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Posted on Feb, 15 2019 by Doe
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Blessed Pope John Paul II was blunt in St. Louis in 1999 when he told Americans, "another great challenge (is) facing this. . .whole country: to put an end to every form of racism, a plague. . .one of the most persistent and destructive evils of the nation."
Racism still victimizes African-Americans. Note current socioeconomic data.
Ultimately, reviewing American racism exposes a classic case of yielding principles to convention, ignorance and self-interest, indicting all too many whites, Catholics included, but the indictment all the more vividly reveals great faith among African-American Catholics. It applies South or North. (Racism is no stranger in the North and Midwest. One of the last lynchings of an African-American occurred in 1930 in Marion, Ind., 30 miles from Our Sunday Visitor's office. Read Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North, by Thomas J. Sugrue [Random House, 2008]).
Benedictine Father Cyprian Davis, an African–American, wrote the standard Catholic African–American history, The History of Black Catholic in the United States (Crossroad, 1992). As the Caucasian–American priest and native Southerner who is writing this article, I admit to differences in perspective and experience, and I am convinced that most whites will need further study of, and actual encounter with, African–American culture to gain the true insight required to remedy racism.
Africans were among early Spanish explorers of North America, but for studying U.S. history, English Jamestown and French Louisiana are better examples.
Jamestown, founded in 1607, was England's first surviving colony in North America. A Dutch ship landed there in 1619, conveying a group of Africans forcibly taken from their homes who were sold as slaves.
Calling the area Louisiana, French adventurers founded present-day Biloxi, Mississippi, in 1699, and today's Natchitoches, Louisiana, in 1714. Then, in 1718, they established Ville de La Nouvelle-Orleans, or modern-day New Orleans, where La Riviere de l'Immaculee Conception, the River of the Immaculate Conception, as they called it, or the Mississippi River, meets the Gulf. In 1803, the United States acquired Louisiana, and in 1812 Louisiana attained American statehood.
For 200 years slavery was a mighty social, economic and political institution in Louisiana. Racial segregation followed. Since Louisiana always has had a heavy Catholic flavor, its past is a good measure of Catholic response to slavery and racism.
As to the entire republic, the original American Constitution — along with many state constitutions and dozens of laws — provided for slavery. As time passed, white Americans came either to defend slavery or denounce it.
In late 1860 and early 1861, eleven Southern states, determined to hold onto slavery, formed the Confederate States of America. The Civil War began.
On Jan. 1, 1863, Union President Abraham Lincoln freed slaves in the seceding states except those in Tennessee and in parts of Louisiana and Virginia. He did not free slaves in states loyal to the Union, but the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, on Dec. 31, 1865, abolished slavery altogether. The Confederacy died on April 9, 1865, with Robert E. Lee's surrender.
Subsequent Reconstruction failed to provide for recently freed slaves. Individual states passed laws segregating blacks from whites, and segregation restricted blacks in all manner of circumstances.
A New Orleans African–American Catholic, Homer Adolph Plessy, challenged a Louisiana segregation statute in a lawsuit, Plessy v. Ferguson. On May 1, 1896, voting seven to one, with one associate justice abstaining, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "separate but equal" facilities, based on race, were constitutional. This decision carved legal segregation in granite. What was not law became social custom, and not just in the South.
The Plessy decision was not the only time American jurisprudence did a disservice to African–Americans. Police routinely harrassed and mistreated blacks. White judges and all-white juries sent blacks to prisons or to death chambers, while whites who committed similar crimes received more lenient rebukes — if any. And woe to any black accused of abusing a white.
Time passed. Blacks willingly fought in America's wars, but military segregation humiliated them and ignored their skills. Seeing the wrong in this, President Harry S. Truman, grandson of a Confederate soldier, desegregated the armed forces in 1946, coincidentally driving the first nail in the coffin of the Democratic Party's "Solid South."
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, on May 17, 1954, found racially segregated public schools unconstitutional, reversing Plessy's basic premise. Finally, Brown killed segregation altogether, but its death rattle was loud.
The Civil Rights Movement came, led by an Atlanta-born charismatic African–American Baptist minister, educated in the East, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Churches took stands. Politicians fought pro and con. Ironically, in his term from 1963 to 1969, President Lyndon B. Johnson, grandson of two Confederate soldiers, priding himself as a man "whose roots go deep into the soil of the South," championed racial equality.
Where was the Catholic Church in this history?
Father Joel Panzer, of the Diocese of Lincoln, wrote The Popes and Slavery (Alba House, 1996). Between 1435 and 1890, Popes denounced slavery. Usually their statements were qualified or read with qualification.
The Second Vatican Council spoke firmly about human dignity. Pope Paul VI's 1967 encyclical Populorum Progressio set human equality in absolute theological terms. Of particular interest to this country, he named African–American priests to the episcopacy, and he met with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
Liturgical reforms, enacted by Pope Paul VI, enabled worship more expressive of African and African–American spirituality. A newfound ecumenical friendliness allowed Catholics to join others in promoting racial justice.
What about American Church leadership in the face of racism, blacks in particular focus? What about white American Catholics at the grass roots?
A conclusion, hard to read, but bolstered by research, appeared on March 31, 1968, in Our Sunday Visitor. Now deceased Msgr. John Tracy Ellis, yet the premier American Church historian in a century, wrote: "Given a record of this kind (response of Catholic bishops and priests) from the birth of the republic to World War II, it should occasion no surprise that an historian of Catholic social thought should conclude, after mention of a few notable exceptions, that the hierarchy had not been distinguished for farsighted or courageous leadership in social and economic problems."
What did Msgr. Ellis mean? The first American bishop, John Carroll, of Baltimore, a white as were all U.S. bishops until 1875, personally owned a slave. Other bishops, dioceses, religious congregations and priests owned slaves. Some bishops defended slavery on grounds that slavery actually helped the slaves.
The First Provincial Council of Baltimore in 1829, involving all American bishops, urged catechizing slaves but gave no details for implementation. Eight more Provincial Councils of Baltimore followed before the Civil War. None questioned slavery.
In Confederate states, Catholic bishops supported secession. New Orleans Archbishop Jean-Marie Odin so fervently upheld the Confederacy that the city's eventual federal occupation considered him a nuisance if not a threat. Federal forces literally imprisoned Natchez Bishop William Henry Elder for his pro-Confederate views.
Bishop Patrick J. Lynch of Charleston accepted Confederate President Jefferson Davis's request to go to Rome to urge Blessed Pope Pius IX to recognize the Confederacy as an independent nation. (The bishop was not successful.)
More edifying, from the time Europeans and Africans arrived on this continent, American Catholic clergy, particularly in Louisiana, but also in Maryland, the other place of higher concentration of black Catholics, received blacks, slave or free, into the Church and cared for them spiritually — albeit under segregated conditions.
Because of all this, an African–American Catholic community and culture developed.
After the war, Baltimore episcopal councils turned to African–Americans, especially freed slaves. Dulling this initiative was the bishops' regret that emancipation had not been more "gradual," but outreach and ministry to African–Americans was encouraged. This urging, of course, was directed to a white clergy. No African–American then was a priest. Attention to blacks never was a genuine national Church priority, yet good things happened.
