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A Traveller's Guide to the
From the Siege of Troy to the Second World War Edited by
David Chandler
This book is respectfully dedicated to the memory of the eight distinguished contributors who have passed over before.
First published by Hugh Evelyn Ltd in two volumes in 1965. The combined edition first published in 1989 Copyright ® David Chandler, 1965 and 1 989 This edition published 1998 by Wordsworth Editions Limited Cumberland House, Crib Street, Ware, Hertfordshire SGI2 9ET ISBN 1 85326 694 9 © Wordsworth Editions Limited 1998 Wordsworth is a registered trade mark of Wordsworth Editions Limited All rights reserved. This publication may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers. This book is a reprint of the 1989 edition and contains references to and maps of the USSR, East and West Germany and Yugoslavia which have been superceded by political change. Printed and bound in Great Britain by Mackays of Chatham pic, Chatham, Kent.
CONTENTS Contributors Preface Introduction to the First Edition Introduction to the New Edition List of General Books on the Art of War List of Maps and Diagrams Editor's Note vii ix xv xix xxi xxiii xxv NATIONAL SECTIONS Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czechoslovakia Eire France Germany (East) Germany (West) Gibraltar Great Britain 1 9 39 41 47 57 65 137 157 177 181 .
CONTENTS Greece Holland Hungary Italy Malta Poland Portugal Spain Switzerland Turkey Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Yugoslavia Glossary of Military Terms Campaign Index Chronology 227 243 251 255 303 309 314 319 335 343 355 371 375 377 383 .
M.R. B O N D .. Professor A. Soldier. S a n d h u r s t .. King's College London.C. E . D.Phil. G I B B S . C. Professor N .A. The Late CAPTAIN C. Oxford University. F.G.CHANDLER. M. M.S. J .E. The late MAIOR-GENERAL H.B. D. M. Commission internationale d'histoire militaire.BIRLEY. R. President of Honour of the British Commission for Military History.O.. H O W A R D ..B.S.M. D.A. formerly Regius Professor of History and Chichele Professor of the History of War.. Ph. University of M a n c h e s t e r ..ADAIR.A.A. D e p a r t m e n t of History.ESSAME.. Soldier.Hist.S.A. s o m e t i m e Senior Lecturer... University of Surrey. D.E.A.C. De Montfort University.A. D e p a r t m e n t of War Studies.LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS (In alphabetical order) Professor J. formerly Head of the D e p a r t m e n t of War Studies. R. Oxford University. D U F F Y . B R E T T JAMES. formerly Senior Lecturer. M. M. C. F.O. Military C o m m e n t a t o r and author. The late MAIOR-GENERAL J.B. D e p a r t m e n t of War Studies.. The late E . D. R. M. M.A..Litt.F.Phil. formerly Chichele Professor of the History of War. Professor B .FULLER.M. S a n d h u r s t ..R.E.B. D. A .D. S a n d h u r s t . C.A.M.S. D. now of Yale University. former Head of the D e p a r t m e n t of War Studies. Bedford.Phil. sometime Chichele Professor of the History of War. and Vice President.. and a u t h o r . Professor C .M.A.A.. M.. R..A.A. Professor M .... . Lecturer and a u t h o r .FALLS.C.A. President of the British Commission for Military History.. M.. F. M.. Oxford University.. J .A. S a n d h u r s t .
M. T.Litt. and a u t h o r . sometime Reader in Military History. S a n d h u r s t . The late W . The late LIEUTENANT-COLONEL G.S. M C E L W E E .A.A. R.C.A.A.A. and T. D .Phil.R.PIERI. D. the Q u e e n ' s University. H.A.M..E. R O O N E Y .. M.B. S a n d h u r s t . S a n d h u r s t . S a n d h u r s t .A. D.L.. M.SELBY. formerly Secretary of the Southern Regional Examination Board for G.. S a n d h u r s t . D .MACINTOSH. F. Soldier. D.NORFOLK. T. Turin University.G.A.S.M..S. Member of the Italian and Spanish Academies.M.. ..A.SHEPPARD.P. The late J.M. R.A.E.S. Silver and Bronze Medals of Valour.A. F.. The late BRIGADIER P.. M. L .D.ROBERTS. B. M.D. M. s o m e t i m e S c h o o l m a s t e r at Stowe.. M... formerly Head of the D e p a r t m e n t of Modern Subjects. R.YOUNG.A.A. S a n d h u r s t .. M.B. Professor M.C. B r o a d c a s t e r and a u t h o r .. M. R.M..STALKER MILLER. sometime Senior Lecturer in the D e p a r t m e n t of Modern Subjects..I.W..S.A. Belfast. Military History. R..M. formerly H e a d m a s t e r of Schools in Cambridgeshire and B. Professor Emeritus of Modern History.LIST OF C O N T R I B U T O R S J.O. D e p a r t m e n t of War Studies. T.D.M.D.E.O.A.M. O. The late Professor P.A.A. formerly Head of the Facolta di Magistero...C. s o m e t i m e Senior Librarian. S a n d h u r s t .KEEGAN.B. R. s o m e t i m e Senior Lecturer. Illustrators: The Late COLONEL R.A. M.. Educational C o n s u l t a n t . formerly an I n t e r m e d i a t e Grade Senior Lecturer. Defence Editor the Daily Telegraph. and also formerly a Senior Lecturer in the D e p a r t m e n t of Modern Studies at R.
Sometimes their application to this pastime has had special significance. probably more historically. but on this occasion history did not repeat itself. mat of a growing number of civilians of all age groups and callings — and indeed of both sexes — needs a little more explanation. Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks had no such mystical illusions. Napoleon. A century later. but rather from a determination to place his generalship in a more favourable light. The result of this energetic tour was an order to the much-tried officers of the historical section of the Depot de la Guerre in Paris. If the interest of many soldiers in former battlefields is understandable. developed an obsession with Marengo — a battle he so nearly lost — and revisited the ground on May 11. 1800. the place where Thutmose III crushed die rebel King of Kadesh and his allies in 1479 BC. hoping to improve their military education by attempts to relate historical events to the actual ground. an artillery observation post had been established upon the famous Lion Mound. for example. It was suitable that the decisive victory over the Turks was eventually won in September 1918 at Megiddo — the supposed site of the legendary battle of Armageddon (the supreme conflict between die nations). Allenby was not alone this century in his interest in the practical application of military history. and even came to believe that he was the reincarnation of a Roman tribune. or in corroboration of their researches among ix . alas did not spring from a wish to correct a point or two of detail. The motivation. General George Patton spent considerable time visiting ancient battle sites in Algeria and Tunisia in 1943. but late in 1944 he felt slightly cheated when the German Ardennes Offensive was halted some little way short of the battleground he had prepared with his British Corps for the showdown — around no less a place than Waterloo. 'The Bull' spent no little time trying to relate the martial achievements of Gideon and other ancient Israelite generals to the actual ground. demanding a major revision of the official account of the events of J u n e 14. The practice of battlefield visiting has naturally long been resorted to by many military historians in search of evidence to support their impressions. 1805. It was not only pulpits that the recently-crowned Emperor desired to 'tune'. General Sir Edmund Allenby was noted by Wavell (then an officer on his staff) as always carrying his Old Testament with him on ground reconnaissances during die Palestinian Campaign of 1917-18.Preface to the new edition Professional soldiers have always displayed considerable interest in the sites of battlefields. but also the pages of history. covering 50 miles during die day and in the process exhausting five horses. and. whether ancient or modern.
A notable English example was F. it is true. however. was a senior lady of amazing energy and great charm who revealed that she was the last decendant of Lieutenant-General Sir J o h n Lambert. in years long before the Sexual Discrimination Act. . She is not. One hopes that Miss Hollingworth's enthusiasm. the dashing soldier of the 95th who rescued the beautiful Juanita from the drink-maddened soldiery after the storming of Badajoz in April 1812 — a lady who later achieved further fame by having the town of Ladysmith in South Africa named after her.archives. and also through him connected to Captain Harry Smith. girls of the better sort. Loraine Petre. and of the Crecy and Agincourt campaigns. and went on to claim that 'from Granada in Southern Spain through France and Italy.G. attracting very different types of people. and a few rare and gifted women'. The interest would seem to stem from several sources. who commanded one of the Guards Brigades at Waterloo. 1809. the correspondent Clare Hollingworth wrote in the Guardian that 'the excitement of a battle hangs over the site for hundreds of years — long after grass. Wells. managed to survive die rigours of reporting the later years of die Vietnamese War. which sprang from a love of history engendered at school. Today the appeal of battlefield touring is becoming increasingly broadly-based. one that had somewhat lapsed since the great history of die Peninsular War in six volumes published by General Sir William Napier between 1828 and 1840. KCB. Little Wars. In July 1965. covering the military events of 1806. memoirs and war-diaries. were wives accompanying their husbands to the scenes of Wellington's achievements. two. 'boys of every age from twelve to 150 . Here indeed is a lady whom H. No less important a generation later than Petre's was the contribution of Lt. by any means unique. and that on The Invasion of the Crimea by Kinglake. her Great-Great-Uncle. and the third. no less than five members were women. although one and all share a deep and abiding regard for x . 1807. that battlefield touring attracts more men than women. would have included a m o n g the chosen to w h o m he dedicated his book on war-gaming. It must be admitted. a second was from Oxford fulfilling what she described as a lifetime ambition. 1813 and 1814 in Napoleon's Europe. . the most amusing trips I can recall have been to battlefields'. of which eight volumes appeared between 1865 and 1886. namely. during the first decade of this century. did much to establish die writing of military history as a respectable academic activity. but of the remaining three one was a historian from Wales in search of local colour. -Colonel Alfred Burne. towns. these instances notwithstanding. On a Peninsular War tour die author of this introduction conducted to Spain for 'Captain Gordon battlefield Tours' in April 1976. or dust have covered horrors'. are classics of military history researched not only in the library but also in die field. His notable quintet of campaign studies. whose studies of The Battlefields of England. the doyenne of the whole party. who explored many of Napoleon's battlefields with the invaluable assistance of an Edwardian bicycle.
scholars and writers of military history naturally find these excursions of both value and interest — although in many cases the pleasure obtained is somewhat marred by die inability to resolve particular problems in the time available. and even grimmer. Of course. for instance. is matched by the many white tombstones in the myriad British War Cemeteries marked simply 'Known unto God'. T h e macabre splendour of the Ossuaire at Verdun. An M . or when a windfall occurs: the presentation of an 1810 cannon-ball to every member of the party by a Portuguese official at Almeida in 1974 was one such. another was the discovery of First World War mementos on the actual ground — by no means a rare occurrence at Cambrai or the Somme. however restricted to their own field of experience. And lastly the teachers. included in the party two veterans of the Tank Corps.000 unidentified French dead. the repository of the mortal remains of 130. Cambrai and the Somme. H S L tour to Verdun. a battlefield tour needs careful preparation if the best possible use of time is to be made. The recollections of such survivors of great events. A visit to a battlefield can also be a very moving experience. But the common experience of having been in the Army is rarely the main motive for joining a tour. Others with regimental associations and interests find satisfaction in following the fortunes of their military predecessors in earlier campaigns. relics of battles sixty years ago. And this can be equally affecting for the visitor with no personal ties. On the other hand. one of whom had served in 'D Battalion' under Brigadier-General Hugh Elles' command that cold November day in 1917 which saw the first use of tanks on a large scale in war. there are also golden moments when some obscure aspect of a battle is suddenly understandable with the ground literally before one's eyes. a visit to such a battlefield is often an act of both homage and remembrance. It is important not to try to see XI . For relations and descendants. Fully two-thirds of the party had military experience of one sort or another. most of it dating from the Second World War or from the days of National Service. The growing pastime of war-gaming accounts for many in the younger age bracket of those who accompany. for example. Whether it is a rough memorial on a Spanish battlefield or a wellkept War Graves Commission Cemetery in France or Flanders. the Military Historical Society's annual tour. Interest in kriegsspiel is by no means restricted to those of tender years. the impression of the loss and waste of human life is inescapable and horrifying. where the chalk is continually extruding these. serves to illuminate the human angle of twentieth-century battles in a way that no amount of reading or documentary research can hope to equal. Collectors with a Peninsular Medal often feel an urge to retread the paths and visit the battlefields fought over by the original recipient.military history. but the older generation often join their preference for this type of instructive holiday with an interest in the collection of militaria and a certain amount of nostalgia for former wars and campaigns in which they feel they were privileged to serve. or former comrades of the fallen.
it is also a good idea to visit the occasional site of an engagement of a different century not associated with the particular period or campaign being studied. a combination of the old with the new is desirable. be neglected. museum. CS Forester's The Gun. in the same general area. or of Sergeant Coignet of the Imperial Guard can add a great deal to one's comprehension of both armies and events. The General. and it is a good idea to intersperse the days of travel and battlefield-visiting with occasional distractions. or serve as a welcome distraction during the inescapable road journeys. and the obtaining of good modern maps. An Infamous Army and The Spanish Bride also have much to recommend them. Where maps are concerned. or of some of Oman's or Sir Charles Fortescue's maps. as this can add an element of depth and an awareness of the successive generations of soldiers of one's own and other countries who have served. it is desirable to read some account 'from the other side of the hill' — the recollections of Colonel Baron Marbot of Napoleon's hussars. nor poetry.G.too much. A visit to a famous art gallery. Two pre-requisites are vital for a successful tour: a carefullyconsidered programme of preparatory reading before the visit. a scale of 1:100.000 is often more practicable. It is also advisable to make enquiries in advance xn . will prove of great value. throws equal light on the problems of senior command in London and at the front during the First World War. or mental indigestion can set in. illuminate the roles of Spanish guerrillas. the works of Rupert Brooke or Siegfried Sassoon have obvious relevance. Photocopies of such useful documents as Lieutenant Unger's sketches of Talavera.000 or even 1:250. while a copy of J. Neither should good historical fiction. Similarly. The best scale of modern map for pre-twentieth century battlefields is 1:25. A cassette of Songs of the Redcoats. Of course it is also necessary to take along a compass and to develop some facility at map-reading. or Death to the French. Rifleman Harris's recollections of the campaigns and battles he served in under Moore and Wellington are as illuminating as Robert Graves' recorded experiences in Flanders of a century later. Albuera and Busaco. Portuguese partisans and individual soldiers with great perception. can also add to the atmosphere. Lockhart's translation of Ancient Spanish Ballads is a suitable companion for a visit to Granada. The reading material selected should be based on sound general accounts — Sir Charles Oman's famous history is virtually compulsory reading for the would-be visitor to the Peninsula. discreetly employed on a coach or car radio. Whenever possible. Roberts's The Military Adventures of Johnny Newcome for a tour of Vitoria. one after another. for the study of battles of the present century. His book. Cavalie Mercer's account of the Waterloo campaign and battle — as seen by an officer commanding a troop of Royal Horse Artillery — also makes compelling and illuminating reading. as is D.000. Miss Georgette Heyer's novels. church or country mansion often serves as a valuable contrast. but a visitor to the Pass of Ronscesvalles in the Pyrenees may also find a reading of Le Chanson de Roland a moving experience. Where poetry is concerned.
about the current state of the original battle site. And that. after all. Battlefield tours. while the Lesser Teson at Ciudad Rodrigo on the Spanish frontier has recendy received a large housing estate. gained over at least two dozen tours in the past 25 years whether from Sandhurst or for specialist societies and travel groups. Benavente and Sahagun. therefore. besides one's notes and one or two carefully-chosen volumes. Blenheim. In the experience of the aumor. for long car or coach journeys over roads of varying quality. and the size of many villages and small towns in Spain and Belgium has not changed too much over the years. together with a camera. are other desirable pieces of personal equipment. Cambrai. is exacdy what the study Xlll . On the other hand. Besides the attraction of reliving in the mind and on the ground some dramatic moments of military history. Careful study of maps in advance will reveal the best viewpoints to head for. binoculars. and next Spring the author of this introduction is hoping to take a party to retrace the steps of Sir J o h n Moore's army from Lisbon to Corunna over eight days by way of Castel Branco. and in the process coming to appreciate the thstances involved for men marching on their feet or on horseback during the last monms of 1808 and the first of 1809. these enterprises are well worth the amount of work and preparation involved. Verdun. Nothing is more disappointing than to arrive at a location after a tedious journey to find that a railway marshalling yard has been placed on top of the area. but the basic topography remains unaltered. The amount of physical endeavour involved can be adjusted to suit the individual's wishes: some prefer to spend several hours walking the battlefields. perhaps a shooting stick. examining each place of action in turn. Reafforestation programmes have played havoc with such battlefields as Culloden in Scotland and Busaco in Portugal. There is also much to be said for following through a complete campaign from beginning to end. many sites are unspoilt and virtually unchanged — pre-eminent among those that spring to mind being Waterloo. A pair of stout shoes. for an unseemly rush spoils the impact of the events being studied. and the suburbs of Brno in Czechoslovakia are creeping inexorably towards the battlefield of Austerlitz. and even those who have only come along 'for the ride' become infected with the fascination of bringing to life old names half-remembered from school or university days. must be prepared. Often the trees and forests have shrunk away. and also robs the visitor of time to enjoy the scenery and to savour the wines and cuisine of the regions he is passing through. and a logical sequence should be worked out so as to trace the development of an action through its various stages. others are content with scaling one or two local eminences to obtain an overview. Ramillies. Salamanca. One should always allow enough time for such an enterprise. however. have much to offer as an unusual form of holiday with a definite purpose in mind. when a tour of Spain or Portugal is envisaged. Salamanca and Talavera. Everybody. a fine spirit of camaraderie invariably affects the party after the first day of slightly hesitant introductions and weighings-up. the Escorial.
C. the editor's permission to republish is gratefuly acknowledged xiv . D.of history is all about.G. and in the process a great deal of enjoyment as well as valuable experience is obtainable. It can be made into a living as well as an academic experience. Parts of this article appeared in History Today in 1974.
In making the final choice. for owing to the regrettably bloodstained history of Europe over the past two millenia more than 2. and at the same time offering him the opportunity of widening his knowledge through sampling the recommended reading. This growing awareness of the interest and importance of the subject has been long overdue.Introduction to the first edition Almost a century ago General Hamley wrote in his introduction to the Operations of War that 'no kind of history so fascinates mankind as the history of wars'. As one prime purpose of the book is to provide a Guide in the practical as well as the philosophical sense. the book is designed to furnish a store of valid factual information which will assist the serious student as a minor work of reference. This fascination has steadily developed. economic and social fields of study. a series of considerations have been balanced against one another. too many historians have tended to dismiss military history as rather a trivial 'poor relation' of the great constitutional. but by no means least. A glance at the book lists of many publishing houses reveals a remarkable growth over the last decade in the number of titles relating to the military affairs of the past.000 possible subjects are available. it is hoped that the following pages will encourage more travellers to visit the sites of historic battlefields at home and abroad for nostalgic or educational reasons. there to indulge in the fascinating and instructive pastime of attempting to reconstruct the events of the past and solving some of its many remaining mysteries: the study of history does not need to be confined to reading alone. foremost among these ranked the regional distribution and present availability of battlefield XV . giving him some idea of the ways in which warfare has changed as weapons and tactics have developed down the ages. In the first place it plans to provide the reader with a series of glimpses into the past. Lastly. To keep this Guide to manageable proportions. The task of selection has not by any means been easy. Today it would appear that the close connection between military and other historical subjects is becoming more fully appreciated. The purpose of this book is three-fold. it has proved necessary to confine its scope to the description of 249 battles. Secondly. and in recent years there has been a perceptible increase in popular interest in military history. of how the essential attributes of leadership have remained unaltered. or at best a subject only suitable for study by soldiers in the furtherance of their professional knowledge.
In consequence of practical considerations of this kind. France is seen as the location of the Hundred Years' War and the three great struggles of 1870. this volume should go some way towards answering the natural questions of 'Who?'. however. or whose attention is attracted to a roadside monument. 'Why?' and 'How?'. interested in exploring the dim corridors of the past. therefore. although the deeds of the greatest Swedish soldiers emerge in the pages on Germany and Russia. the Scandinavian countries have been totally omitted. Inevitably. 1914-18 and 1939-45 against Germany—and so on. provision has also been made to include representative battles from other periods in each National Section.sites. thus in the case of England. The practical difficulties of pin-pointing the sites of many ancient and mediaeval battlefields—besides the problem of finding accurate information about the contests—also suggested a strong weighting of the chronological allocation in favour of the comparatively well-documented period from 1500 onwards. will between them help the reader to remedy these obvious deficiencies. in the interests of economy. the particular interests of the team of contributors had to be taken into account. there is the arm-chair campaigner. in their various ways. First are the serious students. where a different interpretation might be placed upon foreigners armed with binoculars and maps examining the countryside. it was obvious that the countries of western Europe were more amenable for this purpose than their eastern neighbours. who enjoys browsing and speculating by the comfort of his own hearth. Belgium follows Marlborough's fortunes. Lastly. recreating and analysing in his mind the events of yesteryear which have done so much to shape the XVI . any limited selection leaves important gaps unfilled. At the same time. it was impossible to exclude these regions completely and still present a reasonably comprehensive picture of battles through the ages. This Guide. whether at work in the library or out in the field equipped with binoculars. compasses. Frederick the Great and Napoleon. and another form of balance maintained. map and notebook. the Scots. whether at home or abroad. whilst the German and central European countries record the battles of Gustavus Adolphus. Secondly. and the interest of the subjects for expert and amateur alike. we hope to cater for the traveller. It was also decided to associate each country with particular periods and great generals. indeed. Baronial and Civil Wars receive fuller attention. and the more general list relating to the art of war appended below. However. The causes of the conflicts and the events leading up to the battles are often only briefly sketched. whose interest is aroused by the non-committal symbol of crossed-swords and date found on his map. but it is hoped that the selection of suggested reading on each subject. Next. is designed for the use of three categories of people who are all.
D. . Camberley. and prove both interesting and useful.C.G. causing unjustifiable agony and distress to combatants and non-combatants alike—but these considerations should not preclude their serious study. It is hoped that this Guide to the Battlefields of Europe will in its own way make a small contribution to that comprehension. No one would deny that all wars and battles are regrettable acts of human folly. If battles can be described as the punctuation marks on the pages of history then the study of their causes.present and may well forecast part of the future. course and results must be vital to any understanding of our common European heritage. October 1964. if only to avoid the mistakes of the past which made such tragedies inevitable.
The team proved most cooperative and (in the case of the senior contributors) very forebearing. Of course that alone did not ensure massive sales. travel correspondent (and now travel editor) of the Daily Telegraph several times regretted the unavailability of Battlefields. it was an object lesson to me that established authors such as Major-General Essame. Elizabeth de Stroumillo. when the ticklish subject of remuneration arose at my instigation. Once or twice over the intervening period there was a faint stirring of memory — as when. before a surprise and very welcome reawakening. Brian Bond. Pietro Pieri. 'keeps in the cask'. goes the old saying.Introduction to the new edition 'Good wine'. Reading the entries again in 1988. I felt it was high time for me to beat as gracious a retreat as possible under the circumstances. and three years later the Traveller's Guide slid into the oblivion of the remainder trays. The two volumes of the original edition duly appeared in 1965. for instance. and Brigadier Peter Young. it transpired that he expected a rate per thousand words precisely forty-times what the publisher was offering. but even this debacle had its silver lining. I am impressed how well my team worked. Professors Michael Howard. although naturally the Suggested Reading sections have needed to be brought up to date to incorporate at least a selection of the specialist tides that many of the individual subjects xix . outside the occasional library. but their patience must have been sorely tried by the mass of instructions and even admonitions that poured from my pen.L. With reflection. Sir Basil Liddell Hart kindly invited the thrusting editor to tea at Medmenham. Only one 'great man' escaped my net. It has proved necessary to make only the minimum of alterations to the main texts. until. as the same meeting introduced me to B. a recently-appointed lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst with not a published title to my name — with an invitation to contribute entries to A Traveller's Guide to the Battlefields of Europe. a project my friend Hugh Street (Managing Director of Hugh Evelyn Ltd. who was prepared to join the team at the going rate. Major-General J .H. E C Fuller. and seemed only too pleased to be signed up. and received a favourable reception — to my immense relief— from the reviewers.) had entrused to a 'rooky' young historian of no repute whatsoever. Captain Cyril Falls.'s protege. should be prepared to encourage the brashly-enthusiastic young novice-editor. It is now over a quarter of a century since I had the temerity to approach 19 fellow military historians — most of them far more distinguished than I. there to lie sleeping (as it was to prove) for all of twenty years.
Editorial Director of Patrick Stephens Ltd (part of the Thorsons Publishing Group Ltd) for allowing this work to rise. . XX . and above all to merge the two original volumes into a single treatment. in its own way make a small contribution to mat comprehension [of an understanding of our common European heritage] . in all comprising fully 40 per cent of the original team — namely Brett-James. Fuller. . Their memories will remain green through their vast individual and collective published contributions to military history. also to Hugh Street for agreeing to the necessary transfer of rights. twenty years after those words were written. and I have decided to dedicate this new edition of our joint-endeavours to their commemoration.A. from the ashes (or at least the limbo of lost and near-forgotten volumes). the distinguished commando leader of the Second World War and scholar of the seventeenth century and omer periods. and to the international community of scholarship as a whole. may still prove '. For the new edition it has been decided to add a selection of illustrations to supplement the original maps and diagrams. like the Phoenix. bom military and civilian. . David Chandler R. both interesting and useful. McElwee. and capped that trusting act by 'giving away' my bride as a surrogate father-inlaw-elect at Beverley Minster). Peter Young (who in fact appointed me to his newlyformed Department of Military History in early 1961. Essame.have attracted since 1965 from a galaxy of writers in the field of military history in all its many forms.M.' has come substantially true through the vast development of the EEC and the hopeful signs of glasnost possibly leading to a drop of tension and a growth in mutual understanding with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe. in September — indeed. . a sad loss to his many friends. . It is sad to have to record that eight contributors of the original twenty are no longer with us. . in refurbished form. mus reflecting the degree to which my hope (as expressed at the end of my 1964 Introduction) mat the Traveller's Guide might '. Falls. Similar encomiums might be written of the seven others who have died in the interval since 1965 — indeed a sad rate of attrition. The Sealed Knot Society of Cavaliers and Roundheads which he founded in 1968 and led for twenty years as its Captain-Generall. it is interesting to note how distinguished all of my collaborators have become over the intervening fifth of a century. the latest loss being that of my great friend and former head of department. As for the survivors. Sandhurst and the 30 October 1988 Virginia Military Institute. Pieri and Selby. I also hope mat mis new edition.' I am deeply grateful to Darryl Reach.
