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I grew up in a Winchester family. Winchester-Remington was like Ford-Chevy, Republican-Democrat or Catholic-Lutheran where I grew up. My best friends and neighbors the Fink boys, were democrat, Ford, Remington nuts, what's worse is they went full bore using semi-auto shotguns for duck hunting. Our family was more conservative, My dad drove an Oldsmobile, voted republican and shot Winchesters, Model 94 lever actions on the ranch, Model 70 .257 Roberts for deer hunting and the trusty old Model 12 for small game and birds, he wouldn't dream of using a finicky auto in the marsh over the proven pump gun. The thing is my Dad never duck hunted while that was the whole world to the Finks, so I was heavily influenced by them when I started duck hunting at 15. Here's a pic of me at 15 with Dave Fink's (he was 12) Savage Stevens .410/22 over under.
A year later my Dad surprised me with my fist gun. Though he and I would spend hours reading the Shooters Bible, endlessly pouring over the ballistics tables and arguing the merits of the 30-06 versus the .270 for deer size game, checking out all the guns and dreaming about our perfect arsenal, we somehow missed the big news that things had drastically changed at Winchester the prior year, this was 1965. So my dad meaning to buy me a Model 12 was forced into the new and improved Model 1200. Regardless I loved that gun and shot very well with it right out of the box. It was a field grade 12 gauge with 28" modified barrel and vent rib. I shot three pheasants with my first three shots, a year later on a dove hunt in Arizona I shot nine straight, missed one then got my tenth (a limit) with my next shot. I also got my first double on ducks with it that first duck season. All that said, I started comparing it to the solid steel, beautifully machined Model 12, and even the much less finished, solid "ordinance steel" 870, and became disillusioned with the 1200. So I sold it to a guy to buy an 870.
My Dad and I drove down to Pachmyers in downtown LA and ended up buying a nice used 870 TB that came with two barrels, a 30" full choke that would be my pass shooting duck barrel and a 26" modified that I used for upland and decoying ducks. The gun was 2-3/4" which I didn't consider a handicap even though the Fink boys now had 3" Magnum Remington 1100's. This trap grade with standard stock dimensions had upgraded wood and was very nice. I still have it to this day. It was a better built gun than the 1200 and better looking too, but I never shot it as well as that good old 1200. That 1200 just fit me better. I learned to shoot the 870 and killed many limits of ducks over the years, but I had just learned to adapt to the gun, it wasn't a natural fit. That truth became evident some thirty years later when I was hunting with Neil. it was afternoon and we were picking up. Neil was out wading to pick up decoys while I was on shore putting gear away. A flight of mallards swung in as they only do with everyone standing out in the open and no gun in hand. I looked around saw Neil's old beat up 1200 laying against a log, picked it up and shot a double out of the flock without thinking.
Now that I'm older and have a little more means I own way too many shotguns, a few nice over under's, Parker and Lefever side by sides, 870s, my Dad's 16 ga. Model 12 and more than I can think of off the top of my head, but there is something to be said for sticking with the gun that fits you best. I wish I still had that plain Jane Model 1200.


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Taking Control of Your Backups With CrashPlan and CrashPlan PROe ServerFriday, December 7th, 2012
Andrew Renz from Code 42, the developers of CrashPlan, gave an in-depth presentation on backup and restores for desktops, laptops, servers and mobile devices.
Many departments on campus provide CrashPlan backup, such as the School of Medicine, Earth Sciences, DAPER and H&S. Others folks may be interested in using CrashPlan's cloud backup service for individuals and home users.

