his own right. James Mattingly's essay, "The Paracletes of Quantum Gravity," explores further Friedman's sympathetic reading, in the context of modern physics.
Friedman's approach to Cassirer is not exclusively sympathetic. In his "Validity in the Cultural Sciences?" John Michael Krois responds to a criticism of Cassirer's philosophy by Friedman. According to Friedman, Cassirer does not explain how the Geisteswissenschaften are to share in the universal validity of the Naturwissenschaften or, at least, how the types of validity proper to each are to be related to each other (262). As a result, Cassirer abandons his promising middle ground and we are faced with the choice between Carnap and Heidegger. Krois gives a very clear response to this criticism, linked to what Krois sees as the key notion of Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms, the idea of "symbolic pregnance." But more than that, Krois's essay provides an excellent introduction to the neo-Kantianism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as a much broader picture of Cassirer's philosophy than has yet been available. As Krois points out, much of Cassirer's most important work has only recently been published (Cassirer 1999).
The essays on Carnap in this volume present a mixed perspective. Alan Richardson sums up his view of the state of scholarship on the Aufbau at the beginning of his essay (279ff.). One reading, perhaps inspired by Quine, sees the Aufbau as the apex of the method of phenomenalist, empiricist reduction using symbolic logic. Another, spearheaded by Richardson and Friedman, sees Kantian and neo-Kantian elements in the Aufbau, especially in the analysis of objectivity. In "From Mach to Carnap: A Tale of Confusion", Paul Pojman interestingly complicates this tale by arguing for two related theses: that Carnap had both empiricist and Kantian aims in the Aufbau and that the supposedly empiricist influence on Carnap, Mach, was not what we now consider to be "Machian."
Two essays address the interpretation of Carnap in detail: Thomas Ricketts's "Quine's Objection and Carnap's Aufbau" and William Demopoulos's "The Role of the Foundations of Mathematics in the Development of Carnap's Theory of Theories." Ricketts focuses on an historical, interpretive thesis, that there is an underlying continuity to Carnap's views on the "relation of observation to physical theory" (313). One story is that Carnap was persuaded by Quine to abandon his original project altogether. Ricketts gives a different reading, according to which Carnap's seeming change of heart was instead a developing appreciation of the limits of "what can and cannot be defined in the formal languages with which he is working" (326). The contentious part of Ricketts's essay is that he sees this appreciation as evolving in tandem with Carnap's application of "critical conventionalism," the notion that multiple models of the phenomena exist and that the choice between them is underdetermined and based on simplicity (318). Richardson sees critical conventionalism as in tension with the project of the Aufbau; Ricketts does not see a tension there (319). Thus, while this paper defends a nominally historical thesis, the philosophical stakes for Carnap interpretation turn out to be significant.
The subject of the influence of Hilbert's axiomatization on logical empiricism receives less attention than it should. Demopoulos's essay, a further development of the ideas from Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) and Demopoulos (2007), explores the influence of Hilbert's axiomatic methods on Carnap's project of rational reconstruction. Demopoulos gives a rich and technically precise account of Carnap's use of Hilbert's mathematical methods in the Geometry of 1899 to develop his "theory of theories". Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the essay is Demopoulos's suggestion that Carnap's view of truth owes something to Hilbert's (475 and passim), a significant revision to our understanding of Carnap's account of the epistemology and reconstruction of empirical theories.
Physics, Mathematics, and the Dynamic A Priori
In The Dynamics of Reason, Friedman distinguishes between two senses of the a priori: as an unrevisable and infallible set of a priori principles, versus a set of presuppositions constitutive of the meaning of empirical propositions (Friedman 2001, 74). For instance, Newton's laws of motion are part of the framework within which Newton's law of gravitation acquires empirical content (Ibid., 37). In arguing for the latter, constitutive sense, Friedman argues for two theses. First, that the constitutive a priori is dynamic, that is, that it can change over time, which accommodates Kuhn's arguments regarding paradigm shifts in science. Second, though, that Kuhn's arguments regarding the incommensurability of successive paradigms threaten a slide into radical relativism (712ff.). Friedman fills this gap with an analysis of the transitions from one set of "locally constitutive" principles, or rules of normal science, to another, which allows for a broader picture of the rationality of theory change. On Friedman's account, practitioners of one part of normal science can have access to the real possibility of a succeeding account (714).
Friedman applies his analysis to the shift from Newton to Einstein in particular. This turns out to be quite significant in a way, perhaps, not fully appreciated as yet. Noretta Koertge's essay, "How Should We Describe Scientific Change? Or: A Neo-Popperian Reads Friedman," makes the point that, by focusing on the special case of mechanics and physics, Friedman has prejudiced the case in his favor; other disciplines, such as chemistry, may not be amenable to his treatment. Friedman responds as follows: "what I call the dynamics of reason is not intended to be a general theory of scientific change at all -- rather, it is a particular historical narrative accompanied by a particular philosophical gloss" (715). The shift from Newton to Einstein is the most potent challenge to the Kantian ideal of rationality, Friedman says; one can extrapolate, perhaps, that the shift from one theory to another in chemistry or in anthropology does not pose such a challenge.