As a special mission, the Josephite Fathers came and evangelized African–Americans. St. Katherine Drexel founded the Sisters of the Blessed Sacrament to teach blacks and Native Americans. In 1884, bishops opened what is now the National Black and Indian Mission office.
When Georgia's legislature threatened to forbid white instructors in black schools, Father William Lissner, a French priest, and Mother Theodore Williams, an African–American, founded in Savannah, Ga., in 1916, the Handmaids of Mary, a religious community precisely to be schoolteachers for black children.
White priests, including Jesuit Fathers William Markoe and John LaFarge, editor of America magazine, and Msgr. Bernard J. Quinn, of the Brooklyn diocese, whose cause for sainthood is underway, spoke and moved for racial equality.
A disturbing angle in the story has to do with African–American Catholic vocations. Stephen J. Ochs, in Desegregating the Altar (Louisiana State University Press, 1990), carefully details this history.
In 1854, James Augustine Healy, the first African–American priest, was ordained. (He became bishop of Portland, Maine, in 1875). Born in Georgia, a slave in Georgia since his mother was a slave, he was assumed to be Irish because of his Irish father.
Father Augustus Tolton, born a slave in Missouri, perhaps better illustrates the story of black priestly vocations. No American seminary would enroll him, so he studied in Rome. Ordained in 1886, he died in 1897. He is now a candidate for sainthood. (His biographies, From Slave to Priest [Ignatius Press, 1973], and A Place for My Children [Pennink, 2007] are interesting reads.)
Religious took the lead. In 1889, Josephite Father Charles Uncles, was the first African–American priest ordained in the United States. He was one of few. Then, in 1920, the Society of the Divine Word opened a seminary for African–Americans in Mississippi.
Most convents turned black women away — until living memory.
In 1946, Nashville, Tenn.-born Cardinal Samuel Stritch, of Chicago, for whom ministry to African–Americans was an episcopal priority, wrote every Southern bishop urging him to consider African–Americans for his diocesan clergy. Only in 1952 was a black diocesan priest ordained in the South.
Slowly, times were changing. The American Catholic bishops, all white until Auxiliary Bishop Harold R. Perry, S.V.D., of New Orleans, was appointed in 1965, collectively supported the Civil Rights Movement, at least its ideals.
Father Bryan N. Massingale, of the Marquette University theology faculty, however, maintains in Racial Justice in the Catholic Church [Orbis, 2010] that the bishops as a body came late to the scene. Nevertheless, the course was drawn. Many priests and Religious, white as well as black, courageously advocated for equality.
In 1979, all the American bishops published Brothers and Sisters to Us, relying on Scripture and the magisterium to label racism as a sin and as a chronic harm to American life. In 1986, the bishops established the Secretariat for African–American Catholics.
The country's 10 black bishops issued "What We Have Seen and Heard," a letter to all American Catholics, in 1984. Stepping forward, it said that African–American Catholics had come of age and looked to reinforcing and spreading the faith.
What about the white Catholic laity's reaction to slavery and segregation?
Depending upon their wherewithal, white Catholics for two centuries owned slaves. (So did free African–American Catholics.) Before the Civil War, no Catholic of any ethnicity was a prominent abolitionist. The few white Catholic abolitionists were poor, besieged and scattered, except in Louisiana, where white Catholics ran the place.
In 1861, to preserve slavery, a Louisiana state convention voted 113 to 17 to leave the Union. Certainly many deputies were Catholics.
Jefferson Davis, an Episcopalian but with Catholic schooling, was totally committed to slavery. Catholics sat in his cabinet and in the Confederate Congress. High Confederate military commanders were Catholics. Many Catholics bore Confederate arms, including this writer's Irish-American great-grandfather. The only chaplain killed in action on either side was Benedictine Father Emmeran Bliemel, from Nashville, serving a largely Catholic Confederate unit.
For white Catholics outside the South, it usually was out-of- sight-out-of-mind when it came to mistreating blacks. Sadly, clashes developed on occasion, prompted often by economics, and white Catholics tolerated abusing blacks, generally to avoid upsetting the apple cart.
When the Supreme Court decided Plessy in 1896, the only Catholic on that bench, future Chief Justice Edward Douglass White, from Louisiana, a Caucasian, once a Confederate soldier, concurred.
No Catholic sat on the Supreme Court when Brown was rendered. Many Catholic politicians pressed for desegregation. It was not unanimous. Most Southern memebers of Congress reacted to Brown by vowing in their "Southern Manifesto," published in 1956, to retain segregation. Every Catholic Southerner in Congress, except one, Paul Kilday (D-TX), a white, signed the "Manifesto."
President John F. Kennedy, always clearly identified as a Catholic, while philosophically behind racial justice, at first seemed lukewarm about civil rights. But, not long before he was killed on Nov. 22, 1963, he called the idea a moral imperative. (Read The Bystander, by Nick Bryant. [Basic Books, 2006]).
Venerable Henriette De Lille, of New Orleans, was born in 1813 of a Frenchman and part-African–American free woman. Educated, free, seeing blacks wanting all around her, she helped in forming the Sisters of the Holy Family for poor African–Americans.
Mother Mary Elizabeth Lange, African–American, born in Haiti, lived in Baltimore. Concerned about oppressed blacks, free or slave, she founded the Oblate Sisters of Providence.
In New York, a refugee from slavery in Haiti, Venerable Pierre Toussaint, a layman, was legendary for his acts of charity.
This is striking. Well before Pope Pius XI's Catholic Action in the 1920s or the Second Vatican Council's teachings on the lay apostolate, lay witness was noticeable among black Catholics, individually and collectively. Daniel Rudd, born a slave in 1854 in Kentucky's old Catholic heartland, later emancipated, moved to Ohio for schooling. In 1886, he founded The American Tribune, a newspaper for black Catholics, for bonding and evangelization. He was instrumental in 1889 when the first Catholic black lay congress assembled.
Thomas Wyatt Turner, born in Maryland in 1877, attended an Episcopalian primary school because the local Catholic school refused to enroll blacks. He pushed for what came to be called "black pride." He organized groups to confront racism and to create opportunity for blacks.
The Knights of Peter Claver were established for black Catholic men in 1909. An auxiliary for women opened in 1921. (Many white Catholic organizations, particularly in the South, did not admit African–Americans until modern times.)
The Federated Colored Catholics of the United States formed in 1924.
By 1930, many Catholic African–Americans had moved from Southern farms to Northern cities where Catholic night schools, credit unions and fraternal groups came into being. Black Catholic schools always were important.
Groups of black clergy and Religious came together.
An African–American Catholic theologian, Dominican Sister Jamie T. Phelps, wrote in Uncommon Faithfulness (Orbis, 2009), "As we study the history of black Catholics in our Church, we deepen our understanding of how God's will for our salvation was mediated in and through the everyday experiences of the faith-filled lives of the followers of Christ."
In 1984, "What We Have Seen and Heard" listed values strong in the African–American Catholic experience: faith in God, hope and forbearance, generosity, the family, a thirst for justice, regard for the Scriptures, respect for ecumenism, recognition of the strengths and gifts of women, admission of racism, and an active sense of vocation.
Amid irreligion, hopelessness, surrender, wandering, injustice and division, these tested African–American Catholic values are incentives for evangelization and personal spiritual growth.