G. D. An AUas of Military Strategy 1618-1878 (London. Oman.. C. the Indirect Approach (London. The Conduct of War (London. Men in Arms (Aldershot. 1961) Liddell Hart. 1974) Chandler. F. W. Oman. Strategy.. G. G.. The Dictionary of Battle (London. 1956) Spaulding. 1924) 2 vols. H. J. C. G.. Warner and Wise.Select List of General Books on the Art of War Chandler. 1988) Preston. 1500-1800 (London. 1912) Delbruck. F. Nickerson and Wright. (ed). The Transformations of War (English Edition. 1954-56). 1961) Fuller.. C.. 1937 — reprinted 1987) Parker. London. D. 1925) Several of these volumes contain useful bibliographies. Fuller. D. 1954) Lot. B. C. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (London. Geschichte der Kriegskunst (Berlin. 3 vols. 4 vols. J. The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West.. J. 1987) Colin. The Art of'Warfrom the Age ofNapoleon to the Present Day (London. C. The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London. xxi . AD 378-1485 (London. Falls. C. W. F. UArt Militaire et les Armies au Mqyen Age (Paris. 1975) Chandler. G. The Art of Warfare on Land (London. 1980) Chandler D. H. C. The Decisive Battles of the Western World (London. Warfare (New York. 1900-20). The Art of War in the Middle Ages. 1946) 2 vols.
1815 9. 451 18. The battle of Teutoburger-Wald. 1645 . The Battle of Mons. The battle of Cambrai. M a p Three: France 14. The battle of the Ardennes. 1914 7. 1940 21. 1485 34. 1806 28. 1683 3. M a p Two: Holland and Belgium 4. M a p Four: West and East Germany 26. The battle of Rossbach. 1214 16. The battle of Breitenfeld. Hungary. The battle of Ramillies. The battle of Verdun. 1916 25. 1631 27. The Battles of Gravelotte and Mars-la-Tour. The Siege of Nicosia. The Battle of Chalons. The battle of The Boyne. M a p One: Austria. The battle of Waterloo. T h e Battle of Naseby. The Battle of Hastings. The battle of Rocroi. 1870 22. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia 2. 1415 15. 1944 5. The Battle of Bannockburn. 1866 12. The Battle of Sadowa. The Battle of Austerlitz. The Battle of Bosworth.List of Maps and Diagrams 1. The battle of Blenheim. The battle of Fontenoy. 1704 30. 1066 36. 1745 6. The Battles of J e n a and Auerstadt. 1690 13. The D-Day Landings. The battle of Crecy. The Siege of Vienna. The Battle of Culloden. 1917 17. The battle of Agincourt. The Battle of Bouvines. 1706 8. 1746 35. 1314 33. The Siege of Orleans. 1346 19. 1757 29. 1944 20. 1805 11. 1570 10. AD 9 31. M a p Five: Great Britain and Eire 32. 1643 24. The Evacuation of Dunkirk. 1428-29 23.
58. The Battle of the Yellow Ford. 47. AD 409 The Battle of Solferino. 60. 42. 415-413 BC The Battle of Vittorio Veneto. 39. 1944 The Battle of the Metaurus. 38. Turkey. 1944 M a p Seven: Italy. 56. 207 BC The Sack of Rome. 55. 490 BC The Battle of Pharsala. 41. 46. 59. 1598 M a p Six: Greece. 48. Switzerland and Malta The Battle of Cannae. 57.R. 53. 43.37. 1915-16 M a p Nine: the USS. 44. 1476 The Siege of Constantinople. 1491-92 The battle of Vitoria. 1453 The battle of Gallipoli. Bulgaria and Cyprus The battle of Marathon. 45. 40. 1812 The Battle of Pultava. 50. 49. 52. 48 BC The Siege of Rhodes. 1565 M a p Eight: Portugal. 1859 The Siege of Syracuse. 1480 The Battle of Arnhem. 1813 T h e Battle of Morat. 1709 224 226 230 233 239 248 254 260 264 274 280 284 288 299 303 314 325 331 338 344 347 354 359 366 XXIV . and Poland T h e Battle of Borodino. Spain and Gibraltar The Siege of Granada. 54. 216 BC The Battle of Cassino. 1918 The Siege of Malta. 51.
foreign audiorities have been listed.Editor's Note Throughout the book the countries are placed in alphabetical order. in the body of the text — a classification symbol comprising a capital letter followed by between one and four asterisks will be found throughout the volume. DATA TABLES In the second place. the 'data tables'. CLASSIFICATION After the name of each battle — whether on the 'data tables' or. one a conflict of comparatively minor significance. but in several instances the exact size of the forces engaged or casualty figures have been difficult to verify. which introduce some 150 battle descriptions in this volume. four asterisks denoting a very important action. where no notable English work is readily available. The capital letter signifies an estimate of the suitability of the battlefield for a visit to the ground. in the case of the shortest items. accurate information is not always forthcoming — contemporary chronicles being especially prone to over-exageration — and where there is any reason to doubt the authenticity of the figures shown the prefixes 'estimated' or 'approximate' have been liberally employed. xxv . only those tides that are likely to be obtainable through public libraries or book shops have been cited. In certain cases. READING Each contributor has provided a list of suggested reading for the guidance of any who may wish to pursue particular subjects. Thus manuscript sources have generally been omitted and. ranging from an 'A' site (easily accessible and practically unchanged) to a ' D ' site (difficult to reach and practically unrecognisable). Similarly the asterisks relate to the historical and military interest of each battle or siege. For those readers who may prefer a rather 'lighter' approach. however. several points concerning the presentation of the battle descriptions and the format of the accompanying maps and diagrams require brief explanation. for the convenience of the general English reader. In order to assist the reader in the use of this book. The greatest possible care has been taken in preparing these sections. As a general rule. are intended to provide a minimum of vital information in a form that can be assimilated at a glance. Particularly in the case of the more ancient battles. whenever possible preference has been accorded to books published in English. reputed historical novels have been included in a number of instances. as are the battles within each national section.
Visitors to the actual battlefields may wish to procure good maps in advance. CAMPAIGN CHRONOLOGY Although the battles are listed in alphabetical order within the relevant national sections. have been included with the interests of the present-day visitor in mind. but the reconstructed dispositions of the forces engaged should bear at least an approximate resemblance to the truth and provide a useful guide. who are the official agents for sale of Defence Department maps and can also often procure foreign maps. and in metres for sites on the Continent. illustrating a selection of important and accessible battlefields.C. Stanford Ltd. In each case. MAPS T h e general maps have been designed to show the approximate locations of the battlefields together with the most convenient means of approaching the sites by road. Limitations of size have made it impossible to show any more than the minimum of relevant information.000 is the most convenient. approximate location and map reference number. 12 Long Acre. tide of war. Please note that modem boundaries and state names have been employed throughout the volume. The name of the battle is followed by its classification. Many maps may be purchased from E. By this means it is hoped that the visitor will be helped to find his way over battlefields which often extend for miles. Of course the accurate positioning of the troops on the ground has often been difficult to discover. the symbols indicating the approximate position of the troops on the ground have been superimposed on a simplified modern m a p showing the terrain and local landmarks as they exist today. a number of diagrams.000 more practical. For the majority of actions down to 1914. brief description of the event and one suggested authority for consultation. although for the convenience of travellers the main population centres and major roads have been included. Thus in the diagram relating to Blenheim (see p. London W. Where important topographical changes have taken place since the action. In addition. xxvi .2. The contour heights on the diagrams are shown in feet for battles in Great Britain. botii the original and the present locations are indicated. a scale of 1/25. 160) the ancient and the modern courses of the river Danube are botii shown. an abbreviated format has been adopted. the campaign chronology tables at the end of the book will enable a reader to follow up any particular period or war in which he is interested..SHORT TREATMENT In the case of the 90 or so battles and sieges in this volume which have been restricted to the very briefest of treatments for reasons of space. the size of more recent battles makes 1/100. DATING 'New Style' dating has been used throughout. date.
National Sections .
The Campaigns of Napoleon. Forces engaged: (a) French: 22.000 (probably 95. Location: North-east of Vienna on Route 7. Suggested reading: General Work: Chandler.000 infantry. Result: The Austrians held their ground and the French were compelled to retreat.Austria Aspem-Essling (A**) Date: 21-22 May. 1907. On the campaign: Anderson.400 infantry.. 1966. threw across two m o r e bridges from t h e island to the n o r t h bank. a n d six days later Massena crossed over from the south bank of the D a n u b e on to the large island of L o b a u by means of a pontoon bridge. London. Object of the action: The French were attempting to destroy Austrian resistance and secure full control of Vienna by means of a perilous river crossing into contact with the Archduke's army..000 French. left bank of the Danube. Napoleon entered Vienna on 13 M a y . a n d occupied the villages of Aspern a n d Essling to form a bridgehead. 9. London. (b) Archduke Charles and the Austrian army. G.. (b) 23. Archduke Charles. 1809. 130.000). decided to attack Napoleon's unfortified position in Aspern a n d Essling. 1909. 11. T h e Austrian 1 . J. An undoubted check for Napoleon. Precis of Great Campaigns. however. London.000 Austrians. F. H. Opposing sides: (a) Napoleon in command of the 'Grande Armee'. On the battle: Loraine Petre. Napoleon and Archduke Charles. Total: 31. 300 guns. D.000 (reinforced to 70.000 cavalry. Total: 111. (A) Austrians: 100.000 engaged). War and campaign: Napoleonic Wars. Austrian Campaign of 1809 (see p.000 cavalry. Gasnalties: (a) 21. 380).
379). and the suburbs and country north-west to the Wiener Wald. T h e Austrians penetrated into the west side of the village b u t were driven out again. b u t Archduke Charles gave orders for the floating of fireships against the French bridges.000 in the battle.S.h a n d fighting in the streets took place with great slaughter. Location: The 'Innere Stadt' of Vienna. Casualties: (a) Approx. Total: 138. also some cavalry a n d artillery. Object of the action: The saving of Vienna from the Turks.t o . War and campaign: Great Turkish War of 1683-99.000 deaths 2 . Total: 76. 2. Second Siege and Relief of Vienna (A***) Date: 14 July-12 September 1683. a further 5.000 garrison). Napoleon now attempted to break through the Austrian centre with Lannes' corps. Polish and Imperial contingents (exclusive of 16.M. the order for retreat to the m a i n island was given at 11 p m . with 170 guns.000). Napoleon a b a n d o n e d his advance. Campaign of 1683 (see p. b u t the Austrians held t h e m off. Forces engaged: (0) Austrian. a n d although the French held them. Night fell with the French beset on all sides a n d half Aspern lost. (4) Turkish covering force (107. a n d in the meantime the French cavalry staged a counterattack in the g a p between Aspern a n d Essling. a n d by 7 am the French h a d recaptured the whole village of Aspern a n d beaten off attacks on Essling. and the halting of the westward expansion of Islam. Bavarian. in the trenches (31. taking the French by surprise. T h e Austrians forced their way into Aspern once more where h a n d . At 5 pm t h e Archduke ordered a general attack. a n d when the news came of the breaking of the bridge between the south bank a n d Lobau. Massena himself leading the French resistance. Saxon. At Essling the French fared better a n d held off the Austrians. Opposing sides: (a) The United Christian Army under King John Sobieski of Poland.000. Kara Mustapha. (6) The Turkish Army under the Grand Vizier.000). bravely leading his troops in person.000.attack broke first from the north-west on Aspern. As early as 3 am on 22 M a y fighting broke out again. 131. During the night L a n n e s ' corps was brought across the D a n u b e . J. appealing to his troops to take Aspern at all costs. T h e Austrians now renewed their attacks on Aspern a n d Essling.
a n d Burg-Bastions on the southwest side of the city.during the siege. Osterreichs Grossmachtbildung in der £eit Kaiser Leopolds I (Vol. 10.. a n d under this threat to his capital Leopold retired to Passau. Gotha. Nothing could withstand the great Turkish a r m y which swept through H u n g a r y a n d into Austria in early J u l y 1683. a n d entrusted the defence of Vienna to the iron-willed Ernst Ruediger von Starhemberg a n d his energetic colleague. standing between these two bastions. London. VI of Geschichte Osterreichs). T h e efforts of the P a p a l Nuncios in Warsaw a n d Vienna. a n d within a few days a 'maze of trenches wormed towards the Lowel. 1964. On 14 J u l y the Turkish a r m y formed a great semi-circular c a m p about Vienna. J. The Siege of Vienna. Stoye. (b) Approx. induced the Emperor Leopold I of Austria to sign a military alliance with K i n g J o h n Sobieski of Poland on 31 M a r c h 1683. On the Siege and Battle: Das Kriegsjahr 1683. Suggested reading: General Work: Redlich.k.. Vienna. O.000 in the battle. combined with the aggressive intentions of the G r a n d Vizier K a r a M u s t a p h a . a n d following the explosion of a mine on 12 August SECOND SIEGE AND RELIEF OF VIENNA 14th July to 12th September 1683 . 1921. became the chief object of the Turkish attentions. 1883. many thousands more during the siege. in Mittheilungen des k. T h e expected danger soon became reality. Result: The relief of Vienna and the complete defeat of the Turks. Kriegs-Archivs. t h e Mayor J o h a n n Andreas von Liebenberg. T h e Burg-Ravelin.
and Sobieski dealt the coup de grace by launching his 20. and the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria. and after attending Mass with the King and other generals in the Chapel of St. Below them they could see the masses of the enemy army assembled on the heights between Nussdorf and Dornbach. the commander of the Christian left wing. and the Christian left once more broke the Turks on the side of the Danube. storms and sorties until. Weinhaus and Dobling to the Danube below Heiligenstadt. with the left extending to the Danube below the Leopoldsberg. but rejecting the temptation of plunder. in particular a violent assault directed against the Gallitzin-Berg. Yet again Lorraine led the advance. he set his troops in motion for the Nussberg. Joseph on the Kahlenberg. Lorraine had now penetrated the Turkish camp. but by 7 September the whole Christian army was assembled up-river from Vienna on the plain of Tulln. conceived the plan of rolling up the Danube flank of the enemy. The Turks had already succeeded in blowing a wide breach in the Lowel-Bastion itself. The expulsion of the Turks was all the more urgent. The Turks had been forced to fall back to a line extending from Breitensee through Ottakring. and by the middle of the afternoon the Christian army was ready to strike a decisive blow. The Saxons rushed the large earthwork of the 'Turkenschanze' before the 6 cannon could be depressed to bear on them. By noon the Christian left and centre was established in Heiligenstadt and along the Grinzing-Bach. Duke Charles of Lorraine. On the early morning of 12 September the Christian forces drew up in line of battle on the south-eastern slopes of the Wiener Wald. The garrison of Vienna beat off one last fanatical storm of 4 . although the Poles on the right had to take somewhat longer to negotiate the broken country around Dornbach. the Turks finally established themselves as masters. with the great bow of the Turkish camp extending beyond Vienna. only to be driven across the Schreiber-Bach with the help of an Austrian battery planted on the newly captured Nussberg.the ruins of this one outwork were rocked by a continuous series of mines. on the night of 2 September. he wheeled his wing to the right and rolled up the enemy flank in the direction of Wahring. After a bitter struggle for the height the Turks fell back to the fortified village of Nussdorf. countermines. and were still further delayed by Turkish counter-attacks. as Tartar and Turkish horsemen were devastating the countryside as far up the Danube as Melk.000 cavalry in a charge from the meadows between Breitensee and Hernals. before a rocket from the Kahlenberg showed the Viennese that relief was at hand. From Passau the Emperor Leopold had sent appeals to the King of Poland.
Renner Ring opposite the Parliament. likewise a small bench from where Starhemberg is said to have seen the approach of Sobieski's army. Joseph on the Kahlenberg.000 cannon-balls which the Turks fired into Vienna. Other objects of interest within the 'Innere Stadt' are: The Mölker-Bastion (opposite the University). and many of the missiles are still embedded in the walls. The nearby Arsenal (Zeughaus) held much of the ammunition of the defenders. but all Christendom. with the exception of the French Court. Sterngasse.the enemy. on a site now occupied by nos. Neustiftgasse. For Austria the siege of Vienna was the introduction to a decade and a half of war in the east. which were levelled in 1858. here also hangs the Pummerin.000 of the 100. The chapels on the Leopoldsberg and the Kahlenberg were rebuilt after the battle. and each bend corresponds to the projection of one of the old bastions. 5 . One of these balls is shown in the south tower. the great bell first made from Turkish cannon in 1711. who died just before the relief of his city. which is now preserved in a niche next to the door of no. could rejoice in the survival of Europe's bulwark against the Turks. the only remnant of the old fortifications. the Maria-Theresien-Platz. in the VII District. 7 Am Hof was the house of Liebenberg. C. and the Stadtpark sloping down to the little river Wien. and recast from the old metal after the fire of 1945. 32-4. The Burg-Ravelin probably stood a few yards south of the statue of Archduke Charles in the Helden-Platz. No.D. and was imperilled by the accidental burning of part of the Schottenstift. Stephen was struck by nearly 1. however. A 79-pound ball fired into the city on 20 July. At the present day the course of the Ring Road around the I District follows the outline of the fortifications. still lacking the spire that was shot away in 1683. An impression of the glacis is still conveyed by the open spaces of the RathausPlatz.J. decide in favour of the Church of St. K. and dispute the claim to the site of the famous Mass of 12 September. Ulrich. thus the Löwel-Bastion (on the site of the Volksgarten) is commemorated by the turn in the Dr. and early in the evening they received their deliverers into the indescribable ruin of their defences. The Cathedral of St. On the outskirts of Vienna the Türkenschanz Park in the XVIII District takes its name from the earthwork erected against the relieving army. 3. The tower of the Minoritenkirche behind the Chancellery. the more recent historians. which now contains the tomb of Starhemberg. the Grand Vizier had his tent near the Church of St.
380) Object of the action: Napoleon's second attempt to crush Austrian resistance.300 cavalry. 23.500 infantry. Archduke J o h n with his 6 . (A) Archduke Charles and the Austrian army. 554 guns. 139.000. D. Location: Eighteen miles north-east of Vienna close to Route 7.v. 158. Casualties: (a) 32. Total: c. which was a blow to his prestige. Napoleon spent 6 weeks m a k i n g Lobau island in the D a n u b e an impregnable base of operations. 1. Suggested reading: See Aspern-Essling. So m a t t e r s rested over t h e night of 5/6 J u l y . the Austrian Campaign of 1809 (see p. 1969.. General Work: Chandler.600 cavalry.v.). Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars. T h e French next deployed to the north. (b) Austrians: 139. 154. Opposing sides: (a) Napoleon in command of the 'Grande Armee'. G. following his repulse at Aspern-Essling (q.800 infantry. After this check. b u t bulging forward in a great salient between W a g r a m in the north a n d Aspern-Essling in the south by the river D a n u b e . however. T h e Archduke Charles planned to contain with his left a n d attack on his right to cut the French off from Lobau. War and campaign: Napoleonic Wars. Total: c. W h e n Davout reached the plateau of W a g r a m in the north. Result: A French victory. (4) 40. 480 guns. This was partially successful a n d the Austrian a r m y was cut in two. After entering V i e n n a on 13 M a y 1809 Napoleon fought the unsuccessful two-day battle at Aspern-Essling (q. 18. deceiving t h e Archduke Charles who was expecting t h e m to cross near Aspern farther west.Wagram (A***) Date: 5-6 July 1809. on t h e stormy night of 4/5 J u l y . This crossing of the river was a remarkable feat. p. T h e massed guns of Drouot in the centre helped to hold this firmly.). Napoleon launched a great attack in the centre between W a g r a m a n d the D a n u b e . Napoleon sent D a v o u t to attack t h e Austrians in the n o r t h on the W a g r a m plateau a n d Massena to meet Archduke Charles's fierce attacks on Aspern-Essling in the south. building 3 bridges to the south bank from it a n d 4 bridges to the north. their line 15 miles long facing west. London. a n d h a d to withdraw from the north b a n k of the D a n u b e .000 French. the French a r m y was able to cross to the north bank of the D a n u b e at the eastern end of Lobau island. eventually leading to the Peace of Vienna. Forces engaged: (a) French: 130.100. T h u s .000 Austrians.
.000 men from Pressburg arrived too late to affect the issue of the battle. but not a very decisive one.M.S. This was a victory for Napoleon.30. and the Austrians managed to retreat in fair order in spite of heavy losses. J. as an immediate pursuit was not carried out.
8 .
. T h r o u g h o u t November 1944 Eisenhower continued his efforts to close w i t h t h e R h i n e on a b r o a d front. 1944-5 (see p. Panzer Army. 2 airborne divisions (U.S. Suggested reading: General Works: Wilmot. 9 Panzer divisions (1. War and campaign: The Second World War: North-west Europe (campaign.. Crusade in Europe. (A) Germans: 14 infantry divisions. The Battle of the Bulge. Eisenhower. Total: 250. Bradley. isolate 21st Army Group and thereafter induce Great Britain and the U. 1956. 8th Corps 9 . C.000. Result: Complete defeat of Hitler's 'final gamble' and the restoration of the American front. London. Supreme Commander West. 381) Object of the action: The Germans were making a desperate bid to reach Antwerp. (Part VI). thence Route 28 to St.S. Total: 400. 600 tanks. London. S . 1949.. B. but it delayed the Allies from reaching the Rhine for six weeks. (ft) Field-Marshal von Runstedt. Pallud. Ardennes. 1944: Riper and Skorzeny. London. 5Ü1 Panzer and 7th Armies).000. Casualties: (a) 77. (ft) 90. T h e 80-mile Ardennes sector was thinly held by the U . von Manteuffel.100 tanks). 1952.A. 1984. The Struggle for Europe. D. D. London. 733 tanks. London. Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe. P.S. Vith. 1948.000 men. 23.Belgium The Ardennes (A***) Date: 16 December 1944-1 February 1945. Opposing sides: (a) General Eisenhower. C.. 'The Fatal Decisions'.000 men.000 tanks) (6th S. J. Biography: MacDonald. Forces engaged: (a) Allies: 18 infantry divisions. O. Location: From Marche take Route 4 (E 40) to Bastogne. ist and 3rd Armies). A Soldier's Story. London. to offer a negotiated peace. 7 armoured divisions (1. H.. 1987.
heading due west without a pause straight for the Meuse. The Germans waited for a period of bad weather. As early as the first week of November. a fledgling divisions and an inexperienced armoured division. On the right the 6th S. The armour was then to drive through. crossing the Meuse between west of Liege and Namur. He hoped thus to secure a negotiated peace or win time to put his new weapons into action. however. It was accepted that the Germans lacked fuel for an offensive and that von Runstedt was unlikely to consider the narrow winding roads and involved country of the Ardennes in the mists and snow of winter as a promising line of advance. Panzer Army under Sepp Dietrich. The preparations were carried out in extreme secrecy. In 10 . Then at 0530 hours on 16 December 14 infantry divisions supported by 2. Headquarters were given deceptive signs.000 guns advanced through the mist against the thinly held American line. The assaulting divisions were assembled behind the Aachen front to create the impression that they were to be fed into the battle there. In fact Allied intelligence with regard to German intentions and resources was surprisingly bad. Bradley later described this as 'a calculated risk'. Newly arrived divisions were marched north and east in daylight and then doubled back on their tracks at night. The plan aimed at the capture of Antwerp and the destruction of the Allied armies north of the Ardennes. The 7th Army was to protect the southern flank. consisting of 4 Panzer and 5 infantry divisions. equipped with captured American vehicles and including English-speaking volunteers in American uniform.S. was to head for Brussels. Panzer Armies. Strongly held villages and defensive positions were to be by-passed.S. Hitler had decided to stake everything on a counter-offensive here to restore German morale and give him the respite he needed to transfer reserves later to the Russian front. Low cloud on 12 December and for the next week hampered Allied air reconnaissance. Panzer officers were even dressed as infantry. It was to be carried out by the strategic reserve—the 5th and 6th S. Non-German soldiers were evacuated from the front line. Night fighters were flown overhead to drown the noise of the move up of the artillery. On the left the 5th Panzer Army under von Manteuffel.consisting of 2 veteran divisions. Full advantage was taken of the long hours of darkness. and Skorzeny's force. which was to pass through the advance guards and seize the Meuse bridges. The infantry divisions with heavy artillery support were to make the initial attack. was to cross the Meuse on either side of Liege and make for Antwerp. The plan included two further novel features: the dropping of a parachute unit to block the roads north of the Ardennes.
soon found himself faced by a task beyond his ability. selected to command on account of his bravery and loyalty to Hitler. It was south of Butgenbach 11 . Dietrich. nearly got through to the big American petrol dump at Stavelot. Task Force Pieper. between Monschau and Butgenbach. however. 5th Corps. Panzer Army struck firm resistance by two divisions of the U. the 6th S.ARDENNES 16th December 1944 to ist February 1945 the extreme north. One of his armoured groups.S.S.