subset: commoncrawl


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ANYA SCHMEMANN: All right, if folks will get their hot drinks and we'll get started. I'm Anya Schmemann. I'm the director of communications here at CFR, and it's a pleasure to have you all here on this rainy morning.
We do so much by email and telephone these days but we thought it would be a nice opportunity to really get us around a table in a small group to discuss, you know, this really important challenge that's really getting a lot of attention these days; that is, what to do with Iran. The situation seems to be escalating. Tensions are rising.
So there are two possible paths: to diffuse those tensions or to take some decisive action. And I'm pleased to be joined here by two colleagues today: Ray Takeyh and Matthew Kroenig.
Ray Takeyh is a longtime Iran watcher, known to many of you. He's our senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies here at CFR. He recently served in the State Department as a special adviser. He's the author of several books, including two recent books on internal dynamics in Iran, "The Guardians of the Revolution: Iran's Approach to the World" and "Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic."
Matthew Kroenig is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and is a Stanton nuclear security fellow here at the council. It's a year-long fellowship that we have for nuclear issues. He also served as an adviser -- Hi, Michelle (sp) -- for the Department of Defense, and is the author of "Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and Spread of Nuclear Weapons."
Michelle, we do have a plug over here for you if you need it.
QUESTIONER: Great. Thank you. It's on the record, right?
SCHMEMANN: We are on the record indeed.
We have two pieces for you at the end of the table written by these folks. Ray Takeyh had a piece over the weekend in the Washington Post. Matthew Kroenig has a provocative piece in the current issue of Foreign Affairs magazine titled "Time to Attack Iran" -- he will explain what he means by that -- and Ray's piece, "How the West Should Answer Iran's Nuclear Aggression." There's a lot of issues to discuss. The nuclear part of it is really just one of several aspects, so we'll get into that.
Just to frame this, we have two very different statements here. Matthew, in his piece, wrote, "Addressing the threat now will spare the United States from confronting a far more dangerous situation in the future." And Ray's piece says something a little different. He says, "A tense situation can provoke accidental conflicts and mishaps." Parties might act impetuously and irresponsibly. The international community should not necessarily ease pressure. But it does suggest that eschewing -- I like that word -- "conduct" -- one should "eschew conduct that further inflames the situation."
So let me just turn to my colleagues for just some very quick opening remarks and we'll get right to questions.
Matthew, what do you mean by your piece? And, again, I'll quote another line: "A military strike intended to destroy Iran's nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-term national security of the United States." Why would a military strike -- how could it be successful? How would it help? And why can we not live with a nuclear Iran?
MATTHEW KROENIG: So, my analysis in this article came out of work I did last year where I was a special adviser in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and where I worked on defense strategy and policy on Iran.
And so, having -- you know, so Michelle -- or Anya had say that there are two very different paths here: either diffuse tensions or take action. And I think if that was the choice, the choice would be simple. We would obviously not take action. But I'm afraid the choice we're rapidly confronting is between two far more dangerous options; that is, either allowing Iran to have nuclear weapons or conducting a military strike designed to prevent that from happening.
And, based on my work last year, I came to the conclusion that, given that choice, the United States' best course of action is to conduct a surgical strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, pull back and absorb an inevitable round of Iranian retaliation, and then seek to quickly de-escalate the crisis. So, some of you might have already seen the article but I'd just like to take a couple of minutes to provide a kind of an overview of the argument.
So, first, a nuclear-armed Iran obviously poses many dangers. We can go into more detail on all this in Q&A if you're interested, but I think a nuclear-armed Iran would step up its support to terrorist groups and the proxies would be more aggressive in the region in terms of course of diplomacy, would likely transfer sensitive nuclear materials to other states.
And there's always the possibility of nuclear war. I don't think Iran would intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but in a crisis between Iran and Israel or Iran and the United States, a kind of Cuban missile crisis-type situation, it's not hard to imagine things spilling out of control and resulting in a nuclear exchange.
So these are serious threats to the United States if Iran acquired nuclear weapons. We would put in place a deterrence and containment regime to try to deal with that. And so I think that that would work in the sense people say deterrence would work.
If we're talking about deterring Iran from intentionally launching a nuclear war, I agree that deterrence would work, but I think that for the other threats I mentioned, the threat of military -- massive military retaliation is simply incredible. If Iran were to transfer sensitive nuclear materials to Venezuela, for example, the idea that we would launch some kind of massive retaliation response to that I think is incredible.
So these are dangers that we'd have to live with as long as Iran existed as state and possessed nuclear weapons. So this is challenges we'd be dealing with for decades and perhaps longer. So, not an attractive option.
So, what does the military option look like? Part of the reason I was motivated to write this article is I think there is a lot of misinformation out there. And so, I wanted to clear some of that up.
And so, first, I think that a strike -- there's no doubt that a U.S. strike would significantly set back Iran's nuclear program. Again, we can go into more detail in Q&A, but I think it's unlikely that there are significant operational nuclear facilities that we don't know about.
The United States could certainly destroy Iran's known facilities and, in my estimation and others' estimation, it would significantly -- again, a U.S. strike as opposed to an Israeli strike would significantly set back Iran's nuclear program from, I guess, somewhere from three to 10 years. So that buys a lot of time for further diplomacy; for something to change where Iran ends up without nuclear weapons.
There would obviously be serious consequences to a strike in terms of Iranian retaliation: increases in oil prices, the possible effects on Iranian domestic politics, the international reaction. But my experience leads me to believe that consequences wouldn't be as grave as may people fear, and that the United States could put in place a strategy to mitigate those consequences.
So, I'll just mention one here. A lot of people worry that a strike would somehow turn into full-scale war. And so Iranian retaliation is a real fear, but put yourselves in the shoes of, say, the supreme leader. You wake up one morning and you find that, you know, five or 10 of your key nuclear facilities have just been destroyed, but your military is still intact, your regime is still intact. How do you respond?
You're certainly going to engage in some kind of retaliation. You want to save face domestically, re-establish deterrence internationally. On the other hand, you're not going to want to pick a fight with the United States and Israel that leads to the complete destruction of your military or the complete destruction of the regime.
And so I think that Iran would most likely aim for some kind of calibrated response that the United States could certainly absorb. And I think that the United States could play on those fears with a kind of deterrence strategy. We could communicate to the supreme leader, like we did this week, what our red lines are and, say, for example that closing the Strait of Hormuz would elicit a major U.S. response.
So, again, I think, if managed well, what we might be able to achieve is destruction of Iran's key nuclear facilities in exchange for kind of a token Iranian retaliation. We can talk more about that in Q&A.
So, in sum, I think the options are awful but, if forced to chose, a strike is the least-bad option. And it seems like the administration, at least in their public rhetoric, is coming around to this view. So, just in the past few weeks Gary Samore, Dennis Ross, Leon Panetta -- and although he doesn't speak for the administration, Joe Lieberman -- have all made comments to the effect that the administration assesses that the risks of a strike are less than the risks of a nuclear-armed Iran.
So there's been quite a bit of controversy surrounding this article, and to be honest, I'm a little bit surprised by that. It's been the stated policy of two successive presidents that a nuclear-armed Iran is, quote, "unacceptable," and that, quote, "All options are on the table to prevent that from happening." And we're rapidly approaching the point where we have to either accept the unacceptable or exercise our last remaining option. And one of those things is a paradox and the other one isn't.
So I look forward to your questions and comments.
SCHMEMANN: OK, thank you. That's a helpful overview.
You mentioned you imagine yourself in the supreme leader's shoes. Ray, your recent pieces have been exploring the motivations and calculations of the regime. Can you give us any insight? What are they thinking and why are they escalating the situation? How far are they likely to go? And what are the red lines, really, for the United States government?
RAY TAKEYH: Well, if I knew the answer to that -- (laughter). I would say, actually, the following about this in the five minutes or so that's allotted to me: I think we are on the threshold not of war but of diplomacy, and I'm not entirely sure that's a good idea but I think that's where we're heading.
Since 2005, the United States government has had a fairly consistent policy toward Iran. And it's been what is called the two-track policy -- namely that on one hand you have an openness to dialogue and on the other hand you have a series of coercive measures in order to provoke that dialogue.
There is a threshold question here. The threshold question is whether the supreme leader of Iran is susceptible to engagement with the United States and potentially resolving differences with the United States.
That question is answered in affirmative by the entire professional class: State Department bureaucracy, Pentagon bureaucracy. It's answered in affirmative by both the local parties. That's the two-track policy. The two-track policy suggests that under certain circumstances, Iran's supreme leader would be susceptible to an arrangement with the United States.
That was a policy of the second Bush administration and it has continued in the current administration. I mean, I realize that many of the Republican candidates are rejecting their patrimony, but that was a policy of the second Bush administration.
The core logic of the United States' policy, with widespread consensus within the bureaucracy and rather a substantial partisan pedigree, is that under certain circumstances you can actually have an arms control agreement with this country. The rationale is -- (inaudible) -- and Matt rejects it, but I think he's outside that consensus.
And I'm not quite sure if I would answer that question in affirmative today. But, nevertheless, I think the surge -- the pressure at this point is towards further diplomacy in the sense that nobody wants escalation of the conflict.
To the extent that one can decipher a pattern to Iran's conduct, I would say they have their own three-track policy: number one, the idea that they will meet provocation with provocation, threat with threat, violation of sovereignty with violation of sovereignty. You kind of have seen some examples of that, however maladroit those efforts may have been: the assassination, or attempted assignation, of the Saudi envoy in Washington.
There is a large position in Iran that the Saudis have been collaborators with the United States and Israel in intelligence operations directed against the Islamic republic. And the example of that was the defection of an Iranian scientist who subsequently went back through Saudi Arabia. So that essentially is the idea of provocation with provocation.
Shortly after EU, led by Britain, suggested that they would want to have sanctions against Iran in aftermath of the issuance of the IAEA report last November, you saw the storming of the British embassy and pillaging of that embassy.
And recently, with the passage of the central bank sanctions signed by the president in the Defense Authorization Act, you see the discussion of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. That's the provocation-provocation. All those efforts are maladroit and perhaps bluff, but you see some aspect of that working out.
The second aspect of Iran's diplomacy is being open to diplomacy. And I suspect we're sitting in the eve of a 5 plus one meeting March, April, whenever. The idea is that you have engaged in protracted, sporadic and largely inconclusive diplomacy. And once everybody gets to the table, there will be incentives to stay at the table because everyone wants to avoid a conflict of the type that's been discussed.
What has surprised me about Iran's conduct is they have not engaged in a more systematic diplomacy -- you know, meeting every three, four weeks. They have a path in front of them, the so-called Lavrov plan. The deficiencies of that plan are obvious by just looking at the name of the person on it: the Lavrov plan. You can stop there.
It's a step-by-step plan. You know, Iran does this; the international community does that. You can discuss each of those steps for six to 12 years and then discuss a mechanism for implementation of that and mechanism for dealing with the violation of implementation of that.
I'm surprised there hasn't been more of a systematic dialogue between the two states. I attribute that to incapacity of Iran's negotiator, Saeed Jalili, to do so. But I think they'll negotiate another IAEA work plan. The first one was negotiated by Larijani in 2006. And so that diplomacy will continue.
And beneath that is a sort of incremental -- incremental gains in Iran's nuclear program. So here, the supreme leader has uniquely and uncannily -- and I'm not sure how -- understood the limitations of the American bureaucracy; namely, we deal with crises, not problems. And so long as Iran is a problem and not a crisis, then I think he'll just make some incremental gains in his -- in his -- in his -- in this surge of the nuclear technologies.
As I said in the piece, I think in 2005, the idea of systematic Iranian enrichment was viewed as a provocation. That has come and gone. The other red line was Iran should not enrich up to 20 percent -- come and gone. Now the transference of that technology to new facilities, which are hard and mountainous -- that was viewed as a provocation.
But all these have come systematically but incrementally. Iran's nuclear program is not going to be rash. Here, there's a difference between Ali Khamenei and Saddam Hussein. He's not impetuous; he's cautious -- difference between he and Gadhafi: He's not rash; he deals with things systematically, and his time horizon is long and protracted one.
But gains are made. And at each step of the way, the international community acclimates itself to those gains. So now there's a discussion of introducing new generational centrifuges, which will allow them to enrich large quantities of uranium.
What level of uranium enrichment do you need to have a bomb? South African bomb was 80 percent. You don't have to get to 90s. My understanding is that in 1945, '46, earlier, the United States experimented with level of enrichment that is required to have a bomb. And you actually can manufacture one with 20-percent enriched uranium. I mean, it will be huge -- (laughs) -- and you have to deliver it on a freight train. But nevertheless, the notion that you have to get to upper 90s to have enriched uranium for bomb capacity, I think it's -- that's ideal, but you can -- you can have it at lower levels.
So I suspect in the next few months, it will look pretty much like the last few months. There'll be diplomacy, incremental gains; and occasionally, given what has taken places between the two countries, some degree of provocation on both sides with both parties -- all parties -- invested in not having those particular activities lead to a more full-scale conflict. That doesn't mean -- that doesn't mean incidents cannot happen. And that doesn't mean the situation can't get out of hand. I mean, everybody is sort of on the tiger's back today. And when you're on the tiger's back, you don't always pick the place to dismount. But I suspect we're going to go on the way this has go on -- gone on, I'm sorry, to be grammatically correct.
SCHMEMANN: Thank you. Well, a troubling situation no matter how you look at it. Let's jump right into questions. We have about 40 minutes -- (audio break) -- get my attention, I assume that most of you will have questions.
Arshad, let's start with you; David and then Elise.
QUESTIONER: Just one for Matt. You talked about how your assumption is that Iran would respond to a military strike by the United States in a calibrated or token manner.
SCHMEMANN: Can you speak up, Arshad, a little bit?
QUESTIONER: Yeah, sure -- sorry. Matt had said that it was -- it's his assumption or expectation that Iran would respond to a U.S. military strike in a calibrated or token manner. Can you elaborate on why you are so convinced of this?
And secondly, can you talk about the -- if in your view, even if it's a small probability -- but a small probability that they would not respond in a calibrated or token manner, how do you then try to manage the -- manage the conflict?
KROENIG: Excellent question. So -- I mean, the first thing I'd like to say is that I in no way want to be seen as kind of dismissing the dangers of the military option. I think it is a bad option and a dangerous one. I just think compared to the bad and dangerous option of a nuclear-armed Iran, it's less bad.
So why do I think that Iran would aim for a calibrated response? I mean, I think that we've seen -- what we've seen since 1979 is that despite all the extreme rhetoric that -- it's had -- the country has had a fairly pragmatic foreign policy, and its primary goal is to continue to exist. And we haven't seen anything -- and we know that it restrains itself now, for example, in terms of support to proxies and terrorists because it's afraid of U.S. or Iranian retaliation.
So again, if the United States conducts a surgical strike against key nuclear facilities and communicates that through back channels to the Iranians -- I mean -- and through public diplomacy -- you know, in order for something like this to happen, there would have to be a building of international support before there'd be a lot of statements from the administration if we make it clear that we're interested in the nuclear program and not in the regime -- and we conduct the strike -- again, the supreme leader has just lost his nuclear program. It would be a major loss. It's one of the crown jewels of the regime. On the other hand, his military's intact. His regime is intact. He's going to want to continue to exist. And he knows that a full-scale war with the United States could mean that he loses his military and loses his regime.
So my guess is that -- again, that he would aim for some kind of response where he could claim that he retaliated to a domestic audience and to an international audience but that he's not going to want to do something that's going to compel the White House to engage in a full-scale war.
