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We picked up some delicious Jonagold apples this week. They are perfectly crunchy with a perfect balance of tart and sweet. Since they are not the sweet, sugary kind – and it is caramel apple season, after all, I thought I'd make a little caramel for my Friday lunch treat.
And since I'm still sick (good lord – please let this never-ending cold END soon!), I didn't want to spend a lot of time babying and stirring some caramel, so I made caramel the way my mom used to make it for me. The "recipe" (really… there is but one ingredient – a can!) takes time – but you don't have to stand around a monitor anything. Just set a timer and move on.
The beauty of this whole process? I was able to make caramel for my apple (or other fruit) slices more cheaply than it can be purchased, with less fat (if you use the low-fat version) and ALL of the ingredients are identifiable! Wahoo!
So, here's to you, Mom. Thanks for teaching me how to play in the kitchen and make easy caramel. I remember the first time we made this and I wanted to open the can to see the process because I just couldn't believe it would work. I swear this is the recipe that taught me to have a bit more faith and patience than any other. After all, without anything to do and no visual that it was working? It was certainly an act of faith!
Give this a whirl when you get some tasty apples this season, you won't shell out the big bucks for the caramel at the market again.
This makes a perfect treat for lunch or your take-along meal. Just put a couple tablespoons in a small container and bring with your apple slices. It's also super kid-friendly (what caramel recipe isn't?) too. Consider it a cheap way to encourage more apple consumption in your house.
Now…if the "apple a day will keep the doctor away" adage is true…. just MAYBE I'll get over this bug soon too! Bring on the apples! I'm ready for my health to return with a sweet treat to boot!
Easy, Cheap, Gluten-Free Caramel
1 can sweetened condensed milk (use low-fat for half the fat!)
- Peel the label off the can and place it in the bottom of a deep pan. Fill the pan with water until it covers over the top of the can by at least an inch.
- SLOWLY bring the pot to a boil and lower to a simmer. (My mom wrote to remind me to tell you all to bring the water to a boil SLOWLY so the can doesn't explode/pop. (ew! what a mess!) Thanks again, Mom!)
- Simmer for three hours.
- Allow the can to cool before opening (or it will explode).


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Update on CFO transition process
2015 April 22, 08:30 CEST
Gothenburg, 22 April 2015: SKF announces that Christian Johansson will start in his position as Senior Vice President and CFO of AB SKF on 15 June 2015.
As previously announced, the Group's current Executive Vice President and CFO, Henrik Lange, has resigned in order to become CEO of Gunnebo AB. Henrik will leave his employment with SKF on 31 May 2015.
Aktiebolaget SKF
For further information,
please contact:
Media Hotline: +46 31 337 2400
Press Relations: Theo Kjellberg, +46 31-337 6576; +46 725-776 576; email@example.com
Investor Relations: Marita Björk, +46 31-337 1994; +46 705-181 994; firstname.lastname@example.com
SKF is a leading global supplier of bearings, seals, mechatronics, lubrication systems, and services which include technical support, maintenance and reliability services, engineering consulting and training. SKF is represented in more than 130 countries and has around 15,000 distributor locations worldwide. Annual sales in 2014 were SEK 70 975 million and the number of employees was 48 593. www.skf.com
® SKF is a registered trademark of the SKF Group.
Pressimaterjalide allalaadimine
- Press release (PDF)(60.8 KB) eelvaade

subset: commoncrawl


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James Currier brauchte ein neues Logo Design und hat einen Wettbewerb auf 99designs gestartet.
Aus 256 Designs von 93 Designern wurde eine Gewinner gewählt.
Ooga is a Web incubator -- or greenhouse -- that builds branded consumer Web sites and launches them. We're looking for a logo that is fun, vibrant, techy, distinctive, cool.
We are a cutting edge Web development company in San Francisco, currently 25 people but hiring designers and engineers every week as we grow.
We want a brand to help us recruit designers and software engineers and grow the company. I believe getting a good brand starts with a distinctive logo (we'll be putting the logo on our website, on T-shirts, fleeces, mouse pads, etc). The "Ooga" brand will NOT be a consumer brand. The Ooga brand is just for the technology community in San Francisco, and the world wide press and bloggers who might want to talk about the products we are building.
We are nice people, intelligent people, and we are passionate about building websites that touch 10's of millions of consumers in a positve way (we've done it 4 times in the last 10 years and want to keep doing it).
- The Ooga should be **easily readable** type. You're eye should know what you're reading immediately. This is really important
- I would like a mascot, like Twitter has a bird, but we can't have a bird. It's clean and techy and distinctive. Not overly detailed or cartoony or childish. Good examples are elephant (could be sophisticated), a rock, a fire, dinosaur. Stonehenge comes to mind as well.
- Our brand is hip and techy, but nice and energetic. It must feel trustworthy but fun, healthy, happy, like a company that could launch both http://www.medpedia.com and a fun social game with Disney-type artwork (because we have done both).
- We like things a little rougher around the edges, more organic.
- Item 1... can't look like Google, Ycombinator.com, idealab.com, obvious.com, ideo.com, zynga.com.
- We can't have birds in the logo.
Finden Sie heraus, wie ein Designwettbewerb funktioniert, oder lernen Sie mehr über unsere Logo-Design-Angebote.


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Hard Cover, 64 pages
Trim size: 6.060″ x 6.250″
Illustrations by Wietske Vriezen
In stock (can be backordered)
A Handful of Quiet presents one of the best known and most innovative meditation practices developed by Thich Nhat Hanh as part of the Plum Village community's practice with children. Pebble meditation is a playful and fun activity that parents and educators can do with their children to introduce them to meditation. It is designed to involve children in a hands-on and creative way that touches on their interconnection with nature. Practicing pebble meditation can help relieve stress, increase concentration, nourish gratitude, and can help children deal with difficult emotions.
A Handful of Quiet is a concrete activity that parents and educators can introduce to children in school settings, in their local communities or at home, in a way that is meaningful and inviting. Any adult wishing to plant seeds of peace, relaxation, and awareness in children will find this unique meditation guide helpful. Children can also enjoy doing pebble meditation on their own.
Beautiful color illustrations by Wietske Vriezen, illustrator of Planting Seeds (ISBN-13: 978-1-935209-80-5) and Mindful Movements (978-1-888375-79-4).
Born in Hue, Vietnam, Thich Nhat Hanh is a Buddhist monk, poet, scholar, and human rights activist. In 1967, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. He is author of more than one hundred books, and is one of the best known Buddhist teachers in the world today. Previous best-selling books include Being Peace and Buddha Mind Buddha Body. He lives at Plum Village, his meditation center in France, and travels worldwide, leading retreats on the art of mindful living.
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When Women Tell The Truth: #MeToo March 26, 2018
Tags: #MeToo, blogging, misogyny, religious oppression of women, women's rights, writing
When Women Tell The Truth April 27, 2012
Tags: blogging, misogyny, religious oppression of women, women's rights, writing
Some of my posts come from the heart, some from the head. This one comes from the gut. It's difficult to write because I'm swamped with strong emotions I don't quite know how to express. So I'll simply tell you the truth. I've recently come across three troubling blogs. One is written by a woman who describes the sad and dangerous life she lived as a prostitute in New York City for ten years. A second expresses a woman's disenchantment with her religion because of the oppression she's experienced. A third is by a woman who is regularly abused by her husband and wishes she lived in America. None of these women make excuses or plead for sympathy. They simply tell the truth about their lives. And the truth is shocking, painful, and scary.
It's shocking to know how many women suffer at the hands of men who fear and hate them. Shocking to know how often the authorities responsible for protecting women feel justified in not doing their jobs. Painful to know that so many women in today's world are mistreated simply because they're female. Painful to realize I'd rather turn away than face this truth. Scary because it reminds me how vulnerable I am…because I'm a female.
I started this post a few hours ago and was almost finished when I accidentally deleted it. So I had a little inner discussion that went like this: "Oh, darn! It'll take too long to try to rewrite it. I should just start over with another topic that's easier to write about."
My conscience responded with, "Are you sure you didn't unconsciously delete it accidentally on purpose so you'd have an excuse not to post it? Are you perhaps feeling a wee tad cowardly?"
Oops. We bandied this about until the doorbell rang. It was my daughter, granddaughters and granddog who'd dropped by for a brief visit. I told my daughter how I didn't know if I wanted to re-create the post and she said, "Why don't you just write another one about how conflicted you're feeling? Wouldn't that be appropriate for your blog?" Yes, indeedy it would! How'd she get so smart?
So I've decided to tell the truth I don't want to think or write about. A web site called Archetype in Action has been publishing posts of mine for several months in the hope of raising psychological awareness about the unconscious forces in ourselves and society that perpetuate the abuse of women. Last week they posted an older one about the feminine principle in men and women, only to have their site hacked. Someone deleted my article and replaced it with a formal-looking notice saying it was inappropriate! The site manager provided another link and the problem was solved. But is the real problem solved?