The essays by Don Howard, John Norton, Robert DiSalle, Richard Creath, Scott Tanona, Thomas Ryckman, and Dickson explore the scope and limits of Friedman's historical analysis and, in distinct contexts, of his account of the a priori. These essays are rich and rewarding, and represent the vanguard of work on post-Kuhnian philosophy of science, as Friedman dubs it.
In "'Let me briefly indicate why I do not find this standpoint natural.' Einstein, General Relativity, and the Contingent A Priori," Don Howard begins with an appropriately provocative question: "Who is right? Friedman or Einstein?" Friedman argues that the contingent a priori plays a role in "the manner in which theories acquire empirical content" (334). Friedman's defense of the contingent a priori requires at least a functional distinction between a priori and empirical statements of a theory, which rules out a holistic approach to theory appraisal. Howard presents evidence that Einstein himself considered versions of the contingent a priori, as defended by Schlick and Reichenbach, and rejected them, in favor of Duhemian holism. Further, the essay contains an illuminating and persuasive account of Einstein's own view, according to which any particular division of a theory into empirical and a priori elements must always be arbitrary.
The broader approach to historical study that Howard defends, then, is that we ought not "privilege contemporary rational reconstructions over the self-understandings of the historical actors themselves" (350). Historical context can clarify our perspective, or it can muddy it, by introducing the concerns of the present into the reconstruction of the past. If our rational reconstruction of a theory requires that we discount the methodological approach of "the historical actors themselves," that is an excellent reason to question the reconstruction.
The conflict between Friedman's view, as currently stated, and Howard's account, as presented here, will no doubt stimulate reflection and work on these questions. While reading Howard's essay, I was reminded of Friedman's remark, in response to Koertge, that his theory of the dynamics of reason was not intended as a general theory of scientific change. Instead, it was intended to defend Kant's "Enlightenment ideal of rationality". Howard's essay raises a key and very compelling question: to what extent can we divorce the dynamics of reason from the "battle-tested empirical generalizations" and from the facts on the ground, in any account of scientific change (349)?
Tanona's rich essay, "Theory, Coordination, and Empirical Meaning in Modern Physics," addresses a question very similar to Howard's. And the comparison between Norton's essay, "How Hume and Mach Helped Einstein Find Special Relativity," and DiSalle's essay, "Synthesis, the Synthetic A Priori, and the Origins of Modern Space-Time Theory," is a case in point of the difference between the dynamic a priori and the more empirical approach. Norton's essay gives us a careful and historically accurate account of how Einstein responded to problems embedded in nineteenth-century electromagnetic theory. DiSalle's essay, equally careful and quite detailed, focuses on the conceptual changes and transformations involved in the development of the theory of space-time. Friedman and DiSalle see their approaches as "complementary," though Friedman carefully distinguishes the two positions and, it is worth mentioning, brings up the question of the contribution of empirical facts on the ground (718ff.).
The question is of the reconstruction of scientific change. Friedman's account and the accounts inspired by Friedman tend to focus on the conceptual and mathematical continuity between frameworks. DiSalle emphasizes the role of philosophical reflection in theory construction (528), which is, indeed, complementary to Friedman's approach. Norton's, Howard's, and Tanona's essays insist on a strong role for the empirical groundwork for those changes.
Creath's essay, "The Construction of Reason: Kant, Carnap, Kuhn, and Beyond," and Ryckman's "The 'Relativized A Priori': An Appreciation and a Critique," address the foundations of the dynamics of reason from quite different perspectives. Creath, first, gives an analysis of Friedman's notion of communicative rationality and the dynamics of reason; and second, questions whether Friedman's account is better than Quine's as a descriptive project for science, concluding that this is a difficult matter to prove. Ryckman, on the other hand, argues that Friedman's defense of rationality against relativism will succeed only if Friedman "takes on board something like the intentional-analytic framework of phenomenological idealism" (466).
Finally, Dickson's essay, "Beauty Doth of Itself Persuade: Dirac on Quantization, Mathematical Beauty, and Theoretical Understanding," stands out among the others as an account of the role of mathematics in scientific understanding. Dickson develops a view, which he takes from Dirac, that mathematical beauty originates from mathematical generality and that mathematical generality contributes to our understanding. First, it does so by contributing to the construction of scientific theories that aid in understanding nature; and second, it does so by allowing us to better understand the theories themselves. The essay is clear, well defended, and itself a beautiful piece of work.
Overall, the essays in this section, along with the treatment of "Post-Kuhnian Philosophy of Science" in Friedman's concluding essay, reveal that there are lively disputes here over significant questions and that much work remains to be done. Does Kuhn's account of theory change threaten to slide into relativism or Quinean naturalism? If so, does Friedman's account halt the slide? How ought we integrate the account of the dynamics of reason into a broad account of scientific theory change, including experiment, evidence, and sciences other than physics and mechanics? What is the contribution of mathematical and conceptual analysis to theory construction and appraisal in science and in philosophy?