Now, much is better for African–Americans, economically and socially, but the "better" can be a mirage. Economic and social wrongs endure. Racism survives.
Sweeten this culture with the love of Christ, as not that long ago a saintly pontiff implored in St. Louis.
MSGR. CAMPION is associate publisher of Our Sunday Visitor and editor of The Priest magazine.
Copyright © 1996-2019 Our Sunday Visitor, Inc.

subset: commoncrawl


text: I realize that perhaps much of this may seem like hairsplitting, but it reveals important developments as the renewed diaconate continues to gain in maturity and experience. What worked to describe the reality of the diaconate and diaconal life early in the renewal is giving way to more nuanced and reflective expressions, and I hope it will continue to do so. The diaconate, especially in the US, began with an infancy and it has now grown into adolescence and is seeking its maturity. This gets reflected in the language we choose to use to describe all of this.


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P.M.'s TIME is up!
Pehley, let's get a few things into perspective. TIME magazine itself is on life support. Time was up for TIME more than a decade ago. Just like all life drained out of the once iconic LIFE much earlier. The magazine business is like that – cyclical. Particularly in today's zamana in which every internet user is a magazine in himself or herself. And everything is out there – news, analysis, commentary, pictures, quotes, gossip, scoops – the works. Woh bhi, for free! Click... and you have the latest khabar in an instant. In such an environment, why would anybody pay for a slim American weekly that is more expensive than erudite? Given the choice, I'd any day opt for its livelier, more gossipy and better laid out cousin, NEWSWEEK. Or read blogs. Yet, despite its unimpressive circulation and eroded prestige value, some of us in India behave like TIME magazine is the Holy Grail, and every word on its pages represents the gospel truth. Balderdash. For starters, TIME magazine is not exactly unbiased ( which publication is?). TIME has always harboured a political agenda.Its international credibility is not all that high, either. Most American analysts dismiss it off as a lightweight. And in any case, their Asian edition is not read by either Americans or Europeans. So, why the hell are we getting so hot and bothered about the recent " Únderachiever'story that presents a pretty unflattering portrait of Manmohan Singh?What has the magazine said that we, in India, don't already know.... or that hasn't already been said by countless desi commentators across various platforms? There is not a single revelation, insight or even a scrap of tantalising gossip in the flat and somewhat dull piece. The only catchy aspect of the cover story is the bold heading – Underachiever. It is a pretty cruel word to paste across someone's picture. But there are few who would dispute the accuracy of the description. It is as cutting as labelling the slow coach in a class a 'Dunce' in the year book .
Such are the harsh, unforgiving times we live in, alas. Nothing flies without comment. And our poor P.M. has been at the receiving end of some pretty tough criticism. He is hauled over the coals on a nightly basis by over wrought anchors who pounce on any and every issue to run the guy down. That he has made himself such an easy and soft target is of course, entirely his fault. By not opening his mouth even to defend himself against serious charges, "Mum''Mohan Singh has provided opponents ample opportunities to trash him without a contest or rebuttal. Then comes the TIME article, and everybody crows, "See.... this is what the international community thinks of India's Prime Minister... shame-shame."
Without dissecting the merits of the magazine's arguments, my problem is with its motives. Call me paranoid. But I am convinced most foreign journals have a sly hidden agenda, American publications in particular. If the same magazine (TIME) had carried a pretty glowing tribute to Narendra Modi recently, it is certainly no accident that the Únderachiever'story followed. There is clearly a link... a pattern... to both articles. What the ultimate objective is, I leave to intelligence agencies to fathom.Which is precisely why it is important to add a sack full of salt to such reportage. Just as the Modi story was not taken all that seriously by thinking Indians, we should display the same level of healthy scepticism towards the Underachiever one , too. One can't blame the editors of TIME for trying their little stunts. In such a fiercely competitive era, it's fine to pull out all the stops and generate as much publicity as possible in order to get noticed on the newsstand. Sachin Tendulkar had also featured on the TIME cover after his historic 100/ 100 knock, and had been gushingly referred to as the greatest sportsman in the world. This was a bit much. Had they called him the 'greatest sportsman in the cricketing world', few would have quibbled.But in its eagerness to court Indian readers for its Asian edition, TIME is obviously going flat out to feature top personalities from the region.And we, of course, over react and fall over backwards with gratitude for having been thus acknowledged and 'honoured'. The truth is slightly different. TIME , like any other foreign brand, is fighting for readers and ads in this lucrative market. India remains one of the last bastions for books and magazines in a world that prefers to read everything online. Wooing advertisers and readers with such engineered stories is the obvious way forward. Flashing Lists of 100 Most Powerful is another strategy. And we are absolute suckers for similar lists that come with an imported stamp of approval. Let's call it our Oscars'Complex. Year after year, we cravenly hope at least one of our films will get some sort of recognition at the Oscars. That pat on the back is of such vital importance, we will do just about anything to make the cut and be seen on the red carpet. It is as if we have no faith in our abilities to judge our own worth. Or even that we require a foreign expert to hand out a certificate that validates our position.
After the longest time, I actually found myself feeling sorry for the man who, not so long ago was happily basking in the 'Singh is King' after glow. Poor Manmohan Singh. He really should have quit a long time ago! But what could he do? His hands were tied! Madam had not given him permission to do that!And, as the nation well knows, unless Madam gives the go ahead to put in those papers, our P.M. is stuck. And so are we. But we didn't need TIME magazine to tell us , did we?


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There are several reasons individuals make the effort to fully restore 1969 ford mach mustangs for automobile programs and individual satisfaction. Among the primary factors people spend a lot time, energy, and money bring back 1969 ford mach mustangs is the power that is included in that certain mustang model. The engine upgrades that were readily available during the launch of the 1969 ford mach mustang for sale in Vinton IA transformed the mach mustang from the average family vehicle into a racing enthusiasts dream.
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One dead after train, car collide in Redding
REDDING -- One person died and three others were injured Sunday afternoon when a Metro-North work train collided with a car near the West Redding station.
Three people had to be extricated from the vehicle, a gray Subaru Outback with Connecticut plates, while the fourth person was outside the vehicle when West Redding firefighters and emergency personnel arrived about 1:20 p.m.
One person was pronounced dead at Danbury Hospital, according to Metropolitan Transportation Authority spokesman Sam Zambuto.
Names of the injured and their conditions were not available Sunday night, MTA Assistant Police Chief Steve Conner said.
The two crew members on the train, an engineer and a conductor, were unhurt, authorities said. There were no passengers.
The train had left Danbury and was headed south to Norwalk when the accident happened at the Long Ridge Road crossing, about 150 yards from the station.
The train pushed the car, which was traveling south, about 50 yards before it tumbled down an embankment toward Simpaug Turnpike, which was also closed in the vicinity of the accident.
The three-car train and the locomotive stopped about 100 yards past the station.
Conner said police were speaking to witnesses in an attempt to learn whether the warning lights at the ungated crossing were flashing or whether the driver may have disregarded them.
MTA technicians were also examining the signals to see whether they were in working order, he said.
The West Redding station was closed and train service on the Danbury Branch stopped while emergency crews were on the scene.
Metro-North wass bringing in buses temporarily to carry passengers traveling south to South Norwalk.