Here. With Dietrich halted and von Manteuffel with the ball at his feet. Meanwhile Montgomery. Here it blocked Dietrich till the 23rd. Von Manteuffel therefore decided to encircle the place and continue the drive to the Meuse. von Manteuffel's 5th Panzer Army swamped the widely extended U.S. Eisenhower took a more realist view and ordered the 7th U.where the collapse occurred. At his headquarters at Luxembourg Bradley was completely out of touch with the situation. with Panzer Lehr. Late on the 16th Eisenhower and Bradley had only received fragmentary reports. At dawn on the 19th Bayerlein.S. found Bastogne strongly held.S. Patton and Devers at Verdun on the igth. He wished the decisive blow to be struck by the S. Late on 17 December the 7th U. thoroughly informed of the situation by his liaison officers.S. Hitler would not agree. Bradley considered it a spoiling attack designed to forestall Patton's offensive in the south. admirable lateral communications and the best tank going in Belgium. divisions on Dietrich's front and not by the Wehrmacht under von Manteuffel. Vith. under Brigadier-General Hasbrouck. Armoured Division on the evening of the 18th. 12 . Patton's drive got going on the 22nd. The first American troops to reach this place were a battle group of the 10th U. Armoured Division. continued the breakthrough. That night German paratroops.S. It was not till the evening of the 17th that Eisenhower ordered forward the celebrated 82nd and 10ist Airborne Divisions from his theatre reserve. he viewed the prospect of a German irruption over the Meuse with an equanimity which his American colleagues did not share. Here with 3 battle-hardened divisions. Meeting Bradley.S. Armoured Division from the south into the Ardennes. 28th and 106th Divisions and. moving on that night by the light of searchlights. It was left to Eisenhower to rise to the level of events. By this time von Manteuffel's 3 leading Panzer divisions were within 15 miles of the key road centre of Bastogne. American confusion was immediate and impressive. 1 armoured division and 3 armoured brigades. produced something like paralysis behind the American lines. Model now proposed to reinforce the latter with Dietrich's 2 uncommitted panzer divisions. occupied the important road junction at St. The 101st Airborne Division in a lightning move of 100 miles by road arrived there during the night. he placed all American troops north of the line Givet-Houffalize-Prum under Montgomery's command and ordered Patton to swing his army north towards Bastogne. had on his own initiative switched his 30th Corps to the west bank of the Meuse between Liege and Namur. Armoured Division from the 9th Army in the north and the n t h U. landing near Spa.
On the following day the spearhead of the 5th Panzer Army got to within 4 miles of the Meuse near Celles. The sky now cleared and the Allied Air Forces were once again able to intervene. Immobilised for lack of petrol, the Germans failed to make further progress. Here the battle ended on 26 December when the U.S. 2nd Armoured Division crushed the 2nd Panzer Division at Celles. Late on the same day Patton's 4th Armoured Division punched a narrow corridor into Bastogne. Throughout the next week the Germans made an all-out effort to take Bastogne and its corridor but Patton, thrusting in newly arrived divisions straight into battle and aided by the 19th Tactical Air Force under abominable flying conditions, held his ground. In the north Montgomery proceeded to tidy up the front and restore balance, despite American objections, by evacuating the St. Vith salient and withdrawing the U.S. 7th Corps into reserve to reorganise for the counter-offensive. This went in on 3 January. By this time much of the 6th S.S. Panzer Army's strength had been dissipated at Bastogne. Driving through bitter German opposition, storms and waist-deep snow, the U.S. 7th Corps cut the vital La Roche-Vielsalm road on the 7th. Next day Hitler, no longer able to deny that most of his surviving armour was in danger of being trapped between Montgomery's and Patton's thrusts, authorised Model to give up the area west of Houffalize. The Germans waged a fighting retreat, but on 16 January the U.S. 2nd and n t h Armoured Divisions linked up at Houffalize and re-established a solid front. It was not till the end of January, however, that the last Germans were driven out of the Ardennes. Unquestionably, Eisenhower's decision at the crisis to place the northern armies under Montgomery and to send the 101st Airborne Division to Bastogne saved the day. In abandoning the St. Vith salient and creating a reserve before turning to the counter-offensive, Montgomery showed a grasp of the situation superior to that of his American colleagues. Time was needed to regroup, reorganise and make the necessary administrative preparation. Once the skies cleared and the Air Arm could come into its own the issue was never in doubt. H.E.
Courtrai (B**)
Date: 11 July 1302. Location: Courtrai is 27 miles south-west of Ghent (Route 14 (E 3)) The battlefield lies near the Groeninghebeke stream. 14. War and campaign: Flemish Revolt against the French (see p. 378) 13
Object of the action: The French were trying to relieve their garrison in the town. Opposing sides: (a) Guy of Namur and William of Juliers leading the Flemish insurgents, (4) The Count of Artois commanding the French army. Forces engaged: (a) Flemings: details uncertain, but mostly pikemen. Total: perhaps 12,000. (A) French: details uncertain, but a large number mounted. Total: perhaps 15,000. Casualties: (a) Uncertain, but not heavy, (b) 63 nobles; 700 knights. Result: Defeat of the French expedition. Suggested reading: General Work: Van der Linden, H., Belgium: The Making of a Nation, Oxford, 1920. On the Battle: Oman, C. W. C, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, Vol. II (2nd Edn.), London, 1924. In M a y 1302 t h e Flemings arose in revolt against King Philip of France, w h o h a d imprisoned their Count a n d annexed his lands. Courtrai was one of the few towns the French succeeded in retaining. T h e Flemish a r m y fell back to Courtrai when Count R o b e r t of Artois invaded t h e country with a royal French army, composed of the feudal array of north France, Italian mercenaries a n d Gascon javelin soldiers. Behind the Groeninghebeke outside Courtrai the Flemish a r m y under a son of the Count, G u y of N a m u r , a n d William of Juliers his cousin, stood ready for battle. T h e Flemings were a r m e d mainly w i t h pikes, which they relied upon to hold off t h e French cavalry. T h e y were arrayed in a long tightly packed phalanx, w i t h a small reserve u n d e r J o h n van Remesse behind a n d a n o t h e r 1,200 men still farther to the r e a r on g u a r d in case t h e F r e n c h garrison in Courtrai sallied forth. On the morning of 11 J u l y , after an exchange of cross-bow fire across the stream, R o b e r t of Artois ordered his cavalry to charge at the Flemings. T h e three lines of men-at-arms were thrown into disorder by their own infantry as they reached the brook. T h e m a r s h y ground on b o t h sides of the stream caused the 10 squadrons of heavily a r m o u r e d men even more trouble. Before they could form ranks again the Flemish phalanx advanced, pikes levelled, a n d thrust them back. T h e m a i n force of F r e n c h cavalry fared no better against t h e pikemen, w h o presented t h e m with an unbroken front. V a n Remesse reinforced the Flemish centre with his pikemen, a n d the French third line a n d infantry were unwilling to renew the conflict. Artois lost his life along with large numbers of his cavalrymen. T h e battle is m o r e important from the military t h a n the political point of view, for it demonstrated t h a t determined 14
pikemen were more t h a n a m a t c h for unsupported cavalry. It represented the first major victory of infantry over m o u n t e d warriors since Adrianople, i ,000 years before.
Flanders (B****)
Date: Continuous fighting, 1914-18. Location: The battlefield extends from Nieuport (Belgium) to Vimy (north France); the most famous area is around Ypres. 13. War and campaign: The First World War; the Campaigns on the Western front (see p. 381). Object of the action: Continuous Allied and German attempts to achieve a breakthrough towards Berlin or Paris respectively, and thus to solve the impasse of the trench war. Opposing sides: (a) The British, French and Belgian armies. (b) The German army. Forces engaged: Several million men on each side. Casualties: Several millions, details incalculable. Result: Little ground won or lost by either side, but the battle of attrition fought along the front contributed largely to Germany's final collapse. Suggested reading: General Work: Terraine, J., The Western Front, 1914-18, London, 1964. On die Campaigns: Edmonds, J. E. (ed.), Military Operations, France and Belgium, London, 1922-39. On the Campaigns: Mottram, R. H., Through the Menin Gate, London, 1932. Wolf, L., In Flanders Fields , London, 1959. Macdonald, L., They called it Fhsschendaele — the story of Third Ypres, London, 1978. At the end of the G e r m a n retreat from the M a r n e in the a u t u m n of 1914 their open flank came to rest upon the sea at Nieuport, just within the borders of the Flemish province of West Flanders. H e l d there by Belgian inundation of the estuary of the Yser, the line they established r a n southeastwards into France, passing in front of Ypres, between Lille and Armentieres, t h r o u g h the mining villages a r o u n d Lens to the edge of the Artois uplands at Vimy. Between Dixmude and t h e sea the line was held throughout the w a r by the Belgian army, b u t the sector a r o u n d Ypres a n d southwards was from the first essentially a n d memorably British. Most of the place-names along this line are ominously familiar to British ears a n d it is possible to note only the m o r e important. T h e battles for the Ypres ridges are the most notorious. In November 1914, M a y 1915, J u l y - N o v e m b e r 1917 a n d April 1918 there was bitter fighting for their possession. In the First Battle of Ypres the old British regular a r m y held a foothold
FLEURUS (B**).000. 379). Opposing sides: (a) The Duke of Cumberland commanding the Anglo-Dutch-Austrian army. Warfare. O t h e r significant battles are those of Neuve Ghapelle ( M a y 1915) a n d Loos (September 1915). Forces engaged: Allies: 56 battalions. Total: 53. A French a r m y under Marshal Luxembourg signally defeated the Dutch and German a r m y of the Prince of Waldeck. Of these forces 27 battalions and 17 squadrons were before Tournai. T h e T h i r d Battle. T h e 60.P. inflicting 14. N e w York. See Spaulding.000 casualties for negligible territorial gains. a n d Messines ( J u n e 1917). perhaps 70 guns. Location: Five miles south-east of Tournai. (b) Marshal de Saxe (accompanied by Louis XV) commanding the French. 1 J u l y 1690. about 80 cannon.B. A tour of the battlefield is still a poignantly moving experience for the British visitor. 87 squadrons. during which the British a r m y suffered over 200. 18.) 16 . turn left at Antoing from the Mons road (Route 61). Netherlands Campaign of 1745 (see p. 1925. In the Second the Germans employed gas for the first time in w a r a n d caused a temporary p a n i c b u t .K. 20: W a r of the League of Augsburg. is one of the half-dozen great battles of the Western Front. War and campaign: The War of the Austrian Succession. were u n p r e p a r e d to consolidate it. (N. surprised by t h e extent of their own success. 7 miles north of Charleroi. Nickerson and Wright. 146 squadrons. Fontenqy (A****) Date: 11 May 1745. Total: 70. J. Object of the action: The Allied army was attempting to interrupt the French siege of Tournai. better known as Passchendaele.000 casualties a n d taking 49 guns.upon t h e m in the face of ferocious assaults. battle of.000 names of the unfound dead of the Ypres salient recorded on the N e w Menin Gate a n d the numerous a n d enormous cemeteries are an almost unbearable reminder of the sufferings of the British and Commonwealth armies in Flanders between 1914 a n d 1918.000. a classic limited offensive preceded by mine explosions so large that the contours of Messines ridge were permanently altered. both inconclusive b u t costly assaults. (4) French: 93 battalions.D. T h e G e r m a n offensive of April 1918 extinguished t h e m completely a n d they were recovered only in the general advance of the a u t u m n .
Suggested reading: General Works: Fortescue. At Brussels the Allies were taken aback at the news t h a t de Saxe was on t h e move.. II. 1901-6. Leaving a force to contain T o u r n a i . 1906. So it was t h a t the initiative was left entirely to the French. R. b o t h as military thinker a n d rake of prodigious powers. London.Casualties: (a) Possibly 7. a n d t h e n turning at right angles n o r t h to the W o o d of Barry a n d t h e village of Ramecroix. Field-Marshal LordLigonier. 1962. J. M. a n d in April 1745 he directed a feint north-east towards Mons. W.. T h e British have long recalled the stout-heartedness of the infantry. a n d then pounced with his powerful a r m y u p o n the fortress of T o u r n a i a n d sealed up the unsuspecting garrison. whose c o m m a n d e r was not a m a n likely to neglect such an opportunity. In the spring of 1745 the commanders of the Allied a r m y in the Austrian Netherlands rejected the project of the British general Ligonier for a thrust into France. Golin.. Oxford. On the Battle: Skrine. Paris. Edinburgh and London. Fontenoy and the War of Austrian Succession. London. Biography: White.. F. de Saxe arrayed the rest of his a r m y in a carefully chosen defensive line 5 miles to t h e south-east of the fortress.. a n d merely waited upon events.000 Allies.000 French. the Life and Times of Marshal de Saxe. Both flanks were securely anchored—the one on a river a n d t h e other on a wood—but de Saxe improved this strong position still further by studding it with redoubts of his own devising: these were compact earthworks furnished w i t h artillery. a n d thus gave de Saxe ample time to p r e p a r e a position w h e r e he would be all too delighted to receive t h e m . T h e Battle of Fontenoy is notable on several accounts. H. A History of the British Army. Result: A hard-fought victory for the French leading to the conquest of much of the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium). (b) Possibly 7. 1958. Campagnes de Maurice de Saxe. a n d still more so w h e n they later heard t h a t the gateway to western Flanders was as good as within his grasp. the Marshal de Saxe h a d already achieved a considerable reputation. T h e y accordingly m a r c h e d south a n d then west by circuitous a n d ill-directed marches. In outline t h e French position was a sharp salient extending eastwards from the Scheldt at Antoing for just over a mile to the apex at the hamlet of Fontenoy. Biography: Whitworth. J. Vol. Marshal of France. 1910. largely under the impression of the feint on Mons. which could 17 . J. a n d a victory with wide strategic consequences. a n d look back with no less pride on the dash a n d sacrifice of their opponents in t h e Irish Brigade in t h e service of France. For the French it is the masterpiece of the Marshal de Saxe.
direct a heavy fire against an enemy advancing from the front or around the flank. Two lines of infantry.). FONTENOY nth May 1745 To the left of his line. The. was placed behind the Wood of Barry. however. de Saxe devoted his greatest attention. A reserve of fine troops. were disposed behind a sunken road leading northwards from Fontenoy across a low plateau in the direction of Ramecroix: the French troops would be out of sight of the enemy until the last moment. On his far left he lined the Wood of Barry with sharpshooters. but based upon a faulty reconnaissance undertaken the day before. Austrians and Dutch were to tackle the French 18 . and to get this far the Allies would have had to cross the natural glacis formed by the gentle and open eastern slopes of the plateau. and yet leave the French troops wide gaps through which they could launch their own attacks— a decided improvement upon Villars' entrenchments at Malplaquet (q. and Fontenoy itself was converted into a miniature fortress. The Allied plan of attack for 11 May was clear and simple. and a further battery was cunningly ensconced on the far bank of the Scheldt. Three such redoubts were thrown up on the French right wing between Antoing and Fontenoy. whom he accounted the most formidable troops of the Allied army. for here he expected the assault of the British. and constructed two redoubts on the fringes of the wood: the southernmost of these earthworks became famous as the Redoubt d'Eu.v. supported by two further lines of cavalry. including the 6 regiments of the Irish Brigade.
The cavalry endured its torture until Ligonier brought the British infantry through the intervals. while the British were to press home their assault against the apparently clear ground between Fontenoy and the Wood of Barry. The British accomplished their retreat in admirable order. Early in the afternoon Cumberland had to order his drummers to beat out the order to fall back. and their clearing became a matter of the greatest importance. the British withdrew to the crest of the ridge to reform. A renewed Dutch assault on Fontenoy having failed. and then came on again. Neither a destructive artillery fire. and led them to the beat of drum against the plateau. thrown back by a murderous fire. and now that the crisis of the day had come de Saxe did not hesitate to commit his last reserves to the fight: the 5 remaining regiments of the Irish Brigade charged yelling against the British right. The advance in the early hours of the 11 th had already begun when Cumberland learnt for the first time of the existence of the Redoubt d'Eu. as were the attacks of the Austrians and of the rest of the Dutch against the French right. the rearguard facing about at measured intervals to drive away the pursuers. The Battle of Fontenoy had established the clear superiority of the French in force and high command. The continued resistance of these two strongpoints was a thorn in the side of the British for the remainder of the battle. and at about 6 am it deployed in the plain beyond in full view of the French gunners. The strength of the flanks of the French left was only now appreciated. At last. loading their pieces with stones and glass when their grapeshot was exhausted. gradually coalescing under the effect of the enemy fire into one monstrous column against which even the Maison du Roi and the Irish regiment of Dillon threw themselves to no purpose. Meanwhile the British cavalry had completed its passage of the broken country around Vezon. Cumberland took the head of the beautifully dressed lines. nor the first volley of the French infantry were able to break or hasten the steady controlled pace of the British. while a number of line regiments and the French and Swiss Guards closed in on the left.right between Antoing and Fontenoy. The Dutch assault against Fontenoy was. and the depleted redcoats finally delivered one appalling blast of fire which reduced the French lines to a shambles. the muddles and delays of Brigadier Ingoldsby prevented a detached command of British and Hanoverians from carrying the Redoubt d'Eu. and arrayed the foot in two lines in front. and September 19 . however. The two British lines pressed on into the French camp. The French gunners were in a frenzy. no less fatally. who began to rain down shot on the motionless squadrons. at 10:30.
T h e isolation of the corps of the Prince de Clermont seemed to offer the desired opportunity. de Saxe skilfully concentrated his forces for a heavy blow against the enemy left. W. 1910.D. led by Lord Ligonier. Ostend. 380). 90. (A) Nearly 6. In 1747 Cumberland sought to inflict a decisive defeat on the French. Result: An extremely costly victory for de Saxe. but a suicidal charge of three British cavalry regiments. concerned only with preserving their communications with Antwerp. A History of the British Amy. Laffeldt (c***) Date: 2 July 1747. Lord Ligonier was captured. Location: Immediately south-west of Maastricht on the BelgoDutch frontier.000 French. vol. between the rivers Jaar and Demer. War and campaign: The War of the Austrian Succession. Opposing sides: (a) Marshal de Saxe in command of a French army.found the Allies in the north of Belgium. London. and a clash between the two main armies became inevitable. J. The field was lost for Cumberland.000 French killed and wounded. Nieuport. 120. Stalemate ensued on the Meuse for the rest of the year. as a means of recovering the territory lost in the Netherlands in the year before. and just as at Rocoux. Casualties: (a) 14. C. The Allies held an extended position facing south. CJ. and the French had to make four attacks before they could win the village of Laffeldt. distinguished themselves as well as in any other battle of the century.J. Netherlands Campaign of 1747 (see p. 8. Bruges and Ghent: all had fallen to de Saxe. Tournai. (b) Approx.000 Allies.000 Allies (including 2. but de Saxe hurried down from the west to join his subordinate. 20 . II. however.. Suggested reading: Fortescue. but the French detached a force which took Bergen-op-Zoom. and with the outbreak of the Jacobite rebellion the British were forced to look for a time to their own defences. (b) The Duke of Cumberland commanding an Allied army. Forces engaged: (a) Approx. enabled the Allies to retreat in good order. Object of the action: Cumberland was seeking to regain territory lost in the Netherlands.000 British). T h e British infantry.D.
1760-5. Louis X I V ordered Marshal Villars to take any risk to save t h e fortress.. b u t the so-called victory of M a l p l a q u e t did little to secure final victory for the G r a n d Alliance. (b) French: 96 battalions. La Bataille de Malplaquet.. only the city of Mons lay between the Allies a n d the r o a d to Paris. Forces engaged: (a) Allies: 128 battalions. battle of.G. Total: 110.000. Article: Bowen. (b) 12. London. 'The Dutch at Malplaquet'. (6) Marshals Villars and Boufflers at the head of the French army. Marlborough as a Military Commander. See Baxter. William III. Malplaquet.H.000 killed and wounded. its most lasting effects. were to rally French national morale and damage Marlborough's reputation in England. London.L A N D E N ( D * * ) . Journal for S. W a r of the League of Augsburg. S B.R. Object of the action: The Allies hoped to crush Marshal Villars and the last large French army and thus open the road to Paris. Total: 80. H.000) offered battle to the French Marshal Luxembourg (80.000) but over-extended his front a n d eventually the weak point was penetrated by the superior French cavalry. 1911. L. 10 miles south of Mons. Tristram Shandy. 21 . 21. K i n g William I I I (50. March 1962. " i i .A. On the Battle: Belloc. 100 guns. Paris... Opposing sides: (a) The Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene leading the Allies. Malplaquet village itself is in France. 7 miles south-west of St. London. 379).000.000 killed and wounded. Suggested reading: See Oudenarde (p. Malplaquet (B***) Date: 11 September 1709. 60 guns. H. In the spring of 1709 it h a d a p p e a r e d t h a t nothing could save France from defeat. M. Chandler. 26)... Location: The actual battlefield lies exacdy on the Franco-Belgian border. however. 28 J u l y 1693. Sautai. 180 squadrons. G. but Aulnois lies in Belgium. London. T r u i d e n . Casualties: (a) 24. Result: A technical victory for the forces of the Grand Alliance leading to the capture of Mons. 253 squadrons. 1973.. T h e Battle of M a l p l a q u e t was the last major battle jointly fought by M a r l b o r o u g h a n d Prince Eugene a n d was by no means their best action. After the fall of T o u r n a i on 5 September. D. War and campaign: The War of the Spanish Succession: Netherlands Campaign of 1709 (see p. 1904. Work of Fiction (on the period): Sterne. 1966.
through which the Allied cavalry would charge to deliver the coup de grâce. but the Allies were too weary to clinch their victory. Marshal Bouffiers. to join France's last army in a desperate bid to avert national disaster. selected a strong position north of the village of Malplaquet for his stand.C. He placed his flanks in two woods and fortified the gap dividing them. and this development led Villars to weaken his centre exactly as Marlborough had hoped. keeping all his cavalry in reserve. a small body of Allied cavalry appeared on the extreme French left near La Folie after passing round the forest. The Allied right suffered heavy casualties penetrating Taisnières wood. and the full splendour of the Allied cavalry—30. Villars set out to court battle—but. confident of their ability to destroy Villars at their leisure. Mons (and Le Cateau and the Marne) (B****) Date: 23 August-8 September 1914. Location: The initial action was fought along the banks of the Mons22 . Consequently Marshal Bouffiers was able to withdraw the bulk of the French army in excellent order. On the morning of the 11 th the preliminary attacks were launched at 8 am. however. Both sides claimed a victory. There he awaited the Allied onslaught. Marlborough and Eugene advanced their armies from the direction of Mons.and sent the ancient hero. D. A tremendous mêlée developed.000 strong—swept through the entrenchments to engage the French horsemen drawn up beyond. The near-success rallied French morale whilst Marlborough's political foes used the casualty figures to weaken his position. The plan they adopted was hardly subtle: a series of massed attacks against the French flanks in the woods might induce Villars to weaken his centre.G. By i pm Orkney's 19 battalions had taken possession of the undefended redoubts in the French centre. Allied casualties were horrific—25 per cent of their effective strength was laid low—but the French had fared far better. but the long-term advantages favoured the French cause. Shortly after midday. mindful of his great inferiority of numbers. while on the left the Prince of Orange's heedless attacks from Aulnois against Bouffiers were decimated by a cunningly sited French battery which enfiladed the advancing Dutch troops. but for several hours very little progress was made owing to the difficulty of the terrain and the gallantry of the French. during which Villars was himself wounded.
consisting of an almost continuous built-up area stretching some 16 miles to the west of Mons bisected by the M o n s . 1960. 1964. The Western Front. t h a n it is sometimes m a d e out to be. and Marshal Joffre leading the French. W S. 1962. On the Battle: Terraine.000 men of the B. Flanders Campaign of 1914 (see p. J.F. (b) 1st and 2nd German Armies under von Kluck and von Bulow. a n d the force which m e t the British 2nd Corps at M o n s was less strong t h a n it might have been.. u n d e r Sir J o h n French h a d taken up a position on the left of the French army—having concentrated at Maubeuge. London.. (b) 1st and 2nd German Armies.E. The World Crisis. in fact. Total: c. 500.F. Oxford. was crossed by 18 bridges in its length of 16 miles. b u t the individual glory gained there cannot be questioned as it is substantiated by the large n u m b e r of V. The First Battle of the Marne. General Smith-Dorrien's 2 n d Corps. but the final crisis took place ioo miles to the south on the River Marne. or. 1936. Casualties: (a) B.000. Opposing sides: (a) Sir John French commanding die B. (b) Not accurately known. W i t h t h e m it proposed to advance against Germany in accordance w i t h the French Plan 17. F.. R. Vol. T h e canal.F. a b o u t 7 feet deep with an average width of 64 feet. (1. London. London. Object of the action: The German army was attempting to break through the left flank of the Allied armies and envelop them. Mons. 600. Luckily the leading corps of von Kluck's army were scattered. was mainly engaged on 23 August.E. Forces engaged: (a) 100. 400. Total: c. 19.000.E.F. approximately 15.E.. covering the long front 23 . London.s awarded.E.G. War and campaign: The First World War.600 at Mons). R. T h e Battle of Mons has perhaps become more famous t h a n it deserves. Terraine. C.F.Conde Canal. J. On the Campaign: Churchill. M. T h e canal running straight on an east-west line marked the front along which the B. T h e B. T h e region which contains the battlefield of Mons is an unattractive one. B. I. 381). Result: The final result was a victory for the Allies as the Germans were forced back to the river Aisne. T h e bridges shaped the fighting. W h e n Belgium was violated the British on the exposed left met the full force of the strong G e r m a n right wing in the form of the 1 st G e r m a n Army under von Kluck. 1914-18.. A History of the Gnat War.000 French troops. 1923. Suggested reading: General Work: Cruttwell.000.C o n d 6 canal.. Asprey.
had to be withdrawn after gallant fighting in defence of the Mons' bridges which won them two V. The British dug in among the houses and slag heaps covering the bridges. and both the Middlesex and the Royal Irish supporting them had to withdraw covered by the Gordons on their right. lined the canal. The casualties in the 1st Corp were only 40.s for gallant persistence in blowing bridges. and 2 guns abandoned. The 3rd Division under General Hamilton held the right of the front.s. 24 . The casualties at Mons as finally estimated were 1. Here the Royal Fusiliers. and some of the regiments who fought so well there were the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. the Northumberland Fusiliers and the Royal Scots Fusiliers. was away when it started and played no part when he returned. Almost half the casualties were sustained by two battalions: the Middlesex with over 400. facing almost east. too. The 5th Division under General Fergusson held the canal line to the west of Mons. The rest of General Allenby's cavalry division was behind the 5th Division. the Middlesex and the Royal Irish distinguished themselves. covered the right flank of the 2nd Corps with the 5th Cavalry Brigade.of 21 miles. Here the enemy crossed the canal in force and enveloped the Middlesex. but the British suffered from the massed German artillery fire. The whole British line to the left also began its withdrawal west of Mons. wounded and missing. Here the Sappers won two V. permitting his army corps to stumble into the British army one by one as they arrived with no co-ordination of their activities at all.C. Mons was entirely a 2nd Corps battle. making easy targets. The crux of the battle lay in the salient. After withdrawing to a better position 2 or 3 miles south of the canal. and the Royal Irish with over 300. The Royal Fusiliers.C. The Germans advanced in solid blocks. The British rifle fire was so accurate and deadly that the Germans were convinced that the British had brought into action great numbers of machine guns. General von Kluck seemed to have exercised little control. and it was the infantry's shooting which dominated the day. Three days later at Le Cateau the 2nd Corps fought another celebrated battle after they had become separated by the Forest of Morny from the 1st Corps. the British Commander-in-Chief.600 killed. Sir John French. a general retreat from Mons began covered by cavalry actions by the 9th Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards. the West Kents. It was a curious battle. and well-organised rearguard actions with excellent support from the Royal Artillery. General Haig's 1st Corps. including the town of Mons and the awkward salient which the canal made to the north-east of it.