The questions most pressing for Friedman's philosophy of science are among those most pressing for the history and the philosophy of science in general. This volume, as a whole, is an excellent further step on the path toward more productive debate on these issues.
Cassirer, Ernst. 1999. Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis. (ECN 2), edited by Klaus Christian Köhnke and J. M. Krois.
Demopoulos, William. 2007. "Carnap on the Reconstruction of Scientific Theories", in M. Friedman and R. Creath, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Carnap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 248-272.
Demopoulos, William and Friedman, Michael. 1985. "Russell's Analysis of Matter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest," Philosophy of Science 52: 621-39.
Friedman, Michael. 2000. A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court.
Friedman, Michael. 2001. Dynamics of Reason. The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Garber, Daniel and Longuenesse, Béatrice, eds., 2008. Kant and the Early Moderns. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Giere, Ronald. 1973. "History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience?" British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 24: 282-297.
Jauernig, Anja. 2008. "Kant's Critique of the Leibnizian Philosophy: Contra the Leibnizians, but Pro Leibniz", in Garber and Longuenesse, op. cit., 41-63.
Menn, Stephen. 1998. Descartes and Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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Breach Resolution: 8 Lessons Learned
CEO Offers Insights Based on ExperienceFollowing a breach, take responsibility for your actions as an organization and as a leadership team. That's an important lesson learned by the CEO of an organization that experienced a breach last year caused by the theft of an unencrypted laptop.
"I, especially, as a CEO, took individual responsibility for not providing the leadership and not providing the policies, and not providing the tools to those on the front line who were just trying to do their jobs and just trying to do the right thing," says Micky Tripathi of The Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative, a not-for-profit consultancy that experienced a breach last year.
Tripathi spelled out in a recent blog the details of the organization's breach, which involved the theft of an unencrypted laptop from an employee's car, The breach, which affected about 1,000 patients of the collaborative's physician group practice clients, cost almost $300,000 to resolve.
Tripathi outlines in an in-depth interview with HealthcareInfoSecurity's Howard Anderson (transcript below) eight important lessons learned. Among them are:
- If you experience a breach, "treat it as your most high-priority project." Tripathi held daily meetings with a crisis team to coordinate breach resolution efforts.
- Do not underestimate how difficult it is to respond to and remediate a breach.
- Assume all portable devices contain sensitive information and take action to protect it, including the use of encryption.
In the wake of the breach, Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative broadened its use of encryption and trained all staff on how to use the technology. It now uses whole disk encryption of laptops, file-level encryption for passing files to and from its clients, and secure e-mail.
Tripathi is president and CEO of the collaborative, which is supported by 34 non-profit healthcare organizations in Massachusetts. The organization specializes in advising physician group practices and others about the implementation of electronic health records. Tripathi also chairs the Health Information Exchange Workgroup of the federal Health IT Policy Committee, which makes recommendations about health information exchange to the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Before joining the collaborative, Tripathi was a manager at the Boston Consulting Group and served as founding president and CEO of the Indiana Health Information Exchange. He has a Ph.D. in political science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
HOWARD ANDERSON: For starters, can you please briefly describe your organization for us?
MICKY TRIPATHI: The Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative is a non-profit organization that was founded in 2004 to facilitate the implementation and adoption of electronic health records and health information technologies primarily in the ambulatory part of the healthcare delivery market.
Data Breach Details
ANDERSON: You recently wrote a lengthy blog describing your organization's experience with a breach, offering valuable lessons learned. So for starters, please summarize the details of the incident briefly. It involved the theft of a laptop, right?
TRIPATHI: Yes it did. The incident happened when one of our employees had a laptop with them while they were out in the field. [The employee] stopped to have an appointment, left the laptop in their automobile, in a briefcase, and the briefcase was stolen. We believe and have every indication it was just a random, incidental theft. The laptop wasn't exposed, just a briefcase was exposed. A window was broken and the briefcase taken with all of its contents. As it turned out, the laptop had some patient demographic information on it, which thus would constitute a breach of PHI [protected health information] by federal standards and PII, which is personally identifiable information, by Massachusetts state standards.
Lessons Learned
ANDERSON: In your blog you offered a summary of eight lessons learned from the experience. Can you go over those quickly for us now, please, so people can learn from your experience?
TRIPATHI: The first one was really just about ... self-awareness. It was basically saying that if you're a physician practice or a contractor, as I said in the blog, look in the mirror. Look at your organization and make sure that you really understand what's going on in the front lines of the organization. And one of the things that I think is probably true for many, many organizations, not because they're bad or negligent - I certainly don't consider us negligent - is that business processes develop over time and organizations get big and complicated, and while everyone is doing the right thing and they believe that they're doing the right thing, sometimes things start to happen on the front lines that may not be fully in alignment with what your company policy would require.
Often convenience is the enemy of good security practices. It's not because any individual wants to violate good security practices. It's because they have job requirements that suggest a certain level of performance and they start cutting corners - sometimes not even knowing that they're cutting corners - in order to get their job done.