If things do get out of hand -- I mean, it's interesting that a lot of -- when I've discussed this with other people, a lot of times they don't question that Iran would aim for a calibrated response, but they say that, well, there'd be irresistible political pressure on the White House to retaliate. And so it'd be the United States that would want to escalate.
And so maybe that's true, but I think that the United States should be willing to trade Iran's nuclear program for some kind of limited Iranian retaliation. I think it's -- would be in the national interest of the country.
If things got out of control, as you suggested -- which, again, I don't think if we kind of followed the strategy I laid out here would happen -- it's the opinion of our best military planners' sober analysis that the most likely outcome is that the United States would set back Iran's military 20 years in a few weeks. You know, this isn't a balanced military situation.
SCHMEMANN: David?
QUESTIONER: Set back the nuclear program, you said?
QUESTIONER: Oh -- the military.
KROENIG: The military.
QUESTIONER: Military -- sorry, sorry.
QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask either one of you to run through -- part of what makes this such a fascinating game of three-dimension chess here is all of the other countries that are involved. I mean, previous times that we have had these confrontations -- including with North Korea, if you think about the '94 crisis and crises before that -- you had a limited number of players. But here you've got the Chinese; the Russians, who you've already alluded to with the Lavrov plan; the Europeans -- everybody's got a slightly different calculus, and everybody's got one while they know a presidential election is under way here, which is going to, you know, force some decisions.
So if you could just talk for a moment about where you see the different interests laying, as they have now reappeared.
SCHMEMANN: Ray?
TAKEYH: I think at this stage and partly because there are so many equities involved, which is why everybody wants to somehow get to some sort of negotiations -- nobody has high confidence that those negotiations will succeed, but I think that's why you have quite an intensified Russian diplomacy; similarly, I suspect, although less active with the Chinese, who tend to on this issue follow the Russians.
You have at the same time this sort of a severance of economic relationship between Iran and Europe, although I don't -- I'm not quite sure Iran's trade with South Korean and Japanese are going to be impacted even in the aftermath of the passage of the central bank deal, because I think there are ways of mitigating that.
I can't --
QUESTIONER: Were you surprised that Europe was willing to go that full severance? Because they certainly haven't been until now. I mean, what changed?
TAKEYH: No, I -- the European policy has been the most (surprising ?). Now, I'm not sure if that's the function of leadership in Europe -- Merkel, Sarkozy and so on -- or there's been some sort of a reorientation in European approach, because if you go back to the 1990s, European policy toward Iran was what they called "critical dialogue," where they were critical of the United States while having a dialogue with Iran.
That has changed. Europe has now become -- has sort of embraced the American logic that sanctions are a way of approaching this thing, partly to avert a military conflict. So I think to some extent that has to do with their appreciation of the dangerous nature of this issue. And in the process of co-joining with the United States, they may have created antecedents for a military conflict, something they're trying to avoid.
I can't speak about the Israeli calculation about this because I tend to be one of those people who think that Iranians have successively and successfully crossed a variety of Israeli red lines. And so Israelis do have some sort of a credibility crisis here. Now, that makes it a dangerous situation, because they also have concerns that are bordering existential, while at the same time they have to be considered as harboring under some sort of a -- some sort of a credibility crisis here, given the fact that their red lines have been successfully breached by Iran.
And so the whole diplomacy at this point is to keep everybody at bay, which -- I think the best way of doing that is to get to the table, which I suspect will happen sooner rather than later.
SCHMEMANN: Elise?
QUESTIONER: I'd like to just kind of bring that -- expand that out and also bring Matt in. So you're saying that you -- I mean, Israel -- it does seem as if Israel is really moving to the -- to that red line in terms of --
TAKEYH: They've been moving to that red line for -- (off mic) --
QUESTIONER: OK -- OK, but basically, you know, this new -- this new IAEA report and all this stuff about Iran possibly, you know, a little bit more sure about moving to weaponize -- you know, last week, Defense Secretary Panetta kind of laid out a -- the ultimate red line for the United States in saying that it's if we see Iran going for the actual bomb.
So -- and I feel as if you're going a little bit further than that: You're saying let's go now; don't worry about whether they have the actual bomb; let's just take it out now. Is that where I -- is that where I see you? And do -- is that in line with what you're hearing from your military contacts? Because it does seem as if although they may be grudgingly accepting that this might be inevitable, they're very reluctant -- we've heard a lot of military and intelligence people say this would be -- and Dempsey even said this would be a complete tragedy, totally horrible.
But on the other side of the coin, do you believe that Iran, Ray, is really going for the bomb and that this diplomacy is really just playing for time so that they could become a nuclear state? Or do you really feel as if -- when you say that Khameini is susceptible to diplomacy, is --
TAKEYH: I said that's the consensus in this city.
QUESTIONER: OK, but is it --
TAKEYH: I'm not sure if I agree with it.
QUESTIONER: -- do you -- what do you think? Is this diplomacy for diplomacy's sake, in true getting to some kind of bargain with the West; or are they really going for the bomb? And Matt, are we going to really have to make that choice?
SCHMEMANN: Let me start with Matt here and then Ray.
KROENIG: So -- it's an excellent question -- so the -- Secretary Panetta's remarks -- and it seems like the administration's public talking point is that building nuclear weapons would be a red line. And they frequently point to the fact that the intelligence community says that there is no hard evidence that Iran has made the decision to build nuclear weapons.
But I'm afraid that that rests on kind of a misunderstanding about how nuclear weapons are built. Once you have enough highly enriched uranium, you have 95 percent of what you need to build a nuclear weapon. Actually fashioning it into a simple gun-type device is fairly easy. And so I think by setting the red line there, the administration is -- if that really is the red line -- is making a mistake. And I think -- because what you do at that point, if Iran has that capability, is your nonproliferation policy is reduced to praying that Iran doesn't finish the job. By the time they're turning screws on an actual nuclear device, it's too late; you've missed your opportunity.
So from my point of view, what I lay out in the article are other red lines. So I say that if Iran begins enriching above 20 percent toward the 90 percent that it would like to have for a nuclear weapon, if Iran kicks out international inspectors or if Iran installs the advanced centrifuges, the P2 centrifuges, at Qom, that those should be the red lines. And I really think that we should, you know, begin making the case for this now. So I -- Ray said I don't think an arms control agreement is possible or desirable or something like that -- I would be delighted if Iran agreed to give up its uranium enrichment program. I just don't see that happening.
And so I think that we're running out of time and we need to start making the case now and preparing the public and the international community that this is an option we might have to exercise and lay out those red lines so that everyone, including the Iranians, knows what those are.
QUESTIONER: Do you really believe that we're going there, though? I mean, just -- it does seem as if the administration is very reluctant. Are they resigned, do you think?
KROENIG: Resigned to accepting a nuclear-armed Iran or resigned --
QUESTIONER: No, resigned to going after.
KROENIG: It's difficult to say. As I said in the opening remarks, the public rhetoric has clearly changed. When I was working in the Pentagon, Secretary Gates would say things like, well, we -- the military option's on the table, but we wouldn't really like to use it because the consequences would be disastrous. And just over the past week, the rhetoric has really changed. Again, so a number of former and current senior administration officials have essentially said that -- again, the administration judged the risks of a nuclear-armed Iran to be greater than the risks of a strike or have said that they're convinced that President Obama would use force if necessary. And so it's difficult to know what's motivating them. On the one hand, maybe they've made up their mind that they will use force. My hunch is that they won't actually make that decision until they're absolutely forced to. So other possible motivations are that it's to send a signal to the Israelis not to go -- we've got this under control -- or to send a signal to the Iranians that, no, we're serious, you should really take the diplomacy option seriously; or that it's a signal domestically to -- for President Obama's re-election campaign to not let the Republicans outflank him on this issue.
SCHMEMANN: Ray.
TAKEYH: I think Iran is going for the nuclear weapon. He's going for it systematically, cautiously and intelligently. I don't think they'll stop just short, the Japan model. I don't -- nobody just stops short other than the Japanese. The history of proliferation is when you get there, you cross.
And I think, from the perspective of the Iranian regime, life may look better on the other side of the mushroom cloud. You know, after several years of sanctions and so forth, Pakistan and North Korea being the models, the international community's economic sanctions solidarity is likely to erode. The contracts come back.
The argument is going to be this country is too dangerous to be left alone. So the path back to re-engagement with the international economy and re-engagement with the region on your own terms may actually be on the other side of Condoleezza Rice's famed mushroom cloud. That makes some degree of sense if you're sitting from the perspective of the supreme leader.
If he goes back and gets -- makes rather substantial and irreversible concessions on his nuclear program, does he get his central bank back? The conventional balance of power in the Gulf is decisively to Iran's disfavor. We have sort of opened up the armory. If he disarms, do the Saudis give back their planes and trains and automobiles that they've been getting? If you -- and I don't think he had an incentive of system -- of engaging the United States.
So the threshold question that is answered in the affirmative in this city, I would disagree with Matt widely in the bureaucracy and in both political parties. And under certain circumstances, you can get a deal, whatever those circumstances may be. I think he views -- the Sino-American model are often proferred as a model of how to deal with this country. Most people stop in 1973.
If you take this, what he saw when the Chinese engaged the United States, is that eventually they traded in their ideological identity for material gain. And that's not a compromise he's prepared to make. He doesn't want to be the noncommunist leader of a noncommunist party overseeing a prosperous capitalist state. He's maintaining his ideological identify of his regime. And he understands that engagement with the United States imperils that.
And you can't say tactical agreements, because the best way of stopping the American cultural and political invasion is at the beginning, not the middle. So if he maintains this regime, potentially gets some sort of a capability, nuclear capability, then you can re-enter the international community the way Pakistan has or -- I mean, the North Korean case could be suggestive as well.
I mean, the entire international community today is invested in success of a leader that we know nothing about -- we don't even know how old he is -- because we are afraid of an alternative to someone we know nothing about. Whatever -- (inaudible) -- he is, he's got to be -- he's more familiar to us than someone who we think is in the late 20s.
SCHMEMANN: Jonathan.
QUESTIONER: A question for Matt and a question for Ray.
Matt, can you please defend your assertions that Iran could give nuclear weapons to someone else when -- why would they give away the crown jewels, which could be easily traced back to them? And secondly, they are now experiencing a serious degradation of their ability to support their proxies in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories because of what's going on in Syria.
And Ray, what would the -- surely the Iranians would have to give something in order for the president to politically be able to accept or to agree to return to the 5 plus 1. What would that be? But -- and wouldn't he be taking a considerable political risk here domestically, given the vehemence by which the Republicans are going after the Iranian issue, by going back into talks at this point? What is his incentive politically?
SCHMEMANN: (Inaudible) -- some short answers. What would they give away and what would they give up?
KROENIG: OK. Well, thanks for that. That's a softball question for me. I wrote a book in 2010 called "Exporting the Bomb" about why countries have provided sensitive nuclear material and technology to other countries in the past.
So I think it's unlikely that Iran would purposely transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group. I think it's unlikely that they would transfer nuclear weapons to another state. But what I do think is very likely over the coming years would be that Iran would provide uranium enrichment technology to another country; say, a U.S. adversary, Venezuela, is a possible example.
Iran and Venezuela already have a nuclear cooperation agreement. So Iran could easily announce tomorrow that Venezuela is a member of the NPT in good standing, has a right to peaceful nuclear technology, and for that reason we're going to help them with the uranium enrichment facility.
And so, in that way, Iran could contribute to nuclear proliferation. And countries have done this in the past for strategic reasons, basically as a way to constrain their common enemies. So I do think that a U.S. adversary would be the most likely customer.
And even if a country like Venezuela never acquired nuclear weapons, just having a uranium enrichment facility there would obviously cause a lot of headaches, just like Iran's nuclear program has caused headaches for us for a decade, even though they haven't yet acquired nuclear weapons.
TAKEYH: My understanding of the requirements that the international community has, 5 plus one, about Iran returning to the table is they have to write a letter to Lady Ashton saying this time they're going to be serious, as opposed to Geneva and Istanbul of last year. That's my understanding. Maybe David knows something else. So they'd have to meet that bar, which is a low bar. So that's how you get back to (it ?).
I don't think there's a domestic political penalty about engaging in diplomacy with Iran if the president gets back to the table and there's a discussion. I don't see that as a divisive domestic political issue to the extent anybody cares about this issue in terms of the larger public.
SCHMEMANN: All right.
QUESTIONER: Thanks.
Matt, I think I understood you to say that for the administration, the way you're hearing things, that the objective is not the regime but the nuclear program. But we are hearing more and more from Republican candidates that, in fact, the problem is the regime.
And so I'm wondering, actually, from both of you, what impact, if any, that's having, the fact that we are hearing more -- maybe it's from candidates who may not be around a lot longer, but we are hearing more and more that the problem is, in fact, the regime, not just the nuclear program. And I'm wondering what impact, either in Iran or among other partners, that that's having, that that talk is out there.
SCHMEMANN: He wants Matt -- (inaudible).
KROENIG: It's an interesting question. In the Pentagon last year, in my office, there was kind of a three-way debate. And I was actually the moderate in that debate, because the options were seen as deterrence and containment on one side, regime change on the other. And then -- so my advocacy for a surgical strike and pulling back was kind of the middle position.
So it's my position that, you know, I think that the problem is the nuclear program, and that if we can rid Iran of its nuclear program, we should be content with that. But there are others who disagree and think that as long as this regime is in power, we're going to continue to be threatened by them.
Just sticking in terms of the military option, there's no way to really guarantee that you can remove the regime, short of a ground invasion. And I don't think there's any appetite in either party for another ground invasion. So there are things you could do to try to destabilize the regime militarily -- attacking the military, attacking command and control sites. But I think that, realistically, the most we can hope for with a strike is setting back their nuclear program.
SCHMEMANN: Ray, any signs of Arab spring in Iran? (Inaudible.)
TAKEYH: Well, that's a separate question from the regime, because I think its marginalization is fairly intact.
What I would say -- the history of Iran in 20th century has been a history of the population seeking its rights through political protest, in some cases succeeding, as in the 1979 revolution. But the history of the -- the history of Iran in 20th century into 21st century is an attempt to form a population seeking political space, in contrast to despotic regimes. That's from the constitutional revolution to the `53 crisis to the `63 crisis to the `79 crisis to the `97 crisis to the `99 crisis to 2009 crisis. So there's been a sporadic explosion of popular discontent.
Therefore, in that particular country, given that national historical narrative, I'm (unprepared ?) to say that we're not going to see that again. So it's entirely possible that you're going to see a greater degree of re-engagement with popular protest.
I would say one thing that separates the next round of protests from previous ones in the 1990s is that before there was a hope within the population that the system could be reformed through its own provisions -- elections, parliamentary, legislation, expansion of press.
Now, increasingly within the Iranian body politics, it is recognized that -- some may not be recognized beyond the boundaries of Iran -- that this particular regime cannot reform itself. It either has to be displaced -- you cannot condition its despotism through its own constitutional provisions. I would say (yes ?). So that makes the gap between state and society a fundamentally unstable situation.
QUESTIONER: So are they taking -- yeah, but can I just -- in terms of -- is the regime, is the supreme leader, hearing this shift in rhetoric in the United States? And is that having any impact on --
TAKEYH: I can't account how Ali Khamenei makes his decisions. I mean, he talks to 10 people. You know, I don't know what sources of information he uses, how he makes his decisions. I do believe that he has a well-formed global view that is internally consistent. And it's a combination of -- I mean, he's not Kissingerian; he's Huntingtonian. He believes in clashes of civilization. He believes that the sort of an Islamic realm is under pressure from the cultural invasion and subversion of the West. He's been talking about that theme for 20 years. He hasn't rediscovered that. So he has that suspicion of international community.