Again the enemy penetration came on the British right. It appeared as if the Germans must be successful when there occurred what came to be known as the 'Miracle of the Marne'. The French Rhine offensive had failed. and are estimated at 7. this time round the town of Le Cateau itself and up the valley of the Selle.MONS (AND LE CATEAU AND THE MARNE) 23rd August to 8th September igi4 Le Cateau followed the pattern of Mons. Many of the honours of the battle went to the gunners who manned their weapons to the last and then took them away in the face of the enemy. but this time the field of battle lay on open rolling country with few obstacles and less cover for the British fighting their rearguard action. rapid retreat alone saved the B. In the west the German armies now pressed on towards Paris. The losses at Le Gateau were more serious than at Mons. An unhappy lack of co-operation between General French and Lanrezac seemed likely to make disaster more certain until Lord Kitchener.E. in many instances firing over open sights and at almost point-blank ranges.F. and everywhere their armies fell back. Winston Churchill says of it: 'One must suppose upon the whole that the Marne was the 25 . the Secretary of State for War. of 70. The main feature on the Allied side was the very close support given to the infantry by the Royal Field Artillery which was right up alongside them.000 men under Sir John French and the French 5th Army under General Lanrezac from destruction. visited France and put things on a better footing. After this.800 men and 38 guns.
London. which.E. b u t it was less like a n y other battle ever fought. a n d no great recognisable feat of arms. inflicting perhaps 70. in the meantime. siege of. It was into this gap t h a t the B.F. built up a new 6th A r m y on the west of Paris u n d e r General M a n o u r y . 378. The Sea Beggars. London. by a clever appreciation of strategy. 9.M. a n d no shock proportionate to the event can be discerned. to relieve the pressure on France. Paris was safe. governor of Paris. . 1982. p. To meet this von Kluck drew forces from his centre a n d left. 26 . The battlefield area lies north of the town. 1601-4. T h e B.E. Oudenarde (B***) Date: 11 July 1708. T h e n von Kluck swung south-east. Netherlands Campaign of 1708 (see p. between h i m a n d von Bulow's a n d G e r m a n A r m y on his left. a n d thus weakened their forces at a critical m o m e n t . supported by General Galliéni. filled only by cavalry. C. J. 19 miles south-west of Ghent (Route Nationale 58) and 37 miles west of Brussels (Route Nationale 9). a n d because of it the Germans found it necessary to retreat from the River M a r n e . a n d . Comparatively few were killed or wounded. T h e garrison defied all attempts to take the town for three years. Object of the action: Marlborough was trying to regain the territorial losses of early 1708 by forcing action on the French army. See Campaign Chronology.000 casualties on the Spanish besiegers. Joffre. h a d invaded East Prussia. P. O S T E N D (B**) .F. 80 Years' W a r (or D u t c h Revolt against Spain). only when the famed General Spinola took charge were the D u t c h compelled to capitulate. b u t the British were the only a r m y to cross the M a r n e before the German retreat. and Geyl. struck at the G e r m a n right flank. 10. 379).' To begin w i t h t h e Russians h a d mobilised quicker t h a n h a d been expected. The Netherlands Revolt. a n d some French forces pushed forward. a n d they found no secure resting-place till they reached the northern side of the river Aisne.S. War and campaign: The War of the Spanish Succession. a n d created a 30-mile g a p . . Location: The town lies on the river Scheldt. 1947. the only Allied force which advanced continuously throughout the four days from 5 to the 8 of September.. T h e Germans withdrew two corps from their right wing in the west to meet this danger.greatest battle ever fought in the world . and Holland. advanced none too vigorously into t h e vitals of the G e r m a n right wing.
The History of Henry Esmond. Belfield. T h e ensuing battle was m o r e a contact action t h a n a setpiece engagement a n d in this lies m u c h of its modern interest.. A bitter a n d fluctuating struggle developed a r o u n d the villages of Eyne. Result: A heavy defeat for the French which ultimately led to the Allied recapture of Ghent and Bruges and the fall of Lille. including some 9. Marlborough took a great risk when he ordered the m a i n body of the a r m y to follow Cadogan's advance g u a r d over the Scheldt at a point half-way between the town a n d the French forces d r a w i n g up behind the River Norken. this gave M a r l b o r o u g h j u s t enough time to reinforce Cadogan sufficiently a n d enable h i m to h o l d his own against first General Biron a n d thereafter V e n d ô m e in person.000 Allied killed and wounded. a n d the D u k e profited from their inaction to h u r r y fresh battalions over the pontoon bridges. Work of Fiction (on the period): Thackeray. Casualties: (a) 4. C o m m a n d of t h e crucial right flank a n d centre was entrusted to Prince Eugene. (4) Marshal Vendôme and the Duke of Burgundy commanding the French. H e u r n e a n d Groenewald which lasted from 3 pm to nightfall. T h e Duke of Marlborough was extremely despondent a b o u t the general situation until he was joined by Prince Eugene (though not the I m p e r i a l A r m y ) on 9 J u l y at Aasche. Marlborough devised a bold plan to defeat Vendôme's a r m y as it prepared to besiege O u d e n a r d e . 1921. infuriated by Burgundy's intransigence. Book II. T. Atkinson. &. 1971.. 1973. Marlborough as a Military Commander. 1852. 170 squadrons.. Heartened by the Prince's robust confidence. W.000. E. b u t the D u k e was always at h a n d w i t h fresh units to extend the Allied battle line as new French formations came into action. G. Oudenarde. London.000 prisoners.000 French casualties. On t h e night of 10 J u l y the Anglo-Dutch army m a d e a forced m a r c h to surprise the French. Forces engaged: (a) Allies: 85 battalions. Marlborough. London. Chandler. forgot his rôle of commander-in-chief a n d plunged into t h e 27 . D. T h e Battle of O u d e n a r d e came in the nick of time to rally the morale of the G r a n d Alliance after a series of disasters which lasted throughout 1707 a n d into the early m o n t h s of 1708. At first the French were too surprised to react. b u t the gamble succeeded. Total: 80. (£) 15. Suggested reading: General Works: Churchill. Total: 85.000. 150 squadrons. W.. London. 1947.Opposing sides: (a) The Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene leading the Allied army. London. His Life and Times. M. He was further aided by dissension between the two French commanders—Vendôme a n d Burgundy—which resulted in half their a r m y being kept out of the battle. London. (b) French: 90 battalions. C. Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army. Marshal Vendôme.
b u t M a r l b o r o u g h was forced to call a halt as dusk deepened into night. 123 squadrons. including 6. G. By 8 pm almost half the French a r m y was virtually surrounded.000 prisoners. D. Result: A complete victory for the Allies. C. who suddenly found themselves assailed in flank a n d rear by the D u t c h a n d Danish troops.G Ramillies (A****) Date: 23 May 1706. Opposing sides: (a) The Duke of Marlborough commanding the Allied army. C.. London. the second city of France. A. Article: Atkinson. 120 guns. Total: 60. J.600 Allied killed and wounded. D. T h e Battle of Ramillies was perhaps the Duke of Marlborough's 28 . his Life and Times. M a r l b o r o u g h sent General Overkirk a n d the young Prince of O r a n g e on a long detour t h r o u g h O u d e n a r d e to the Boser Goûter high ground. (b) 18. This formed the centre of the French position. Atkinson. 70guns.. Vol. Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army. Object of the action: Marlborough was undertaking the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. (b) Marshal Villeroi in command of the French army. England under Queen Anne: Ramillies. pike in h a n d . in The Fighting Forces' review. Chandler. 1947. 1973. Netherlands Campaign of 1706 (see p. Marlborough. Book II. Nevertheless. Casualties: (a) 3.000. 1921. 'Ramillies and Oudenarde'. London. Article: Burne. August 1933. 32. Suggested reading: General Works: Churchill. This move through dead ground went unnoticed by the French right a n d centre.fighting. and Wijn. On the Battle: Trevelyan..G. (b) French: 70 battalions. a n d m a n y of V e n d ô m e ' s m e n escaped through a gap in the encircling troops. 17. J u d g i n g the m o m e n t for victory to be close. leading to the capture of the north and east of the Spanish Netherlands. Location: From Namur follow Route Nationale 22 : the village of Ramillies-Oflus lies 4 miles beyond Eghezée. London. 379). London. 132 squadrons. 'Ramillies' in the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research.000 French casualties.000.. T. 1954. G. W. M. 1932. Marlborough as a Military Commander. W S. T. H. t h e result was a notable victory which once again shattered French morale a n d eventually led to the recapture of G h e n t a n d Bruges a n d to the fall of Lille. Forces engaged: (a) Allies: 74 battalions. Total: 62. whilst Eugene launched a desperate charge against their left. War and campaign: The War of the Spanish Succession.
RAMILLIES 23rd May 1706 29 .
II) had resulted in a breakdown of co-operation and an abortive campaign in Flanders (1705). Reports of these moves caused a surprised and gratified Marlborough to concentrate his forces and march with all speed for the plain of Ramillies. On the open ground stretching between Taviers and Ramillies. A series of villages provided a line of useful strongpoints: slightly advanced before the extreme right stood the hamlet of Francqnée (Franquenay).000 men. and. supported by the village of Taviers. As soon as it was light on the 23rd the Duke reconnoitred the French position and decided to attack with his 62. his front stretched in a long 30 .v. 23 May 1706. where he intended to camp on the night of Whit-Sunday. The Duke. To cover the entire 4-mile ridge Villeroi had been compelled to overextend his forces. Villeroi stationed 82 squadrons supported by infantry brigades. the position bore a remarkable resemblance to the one occupied by the French at Blenheim. The year 1705 and the early months of 1706 were a period of deep frustration for the Duke. However for once the French forestalled the Allies. affording Louis X I V enough time to reorganise his disrupted forces. and the left flank pivoted on the village of Autre Eglise. soon adjusted his schemes to meet the new situation. The centre of the line was formed around Ramillies and Oflus. Marlborough was not very confident that the battle-wary French would take up the challenge. abandoning his original intentions. and Marlborough's advance party found the chosen site already occupied by Marshal Villeroi's 60. Whilst the latter trailed his coat near the Lines of Brabant. Villeroi's army was deployed along a low ridge. Vol. however.most successful action. In consequence. hoping to lure Marshal Villeroi into accepting battle. On this one occasion he was in sole command of the Anglo-Dutch army. Allied over-confidence after his triumph atBlenheim (q.000 troops as soon as they came up from Merdorp. however. and earned the whole credit for both the victory and the subsequent conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. Moreover. In many respects.. two-thirds of which was protected by the marshes of the Little Geet. Marlborough's eagle eye. marched from Liège in early May into enemy territory. but on this one occasion Louis XIV was equally determined that a battle should be fought so as to restore the prestige of the French army. Marshal Villars's offensive on the Rhine thwarted Marlborough's first plan for 1706—a march to north Italy in support of Prince Eugene. Villeroi suddenly advanced from Louvain and crossed the River Dyle. whilst the right flank was sheltered by the River Mehaigne. and consequently goaded his commander in the Netherlands to seek out 'Monsieur Marlbrouck'. at once noted several important errors in the French dispositions.
The Allied army. To stabilise this sector Villeroi was forced to draw still further on the infantry reserves of his right centre. stormed the villages of Francqnée and Taviers with such vigour that the French garrisons fled precipitately. General Orkney recorded: 'Milord Marlborough was rid over. but got other squadrons to his aid which he led up. the advantages of 'interior lines' and the invaluable area of dead ground. compelling him to weaken his centre to strengthen his flanks. Shortly after three in the afternoon the crisis of the day took place. and possessed an additional advantage in a convenient fold in the ground which would effectively conceal any Allied transfers from the right flank to the centre. was drawn up on a shorter front inside the two horns of the French crescent.concave curve which would delay movements from one flank to the other. Although Orkney was still making great progress on his side Marlborough now knew that the battle would have to be won in the centre. At one o'clock the batteries went into action. and an hour later the Allied forces attacked both French flanks simultaneously. was shot by a cannon ball that passed through Marlborough's legs. p. the Maison du Roi* losing their silver kettle-drums and Negro drummer in the mêlée. Thus within an hour of the opening of the battle Marlborough was already imposing his will upon his adversary. where the marshes of the Little Geet would inevitably obstruct their employment. and accordingly immediately transferred several units from his centre to the threatened area. See glossary. In addition Villeroi had stationed 50 squadrons on his left flank. for the marshes on the right made it practically impossible to support Orkney's battalions with cavalry. Major Bingfield. on the other hand. Taking into account these errors. He was under specific instructions from Versailles 'to have particular attention to that part of the line which will endure the first shock of the English troops'. This assault soon attracted Villeroi's attention. the Allied army's slightly superior numbers and far stronger artillery. Marlborough was in a commanding position. 31 . Meanwhile on the other flank the Dutch Guards. The French cavalry on the right charged Overkirk's 69 squadrons and almost routed them. * Special note. This event constituted a dire threat to Marlborough's centre. holding his stirrup to give him assistance onto his horse. assisted by 2 cannon. 376.' In due course the French cavalry were severely repulsed. but was remedied by the Duke in person at the head of first 18 and then a further 21 squadrons drawn from his centre and right wing by way of the concealing reverse slope. General Orkney launched a determined attack with the English infantry across the Little Geet against Autre Eglise. During the bitter cavalry action that ensued Marlborough had a narrow escape.
The fruits of victory were most rewarding for the Grand Alliance. the last being the Adjutant General himself. STEENKIRK (C**). battle of. and marched off to reinforce the coup de grâce against the French centre. London. 11 October 1746. its cohesion shattered.000) defeated Charles of Lorraine (80. The French Marshal de Saxe (120. In desperation. 1910. and Fortescue. Ostend and Menin all opened their gates. Town after town fell to the Allies during the ensuing weeks: Louvain. At five in the evening the great assault against Ramillies and OfFus was launched. 13.' Under Cadogan's eye the English infantry withdrew to its earlier position. A renewed attack all along the crumbling line finally shattered French resistance. D. Before dawn the following morning the fleeing remnants of Villeroi's army had been chased 15 miles towards Louvain. II. turned to their left. Vol.G. once again. To deceive the French command into believing that the whole of Orkney's force still faced Autre Eglise. but as I was going to take possession I had ten Aides-de-Camp to me to come off. Prince Eugene won the Battle of Turin (q. 3 August 1692. Villeroi tried to form a new line at right angles to his centre. near Enghien on the river Senne.. W.Consequently the Duke called off the assault—much to Orkney's indignant amazement: 'The village of Autre Eglise was in our grip. battle of. but his troops became inextricably involved with the tents and wagons of the camp area. 196. whilst on Marlborough's order the remainder disappeared from sight into the dead ground. p. But. for besides the victory of Ramillies and the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. Brussels. Ghent.000 Allies) by penetrating his extended left flank. King 32 . War of the Austrian Succession. each side lost approx. Little wonder that contemporary observers forecast a speedy end to the war. ROCOUX (C***). the colour-parties of these battalions were left just below the crest. Antwerp.) in north Italy and cleared the French from the Po valley. Reaching the crest of the opposite ridge half the battalions halted in full view of the foe. 5. See Campaign Chronology. 15.000 men. J. a combination of diplomatic bungling. 1706 indeed proved a memorable year for the Allies. Bruges. near Liège.v. A History of the British Army. and by eight in the evening the pursuit was well under way. overconfidence and lack of Allied co-operation was to throw away the many advantages gained by Marlborough and his men at 'this great and glorious day at Ramillies'. War of the League of Augsburg.C. after the final rout of the remnants of his cavalry near the Tomb of Ottomond.
. Allied 33 . War and campaign: The Hundred Days—or final campaign of the Napoleonic Wars. (b) The French lost 25. (b) The Emperor Napoleon in command of the French army. 246 guns. Casualties: (a) The Allies lost 15. 156 guns. Waterloo. 1955. On 20 March he entered Paris and Louis X V I I I fled. as in 1813-14.000 casualites.500 cavalry. Opposing sides: (a) The Duke of Wellington commanding an Anglo-Dutch army. Location: Waterloo village is situated 9 miles south of Brussels on the road to Charleroi via Genappe. 380). Total: approx.000 casualties in the later stages. London. Suggested reading: General Works: Hall. 5.250 artillerymen. On the Campaign and Battle: Naylor. Brett James. having defeated the Prussians at Ligny. was intent on crushing Wellington's Allied army. D.. (see p. II. G..000 men into the field and that. Forces engaged: (a) Allies: 50. Vol. William III. In response the four Allies—Great Britain. A. London. thus opening the way to Brussels. 72. leading to the firm restoration of the Bourbon dynasty on the throne of France. 68.William III (70. 1966. B. 1918.000 infantry.000 infantry. 1980. Fuller.600 artillerymen. 12. Decisive Battles of the Western World. Austria and Prussia—agreed that each would put an army of 150. Hamley.100. Result: Complete victory for the Allies and the final defeat of Napoleon. Waterloo. Total: approx. Studies in Napoleonic Strategy. 1960. Russia.000. London. Waterloo (A****) Date: 18 June 1815. London.000) attempted to surprise the camp of the French Marshal Luxembourg but was repulsed after a hard fight costing each side more than 7. Napoleon would be overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. 1922. Edinburgh. London. 16. Chandler. Object of the action: Napoleon. Sir E. 7.750 cavalry. J. 1964. The Operations of War (7th Edn. C. the Prussians suffered a further 9. On 1 March 1815 Napoleon landed at Cannes after his escape from Elba.000. See Baxter. 15. (b) French: 49. F. London. wounded and prisoner.. S.000 killed. the Hundred Days. The battlefield lies a further 3 miles south. J.). The Hundred Days.
that is to strike at allies at the point where their armies joined. On 16 June Napoleon attacked Blücher's army. of these. If those allies had divergent lines of communication. Now. and the Austrian across the lower Rhine. but his army as a whole was spread over the area Charléroi-Liège. broadly. But the Prussian army.000 formed the Armée du Nord under his personal command. and the Prussian forces commanded by Blücher. at Ligny.strategy was for the Anglo-Belgian-Dutch forces commanded by Wellington. Second. Finally. away from Wellington. fully complying with the agreement reached between himself and Wellington that they would not allow their armies to lose contact. to invade France from the north. His reasons for this choice were that the eastern and south-eastern frontiers of France were strong and could be held with relatively few troops for the time being. Having begun the campaign in his best style. and to start by attacking Wellington and Blücher who were advancing from the Netherlands and the lower Rhine. of the kind he had used on several earlier occasions with great success. He decided to deal with his enemies piecemeal if possible. 125. that is south-west of Antwerp and west of Brussels. This strategy had succeeded against the Austro-Sardinian forces in 1796. though driven back. Wellington and Blücher were ready for operations first. Wellington's lay north-west on the line Mons-Ghent. instead of withdrawing eastwards. therefore. then the Prussians must have been much harder hit. Having made his choice. Wellington's and Blücher's forces were already in the neighbourhood of Brussels and Liège and. most directly menacing Paris. By the end of May 1815 Napoleon had nearly 300. and they had not prevented the enemy from invading France in 1814. the Prussian line of communication lay north-east via Liège to Cologne. was not fully engaged and withdrew in comparatively good order. First. on the other hand. Moreover. 34 . still not fully concentrated. some 10 miles north-east of Charleroi. in 1815. Napoleon therefore decided to advance along the axis of the Charleroi-Brussels road which led directly to the area where Wellington's left wing joined the right wing of the Prussian army. then success against them at this critical point would almost certainly drive them apart. Napoleon's strategy was. The Franco-Belgian frontier. The Russian army was to attack across the middle Rhine. Napoleon at this point committed two grave mistakes. was open except for a few fortresses. By 14 June the French army had concentrated in the area Maubeuge-Avesnes-Rocroi-Chimay.000 men under arms and. had he kept d'Erlon's corps with him at Ligny. Blücher retreated northwards towards Wavre. At this point Blücher's advance guard was at Charleroi.
lay opposite each other on the Waterloo battlefield. On 18 June the two armies. On 17 June Wellington heard of Blücher's temporary reverse and withdrawal. On 16 June Ney and Wellington watched each other at Quatre-Bras and some indecisive action took place. Wellington also was determined to accept battle. In the meantime Wellington.when the Prussians withdrew. failed to do his job properly. Napoleon assumed and continued to assume that they were moving away from Wellington. and himself decided to withdraw also to the Waterloo position. on the afternoon of 15 June. And Grouchy. who had been ordered by Napoleon to hold the British in check. sent to pursue Blücher. with the French now concentrated under Napoleon who had joined with Ney. The battlefield of Waterloo was comparatively small. had himself advanced towards Quatre-Bras. who had been taken by surprise by the speed of Napoleon's advance. stretching about 2 J miles from north to south and no more than 4 miles at its extreme width. There he made contact with Ney. Ney failed to strike swiftly with his concentrated force at this stage and thus lost the opportunity of defeating Wellington before he was ready to fight. It was divided by the 35 . Unaccountably. because he received a message telling him that at daybreak on 18 June two Prussian corps would set out to join him and that two more would be held in readiness to follow.
But it was far from a complete failure. met with the same fate as the earlier cavalry attack. Ney's cavalry broke through only to beat themselves vainly against the infantry squares. The second phase began at about 4 pm at a time when Napoleon was already beginning to be distracted by the appearance of the forward Prussian troops debouching from the Paris Wood. from a point about a mile and three-quarters south of Mont St. before Ney's attack in the centre with d'Erlon's corps began the main operations. to penetrate there and exploit the penetration. this time. In the process. The fighting.Charleroi-Brussels road. with very little help from the French artillery. particularly since the cavalry drove on too far and became disorganised. and his right flank by the Château of Hougomont. From the beginning the diversion in fact tended to absorb more French than Allied forces. Wellington's centre had been weakened so 36 . led by Kellerman. consisted of four main phases. Jean. The result was that they suffered very heavy casualties from the delayed and concentrated musket fire of Picton's division and were then driven back by Uxbridge's cavalry. His front centre was reinforced by the farm and sandpit at La Haye Sainte. and then. at about 5. Ney led a great cavalry attack covering the whole area between La Haye Sainte and Hougomont. which lasted from 11. Unsupported by infantry and with no preparations to spike the Allied guns. Jean and extending about a quarter of a mile west of the road and a mile and a quarter east of it. where Wellington's main line ran.30 pm d'Erlon's main attack began and ran into immediate trouble because the French columns were too densely packed to deploy into line as they approached the Allied position between La Haye Sainte and Papelotte. as on other occasions. as a diversion. there was a low ridge nearly a mile south of the village of Mont St. south of Hougomont to the hamlet of Frichermont. the ground between the two ridges never dipping more than about 50 feet. At 1. In the first phase Reille's division advanced at 11. This. stretching from the Brussels-Nivelles road.30 am against Hougomont. however. Wellington. Napoleon's overall tactical plan was to strike at the centre of Wellington's army. Wellington's forces themselves suffered heavily. gave his line the protection of the dead ground behind the ridge until the action began.30 am until about 8 pm. In order to restore the morale of his army Napoleon now ordered another cavalry attack.30 pm. Here Napoleon drew up his line. again unsupported by infantry and. turned back by Uxbridge's cavalry. On the north. On the south of the battlefield was another low ridge. were decimated by the Allied guns quickly brought back into action again.
once their fire had taken effect. so the Prussians had established full contact with Wellington's left. his various arms were not adequately co-ordinated. N.H. this time against Maitland's Brigade of Guards. packed too tight to deploy against concentrated musket fire. Infantry and cavalry did not operate together and each failed because the support of the other was lacking. Second. First. Again. his traditional combination of column and line.G. As the French were repulsed. this attack also failed.much that he was almost without reserves and himself led forward the Brunswickers to re-establish the centre of his whole position. Napoleon's tactics were faulty in two respects. his infantry protected by natural and artificial features as long as possible and supported. Waterloo was won—apart from the vital co-operation of the Prussians at the critical phase:—by Wellington's superior tactics. l'ordre mixte. 37 . Napoleon brought forward the Guard and attacked diagonally between Hougomont and La Haye Sainte towards Wellington's right centre. and the retreat of the French began. At about 7 pm the fourth and final phase took place. failed to operate successfully in the narrow confines of this particular battlefield. by a decisive cavalry action. As before he depended upon concentrated fire by artillery and small-arms.