One of the things that we found was that we needed to do a really meaningful self-examination end-to-end of what's going on in our organization, and that's the first lesson learned I would offer to any organization. I would say the only organizations I know of that really know this are the ones who have been through a security breach. What I would like to do is see if we can get to the point that you don't have to go through the experience that we went through to actually do this kind of self-assessment, as painful as it might be, particularly for your front lines. Understand where that interface is between your organization and the outside world and your customers, where you're getting that PHI or where you're giving it back, and what are the processes ... on the front lines. I think you will almost always find that there's room for improvement.
Protect Mobile Devices
Second, I would say that it's probably a good practice to assume that your portable devices contain some kind of sensitive information. ... Your mobile device probably almost certainly contains some kind of sensitive information if you're dealing with PHI on a routine basis. The example that I drew on was not one that necessarily pertains to us because we're not a covered entity. We're not a provider organization, but we work with many, many provider organizations, and one of the things that we found is that they have mobile devices where they use their EHRs. Those EHRs on the mobile devices are synched up either with a cloud-based system or with a client-server based system back in their office, and those EHRs are supposed to, whenever they're shut down, delete any locally, temporarily stored information that was made available on that mobile device. Well it turns out that we have found in almost every case that we've gone into that the mobile device actually has PHI on it, either because the software wasn't quite as robust as suggested by the vendor or more often the users were doing things that the vendor would probably say they shouldn't do. But the only guard against that was just the statement that you shouldn't do it [store PHI on mobile devices].
For example, saving a referral letter in the system [may] create a Word document. If we [open] up [the device], create the referral letter and then save it back into the EHR, there are many applications that either would allow, or as a matter of routine course, save a temporary file on that mobile device. And when the computer shuts down, it doesn't delete the temporary file, or the physician might inadvertently, or on purpose, save it locally. Again, because they don't know, they don't realize that it would constitute a real risk on their part. That's why we strongly recommend now and we're strong believers in encryption as really a back-stop to those policies. It doesn't mean you shouldn't have those policies, but encryption is an important back-up.
Understand Work Flow
Third, we would strongly recommend that you understand who's working in your practice and what they're doing. We certainly understand that part of the challenge with that - there are a couple of challenges - one is that physician offices are really, really busy. There are people coming in and out all the time and they have complex systems - not just IT systems - all sorts of other systems going on in their practice and there are vendors who they rely on coming in and out, and it's hard to know what each and every one of them is doing. But that said, anyone who is touching your EHR system, or touching PHI, you probably ought to get a handle on what they're doing. That doesn't mean that there's day-to-day diligence applied to what they're doing, but it's probably worth having a conversation upfront with that vendor about what exactly they are going to be doing in the way of having to access PHI and how they handle PHI.
One of the things we do now, based on this experience as a company, is that we will force that conversation with our customers, so as an ... initial part of our engagement, we have a little statement that we've created about ... the data that we expect and need access to and here's how we treat the data and manage the data. That doesn't really protect us from anything. I mean, if we have a breach - we have a breach. But we really use it as a vehicle to generate awareness and to have the conversation with the provider organization to make sure they're aware of what we're doing, because, at the end of the day, one of the things that we were surprised to find - and somewhat disappointed because we wanted to take full responsibility for this - was that the provider organizations who we worked for were, from a federal perspective, the ones who were really held responsible.
The federal law basically assumes that you as a covered entity know what your vendors are doing, and if something happens with one of your vendors, one of your contractors, the responsibility is yours. I don't think many provider organizations really know that. I think that we've come to sort of take for granted business associate agreements and providers think that, "Well, I've signed a business associate agreement so all the responsibility is now theirs." Not true from a federal perspective.
Need for Crisis Management
The fourth lesson I would offer is that you need to take it seriously. What I mean by that is - and we didn't come to this right away - after the initial shock we contacted our attorneys and I assumed that they would start to manage the process. But what we found was that it was a much more engaged activity than that. It took us about a day or two to realize that we're going to have to treat this as a serious crisis ... I put everything aside, cleared my desk, cleared my calendar for the first day or two while we [discerned] what the problem was. Then [we] got together a crisis team, which included our attorneys, my security officer and our customers and had literally daily meetings every day at 5 p.m. We had an hour phone call where we'd manage the progress. We put together a project plan.
My company took responsibility for all of this, but we did ask that all those people be a part of those daily phone calls, and obviously our attorneys were working by our sides. But we wanted to make sure that we were, on a daily basis, all in touch, all staying on top of any new information that was coming out as we did the forensic analysis, and, most important, that we were all on the same page with respect to what the actions were that we needed to take going forward as we were trying to navigate the state and federal laws and what the notification requirements were, and media notices and all of that.
So I would certainly say treat it as a serious project ... even think of it as a crisis. Put together a crisis team. Put together a project plan and then treat it as your most high-priority project.