This morning's e-mail contained the latest post from the blogger who's experienced oppression by her religion and culture. In it she expressed her anger at the hypocrisy of a religion that makes scholarly pronouncements emphasizing women's rights while dismissing the women who do not experience these rights. After I read it I clicked on the link to her site so I could make a comment. Guess what. The post was gone and there was a notice that said: "Not Found, Error 404. The page you are looking for no longer exists."
Here I am, a well-intentioned, well-loved, well-treated woman in 21st century America, afraid to express my anger about injustices against women for fear of becoming a target for misogyny. Is a world where women are afraid to tell the truth the kind of world in which we want our daughters and granddaughters to grow up?


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Learn how to contact each ARDA department.
Click here to view ARDA's staff by name.
Every autumn brings an air that is crisp and filled with a sense of change and each autumn the ARDA Fall Conference takes a look at the past year as it prepares for the upcoming new year. This year, industry leaders came together in positive synergy to look at 2018 and the endless possibilities that it holds. This air of positivity was strongly felt throughout the conference halls, in the courtyard, around dinner tables and even overflowing into the city streets of Washington DC. It helped to fuel our industry workshops and meetings during the conference, as we begin to develop key strategies that will lay the foundation for our industry's continued growth. This year's program took a deeper-dive into the economic and political environments that surround our business and the initiatives that help to drive our industry forward. Here are a few highlights:
Interval International kicked off Fall Conference with it's opening night reception.
ARDA Trustees mingled during the Trustee Foundation Dinner at the Kreeger Museum hosted by First American Title Insurance Company.
ARDA-ROC Legislative Luncheon special guest speaker A.B. Stoddard shared insightful analysis of recent mid-term elections and key forces at work in the overall political landscape.
ARDA president and CEO, Howard Nusbaum gave the State of the Industry address, which included panelists (L-R) Robb Webb of Baker & Hostetler; Robert Spottswood of Spottswood Companies; Don Harrill of Holiday Inn Club Vacations; and Mark Wang of Hilton Grand Vacations.
Keynote speaker former Chief Economist of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Martin Regalia dispelled some of the mysteries of the U.S. economy (sponsored by Fidelity National Timeshare).
RCI hosted a luminous closing reception to celebrate another successful Fall Conference.
Chairman's League Breakfast (sponsored by Resort Travel & Xchange) speaker Charlie Cook, editor and publisher of The Cook Political Report and Columnist for the National Journal, shared his thoughts on political pundits and what to expect for the 2020 election.
To see more photos from the event, view our Facebook Album.
Check out all of ARDA's upcoming events here.
Legacy properties have very different needs than a resort
that is in the active sales phase. Lead generation and sales tools are no
longer the priority, but finding ways to drive rental revenue, make investments
in the resort, and protect your property become the new focus areas.
To ensure the property continues to flourish, there are four
key business services that should be in place. If the list looks overwhelming
without the in-house expertise needed, there's no reason to worry. There are
plenty of companies that can provide these services.
#1 – Gain Control of
One unique challenge facing legacy resorts is gaining
control of inventory. Legacy resorts face common issues like aging owners, increasingly
delinquent maintenance fees, and the "Sunset Clause" that will come into effect
over the next few years.
In these situations, it's important for legacy properties to
work with professionals who can handle these issues and obtain deeds back from
delinquent owners.
#2 – Maintain Revenue
With timeshare sales no longer happening onsite at legacy
resorts, maintaining cash flow requires rental revenue. To optimize the revenue
your property can generate, it's essential to make sure the right unit is
reaching the right person at the right time—and most importantly, at the right
When this is done properly results include growing revenue and
occupancy, increasing efficiencies, and enhanced reporting and forecasting.
#3 – Invest in Your Property
When investing in your property, a good starting point is
gathering feedback from your owners and rental guests. That way, you know what
will have the most significant impact on traveler experiences.
After reviewing feedback, it's time to prioritize needed
renovations and invest where you see fit.
#4 – Protect Your
While it's never a happy exercise to imagine what could go
wrong at your property, insurance is essential to keeping resorts running smoothly
and mitigating risk. Legacy resorts need to be mindful of their insurance coverage
while also being mindful of budget.
By Sharon Scott, RRP
It is probably going to be necessary for those of us
currently in authority to break existing paradigms and restructure current
procedures if we are to engage this generation. We need to rethink the way we
do things currently. We need to deconstruct and then reconstruct our organizations
to eliminate hierarchical, top down methods.
How then are we to recruit our resorts' future leaders?
Do things "their
Engaging millennials in the leadership process begins with
making the resort experience an important ingredient in their lives. Part of
our resort's ethos must be one of fun—supporting experiential travel younger
owners can enjoy with their peers. Attract them with events and activities to which
millennials can relate.
Do a little research to see what millennials are buying,
using individual expenditure reports to follow their interests. The results may
pleasantly surprise you, as there are beginning to be more and more millennials
with money to spend on fun.
Give them
Once millennials begin vacationing at a timeshare resort,
they will expect a level of service that, frankly, many of us just don't offer.
They want to stay connected to the internet at all times, but they also want to
stay connected to the greater community.
Make them feel they're part of it. Solicit their opinions; seek their
Leverage their sense
of purpose.
Those of us who have long retained the authority to operate
our companies and associations in ways that have been proven successful in the
past may feel resentful, as the "new kids" dispassionately dismiss time-honored
Nationally-acclaimed political columnist and author of New York Times best-seller, Applebee's America, Ron
Fournier says "they are purpose-driven, having learned at an early age just how
fragile life can be in the post-9/11 world." He argues they are impatient and demanding
because they grew up with the Internet, which taught them they could command
change and choice simply by typing.
If we want to attract millennials' hearts and minds, HOAs
need to first get them invested in the concept of being part of the resort's
family by providing vacations they will find desirable. After you earn their buy-in,
then provide them with leadership opportunities.
Copyright 2014. American Resort Development Assoc. All rights reserved.


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Bridal trends for 2017..
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Thursday, October 29, 2009
Guy Davies' review of Return to Rome, part 2
It is my hope and prayer that I can emulate in my own Christian practice the sort of virtues that I have found in Mr. Davies' public example.
10 comments:
- Guy Davies said...
Thanks for the links, the helpful interaction and for your kind and generous remarks.
Guy Davies
- October 29, 2009 at 1:55 PM
- lojahw said...
Frank says: "But the Church maintains, quite sensibly, that the Bible cannot be read in isolation from the historic Church and the practices [and beliefs] that were developing [e.g., purgatory, praying for the dead, penance, Eucharistic realism, etc.] alongside the Church's creeds—creeds that became permanent benchmarks of orthodoxy during the same eras in which the canon of Scripture itself was finally fixed."
It seems that Frank's underlying point is that the Reformation's understanding of Scripture relies on the authority of creeds which were developed alongside practices and beliefs which Protestants reject. His unstated point is: why accept one and not the other? In response, firstly, he begins with a mistaken view of history.
Regarding history, the Trinitarian orthodoxy of the early church prior to the formulation of the Nicene Creed is well attested to in the writings of the Scriptures as well as both the Greek and Latin fathers. The fourth century creeds merely restated what the Scriptures, the church fathers, and the Apostles' Creed had already proclaimed. Hence, Trinitarian orthodoxy was neither developed alongside the practices and beliefs most strongly rejected by Protestants,* nor was it dependent on a particular ecclesiastical tradition. This ante-Nicene orthodoxy is well documented in the works of Ignatius of Antioch (Philadelphians, 6), the Didache, Justin Martyr (First Apology 1.63), Melito (Fragment 6, on the two natures of Christ), Irenaeus (Against Heresies 1.10), and Tertullian (Prescription against Heretics, 13), to cite just a few within the first hundred years of the writing of the New Testament.
And why would one never arrive at Trinitarian doctrine from Scripture alone? Aside from the Trinitarian references below, the finer details of the Nicene and Apostle's Creeds are amply supplied by the Bible and can be readily ascertained and defended without the benefit of any particular tradition.
Isa. 48:12-16, I am the first and the last. . . . The LORD Yahweh has sent Me, and His Spirit. (cf. Rev. 1:17-18)
Matt. 28:19 . . . baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. (one name, three persons)
Eph. 2:17-18 for through Him [Jesus] we both have our access in one Spirit to the Father.
Finally, Frank assumes that if the Church got a few things right, it must be right about everything. But the Scriptures and apostolic beliefs and practices of the "faith which was once for all delivered to the saints" were in place long before the developments of the Church he cites. Jesus promised His original disciples that the Holy Spirit would lead them into all the truth, i.e., all truth essential for salvation. I believe Jesus kept His promise, and therefore, the only essential beliefs and practices for all generations of Christians are those handed down by the apostles.
*Note: Purgatory, the sacrament of penance, invocation of departed saints, veneration of images, Marian devotion, etc., were POST-NICENE developments.
Lover of Jesus and His Word
- October 29, 2009 at 6:18 PM
- Francis Beckwith said...
FIrst, if you are suggesting that Ignatius had a doctrine of the Trinity, let alone a developed one, then you should deliver a paper on this at the next AAR meeting. That's quite a find.