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Florida Suncoast Chorus is an extraordinary group of gentlemen who gather together in celebration of the art form known as barbershop music. We are a chapter of the Barbershop Harmony Society.
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|About The Florida Suncoast Chorus
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Drive-in movie theaters are often thought of as relics from times gone by. But while it's true that the real estate drive-ins occupy are often more valuable than the business, many theaters are hanging tough. The past decade has even seen some new theaters built.
Make no mistake, though. The industry, like many small businesses, faces challenges. The number of screens has declined from more than 4,000 in the 1960s to 366 today. Skyrocketing real-estate values tempted many owners to sell out to commercial developers.
And now, the 21st-century is providing drive-in theater owners with a new challenge: digital projection.
The United Drive-In Theater Owners Association expects that within the next two years, movie studios will stop distributing films domestically in 35mm celluloid prints, forcing theater owners everywhere—not just those running drive-ins—to convert to digital projectors or shut down. While digital delivery of a new release will cut down dramatically on studios' printing and distribution costs, it will increase expenses for theater owners: They will have to pay between $60,000 to $85,000 to upgrade each screen.
The good news is that many are prepared to battle it out. "People who run drive-in theaters in the 21st century are never dull, and their stories are all unique," said photographer Carl Weese, who has been documenting drive-ins for more than a decade.
What will it take for drive-ins to, as the joke goes, not have to sell out to Wal-Mart? Here are 10 theaters that are re-inventing themselves for the future.
Posted 4 June 2012


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Coleen Rowley's Memo to FBI Director Robert Mueller
An edited version of the agent's 13-page letter
May 21, 2002
FBI Director Robert Mueller
FBI Headquarters Washington, D.C.
Dear Director Mueller:
I feel at this point that I have to put my concerns in writing concerning the important topic of the FBI's response to evidence of terrorist activity in the United States prior to September 11th. The issues are fundamentally ones of INTEGRITY and go to the heart of the FBI's law enforcement mission and mandate. Moreover, at this critical juncture in fashioning future policy to promote the most effective handling of ongoing and future threats to United States citizens' security, it is of absolute importance that an unbiased, completely accurate picture emerge of the FBI's current investigative and management strengths and failures.
To get to the point, I have deep concerns that a delicate and subtle shading/skewing of facts by you and others at the highest levels of FBI management has occurred and is occurring. The term "cover up" would be too strong a characterization which is why I am attempting to carefully (and perhaps over laboriously) choose my words here. I base my concerns on my relatively small, peripheral but unique role in the Moussaoui investigation in the Minneapolis Division prior to, during and after September 11th and my analysis of the comments I have heard both inside the FBI (originating, I believe, from you and other high levels of management) as well as your Congressional testimony and public comments.
I feel that certain facts, including the following, have, up to now, been omitted, downplayed, glossed over and/or mis-characterized in an effort to avoid or minimize personal and/or institutional embarrassment on the part of the FBI and/or perhaps even for improper political reasons:
1) The Minneapolis agents who responded to the call about Moussaoui's flight training identified him as a terrorist threat from a very early point. The decision to take him into custody on August 15, 2001, on the INS "overstay" charge was a deliberate one to counter that threat and was based on the agents' reasonable suspicions. While it can be said that Moussaoui's overstay status was fortuitous, because it allowed for him to be taken into immediate custody and prevented him receiving any more flight training, it was certainly not something the INS coincidentally undertook of their own volition. I base this on the conversation I had when the agents called me at home late on the evening Moussaoui was taken into custody to confer and ask for legal advice about their next course of action. The INS agent was assigned to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and was therefore working in tandem with FBI agents.
2) As the Minneapolis agents' reasonable suspicions quickly ripened into probable cause, which, at the latest, occurred within days of Moussaoui's arrest when the French Intelligence Service confirmed his affiliations with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama Bin Laden, they became desperate to search the computer lap top that had been taken from Moussaoui as well as conduct a more thorough search of his personal effects. The agents in particular believed that Moussaoui signaled he had something to hide in the way he refused to allow them to search his computer.
3) The Minneapolis agents' initial thought was to obtain a criminal search warrant, but in order to do so, they needed to get FBI Headquarters' (FBIHQ's) approval in order to ask for DOJ OIPR's approval to contact the United States Attorney's Office in Minnesota. Prior to and even after receipt of information provided by the French, FBIHQ personnel disputed with the Minneapolis agents the existence of probable cause to believe that a criminal violation had occurred/was occurring. As such, FBIHQ personnel refused to contact OIPR to attempt to get the authority. While reasonable minds may differ as to whether probable cause existed prior to receipt of the French intelligence information, it was certainly established after that point and became even greater with successive, more detailed information from the French and other intelligence sources. The two possible criminal violations initially identified by Minneapolis Agents were violations of Title 18 United States Code Section 2332b (Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, which, notably, includes "creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any other person by destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States") and Section 32 (Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities). It is important to note that the actual search warrant obtained on September 11th was based on probable cause of a violation of Section 32.1 Notably also, the actual search warrant obtained on September 11th did not include the French intelligence information. Therefore, the only main difference between the information being submitted to FBIHQ from an early date which HQ personnel continued to deem insufficient and the actual criminal search warrant which a federal district judge signed and approved on September 11th, was the fact that, by the time the actual warrant was obtained, suspected terrorists were known to have highjacked planes which they then deliberately crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. To say then, as has been iterated numerous times, that probable cause did not exist until after the disasterous event occurred, is really to acknowledge that the missing piece of probable cause was only the FBI's (FBIHQ's) failure to appreciate that such an event could occur. The probable cause did not otherwise improve or change. When we went to the United States Attorney's Office that morning of September 11th, in the first hour after the attack, we used a disk containing the same information that had already been provided to FBIHQ; then we quickly added Paragraph 19 which was the little we knew from news reports of the actual attacks that morning. The problem with chalking this all up to the "20-20 hindsight is perfect" problem, (which I, as all attorneys who have been involved in deadly force training or the defense of various lawsuits are fully appreciative of), is that this is not a case of everyone in the FBI failing to appreciate the potential consequences. It is obvious, from my firsthand knowledge of the events and the detailed documentation that exists, that the agents in Minneapolis who were closest to the action and in the best position to gauge the situation locally, did fully appreciate the terrorist risk/danger posed by Moussaoui and his possible co-conspirators even prior to September 11th. Even without knowledge of the Phoenix communication (and any number of other additional intelligence communications that FBIHQ personnel were privy to in their central coordination roles), the Minneapolis agents appreciated the risk. So I think it's very hard for the FBI to offer the "20-20 hindsight" justification for its failure to act! Also intertwined with my reluctance in this case to accept the "20-20 hindsight" rationale is first-hand knowledge that I have of statements made on September 11th, after the first attacks on the World Trade Center had already occurred, made telephonically by the FBI Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) who was the one most involved in the Moussaoui matter and who, up to that point, seemed to have been consistently, almost deliberately thwarting the Minneapolis FBI agents' efforts (see number 5). Even after the attacks had begun, the SSA in question was still attempting to block the search of Moussaoui's computer, characterizing the World Trade Center attacks as a mere coincidence with Misseapolis' prior suspicions about Moussaoui.2