Sorting Out Complexities
The fifth lesson I would say is to not underestimate how difficult it's going to be just to figure out what you actually did, and what you might have violated and what you might not have violated, and what remediation you're supposed to do. Because one of the things that we found was that it takes a while to figure that out. And one of the recommendations that we had - and this is going to the sixth one - is to keep a daily log of your activities from day one. This was just advice from one of our board members who worked for a large provider organization that had been through a number of these [breaches] before.
One of the things that we just came to recognize ... was that as hard as it is to get your arms around this - and you're working really hard and we think that we were doing everything in the provider's interest and the patient's interest - you'll still get criticism from those who are on the outside and don't realize that some of the stuff takes time just to figure out what actually happened, let alone to then take the remediation steps. So you'll inevitably find someone, a significant stakeholder, who will look at something where you've taken two and a half weeks and they'll say, "What were you doing? You were sitting on it." The reality was you were working incredibly hard just to get to the point that you could find out who needs to be notified of what and what actually happened so that you don't give anyone any misinformation. A daily log can really help with that.
Take Responsibility
Number seven - as I say in the blog - is you've got to "man up." What I mean by that is not staff up but man up in the sense of take responsibility. Take responsibility for your actions. It's really, really easy, we found, to sort of shuck responsibility and to say, "Well it's their fault and if only the process was better, and this is a multi-stakeholder thing and it's your fault and our fault." The reality of the situation was we were the ones who had the information and made a mistake and the information was taken. What we found was that everyone was incredibly respectful and forgiving.
All of our customers, most importantly the one who had the breach that was over 500 and who arguably suffered most from all of this, had their name published on the federal list of large breaches, also had the media notices issued on their behalf that they had a breach - they were incredibly sympathetic with our situation. And I think that a part of that was because we took accountability from the beginning and made sure that they understood that we took accountability and that we were going to do everything in our power to make them whole. Some things you can't make them whole on, like their loss of reputation, but they were incredibly sympathetic with our situation as well.
Executive Leadership
The last thing that I would offer is really about the importance of not only taking responsibility as an organization, but having taken responsibility from a management and leadership perspective.
One of the things that we found was that as we did the analysis of the work flow, what our front-line people were doing and how so much patient information could be on a laptop in an unencrypted form, one of the things we found was some of the other people on the front lines basically were saying, "There but for the grace of god, go I," basically meaning that this was a mistake by the person who definitely violated company policy, definitely did something they shouldn't do, but, on the other hand, probably didn't have enough education and training. They probably didn't have enough tools to allow them to do their job securely. Because as I said earlier, in our opinion, convenience is the biggest enemy of security. We can say all we want about policy and you must do this and you have to do that, but if we're also telling them you have to cover these 10 practices and you better get this done in the next two months, then you've given them basically a conflicting set of objectives that's very hard for them to do in a secure way if they're also not given security tools that will allow them to get the job done according to what the company goals are ...
We took responsibility as an entire company. And I, especially, as a CEO took individual responsibility for not providing the leadership and not providing the policies and not providing the tools to those on the front line who were just trying to do their jobs and just trying to do the right thing. That was a part of the responsibility that we took. We did end-to-end analysis, we brought in the front-line people, we asked them to describe in great detail what their work flow was, what their need for PHI was [in various] circumstances ... and then we crafted a set of policies that would abide by all federal and state laws as well as our company priorities - our ethical responsibilities as a company.
Then we provided them with a set of tools, very specific tools that we made sure that everyone of our front-line people had, and we made sure they had the training to use those tools. We did each of those steps with the participation of the front-line folks so that those tools were things that the front-line folks participated in the selection of as well. That gave us the confidence that the organization, from the top all the way down to the bottom ... had all bought in and understood why we had all these tools in place. We had some confidence that they were going to be used appropriately and on a daily basis.
Those are the eight lessons learned. As I said, there are many, many others. I'm sure many of your readers and listeners would have many others to offer, but I hope that these lessons learned can be lessons that other people can take and learn from without having to go through our experience.
Use of Encryption
ANDERSON: When you refer to tools, you're now using encryption on all your mobile devices? Is that the most significant thing you did in making sure that people have that technology and know how to use it and are using it consistently?
TRIPATHI: We have three specific tools that we rolled out. One was whole-disk encryption. I made sure that I was the first person to get the whole-disk encryption on my laptop just to convey to the entire company that this is incredibly important and it's a high priority, even though I never have PHI on my laptop because I don't do any real work, I'm just a CEO. But I wanted to make sure that whatever pain they were going through - because it's a little bit of an inconvenience ... to have the encryption software on there because it takes time. It adds to the boot-up time. I wanted to make sure that everyone understood that this is really important. So whole-disk encryption was one.
The second was a tool for file-level encryption. Often we want to be able to pass a file, get a file from a customer and receive it on our end, but also be able to pass it back. We want to be able to do that in a secure way, so we provided them a tool that they could zip something up according to the FIPS encryption standard and be able to give that to someone else.
The last tool that we provided was secure e-mail. There are sometimes circumstances where they need to be able to e-mail something back and forth. It may be too big or it may be inconvenient for them to try to zip it up and then send it, which would also be HIPAA compliant, and so we offered them the secure e-mail option as well - a secure open channel for them to be able to send whatever they need to send.