Second, when I say the "doctrine of the Trinity," I don't mean "belief in the Trinity." One substance and three persons--with all the nuances and distinctions unpacked--was the result of hard work and philosophical reflections, and was by no means the obvious reading of Scripture. If it were, why does not Paul mention the doctrine in all its fullness? Or even Jesus or any of the other NT writers. The Didache, which you mention, fails to offer an elaborate account of the Trinity. And yet, Trinitarianism is at the center of Christian theology.
In similar fashion, to say that the Chalcedonian formulation of the Incarnation as orthodoxy is not to claim that no one prior to Chalcedon believed in the Incarnation. But what exactly the Incarnation meant was not an obvious deliverance of Scripture. If it were, then why did we wait until the 5th century to finally get it right?
You write:
"The fourth century creeds merely restated what the Scriptures, the church fathers, and the Apostles' Creed had already proclaimed."
You can't possibly believe that this is true. Is Chalcedon a mere restatement of what father or creed? And Nicea contributed nothing to the development of Christian theology?
The Apostles' creed is a thin reed compared to the Nicene Creed, which was only one part of the council's conclusions. The others included rules about penance, ordination, and the viaticum: http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Councils/ecum01.htm If penance did not pre-date Nicea, why does Nicea mention it? It seems reasonable to assume that it was a standard practice in the church for quite some time. In fact, we don't have to assume it. We know from the debate over rigorism that penance was an uncontroversial aspect of Christian practice.
I'm not assuming that because the church got some things right they got all things right. I'm arguing that the best way to make sense of doctrinal development is to have a Magisterium. After all, Nicea settled something, didn't it? Was it merely that it restated Scripture? Couldn't be, since anyone could have rejected the Council without fear of heresy? Who the heck is the Council, unless their conclusions carry real authority?
I think you underestimate the given that you think is obvious. The Catholic Church has provided you (indeed, all of us) the bible, the creeds, and the theologians from which to create Protestantism. But then you look back into that Church History and see how everything turned out just right once 1517 arrived. You see this or that Church father saying something seemingly consistent with the Creeds that were eventually universally accepted. What you fail to understand is that the creeds were created and offered as authoritative documents precisely because the answer was not that obvious. And the case was closed precisely because the Church had the authority to close it. Again, if not, then why did everyone think it was closed?
You're simply mistaken about ante-Nicean Catholic practices. Take a look at Robert Louis Wilken, The Spirit of Early Christian Thought. Yale University Press, 2003, or J. N. D. Kelly, or even Pelikan. gnatius, Irenaeaus, Cyprian, and Tertullian all mention penance.
Wilken writes: "Early in the church's history Christians gathered at the tombs of martyrs to pray and celebrate the Eucharist. The faithful of one generation were united to the faithful of former times, not by a set of ideas or teachings (though this was assumed), but by the community that remembered their names… The communion of the saints wa a living presence in every celebration of the Eucharist." (46).
(continued in next post)
- October 30, 2009 at 12:22 AM
- Francis Beckwith said...
And from the Catholic Encyclopedia: The testimony of the early liturgies is in harmony with that of the monuments. Without touching the subject of the various liturgies we possess, without even enumerating and citing them singly, it is enough to say here that all without exception—Nestorian and Monophysite as well as Catholic, those in Syriac, Armenian, and Coptic as well as those in Greek and Latin—contain the commemoration of the faithful departed in the Mass, with a prayer for peace, light, refreshment and the like, and in many cases expressly for the remission of sins and the effacement of sinful stains. The following, from the Syriac Liturgy of St James, may be quoted as a typical example: "we commemorate all the faithful dead who have died in the true faith...We ask, we entreat, we pray Christ our God, who took their souls and spirits to Himself, that by His many compassions He will make them worthy of the pardon of their faults and the remission of their sins" (citations omitted)(Toner, "Prayers for the Dead")
- October 30, 2009 at 12:23 AM
- Jae said...
Very well said, Francis! you did your homework!
Your book, "Return to Rome" is an honest, logical and made a lot of sense compared to any differing protestant exegesis of the Scripture.
Related, the Early Church history for Pete's sake, most if not all the Patristic Fathers were either Catholic Bishops or priests who recognized the ("themes") of Church hierarchy, Authority, Eucharist, Mass, penance, fastings and the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome.
These were the "themes" of the early protestant churches?
- October 30, 2009 at 3:20 PM
- lojahw said...
Frank, did you read my post quoting Ignatius' letter to the Philadelphians? Have you read the fathers writings that I cited? Your assertions do not do justice to the Scriptures, the fathers or the Apostle's Creed. I have 30 pages of quotes from Scripture and the church fathers anticipating every substantive point of the creed. Rather than fill your blog with all the quotes, however, I'll simply offer the following:
May I assume that you accept the clear teaching of Scripture (e.g., John 1:1; 10:30; 14:9-10; Phil. 2:6; Col. 1:19) and the church fathers on Jesus' divine nature?
The Scriptures on Jesus' human nature:
John 1:14 And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.
John 19:5 Jesus then came out, wearing the crown of thorns and the purple robe. Pilate said to them, "Behold, the Man!"
Acts 2:22 "Men of Israel, listen to these words: Jesus the Nazarene, a man attested to you by God with miracles and wonders and signs which God performed through Him in your midst…
Acts 25:19 but they simply had some points of disagreement with him about their own religion and about a dead man, Jesus, whom Paul asserted to be alive.
Rom. 5:15 For if by the transgression of the one the many died, much more did the grace of God and the gift by the grace of the one Man, Jesus Christ, abound to the many.
Phil. 2:7-8 emptied Himself, taking the form of a bond-servant, and being made in the likeness of men. Being found in appearance as a man, He humbled Himself…
1 Tim. 2:5 For there is one God, and one mediator also between God and men, the man Christ Jesus,
Trinitarian orthodoxy has always affirmed both Jesus' divine and human nature, yet how He is both God and man at the same time is beyond mere human understanding. Various intellectual constructs to describe the nuances are not essential to saving faith.
The church fathers had no problem integrating the Scriptural teaching on the two natures of Christ:
From Ignatius' letter to the Philadelphians: "If any one says there is one God, and also confesses Christ Jesus, but thinks the Lord to be a mere man, and not the only-begotten God, and Wisdom, and the Word of God, and deems Him to consist merely of a soul and body, such an one is a serpent… If any one confesses the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and praises the creation, but calls the incarnation merely an appearance, and is ashamed of the passion, such an one has denied the faith…"
Melito: "For, being at once both God and perfect man likewise, He gave us sure indications of His two natures," (Fragment 6)
Irenaeus: "the ascension into heaven in the flesh of the beloved Christ Jesus … in order that to Christ Jesus, our Lord, and God, and Savior, and King, 'every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth,'" (Against Heresies 1.10).
Tertullian: "as He is of the Spirit He is God the Spirit, and is born of God; just as He is also born of the flesh of man, being generated in the flesh as man. … Not without reason, however, did He descend into a womb. Therefore He received (flesh) therefrom." (On the Flesh of Christ, 18-19).
Finally, according to Tertullian ca. AD 200: "…the mystery of the dispensation is still guarded, which distributes the Unity into a Trinity, placing in their order the three Persons— the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost: three, however, not in condition, but in degree; not in substance, but in form; not in power, but in aspect; yet of one substance, and of one condition, and of one power, inasmuch as He is one God, from whom these degrees and forms and aspects are reckoned, under the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. (Against Praxeas 2)
I'd be happy to provide additional quotes from the Scriptures and the fathers to support my claim that the Trinitarian faith affirmed by the Protestant Reformers was widely taught before the development of the dogmas Protestants have not accepted.
- October 31, 2009 at 12:24 PM
- Francis Beckwith said...
Thanks for the citations and quotations. You're absolutely correct. In fact, those very quotes were instrumental in helping me to return to the Church. Take, for example, Tertullian, who is never beatified. Why? Because he drifts into heresy, a heresy that leads to schism. So, how is this problem resolved? By the Church. Moreover, as these orthodox ideas begin developing within the writings of the Fathers, and eventually find their way into the creeds in a more developed form, we have side-by-side and symbiotically the development of liturgies, practices, and beliefs unique to the Eastern and Latin rites of the Catholic Church. That is, the Scriptures that eventually make the canon are read in churches that practice liturgies that embrace Eucharistic realism, penance, etc. and do so under the authority of the bishop. So, what we have here is an organic development--a full integration of word, authority, and sacrament.
So, the passages from the Fathers you cite must read in that historical and eccelsiastical context rather than as passages detached from that context.
- October 31, 2009 at 12:35 PM
- lojahw said...
That Tertullian later slipped into error does not invalidate his nor any other orthodox statement of faith grounded solely in the Scriptures handed down by the apostles. Your claim that the church fathers' Trinitarian beliefs depended on traditions developed over centuries is simply unfounded - you have failed to demonstrate otherwise. That other beliefs and practices were developed over the centuries in the Church is irrelevant. One cannot read the early church fathers without recognizing their orthodoxy (with which the Protestant Reformers agreed), long before the beliefs and practices rejected by the Reformers were developed by the Church.