He's also a North-South person, sort of a Berkeley `68 rhetoric. You know, the North is determined to exploit the resources of the South for its own industrial development. However you look at it, whether it's the Berkeley mindset or Huntingtonian mindset, the central antagonist is the United States, in one case as a source of cultural subversion, and in another case as a source of capitalist exploitation.
I don't think he can relieve himself of that ideological template, and I'm not sure if anybody around him suggests that's not necessarily the case.
QUESTIONER: Are they taking a risk by going -- holding parliamentary elections?
SCHMEMANN: Let me actually just get a few --
TAKEYH: I don't think so. I think those --
SCHMEMANN: Here, just on the election, could you just expand on that? Let's do this quickly, but then we do have a couple of questions here.
TAKEYH: I think the -- Iran has had elections on time, and its electoral cycle goes on. It went on during the Iran-Iraq war. They never suspended it. At the risk that Iran's is the potential for popular protest --
QUESTIONER: That's what I mean.
TAKEYH: -- and I can't tell you if it's going to be popular protest or not going to be. I would say this regime, given the historical narrative of that country and the nature of that population and the nature of that regime, that's an inherently unstable situation. What provokes a larger conflagration, whether it's the martial actions or not, I don't know.
QUESTIONER: Yeah, but -- I mean, just in the context of the Arab Spring --
TAKEYH: Yeah.
QUESTIONER: I mean, is this election any -- and given, like, where you were in the last election and where you are now, you don't think this whole next context gives any difference --
TAKEYH: I think it may. I think that's possible. I just don't know if it's going to happen.
SCHMEMANN: Hold the thought. We'll come back to it.
Viola (sp).
QUESTIONER: Matt, I wanted to follow up on a couple of things that you said. You said rapidly approaching the time when this might be necessary. What's the point at which you think that would occur in your sort of gaming this out? And you also mentioned Gates's precautions last year. But doesn't his -- weren't his precautions primarily aimed at Israel?
And Ray, I wanted to ask you, if I understand you correctly, you said -- you're basically saying that the supreme leader is interested in engaging with the U.S., but only to the extent of kind of dragging things out for them to pursue their own ends, not to -- not --
TAKEYH: He's not looking for an arms control agreement.
QUESTIONER: He's not looking in any sense to --
TAKEYH: The end game is not an arms control agreement.
QUESTIONER: There's no way he would ever --
TAKEYH: No, it's not -- we're not heading to SALT II. (Laughter.)
KROENIG: On how much time do we have left, again, I think the -- you know, once you have enough highly enriched uranium to make a weapon, you're basically there, actually fashioning it into a simple gun-type device relatively easily. So how long does it take them to get to significant quantities of highly enriched uranium?
David Albright estimates that right now, that if Iran were to decide today that it wants to dash and build its first nuclear weapon, it would take about six months to get enough weapons-grade uranium. But that timeline is shrinking as they're -- I can go into the details of why if you're interested over the course of this year.
And, in fact, Olli Heinonen, former deputy director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and currently at Harvard, had an article that came out in Foreign Policy this week or last week where he argues that by the end of this year, that timeline will have shrunk to one month so that, by December 2012, if Iran decides to dash, it'll take one month to do that.
And that's really dangerous for a number of reasons, including because IAEA inspectors aren't in Iran all the time. And so it's possible that IAEA inspectors could leave, Iran dashes, and they come back in and we're facing a fait accompli.
SCHMEMANN: Jeffrey?
QUESTIONER: Matt, why can't the United States, which successfully contained the Soviet Union and brought about indirectly its dissolution -- why can't it simply contain a nuclear Iran?
SCHMEMANN: Go ahead.
KROENIG: Well, I think that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, we'll do our best to deter and contain Iran. But, you know, I think the -- first of all, we have to remember that the Cold War was a dangerous time. We came very close to nuclear war a number of times. There were a number of proxy wars. I'm not sure that --
QUESTIONER: That was with a country with thousands of weapons as opposed to seven or five or 10.
KROENIG: True. But it was a dangerous time. And, you know, so when I do the comparison, you're right that the Soviet Union's capabilities are much greater, but I also think that there are a number of other differences that make me worry more.
So, for example, you know, having five or seven weapons arguably makes the situation more dangerous. If you look at the nuclear balance between Iran and Israel, for example, I don't think either side would have secure second strike capabilities. The United States and the Soviet Union both thought that they could absorb a nuclear attack and then retaliate.
If you're Israel or Iran, you know, Israel is a small country. Some people have said it's a one-bomb country; that it couldn't afford to absorb even one nuclear attack. And you're Iran with five or seven nuclear weapons and you get into a crisis, both sides have incentives, I think, to use nuclear weapons first or to do things that would prevent the other side from disarming them in a first-strike nuclear attack such as delegate nuclear launch authority to lower-level commanders, put nuclear weapons on high alert that increase the risk of an accident.
So I think that there are many dangers that we'd be dealing with with a nuclear-armed Iran, not the least of which is a possible nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel or Iran and the United States.
And, again, maybe we would be successful in undermining the regime and getting a more friendly government come to power as we did in the Soviet Union, but it's possible that we'd be dealing with those threats for decades or longer as well.
QUESTIONER: Can I just -- the Israel question. You weren't able to address that earlier. Gates actually -- Gates' caution was actually aimed at Israel more so than dissuading, you know, speaking up against a potential U.S. strike.
KROENIG: That's exactly right. And so I think there is a lot of confusion in the public about the Israeli option and the U.S. option, and they're very different for a lot of reasons.
And you're right. When Gates was talking about a strike would be disastrous, he was talking about Israel. But there are dangers with that kind of public rhetoric if you're really trying to convince Iran that we would use force if necessary but then, immediately after, talking about the military option.
So I do think it was aimed at instilling caution in the Israelis, but I also think it had negative effects on the message we were sending to the Iranians.
SCHMEMANN: Laura?
QUESTIONER: (Could I ?) follow up on one of Jonathan's (sp) questions? Assuming the Iranians do get to the talks in -- (inaudible) -- even though (Ashton's ?) not gotten their letter yet, the U.S. has been talking about a confidence-building measure of asking Iran to give, I guess, its stockpile of 20 percent uranium and to give up the 20 percent enrichment in exchange for an offer to not impose another round of U.N. Security Council resolution -- even though I don't see that one's -- (inaudible) -- coming.
You know, how do you see that playing out? As poorly as in Istanbul last year, or --?
TAKEYH: I'm not sure what mood the Iranian negotiators will come to the table, whenever that happens. My guess is that they are -- they are unlikely to relinquish that stockpile. And we're no longer talking about, interesting enough, about 3.5 percent enriched uranium but 20 percent. So their goalpost has moved yet again.
But I think it'll be deliberated. It'll be studied. It'll be talked about. There will be technical talks. At the end, I'm not sure if that particular offer is one that is attractive to them, although I can see them conceding to not enrich beyond 20 percent as a retort to that. But I'm not certain -- I just can't see that arrangement coming to fruition. But I can see it being deliberated in a protracted manner.
SCHMEMANN: Walter?
QUESTIONER: To go back to what you call a surgical strike, could you go through that scenario? I mean, if we do it the way we usually do it, that would take out all air defenses. It'll take out their command and control. Then you've got to take out, as you say, we know where all the sites are.
What kind of civilian collateral damage are you going to have in that? And how long would it take, because then I assume you've got to go back and see what you did?
And the second part, for Ray, is -- my time in Iran is they've never forgotten our overthrow of their government in the '50s. What do you think this would do to our relations with all the Iranians that we go in, clearly killing a lot of people? I mean, what kind of future and how are they going to look and how is it going to look in kind of the rest of the world?
SCHMEMANN: Surgical strike?
KROENIG: And so, obviously, the president would have a range of different options if he were deciding to do this. And so, you know, I think most professional military planners like to reduce the danger to U.S. forces as much as possible. So they would prefer to take out air defenses, to hit some command-and-control sites and then, also, I think, they would prefer to eliminate some of Iran's ability to retaliate in the aftermath of the strike. So maybe going after naval assets or ballistic missiles.
So that would, obviously, be a much bigger option.
On the low end, if Israel has done this kind of thing in the past, they've gone in, bombed the nuclear sites and gotten out. And so I would be -- I would advocate for something closer to that kind of minimal strike.
So you're absolutely right that you would have to go after some air defenses even in that scenario. But I think that the smaller force package would be the best way to go in terms of limiting the dangers and limiting the likelihood that Iran would want to escalate.
So in terms of civilian casualties, you know, it's -- one of the -- collateral damage is one of the unfortunate downsides of any conflict, obviously. I think the likely casualties in this kind of strike would be much less than many people assume.
If you look on Google Maps, the major nuclear facilities are out in the middle of nowhere. They're not in civilian areas. And so some of the -- so, for example, Natanz -- (inaudible) -- are out in the middle of nowhere.
Now, there are centrifuge manufacturing component factories in Natanz and Tehran. And so then that would be a decision, I think, that would go to the presidential level of how important is it to get those sites, and are we willing to accept the increased risk of collateral damage in order to get those.
But those are the less important facilities. Again, the big facilities that we'd definitely want to get in a strike are not located in urban areas.
TAKEYH: I'm not -- I mean, to some extent, the response to your question is contingent on the scope of civilian casualties, whether they can be mitigated or not, and whether the regime will be beneficiary of some sort of a nationalistic surge.
All these questions are almost impossible to predict with any degree of precision or confidence. My guess is they'll operate at two levels. It'll congeal the regime in the sense that differences between different elements of the regime are going to be put aside. So it's going to be more of a consolidated regime. Where you saw a lot of fissures and differences between them today, that's likely to be mitigated, if not evaporated.
The larger question between state and society, whether the bonds between the two that have been so damaged as a result of the 2009 election can be rehabilitated is I'm not entirely sure. But I think it will consolidate the regime within itself and within its core constituency, whatever percentage of the population; that is 5 percent, 10 percent.
But in terms of the larger national unity, I just don't know. My suspicion is probably not, but I can't tell you that with any degree of personal confidence.
SCHMEMANN: So we've come to the end of our hour, but we did start a few minutes late. So if you don't mind, we'll maybe just go two or three minutes over.
But maybe we can just wrap up a few last questions and then have the two of you just address them.
QUESTIONER: I just had a quick one --
SCHMEMANN: So, Mike, quickly, and then Paul.
QUESTIONER: The inference I've drawn from a lot of this is that if this is going to be done, it's going to go done by the United States; that the Israeli option, so to speak, just isn't practical. It's too small. What it could do compared with the consequences is so vast that it's just increasingly coming off the table. But then that is not calculating Israeli politics.
SCHMEMANN: OK. So note that one.
QUESTIONER: What does a likely limited Iranian retaliation look like? And secondly, my recollection is that Bob Gates said that a military strike would slow the Iranians down by one to two years. You say 3 to 10.
Can you explain why the difference?
SCHMEMANN: Douglas, did you have a --
QUESTIONER: Yeah. Just of your assessments, both of you, Matt and Ray, on the covert campaign and how effective that's been in slowing the -- is it slowing the program down, if at all, in your view?
QUESTIONER: That's what I was going to ask is what's the -- you know, can you balance that out? Can you do that instead of surgical strikes?
SCHMEMANN: Matthew, see if you can answer those. Ray will have the last word.
And then this conversation can continue after we're finished as well.
KROENIG: Well, I'll start with Secretary Gates' comment that a strike would set back Iran's program one to three years. That was for an Israeli strike, as Mike pointed out correctly that the U.S. strike would do much more damage.
I and others estimate a U.S. strike would set Iran back three to 10 years, but with the caveat that it's impossible to say because it depends on so many questions like does Iran decide to reconstitute its nuclear program at all. How quickly does it try to reconstitute the program? How able is it to get needed supplies on the international market? How able is the United States and the international community to put in some kind of post-strike enforcement regime?
So there are a lot of variables that go into it. Any estimate of delay is -- (inaudible) -- but the U.S. option would impose a much more significant delay.
So getting to Mike's question, I think you're absolutely right that the U.S. -- or the Israeli option would do less damage to Iran's program and that Israel would be less able to manage some of the consequences.
So in my view, if this is going to be done, it should be the United States that does it. That said, we've asked Israel a number of times not to do this, and they have given us no guarantee that they won't. So they might have a different calculation.
In terms of what would limited retaliation look like, I think Iran's most likely response is it would launch salvos of ballistic missiles toward U.S. bases and ships in the region, possibly against Israel as well. It would likely try to step up its support to proxies in Afghanistan against U.S. forces, encourage Hamas and Hezbollah, I think, to retaliate against Israel, possibly look to sponsor terrorist attacks around the world against U.S. interests and then also, I think, to harass and possibly attack commercial and naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.
I think that's probably the most likely limited option.
MS. : It's not that limited, though.
QUESTIONER: It doesn't sound so -- (laughter).
QUESTIONER: How do you de-escalate from there so quickly, as you say?
QUESTIONER: What about support from other -- what would happen in other Muslim countries? I mean, there would be turmoil, wouldn't there, anti-American turmoil?
QUESTIONER: Not on the Gulf. (Laughter.)
QUESTIONER: Yeah, but Egypt and other places, Pakistan, there would. Afghanistan, there would.
KROENIG: Yeah, there'd be a whole other set of questions about the international reaction to this and what we'd try to do beforehand and afterwards to try to manage that. And --
QUESTIONER: How do you de-escalate from global attacks on American interests? How does the U.S. then go in and say, OK, well, that was -- thank you very much for the retaliation, but we're finished now? I don't understand how --
MS. : You've got your central bank back. (Laughter.)
QUESTIONER: I don't understand how it doesn't spin out of control.
KROENIG: Right. Well, I mean, I number of things I would say in response. First, again, I don't think that this is some kind of, you know, clean, easy solution. I think it's a bad option. I just think a nuclear-armed Iran is an even worse option.
And the other thing I said, the type of retaliation I talked about, you know, sounds bad and indeed, it is. But we've seen what the -- to some degree, what the harassment of U.S. naval vessels in the Strait of Hormuz looks like this week. It wasn't that bad.
We've seen -- you know, Iran has ballistic missiles it could use to retaliate against U.S. bases and ships in the region, but they're not very accurate. There's a good chance that they would launch a number of salvos that wouldn't even hit anything, and that maybe would be in the U.S. interest to claim that it hit something just for them to save face and to help de-escalate the crisis.
So they would certainly ask Hamas and Hezbollah to increase attacks against Israel, but, you know, put yourself in Hezbollah's shoes or in Hamas' shoes. Again, you're not going to want to do anything that's going to lead Israel to invade and completely destroy you. So I think, again, that those actors would seek calibrated responses.
SCHMEMANN: Let me go to Ray for covert ops and the last word.
TAKEYH: I don't have anything beyond conventional answers regarding cyberwar against Iran facilities. It is suggested by IAEA that they have retarded Iran's program. I accept that.
I think assassination of scientists is not a good idea because Iran's scientific apparatus is much larger and much more sophisticated than Egypt in 1950s or what have you. And that, essentially, engenders some esprit de corps within the scientific community, which may be the last bastion of Iran's public institution that has some sliver of a nationalistic embrace of this particular program.
So three, four scientists killed over a couple of years is, in my judgment, not a particularly good idea, if you're looking at it from the question of slowing down the program beyond the ethics of it.
There's things that seem to be exposing military bases and so forth. My estimation is that it further commits the supreme leader to his program as opposed to thinking that now is the time to cede this particular program and, quite possibly, makes diplomacy more difficult even if you had any confidence in it. It's arguably that Iranians came last year to Geneva and Istanbul without a determination to concede, but those meetings preceded the assassination of one of their scientists. And the other one whom they made -- got promoted to head of atomic energy organizations -- I don't know if that's good or bad idea for you.
So I'm not sure if that's a productive approach to disarmament.
I will say one more thing about the military use which Matt talks about. I think, from my perspective, Iranians will definitely retaliate against Israel. No matter if Israel was not a source of this conflict. And if they hit a daycare center in the outskirts of Tel Aviv, you know, there's an escalatory dynamic there that's potentially perilous.
SCHMEMANN: Matt, last word?
KROENIG: Just on the covert options, there are things you can do with 30,000-pound bombs that you can't do with computer viruses. And so that's why the military option would do much more damage than covert operations ever could.
SCHMEMANN: All right. Well, thank you. I apologize for going over time. You have our email addresses. You've met my colleague, Lucy, who's our media liaison who can help you with all your needs.
We're also interested in hearing from you if you have ideas for future roundtables that you'd like -- (inaudible). We'd be happy to do it.
So thank you all and have a good week.