1903. 40. On the War: Krahmer. The RussoTurkish War of 1877. T h e Plevna position was on the right flank of 38 . 1877-1878. O s m a n Pasha m a r c h e d towards the threatened territories with a Turkish a r m y from Widdin.. London. The Campaign in Bulgaria. 110. 1902. b u t finding t h a t he was too late to save the town of Nicopolis on the D a n u b e . Casualties: (a) Approx. 1958. 1877-1878. War and campaign: Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8: Plevna Campaign of 1877 (see p. Berlin. R.Bulgaria Plevna (B**) Date: 20 July-10 December 1877. Forces engaged: (a) Approx. Opposing sides: (a) General Krudener and later Prince Charles of Rumania with Todleben commanding the Russo-Rumanian forces.000 Turks and 77 guns. Object of the action: The Turks were attempting to hold up the Russian advance into Bulgaria.. London. Greene. The Siege of Plevna. (b) 40. (b) Approx. 163. F.000 Russians (including sick). 381). Suggested reading: General Works: Maurice. (b) Osman Pasha commanding a Turkish army. Result: Eventual capture of Plevna by the Russians.. On the Operations: Furneaux. In late J u n e 1877 powerful Russian forces invaded Bulgaria. 30. but only after Osman Pasha had succeeded in paralysing all the armies of the Grand Duke Nicholas. F.000 Russians and 500 guns (at the siege's end). Geschichte der russisch-türkischen Krieges auf der Balken-Halbinsel. he fell back to Plevna a n d began to turn the neighbourhood into an i m p r o vised fortress. Location: About 100 miles north-east of Sofia by the road to Bucharest. V.000 Turks.
so completing the isolation of Plevna. main action 21-26 August. Forces engaged: (a) Allies: at first 8.000 cavalry.000 men.the invading armies. and later Prince Radetzky commanding the Russo-Bulgarian forces. 39 . After a few encounters the Russians launched their first major attack on 30 J u l y . rising to 30.000 (January). O n c e again the Turks held their ground. Location: Between Gabrovo and Kazanlok. 381). a n d before they could resume their advance. A m o n t h later Osman Pasha undertook an offensive on his own account. a force of 35.D. later as many as 60. he was compelled to retire behind the shelter of his fortifications.000 Russians crossed the river V i d a n d seized Gorni-Dubnik. about 100 miles east of Sofia. a n d the combined Russian a n d R u m a n i a n forces stormed Osman's works on 11 September. however.000. in conjunction with the moves of M e h e m e t Ali on the Lorn a n d of Suleiman on the Shipka Pass. Object of the action: The Russians were trying to secure control of the route over the Balkan Mountains. b u t on the night of 9/10 December he staked everything upon an a t t e m p t to strike through to open country. O s m a n contrived to hold off the Russians for a few weeks more. T h e Russians. the Russians were forced to detach forces to dispose of this annoyance. but having been repulsed from Zgalevitza. Opposing sides: (a) General Gourko. W i t h i n a few hours O s m a n saw his army break against the Russian lines. he p a i d particular attention to the g u a r d i n g of his rearward communications with Sofia. The Shipka Pass (B***) Date: 17 July 1877-9 January 1878. only to be thrown back with a loss of nearly 8. with the exception of one of the Grivitza redoubts. C.000 Turks in July. b u t on 24 October. (A) Turks: 4. the most vital d a y of the whole siege.000 (August) and 36.000 infantry and 4. were reduced to such straits t h a t they called on the help of the petty state of R u m a n i a . a n d sink into confusion. 163. a n d on this occasion the enemy casualties reached the frightful figure of 18. an unconditional surrender brought the gallant defence of Plevna to an end. War and Campaign: Russo-Tiirkish War of 1877-8 (see p.000. Later on the 10th.J.000-5. (b) Suleiman Pasha and Vessil Pasha in command of the Turks. All the time O s m a n h a d been extending a n d deepening his works.
a n d not until J a n u a r y 1878 could they crush the Turkish forces which still held the village of Shipka immediately below t h e pass. h a d left Gourko's force devoid of any support. for the defence of Plevna. 40 . (b) Details unknown. a n d continued his m a r c h towards the valley of the Maritsa. Suggested reading: As for Plevna.J. Early August found the Russians thrown back once more to t h e mountains.D. T h e Russians were fortunate to be able to cling to the m o u n t a i n ridge during the fierce attacks of Suleiman Pasha in August. Gourko occupied the position on 19 J u l y . after two days of m u d d l e d fighting.Casualties: (a) At least 10.000 over the period. Following the Russian passage of the D a n u b e in J u n e 1877.000 during the 20-26 August offensive. an advanced g u a r d u n d e r General Gourko was given the task of securing the Shipka Pass. but at least 10. combined with Turkish counter-offensives. Result: The Russians captured and held this vital position for several months and used it as an avenue for the successful offensive of early 1878. C. an important route over the Balkan Mountains.
Location: On the east coast of the island of Cyprus. 1841. On the Campaign: 41 . 350 Venetians. Object of the action: The Turks were striving to complete their conquest of Cyprus. Paris. Casualties: (a) Some sources claim 40. Edinburgh.Cyprus AMATHUS. G.000 Crusaders to chastise the Cypriots for looting stranded English shipping. (A) Approx. 378). subsequently seizing the port of Limassol itself. A History of the Ottoman Empire. E. 1878. destined to last for 207 years.. War and campaign: The War between Venice and the Turks (see p. Hammer. and drove the Emperor of Cyprus's a r m y from their defensive barrier. Vol II. 6 miles to the east of Limassol. von. 179.. 6 M a y 1191 .000 Turks and their allies. (b) Signor Bragadino. (2nd Edn. Then and Now.). in command of the. See H o m e . Opposing sides: (a) Lala Mustafa. Venetian Governor of Famagusta. Famagusta (A***) Date: 18 September 1570-6 August 1571. History of the Ottoman Turks. J. K i n g Richard I of England landed 3. 177.000 Turks (probably exaggerated). Cyprus. (B**) . Suggested reading: General Work: Creasy. armies of Sultan Selim II. battle of. i960. T h i r d Crusade. London. (A) The entire garrison was put to the sword.000 (January 1571). Forces engaged: (a) Perhaps 70. reinforced to 2. Result: The final establishment of Turkish rule over Cyprus.
) on 9 September 1570. 1700. and hardly a house or church remained standing within the walls by the end of July 1571. and one by one the Venetian garrisons were destroyed. and consequently ordered his general Mustafa to capture the island from its Venetian rulers. C. The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta. Then and Now. For all their valour. and the Turks lost no time in putting everyone to the sword: their fury knew no bounds 42 . Mark only continued to fly over the battlements of Famagusta. G. but enabled his followers to win a temporary entrance into the fortifications.v. The bastion bears his name to this day in commemoration of this deed. Tradition has it that Selim II coveted the fine wines of Cyprus. but they were opposed by a man of no common mettle—Mark Antonio Bragadino. They were immediately seized and massacred. London. Deeds of valour were not lacking on the Turkish side: Djamboulat Bey earned immortal fame by riding his horse at full gallop against the whirling knife-blades of a Venetian 'infernal machine' protecting one of the entrances to the bastion defending the Arsenal in the south-east corner of the defences. In 1570 a vast armada descended on the shores of Cyprus. the Lion of St. London.. A General History of the Turks. save only Bragadino who was mutilated and put on public show before being flayed alive. according to some sources. This act of heroism cost Djamboulat his life. Modern Work: Home. The Turkish commander-in-chief—distressed by the mounting total of casualties amongst his men—offered the garrison the full honours of war if they would capitulate. i960. A Venetian fleet slipped 1. Cyprus. Within a month the Turks had opened a close siege with a huge advantage in numbers of men. R. Signor Bragadino unwisely accepted the Turkish offer of a free passage. U. In consequence the siege was both long and bloody. Many assaults were driven back. Many of the original fortifications still stand.000 cannon-balls during the 11 months of the siege. On the Siege: Foletta.Knolls. which expended.600 men and many supplies into the city on 23 January 1571. D. the small garrison defying the hordes of Islam from the fine ramparts and towers which survive practically unchanged to this day. and the beleagured garrison. made repeated sallies to destroy the Turkish batteries.. and set off for the camp of Mustafa on 5 August with a handful of officers and 50 men of his garrison to settle the final terms. Cobham). Resistance collapsed with the loss of the intrepid Governor. the garrison and population were rapidly succumbing to starvation. as many as 100. 1903. the heaviest fighting centring around the Land Gate. (trans. After the overwhelming of Nicosia (q. for all its tiny size. London.
Then and Now. t h e Crescent of Islam flew over the whole island of Cyprus. and expel the Venetians from the island. 378)..000 Venetian troops organised into 11 companies and perhaps 5. 1700.500. (A) Nicolo Dandolo. 2. London. Object of the action: The Turks wished to take possession of the capital of Cyprus. reinforced by 20. War and campaign: The War between Venice and the Turks (see p. (b) Some accounts assert that 14. King of Cyprus. led 1. i960. D. Opposing sides: (a) Lala Mustafa commanding the armies of Sultan Selim II. R. Paris. K H I R O K I T I A (B**) . A History of the Ottoman Empire. Nicosia (A***) Date: 25 July-9 September 1570.600 cavalry and 4. 1841.C.000 were enslaved after the storm. « . A General History of the Turks. 18 miles west of Larnaca a n d Limassol.000 militia. 900 guns (but litde powder or shot).000 sailors and marines (September). Total: 8. b u t the breakdown of Cypriot discipline led to disaster. 176. a n d few escaped their w r a t h .) Vol II. Forces engaged: (a) Turks: estimated at 50. Location: The city stands in the midst of the Cyprus plain: many fortifications still remain. and the Venetian garrison.500 cavalry..866 soldiers and Cypriots perished and a further 2. a n d a period of Turkish rule was inaugurated that was destined to last for 207 years. Lusignian Wars.000. Following the capture of t h e city a n d port. (4) 3. Even the Sultan is recorded to have been shocked when he learnt of the dreadful atrocities perpetrated by his m e n at Famagusta. On the Campaign: Knolles. 178. J a n u s de Lusignan. Casualties: (a) Not known but probably heavy.000 infantry. Result: The capture of the capital of Cyprus by the Turks. Total: 72.G. initially Janus pressed the Moslems back. 5 July 1426. London. von. Cyprus. J. (2nd Edn. See H o m e . Suggested reading: General Work: Hammer. battle of.when they realised how weak a garrison h a d defied them a n d inflicted so m a n y casualties. J a n u s himself was captured.000 foot to meet an a r m y of Egyptian invaders. and Lusignian rule soon broke d o w n . Governor of Nicosia. G.
London. D u r i n g the six-week investment the Venetians received no outside aid. Eye-witness Account: Calepio. b u t Mustafa was strongly reinforced in early September. a n d only 1. Cobham). D. Fra. moreover.. h a d only been completed for 3 years when they were called upon to withstand the assault of the Turkish forces of Lala Mustafa.On the Siege : Foletta. Unfortunately there was a chronic shortage of powder a n d shot. T h e fortifications of Nicosia. U. m a n y of the local militia had no idea of military duties.040 arquebuses could be issued from the armoury. C. London.000 troops might be levied locally to meet the impending Turkish invasion on the coast of Cyprus. (Trans.. G. The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta. 1903. Modern Work: Home. Cobham). Dandolo. a n d discipline was poor. Mustafa duly landed unopposed near Limassol from a huge fleet of 200 galleys besides many more galiots and transports. igo8. i960. As the Governor. Cyprus. By 25 J u l y the Turks h a d reached Nicosia. Then and Now. D. everything depended on successfully withstanding a siege from within the walls. T h e Turkish batteries on the hill known as Santa M a r i n a kept up a practically ceaseless fire on the NICOSIA 25th July to gth September 1570 44 . comprising 11 bastions. London. 3 gates a n d an 'enceinte' 3 miles in length. Excerpta Cypria. (trans. h a d ignored suggestions t h a t a strong force of 29. A. and the siege at once began. C.
bastions of Podocatore and Constanza, but the Venetian garrisons clung grimly to their defences with the greatest gallantry. The shortage of powder made an effective counterbombardment out of the question. The effects of the cannonade against the thick earthen banks of the main walls were disappointing, and so Mustafa ran trenches under the counterscarp, soon penetrating into the broad, dry ditch. On 15 August Dandolo permitted a sortie, timed for noon. The garrison caught the Turks enjoying their wonted 'siesta', rapidly overran two redoubts, and sent the Muslims reeling back to their main camp on Santa Marina. Unfortunately Dandolo refused to commit his reserves, and in consequence the chance of a complete victory passed the Venetians by. 'We never made another sally,' lamented Fra. Calepio, 'so that the enemy came boldly up to destroy our works.' Anxious lest a rumoured relief fleet from Venice might make its appearance, Mustapha ordered an all-out assault for 9 September against the four southern bastions, most especially the Podocatore. After a bitter two-hour struggle, sheer weight of numbers won the Turks an entrance through the Podocatore bastion, a further foothold being won on the Constanza tower, the place being today marked by the commemorative Mosque of the Standard-bearer. A desperate fight continued for eight more hours within the city, but after the capture of the Famagusta Gate in the evening resistance was brought to a close with the arrival of the Turkish cavalry. Three days of loot and rapine ensued before the main army moved on for the port and fortress of Famagusta (q.v.), the sole remaining bastion of Venetian rule in Cyprus. D.G.C.
Date: 2 December 1805. Location: About 5 miles east of Brno on Route 47 to Olmutz; the battlefield lies to the south of the road and to the west of Austerlitz. 138. War and campaign: Napoleonic Wars ; die Moravian Campaign of 1805 (War of 3rd Coalition) (see p. 380). Object of the action: Napoleon was attempting to solve a threatening strategic situation by luring the Austro-Russian army into making an unwise attack. Opposing sides: (a) Napoleon in command of the French 'Grande Armée'. (A) The Emperors of Russia and Austria widi General Kutuzov. Forces engaged: (a) French: the Guard, 4 'corps d'armée', the reserve cavalry and 139 guns. Total: 73,100. (b) Allies: the Russian Guard and 7 corps with 278 guns. Total: 85,700. Casualties: (a) About 8,500 French killed and wounded, besides 570 prisoners, (b) About 27,000 Allies including 11,000 prisoners. Result: The destruction of Austrian morale leading to the Peace of Pressburg and die collapse of Pitt's 3rd Coalition. Suggested reading: General Work: Chandler, D. G., The Campaigns of Napoleon, London, 1967. On the Batde: Manceron, C, Austerlitz, Paris, 1960; Duffy, C. J., Austerlitz, 1805, London, 1977; Burton, R. G., From Boulogne to Austerlitz, London, 1912. Work of Fiction: Tolstoy, Leo, War and Race (edn.), Oxford, 1961. In 1805 Napoleon gave up all ideas of an invasion of England a n d swung his G r a n d A r m y r o u n d for a m a r c h eastwards, first to the R h i n e , a n d then to the D a n u b e a n d Vienna. By doing this quickly he hoped to be able to defeat the Austrians before
they could be joined by the Russians. This was a march comparable to Marlborough's 'March to the Danube' a century earlier, and it proved altogether successful and had great results. The French columns reached the Danube about Donauwörth on 6 October, cutting the line of communication of General Mack and his Austrians with Vienna, and later surrounding Mack's force at Ulm. Mack considered a plan of moving away north into Bohemia and at the same time cutting in turn the French communications. This was a good project but was never carried out. Instead Mack hesitated in uncertainty until 13 October by which time he was shut in on every side, and Napoleon could truly say that he had routed his enemy merely by marching round him. On 14 October Ney drove back the Austrians in Elchingen on Ulm, but Mack at first refused to surrender. It was to his advantage to gain as much time as possible to allow the Russian army to approach, and he announced his intention of holding out to the last; but he changed his mind when Napoleon threatened to take the town by storm, and surrendered with about 27,000 men on 20 October. During the scene of surrender Napoleon is said to have stood with his arms crossed behind his back warming himself at a camp fire, talking with all and sundry in a most agreeable manner. He was dressed in the uniform of a common soldier with a grey coat singed on the elbows and tails, and a slouch hat, without any badges of distinction, on his head. Throughout the campaign he was less the Emperor and more the General Commanding the Army in the Field. After Mack's surrender, Napoleon, despite Prussia's threatening attitude and the British victory at Trafalgar on 21 October, moved on Vienna, intending to fight the Russians, who had 54,000 under General Kutuzov on the river Inn and 30,000 under Buxhowden in Moravia. In the meantime Murat dashed on Vienna and by means of a feigned armistice seized the great bridge there. Thus in November Napoleon entered the Austrian capital. Napoleon next resolved to cut off the Russian retreat into Moravia, but the Russian and Austrian forces, commanded now by their two Emperors, Alexander and Francis, managed to concentrate at Olmutz. Napoleon established his headquarters at Brunn, and on 2 December the Austro-Russians decided on battle west of Austerlitz, as the Emperor hoped they would. The French, 68,000 strong, stood east of Brunn, in the angle formed by the roads leading from that town to Vienna and Olmutz respectively, and behind the Goldbach stream and its string of lakes. The Allies, almost 90,000 strong, had their headquarters in Austerlitz and occupied the plateau of Pratzen to the west of it. Napoleon thought the Austro-Russians would
T h e Russian General Buxhowden m a n a g e d to cross the Goldbach in the south a n d drive the French right wing back.AUSTERLITZ 2nd December 1805 try to t u r n his right flank to cut h i m off from Vienna in the south.000 m e n . a n d succeeded in capturing the plateau. In the north on the French left flank Bagration's Austrians a n d the cavalry of Lichtenstein tried to outflank the French. This was a considerable achievement on Davout's p a r t as the Russians were well supported by guns a n d h a d a considerable superiority in numbers. watching from the centre of his army. T h e French met the Allies 48 . a n d Napoleon. T h e n Davout appeared from Vienna. realised the enemy centre was now weak. delivered with M u r a t ' s help such a strong counterstroke that the Austro-Russians were driven back along the O l m u t z road north-eastwards a n d later off the battlefield. a n d t h e French stopped the hostile forces pouring down from the plateau. totalling about 10. a n d this was how the battle opened. not long afterwards. gave Soult the order to advance. Soult replied. ' T w e n t y minutes'. Kutusov launched a strong counter-attack with the Russian Guards a n d all other disposable bodies. Napoleon. having repulsed this threat. based on the Santon height. Soult staged a pronged attack on the heights to isolate a n d surround t h e enemy holding the village. T h u s the flank attacks by the Allies failed a n d at the same time drew off forces from their centre on the Pratzen plateau. He asked Soult how long it would take for his division to reach the heights. This was the crisis of the battle. b u t Lannes.
u n d e r the terms of which the Russians returned to their country. Assailed on all sides the Allies in the south tried to flee across the frozen lakes. 17 cavalry regiments. but the ice broke a n d m a n y were engulfed. Location: About 27 miles east of Prague on the highway to Kolin (Route 12). Opposing sides: (a) King Frederick II in command of the Prussian army. At one point Napoleon personally took charge a n d ordered forward p a r t of his G u a r d cavalry after one French regiment h a d been ridden down a n d lost an eagle. Casualties: (a) 13. cutting the hostile forces in two. 116 squadrons. (b) Approx. but he does not seem to have realised immediately the extent of his success. Leaving Bernadotte to hold the plateau. • War and campaign: The Seven Years' War. a n d negotiations for peace between France a n d Austria began. On t h e conclusion of t h e battle Napoleon rode over t h e battlefield observing the killed a n d wounded.000 men from Napoleon's reserve. 9. 380). Total: 40.000. A vigorous pursuit by t h e French was m a d e towards Olmutz.768 Prussians and 45 guns lost. T w o days later Emperor Francis of Austria arrived at Napoleon's c a m p . Total: 32. a n d he passed through the bivouacs addressing each of his regiments. Kolin (A***) Date: 18 June 1757. 49 .000 Austrians. a n d the French cavalry n o w pushed forward as far as Austerlitz. culminating on 26 December in the T r e a t y of Pressburg. Object of the action: Frederick the Great's attempt to defeat the second Austrian army moving against his position before Prague from the east. Forces engaged: (a) Prussians: 32 battalions. (b) Marshal Daun in command of the Austrian army.000.S. Central European Campaign of 1757 (see p.M.with an even greater reinforcement of 25. (b) Austrians: 42 battalions. It was in fact not only one of the most complete a n d perfect of Napoleon's victories b u t also one which h a d immediate results. Napoleon sent Soult's forces round the rear of Buxhowden w h o was held in front by Davout. 145 guns. a n d a suspension of hostilities was arranged. J. 50 guns. 127. T h e final French thrust broke the enemy.
guns a n d position was b o u n d to tell.Result: A victory for the Austrians which led to the relief of Prague and forced Frederick on to the defensive until Rossbach. Frederick carried out a characteristic m a r c h across the Austrian front with the intention of rolling up a flank. and upon Anhalt-Dessau's advance they too hurled themselves at the Austrian line.D. London. Frederick the Great. The Life of Frederick the Great. was advancing on h i m from the east. T h e skilful defensive fighter D a u n used the lull to transfer reinforcements to his threatened right. D a u n was taken aback by the spirit with which the foremost Prussian troops pressed h o m e their attack. a Military Biography. 1919. north of Prague (Road N o . b u t in the extremely hot m o r n i n g of i8 J u n e the Prussian a r m y lacked something of its customary speed a n d address.. Geschichte der Königlich Preussischen Armee bis zum Jahre 1807. a n d a charge of Saxon a n d Walloon dragoons broke a last attempt by the enemy reserve cavalry to restore Frederick's fortunes. 1960. C. Biography: Young. 1985. 124.. Frederick h e a r d t h a t a second Austrian army. T h u s a flanking movement was converted into a frontal assault. in which t h e Austrian superiority in numbers. T h e infantry of the Prussian right centre u n d e r Manstein h a d already been galled beyond e n d u r a n c e by t h e fire of Croatian skirmishers. G.). L. Duffy. Some five weeks after his victory outside Prague (q. II. a n d when the movement of the Prussians was resumed early in the afternoon the Austrians were ready to greet t h e m . Frederick the Great. ordered Prince Maurice of Anhalt-Dessau into the attack with the troops next in line. J. 1928. Frederick accordingly left a covering force before Prague. L O B O S I T Z (B**). Berlin. T h e Imperialists threw back t h e Prussian infantry at every point. Frederick the Great (28. London. Suggested reading: General Work: Reiners. b u t the assault was repulsed by a heavy fire. General Work: Jany. a n d Frederick.000) gained a limited tactical success against Marshal 50 . 8 ) . Vol. battle of. perhaps prematurely. Seven Years' War. London. C. (q. N. he reached the conclusion that the enemy right wing—which was out of his sight—must offer h i m the best opportunity for attack. i October 1756..v.v. a n d marched to meet the new danger. u n d e r Marshal D a u n .J. T h e K i n g found the Austrians holding a row of low heights to t h e south of t h e Kaiser Strasse near Kolin a n d .). a n d rested for two or three hours before t h e movement was completed. with the impatience t h a t marked his conduct throughout the battle.
von.000. London.300 Prussians. Prague (A***) Date: 6 May 1757.500 prisoners. Vienna. 82 guns. (b) Perhaps 12. C. a n d hastened the m a r c h of the second Austrian line to the edge of the plateau so as to h e a d off t h e Prussian thrust.000. On the Battle : Hoen. Result: Rout of the first Austrian Army leading to the siege of Prague by the Prussians. Total: 60. a n d early on the morning of the 6th the K i n g undertook a turning movement with t h e a i m of gaining t h e eastern slopes of t h e plateau. 380). Forces engaged: (a) Prussians: 66 battalions. 20 regiments of cavalry. M. Suggested reading: As for Kolin. 136. against all expectation. C. 59 guns.000 Austrian dead and wounded besides 4. (b) Austrians: 60 battalions. See Duflfy. Die Schlacht bei Prag in Streffleurs Militärische Zeitschrift. seized the initiative by invading t h e Austrian province of . London. from where he could roll up the Austrian line from the right. Marshal Browne. Location: Four miles east of Prague on Route 12. 1964. (b) Prince Charles of Lorraine in command of the Austrian army. T h e Austrians therefore hastily assembled their forces. War and campaign: The Seven Years' War. T h e negligence of Prince Charles of Lorraine allowed Frederick to unite all his troops in the presence of the Austrians on the night of 5 M a y . the c o m m a n d e r of the Austrian right wing. Total: 67. Central European Campaign of 1757 (see p. The Wild Goose and the Eagle: A Life of Marshal von Browne. was probably the first to realise the enemy intention. and took up a c a m p facing north on a plateau to the east of Prague..354) thanks to General Keith's capture of Lobosch Hill. In the spring of 1757 Frederick of Prussia. 1964. The Wild Goose and the Eagle: A Life of Marshal von Browne. Opposing sides: (a) King Frederick II commanding the Prussian army.Bohemia (now p a r t of Czechoslovakia) and advancing almost to the walls of Prague. 113 squadrons. 1909.Browne (33. Object of the action: Frederick the Great was attempting to capture Prague during his bold invasion of Bohemia. Casualties: (a) 14. Duffy. T h e leading Prussian infantry encountered some difficulty a n d delay in 51 .