This post began with the assertion that the interpretation of Scripture upon which Protestants depend grew out of traditions developed over many centuries. I have cited a number of references which demonstrate otherwise. Appealing to generalities about liturgical practices and the canon of Scripture do not refute my argument. Can you name one substantial creedal truth that was not clearly anticipated by both the Scriptures and the early church fathers?
- October 31, 2009 at 3:30 PM
- Francis Beckwith said...
lojahw: I'm just not sure what to make of your last comments. I did no say that Tertullian's heresy invalidates his Trinitarian beliefs. What I did say was that in order to distinguish Tertullian's Trinitarianism from his heretical beliefs an authoritative body was required, the same authoritative body that agreed with Tertullian that the deutercanonical books were Scripture (in addition to the Book of Enoch!)
As for what the fathers anticipated in terms of creedal formulations, again, that is the Catholic narrative. Doctrine develops, and the more developed version helps us to see, in retrospect, how it in fact developed. Prior to Tertullian's "Trinity," there were less developed versions of the Trinity for which the term "Trinity" had not yet been coined. In fact, the NT does not offer a formulated doctrine of the Trinity. And even after Tertullian the nuts and bolts of the doctrine had to be worked out. But even more important was the carefully crafted presentation of Christ's two natures in Chalcedon. In that case, the Church indeed had accepted that Jesus was both God and man. But what precisely did that mean, since the natures of God and man actually have inconsistent properties, e.g., eternality v. finitude, omnipresence v. limited to space and time, etc.
By the time we hit the Reformation in 1517 all the work's been done: fixed canon, catholic creeds, etc. Thus, it seemed relatively easy for the Reformers to see in Scripture that doctrines that already been established. But it didn't take that long to unravel as others who took the Bible seriously began to apply the Reformers' skepticism to those doctrines they took for granted. This is why we eventually get Unitarianism, "no creed by Christ" Campbellites, as well as the rejecting of the moral and social views entailed by Scripture on matters of marriage, women's ordination, family, procreation, abortion, etc.
Moreover, there are several scholars who make a pretty convincing argument that Calvin in fact reject aspect of Chalcedonian Christology and at times sounds Nestorian. I'm no expert on Calvin or Nestorius. But it seems to me that these arguments have merit.
- October 31, 2009 at 4:11 PM
- Francis Beckwith said...
Clarification. I was not saying that the Church accepted the book of Enoch as scripture; just that Tertullian seems to have done so. I need a proofreader!
- October 31, 2009 at 5:07 PM


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Kacie Smith scores four goals to go with two assists in Sunday's 12-0 victory ov er New Haven in Easton.
Junior All-American Kacie Smith once again led the nationally ranked Stonehill College field hockey team to victory Sunday afternoon.
Smith had four goals and assisted on two others as the 10th-ranked Skyhawks coasted past the University of New Haven, 12-0, at W.B. Mason Stadium in Easton.
Stonehill set a program record for goals while improving to 3-3. The previous mark was 11 goals against Southern New Hampshire three years ago.
Smith tied her career high with the four goals and picked up her third hat trick of the season,
Alexandria Sylvia of Brockton gave Stonehill a 1-0 lead at 14:09.
Freshman Taylor Ladue had a pair of goals and an assist while Alexandra Dillon and Morgan Greenberg scored the first goal of their careers and Hannah Gifford netted her first goal of the season.
Carley Andersen and Samantha Day also scored in the win.
The Skyhawks open the Northeast-10 Conference season Wednesday night at Bentley.
Elsewhere in college field hockey:
UMass Dartmouth 2, Salem State 1 (OT): Freshman Desarai Melendez of Brockton gave the Corsairs (2-3) the victory with her first collegiate goal.
Melendez scored less than eight minutes into overtime for the road win.
Stonehill 9, Saint Michael's 0: The Skyhawks (4-0) improved to 2-0 in the NE-10 with the win in Colchester, Vt.
Singles winners were Victoria Barbetta, Isabelle Porter, Alexandra Vo, Nicole Downey, Emma Prinos and Bethany Hammond.
The doubles teams of Barbetta-Porter, Vo-Annelise Howick and Colleen O'Donnell-Hammond also earned victories.
Monroe 2, Massasoit 0: The Warriors (2-3) lost to the Mustangs, who are ranked No. 1 in the National Junior College Athletic Association poll, on Saturday night in New York.
Ollie Dagraca made four saves for Massasoit, which had just one shot on goal as Monroe (7-0) recorded its fourth straight shutout.
The Mustangs scored a goal in each half.


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Psychology in Society
versión On-line ISSN 2309-8708
versión impresa ISSN 1015-6046
Psychol. Soc. no.40 Durban ene. 2010
Working with the apartheid archive: or, of witness and testimony
Leswin Laubscher
Department of Psychology, University of Stellenbosch Stellenbosch, South Africa & Department of Psychology, Duquesne University Pittsburgh, USA, email@example.com
Working with the apartheid archive demands a spectral scholarship - an engagement with the dead and the past, and the unknown of a future-to-be. This "hauntology" poses challenges unlike those of a traditional, evidentiary ontology and epistemology. Indeed, to the extent that it is an ethical metaphysics, as proposed by Emmanuel Levinas, that motivates all knowing, including that of the self and psyche, the manner of the researcher's response is in the order of witnessing and testimony. As particular mode of response, the witness who testifies sees his or her task less in terms of generating totalising thematic knowledge, than in tracing the limits of knowledge in the experience of the other.
Key words: Apartheid Archive Project, hauntology, witnessing, testimony, Levinas, Derrida, apartheid, ghosts
"We have only a little time to please the living,
But all eternity to love the dead"
(Antigone, Sophocles, 1947[1986])
The Apartheid Archive Project (AAP) presents its being and its task, its faith and its creed, around soliciting "[...] experiences of racism of (particularly 'ordinary') South Africans under the old apartheid order [...]" because "[...] traumatic experiences from the past will constantly attempt to re-inscribe themselves (often in masked form) in the present, if they are not acknowledged, interrogated and addressed" (Apartheid Archive Project [AAP], 2010). I have argued elsewhere (Laubscher, 2010) that this directive charges nothing less than an archontic guardianship of the archive, a keeping watch over memory as memorial (which is to keep the [honorific] past, to keep it safe) as well as reminder (which is to prevent the [traumatic] past from returning). I have also argued that this guardianship balances on the political authority and organisation of a material substrate, or address (inclusive of who resides there), on the one hand, and the hermeneutic privilege to interpret the archive (which is also to mark what is archived, and how), on the other.
This article revisits much of that earlier territory (Laubscher, 2010), but hopefully in the manner of an/other beginning, of a beginning again that is altogether different, even as it is familiar because it reminisces and remembers. Hence, as I recapitulate an earlier argument of a spectral and infinite ethical responsibility to, and from, the other in the section below, I do so by somewhat different terms and figures than before, most notably that of the ghost and the spectre of an "hauntology". Hereafter, I propose that the experiential and actionable manner of the "hauntological" response is in the order of the witness and testimony.
Introduced by Jacques Derrida (1994), hauntology is a near homophone of ontology, in his native French - a devilishly clever performance of the very argument that the traditional Western ontological stance of reason and presence is always and already haunted by absence and the infinite. Foregoing expository detail here as to Derrida's rather complex and nuanced critique of Western ontology and epistemology, suffice to say that our scholarship, by that argument, would do well by turning away from the violence of a totalising knowledge and the delusion of a timeless and essential understanding fully present to itself. Instead, the scholar "of the future" (Derrida, 1994: 176) would cultivate a knowing that exceeds knowledge, as it were, such that his or her "research" is about more than a learned analysis of archived "experiences from the past" (AAP, 2010), but also about meeting the dead, about facing (up to) "[...] ghosts and apparitions [...] who demand an address from us [...] and to whom and for whom we are to respond" (Laubscher, 2010: 375). Simply put, our scholarship has to be about ghosts (even be ghostly) because the archive is about ghosts.
What is it then, to characterise the archive as haunted and spectral? Quite apparently, the people whose stories comprise the archive are absent, at least in the sense of a certain materiality and tangible presence. That is to say, they are unavailable in one or all of four ways, at least: firstly, they are not there now, even as some of them once were, face to face, when they shared their stories with the researchers or the students and interviewers who collected a portion of the narratives in the archive. Secondly, they are not there or here because we never met them, face to face, but come to imagine them through the stories collected by other researchers or submitted via the website (which a great number of people have done anonymously, adding another layer of remove). Thirdly, they are absent because they are dead - either because they have died since telling their stories, or because they were conjured up in memory and referenced by the living, calling from some elsewhere, as it were, with their stories. Fourthly, in what is the absence of another kind of death, the archive teems with the nameless figures and faces of the casual acquaintance here, or the fleeting and transitory accident there, where lives intersected and crossed in an ephemeral historicity that belies their lasting demand for witness in the stories that summon them, still. There is even yet another absence and death: by the archive's record of certain narratives, it fixes and rescues some, affords them a public space and presence, but always at the cost of others, alongside the silence of countless others whose stories are not noted there, for any number of reasons.