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Very, very good post. You made some great points.[soapbox mode on]
The closure on mental health facilities is happening all over the country. I retired from the state mental health agency in Alabama in 2010. Since I retired, 2 (of 5) mental illness facilities have closed. These 2 served about 600 residents. Within the next 12 months, a third will downsize from about 400 residents to about 200. Within the past 10 years, 2 other facilities have closed serving about 250 residents including the only facility for youth. Also within the past 10 years, all the centers for residents with mental retardation have closed!
These closures are because of two forces that feed off each other. First, there is a move to put residents in the community rather than to isolate them in large facilities. This is a result of pressure by parents and advocates. Second, these facilities need huge capital outlays to maintain and in our case, it was easier to accede to the forces that seek closure than to try to get money to repair them. For example, one of our facilities needed almost 10 million in repairs to the mechanical and electrical systems. Making these repairs would have saved almost $20 million over 20 years but somebody felt it was less expensive just to close the facility. (I had a project worked out that would have paid for the repairs out of the utility savings the repairs would generate.)
Closure of both mental retardation and mental illness facilities is also a hot button within the Federal Ct system. Thus, we closed the mental retardation beds to suit the advocates but there aren't sufficient beds in the community to accept all the people who need them. These folks are living at home, many of them in terrible conditions, program-wise, as opposed living to the mental retardation centers.
What I did was manage the land assets of the agency. We had about 15,000 acres of land all over the state. I worked to keep the land as an income stream that was used for major repairs .... roofs, boilers, elevators, etc. I used to claim to be the only profit center in the entire agency as we had income of over $1 million a year from our land....farm leases, commercial leases, hunting leases, oil-gas drilling rights and leases, etc. Since my retirement, the Dept has sold hundreds of acres of land and used the money for operating expenses. So, where we had an assured income for repairs, now the source of the income is gone and the money was spent in one budget cycle.
In short, the mental health system in this country just can't accommodate folks like the Sandy Hook shooter because the system has deteriorated so badly that it just can't be fixed without huge sums of money that just aren't available. The state facilities have deteriorated so badly because of legislative neglect that they're cheaper to close that to operate. Instead, the money is going to prisons...and so are large numbers of the people the mental health system used to serve.
[soapbox mode off]