Those three tools were [in] the tool kit that we came up with, with the input of the front-line folks, that would provide them with enough flexibility to be able to use any one or any combination of those to get their jobs done.

subset: commoncrawl


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Listen to Your Mother - Indianapolis is just about 3 hours away and I'm trying to take my mind off the fact that Listen to Your Mother is just about 3 hours away.
I'm not really nervous. I love an audience! But I am excited in a "maybe I need a pre-show glass of wine" sort of way. I spent the morning getting things ready:
Clothes for Robbie's school program tonight...(his clothes, not mine)...CHECK.
E-mail directions to the theatre to my dad...(because apparently he doesn't have Google)...CHECK.
Steal Annie's makeup...(because I don't really own any)...CHECK.
Curling iron...CHECK
New shoes that might add a hint of unwelcome realism to my piece if I'm not careful...CHECK.
Two versions of my outfit...(because I still don't know what to wear)...CHECK.
Extra underwear...(Hey! You never know...)...CHECK.
I want to text Mike and tell him not to bring me flowers or anything. But I'm afraid he'll say he wasn't planning to bring me flowers or anything and then I might be disappointed.
I'm a little embarrassed that the pre-show slideshow will display me in varying degrees of fatness. "Oh look, there's skinny (skinnier) Amy." "Oh, there you are...what happened to you?!" But so proud that my beautiful kids and my wonderful mom will also grace the screen with me.
I'm humbled by the friends who purchased tickets and are coming to the show to hear me read my piece.
Mostly, I'm just so honored to be part of this cast. These women have stories to tell -- amazing stories and ordinary stories told in amazing ways.
Thursday, May 2, 2013
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The Yale University Board of Trustees has voted to rescind Bill Cosby's honorary degree after the comedian was found guilty on sexual assault charges on Thursday.
Cosby was convicted on three counts of aggravated assault related to an encounter with a former Temple University employee, Andrea Constand, in his Cheltenham home in Pennsylvania. He was accused of drugging and molesting Constand in 2004. During the trial, five other women testified to also having been drugged and assaulted by Cosby.
A Yale spokesman released the following statement Tuesday night:
"Today the Yale University board of trustees voted to rescind the honorary degree awarded to William H. Cosby, Jr. in 2003. The decision is based on a court record providing clear and convincing evidence of conduct that violates fundamental standards of decency shared by all members of the Yale community, conduct that was unknown to the board at the time the degree was awarded. The board took this decision following Mr. Cosby's criminal conviction after he was afforded due process.
"Yale is committed to both the elimination of sexual misconduct and the adherence to due process. We reaffirm that commitment with our action today."
Wesleyan University President Michael Roth has also announced he intends to ask the Board of Trustees to revoke the honorary degree Wesleyan awarded Cosby in 1987. Roth will make his request when the Board of Trustees meets in May.
[NATL] Bill Cosby Through the Years
In June 2016, the University of Connecticut revoked an honorary degree awarded to Cosby in 1996. It was the first time the school had ever rescinded an honorary degree.
The court case has destroyed the legacy of the once influential comedian. He was originally charged in 2015, but the initial trial ended in a mistrial when the jury deadlocked.
Cosby now faces up to 10 years in prison on each count. A sentencing date has not been announced. His attorneys said they plan to appeal the verdict.


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In a week filled with news of computers and security, MIT hosted the Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference, held at the Hyatt Regency from March 27-30.
Thursday at the conference, Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) announced, via telephone, a bill that would end the imposition of government-designed encryption standards and would promote the use of commercial encryption. The formation of a Congressional Internet Caucus to increase Congress' understanding of the Internet and to get more members on line was launched the same day. On Friday, reporters sought out conference participants for comment on the case of an Argentinean student charged with breaking into DOD computers and other government computers through Harvard's computer system.
Conference chair Professor Harold Abelson, Class of 1922 Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, coordinated the conference, which covered topics from the Communications Decency Act to electronic money and cyber crime.
Professor Michael Dertouzos, director of the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, gave the March 28 banquet talk entitled "Ancient Humans in the Information Age" at the conference and appeared on WBUR's "The Connection," show hosted by Christopher Lydon, in conjunction with the conference.
Professor Dertouzos discussed his theories that a post-industrial society based predominantly on information cannot happen, that we will have an increased rather than decreased need for publishers and others who will sort and select material for us, and that information technology will not automatically democratize the world. He believes the information market will bring on the rise of the "urban villager," but not lead to basic changes in human relationships.
"Technology has shifted dramatically-from stones and clubs and plows to engines, jet aircraft and keyboards-but we have not changed," Professor Dertouzos said. "You are the same human being. You may watch TV and eat with a spoon and fork, but you have the same brain, same musculature, the same aspirations and beliefs you had 1,000 years ago."
While some have said that our world may soon be filled up with information, Professor Dertouzos thinks that won't happen because of the nature of information as an intermediate good. "The economy can't become so skewed that the value of the information exceeds the value of the physical goods and services produced. A post-industrial society based predominantly on information cannot happen.