Hence, as it is "[...] neither present nor absent 'in the flesh', neither visible nor invisible, a trace always referring to another whose eyes can never be met" (Derrida, 1995a: 85), the archive is a spectral place, where stories and experiences reach from a no-place, from memory, and absence. This is also to say, of course, that apartheid (as the manner of a certain kind of relation) reaches from a place and time that was and is no longer, from an absence (i.e. the incarnation of racism, in the present, even if one attributes it to apartheid's patronage and legacy, is not apartheid, per se). The archon, therefore, inasmuch as s/he solicits, re-cords, re-calls, re-inscribes, re-surrects, and otherwise conjures the re- of memory in re-membrance, deals with death and apostrophises someone or something that is not there. Thoroughly inhabited by death, loss, and absence at the root, and for its very being, given as it is in the aporetic of memory inhabited by forgetting from the beginning (Derrida, 1995a), the archive attempts to keep alive in the face of death, and is always about a conjuring, about traffic with ghosts and apparitions.
But what is it to conjure the dead? What is it to face the faces of those ghosts that haunt the archive? Another form of the question asks why would the dead return? Why would the ghost show itself, either by itself or by our conjuration, which may or may not amount to the same instance? A popular and commonsense response to the question of the dead's return is because they have unfinished business, because their affairs are not complete or in order: something needs to be righted, corrected, completed, or otherwise put in order in this, the land of the living, before they can return, permanently, to the realm of the dead. This is as much the logic of Hamlet's wraith, as it was of those countless ghosts whom the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) aimed to lay to rest, finally. Albeit less explicit than the TRC, the AAP, as well, suggests a laying to rest: that is, whereas extraordinary stories of apartheid have been told, ordinary stories have not to the extent that needs be, and by doing so the ghosts of everyman can finally be heard such that those stories too, can be noted and acknowledged, such that wrongs can be righted in remembrance, and injustice corrected in the historical redemption of time and the testamentary.
There is another reason for the dead's return, allied to the preceding sense of having been wronged, namely that they have not been properly buried (Davis, 2007). The TRC clearly responded to this ghostly charge for a knowledge of the grave, for a knowledge of the bones, such that one could mourn, finally bury the dead, and stop their haunting unease. We recall Antigone, who weeps not only for her father, Oedipus, but also because she does not have a place, a body, or a tomb where, or over whom, she can shed her tears. She pleads with Theseus, "only to see our father's grave", in order for her mourning to have an address, a place for her to lay the dead to rest. Again, while it is not as pronounced a response as the TRC's, the Apartheid Archive Project reasons thus as well. Is the notion that apartheid may return, and come to haunt our future lest we attend to its past, and understand it properly, not a form of wanting to know where it is buried, such that we can finally bury it, such that we can bury it finally?
In these instances above, our conflicted relationship with the dead is clearly noted. We want to remember and we want to keep the dead in remembrance, but we also want to keep the realms of the living and the dead separate. We want to have a tomb, and a place to mourn at - a grave, museum, or a monument - but we are clear too that that world is separate from ours, and that is the way it should be. Whether we mourn in loving remembrance, or keep exorcising watch, the ghost has to die twice for it to settle in its world; the paradox of "successful" mourning is, after all, that one forgets, while the very readiness to kill again, in exorcism, is to remember the first death.
But there is yet another way to put something right. The ghost may return either to obtain a second chance for itself, or to grant a second chance to the living. That is, to go through the event or the moment again, and not to make the mistake again - or to make it again. Are the maxims of history repeating itself on the one hand, and learning from history such that it does not repeat itself, on the other, not precisely manifestations of the dead's return to grant or demand another chance? We may consequently avoid the mistake the second time around, having learned our lesson, or we may not, and repeat the error of our earlier ways. When Primo Levi says, "We must be listened to [...]. It happened, therefore it can happen again: this is the core of what we have to say" (Levi, 1988: 199), the Holocaust is as possible in some future as it is incomprehensible in some past. For the AAP, the researcher's charge and responsibility is explicit and clear: to remember and understand by means of these stories of the archive in order not to make the mistakes of the past again. The gift of the archive is precisely that those ghosts caution, by their experiences and suffering, against making the apartheid-mistake again. By the living's response, now, we are given another chance, and in action, we redeem the dead by giving them a second chance - their lives and struggle against apartheid were not in vain, as the petty resistance and the grand, both, are redeemed in our heeding them. Again, though, having obtained this redemptive or damning second chance, the ghost leaves, and the realms of the dead and the living attain to their absolute separateness as the order of things.
Though they deal with ghosts and the dead, I maintain that the responses above do not proceed from hauntology as much as it does ontology: a hauntological academics is not about expelling or excommunicating the ghost as much as it is about inviting it, speaking to it, of it, and even for it. This is so, firstly, because there are other ways in which the dead may return, other than the ones listed above.
The dead may return, for example, because the living cannot be fully alive without the dead. Here, life and death are inextricably bound and each haunt and obsess the other with less clear boundaries than we would like to believe. The one traces the other, and we visit more seamlessly than is apparent. Secondly, the dead may return to tell us what no human, what no living human, could know (Davis, 2007). That is, they return to bring us understanding and knowledge - knowledge and understanding that is only available by their relay. This does not mean, though, that we can know the ghost itself. Indeed, it is fundamentally beyond understanding, and to attempt a description of the ghost's essence, or its truth as fundamental and law, is to turn the dead into an object, is again to practise ontology, and to operate under the illusion of the ghost speaking when, in fact, it is but the false agency of ventriloquy or prosopopoeia. It is to kill the dead again. Inasmuch as they bring a knowledge and understanding that only they can bring, it is not about any content, not about finally divulging this or that secret, as much as it is about bringing the very secret of the secret, which is secrecy itself, "[...] an essential unknowing which underlies and may undermine what we think we know" (Davis, 2007: 11). As such, and even as the ghost and the dead do not belong to the order of knowledge, at least a certain kind of knowledge, it opens up the order of possibility, of what is new and not yet heard; it is "[...] the structural openness or address directed towards the living by the voices of the past or the not-yet formulated possibilities of the future" (Davis, 2007: 13).
Thus is opened up the very challenge of the project: to keep and hold memories of apartheid in such an understanding light that it does not happen again. But this movement is not of knowledge as much as it is of conjuring, or at least a knowledge of conjuring, of welcoming the spectre which is also to be open to the ghost. To the extent that it keeps a past, and keeps a past at bay, it guards a future, wagers a future, and invites the spectre of possibility. "Memory is mourning to the extent that memory is promise" (Laubscher, 2010: 377). To allow the living present to be visited by the dead, by the ghosts of the past as well as the spectres of the not-yet, is then to acknowledge that the present is fissured, haunted by a past and a future, never present to itself. To keep the past, therefore, is to break with it, to invent it, to re-launch it in order to keep it alive in the coming of a future that is not-yet. "Remembrance restores possibility to the past, making what happened incomplete and completing what never was. Remembrance is neither what happened nor what did not happen but, rather, their potentialization, their becoming possible once again" (Agamben, 1999a: 267).
Keeping the archive is to say yes to a heritage not of our choosing, but by our election to responsibility. To show fidelity to that dead whom I have not chosen, but to whom and which I have been elected, is to conjure a spectral future by keeping the archive in the form of a promise and a pledge. It is to welcome the ghost and the spectre in a decision, an action, a wager, that opens a future. An exorbitant scholarship is demanded of this "'scholar' of the future, the 'intellectual' of tomorrow" [who learns] "from the ghost" (Derrida, 1994: 176), an ex-orbit-ance in its offering of that "[...] which is outside the orbit, the orb (eye) [...] of Western philosophy" (Eagleston, 2004: 281).
Yet, inasmuch as the hauntological departure point is as clear ("they are always there, spectres, even if they do not exist, even if they are no longer, even if they are not yet" [Derrida, 1994: 176]) as the scholarly imperative (to learn from the ghost "[...] how to talk with him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech" [Derrida, 1994: 176]), how does one speak to, of, or for the dead?
The title heading assumes a listening - an opening for the appearance of the ghost, or a conjuring receptivity, that is already a listening. Even so however, speaking is not settled, and the section title strains, for example, under the power of a preposition. Inasmuch as preposition, after all, proposes a relation between elements, it ought to matter whether one speaks, to, of, or for the dead. Especially as researcher and archon, as researcher-archon, sensitive to the dead of the past, and the phantom of the future, what is the mode of my address?