Stuttgart.-M.D.000.J. 1966. 1935. Total: 271. H. Kessel.). a n d the heart went out of the Austrians. and before long the Imperialists were split in two: 15. (b) AustroSaxons: 13.237 wounded. The Campaign of 1866 in Germany (trans. a n d Browne seized the opportunity to launch his grenadiers in a charge.393 wounded. On the Campaign: Prussian General Staff. 1907.000. (b) Lieutenant F. Forces engaged: (a) Prussians: 8 corps and 3 cavalry divisions. around the villages of Sadowa and Lipa. Bohemian Campaign (see p. The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany.. Opposing sides: (a) The King of Prussia in titular command with F.000 prisoner. C. 381). Result: A total victory for the Prussians. Casualties: (a) Prussians: 1. Location: Five miles north-west of Hradec Kralove (or Königgrätz) on Route 35 . On the Batde: Bonnal.crossing the swampy meadows of the Roketnitzer Bach to the north-east of Sterbohol.000 m e n of the right wing were completely cut off a n d h a d to retreat into the country. leading to the Treaty of Prague (23 August) which excluded Austria from Germany and made Prussia leader of the North German Confederacy. Total: 278. Object of the action: Von Moltke was attempting to destroy the main Austrian army by means of a double envelopment. Sadowa (c****) Date: 3 July 1866. Frederick threw heavy columns into a g a p that h a d opened in the Austrian right centre (along the line of the present railway).935 killed.000 killed. 125. Suggested reading: General Work: Friedjung. von Benedek commanding the Austrians and the Saxon army under their Crown Prince Albert. London.. b u t for the whole Austro-Prussian War. von Moltke as Chief of Staff. 7. Sadowa. while the rest of the army was driven back. 13. London. to the protection of the ramparts of Prague. 1907. fighting desperately. It was Moltke's first opportunity to try out his theory of g r a n d 52 . London.-M. not only for the Bohemian campaign of 1866. (b) Austrians: 8 corps (including 1 Saxon) and 4 cavalry divisions. T h e Battle of Sadowa was decisive. War and campaign: The Austro-Prussian War of 1866. T h e Prussian Marshal Schwerin was killed in attempting to rally his troops. Moltke. E. 18. b u t Browne himself was severely wounded by a cannon-shot.
SADOWA 3rd July 1866 53 .
The 3rd and 10th Corps. He massed his vastly superior artillery on the forward edge of the heights of Chlum and Lipa and ordered his infantry to stay firm in their positions and rely on fire-power to wear the Prussians down. derived from Napoleon. with the Army of the Elbe only 10 miles to the south-east and the Crown Prince's army strung out from Prausnitz to Hisitz some 15 miles to the north.000. and one in Northern Silesia. But the Austrian generals were incurably defensive-minded. was still 7 days' march away on the Iser.strategy. The total strength of the Prussians was approximately 278. In spite of having only one railway track. and by 2 July had allowed themselves to be manoeuvred into a central position on the high ground between the Elbe and the Bistritz and astride the main road running back through Königgrätz to Vienna. though united with the Elbe Army. by concentrating two 'masses of manoeuvre'. By then the advanced guards of the Prussian ist Army were in contact with the Austrian outposts at Sadowa. The preliminary battles had already shown the Prussian breech-loading 'needle gun' and open infantry formations destructively superior to the Austrian muzzle-loaders and massed bayonet charges. where Benedek began at once to concentrate the main Austrian army. that of the Austrians 271. He drew up his forces on the traditional Austrian pattern. The war opened on 14 June.000 men. The difficulty of assembling his forces from Prussia's scattered dominions decided Moltke to concentrate 3 armies round the frontiers of Saxony and Bohemia: one on the Elbe. Benedek hoped to counter this by fighting an old-fashioned defensive action. and he hoped to save enough time in mobilisation to anticipate the Austrian concentration and move into Bohemia on converging lines before Benedek could exploit the benefit of his interior position. They missed the chance of inflicting a crushing defeat on the Crown Prince as he emerged from the narrow mountain passes. one on the Saxon frontier. and where the Saxon army could easily fall back for support. one of which could grip the enemy frontally. closely supported by the ist and 6th. under Prince Frederick Charles. when the Crown Prince's 2nd Prussian Army was only entering the passes over the Riesengebirge and their ist Army. But it was clear that the decisive theatre of operations would be in Bohemia. while the other was available for outflanking movements or envelopment. along a total front of nearly 200 miles. with Prussian attacks on Austria's South German allies and Italian moves against Austrian Venetia. Benedek's forces were assembled round Josephstadt by 26 June. This gave him the use of 5 railways. formed an immensely strong centre on the heights of Chlum 54 .
Moltke was thus aiming at a double envelopment of the entire Austrian army. Thus the Crown Prince's advanced guards caught them still on the march and stormed. Prince Frederick Charles was to attack frontally at first light and pin down the Austrian centre. was held by the 4th and 2nd Corps on the line Chlum-Nederlist-Lochenitz. and by midday 5 of them were held in the woods and villages south of Sadowa in the same way.000 casualties from the murderous gunfire. and Prussian exhaustion prevented any serious pursuit. North of the road the remaining division—the 7th —had disintegrated under the attacks of 3 Austrian corps and was in danger of total annihilation. totally refused. A brilliant cavalry action and heroic self-sacrifice by the gunners enabled the bulk of the Austrian army to get back across the Elbe. but the advance was halted at the forward edge of the woods beyond by the brilliantly handled and sited Austrian artillery.and Lipa. into the very heart of the Austrian position at Chlum. under Crown Prince Albert. while the Army of the Elbe engaged the Saxons and felt round their left flank. The right flank. The village and the bridge over the Bistritz were carried without heavy fighting. while the Elbe Army had only got to grips with the Saxon main positions at 11 am and its methodical advance round the Austrian left could do nothing immediate to relieve the situation. disobeying his orders. was actually contemplating throwing in his 2 reserve corps and his cavalry in a general assault which would almost certainly have routed the Prussian ist Army. He at once sent orders to the Crown Prince to move with all his forces against the Austrian right flank. It was only at 10 pm on 2 July that Moltke discovered that the whole Austrian army was concentrated forward of the Elbe. almost unopposed. with the 8th Austrian Corps and the 2nd Reserve Cavalry Division in rear. though in great disorder. But Counts Feastetics and Thun. and had suffered between them some 5. Thanks to a series of gallant counter-attacks the inevitably piecemeal advance of the Crown Prince was held. Between 12 noon and 1 pm Benedek. The Prussian troops had only had a cup of coffee for breakfast and their morale was cracking. Only at Benedek's third urgent order did they start back to their assigned stations. had led the 4th and 2nd Corps to join the 3rd in a series of massed attacks—which also contravened the new tactical instructions—on the luckless 7th Division in Maslowed Wood. But the Austrians were in no position to 55 . and the left wing was entrusted to the Saxon army. Gradually all the 6 divisions of Frederick Charles's army were drawn into the frontal assault. unaware that his right flank had become completely exposed to the Crown Prince's advance. The battle began with the attack of the Prussian 8th Division on Sadowa at 8 am.
and Bismarck.renew the fight. 56 . fearful that France might intervene to rob him of his gains. advised his King to make peace at once on generous terms. Prussia's Minister-President.L. W. So ended what has been called the 'Six Weeks' War'.McE. which nevertheless secured Venetia to Italy and Prussian hegemony for the future in Germany.
The Boyne (A***) Date: 11 July 1690*. (b) King James II in command of the Franco-Irish Jacobite' Army.500 Jacobites killed and wounded. who for his part was trying to retreat back to Dublin. near Ballinasloe.000. 12 July 1691. C. Warfare in the late 17th Century. Just's Irish Jacobites and French troops (25. Irish Campaign of 1689-91. 6 guns.000 infantry. paving the way for Marlborough's and Ginkel's reconquest of Ireland. The reason for this discrepancy is that Aughrim was fought on 57 .Eire AUGHRIM ( D * ) . 1988. Location: On the road from Drogheda to Slane.000 cavalry. Forces engaged: (a) Williamites: 26. 66.000) after killing their commander. 5. * Special Note: 12 July 1690 is often regarded as the date of the battle. between Oldbridge and Slane. 379).000 Williamites killed and wounded.000 (exclusive of the garrison of Drogheda).500 infantry. Opposing sides: (a) King William III commanding a multinational ' Williamite' Army. Total: 23. War and campaign: 'The Jacobite War'—part of the War of the League of Augsburg (see p. 50 guns. Object of the action: William III was attempting to force battle on James II. See Grant. General Ginkel (18. former King of England.000) routed General St. battle of. (b) Over 1. (b) Jacobites: 18. The actual 'Old Style' date was 1 July (thus 11 July 'New Style'). 8. London. Casualties: (a) Over 2. Result: A thorough victory for King William. Total: 35.000 cavalry. 65.
time had been wasted and his adherents had incurred heavy loss in men and prestige in the abortive siege of Londonderry. Few authorities agree about the casualties. C. 'Eyewitness of the Boyne'.) the following year. The new campaign opened with the arrival in mid-June of William with reinforcements. but still lacked strength for an offensive. despite its name. G. where Schomberg's son Meinhart was in command.000 men at Bangor in August 1689 and drawn in numbers of Irish Protestants. There was another at Rosnaree and at Slane a bridge cut by the Jacobites. One has therefore to make the nearest possible estimate of these and also of the numbers engaged. but had few trained troops and fewer arms. obtained over 6. All he was now ready to undertake was a rearguard action. Belloc on one side and Macaulay on the other especially so.S. 1963.000 during the winter. On the Williamite side Schomberg had landed in the north with over 10. His Viceroy. When James reached Dublin on 3 April after landing at Kinsale. His army was mainly foreign. Vol VI. On the Battle: Boulger. Article: Simms. Suggested reading: General Work: Macaulay. Dublin. but had second thoughts on learning of his enemy's numerical superiority and fell back behind the Boyne. 1861. Grant. London.. H. James the Second. had proved a good organiser. but only a handful of muskets.. in The Irish Sword. by agreement unarmed. J.000 infantry from France. chiefly from sickness. its cream being perhaps the Dutch Brigade of Blue Guards. James marched to Dundalk. London. He could not cross at Dundalk because it was too strongly held. D. there was no bridge. The Boyne is a very difficult battle to describe. between Newry and Dundalk. 1911. the Duke of Tyrconnell.. No. The Battle of the Bqyne. London. Warfare in the late 17th Century. James. 1928. missing a better chance of resistance in the Moyry Pass. slightly wounded the day before by a cannon-ball grazing his shoulder. At Oldbridge. because he sent in return an Irish brigade. 1988. Lord. William's problem was not simple. at 58 . On the Campaign: Belloc. William. The historians are for the most part prejudiced.12 July (N. He lost some 8. but several fords passable at half flood between it and Drybridge. That at Donore was available at low water only. who had lost about the same number before Deny. determined to pass the river at three points: on the right. The History of England from the Accession of James II. London. and it did not occur to the French that this had been without arms at home. 22. He was so set on retreat that he sent back his baggage and even six of his guns to Dublin. The fighting was brief and movements rapid. and this date was chosen for the commemoration of both battles.
under his own command. from which he feared the hostile cavalry would cut him off at Duleek. opposite Rosnaree. Ulster and English regiments* The Dutch were charged by Tyrconnell and Irish cavalry broke the ranks of the Huguenots as they climbed out of the water. Schomberg was 72 and Berwick barely 20. however. but it was probably before noon. He had picked infantry: Dutch Blue Guards. It is curious that. that Tyrconnell needed all the force he had and that none could be spared. He deployed his main body on slightly rising ground from half a mile to a mile from the Boyne. at Drybridge. Schomberg galloped down to rally the troops and was instantly shot dead. at Oldbridge. in the centre. and in Oldbridge Antrim's and Clanrickarde's infantry regiments. where the Dublin road ran through a defile. James had meanwhile ridden forward with the intention of transferring troops from the neighbourhood of Oldbridge to his left. still a fair soldier despite hard living. despite the fact that the tide was now so high that horses had to swim and infantry to cross in single file. Reports of the hour of Schomberg's attack vary. He found. under Schomberg himself. Then followed calamity for the Jacobites. James had posted only one regiment. Later on Tyrconnell. of the two most celebrated commanders engaged. Neill O'Neill's Dragoons. gradually got his wing over.Rosnaree. Huguenots. moved 5 more infantry regiments into the village and drew up 3 cavalry regiments and 2 troops of the first-class bodyguard under James's bastard son Berwick in their rear. William. He was awaiting fresh cavalry when he learnt that his right 59 . on the left.
the campaign broke the Jacobite menace for the time being. 1936. Location: Two miles east of Kinsale. 30 miles north of Dublin on the T .000) stormed the town defended by Sir Arthur Aston (3. though for complete success England had to await Ginkel's victory at Aughrim in 1691. as he writes.. all through his memoirs. told him that there was now nothing to be done but to charge the enemy forthwith before his troops knew what had happened'. The Williamite superiority in infantry was far greater than it looks because a large proportion of the Irish were largely untrained and miserably armed. 'the King. The Battle of the Boyne was in the main a fighting retreat. 68. Cromwell (12. He finally embarked for France at Kinsale. It must be added that he is. See Curtis. London. came up and said a charge was impossible because straight in front were two high-banked double ditches and a brook. but has unwittingly deceived later historians by believing reports that young Schomberg crossed at Slane. storm of. James rode to Dublin. Meanwhile a heroic defence by O'Neill with his original regiment and a handful of reinforcements had broken down and the Williamites were moving on Duleek. In the brief conflicts at close quarters the odds against the Jacobites in artillery were over eight to one. 378). As things were. The dauntless Berwick charged again and again—he says twelve times—and on one occasion broke the Inniskillingers.000 Royalists) and put every living soul to the sword. 10 September 1649. Cromwell's Campaign in Ireland. just south of the Bandon. finding many raw Irish troops in a panic but the French regiments in good order. E. As it was they escaped with trifling further loss. CF. whispering in Lauzun's ear. on which. DROGHEDA (C***). which was a possibility. but concludes that the Jacobites might well not have got through the defile but for the death of Schomberg.flank was already beaten. 60 . which might have come off if the French fleet had shown more activity after Beachy Head or William had had to withdraw troops— even to return himself. War and campaign: Tyrone's Rebellion (see p. who had reconnoitred the ground. i . James's venture was a gamble. reliable as regards events seen. 64. Kinsale (c***) Date: 26 December 1601. Sarsfield. History of Ireland. But nothing would go right for him.
200 Spaniards. Sir R i c h a r d Wingfield wheeled a n d rode back. Chandler. Grant. 1988. whereupon the Irish began to break a n d join the flight. Warfare in the late 17th Century. R. Suggested reading: General Work: Bagwell. his strength raised to some 500. Forces engaged: (a) English : i. Dublin. Ireland under the Tudors. 1973. On 3 J a n u a r y the Irish advanced from the west.500 Irish and Spaniards killed and wounded. 'The Battle of Kinsale'. Marlborough as a Military Commander.300 Irish.Object of the action: The rebel Tyrone was attempting to relieve a Spanish force besieged in Kinsale by English forces. in Irish Historical Studies.500. Opposing sides: (a) The Lord Deputy.. London. 1810. Article: Hayes-McCoy. (b) The Earl of Tyrone in command of the Irish army. This time the Irish horse a n d Tyrone's infantry broke. (b) Irish: 6. Panic spread to O'Donnell's troops on t h e right a n d they disappeared in wild flight. Finally 48 surrendered a n d a b o u t 60 returned to Castlehaven. a n d finally. C. 2. Casualties: {a) One officer and a few English rank and file killed. caught sight of t h e enemy d r a w n up in three heavy 'battles'. Mountjoy. occupied by reinforcements which h a d been u n a b l e to reach Kinsale.500. Mountjoy ordered one of his 3 infantry regiments to attack t h e m in flank. leading to the abandonment of Kinsale by the Spaniards and the eventual collapse of Tyrone's rebellion. G. i oo infantry . C. Lord Mountjoy. London. London. commanding the English army. London. Mountjoy. E. b u t at the last m o m e n t T y r o n e changed his m i n d a n d withdrew. T h e Spaniards resisted gallantly till half their n u m b e r h a d been killed.. t h e slaughter of t h e vanquished 61 . Total: 6. 1955. of a Spanish expeditionary force which h a d occupied the walled town. G A.. T h e n . On t h e left R i c h a r d Tyrrell's M u n s t e r m e n a n d 200 or m o r e Spaniards withdrew to a hill near by. rating the Spanish infantry high a n d expecting a sally. September 1949. London. T h e Battle of Kinsale was the result of a siege that h a d lasted 2 months. Elizabethan General. he charged again. On the Campaign: Stafford. a mile a n d a half away. {b) Approx. T h e fight began with a cavalry attack on Tyrone's centre. a n d Wingfield's cavalry hurtled into t h e mass. but. left t h e bulk of his forces to watch t h e m a n d himself led t h e remainder in pursuit over two boggy causeways. D. (horseunknown). c o m m a n d e d by himself. 1890. 400 cavalry. Result: An overwhelming English victory. Total: 1. On the Battle: Falls. Pacata Hibernia. Vol III. T h e Earl of T y r o n e a n d H u g h O'Donnell m a r c h e d south to relieve it. H a d not the English cavalry horses been in miserable condition for lack of fodder. seeing t h e pikemen stand fast.
CF. but Mountjoy did not receive Tyrone's surrender till March 1603. siege of. the English claimed to have found 1.000) induced Patrick Sarsfield (c. Irish Campaign of 1689-91. muffled by hills. Eventually the Spanish commander. Revolutionary Ireland and its Settlement. for the Irish. 67. 1911.000) to surrender the town on terms shortly before the arrival of a French relieving fleet. 16.. many being slain —sometimes trodden into bogholes—by fellow-countrymen whose lands Tyrone had ravaged. London. The unarmed mob which escaped suffered more loss on the way north. asked for a parley. O'Donnell died in Spain. Don Juan del Aquila. LIMERICK (D*). apparently not having heard the slight musketry fire. The Spaniards had made no sortie. R. H.200 dead. 12. General Ginkel (c. September to October 1691. As things were.would have been appalling. The siege and battle stamped Mountjoy as the ablest Elizabethan soldier. as a result of which his troops were shipped home on honourable terms. 62 . See Murray. It was the end of Spain's menace to the Kingdoms of England and Ireland and. a rout all the more extraordinary in view of Tyrone's success at the Yellow Ford and elsewhere. at the mouth of the river Shannon.
64 .
France Agincourt (A****) Date: 25 October 1415. Perroy. Total: 5. commanding the French. C. War and campaign: The Hundred Years' War.. a n d was practically t h e last great 65 . about 8 miles north of Hesdin.000 dismounted knights and men-at-arms. 1947. including the Duke of York. Batde of Agincourt — a Reassessment. Result: The complete rout of die French enabled the English to reach Calais safely. Location: The village of Azincourt lies to the east of the HesdinFruges-Calais road (N. Henry V.28). W. London. Hibbert. London. 1964. Forces engaged: (a) English: 4. The Agincourt War. Suggested reading: General Works. 72. 1924. London.000 captives. A. Constable of France. C. O.000 cross-bowmen. Casualties: (a) Perhaps 400 English. W. (b) Charles d'Albret. and Lord Camoys leading the English. London. 7. Henry V and the Invasion of France. T h e Battle of Agincourt formed the climax of H e n r y V's invasion of France in 1415. Object of the action: The Constable of France was attempting to cut off and destroy Henry V's army before it could reach Calais and safety. On die Campaign and Batde: Burne. (b) French: 3. 378).. Play: Shakespeare.). E. 1956. die Duke of York.700 English. Oman. a few 'bombards'. {b) Probably 8.000 French. Jacob. the invasion of France 1415 (see p. F. London.000 mounted and 15.000 Frenchmen killed.950 archers. and 2. 750 knights and menat-arms. The Art of War in the Middle Ages. E. Estimated total: 25.. 1951. Opposing sides: (a) King Henry V. The Hundred Years' War. including the Constable. (2nd Edn.
This venture involved considerable risks: by early October the French Constable had already collected some 14. and slightly over a month later the town fell into English hands. Henry ordered 'Advance Banner!' at 11 am and moved his men forward to the narrowest neck of the plain. The morning of St. Henry decided to march defiantly through French territory to the English-held fortress of Calais. The 6. and halted for the night in the neighbouring village of Maisoncelles. and by the 16th rations were running low and the army was becoming increasingly dispirited.000-strong English army left Harfleur on 8 October. and to reach Calais the English would have to cross the broad River Somme. where the army could spend the winter preparing for the next campaign. it was evident that Henry would have to fight his way through to Calais against great odds. For the next 5 days Henry marched up the river vainly searching for another ford. The siege had been longer than anticipated and this made an immediate advance towards Paris out of the question. Henry's army landed near Harfleur on 15 August. we band of brothers' was how Shakespeare immortally described the mood of the English army. Everything depended on a free passage over the 'Blanchetaque' ford below Abbeville. The men were understandably weary: they had covered 260 miles in the last 17 days. and although d'Albret played 'cat and mouse' with the English army for 6 more days. for a fast 160-mile march. it was hoped. The French were gay and confident—laying wagers on the prisoners they would take—but King Hal had whipped up his army's morale to fever-pitch. and by the end of the next day the English army was safely over the Somme. and knight and archer shared a feeling of kinship: 'We few. each man carrying 8 days' rations—sufficient. instead. But now the French army was only 7 miles distant near Peronne. all the heavy impedimenta was left with the Harfleur garrison. Crispin's Day found the two unequal armies facing one another across the narrow and gently undulating plain bounded by the forests of Agincourt and Tramcourt. Everything went well until the 13th. Constable d'Albret had devined Henry's intention and sent his advance guard to hold the crossing while the main French army advanced from Rouen and crossed the Somme at Amiens. Two days later an undefended crossing was at last discovered near Nesle.000 men at Rouen. when Henry's scouts reported that the vital ford was strongly held by the enemy. including the 'bombards'. we happy few. On the 24th the English came upon the encampments of the 'terrific multitude' in the Fernoise valley. Determined to show that his army was not afraid of its vast opponent. hardly 400 yards from the 66 .English martial achievment of the Hundred Years' War.
the men-at-arms were stationed to hold the intervals. but there were insufficient men to form a reserve and so the camp had to be entrusted to the sick. The front covered 940 yards.AGINGOURT 25th October 1415 serried French ranks. their positions protected by a fence of sharpened stakes driven into the rainsodden earth. the third 67 . the first two on foot.200-yard front. Constable d'Albret deployed his men in three dense lines along a 1. The archers were massed on the flanks and in two 'wedges' covering the centre.
and seizing their swords . and into this confused mass plunged Henry at the head of his knights. .mounted. but as they came they inevitably narrowed their front to come at their adversaries and to avoid the hail of arrows poured into their flanks by the English archers. while the large body of prisoners—many of whom had not yet been divested of their armour—already constituted a menace in the very midst of his position.' The first French line was soon reduced to a shambles. . this did not materialise. 90 Lords and 1. The French first line rushed forward to engage the English knights. perceiving this disorder . Simultaneously. amongst other items. killing the sick and capturing. however. and a wall of bodies separated the victorious English from the third and last line of the French army. and the second shared the same fate. The English 68 . the French knights to Henry's front—who still outnumbered the entire English force— showed signs of renewing the attack.560 knights besides a host of men-at-arms and cross-bowmen. Remy). The battle opened when the French cavalry flank divisions —stung into action by the long-range shooting of the English archers—made disorganised charges against Henry's flanks. The Battle of Agincourt cost France at least half the nobility. Henry gave the order to kill the prisoners—and with long faces the soldiers turned to the gory task which deprived them of many a rich ransom. A detachment of French marauders had surprised and looted the English camp. In the event. threw their bows and arrows on the ground. quitted their stakes. the King's crown and seals. and the fleeing horsemen trampled through the advancing ranks of their own centre. . . Only half an hour after the opening of the battle the French attack lay in ruins. sallied out upon them. This 'cruel butchery' has been widely criticised. Faced with the prospect of losing the battle. The resulting press became appalling. 'the English archers. It appeared probable that Henry's army was about to be assailed from front and rear at a moment when the bulk of the archers were scattered seeking for loot. Despite appearances the battle was not quite over: disturbing news reached Henry from the rear. Meanwhile. The cross-bowmen and a few cannon were situated between the first and second lines. and many Frenchmen were unable to raise their weapons to strike a blow. including the Constable. but in Henry's defence it is hard to see what else he could have done in the face of an impending attack. These achieved nothing: 'Their horses were so wounded by the arrows that they were unmanageable' (St. The archers busied themselves seizing prostrate French noblemen to hold for ransom. 3 Dukes. and the slaughter was stopped. while two further bodies of mounted knights—each 600 strong—were placed slightly in rear on the flanks.