"The gap between rich and poor will increase-within a country and among countries. If you are rich, the information technology helps. If you're poor it doesn't," Professor Dertouzos explained. "If you're poor, you don't have the means. All the nonsense you hear that says that computers will help bridge the gap-they can, but not by themselves. For them to help, there has to be money spent, there have to be teachers around, there has to be a lot of activity, a lot of benevolent activity. Left to its own devices, the information market will increase the gap and therefore we must help the have-nots with our money and with our work. If we don't, the poor, whether they are countries or people, will, as history teaches, revolt.
"As ancient humans, we have the ability to contact a few thousand human beings in our lifetime. Typically, the capacity of a human is a handful or two of close, solid relationships and a couple or three thousand acquaintances. The information age cannot change that. You can be close in proximity to hundreds of millions, but you can't know them all, because all you can remember is 3,000. All you can do is replace the label `physical acquaintance' with `virtual acquaintance.'
"The information age will help increase our productivity and will bring us closer to one another, helping us better understand our fellow human beings," Professor Dertouzos said. "However, it will not be a panacea that will solve all the problems of human kind. It's not going to free our spirits, increase our compassion, make us better people. Nor is it going to turn us into criminals or violent people. The information market will help us, but will remain fundamentally utilitarian."


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According to Bullrun HQ: "Latest info direct from Kansas City..1st Tove Christensen, 2nd Los Matadors, 3rd Team Gotham..all cars now starting to arrive. AMG Dolls in 5th." Which means that we must amend our earlier statement that the Magnaflow RS4 was not the first in, and apparently the GT2 sled of Tove Christiansen has taken the official first for the stage into KCMO.
Meanwhile, from the august Mr. Roy: "Annabelle Frankl of Team Twins, out of jail for $1000 bail, Saline county, arrested by former Corvette owner Deputy Shively, 60 miles from KC, MO, town of Marshall, for 106mph in a 70mph in a Corvette Z06." So Nicholas and his motoring-journo sister are back on the road together. Godspeed, twins. We'll buy you a birthday drink in a couple of days.
Thanks to Jalopnik!


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The Negro Leagues Committee was formed in 1971 in an effort to research and preserve the history of blacks in baseball before the re-integration of the game, and to support efforts to give them recognition.
1994 marked the release of the committee's landmark publication, The Negro Leagues Book, which was updated in 2020 by Larry Lester and Wayne Stivers. The committee also compiles Negro League statistics, interviews former players and provides a network for research in the area. Subcommittees include ballparks, Negro Leaguers in Japan, Organized Baseball records, player register updates, and Negro League rosters.
A Negro League Bibliography has been initiated in conjunction with the Bibliography Committee. The eighth edition of The Baseball Encyclopedia featured Negro League player statistics provided by the committee.
The committee also hosts the annual Jerry Malloy Negro League Conference, the only symposium dedicated exclusively to the examination and promotion of black baseball history. You can learn more at SABR.org/malloy. The committee also holds a high school essay contest, art competition and offers school library grants.
To learn more about donating to the Negro League Baseball Grave Marker Project, click here.
- Newsletters: To find current and past Negro Leagues committee newsletters, click here.
- Announcements: To sign up for email announcements from this committee, click the "Announcements" button above, then click "Join Group" (). All SABR members are eligible to sign up for announcements from any committee.
- James Brunson III (Co-Chair)
- Todd Peterson (Co-Chair)


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Waiting on Wednesday was started by Jill at Breaking the Spine. This weekly meme shares the upcoming books that I'm most excited about.
Audrey Whitticomb has nothing to fear. When your mother is the most powerful superhero in the Twin Cities, it's hard not to feel safe. But when Audrey is lured into the night air by something most definitely not human, the time for feeling safe is over.
Now Audrey knows the truth: her mom doesn't just stop criminals. She fights Harrowers—merciless beings who were trapped Beneath eons ago. Some have managed to claw their way into our world, and they want Audrey dead because of who she is: one of the Kin.
There is some good news, though. Audrey has powers of her own. Being able to read someone else's mind and glimpse the future can be very useful. If she's able to get close enough to Patrick Tigue, a powerful Harrower masquerading as human, she could use her Knowing to figure out his next move. But it won't be easy, not if Leon, her mother's bossy, infuriatingly attractive sidekick has anything to do with it. Lately, he hasn't let Audrey out of his sight.
When an unthinkable betrayal puts Minneapolis in terrible danger, Audrey discovers a wild, untamed power within herself. It may be the key to saving herself, her family, and her city. Or it may be the force that destroys everything—and everyone—she loves.