4) In one of my peripheral roles on the Moussaoui matter, I answered an e-mail message on August 22, 2001, from an attorney at the National Security Law Unit (NSLU). Of course, with (ever important!) 20-20 hindsight, I now wish I had taken more time and care to compose my response. When asked by NSLU for my "assessment of (our) chances of getting a criminal warrant to search Moussaoui's computer", I answered, "Although I think there's a decent chance of being able to get a judge to sign a criminal search warrant, our USAO seems to have an even higher standard much of the time, so rather than risk it, I advised that they should try the other route." Leaked news accounts which said the Minneapolis Legal Counsel (referring to me) concurred with the FBIHQ that probable cause was lacking to search Moussaoui's computer are in error. (or possibly the leak was deliberately skewed in this fashion?) What I meant by this pithy e-mail response, was that although I thought probable cause existed ("probable cause" meaning that the proposition has to be more likely than not, or if quantified, a 51% likelihood), I thought our United States Attorney's Office, (for a lot of reasons including just to play it safe) in regularly requiring much more than probable cause before approving affidavits, (maybe, if quantified, 75%-80% probability and sometimes even higher), and depending on the actual AUSA who would be assigned, might turn us down. As a tactical choice, I therefore thought it would be better to pursue the "other route" (the FISA search warrant) first, the reason being that there is a common perception, which for lack of a better term, I'll call the "smell test" which has arisen that if the FBI can't do something through straight-up criminal methods, it will then resort to using less-demanding intelligence methods. Of course this isn't true, but I think the perception still exists. So, by this line of reasoning, I was afraid that if we first attempted to go criminal and failed to convince an AUSA, we wouldn't pass the "smell test" in subsequently seeking a FISA. I thought our best chances therefore lay in first seeking the FISA. Both of the factors that influenced my thinking are areas arguably in need of improvement: requiring an excessively high standard of probable cause in terrorism cases and getting rid of the "smell test" perception. It could even be argued that FBI agents, especially in terrorism cases where time is of the essence, should be allowed to go directly to federal judges to have their probable cause reviewed for arrests or searches without having to gain the USAO's approval.4
5) The fact is that key FBIHQ personnel whose job it was to assist and coordinate with field division agents on terrorism investigations and the obtaining and use of FISA searches (and who theoretically were privy to many more sources of intelligence information than field division agents), continued to, almost inexplicably,5 throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis' by-now desperate efforts to obtain a FISA search warrant, long after the French intelligence service provided its information and probable cause became clear. HQ personnel brought up almost ridiculous questions in their apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause.6 In all of their conversations and correspondence, HQ personnel never disclosed to the Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had, only approximately three weeks earlier, warned of Al Qaeda operatives in flight schools seeking flight training for terrorist purposes!
Nor did FBIHQ personnel do much to disseminate the information about Moussaoui to other appropriate intelligence/law enforcement authorities. When, in a desperate 11th hour measure to bypass the FBIHQ roadblock, the Minneapolis Division undertook to directly notify the CIA's Counter Terrorist Center (CTC), FBIHQ personnel actually chastised the Minneapolis agents for making the direct notification without their approval!
6 ) Eventually on August 28, 2001, after a series of e-mails between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA deliberately further undercut the FISA effort by not adding the further intelligence information which he had promised to add that supported Moussaoui's foreign power connection and making several changes in the wording of the information that had been provided by the Minneapolis Agent, the Minneapolis agents were notified that the NSLU Unit Chief did not think there was sufficient evidence of Moussaoui's connection to a foreign power. Minneapolis personnel are, to this date, unaware of the specifics of the verbal presentations by the FBIHQ SSA to NSLU or whether anyone in NSLU ever was afforded the opportunity to actually read for him/herself all of the information on Moussaoui that had been gathered by the Minneapolis Division and the French intelligence service. Obviously verbal presentations are far more susceptible to mis-characterization and error. The e-mail communications between Minneapolis and FBIHQ, however, speak for themselves and there are far better witnesses than me who can provide their first hand knowledge of these events characterized in one Minneapolis agent's e-mail as FBIHQ is "setting this up for failure." My only comment is that the process of allowing the FBI supervisors to make changes in affidavits is itself fundamentally wrong, just as, in the follow-up to FBI Laboratory Whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst's allegations, this process was revealed to be wrong in the context of writing up laboratory results. With the Whitehurst allegations, this process of allowing supervisors to re-write portions of laboratory reports, was found to provide opportunities for over-zealous supervisors to skew the results in favor of the prosecution. In the Moussaoui case, it was the opposite -- the process allowed the Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the significance of the information thus far collected in order to get out of the work of having to see the FISA application through or possibly to avoid taking what he may have perceived as an unnecessary career risk.7 I understand that the failures of the FBIHQ personnel involved in the Moussaoui matter are also being officially excused because they were too busy with other investigations, the Cole bombing and other important terrorism matters, but the Supervisor's taking of the time to read each word of the information submitted by Minneapolis and then substitute his own choice of wording belies to some extent the notion that he was too busy. As an FBI division legal advisor for 12 years (and an FBI agent for over 21 years), I can state that an affidavit is better and will tend to be more accurate when the affiant has first hand information of all the information he/she must attest to. Of necessity, agents must continually rely upon information from confidential sources, third parties and other law enforcement officers in drafting affidavits, but the repeating of information from others greatly adds to the opportunities for factual discrepancies and errors to arise. To the extent that we can minimize the opportunity for this type of error to arise by simply not allowing unnecessary re-writes by supervisory staff, it ought to be done. (I'm not talking, of course, about mere grammatical corrections, but changes of some substance as apparently occurred with the Moussaoui information which had to be, for lack of a better term, "filtered" through FBIHQ before any action, whether to seek a criminal or a FISA warrant, could be taken.) Even after September 11th, the fear was great on the part of Minneapolis Division personnel that the same FBIHQ personnel would continue their "filtering" with respect to the Moussaoui investigation, and now with the added incentive of preventing their prior mistakes from coming to light. For this reason, for weeks, Minneapolis prefaced all outgoing communications (ECs) in the PENTTBOM investigation with a summary of the information about Moussaoui. We just wanted to make sure the information got to the proper prosecutive authorities and was not further suppressed! This fear was probably irrational but was nonetheless understandable in light of the Minneapolis agents' prior experiences and frustrations involving FBIHQ. (The redundant preface information regarding Moussaoui on otherwise unrelative PENTTBOM communications has ended up adding to criminal discovery issues, but this is the reason it was done.)
7) Although the last thing the FBI or the country needs now is a witch hunt, I do find it odd that (to my knowledge) no inquiry whatsoever was launched of the relevant FBIHQ personnel's actions a long time ago. Despite FBI leaders' full knowledge of all the items mentioned herein (and probably more that I'm unaware of), the SSA, his unit chief, and other involved HQ personnel were allowed to stay in their positions and, what's worse, occupy critical positions in the FBI's SIOC Command Center post September 11th. (The SSA in question actually received a promotion some months afterward!) It's true we all make mistakes and I'm not suggesting that HQ personnel in question ought to be burned at the stake, but, we all need to be held accountable for serious mistakes. I'm relatively certain that if it appeared that a lowly field office agent had committed such errors of judgment, the FBI's OPR would have been notified to investigate and the agent would have, at the least, been quickly reassigned. I'm afraid the FBI's failure to submit this matter to OPR (and to the IOB) gives further impetus to the notion (raised previously by many in the FBI) of a double standard which results in those of lower rank being investigated more aggressively and dealt with more harshly for misconduct while the misconduct of those at the top is often overlooked or results in minor disciplinary action. From all appearances, this double standard may also apply between those at FBIHQ and those in the field.