Caesar's conquest of Gaul culminated in a general rising of the Gallic tribes under a young chieftain of outstanding ability.000 Gauls. Alesia (D***) Date: 52 B. 1960. relieving army.v. (see p. Forces engaged: (a) Romans : several Legions supported by cavalry detachments. Fuller. Julius Caesar. 69 . peace might have been won t h a t same year. War and campaign: Caesar's Gallic War. Total: approx. D. to capitulate.000 foot and 15. H a d it turned in its tracks a n d m a r c h e d on Paris. 377). I he Roman Republic.) he withdrew to his m o u n t a i n stronghold of Alesia.. The History of iùnne. After an abortive a t t e m p t to ambush Caesar's army.000. Shortly afterwards the English army with its remaining 2. J. 1891. Work of Fiction: Warner. (b) Vercingetorix at the head of the Gauls. II.000 prisoners resumed the m a r c h to Calais. 70. by n a m e Vercingetorix. Object of the action: Caesar was attempting to force the Gallic leader.. F. Caesar. London.).. On the Campaign and Battle: Caesar. A. perhaps «50. London. 1923. Rice Holmes. w h o was stifled in his a r m o u r b e n e a t h a pile of slain—a fate t h a t befell m a n y more on t h e field. J.C. (b) Gauls: besieged force. 1920. Vercingetorix. The site lies east of the town. and founded modern France. (a) Julius Caesar at the head of a Roman Army. Suggested reading: General Works: Mommsen. 1966. Casualties: Unrecorded.000 foot and 8. After nearly 7 years of campaigning. b u t H e n r y considered the season too far advanced for further operations. 80. as H a n n i b a l h a d t r a p p e d Flaminius' at Lake Trasimene (q. Total: 353. 99. Biography: Dodge. T h e French were consequently awarded a breathing-space. T. T. IV (Everyman's Library Edn. Result: Vercingetorix's enforced surrender and the defeat of the ( Jallic armies completed the Roman conquest of Gaul. Opposing sides-. Location: Alesia.000 cavalry. Vol. C. not far from Dijon.000 cavalry. Book VII. Vol.losses were astonishingly light—but included in their number the stout Duke of York. The Gallic War. Imperial Caesar. Oxford.G. T. despite unfavourable circumstances.C. now called Alise-Sainte-Reine is in the Côte d'Or Department. c o m m a n d e r of the left wing. New York.. a n d the effects of H e n r y V's great victory failed to come up to the most optimistic expectations. R.
capitulated.000 Americans.There Caesar laid siege to him. no greater than the one and incomparably smaller than the other. 381). The Argonne (B***) Date: 26 September-11 November 1918.S. whose army was now starving. Result: A successful break-through towards the Meuse was achieved at high cost. Casualties: (a) 122. and which had to hold 25 miles of entrenchments in order. and Vercingetorix. he encompassed the mountain with a line of contravallation. Near Route Nationale 48.C. War and campaign: The First World War. followed. When the relieving army arrived. later supplemented by a few French. shortage of forage compelled Vercingetorix to send his cavalry away and appeal to the Gallic tribes to come to his relief. his problem became.F. When Caesar learnt of this. (b) The Crown Prince commanding a German Army Group. 86.000 cavalry. divisions. the western edge of the Argonne Forest. he prepared to be himself besieged. in which Vercingetorix attempted to break out. 70 .F. Veuziers and Brieulles. But before it was completed. the Meuse-Argonne Offensive of 1918 (see p. a desperate series of engagements. (b) 16. In the last one the relieving army was decisively beaten. but also how to prevent the relieving army from breaking into it. An army which not only was the besieger but itself was besieged. According to Caesar. (b) 11 German divisions.000 infantry and 8.000 German prisoners. Object of the action: The Americans and French wished to cut the strategic German railway running through Mezières and Sedan. J. at one and the same time. First. to achieve its aim and secure itself against defeat. Forces engaged (outset of battle): (a) 15 U. He solved it by encompassing his line of contravallation with a line of circumvallation 14 miles in circuit. it consisted of a series of entrenchments 11 miles in circuit. they mustered an army of 250. Location: Between Verdun. which faced outwards. not only how to prevent Vercingetorix from breaking out of his stronghold. Thus this remarkable siege was brought to an end by the simultaneous defeat of two armies by a single army. Opposing sides: (a) General Pershing in command of the American Expeditionary Force. other casualties not revealed.
German strength stood at 11 divisions. Pershing. but its proximity to the German strategic railway. The arrival of battlehardened divisions from St. 1931. The battle of the Argonne was America's most important contribution to the Allied effort on the Western Front. I -ondon. by 1918. near Dieppe. 2. by 6 November the enemy were in full retreat. With massive air and artillery support and strong French activity on the left. The French 4th Army on his left attacked at the same time. the French Wars of Religion. 1925. New York. My Experiences in the World War. The Argonne is an area of broken hills and forest. 1929. with 6 in reserve. His immediate objective was the clearing of the forest to the line Montfaucon-Romagne.800 guns and 180 tanks. i960. London. an ambitious project which stout German resistance obstructed.Suggested reading: General Works: Falls. The French had made no progress against it in four years of bitter if intermittent fighting. whose natural defences had been so improved l>y the Germans that it formed. 79. He took over the sector from the French on 22 September. By 3 October they had advanced 10 miles at most and only 5 in the Argonne itself.D. in almost complete secrecy.P.. At the Armistice the Americans stood everywhere on or beyond the Meuse. The front selected for attack was bounded by two river valleys. perhaps the most lonnidable position on the Western Front. gradually freeing the Americans' flanks from enfilade fire and allowing the French to advance to the upper Aisne. made its capture essential to the Allied strategy in the autumn of 1918. ARQUES (B**).000 Huguenots and Royalists) repulsed the Duke of Mayenne's 71 . and her most notable victory of the First World War. Commanding an American Army. the Aire and the Meuse. His inexperienced troops exposed themselves recklessly and suffered heavily. Marshal Foch entrusted the task to the American army. On 1 November the ist Army.).K. and began his attack with a short and violent bombardment on 26 September. whose inexperience was outweighed by its strength and enthusiasm. E. battle of. against which General Pershing's ist Army could deploy 9. which ran through Mezières and Sedan. C. Hunter Liggett. The First World War. 21 September 1589. Mihiel on 4 October kept the advance going slowly. Work of Fiction: Remarque. between the Meuse and the Champagne. All Quiet on the Western Front (English Edn. further reinforced tfnd now commanded by General Hunter Liggett. King Henri IV (8. New York. launched its final assault against the last German line (Vouziers-Brieulles). it quickly broke through. M. J.
72 . Arras (c**) Date: 21 May 1940. (b) Germans: 2 rifle regiments. London.T. Liddell Hart. J.F. II. the S. Casualties: (a) 57 British tanks out of 83 engaged.attempt to crush his a r m y with 24.R. Opposing sides: (a) Major-General Franklyn commanding the British 5th Division. 'The Batde of Arras' in Correlli Barnett et ai. Bond. Vol. T. light French units. London. followed closely by two infantry battalions. J. Location: Arras stands on the River Scarpe. May 1940 (see p..). Draper. Sir C. ) . London. Old Battles and New Defences — Can we learn from Military History?.. See O m a n . The Six Weeks' War. Totenkopf Division just as they were beginning a disorderly advance through the villages of Wailly. (b) About 20 German tanks and a considerable number of motor vehicles. Ficheux a n d Agny. 'Frankforce'. H. B.000 Leaguers by holding a narrow defile. New York. Impervious to G e r m a n anti-tank fire the British tanks wrought havoc among the chaos of troops. W. 1953. leading the inner flank of t h e thrust from t h e Meuse. 74. Object of the action: An improvised attempt by the B. was temporarily checked south of Arras by an improvised British formation. S. B.. 1959. striking 6th a n d 7th Rifle Regiments a n d the unblooded S.. The Battle of Arras..v. 1949. 381). Totenkopf Division. London. At 1330 hours the columns moved (from Vimy) to the west of Arras a n d then swung eastward across the Arras-Baumetz railway. Vol II. 1946. about 50 miles from the Belgian frontier. 1986.E. guns a n d transport..S. A History of the Art of War in the 16th Century (Revised E d n . The Tanks. to check the German advance towards the Channel coast. 25th Panzer Regiment. 1986. On 21 M a y 1940 Rommel's 7th Panzer Division. D u e to hurried assembly the counter-attack was initiated by two columns of tanks only (4th and 7th R o y a l T a n k Regiments). H. 2 regiments of the R. but without artillery or air support.S. On the Campaign. Sutherell. but psychologically it instilled caution into the German High Command and thus contributed to the successful evacuation from Dunkirk (q. War and campaign: The Second World War. Gamberley. Result: Tactically a failure. Liddell Hart. (b) General Rommel in command of 7th Panzer Division. The Rommel Papers. Suggested reading: General Works: Churchill. London. the Battle of France. 1954. Forces engaged: (a) British: 2 infantry battalions. B. The Second World War.
Army Group. 1944-5 (see p.J.S. Patton's 3rd A r m y continued its offensive towards the Saar. swept on almost unopposed to liberate 73 . did the few surviving British tanks a n d infantrymen w i t h d r a w north of Arras. To the south. B. Location: Between Saverne. 1952. Crusade in Europe. Beifort (B***) Date: 19-22 November 1944. C. B. the North-west European Campaign. War and campaign: The Second World War. Only on t h e arrival of 25th Panzer Regiment at dusk. broke through t h e Belfort G a p a n d reached t h e U p p e r R h i n e a n d the outskirts of Mulhouse in a single day. London and Toronto.000. History of the French First Army. 1952. brilliantly led by de Tassigny.. Object of the action: An Allied attempt to break through the Upper Vosges Mountains to the Upper Rhine. A r m y on the left a n d t h e ist French Army on the right. with the 2nd French Armoured Division in t h e van. 1948. 1952. London. taking Metz on 18 November. C. (b) approximately 70. R o m m e l was so shaken t h a t he thought five British divisions were defending Arras. (b) General Balck (later Himmler) commanding German Army Group 'G'. 5 armoured divisions (750 tanks). Suggested reading: General Works : Wilmot. The Struggle for Europe. Devers's 6th A r m y G r o u p . London. Opposing sides: (a) General Devers commanding the 6th U. 381). Casualties: (a) approximately 35. consisting of t h e 7th U . Tassigny. 100..Although daily anticipating a counter-attack. 4 Panzer divisions (350 tanks). faced t h e formidable barrier of the Vosges held by t h e G e r m a n ist a n d 19th Armies with t h e 5th Panzer Army in reserve. a n d after twelve hours' fighting. 1946. Forces engaged: (a) Allies: 10 infantry divisions. (b) Germans: 7 or 8 infantry divisions. Strasbourg and Mulhouse. H.000. T h r o u g h o u t October a n d November. D. London.B. S . 7th A r m y forced the Saverne G a p a n d on t h e 23rd. On the Campaign : Liddell Hart. S . Three Tears with Eisenhower. Eisenhower. H. Result: The isolation of the German 19th Army in the Colmar Pocket and the reaching of the Upper Rhine. Laltre de. London. T h e town was finally a b a n d o n e d on the night of 23 M a y .. T w o days later t h e U . On 19 November the ist French Army. Memoirs: Butcher. The Other Side of the Hill.
Total: 3. west coast of France. Vol II. J. 1910. But owing to the steepness of the g r o u n d only 60 m e n reached the summit. (b) French. W. S. J. Pitt thought out this enterprise as a diversion to cover t h e Mauritius expedition. Weakened by detachments to south-west F r a n c e a n d exhausted by their recent efforts.000. These attacks isolated t h e G e r m a n 19th A r m y m t h e Colmar Pocket from which Hitler forbade t h e m to withd r a w . War and campaign: The Seven Years' War. 7th A r m y to aid P a t t o n on the Saar. H. Belle Isle (B***) Date: 7 April-8 June 1761. 380). 1907. A n d r é at t h e eastern end of the island. He therefore decided to deliver t h e attack on M a r t i n i q u e the m o m e n t t h e hurricane months were past a n d send off the Belle Isle expedition at once.000. 1986.. He saw t h e country at this time committed to negotiations for peace b u t wanted to press on with t h e war with utmost energy to get better terms. Result: The capture of the Island. 97. Casualties: (a) 700 British killed and wounded. England in the Seven Years' War. leaving the French to deal with the G e r m a n 19th A r m y alone. 'Belle Isle' in Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. Total: 8. so t h e rest of the troops were re-embarked after 74 . Object of the action: The Earl of Chatham hoped to extract better peace terms from the French by seizing a piece of their national territory.Strasbourg. Suggested reading: General Work: Corbett. Opposing sides: (a) Admiral Keppel and General Hodgson commanding the British forces. the majority capitulated on terms and were repatriated. S . commander of the French garrison. On the Battle: Fortescue. Article: Hebbert. A History of the British Array. Instead of ordering the double envelopment of this pocket. a n d these were overpowered. J. a n d an attempt was m a d e to storm the French entrenchments at Port St. London. London. (b) Very few. Location: Island off Quiberon Point. this proved beyond their power. London. Eisenhower switched the U . (b) General Sainte Croix. soon to be restored to the French by treaty. Forces engaged: (a) British.E. Summer Issue. Campaign of 1761 (see p. On 7 April the fleet anchored off t h e island of Belle Isle with their troops shifted to flat-bottomed boats.
I (2nd Edn. 18. the British commander. h a d fought bravely and was. From Domesday Book to Magna Carta. Forces engaged: (a) Imperialists: approx. However. but at length. a n d was conveyed to L'Orient with all t h a t was left of his force. Bouvines (A***) Date: 27 July 1214. L. on 8 J u n e . dashing King John of England's hopes of regaining his French possessions. 1214 (see p. t h e enemy entrenchments were carried by storm. 6. best reached by Route Nationale 35. 7.M. W. A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages. Paris. securing the ruling dynasty. (b) King Philip Augustus in command of the French army. a n d after being reinforced compelled t h e F r e n c h to retire into t h e fortress of I'iilais.000 foot. was compelled to surrender on 7 J u n e . Suggested reading: General Work: Poole. 1915.). Hodgson. h a d to wait two weeks to l a n d his heavy artillery owing to continual gales. Golin. Result: A complete victory for the French. 378). A. Next the French retired to the citadel which. Total: 22. Object of the action: The Imperial army was trying to force its way through to Paris. W h e n charged he drove back the enemy. a n d although the m a i n assault was held. (b) French: details unknown. w o u n d e d a n d prisoners. London. War and campaign: The Anglo-Imperial invasion of France. Total: 24. 140 nobles and 1. On the Battle : Oman. Foy successfully a n d reached the summit unobserved in a sector which the French h a d thought unscaleable. on 13 M a y . a fortnight later. Les Grandes Batailles de l'Histoire. The F r e n c h commander. C. J. 75 . 1924. 1954.000 cavalry. Location: South-east from Lille.S.. Opposing sides: (a) The Emperor Otto IV commanding the Imperial army. Casualties: (a) 170 knights killed. the battlefield lies on the road from Bouvines to Gruson near the railway crossing. 15. Vol. 71. decided on several attacks along t h e n o r t h a n d east coasts. but very slight. Sainte Croix. after a gallant defence. t h e commanders.000 foot.000. allowed to m a r c h out through the breach with all t h e honours of war. therefore. Oxford. Brigadier L a m b a r t developed a feint attack east of St.000.000 rank and file prisoners. (b) French: approx. C.000 cavalry.having lost a b o u t 500 m e n killed. and ending the Imperial rule of Otto IV.
were mustered many more feudal contingents from all over France. paid by English gold. and take up positions on the slight rise east of the river astride the Roman road to Tournai. Accordingly he marched westwards towards Bouvines. in Vermandois. having by-passed Tournai. On the morning of 27 July the Imperialists. This plan was marred by the delays of the German emperor. cavalry and foot soldiers. Leaving an army under Prince Louis to watch the English. Therefore Philip ordered his army to face about. But Otto had resolved to seek battle. He led his army north-westwards. He then moved into Flemish territory and captured Tournai on 26 July. The French soldiers were drawn up in 3 lines —cross-bowmen. meanwhile Otto would enter France from the north and capture Paris. caught up with the French before they had crossed the Marque. By ravaging southern France the King hoped to attract the French field army towards him. Limburg and Lorraine. In alliance with Emperor Otto IV of the Holy Roman Empire and various disaffected French vassals he planned a double invasion of France. On the right wing. composed of baronial tenants including 70 Norman knights. The Imperialists deployed a long line of pikemen first. Holland and Namur. under the Duke of Burgundy. but Otto failed to march on Paris. In addition a large force of mercenaries. and 76 . Auxerre and many other companies from northern France. These in turn were divided into 3 divisions. making a detour to the west to pass round the Germans. 70 miles north of Paris. the Dukes of Brabant.On 15 February 1214 King John of England landed in France determined to win back the lands of the Angevin empire lost to the French. swelled his ranks. In the meantime Philip had summoned the feudal array of east. in his rear. The king commanded the centre. Otto did not leave his base in the Netherlands. He mustered his forces in the middle of July at Péronne. Already the French rearguard cavalry under the Viscount of Melun had fought an action against the Flemish cavalry. where he had been supplementing his meagre German forces with the tenants of his allies. At once the French king decided to march southwards with all haste. King John's operations in Poitou and Anjou drew Philip Augustus south in March. central and north France. the French king hurried northwards. and although Philip had sent the Duke of Burgundy to stiffen this resistance it had become clear that the army would not be able to cross the bridge at Bouvines in time. Dreux. Here he learnt that the invaders had left Flanders and were in fact at Valenciennes. On the left stood the men of the Counts of Ponthieu. where there was a bridge over the River Marque. and the Counts of Flanders. At last on 12 July he entered Nivelles in Brabant and then moved southwards into Hainault in the right direction for Paris.
BOUVINES 27th July 1214 supported these with their cavalry. who fell back rapidly behind their own cavalry. King Philip then led the heavy cavalry under his command. who advanced upon the French. Mounting again he directed his cavalry in repeated charges among the disorganised Imperial infantry. and a confused cavalry fight ensued. The Flemings on the right of Otto had by now lost most of their leaders. and the King himself almost lost his life when he was pulled off his horse. Soon the whole Imperial left wing was in action against the French opposite them. Namur and Limburg. In the centre a furious battle raged between the unwearied 77 . After the capture of Salisbury by the Bishop of Beauvais his mercenary soldiers fled. Soon each French knight was hacking about him at a cluster of German pikemen. hoping to break the Imperial line. A squadron of 300 men-at-arms from the French right charged first. The left division consisted mainly of Flemings. but as a fighting unity the Imperial left wing was no more. but they were repulsed by the Flemish. the centre of Germans supported by men from Brabant. charging into their disordered ranks. In the centre the Imperialist pikemen soon routed the French infantry and continued to advance. and the right wing of mercenaries under the Earl of Salisbury and the cavalry of the Count of Boulogne. On the French left the battle had also gone well for King Philip. and gradually they also gave ground and scattered for safety. The Count of Boulogne and his feudal array stood their ground valiantly against the Count of Dreux.
690 wounded. t h e Bishop-Elect of Senlis. T h e Count himself became a prisoner of t h e martial Guérin. T h e Count of Boulogne. (b) Field-Marshal Rommel commanding Army Group 'B'. which was to last until Easter. the North-west European Campaign of 1944-5 (see p. this enabled Bradley to break out on 25 July. 1220.350 tanks). increasing numbers of Germans followed t h e example of their leader a n d fled t h e field. later. J. slew the Emperor's horse. and thus facilitate the American ist Army's breakout through St. however.010killed. Object of the action: Montgomery intended to de down as many German Panzer divisions as possible. with some 700 pikemen formed in a circle protecting his cavalry whenever they returned from their charges. 1 airborne divisions. A French knight. (b) German 7Ü1 Army and Panzer Group West: 6 infantry divisions and 7 Panzer divisions (670 tanks).G e r m a n chivalry a n d the tired knights of King Philip. Caen Area (A***) Date: 6 June-25 July 1944. continued to resist. Opposing sides: (a) Field-Marshal Montgomery in command of the Allied 21st Army Group. General Hausser.E. T h e absence of their general lowered the morale of t h e G e r m a n nobility w h ' engaged t h e French cavalry with desperate counter-charge As m o r e soldiers from the French left wing gathered to reinforce their fellows in the centre. 387).v. Forces engaged: (a) British 2nd Army: 10 infantry.). but his loyal Saxons gathered around h i m a n d covered his retreat from the field u p o n a borrowed m o u n t .000 mounted men-at-arms. War and campaign: The Second World War. He was defeated only by the combined efforts of 3. and 6 armoured brigades (1. G e r a r d la T r u e . Result: The bulk of the German armour was attracted to the British front. 3 armoured. 83. T h e E m p e r o r O t t o lost his throne as a consequence of the battle a n d K i n g J o h n returned to face the crisis which culminated in t h e signing of M a g n a C a r t a . Lo (q. (b) German (to 23 July) : 116.863 killed and wounded (Normandy Front). Casualties: (a) British (to 19 July): 6. T h e t r i u m p h a n t French king signed a truce on 18 September with K i n g J o h n . Location: The road-triangle Caen-Villers Bocage-Bayeux (best approach Route Nationale 13). 78 . 28. w h o cut their way past the spearmen.A.
a n d with the ist Corps east of the O r n e .. Despite pressure from American a n d . 79 . H e then proposed to pivot the whole front on Caen a n d break out on the west flank with t h e American armies u n d e r Bradley. N. Invasion — They're Coming. This drew all the available G e r m a n armour on to the British front. Montgomery accordingly p l a n n e d to threaten to break out here. M. Partly owing to the intervention of the 21st Panzer Division a n d partly through failure to exploit fully initial surprise. At 2100 hours on 7 J u l y . London.. Ottawa.. London. London. At the outset. P.Suggested reading: General Works: Wilmot C. London. b u t not the F a u b o u r g de Vaucelles south of the O r n e . Montgomery suspended the batde. 1952. London. T h e city. June 1944. A glance at the map suffices to explain the immense stategic importance of Caen in the Battle of Normandy. British sources he never once deviated from this aim. Bayeux a n d Caen were included in the D . Keegan J. 467 Lancasters of Bomber C o m m a n d d r o p p e d 2. Stacey.D a y objectives of the British 2nd Army. P. the bulk of the German mobile reserves were sited north of the Seine. 1951. The Battle of Normandy. Bayeux fell on 7 J u n e . The Struggle for Europe. Hastings. 8 miles south-west of Caen. with t h e result that on 25 July. T h r e e battles resulted. The Victory Campaign. the chance of taking Caen on D . On die Campaign: Speidel. By 29 J u n e it h a d forestalled the last German attempt to break the Allied front. D. 1984. T h e storm from 18 to 21 J u n e delayed t h e start of the next offensive to 25 J u n e .. regrettably. Essame and Belfield. Seven Armies in Normandy. 1962. T h e Germans quickly endeavoured to concentrate 4 very good Panzer divisions in the area. London. an attempt between 10 a n d 15 J u n e to outflank a n d encircle the city with t h e 30th Corps from the Bayeux area towards Villers Bocage a n d Evrécy. The city was also the sally port offering the invaders the shortest route to Paris and the Seine ports and to the best country for the establishment of airfields. 1965. 1983.. His strategic aim achieved. attacking both east and west of the Orne.560 tons of bombs on Caen causing immense d a m a g e a n d m u c h civilian suffering. T h e theme of British operations for the next m o n t h thus became the c a p t u r e of Caen. T h e first. For the next 20 days Montgomery continued to pull the weight of t h e enemy's a r m o u r on to the British front. Normandy. 1984. fell to the British 2nd A r m y on the following day. H.. Carell.D a y was missed. This involved a thrust by the 8th Corps from the north between Caen a n d Tilly across the River O d o n a n d aimed at placing the British armour astride the Caen-Falaise road. thus drawing the G e r m a n armoured divisions on to the British a n d Canadians a n d wearing t h e m down. London. H. 1960. We defended Normandy. P. Willmott. They must therefore approach the bridgehead from the east and converge on Caen.
On the Campaign and Batde: Miles. Fuller. Article: Chandler. J. he was holding 7 Panzer divisions. W. Vol.. Location: Follow Route Nationale 17 or 29 from Gouzeaucourt or Boursies to Cambrai. Woolcombe. H.000 British (approx. (b) Germans: 6 divisions (ultimately strengthened to 20). Vol. where the terrain was favourable for use of the tank. London. 3 tank brigades. supported by Bomber C o m m a n d . London. The Tanks.. (b) 53.. 80 . As t h e American breakout proceeded. 4.000 German. Military Operations.. Battle of the Tanks. 1948. Cambrai. 1964. the Western Front. 6 infantry divisions a n d 3 Nebelwerfer brigades (over 600 tanks) in the Caen area. an indication of the work of the tank pioneers a n d t h e nearest a p p r o a c h to a quick a n d cheap breakthrough which a n y a r m y h a d hitherto achieved o n t h e Western F r o n t since the construction of the continuous trench system in N o v e m b e r 1914. 1917 (see p. t h e ist C a n a d i a n A r m y . T h e Royal T a n k Regiment. Opposing sides: (a) General Byng commanding the British 3rd Army. B. London. G. D. Lo.. 5 French divisions in reserve. (b) General von der Marwitz in command of the German 2nd Army. C. 1920. London.E. the direct descendant of the T a n k Corps of 1917. Suggested reading: General Works: Termine. annually a n d rightly celebrate 20 November as their regimental day. Cambrai (A****) Date: 20 November-5 December 1917. 1967. London. Result: A brilliant initial success was nullified by a lack of reserves to resist German counter-attacks. H. Forces engaged (on 20 November): (a) British: 19 divisions. R. in Peter Young (ed. France and Flanders. J. 'The Batde of Cambrai'. and Edmonds. 1914-18.when t h e Americans were at last ready to break out at St. J. whereas the Americans were faced only by 9 divisions of sorts a n d not m o r e t h a n 100 tanks. London.. The Western Front. F. 1959. Tanks in the Great War. War and campaign: The First World War. I. Liddell Hart. relendessly continued t h e attack down the r o a d towards Falaise. Cambria 1917. 1971.). Casualties: (a) 44.) The Pumell History of the First World War. 76. for C a m b r a i was t h e first great tank offensive in history. 381) Object of the action: An Allied large-scale raid on the Somme front.
however. Quentin canal which turned north again to Cambrai before it reached the dominating spur of the Bourlon ridge on the left. trenches and interlocking strong points some 4. who knew only too well how few were the reserves available. Behind Cambrai the upper Sensée river ran at right angles across the axis of advance. Quentin canal. The tanks at Ypres had. bogged in the autumn quagmireFarther south. The British would thus attack into a narrowing pocket and would have to seize both the ridge and the canal to break across the flanks and secure crossings over the Sensée to break through in depth. he turned again to a plan which he had briefly considered earlier. set a time limit of 48 hours for the seizure of the flanks and the crossings. 81 . had advocated no more than a raid on an enormous scale. the Tank Corps staff officer who had selected Cambrai as a profitable tank zone. On 13 October Haig gave his approval to the withdrawal of tanks from Ypres and the inception of detailed planning. firstly to break through the Hindenburg line. The front chosen for attack was bounded on the east and west by the Canal du Nord and the St.The main efforts of the British Army in the summer and autumn of 1917 were engaged in Flanders where Haig's obsession with the scene of his first major command was worked out in a series of dreadful and fruitless frontal assaults on the ridges before Ypres. Fuller. commanding the 3rd Army. By 19 November the 3rd Army had 19 divisions on the front. The gap was blocked by the main Hindenburg position. Bourlon wood and the Sensée crossings. designed to humiliate and confuse the enemy by a short and dramatic coup de main. Unless the original force could keep to schedule the operation would fail for lack of support and must be abandoned. offered the chance of a quick advance for it was largely free of the shell craters which had trapped the tanks at Ypres and was weakly garrisoned. The open country in the centre. a belt of wire. Byng. These objectives were approved but Haig.000 yards deep. lastly to push north-west towards Valenciennes. as the experts forecast. about 7 miles apart. behind which ran a second position (the Masnières-Beaurevoir line). which was to strike the blow. By the middle of October it was clear even to him that the battle could not be prolonged with any profit in the worsening autumn weather and. prepared a more ambitious project whose objects were. the rolling chalk downs of the Somme provided the 'going' which they needed and offered a good chance of exploitation if the tanks could secure the preliminary breakthrough which the tank staff confidently predicted. thirdly to cut off the Germans between the Sensée and the Canal du Nord and. next to capture Cambrai. anxious for a success and a diversion elsewhere. Supporting the main position and narrowing the gap was a westward loop of the St.