Published by Disney-Hyperion
Release Date: September 3, 2013


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Michael Yo
Michael Yo is a Stand-up Comedian, Actor, and TV Host known for his work on E!'s Chelsea Lately, is a regular on The Talk, The Wendy Williams Show and The Today Show. This self-proclaimed "Half-Black Brother with a Korean Mother" has also appeared on E! News, Kourtney & Khloe Take Miami and his own show, Yo on E!. Michael is currently a co-host on CBS's The Insider. You can also see Michael on Yahoo's The Yo Show on Yahoo, a show that highlighted Michael's unique personality and humorous take on celebrities and pop culture. You can catch Michael on the silver screen in Losing Control, Cookout 2 and Sofia Coppola's Bling Ring. Michael has appeared at numerous comedy clubs across the country including: Improv's, Stand-Up Live, Palms Hotel, Laugh Factory, Comedy Store, and Comedy Juice among others. His Hot Mess Tour also performs at colleges throughout the country.


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Farmers' Market This Afternoon!
It's the last time in August you can go to the Wednesday edition of the Yellowstone Valley Farmers' Market! Head on down to Sky Point this afternoon between 4 and 7. There are loads of fresh herbs, veggies, fruits and bedding plants with your name on them!
You can also catch the Farmers' Market Saturday from 8-Noon under Sky Point, downtown Billings.


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A protozoan that has been studied by a University of California, Santa Barbara scientist for the past 46 years has been assigned high priority for genome sequencing by the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI).
Called Tetrahymena, the single-celled organism split off from an ancestor in common with humans about two billion years ago. Yet it carries many of the same genes as humans, and therefore can be used to understand the function of many human genes.
Small as it is, Tetrahymena has about 30,000 genes, a similar number as humans. It reproduces quickly, doubling in numbers every two hours, which makes it inexpensive and easy to study. The organism is a ciliate, and uses tiny cilia, like hairs, to propel itself.
Eduardo Orias, research professor of genomics in the Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology Department at UC Santa Barbara, submitted a white paper to the NHGRI, on behalf of and with contributions from the international ciliate research community. He also consulted with the Whitehead Institute/MIT Genome Center. This resulted in Tetrahymena being chosen as a high priority genome for sequencing.
Orias began his study of Tetrahymena in 1956, when he was a graduate student at the University of Michigan, and has been working on it virtually ever since. For several years now his research group at UCSB has been doing genetic and physical mapping of the organism.
Studies of Tetrahymena have made major contributions to genetics and cell biology. For example, scientists used this organism to study the structure of telomeres (ends of chromosomes) and the telomerase enzyme, which has profound importance in cancer and aging.
Sequencing of Tetrahymena will have many benefits, including informing the biology of the causative agent of malaria and other related protist pathogens of great medical or agricultural significance.
Orias, who is the coordinator of the International Tetrahymena Genome Project, will collaborate in the analysis of the genome sequence and will facilitate the exchange of information and expert advice between the Tetrahymena research community and the sequencing center.
Rat and mouse genome sequencing is approaching completion. In addition to Tetrahymena, NHGRI has chosen (in alphabetical order) chicken, chimpanzee, fungi (various species), honey bee and sea urchin for the next round of sequencing.
Contact: Eduardo Orias, (805) 893-3024, firstname.lastname@example.com


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Details e-Book Think and Grow Rich
🗸 Author(s): Napoleon Hill
🗸 Title: Think and Grow Rich
🗸 Rating : 4.5 from 5 stars (632 reviews)
🗸 Format ebook: PDF, EPUB, Kindle, Audio, HTML and MOBI
🗸 Supported Devices: Android, iOS, MacOS, PC and Amazon Kindle
"Think and Grow Rich is a motivational book written
by Napoleon Hill and inspired by a suggestion by Scottish-American billionaire
Andrew Carnegie. It was published in 1937 during the Great
Depression.[1] It remains the biggest seller of Napoleon Hill's
books, selling a claimed 30 million copies over the next 70 years (although
Alice Payne Hackett's 70 Years of Best Sellers suggests the figure was
The text of Think and Grow Rich! is founded on Hill's earlier work
The Law of Success, the result of more than twenty years of research
based on Hill's close association with a large number of individuals who
achieved great wealth during their lifetimes.
At Andrew Carnegie's bidding, Hill studied the characteristics of these
achievers and developed 15 "laws" of success intended to be applied by anybody
to achieve success. Think and Grow Rich! condenses these laws further and
provides the reader with 13 principles in the form of a philosophy of personal
— Excerpted from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.


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Revive Adserver development and consulting
What is Revive Adserver?
I'm sure it doesn't need any introduction, but Revive Adserver (previously known as OpenX Source) is the world's leading independent ad server. It provides you with the simple tools you need to make money from advertising. And it's open source!
What services can I offer?
Almost anything! I'm one of the original developers of the the Revive Adserver ancestor phpAdsNew and since 2001 I've been part of the development team of the project in its various incarnations, up to the latest and greatest version 4.1. The deep knowledge of its inner works and functionalities allows me to offer a broad range of services, like functional and technical support, deployments and development of plugins and customisations. If you don't need any extra features, but a bug in the latest release is giving you headaches, I can probably fix it for you and contribute the fix back to the community, should you wish so.
Do you need anything else that I haven't mentioned?
Just ask and most likely I can do it for you!