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I started to notice a few years back that as I was able to scratch names off my wish list, there weren't necessarily other names moving in to take their place. Now that wishlist has emptied out completely of never-before-made figures. All that's left is Barada, but since we've had 3 versions of his character made, it's just not the same as one who has never been immortalized in plastic before.
Sure there are other characters that I think would be neat to see made into figures, but nothing else has a direct link to a childhood memory. Every single character that I pointed to, when I was between the ages of 10-13 years old, and said "I want to see a toy of that guy!" has been made in one form or another. So 2012 saw a very significant chapter come to a close in my Star Wars collecting life.
If Kithaba had been the only figure released this year, the impact would still have been the same for me; but right now I'm kind of struggling to find anything to look forward to. As a result, my interest in Star Wars seems to be fading exponentially from month to month.
However, when I envision store shelves clogged with unsold Episode 1 merchandise, then I realize that those people who wanted 2012 to be a repeat of 1999 actually got their wish.


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Web Stories
Choreographer Jones to present three-part Toni Morrison Lectures
Tuesday, April 17, Thursday, April 19, and Tuesday, April 24, 2012, 8 p.m. · Alexander Hall, Richardson Auditorium, and McCosh Hall, Room 10
Posted March 21, 2012; 12:21 p.m.
Tony Award-winning choreographer Bill T. Jones will present three talks on "The Life of an Idea: Investigating Belonging, Appropriating and Adapting in the Context of Time" as part of the Toni Morrison Lectures. The talks will take place at 8 p.m. on the following dates: Tuesday, April 17, in Richardson Auditorium, Alexander Hall; Thursday, April 19, in McCosh Hall, Room 10; and Tuesday, April 24, in Richardson Auditorium. Tickets are required.


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Reality Check: Looking At 2006 State Of The State Promises
Doyle To Give Speech Tuesday
MADISON, Wis. - In 2006, Gov. Jim Doyle proclaimed, "Wisconsin is moving forward." Yet a number of the programs that he proposed still haven't been completed.
With Doyle scheduled to give his annual State of the State speech on Tuesday night, here is a list of the major initiatives that Doyle proposed during last year's address:
Health Care
Last year, much of Doyle's focus was on health care, and the governor made some bold moves.
"In Wisconsin, every child will have access to health insurance by next year," said Doyle.
This promise remains a work in progress, WISC-TV reported.
Doyle proposed Badgercare Plus, a way to combine three state programs to give everyone a chance to buy insurance, regardless of income. The plan is currently awaiting federal approval. It is in Doyle's budget for February.
Despite the proposal, offering health care access to every child doesn't mean every child will have health care. Currently, half of the uninsured children in the state could be getting coverage, but their parents haven't signed them up.
"I'm calling on the Legislature to outlaw the practice of health care dumping," Doyle said last year. "Companies cannot be allowed to deliberately manipulate the system."
This move ultimately failed. Bills put forward by Democrats didn?t get a vote in the Republican-controlled Legislature last session.
Heating Assistance
"I propose an emergency heating assistance package to provide $6 million to families who make $40,000 a year or less," said Doyle.
This did pass, but the income ceiling was set at $34,000 instead of $40,000.
Doyle also introduced last year the Wisconsin Covenant, a guarantee that any eighth-grade student who maintains a B- average and stays out of trouble could get into college.
This plan is in progress. The universities have agreed to the framework, but the funding would have to come in the next state budget, WISC-TV reported.
Check Channel 3000 for on Tuesday night for full coverage of the governor's State of the State address and a livestream of the speech.
Latest Political Headlines
- State lawmakers urging action on lead poisoning
- Dementia care funding at risk in state budget
- State lawmaker: Canada doesn't grasp urgency of milk crisis
- Superior city council member arrested following a domestic dispute, police say
- Nygren accuses fellow Republican of 'bloviating'
- Lawmakers resurrect woodchuck hunting bill


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Earlier this week, it was reported that Spotify was close to finalizing $100 million in financing that would bring the digital music service's value in at just over $3 billion. As of Monday, Goldman Sachs was the only investor identified, but now The New York Times reports that Coca-Cola and Fidelity Investments are two other investors involved in the financing round.
The Times' sources say roughly half of the $100 million investment comes from Goldman Sachs, with about 10 percent from Coca-Cola and 15 percent from Fidelity. The remaining 25 percent is coming from Spotify's existing investors.
The paper notes that earlier this year, Coke and Spotify announced a marketing partnership but no specifics were ever revealed beyond a promise to help the digital music service expand globally into new markets.
Nikki Nite, VP of Prog. & Ops, Entercom/Austin
Copyright © 2017 Friday Morning Quarterback Album Report, Inc. and Mediaspan Online Services - All Rights Reserved
Contact: Mediaspan Online Services
FMQB, 1930 East Marlton Pike, Executive Mews, Suite F-36, Cherry Hill, NJ 08003. (856) 424-9114.