That most famous ghost of the Danish ramparts provides some preliminary clues. We know that Horatio, the scholar, does not believe in the ghost at first: "Horatio says 'tis but our fantasy, and will not let belief take hold of him" (Shakespeare, 2002, 32-33). Yet, it is also as scholar that he is charged to investigate, and by that learned pedigree, to explain the ghost to Bernardo and Marcello. When he ultimately sees the ghost, Horatio is filled with "fear and wonder", yet when he addresses the ghost, he orders and commands it: "[...] I charge thee speak" (ibid: 62). In response, we recall that the ghost "stalks away", in spite of Horatio's continued instruction to "stay! Speak, Speak! I charge thee, speak" (ibid: 65). In fact, when it appears again, Horatio not only orders the ghost, but threatens it, leading Marcellus to note that "It is offended", and "we do it wrong being so majestical/ to offer it the show of violence" (ibid: 166-167). The commoner may know more about ghosts than the scholar, after all. Finally, when the ghost appears again, this time to the threesome with Hamlet in tow, it singles him (Hamlet) out, beckoning him to follow: it is a singular (s)election which Hamlet cannot but obey. He must follow; his friends advise to the contrary; they even physically try to restrain him by wrestling him to the ground. But Hamlet must hear the ghost: "I am call'd", he says and opens up speech with the ghost first by following the ghost, by entrusting, risking, willing to go who knows where. It is only then, upon risking and following, asking only "Where wilt thou lead me?" (ibid: 733), in the willing submission to the ghost's knowing, that the ghost speaks, for the first time. It says, "Mark me" - listen to me, see me, heed me, note me, notice me.
Paul de Man (1984) also wondered about talking to the dead. For him, this talking to the ghost takes place in the terms of prosopopoeia, which renders it a fiction, an invention, irrespective of the reverential or sensitive manner with which we do so, as in the funeral oration, where we often ascribe words to the dead, and where we speak for the dead as if they were, themselves, speaking. Whereas it is not entirely the same, the living speaking for the dead in ventriloquism is an allied metaphor. The importance of de Man's point, though, is that we create a fiction of agency; the words of the dead are provided by the living and there is no real exchange with the alterity of the dead.
Even when the direction of the metaphor is changed, as is so often the case in popular film and lore, and the ghost ventriloquises the living in possession, there is still no real exchange with alterity as the ghost takes over the living who become but a mouthpiece and tangible means for the spectral parasite. Here, as well, the ghost is not addressed in any understanding exchange or welcoming meeting of the worlds.
Even in mourning, where the dead is within us, and remain with us from our care for them, one could argue that this being-with-the-dead is not to coexist with the dead. To be sure, we may carry them around with us, remember their birthdays and put flowers on their graves - a memorialisation that keeps them within memory - but we know though, that this is an elegiac mourning, and that they are gone, they are not really with us. Anything otherwise would be a hallucinatory mourning, for which psychology and psychiatry is at the ready to offer its exorcising services. In fact, whereas we at least had complicated bereavement in the language of the DSM-IV and the clinical ward (as if there can be any other kind of bereavement, but complicated, and as if there is anything normal to its definitional counterpart, normal mourning), the new DSM-V, slated for publication in May 2013, seems set to remove even that exception by allowing two weeks for normal mourning (American Psychiatric Association, 2010), whereafter, should symptoms persist, one is eligible for depression and the cross, garlic and holy water of little pills - blue, pink and green.
But "how does one honour or mourn the dead if not by talking to them?" (Jacobus, 2007: 393). Perhaps we have directed our question to the wrong audience; perhaps, not unlike the case for Hamlet, the answer lies with the ghost, who will only speak once Hamlet has given himself in welcome, which is also to say, welcomed the ghost in hospitality. In his homage to Louis Marin, Derrida says that Louis "[...] is watching me and that is why, for him, I am here this evening. He is my law, the law, and I appear before him, before his word and his gaze" (Derrida, 2001: 199). The death of the other institutes my response and my responsibility; we are back to Levinas (1969, 1974) and the ethical injunction as ground zero for all knowledge and action. The death of the other is my affair for the responsibility that accrues from it, and for the manner that the survivor, surviving the other's death, continues to be determined by his or her relationship with the dead. It is, we remind ourselves by way of Levinas, the other's death that matters more, more than my own, for the fact that it opens justice and love, which is "[...] the emotion over the death of the other. It is my welcoming the other, and not anxiety of the death awaiting me, that is the reference to death" (Levinas, 2000: 105). To speak to the dead, consequently, is also to speak to the self, to the responsibility of the self, the self, itself, given as it is by the other.
Moreover, if the ghost and the phantom, the dead and the not yet, pose an ethical command, to ask how to speak to the ghost is even less of the constative that describes or charts what is. One cannot calculate how to speak to the ghost beforehand for its appearance - even by conjuring - as surprise, as the unforeseeable happening that arrives like a seizure from on high (sur-prise, from superprehendere, to seize). If not the constative, then perhaps a performative, where the fact of speech, that we speak, or attempt to, answers the question in the wager of the response that does not quite know, but risks and promises - not altogether unlike the familiar example in linguistics and philosophy of the performative speech of the marriage ceremony. To say yes, I do, at the marriage altar is not mere speaking, is not description or knowledge, but constitutes the very event, produces the very event, in speaking.
But yet, and even so, is it not in the end, and after all, the living speaking? Is it not that the dead and the past without response, prosopopoeia and a pitying mourning all, in the end, the very end, all things said, point to something, even someone, that does not respond, that does not speak? We recall de Man's fictive prosopopoeia, but we also remember that this fiction takes the form of an address. Derrida takes this to mean that de Man addresses him, at the very moment of the memorial, as he (Derrida) speaks these words. de Man addresses himself to Derrida, and the other friends and survivors gathered to re-member; he (de Man) "[...]looks at us, describes and prescribes to us [...]" (Derrida, 1989:26), not unlike Marin, for whom a similar sentiment was expressed and referenced earlier, or Levinas, to whom Derrida addresses a haunting funeral oratory "[...] directly, straight on [...]" in the manner of a law, "[...] to address oneself directly to the other, and to speak for the other whom one loves and admires, before speaking of him" (Derrida, 1999: 2). To be sure, one speaks to the dead in the knowledge of a "without response", in the knowing sense that the dead "[...] no longer exists except in us, between us" (Derrida, 1989: 28), but it is precisely and paradoxically this very knowledge that now opens another knowledge, another knowing, that one's words is neither one's own, nor singularly theirs, but precisely in an in-between that prevents closure and killing the dead again. Clearly, there are many instances where we kill the dead again, because we use and abuse them to our own ends, and where we impugn meaning to them not from our talking to them but from our own intentions and desires in the living. The politics of the finite and the calculative, and the religion of the dogmatic and the literal share much, after all.
From the between, however, we are never the same, never ourselves, having survived the death of the other, having witnessed the death of the other. Put another way, we are now ourselves, the other being-in-us, between us. Death and the past is a moment "[...] between memory and hallucination" (Derrida, 2007: 28). It is a between us that is an inheritance, a bequest, an entrusted responsibility. It is not so much that we see the dead, perhaps, as that they see us; and in doing so displacing and disrupting our self-presence (Jacobus, 2007). As such, even though the dead and the faces of the dead are in us, it is not ours; we do not own the image in the manner of some interiorising self-possession. We are looked at, in the ethical injunction of a response, and the response is our witnessing and testimony - it is such that the "speechless", the "without response" makes us respond, makes us speak. Agency has, in a sense, passed to the dead, in a testimony "[...] where the one who speaks bears the impossibility of speaking in his own speech" (Agamben, 1999b: 120).
To speak to the dead, of the dead, and for the dead, is to bear witness, and to offer testimony. It is thus that we take responsibility for the ghost of the past such that we can conjure the spectre of the future. Like a confession, which is not simply about conveying information, but involves a transformation "[...] in my relationship to the other, in which I present myself as guilty [...]" (Derrida, 2007: 8), testimony has to attest and offer attestation that produces an event, an/other event, for it to be testimony and for one to attest at all.
The researcher-archon, consequently, who desires a spectral scholarship, who feels him/herself compelled ("ordered and ordained" is a phrase Levinas, 2000, uses) to proceed from the ethical injunction of the other, may do well to fashion such scholarship by the manner and mode of the witness and testimony. This is not to advocate an end to scholarship (is this paper not scholarly?), but a thinking that proceeds less from asking what the experience (data) means, than from how the experience is to be acknowledged (Myers, 1999). Indeed, the ethical response(ibility) not only precedes evidence and proof, or in a less naturalistic register, interpretative truth or knowing, but also founds it. Even closer than metaphysics, the epistemological how I set out to meet the ghost and the dead precedes what the ghost says, as it conditions both that I see the ghost or that it says anything at all.
The law and the juridical arguably provide us with the most accessible and commonplace figure of the witness and testimony. By the law of the law, the witness has firsthand knowledge of an event, and is called upon to provide the truth of the event in testimony; to settle questions about it, as it were, having been there, and having had access to the event through the senses (we will leave in abeyance the implications and assumptions attendant upon the hierarchy of the senses in truth, such that the evidence of the eye-witness, having seen, is the exemplary standard). The witness is summoned, under penalty (sub poena), to speak, to tell the truth of his or her witnessing, in testimony. This juridical truth is premised on fact and proof, on evidence (e-videre), that is, what is obvious to sight. However, e-videre also evinces what is obvious to mind, even as it is not obvious to sight (while no one saw the accident, the mangled wreckage of the car makes it obvious that the car travelled at a high rate of speed at impact). There is an interesting qualification, I venture, of particular importance to the researcher and the credentialed professional, where the obvious to mind rule holds not only for the commonsensical and reasonable, but actually also for the uncommon. In such cases we turn to the expert witness who is to illuminate, and bring to sight, by dint of his or her education, training or experience, a truth which is not immediately apparent, but nonetheless obvious to the expert mind.