The artillery numbered 1.000 guns.CAMBRAI 20th November to 5th December 1917 Six of these were to make the break-in which the Cavalry Corps (5 divisions) was to exploit. secretly assembled and masked from discovery by dependence on a new and most difficult technique: shooting 82 .
Q. with 4 in support. while Haig had almost nothing on hand.. Although the Germans had received rumours of an impending attack they were quite unaware of the nature of the blow about to fall. to salute a victory. They had only 2 divisions in the line. 83 . although the situation looked promising on the map. to intense fire from 3 field batteries in the orchards around the village.from the map without preliminary registration. Haig had nothing in hand to reinforce his effort. Within 4 hours the whole of the Hindenburg line was in British hands. There were also 3 French infantry and 2 cavalry divisions behind the British. But some were already on their way. The commander of the 51st (Highland) Division distrusted the new arm and had kept his infantry too far behind the tanks. This unprecedented simultaneity carried the British quickly and easily through the German first positions. The church bells were rung next morning in London. for the first and last time before the armistice. but the exposed advance must be extended if the attackers were themselves to escape harm. except around the fortified village of Flesquières in the centre which was stubbornly defended. completing their approach under cover of noise from low-flying aeroplanes. By evening. At 6. and only 150 guns. the troops were tiring and 179 of the tanks were out of action. 476 in all. but the other divisions were intent upon securing their own objectives and the notorious weakness of communications prevented a clear picture of the situation percolating to 3rd Army H. and the tanks had been brought forward by train. who were themselves subjected. The assaulting infantry and tanks had practised the techniques of co-operation thoroughly in back areas. The 'cavalry gap' had not appeared. disposed there at the insistence of Pétain to help in enlarging the expected success. The village might have been taken at any time by a flank attack from right or left. as they moved onward. but if dramatic it was not complete.20 am on 20 November the bombardment opened and the infantry and tanks moved forward. Paschendaele had worn down their army to a dangerously weak level and it could not be made up until the Russian armistice released troops from the east. During the night of 19 November they leaguered in the ruined villages and the dense thickets of Havrincourt wood. The well-known 'diminishing power of the attack' had set in and the Germans were hurrying troops to the area. a departure from convention which lulled enemy suspicion. Finally. Thus the infantry were exposed to German machine guns undestroyed by the tanks. There was to be no preparatory bombardment. 3 brigades of tanks stood ready to move off. Bourlon was unattacked. of which 378 were fighting tanks and the rest supply or gun-carriers. less had been achieved than was necessary.
451. which seemed to promise a continuation of the previous day's progress. but this is no fair measure of its importance. Forces engaged: Uncertain. (b) Attila the Hun commanding his barbarian army. and the Visigoth king. 377). The success of the Allied armies in late 1918 and the later development of all armoured forces stem from the surprise and triumph of 20 November 1917. J. After an initial advance of a mile and a half. their attacks drove in the sides of the salient and regained much of the ground lost. 84 . They also broke through the original British line south of Villers Plouich.D. On 29 November they repaid the surprise. Location: Follow Route Nationale 19 from Paris for 139 km. Casualties: Not known. Theoderic. but this came too late for a quick success at Bourlon against which Haig was now forced to concentrate. Haig was unable to disengage or. on the night of 4/5 December Haig ordered a withdrawal to a line from Flesquières to Gonnelieu. Although his time limit had been exceeded. War and campaign: The Hun Invasion of Gaul (see p. Against the more resolute British defence the effect was minimised but. Quentin canal. Châlons-sur-Marne (Mêry-sur-Seine) (B***) D a t e : A. with 20 divisions in hand. to Merysur-Seine. to divert the enemy by attacks on the right where he held crossings over the St. almost exactly the area captured in the first day's fighting. In Russia and Italy they had recently experimented with a technique of hurricane bombardment and infantry infiltration which had proved enormously successful. in fact.P. 95. Aetius. For the next week bitter fighting raged around this little spur. Thus.Flesquières was. Opposing sides: (a) The Roman Master of the Soldiers. the infantry met tenacious resistance in Bourlon wood and the advance ceased. from Troyes. evacuated during the night. in material terms.K. although German gains to the south had turned it into an uncomfortable salient.D. Object of the action: The Romans were attempting to repulse the Huns from northern Gaul. It was clear that the British posture was unbalanced and. 29 km. for lack of troops. Cambrai was a disappointment. As his casualties mounted the Germans were assembling divisions from east and west for the counter-stroke.
living as devouring parasites in every society at which they struck. 1915. T. for the Emperor Valentinian's repressed and half-crazed sister Honoria had secretly sent him her ring and a request for marriage. although not large in numbers or physique. but the powerful Visigothic kingdom of Theoderic in Aquitaine. 1900.). They were destroyers. appeared to be militarily invincible: living in the saddle. in History Today. E. Fuller. were still a danger to the Empire.. demanded his bride and half Valentinian's Empire as her dowry. Vol. who. who may have been supposed to attack Italy. but the Hun impetus was checked for the first time. Italy and her Invaders (2nd Edn. London. J. but in 450 the new eastern Emperor Marcian suspended payment. and Rome had in fact employed Huns as mercenaries against them to defend Provence.. Surprisingly. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Edn. and their powers were yet further enhanced by the acquisition of Roman horses of superior size and endurance.D. in contrast to the Germanic invaders who had preceded them into the Empire. London. was still the terror of the entire Roman Empire after eighteen years of rule over his barbaric horde of nomads based to the north of the Danube. Article: Grant. At the same time. Attila. pure and simple. M. had ravaged the Chinese Kmpire. For long Attila had been content to exact a tribute in gold. 85 . who already had numerous wives. their horsemanship and mobility in the field were incredible. The Huns. 'Attila the Hun'. Suggested reading: General Works: Gibbon. 1954.. First. J. Bury). The Visigoths. 1892. IV. who a generation before had captured and sacked Rome. centuries before. under Alaric. London. At any rate. In A. Attila must have known that his most formidable opponents were not the Romans themselves. 1954. They were by now relatively civilised.). This in particular directed Attila to Gaul rather than Italy. His reasons were twofold. I. the King of the Huns. now dominating North Africa. and the rival candidates appealed to Attila and to Rome. Worse still for Rome. F. 451 Attila. But the Visigoths were now in conflict with Attila's Vandal allies. On the Battle: Creasy. C. B. and would certainly oppose Attila himself. and they were Christians..Result: Neither side gained a clear victory. their nobles at least were educated men. Vol. Decisive Battles of the Western World. took up the offer. the attractions of civilised life meant nothing to them. The request was refused. Fifteen Decisive Battles of the Western World (Oxford Edn. Attila decided to attack in the west first. though it is possible that concerted action was planned with Geiseric the Vandal king. the Ripuarian Franks who were settled in north-west Gaul were without a king. he conveniently had a pretext. E.. Hodgkin.
the Visigoth king Theoderic at Toulouse was given eloquent warning of the common danger. son of King Theoderic. Master of the Soldiers. and decided to wait till the early afternoon before giving battle. and for the past twenty years virtual ruler of the Western Empire. the allied weak spot. From them Attila might expect welcome as a deliverer. including Trier. The Roman and Visigoth army had now been strengthened by the adhesion of Sangibanus. in three columns. under the name of Bagaudae. King of the Alans. managed to occupy a small prominence overlooking the plain. the Ostrogoths facing their Visigoth kinsmen on the left wing. striking at Arras. Aetius and Theoderic put the suspect Alans in the centre. had spent a period of exile with them. Cologne. and had been in a state of rebellion for many years. He entered Gaul in early summer of 451. After the initial exchange of missiles Attila's cavalry charged the centre. Attila put the Huns in his centre. Aetius pursued his rearguard and inflicted severe casualties on the motley forces of the Huns and their allies. which was miraculously saved. On 14 June he began his retreat towards the Seine. As a young man he had lived as a hostage among the Huns. he moved towards the south and besieged Orléans. living in retirement on his estates at Clermont. Meanwhile the Roman forces had been gathering in the south. and took the left and right wings respectively for their own forces. another barbarian people settled in Gaul. broke through and wheeled round to take the Visigoths in the rear. and knew Attila personally.The native peasantry of Gaul looked on Roman and Visigoth armies alike as oppressors. had on several occasions employed them as mercenaries. The Roman commander-in-chief was Aetius the Patrician. The united army advanced on Orléans. Attila took this as a sign 86 . and mustered his forces. Through the mediation of the powerful Gallic senator Avitus. Aetius had crossed the Alps with a token force only. Metz and Strasbourg. were sacked and burned. strategically controlling an important crossing of the Loire. In the meantime a small Visigoth force under Thorismond. It was an ideal position for him. From Paris. and the Gepidae and other contingents on the right. When the Romano-Gothic force arrived Attila realised that he was outnumbered. overlooking the Hun left flank. Over a dozen cities. the only hill of any size and thus a tactical position of immense importance. Attila moved back on the Seine and halted at Méry. clearly planning to give battle in the wide plains of Champagne. but he was suspected of being ready to change sides. and Attila raised the siege which had lasted five weeks. In the clash King Theoderic was struck by a missile and trampled to death in the mêlée. Mainz and Strasbourg. where his cavalry could be used to full advantage.
and saved Europe from becoming a desert. sullenly suspecting a trap. Eventually he came out. to leave Italy. It was now dusk and he rode back with his men to the Goth camp. Attila. and the Huns were never again a serious threat to Rome. It was the first time that he had not conquered. this chieftain who still claimed the Emperor's sister and her dowry. and occupied Milan. Aetius preferred to maintain a balance of terror. including Aquileia. He had preyed on Thorismond's fears that if he did not return at once to Toulouse he might be ousted from the throne. and he suffered serious casualties. who had feared that the Visigoths. causing the pursuit to lose its impetus. barricaded by wagons. would present an intolerable menace to Rome once more. The co-operation of Roman and Visigoth was a promising augury for the future. The battle showed that the Germanic barbarians—the Visigoths—could choose civilisation rather than barbarism. a matter of vital importance to him as the number of actual Huns was always small. Although the battle in Champagne in June 451 did not completely finish off Attila. destroying numerous cities. to which Aetius also had come. and were prepared either to fight him again or to starve him out. The rest of the batde had been indecisive so far^ but Attila and the Huns were now forced to retreat and were pursued right up to their encampment. It was the first time that his invincibility had been shaken in pitched battle. after a barbarous revel to celebrate yet another marriage. He had even prepared his own funeral pyre. Here Thorismond was thrown from his horse and narrowly escaped. Here Thorismond was formally elected king by the army in succession to Theoderic and swore revenge against the killers of his father. in the safety of his camp. What had happened was the work of the diplomatic Aetius. So the Visigoths left. was prepared for the worst. retired north across the Rhine and went back to his primitive cantonments on the Danube. if completely victorious over Attila. Attila remained in his camp for several days.of victory. The next year. After his death his illdisciplined and motley armies disintegrated. Here a deputation led by Pope Leo somehow persuaded him. The next year Attila descended on Italy itself. its importance cannot be underestimated. died from a haemorrhage on the marriage bed. after managing to hold out on the Roman left wing. But the next morning the Visigoth and Roman contingents dispersed and went their separate ways. but the result was to bring on a furious charge from the dead king's son Thorismond from his position above/the plain. The Visigoths were breathing fire and slaughter. perhaps by preying on his superstitions. and the number of subject allies he could compel to serve him depended largely on the myth of his invincibility. Padua and Verona. like those which 88 .
K. F. near Laffaux. 30. H. arose out of t h e rivalry between Philip VI of 89 .000 other ranks. Vol. M u c h fighting centred along this natural line of resistance between Laon and R h e i m s . 73. Total: approx. 1346. with some Genoese and Italian troops. (b) King Philip VI commanding the French forces. Western Front. 1987. London. Sir C. C. de.. Prelude to Victory. 1946.500 knights and squires and perhaps 10. Lot. Crécy. Result: An overwhelming English victory which in due course opened the way for the siege and capture of Calais. 16-30 April 1917.. 1917. London. Opposing sides: (a) King Edward III commanding an army of Englishmen and Welshmen. of which Crécy was t h e first major land battle. 1946 (English Edn. H. E. On the Campaign and Batde. Vol. moving towards Flanders. Location: From Abbeville follow the Hesdin-St. J. M.000 foot (including Genoese cross-bowmen) . London. battle of. Burne. Crécy (A****) Date: 26 August 1346. 1955.R.. 9. 2. London. (b) The French lost 1. See Spears.000) led directly to the 'military strike' of M a y 1917. the terrible casualties inflicted on the French during t h e Nivelle offensive of April 1917 (187. Work of Fiction: Ellis. 378). large numbers of ccmmunal militia. The battle site lies in the triangle Crécy-Wadicourt-Estrées.. A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages. 1924.B. LArt Militaire et les Armées au Moyen Age. I. London. 1951). 1949. the Hundred \ears' War (see p. F. A. 1939. Perroy. turn left 3 miles south of Labroye for Crécy-en-Ponthieu.000 Welshmen. Fuller. Forces engaged: (a) English: 5. Object of the action: Edward III.. La Guerre de Cent Ans. Vol. Guns Forever Echo.500 men-at-arms. London. C H E M I N DES D A M E S ( B * * * ) . Suggested reading: General Works: Oman.000 men-at-arms. 1954. 1. The Hundred Years' War.500 archers. Total: approx. T h e H u n d r e d Years' W a r . I. London. The Crécy War. 10. Casualties: (a) The English lost about 100 all ranks.000. Omer road north for 11 miles.). War and campaign: The Normandy-Calais Campaign of 1346.000. (b) French: 6. 85. The Decisive Battles of the Western World. A. if they did recover at all. turned to face his French pursuers. Wailly.the H u n s h a d created in central Asia a n d which took centuries to recover from the effects of a few years of domination. II (enlarged 2nd Edn.
to undermine his rival's power. set sail for France. claiming his own right—through his mother Isabelle. The lower Seine was found to be impassable. as Duke of Aquitaine. Edward III was anxious not to bind himself too strongly as an obedient subject and. He chose the latter. and it is not clear whether Edward intended simply a diversion or a raid in force. and proceeded to Crécy. A decision was then enforced on Edward by a mutiny among his own ships' crews who. returned to England. or. deprived of his line of communication. crossed the Somme by the bridge in Abbeville. was a vassal of the French king. Edward. which for a generation at least gave the English command of the Channel and therefore the ability to mount expeditions to invade France with relatively little fear of interference. if the latter. attacking northern France through Flanders. after Philip had declared Edward's province of Guienne forfeit. Brittany or Guienne. and the latter wished to insist on as binding a form of vassalage as possible in order to restrain a dangerous and over-mighty subject. But. 90 . what the precise objective of the raid was to be. and Edward was forced to go close to Paris before getting across at Poissy. His general strategic plan is far from clear. 10 miles below Abbeville. In the ensuing clash each king took advantage of the other's domestic problems. It seems that Edward had originally intended to sail for Gascony but changed his mind and made for the Cotentin peninsula. Thus what began as a feudal quarrel developed into a dynastic conflict. Edward. After several vain attempts he crossed the Somme at Blanchetaque. In the next few years there followed further expeditions to Flanders and to Guienne. Active hostilities broke out in 1337 when.000 men at Portsmouth and. Edward hurried northwards towards the Somme at Abbeville. daughter of Philip IV of France—instead. It had already become a fairly established strategy to divert the King of France from his attacks on Guienne by. on 24 August. to get to Flanders. But in 1346 the approach was entirely different. on 11 July. against his orders. whether in Scotland. in the end. probably influenced in his choice by the news that his Flemish allies had crossed the French frontier and laid siege to Béthune. In these early years of fighting the one decisive action was the naval battle of Sluys of 24 June 1340. in turn. some 12 miles farther north. Edward made his first attack on Philip via Flanders. Knowing that Philip now had a large army in the Paris area. denied the right of Philip to be King of France at all. Early in July 1346 Edward III mustered an army of about 10. still in pursuit. the Seine and the Somme had to be crossed. could either move south towards his own troops in Guienne or north-east towards Flanders.France and Edward III of England. Meanwhile Philip.
CRÉGY 26th August 1346 91 .
by the Earls of Arundel and Northampton. though less protection. however. his army was marching in considerable disorder and totally unready for battle.At Crécy Edward decided to turn and accept battle. delaying battle until the next day. Moreover. most were decimated by the English archers firing in from the flanks. 92 . assuming that the French must—as they did—approach from this direction using the Abbeville-Hesdin road.000 strong. now about 9. On the English side it had been a static battle defending a strong natural position. Two divisions were placed forward. on the two inner flanks archers were similarly posted. on the left. As the cross-bowmen gave way before this deadly attack and turned to retire in disorder. their positions forming a V-shape at that point. on the north the village of Wadicourt itself gave some. the reserve division by Edward III. The line of battle of the first two divisions was one to which the English were now becoming accustomed. a third behind in reserve.000 yards apart. On the south. attempting to get to grips with the dismounted English men-at-arms. As they approached the English the Genoese cross-bowmen were thrown forward to begin the attack at about 6 pm. Contact between the two armies was made in the late afternoon of 26 August and some of his entourage urged Philip to halt and form up his army. This wise advice was never put into action simply because the advance guard of the French army refused to stop. was drawn up in three 'divisions' or 'battles'. the second. In addition many small holes were dug in front of these positions to cause the enemy cavalry to stumble. It is calculated that some 12 to 15 quite uncoordinated attacks of this kind took place during the next 4 to 5 hours. In his advance from Abbeville Philip had at first lost touch with the English and had not expected them to turn and fight. the French men-at-arms charged down and through them. two villages about 3. From this position they could pour flanking fire against enemy horsemen attacking the dismounted men-at-arms. long-bowmen. He drew up his army in the area between Crécy and Wadicourt. On each outer flank archers. were out-ranged by the English long-bow which was capable of being used effectively at ranges of 200-250 yards. In each division the men-at-arms were dismounted and stationed in the centre. and although some got to grips with the centre of each English division. the position was protected by the edge of the dense Forest of Crécy and the tiny River Maye. The first division. or right flank. was commanded by the Prince of Wales. The English army. and faced south-eastwards in the direction of Fontaine-sur-Maye. were drawn up at an obtuse angle to the line and forward of it. on the right. on the forward slope of the rise which lies east of the road between Crécy and Wadicourt. Their weapons.
Opposing sides: (a) General Montgomery commanding 2 ist Army Group (2nd British and ist U.500 wounded or missing. 1952. Strategically. 1960. London. Marshal Villars (24..500 Allies killed: 8. L.S. Result: Although no final objectives were attained. as we have seen. London. N. 75. Young. battle of. Armies). DENAIN (G***) . War and campaign: The Second World War. and thus inaugurate the Second Front in the West. B. (b) Germans: elements of 3 infantry and 1 Panzer divisions.. D-D ay (Operation Overlord) (A****) Date: 6 June 1944. Wilmot. 82.G. A n d on 28 August E d w a r d continued his m a r c h via Montreuil to Calais. 24 July 1712. this success raised French morale and discouraged the Allies. See Henderson. part of Rommel's Army Group 'B'. Object of the action: The Allies were attempting to establish a bridgehead on the Normandy coast of German-occupied Europe. N. Prince Eugen of Savoy. thereby regaining Denain.000) inflicted a sharp defeat on General Albemarle (10. and later St. (b) General Hausser's 7th German Army. Amand and Douai from the Allies.. C. 2 commando and 3 armoured brigades. t h e battle of Crécy established the supremacy of the long-bow on the battlefields of Europe a n d gave England the standing of a great military power. On the Battle: Ryan. (b) Germans: no figures known. The Longest Day. a n d its only immediate result was the capture of Calais. the North-west Europe Campaign. on Prince Eugen. Forces engaged: (a) Allies: 3 airborne. the Allies achieved a decisive success and thus secured a considerable bridgehead in 'Festung Europa'. London. Location: A 30-mile stretch of the Normandy coast from the river Orne to the base of the Cotentin Peninsula.By midnight Philip withdrew to the castle of Broye. the whole operation lacked coherent purpose. War of the Spanish Succession. Casualties: (a) 2. The Struggle for Europe. 1946. C. Normandy to the Baltic. 1964. 7 infantry divisions. 93 . Tactically. 1944-5 (see p. 381). London.500) and indirectly. on the river Scheldt.H. Suggested reading: General Works: Montgomery. P.
The naval operation to sweep lanes through the minefields. D-Day.. London.D-Day. and the British had also a mass of special tanks known as 'Funnies' for gapping minefields and wire. month-long. June 1944. transport two armies across the Channel and support the landings with gunfire involved using over 3. H. had General Bradley's American ist Army and British 2nd Army under General Dempsey. D. But his forces were necessarily widely dispersed. 1981. 1984.. He was also absent on leave in Germany when the battle began. responsible for defending the whole north-western coast of Europe. bridging awkward places and blowing up concrete emplacements. and he could only move up his best armoured reserve divisions with Hitler's direct permission. London. had to secure both flanks of the assault. London. Gthjune 1944. under the supreme command of General Eisenhower. D-Day was the breaching of the so-called Atlantic Wall of Hitler's 'Fortress Europe' to enforce the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. which was to 94 . Amphibious tanks were to accompany the infantry assault boats. 1984. planned to fight to a finish on the heavily fortified beaches.000 ships. Field-Marshal Rommel. Freeman. dropped soon after midnight. P. For the cross-Channel assault Montgomery. Airborne divisions. Willmott. air offensive against road and rail communications in France and all bridges over the lower Seine. D-DAY (OPERATION OVERLORD) 6th June 1944 The assault was preceded by a massive.
Rommel had strengthened his defences by widespread flooding of the river valleys behind the beaches. though only 4 miles of coast had been cleared. however. landed at the wrong places and in great disorder under a withering fire from the unsubdued defences. By midnight they held an area running 9 miles inland. code-named Utah and Omaha for the Americans. and the assault companies of infantry. west of the Vire. by seizing Caen and Bayeux. where they drowned. while successive waves of troops and vehicles came ashore in mounting confusion. Linking them were the Canadians on Juno. In spite of confusion on the beaches and some heavy fighting along the dunes. the American ist and 29th Divisions came very near to disaster. was also successful.000 casualties. The 50th Division was to land on Gold and capture Arromanches and Bayeux. Gold. were pinned to the tide-line for hours. north of the Vire estuary.30 in the morning onwards. Almost all the tanks launched were swamped. and the beach defences were gradually worn down.come in at half-tide. by 1 pm they had linked up with the airborne troops. By good fortune opposition there was. many of them into the floods. hoped to capture Caen. the 3rd Division. On the beach alone they had suffered over 3. Dempsey. Brilliant leadership and the fighting courage of the troops at last got a few parties moving inland by midday. But by midnight they had only penetrated about i£ miles on a 4-mile front and their situation was still very precarious. The seaborne landing by the American 4th Division on Utah. Some assault craft and tanks sank in the heavy seas. The American 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions had the tasks of securing the five causeways which ran back through the floods behind Utah beach and the bridges beyond the floods over the River Merderet. At Omaha. and bad navigation brought the whole assault wave in a mile south of the selected beach. whereas at Utah there had only been 12 killed and 100 wounded. on five beaches. had to shield the Americans from interference by the German armoured reserve. from 6. dropped at 95 . Juno and Sword for the British and Canadians. The 6th Airborne Division. Farther to the east the British 2nd Army had three beaches. Bradley was to secure a firm base for operations to cut off and capture Cherbourg. who were to cut the Caen-Bayeux road and threaten Caen from the west. The preliminary air and naval bombardment overshot the target. light and two of the five causeways were quickly secured. Wherever possible. which was mostly held back in the area between the Seine and the Loire. But the handful which assembled secured almost all the objectives and caused the maximum bewilderment and confusion among the Germans. landing on Sword. Inexperience and bad navigation led to them being dropped over a widely scattered area.
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