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40 hr week, the last I looked you always made more if you worked 50.
Overtime pay? Generally 90% don't want it and the other 10% will just about fight for it.
vacation time? Who has ever worked during their vacation that were not paid extra? You don't think that the cost of vacation is not figured when salaries are offered? You think companies would pay the asme if no vacation were offered or is say 50 of 52 weeks were demanded for vacation? You have to be kidding. Just more of union propaganda/
Health and safety regulations??? Today more claims for workman's compensation and dissability than EVER before. So how has that worked out?
Living wage?? My first job was delivering newspapers at 10. Did I make enouogh to live on. Certainly not, but I did learn the honor and priviledge of working and my parents saw to that. I only wish kids had the same chance I had when I grew up, not so today.
Employers don't give workers jobs. They hire them with the expectation of making a profit from the labor they purchase. The biggest problem I see with unions is that they see that that the poorest worker is paid the same as the best. A union guarantees that the best workers make less than the normally would and the worst make far more than they normally would. Unions subsidize the poor workers at the expense of the best. they love to spout your propaganda. I have always paid the best more than the marginal because I always wanted to keep the best. As for the marginal, I could care less if they quit. they were always easy to replace. Not true of the best.


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I have bad luck with collars. I have had 3 sportdogs and all have crapped out within a yr and a half. I hardly even use them. I use them for training early, reinforcement and behavior in the blind etc. Mostly discipline. So..i am not sure what route to go. I don't really want to drop hundreds of dollars and a new collar when I rarely push the buttons. Can someone recommend a collar that isn't going to break the bank but still be useful for yrs? How about those tt garmins?? I wouldn't mind buying used but then have concerns battery life would be short or whole unit not last long. I am a get what you pay for type of guy and maybe I just need to pull the trigger. But..trying other avenues first. The majority of the times either of my dogs get a nick is when they are laying next to my layout blind and geese/ducks are coming in and they try to slide or pick head up. I give a light nick to remind them to hold still..and I hardly ever have to do that. Maybe a nick or two when pheasant hunting if ranging too far and don't listen to come back. I just can't justify..spending huge dollars. Any thoughts on brands, styles, etc? thanks
Posts: 186
Joined: Tue May 08, 2007 11:13 am
Location: northeast SD


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I'm having problems getting the sample code the Atlas Scientific website has to work.
#include <SoftwareSerial.h>#define rxpin 0#define txpin 1SoftwareSerial myserial(rxpin, txpin);
what u mean cannot do that?
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Difference between revisions of "Frosting on the Cake"
(video walkthrough)
|Line 25:
|Line 25:
*When the Stretch E is driving of from where the deal was busted, you can see several Lost members and bodyguards fighting.
*When the Stretch E is driving of from where the deal was busted, you can see several Lost members and bodyguards fighting.
== Secondary objectives ==
== Secondary objectives ==
Revision as of 18:36, 3 February 2012
|Frosting on the Cake
A police roadblock explodes.
|The Ballad of Gay Tony
|Tony Prince
|BOABO, Broker.
Frosting on the Cake is a mission in The Ballad of Gay Tony. It is given by Gay Tony to Luis Lopez.
The mission starts showing Gracie, Sharon, Evan and Rocco having a coke hit at Tony's apartment. Luis walks in looking for Tony, who called him in earlier. After having an exchange with Rocco, Luis finds Tony passed out on the floor. After waking him up with a brisk dunk in the bathroom sink, Tony tells Luis that they're going to purchase some 2 million dollars worth of diamonds off a smuggler in Broker. As they leave, Evan decides he wants to go as well. Outside they find a Stretch and a Stretch E, Tony commenting it was a wild night for these to be there. Tony and Costas take the Stretch, leaving Luis and Evan to take the Stretch E.
Drive the Stretch E with Evan to the docks where the Platypus in Broker, where The Cook is waiting. Listen to Evan whine, but try not to damage the limo too much. Once you arrive, a cutscene will start showing the deal going down. At first everything is fine, but soon Johnny Klebitz and the Broker Chapter of the Lost biker gang show up to crash the deal. Luis, Tony and Costas will dive into the Stretch E, and Evan with the diamonds jump into the stretch. Now, instead of driving, you'll be riding shotgun, with the camera facing behind the car, and are given Sticky Bombs in order to hold off of the chasing bikers and trucks. Try to aim for their front tires, and destroy roadblock as soon as you get to them. Once you near the Algonquin Bridge an APC will show up, along with a NOOSE Annihilator. Throw as many Sticky Bombs as you can until the APC explodes, and 2 or 3 to drop the chopper. At the end of the bridge, your driver is shot and you must lose the heat, regaining control of the limo. Lose the heat, and go to Hercules to end the mission. The mission ends when Tony tells you that Evan was killed, apparently while bleeting online about his impending doom at the hands of Johnny Klebitz, and the diamonds are lost.
- This mission appears in The Lost and Damned with Johnny's point of view. This explains why the remaining Lost bikers are dead during the chase between Johnny and Evan.
- This may be the only time you get to drive the Stretch E as it is extremely rare.
- This is the only mission that NOOSE actually utilizes the APC.
- Although in The Lost and Damned Johnny had 5 or 6 bikers with him but in The Ballad of Gay Tony he brought a small army of bikers which are the enemies that chase you.
- When the Stretch E is driving of from where the deal was busted, you can see several Lost members and bodyguards fighting.
Video Walkthrough
Secondary objectives
|Target score
|Time taken to complete the mission.
|Player Damage
|Damage attained by the player.
|Bomb Accuracy
|Amount of accuracy of the stick bombs.
|Escape Cops Time
|Time taken to lose the wanted level.


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There are numerous ways to contact the city about neighborhood traffic safety needs. Below are forms that will be routed to relevant staff personnel who will then follow-up with you based on your request.
If you are seeking police enforcement (parking, speed, other), complete a Police's traffic service request.
If you areReporting a street light outage or traffic signal problem? Submit a traffic signals and street maintenance request.
450 110th Ave. NE
P.O. Box 90012
Bellevue, WA 98009
Contact: NTSS
Phone: 425-452-6457
E-mail: email@example.com


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Access your Emirates Skywards or Business Rewards account
Explore our website in multiple languages for a tailored experience.
Find flights, see our featured fares and earn Skywards Miles on your travels.
Find the best fares across our global network.
Check in online, choose your seats and add extra services with one click.
Connect to new experiences, people and cultures in over 150 destinations worldwide.
Open up a world of rewards every time you travel. Enjoy reward flights, upgrades, exclusive benefits and more.
NBAD offers over 120 branches and cash offices and 490 ATMs within the UAE. It has the largest global network of a UAE bank, with 50 branches and 60 ATMs across four continents.
Since 2009, NBAD has been ranked annually as one of the 'World's 50 Safest Banks' by the prestigious Global Finance magazine, making it the safest bank in the Middle East.
NBAD's rewards programme, NBAD Stars, has partnered with Emirates Skywards to allow credit card holders to convert NBAD Stars to Skywards Miles that can be redeemed for exciting rewards.
Please contact NBAD on 8002211 (toll free within the UAE) to change your NBAD Stars to Skywards Miles.
8 Stars = 1 Skyward Mile


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Acceptable but not great computer speakers
Pros: Readily available
Cons: no highs, boomy bass, noisy electronics with hum
First of all I do not like Bose products. This was my first purchase and I only bought these because I was in Bogota and there was NOTHING else available. These were what I expected. No tweeter means there were no highs to speak of. I also found the bass to be quite boomy which is what I expect the general uninformed public would like. There was noticeable noise when no music was playing as well as a pronounced hum. I didn't bother to return them because nothing else was available. There are many other much better options out there.


text: I'm such a die hard fan of the Action Fleet line that I keep picking up ships from non-Star Wars lines. I just bought a TAC fighter Action Fleet ship on Ebay from the Starship Troopers line. I also have all of the Battle Squads vehicles. My question is, "Is there a good photo archive on the net for all Action Fleet type ships?" If not there should be. I have some great shots of the Battle Squads line save on my computer if someone wants to start an "Action Fleet" photo archive page.


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Downloaded and built from source xmlrpc-c. I still prefer Python (or even Java) for xmlrpc, but knowing how to do it in C will surely prove useful later. Its fun to set up clients and servers in different languages and have them talk to each other.
I'm certified as an Apprentice now! Thanks to fzort, badvogato, zanee, and ncm.


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- Horoscopes
- Dear Abby
- Games & Puzzles
- Lifestyle
- Events & Exhibits
- Food & Drink
- Arts & Music
- Movies & TV
The former chairwoman of the General Assembly's Internship Committee said Monday that state Rep. Ernest Hewett, D-New London, was not assigned female interns because of "a history of bad behavior" involving females.
State Rep. Mae Flexer, D-Danielson, said Monday that Hewett's "snake" comment last week wasn't the first example.
"We know he has a history of bad behavior, and we made a choice not to expose young women to that behavior just like no young woman or any young woman should have to be exposed," to it, Flexer said.
Hewett was stripped of his deputy speaker title last week, in response to a Feb. 20 Appropriations Committee meeting in which he said to a teenage girl: "If you're bashful, I got a snake sitting under my desk here."
Hewett was responding to comments made by a 17-year-old ambassador for the Connecticut Science Center who asked the committee to continue funding the center's ambassador program because it helped her overcome her shyness and get over her fear of snakes.
Hewett also told the Hartford Courant on Friday that he doesn't want to work with female interns because "that keeps me good and that keeps everybody else good."
Flexer was the chairman of the General Assembly's Internship Committee in 2011 and 2012 and now serves as a member of the committee.
Ever since she walked in the door, she said, she has known Hewett was not to be assigned a female intern.
There were "at least a handful" of incidents involving Hewett and females prior to her serving on the committee, she said. It was primarily verbal sexual harassment, which could include anything that creates a hostile work environment, she said.
Flexer said she would not go into detail because she did not want to highlight certain individuals that might not want to be in the public, she said.
"There are plenty of legislators for female interns to work with so not permitting Hewett to work with female interns is not seen as a loss," she said.
But she said Hewett's comments to the Hartford Courant about choosing not to work with female interns were "outrageous."
"They may give me a female, but I don't want a female intern," Hewett said. "That may sound sexist but I really don't."
Flexer said, "I mean, it is just ludicrous and it is so sexist and we cannot tolerate that kind of behavior or thought process. If everyone was like that there would be no women in the workplace. It's just ridiculous."
On Friday, when Hewett was asked whether he had ever had problems with female staff members he said, "I get along with everybody."
House Speaker Brendan Sharkey, D-Hamden, has called for the upperclassmen of his caucus to have a sexual harassment refresher course. Hewett will also face the women of the Democratic caucus today.
Flexer said she hopes the refresher course that Sharkey is planning will be "a little more thorough" than previous sexual harassment trainings.
Maybe this can turn into a "good thing," she said.
"Perhaps state legislators can make it understood that sexual harassment is not OK and stand by people who speak up about it," she said.
"And stop it from being a series of whispers that we just talk about and don't do anything about," Flexer said.
Hewett did not return calls on Monday.
Meanwhile on Monday, the Connecticut Republicans launched an online petition at www.ipetition.com that calls for Hewett to resign for his "wildly offensive comments to the young girl." As of 10 p.m., more than 1,500 people had signed the petition.
Rep. Hewett stripped of deputy speaker post after remark to teen at hearing
Groton notifies parents of 300 children that school will close
U.S. Supreme Court rules Mohegan employee not immune from 'individual capacity' lawsuit
Police: Off-duty officer punched elderly Foxwoods employee in the face
Montville man pleads guilty to selling heroin connected to overdose death
Police: Wife's Fitbit logs steps after husband says she died
New London residents call on city to get rid of brazen coyote
Conn College panel encourages local activism, continuing the 'resistance'
Waterford man pleads guilty in Connecticut College hit-and-run death case
Trump pushes wall funding in spending dispute with Democrats