In all these cases, the summons is to truth - having witnessed the event, to testify to its truth, and to do so from two motivating pressures. Firstly, there is the public sanction and threat of penalty should one refuse the testifying injunction, or violate the summons in perjury. Secondly, there is the apparent private motivation of the moral, and right thing to do, having sworn, under oath ("I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God"), to answer the summons to truth, in truth. On closer examination though, the assumption is not of a solely internal or private motivation, at least not primarily so; in fact, the notion of an oath is precisely to promise before an other, a divine witness. As such, whereas there may not be any consequences to one's perjurious testimony if one lies, if one lies in secret, such that no one (else) knows, that no one knows is only true in the world of the living; the divine witness to whom one promises, sees, commands, "orders and ordains" from a place that is both wholly elsewhere, and exterior, as it is wholly here, and interior, from within.
It is this latter notion that is, perhaps all too clearly by now, of particular interest and instruction. We have already argued the appearance of the other from on high, in majesty and misery, whose coming disrupts the egoic even as it founds it; and if this meeting with infinity and transcendence in the face sounds like the divine witness who sees from within, it is. By Derrida's reframing of Levinas, "[...] God, as the wholly other, is to be found everywhere there is something of the wholly other", so that what can be said about the relation to God "[...] can be said about my relation to every other (one) as every (bit) other [tout autre comme tout autre], in particular my relation to my neighbor or my loved ones who are as inaccessible to me, as secret and transcendent as Jahweh" (Derrida, 1995b: 78). To witness, now, as it is to testify, is consequently a summons to a wholly different order of truth than fact, proof, totalising law, theory or settled science. It is nothing less than a summons to justice, love, care, and the self that is myself by the other in me.
Bearing witness.
It may be no accident that we couple so easily, as if it is one and the same, as if it cannot be uncoupled, the notions of witnessing, and bearing it, which is to say, carrying it, suffering (sub + ferre, to bear from below) it. To bear witness is to carry a singular and irreplaceable responsibility; Shoshana Felman says beautifully that "[t]o bear witness is to bear the solitude of a responsibility, and to bear the responsibility, precisely, of that solitude" (Felman, 1992: 3). Yet it is not a self-centred responsibility in the sense of a choice or an internalised essence, but a responsibility to, and for, the other that transcends the self even as it founds it in fissure and (being put in) question. It is an indeclinable responsibility that haunts the witness. Put another way, the witness is a haunted subject, haunted by the event s/he has witnessed, which is also always the other, and the other in him/her. Primo Levi, wrestling with the witness in relation to the Holocaust, notes that it is less a witnessing to, than a witnessing for (Levi, 1988; Myers, 1999). To bear witness is to be marked, and to bear the mark - of having seen, and having borne witness, which is also to be born as witness. For our purposes, the ghosts of apartheid - all of them, heroes and villains, victims and perpetrators, even as they are never simply those - summon us by these narratives as we allow their coming by conjuring them. And, having seen, having heard, they haunt us, demanding of us to bear them; and to bear them in the wager of a future - that is, as we will see, to bear witness to the not yet by our testimony, to bear the future by attestation.
The distance between witness and testimony, however, is an impossible one. For example, the face and the face of the ghost, the past and the other, cannot be known, and belongs to a truth that is of another order altogether than that of explanation and law. How then to put into words what exceeds language, or to put into thematised order and the logic of ontology, what is transcendent and infinitely unknowable? Or, in addition, how to account for the fact that what the witness sees is thoroughly shot through with unseeing, with not being aware of the meaning of the event or the other in the moment of its happening. Countless stories of the archive relate the meaning of the event only becoming clearer later, much later, such that witnessing, so to speak, may only be available through testimony and re-collection "[...] in another place and in another time" (Bernard-Donals & Glejzer, 2001: 58).
Offering testimony.
The witness in a court of law may be summoned by, and to, truth, but it is in testimony that truth is revealed, or made manifest. The attendant assumption is clear and rarely questioned: that testimony accurately translates the event into language, and that - by the direction of the court - this record of the historical, of the event and the facts of the event, can come to represent, and even stand in for, the event as it was. To this factual end, testamentary verification is often attempted by placing the testimonies of others that were there as well, next to each other, in comparison and in the service of the assumptive essential truth of the event, which can supposedly be gotten to. Even where there is a suggestion that the testimony does not quite tell all, or perhaps even testifies to what it does not know (like an unconscious in psychoanalysis which, as is the case with the cross-examination of the law, aims to uncover, tease out and bring to light not just what the patient/witness does not say, but what the patient/witness does not know s/he is saying), the assumption is still of a fundamental truth that can be revealed in reasoned seeing - such that anyone witnessing the event will have seen the same thing, really, even if they did not, or say they did not. But if testimony is to proceed from the ethical responsibility of the witness, and the face of the other, what the law understands as testimony is not that at all; if anything, it is a deposition (Strejilevich, 2006), a totalising rendering into an essentialised and universalised deposit what fundamentally cannot be reduced into fact. To be sure, one can testify to the historical unfolding of an event, but that is not the extent of testimony, and in truth is only superficially what it is, impossible as a what it is question may be. For the researcher-archon-witness, testimony has to be less the juridical bringing to evidence in clarity, bringing to stable hermeneutic truth in knowledge, or categorising in law, as much as to offer an attestation that "[...] in different ways, encounter - and make us encounter - strangeness" (Felman, 1992: 7). This researcher-archon-witness of the apartheid archive and the future has to bring to light, and onto the stage, for and to an audience "[...] what cannot be brought onto the stage, in the name of those who are no longer able to speak for themselves" (Assman, 2006: 268).
To attest in this way, though, is immediately to confront a failure of translation from witness to testimony - a threefold failure, at least. Firstly, as we have already seen in the section on witness above, we are unable to seize, that is perceive, the event in the moment of its happening, or the face in the sur-prise of its appearance; there is always an excess, and a beyond, that hides and resists both witness and testimony, by extension. Secondly, the historical moment of witness cannot be recuperated in testimonial narration, and notwithstanding the "[...] compulsion to speak [...] what the witness says is neither a reflection of the event (which is irretrievably lost to memory) nor unaffected by it" (Bernard-Donals & Glejzer, 2001: xii). Absence is a structural part of testimony, a testament to what is no more. Thirdly, of course, there is the failure of translation, of putting into words and language what exceeds language.
Paradoxically, though, this doomed and impossible testimonial quality, rather than stifling speech, actually compels it, and sets it in motion. As much as one often says about an experience one has had (one has witnessed) that it just cannot be put it into words, it is precisely because we cannot that we try, that we stutter, grope, and attempt the impossible. It is precisely by the inordinate, singular ethical command that cannot ever be satisfied, that we attempt a response, a testimony; "[...] we must remember and cannot remember at the same time" (Bernard-Donals & Glejzer, 2006: 111). And so testimony is not (only) about what happened, but - and this is what the court of law misses in its guided insistence on fact and the yes or no answer of the sequence of events - also how it was to be there, to have seen the ghost, and what the experience of the moment was like. It is to attest to affect and the incomprehensible, such that it "[...] cannot speak without losing track of itself" (Strejilevich, 2006: 706). Hence, inasmuch as testimony allows for a recuperation, a reiteration, or a bringing back, it is never a copy, nor a representational analogue to the historical witness. If anything, it is a seeing again, for the first time, which is to say, a seeing differently (not altogether unlike what happens in therapy, a certain kind of therapy, where living the trauma, again, is to live it for the first time, in catharsis, abreaction, or working through). In fact, one may well become a witness only by testimony. In a court of law, one may be called to the witness stand, to be sure, but one only becomes a witness by one's testimony, by public attestation. And if there is such a thing as a private witness, and an internalised testimony or speech (even as there may be no such thing as a private language - a topic for another day), it is still the iterative quality of bringing back, of the one re-membering in testimony to the other in one, the witness, that founds and allows for witnessing at all.
Earlier, I commented on the coupling of bearing witness, of suffering (to bear) the event, experience and other in witness. There is as spontaneous a link in the offering testimony couplet, but what is even more striking is how suffering and offering depart from the same etymological port (suffer: sub- + ferre; offer: ob- + ferre); having borne (having suffered) witness, it is now to offer to the other, to present to an audience, in testimony. Testimony is, fundamentally, for the other, including the other in me. There is an address to an audience "[...] to impress upon a listener, to appeal to a community" (Felman, 2000: 103) that is more than a simple narration or description, but "[...] to commit oneself, and to commit the narrative to others" (Felman, 2000: 103). Inasmuch as testimony involves a passage into discourse, a movement from witness to language (turning being addressed into addressing); inasmuch as the witness is haunted by an other, and is pursued by that other to speak, to attest in testimony before an audience, another other; inasmuch as the witness testifies not only for his or her own sake, to having been there, but also for those who are not here; inasmuch as testimony transcends the speaker whose speech becomes the medium by which s/he realises his witnessing - all these observations are to glimpse a fundamental structure to testimony that is for, and from, the other.