8) The last official "fact" that I take issue with is not really a fact, but an opinion, and a completely unsupported opinion at that. In the day or two following September 11th, you, Director Mueller, made the statement to the effect that if the FBI had only had any advance warning of the attacks, we (meaning the FBI), may have been able to take some action to prevent the tragedy. Fearing that this statement could easily come back to haunt the FBI upon revelation of the information that had been developed pre-September 11th about Moussaoui, I and others in the Minneapolis Office, immediately sought to reach your office through an assortment of higher level FBIHQ contacts, in order to quickly make you aware of the background of the Moussaoui investigation and forewarn you so that your public statements could be accordingly modified. When such statements from you and other FBI officials continued, we thought that somehow you had not received the message and we made further efforts. Finally when similar comments were made weeks later, in Assistant Director Caruso's congressional testimony in response to the first public leaks about Moussaoui we faced the sad realization that the remarks indicated someone, possibly with your approval, had decided to circle the wagons at FBIHQ in an apparent effort to protect the FBI from embarrassment and the relevant FBI officials from scrutiny. Everything I have seen and heard about the FBI's official stance and the FBI's internal preparations in anticipation of further congressional inquiry, had, unfortunately, confirmed my worst suspicions in this regard. After the details began to emerge concerning the pre-September 11th investigation of Moussaoui, and subsequently with the recent release of the information about the Phoenix EC, your statement has changed. The official statement is now to the effect that even if the FBI had followed up on the Phoenix lead to conduct checks of flight schools and the Minneapolis request to search Moussaoui's personal effects and laptop, nothing would have changed and such actions certainly could not have prevented the terrorist attacks and resulting loss of life. With all due respect, this statement is as bad as the first! It is also quite at odds with the earlier statement (which I'm surprised has not already been pointed out by those in the media!) I don't know how you or anyone at FBI Headquarters, no matter how much genius or prescience you may possess, could so blithely make this affirmation without anything to back the opinion up than your stature as FBI Director. The truth is, as with most predictions into the future, no one will ever know what impact, if any, the FBI's following up on those requests, would have had. Although I agree that it's very doubtful that the full scope of the tragedy could have been prevented, it's at least possible we could have gotten lucky and uncovered one or two more of the terrorists in flight training prior to September 11th, just as Moussaoui was discovered, after making contact with his flight instructors. It is certainly not beyond the realm of imagination to hypothesize that Moussaoui's fortuitous arrest alone, even if he merely was the 20th hijacker, allowed the hero passengers of Flight 93 to overcome their terrorist hijackers and thus spare more lives on the ground. And even greater casualties, possibly of our Nation's highest government officials, may have been prevented if Al Qaeda intended for Moussaoui to pilot an entirely different aircraft. There is, therefore at least some chance that discovery of other terrorist pilots prior to September 11th may have limited the September 11th attacks and resulting loss of life. Although your conclusion otherwise has to be very reassuring for some in the FBI to hear being repeated so often (as if saying it's so may make it so), I think your statements demonstrate a rush to judgment to protect the FBI at all costs. I think the only fair response to this type of question would be that no one can pretend to know one way or another.
Mr. Director, I hope my observations can be taken in a constructive vein. They are from the heart and intended to be completely apolitical. Hopefully, with our nation's security on the line, you and our nation's other elected and appointed officials can rise above the petty politics that often plague other discussions and do the right thing. You do have some good ideas for change in the FBI but I think you have also not been completely honest about some of the true reasons for the FBI's pre-September 11th failures. Until we come clean and deal with the root causes, the Department of Justice will continue to experience problems fighting terrorism and fighting crime in general.
I have used the "we" term repeatedly herin to indicate facts about others in the Minneapolis Office at critical times, but none of the opinions expressed herin can be attributed to anyone but myself. I know that those who know me would probably describe me as, by nature, overly opinionated and sometimes not as discreet as I should be. Certainly some of the above remarks may be interpreted as falling into that category, but I really do not intend anything as a personal criticism of you or anyone else in the FBI, to include the FBIHQ personnel who I believe were remiss and mishandled their duties with regard to the Moussaoui investigation. Truly my only purpose is to try to provide the facts within my purview so that an accurate assessment can be obtained and we can learn from our mistakes. I have pointed out a few of the things that I think should be looked at but there are many, many more.8 An honest acknowledgment of the FBI's mistakes in this and other cases should not lead to increasing the Headquarters bureaucracy and approval levels of investigative actions as the answer. Most often, field office agents and field office management on the scene will be better suited to the timely and effective solution of crimes and, in some lucky instances, to the effective prevention of crimes, including terrorism incidents. The relatively quick solving of the recent mailbox pipe-bombing incidents which resulted in no serious injuries to anyone are a good example of effective field office work (actually several field offices working together) and there are hundreds of other examples. Although FBIHQ personnel have, no doubt, been of immeasurable assistance to the field over the years, I'm hard pressed to think of any case which has been solved by FBIHQ personnel and I can name several that have been screwed up! Decision-making is inherently more effective and timely when decentralized instead of concentrated.
Your plans for an FBI Headquarters' "Super Squad" simply fly in the face of an honest appraisal of the FBI's pre-September 11th failures. The Phoenix, Minneapolis and Paris Legal Attache Offices reacted remarkably exhibiting keen perception and prioritization skills regarding the terrorist threats they uncovered or were made aware of pre-September 11th. The same cannot be said for the FBI Headquarters' bureaucracy and you want to expand that?! Should we put the counterterrorism unit chief and SSA who previously handled the Moussaoui matter in charge of the new "Super Squad"?! You are also apparently disregarding the fact the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), operating out of field divisions for years, (the first and chief one being New York City's JTTF), have successfully handled numerous terrorism investigations and, in some instances, successfully prevented acts of terrorism. There's no denying the need for more and better intelligence and intelligence management, but you should think carefully about how much gate keeping power should be entrusted with any HQ entity. If we are indeed in a "war", shouldn't the Generals be on the battlefield instead of sitting in a spot removed from the action while still attempting to call the shots?
I have been an FBI agent for over 21 years and, for what it's worth, have never received any form of disciplinary action throughout my career. From the 5th grade, when I first wrote the FBI and received the "100 Facts about the FBI" pamphlet, this job has been my dream. I feel that my career in the FBI has been somewhat exemplary, having entered on duty at a time when there was only a small percentage of female Special Agents. I have also been lucky to have had four children during my time in the FBI and am the sole breadwinner of a family of six. Due to the frankness with which I have expressed myself and my deep feelings on these issues, (which is only because I feel I have a somewhat unique, inside perspective of the Moussaoui matter, the gravity of the events of September 11th and the current seriousness of the FBI's and United States' ongoing efforts in the "war against terrorism"), I hope my continued employment with the FBI is not somehow placed in jeopardy. I have never written to an FBI Director in my life before on any topic. Although I would hope it is not necessary, I would therefore wish to take advantage of the federal "Whistleblower Protection" provisions by so characterizing my remarks.