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TDK EB750 Headphones
" These IEMs have an MRSP of $40. For that price they are not worth it. However, in many discount places, especially in Canada, you may find these @ $15 or less. If you find them for this price, grab them. I personally paid $10. Sound is great for the price. They look very rugged and feel solid, I believe they are made from aluminum. The cord is also tangle free and feels very nice...." --thug behram
Visang ro1
In ear monitor headphones.
Visang RO3
The R03 is an up-market professional-level earphone from well-known Chinese manufacturer ViSang. With quality materials used all-around, the build of the R03 is as venerable as the sound. Metal shells and a Cu-Ag alloy cable ensure longevity while the 10.7mm dynamic driver delivers crisp, powerful, and engaging sound. A uniquely patterned cable sheath provides flexibility and reduces cable...
Visang VS-K1
VS-K1 is a tri-band silver-line balanced-ear ,cavity use all-metal cutting process excellent resolving power, high elongation, low-frequency elastic density superb, Naiting sound is a highthe quality of the HI-FI headphones.It is suitable for all kinds of music to listen and popular vocal jazz rock.
ViSang VS-R02 InEar Hi-fi Noise Isolation Ear-Buds Earphones
Visang R02 is an earphone with equilibration. The high, medium, and low frequency distribution is average. It works well and grabbed a frequency and not to influence another frequency. The sound is up, good clean and fresh. This earphone sound great for the price. Their sound quality easily compares with products costing 2-3 times as much. Isolation and comfort levels are also very good. A...


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Welcome to the Rose-Hulman Efficient Vehicles Team Page
Our Team
The Rose-Hulman Efficient Vehicles (RHEV) team is comprised of interdisciplinary undergraduate engineering students. Together this team has built two of the most fuel efficient single passenger vehicles in the United States. For the past 3 years, RHEV has placed two cars in the top five of the Shell Eco-Marathon. The team's current reccord of 1972 mpg was set in 2007 at Rockingham Speedway in Corby, England
Our Competitions
Currently the Rose-Hulman Efficient Vehicle Team competes in two competitions:
SAE Supermileage
The SAE Supermileage competition is currently held in Marshall, Michigan at the EATON Proving Grounds. This yearly competition takes place during the month of June.
Shell Eco-Marathon
The Shell Eco-Marathon is currently held in Houston, Texas at the George R Brown Convention Center. This yearly competition takes place during the end of March to early April.
Our Goal
The objective of the Rose-Hulman Efficient Vehicles Team is to maximize fuel economy in a single person vehicle created to compete against other schools and teams in sanctioned competitions. The team provides an opportunity for students to learn about and participate in the design and construction of a fuel efficient vehicle.


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To apply for financial aid, submit a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). While students may apply for federal financial aid throughout the year, Ivy Tech has established the following financial aid processing priority dates for each enrollment period. In addition, students that have all of their financial aid requirements completed by the following bookstore priority date will have their aid available to use at the bookstore the first day it opens:
|Bookstore Priority Date
|Priority Date
|June 30
|July 15
|November 15
|December 1
|April 15
|May 1
In order to ensure priority processing and "on-time" delivery of eligible financial aid, students must apply and return all requested forms/verification paperwork by the priority processing date. Meeting the priority date gives Ivy Tech the necessary time to review and process your aid request accurately and on time for the Fall semester. It is recommended that you begin the financial aid application process at least 3-4 weeks before the priority processing date (for example, on or before mid-June for the following Fall semester).
If you have already filed a 2017-2018 FAFSA, you do not need to re-file for the December 1st priority date.
If the semester priority processing date is missed, a student's application will still be accepted and processed, however, your aid will most likely not be posted by the first day of classes. You can still take advantage of paying your tuition through Nelnet in order to meet the College's payment deadline for tuition and fees.


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Fast Computation of Terrain Shadow Maps
point map working terrain algorithm light using function projection
The topic of terrain rendering is a very big one. This paper will focus on the lighting and shadowing aspects of terrain rendering. In the pictures below you can see the effect of this technique in action.
Terrain shadows generated using this algorithm
Algorithm description
The algorithm is quite simple in fact. For every grid point, we check if the ray from the light position to the point intersects the map. This is done very quickly by checking only the points that are under the projection of the vector L, as shown in Figure 1.
- A = working point
- B = coordinates of the sun position projection ( vector B = vector(sun_pos.x, 0, sun_pos.z) );
- C = coordinates of the sun position;
- L = light direction vector ( L = A - C );
- P = any point that lays under the projection of vector L;
- X(P) = coordinates on the L vector whose projection is point P (computed used simple LERP).
If all the P-type points have been tested and no intersection was found, then the illumination at point A is computed using the following formula:
Illum(A) = ambient_color_value + (L dot N)
clamped to the range [0,1].
Algorithm implementation
The function genLightmap handles the light map generation. It tests and illuminates every point on the height map.
Note: If you plan to copy & paste this code into your own program you should know that the normals are compressed from 1 float per component, to 1 byte per component. (see the note at the end of the paper)
int intersect_map(const vector3& iv,const ray& r,Image* hm,float fHeightScale){ int w,hits; float d,h,D; vector3 v,dir; v = iv + r.direction; w = hm->w; hits = 0; while (!(( v.x >= w-1 ) || ( v.x <= 0 ) || ( v.z >= w-1 ) || ( v.z <= 0 ))){ // length of lightdir's projection D = Magnitude(vector3(v.x,0,v.z)-vector3(r.origin.x,0,r.origin.z)); d = Magnitude(iv-v); // light direction h = iv.y + (d*r.origin.y) / D; // X(P) point // check if height in point P is bigger than point X's height if (hm->data[ifloor(v.z)* w + ifloor(v.x)] * fHeightScale > h){ hits++; // if so, mark as hit, and skip this work point. break; }; dir = r.direction; dir.y = 0; v += Normalize(dir); // fetch new working point }; return hits; }; Image* genLightmap(char* normal,Image* hm,vector3 fSunDir,int w,float fAmbient){ int i,j,hits; float f,dot; vector3 n,fVertex; Image* lmap; ray r; float fHeightScale = 10.0f / 255.0f; lmap = new Image(w,w,1); if (!lmap){printf("(!) Error: cannot alloc lightmap!\n");return 0;}; for (j=0; jdata[j*w+i] * fHeightScale; fVertex.z = j; f = fAmbient ; r.origin = fVertex + fSunDir * 2000.0f; r.direction = fSunDir; // checks current working point for intersection if (!intersect_map(fVertex,r,hm,fHeightScale)){ // compute the lighting equation n.x = (float)(normal[3*(j*w+i)+0]); n.y = (float)(normal[3*(j*w+i)+1]); n.z = (float)(normal[3*(j*w+i)+2]); f += 0.5f*(1.0f+DotProduct(Normalize(n),Normalize(fSunDir))); if (f>1.0f) f = 1.0f; }; dot = f * 255.0f; lmap->data[j*w+i] = (unsigned char)dot; }; }; return lmap; };After you have successfully created your light maps, you will probably want to use them. I will tell you two ways to add them to your own terrain engine: one is to use them as light maps, and the other is to set the color of each point in the terrain according to its corresponding color in the shadow map.
Terrain color map
Terrain shadow map
Final terrain texture
If you intend to use the shadow map as a light map, you should consider the use of a supplementary texture unit. In any case, if you decide to use this technique, you should set the texture environment mode to modulate. In OpenGL, this is done in the following manner :
glTexEnvi(GL_TEXTURE_ENV,GL_TEXTURE_ENV_MODE,GL_MODULATE);Color component
When using the shadow map pixels as color components for the terrain geometry, you should consider using separate buffers for each vertex component. By doing this, you will be able to send the data returned by genLightmap directly to the renderer, by setting the color array pointer to the address of the returned data. In OpenGL, this is done with the glColorPointer function.
For any questions or suggestions, feel free to e-mail me at firstname.lastname@example.com
The full sources for this article can be found at http://nervus.go.ro/ in the Downloads section.
The sources are free, you can do whatever you want with them, but if you include them in your project, or use this algorithm for any commercial or non-commercial use, please give me credit.
Global Illumination Compendium
March 16, 2000,
Philip Dutré
Program of Computer Graphics
Cornell University