Yet, even as the offering is of an order that resists totalising knowledge, the testimony of the archon-researcher-witness must interpret as s/he testifies, or does testify to an interpretation, and translation: to report what the ghost said, or meant, or even that the ghost said, is already to thematise. But if our departure point is less the scholarly lawfulness of the apartheid experience, of which the thematic secret is hidden in the data, but rather what commands us is our responsibility to those who were and are pained, afflicted, or suffered and are suffering under, and by, apartheid; if we proceed from the question: "How have we been addressed by those who suffer?" (Hatley, 2000: 2), our "[...] first duty is not to classify and compare but [...] to respond" (Hatley, 2000: 2). Again, we can - and must - thematise and explain, provide reasons and come to understandings, but whereas there can be reasons for apartheid, for example, or dynamics and processes to racism, there can be no reason for this child's pain at a Whites-Only playground, nor understanding of that black father's shamed impotence before his son's seeing him become a boy himself - to provide reasons for those singular moments and experiences, related by the ghosts and faces of our archive, to eclipse and cover over those moments in the totalitarian violence of a theme, an explanation and a reason, is to violate, and to kill the ghost, again. Our response is not, in the first instance, understanding, or "[...] a historical record of a particular act of violence, but [...] to witness it", meaning, "[...] a mode of responding [...] that exceeds our epistemological determination and becomes an ethical involvement" (Hatley, 2000: 2-3). As such we are "[...] uniquely and particularly responsible" for how we "[...] characterize those who have actually suffered" (Hatley, 2000: 112). Evidence, at least in the sense of a sterile proof or process, is but to highlight "[...] the detritus of history" as it "cannot really account for those who suffered, cannot represent the trauma of the event except as an absent center" (Bernard-Dogals & Glejzer, 2001: 108). There certainly was a national Group Areas Act, and a set of apartheid laws that held for everyone, but everyone's experience of those laws were wholly particular, and singular; to the extent that the researcher-archon-witness does thematise and interpret, it is by witness and testimony that every singular story must question the universal process, threaten it and unsettle it. Our research, as such, and like Felman's description of teaching about the Holocaust, must "[...] testify, make something happen, and not just transmit a passive knowledge" (Felman & Laub, 1992: 53). It has to testify to a seeing that is a seeing anew, and differently - a testimony not as we remember, really, but as we learn to see for the first time (Guyer, 2009).
And in testifying, in this way, we may just provoke a crisis, create an event, awaken in an other, his or her inheritance in responsibility. This, of course, cannot be guaranteed, even as it is tempting to think the "[...] end of testimony becomes to witness, the end of witness [...] to testify" (Bernard-Donals & Glejzer, 2001: 125). However, to offer a singular testimony, a text that could not have been written by anyone else, from a wholly singular encounter with the other in responsibility, such that testimony offers the singular signature of that response, is to wager an otherwise than being in a being otherwise. The good therapist knows to work here, at the level of unease and the unsettling sur-prise of the other; it is time that the archon-researcher-witness does too, as the turning of testimony into testament only occurs at the happening of witnessing, of making witness.
In Otherwise than being (1974/1998), Levinas distinguishes between the Saying (le Dit), and the Said (le Dire). The Said is textuality - language, the message, propositions about the world and truth, for example - whereas the Saying is antecedent to the very signs it assembles; the "signifyingness of signification", it speaks to the exposure and proximity to the other, there where "[...] the infinite, or that which escapes Being, is to be sought" (Davis, 1997: 76). Yet, even as the Saying can never be fully present in the Said, the Said constitutes the only access we have to the Saying; and, even as the Saying exceeds every Said, it leaves a trace, a mark, on the Said, "[...] but is never revealed in it; it is not a theme, but can only be discussed in terms of themes" (Davis, 1997: 76). Quite simply, the scholar of the future, s/he who learns from ghosts, needs to trace this trace, this "intrigue of Saying" which is simultaneously the "intrigue of responsibility". Where ethics, rather than knowledge, is at stake - or put differently, where knowledge is seen to be given by an ethics, testimony is an unfurling unsaying, "[...] a saying that must also be unsaid [...] in order to thus extract the otherwise than being from the said in which the otherwise than being [...] already comes to signify only a being otherwise" (Levinas, 1998[1974]: 7).
Perhaps we can then imagine a psychology that can acknowledge its own ghosts, and can face up to psukhe, the breath of the soul, which we recall is only so by the union of Psyche and Eros, of the singular by the other. There is, by that lesson, no place for love to abide but the soul, and no sense for the soul, but love. And perhaps, just perhaps, we, researchers of the apartheid archive, scholars of the dead and the not yet, will come to recognise that this herald for psychology is really the bells tolling for us, singularly.
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text:
You know you're supposed to eat fruit every day, right? No, cherry-flavored Starburst doesn't count. We're talking about the low-fat, high-carb, natural-sugar goodness of bananas and apples and blueberries and kiwis.
Unfortunately, carrying fruit with you on a ride isn't so easy. Bananas turn to mush, apples get bruised and pineapples are all pokey. That's why we love dried fruit: It's compact, light and downright tasty. Stick a bag of it into your jersey pocket and bingo: cheap, quick energy, and no mess.
But being the curious folk that we are, we had to ask: Which is better, dried or fresh? "When you dry fruit, it loses a small amount of vitamin C and thiamin, maybe 15 percent or so," says Dennis Bobilya, a professor of nutrition at the University of New Hampshire, in Durham, and owner of Seacoast Sports Nutrition. "But really what you're losing is water, so from a nutritive standpoint, there's not much difference."
So it's all good, right? Sort of. We get most of the water we consume from the foods we eat. Yup, even if you're drinking your eight glasses of H2O every day, you're getting most of your hydration from food. Except, of course, when you eat dried fruit.
"I'm not saying that eating dried fruit is going to dehydrate you, but it's certainly not going to improve your hydration," notes Bobilya. "You're going to need to be extra conscientious about drinking water, especially if you're actually riding and already needing hydration."
And because dried fruit is such a concentrated source of calories, it might not sit as well with your tummy during hard rides. "Fresh fruit is more easily digestible because it comes with the fluid you need to digest it," says Bobilya. One more caveat: Because dried fruit is compact, it's easy to eat too much--not good if you're trying to retire your elastic-waistband trousers. If you don't need the convenience of dried, go fresh.


text:
Race and related grounds
Under the Code, every person has the right to be free from racial discrimination and harassment in the social areas of employment, services, goods, facilities, housing accommodation, contracts and membership in trade and vocational associations. You should not be treated differently because of your race or other related grounds, such as your ancestry, ethnicity, religion or place of origin.
Canada, its provinces and territories have strong human rights laws and systems in place to address discrimination. At the same time, we also have a legacy of racism – particularly towards Indigenous persons, but to other groups as well including African, Chinese, Japanese, South Asian, Jewish and Muslim Canadians – a legacy that profoundly permeates our systems and structures to this day, affecting the lives of not only racialized persons, but also all people in Canada.
Relevant policies:
October 2003 - The Report begins with a brief explanation and definition of racial profiling. In addition, the Report explains the human cost of racial profiling on the individuals, families and communities that experience it. It details the detrimental impact that profiling is having on societal institutions such as the education system, law enforcement agencies, service providers and so forth. It also outlines the business case against profiling – in essence the economic loss sustained as a result of racial profiling.
Racial profiling inquiry: Major themes (fact sheet)
December 2003 - In reviewing the material received during its inquiry, the following eight themes emerged.
Racial profiling inquiry: Objectives (fact sheet)
December 2003 - The Commission's racial profiling inquiry initiative was undertaken in response to community concerns about the impact of profiling on members of their respective communities. The inquiry's main objectives were to give individuals who had been subjected to profiling an opportunity to share those experiences and to show its effects on their families and communities. In doing so, the Commission hoped to raise public awareness of the harmful effects and the social costs of racial profiling.
Racial profiling inquiry: Background and process
December 2003 - The Report wraps up the Commission's inquiry initiative by relating what the Commission heard and providing an analysis of the effects of profiling on more than just the individuals and communities most likely to experience it. The Report also analyzes the detrimental impact that profiling is having on societal institutions such as the education system, law enforcement agencies, service providers, etc., and providers, etc., and provides recommendations for bringing an end to this practice.
Racial profiling inquiry: Main report recommendations (fact sheet)
December 2003 - The Commission's report on racial profiling puts forward a number of recommendations to address the issue of racial profiling.
What is racial profiling? (fact sheet)
2003 - For the purposes of its inquiry, the Commission's definition for "racial profiling" is any action undertaken for reasons of safety, security or public protection, that relies on stereotypes about race, colour, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, or place of origin, or a combination of these, rather than on a reasonable suspicion, to single out an individual for greater scrutiny or different treatment.