Coleen M. Rowley
Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief Division Counsel
1) And both of the violations originally cited in vain by the Minneapolis agents disputing the issue with FBIHQ personnel are among those on which Moussaoui is currently indicted.
2) Just minutes after I saw the first news of the World Trade Center attack(s), I was standing outside the office of Minneapolis ASAC M. Chris Briesse waiting for him to finish with a phone call, when he received a call on another line from this SSA. Since I figured I knew what the call may be about and wanted to ask, in light of the unfolding events and the apparent urgency of the situation, if we should now immediately attempt to obtain a criminal search warrant for Moussaoui's laptop and personal property, I took the call. I said something to the effect that, in light of what had just happened in New York, it would have to be the "hugest coincidence" at this point if Moussaoui was not involved with the terrorists. The SSA stated something to the effect that I had used the right term, "coincidence" and that this was probably all just a coincidence and we were to do nothing in Minneapolis until we got their (HQ's) permission because we might "screw up" something else going on elsewhere in the country.
4) Certainly Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which begins, "Upon the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government" does not contain this requirement. Although the practice that has evolved is that FBI agents must secure prior approval for any search or arrest from the United States Attorneys Office, the Federal Rule governing Search and Seizure clearly envisions law enforcement officers applying, on their own, for search warrants.
5) During the early aftermath of September 11th, when I happened to be recounting the pre-September 11th events concerning the Moussaoui investigation to other FBI personnel in other divisions or in FBIHQ, almost everyone's first question was "Why?--Why would an FBI agent(s) deliberately sabotage a case? (I know I shouldn't be flippant about this, but jokes were actually made that the key FBIHQ personnel had to be spies or moles, like Robert Hansen, who were actually working for Osama Bin Laden to have so undercut Minneapolis' effort.) Our best real guess, however, is that, in most cases avoidance of all "unnecessary" actions/decisions by FBIHQ managers (and maybe to some extent field managers as well) has, in recent years, been seen as the safest FBI career course. Numerous high-ranking FBI officials who have made decisions or have taken actions which, in hindsight, turned out to be mistaken or just turned out badly (i.e. Ruby Ridge, Waco, etc.) have seen their careers plummet and end. This has in turn resulted in a climate of fear which has chilled aggressive FBI law enforcement action/decisions. In a large hierarchal bureaucracy such as the FBI, with the requirement for numerous superiors approvals/oversight, the premium on career-enhancement, and interjecting a chilling factor brought on by recent extreme public and congressional criticism/oversight, and I think you will see at least the makings of the most likely explanation. Another factor not to be underestimated probably explains the SSA and other FBIHQ personnel's reluctance to act. And so far, I have heard no FBI official even allude to this problem-- which is that FBI Headquarters is staffed with a number of short term careerists* who, like the SSA in question, must only serve an 18 month-just-time-to-get-your-ticket-punched minimum. It's no wonder why very little expertise can be acquired by a Headquarters unit! (And no wonder why FBIHQ is mired in mediocrity! -- that maybe a little strong, but it would definitely be fair to say that there is unevenness in competency among Headquarters personnel.) (It's also a well known fact that the FBI Agents Association has complained for years about the disincentives facing those entering the FBI management career path which results in very few of the FBI's best and brightest choosing to go into management. Instead the ranks of FBI management are filled with many who were failures as street agents. Along these lines, let me ask the question, why has it suddenly become necessary for the Director to "handpick" the FBI management?) It's quite conceivable that many of the HQ personnel who so vigorously disputed Moussaoui's ability/predisposition to fly a plane into a building were simply unaware of all the various incidents and reports worldwide of Al Qaeda terrorists attempting or plotting to do so.
*By the way, just in the event you did not know, let me furnish you the Webster's definition of "careerism - - the policy or practice of advancing one's career often at the cost of one's integrity". Maybe that sums up the whole problem!
6) For example, at one point, the Supervisory Special Agent at FBIHQ posited that the French information could be worthless because it only identified Zacarias Moussaoui by name and he, the SSA, didn't know how many people by that name existed in France. A Minneapolis agent attempted to surmount that problem by quickly phoning the FBI's legal Attache (Legat) in Paris, France, so that a check could be made of the French telephone directories. Although the Legat in France did not have access to all of the French telephone directories, he was able to quickly ascertain that there was only one listed in the Paris directory. It is not known if this sufficiently answered the question, for the SSA continued to find new reasons to stall.
7) Another factor that cannot be underestimated as to the HQ Supervisor's apparent reluctance to do anything was/is the ever present risk of being "written up" for an Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) "error." In the year(s) preceding the September 11th acts of terrorism, numerous alleged IOB violations on the part of FBI personnel had to be submitted to the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) as well as the IOB. I believe the chilling effect upon all levels of FBI agents assigned to intelligence matters and their manager hampered us from aggressive investigation of terrorists. Since one generally only runs the risk of IOB violations when one does something, the safer course is to do nothing. Ironically, in this case, a potentially huge IOB violation arguably occurred due to FBIHQ's failure to act, that is, FBIHQ's failure to inform the Department of Justice Criminal Division of Moussaoui's potential criminal violations (which, as I've already said, were quickly identified in Minneapolis as violations of Title 18 United States Code Section 2332b [Acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries] and Section 32 [Destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities]). This failure would seem to run clearly afoul of the Attorney General directive contained in the "1995 Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations" which mandatorily require the FBI to notify the Criminal Division when "facts or circumstances are developed" in an FI or FCI investigation "that reasonably indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed." I believe that Minneapolis agents actually brought this point to FBIHQ's attention on August 22, 2001, but HQ personnel apparently ignored the directive, ostensibly due to their opinion of the lack of probable cause. But the issue of whether HQ personnel deliberately undercut the probable cause can be sidestepped at this point because the Directive does not require probable cause. It requires only a "reasonable indication" which is defined as "substantially lower than probable cause." Given that the Minneapolis Division had accumulated far more than "a mere hunch" (which the directive would deem as insufficient), the information ought to have, at least, been passed on to the "Core Group" created to assess whether the information needed to be further disseminated to the Criminal Division. However, (and I don't know for sure), but to date, I have never heard that any potential violation of this directive has been submitted to the IOB or to the FBI's OPR. It should also be noted that when making determinations of whether items need to be submitted to the IOB, it is my understanding that NSLU normally used/uses a broad approach, erring, when in doubt, on the side of submitting potential violations.
8) For starters, if prevention rather than prosecution is to be our new main goal, (an objective I totally agree with), we need more guidance on when we can apply the Quarles "public safety" exception to Miranda's 5th Amendment requirements. We were prevented from even attempting to question Moussaoui on the day of the attacks when, in theory, he could have possessed further information about other co-conspirators.} (Apparently no government attorney believes there is a "public safety" exception in a situation like this?!)
BREAKING NEWSFBI's 'Phoenix' Memo UnmaskedFortune's investigative reporter, the only journalist to see confidential document, reveals its true name and nature.
Ken Williams, FBI agent who wrote the "Phoenix" memo.
What happens when bosses ignore memos from subordinates? The country is now learning the answer to that question in a most painful way.
On July 10, 2001, an FBI agent in Phoenix wrote a memo raising serious concerns about Middle Eastern men attending U.S. flight schools. The memo never made its way up the chain of command, and no action was taken. It wasn't seen by FBI Director Robert Mueller until after Sept. 11, and President Bush wasn't made aware of its contents until a few weeks ago. The confidential document still hasn't been released, and yesterday it was the subject of a closed-door Senate Intelligence Committee session.Recently, I had a chance to read the memo -- apparently the first journalist to have done so. It was shown to me by a reliable government source, who permitted me to take notes but wouldn't let me copy it. What I learned -- and what FORTUNE aired yesterday on CNN -- is chilling. The memo raises questions about what federal law enforcement officers knew and what they did or didn't do to protect the U.S. from terror attacks in the months before Sept. 11. After reviewing the memo, one cannot help but conclude that the FBI dropped the ball -- perhaps ignoring the alert altogether.
The memo was written by Phoenix FBI Special Agent Kenneth J. Williams, described as a member of "Squad 16," and it was approved by a man named William A. Kurtz. The title reads: "Zakaria Mustapha Soubra; IT-OTHER (Islamic Army of the Caucasus)." The "synopsis" says: "Usama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona." And the memo bears the FBI codes: "Derived from G-3" and "Declassify on X1."
Soubra, the memo said, was a student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, Ariz. (According to the Los Angeles Times, he was questioned by FBI agents in 2000, after he was observed at a shooting range with another Muslim, who was a veteran of Islamic jihads in the Balkans and the Middle East. No charges were brought against him, and he is currently a senior at Embry-Riddle.) The organization named in the memo's title, the Islamic Army of the Caucasus, is based in Chechnya and was at one time headed by a man named Amir Khattab, who, according news reports, is suspected of having ties to Osama bin Laden.
The FBI's probe of Soubra, according to the Williams memo, was instituted on April 17, 2000, nearly 17 months before last year's terror attacks. Williams warns in his July 10 memo of a possible "effort by Usama bin Laden to send students to the U.S. to attend civil aviation universities and colleges." He also refers to a "fatwa by Al-Muhjiroun, spiritual leader Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed Fostok." (Fostok, according to news reports, once ran a London-based radical group called the Islamic Liberation Party, dedicated to overthrowing Western society. He was arrested for suggesting that it was permissible to kill then British Prime Minister John Major, which he denied and was released without any charges being filed.)
The Williams memo included the names of several Middle Eastern students, one identified as a "Saudi national," who were apparently students at Embry-Riddle at the time. One reason FBI officials have given for not releasing the memo is that several of these individuals are still under investigation. So, although those names are now in my notebook, they will not be published here.
FBI officials apparently didn't do much with the Phoenix memo. It was sent to roughly a dozen FBI officials, none of whom apparently sent it to the agency's acting director. FBI Director Mueller, who took over in early September, before the attacks, concedes that the agency didn't act aggressively on the memo. Among other lapses, it never shared the memo with the CIA, which only learned of its existence a few weeks ago.
So the question is: Had senior FBI officials, the CIA, and the Bush Administration seen the Phoenix memo, could they have stitched together enough clues to prevent the terror attacks? That's something that may take months of hearings and investigation to answer. But the first step is clear: The memo should be released immediately, names blacked-out if necessary, so we can all learn what Agent Williams knew.
Memo: FBI destroyed evidence in bin Laden case after glitch with e-mail surveillance system
D. IAN HOPPER, AP Technology Writer Tuesday, May 28, 2002
An internal FBI memo says agents destroyed evidence gathered in an investigation involving Osama bin Laden's network after its e-mail wiretap system mistakenly captured information to which the agency was not entitled.
The FBI software not only picked up the e-mails of its target "but also picked up e-mails on non-covered targets," said a March 2000 memo to agency headquarters in Washington.
"The FBI technical person was apparently so upset that he destroyed all the e-mail take, including the take on" the suspect, the memo said.
A Justice Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Tuesday night that the e-mails were not destroyed. The official did not elaborate or try to reconcile the statement with the memo.
The episode was described in documents made public through a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a Washington advocacy group. The material was not included in an original release but became public after a federal judge ordered the bureau to give out more documents.
At issue was an investigation in Denver in which the FBI's bin Laden unit was using the bureau's Carnivore system to conduct electronic surveillance of a suspect under a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrant.
The suspect's name and other information identifying details of the investigation were marked out of the letter.
The memo surfaced as the FBI was addressing concerns it mishandled aspects of terrorism investigation prior to the Sept. 11 attacks. Those concerns include a warning from its Phoenix office about Arab pilots training in the United States last July.
As an outgrowth of that and other much-criticized FBI actions before the attacks, the agency is to form a new office of intelligence and strengthen its oversight of counterterror investigations. Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller were expected to outline high-profile changes Wednesday at the FBI's headquarters, including closer ties to the CIA and an overhaul of the FBI's outdated computer systems.
FBI officials refused on Tuesday to discuss the Carnivore memo or the investigation it referred to. They did, however, say that the bin Laden unit at FBI headquarters handles only investigations involving suspected activity by his terror network.
The memo shows FBI agents were worried about the fallout in the Denver case.
The Justice Department's Office of Intelligence and Policy Review was furious after learning the evidence captured by the e-mail wiretap system was destroyed because of the glitch, the memo states.
"To state that she was unhappy at ITOS (International Terrorism Operations Center) and the UBL (bin Laden) unit is an understatement," the memo stated, quoting a Justice official.
The memo said Justice officials worried the destruction of the evidence would signal an "inability on the part of the FBI to manage" the warrants that are key tools in espionage and anti-terrorism cases.
Privacy groups and some members of Congress have complained that Carnivore had the potential to collect more information than allowed by a warrant.
"Here's confirmation of the fact that not only did it do that, but it resulted in a loss of legitimately acquired intelligence," said David Sobel, general counsel of EPIC.
To allay Congress's concerns, FBI General Counsel Larry Parkinson testified in July 2000, "We do not deploy (Carnivore) in a way that exceeds the court order."
The e-mail from an unnamed author to M.E. "Spike" Bowman, the FBI's associate general counsel for national security, said Denver agents installed the e-mail surveillance system in March 16, 2000, but the device did not work correctly.
Henry Perritt, who led a team authorized by the FBI to review the surveillance system, said he was surprised the technician deleted the e-mails.
"The collection is supposed to be retained for judicial review," Perritt said. "If an agent simply deleted a whole bunch of files without the court instructing, that's not the way it's supposed to work."
Another document released through the privacy group's request explains the bureau's policy for overcollection on a surveillance warrant. The memo, dated just a week after the Denver e-mail, says the e-mails should be kept under seal so that senior FBI officials can figure out how the wiretap went wrong.
The unintended targets of the FBI's snooping may have deserved notification that the mistake was made, the FBI memo said.
Authorities have used Carnivore-type tools more than 25 times in all types of criminal cases, to catch fugitives, drug dealers, extortionists and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Carnivore is now called DCS-1000.
FACT: Prior Knowledge of 9-11
USA Spy Forsaken by US Government
Four Washington "Wise Men" Discuss America in the Age of Terrorism
Agent accuses FBI of 'sabotage'
Whistleblower says clues to September 11 were ignored
Gov't Credit Cards Used At Casino
Whistleblower Complains of FBI Obstruction
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