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After the failure of the US federal government under the Articles of Confederation, the men working to shape the new American government—later termed the "Founders"—determine that the new government must have a president with power equal to that of Congress and the Supreme Court. The federal government itself has far more power under the new Constitution than it had under the Articles, but many Founders worry that the government will have, or take upon itself, the power to constrain or even destroy individual rights and freedoms. The government, therefore, will have strict limitations on its functions, and will be divided into three co-equal branches. Debate over whether the new government should have a single president or an executive council rages, but eventually the Founders decide that a single president could best act decisively in times of crisis. However, Congress has the strength to curtail presidential power via legislation and oversight. One of the Founders' most crucial decisions is to give Congress, not the president, the power to declare war and commit military troops to battle. Congress must also authorize any military actions that fall short of actual war, the creation and maintenance of armies, and exercise control over how the president can call on the armed forces in emergencies. Finally, the Founders, all too aware that until the English Revolution of 1688, the King of England could use his "prerogative powers" to dispense with a law that he felt unnecessary, move to ensure that the US president cannot use a similar usurpation of power to override Congressional legislation, writing in the Constitution that the president must "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." In 2007, reporter Charlie Savage, drawing on James Madison's Federalist Papers, will write: "Knowing that it was inevitable that from time to time foolish, corrupt, or shortsighted individuals would win positions of responsibility in the government, the Founders came up with a system that would limit anyone's ability to become a tyrant or to otherwise wreck the country. And over the next century and a half, the system worked as the Founders had designed it to work." (Savage 2007, pp. 14-16)
James Madison, one of the founders of the American system of constitutional government (see 1787), writes of the importance of Congress, not the president, retaining the power to send the nation to war. "Those who are to conduct a war cannot, in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges," he writes, "whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analagous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power from executing from the power of enacting laws." (Savage 2007, pp. 19)
President Abraham Lincoln, responding to a Confederate attack on Fort Sumter in South Carolina, does not wait for Congress to begin its next session to make his response. Instead, Lincoln, wielding powers that the Constitution does not grant him and without a formal declaration of war, drastically enlarges the Union's army and navy, blockades Southern ports, spends money not appropriated by Congress, and arrests Northern citizens suspected of being Confederate sympathizers. All of these steps exceed his authority under the Constitution and under federal law. Lincoln addresses Congress as soon as it reconvenes, admitting that he has exceeded his authority (see 1787 and 1793), and refusing to argue that his actions are lawful based on any "prerogative of power" inherent to the presidency. Instead, he explains that he felt he had to respond immediately to the sudden crisis, and asks Congress to retroactively authorize his emergency actions. He says, "These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them." Congress gives Lincoln the retroactive authorization he seeks. (Savage 2007, pp. 16-17)
President Roosevelt, recognizing that Congress has the Constitutional authority to declare war (see 1787 and 1793), asks the legislature for a declaration of war against Japan in retaliation for the Japanese air attack against US naval forces at Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt calls the date of the Pearl Harbor attack, December 7, 1941, "a day which will live in infamy." He says, "I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire." With a single exception—Representative Jeannette Rankin (R-MT)—every member of the House and Senate votes to authorize war against Japan. The next day, the US will declare war against Germany and Italy as well. (Savage 2007, pp. 18; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Museum 2/10/2008)
President Harry Truman, without the approval of Congress, sends US troops to fight in the Korean War. Unlike his predecessor (see December 8, 1941), Truman asserts that he has the inherent right to do so as the commander in chief (see 1787 and 1793). Truman bases his decision in part on a UN Security Council resolution passed three days before—at the US's behest—approving military aid to South Korea, which was invaded by North Korean troops on June 25. In 2007, reporter and author Charlie Savage will write: "But the permission of foreign states was irrelevant to the domestic legal issue of who got to decide whether the United States would go to war. No president had ever before launched anything on the scale of the Korean War without prior permission from Congress, as the Constitution requires." Savage will explain why Congress allows Truman to usurp its prerogatives: "[M]embers of Congress, eager to appear tough against Communism and to support a war effort, did nothing to block Truman." (Savage 2007, pp. 19; Truman Library 3/2008)
Attorney General Edwin Meese receives a report, "Separation of Powers: Legislative-Executive Relations." Meese had commissioned the report from the Justice Department's Domestic Policy Committee, an internal "think tank" staffed with hardline conservative scholars and policy advisers.
Recommendations for Restoring, Expanding Executive Power - The Meese report approvingly notes that "the strong leadership of President Reagan seems clearly to have ended the congressional resurgence of the 1970s." It lays out recommendations for restoring the power taken from the executive branch after Watergate and Vietnam, and adding new powers besides. It recommends that the White House refuse to enforce laws and statutes that "unconstitutionally encroach upon the executive branch," and for Reagan to veto more legislation and to use "signing statements" to state the White House's position on newly passed laws. It also assails the 1972 War Powers Resolution and other laws that limit presidential power.
Reinterpreting the Separation of Powers and the Concept of 'Checks and Balances' - Perhaps most importantly, the Meese report claims that for 200 years, courts and scholars alike have misunderstood and misinterpreted the Founders' intentions in positing the "separation of powers" system (see 1787 and 1793). The belief that the Constitution mandates three separate, co-equal branches of government—executive, judicial, and legislative—who wield overlapping areas of authority and work to keep each of the other branches from usurping too much power—a concept taught in school as "checks and balances"—is wrong, the report asserts. Instead, each branch has separate and independent sets of powers, and none of the three branches may tread or encroach on the others' area of responsibility and authority. "The only 'sharing of power' is the sharing of the sum of all national government power," the report claims. "But that is not joint shared, it is explicitly divided among the three branches." According to the report, the White House should exercise total and unchallenged control of the executive branch, which, as reporter and author Charlie Savage will later explain, "could be conceived of as a unitary being with the president as its brain." The concept of "checks and balances" is nothing more than an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to encroach on the rightful power of the executive. This theory of presidential function will soon be dubbed the "unitary executive theory," a title adapted from a passage by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. (Savage 2007, pp. 47-48) Charles Fried, Reagan's solicitor general during the second term, will later write that though the unitary executive theory displays "perfect logic" and a "beautiful symmetry," it is difficult to defend, because it "is not literally compelled by the words of the Constitution. Nor did the framers' intent compel this view." (Savage 2007, pp. 50)
Congress explicitly refuses to grant the Bush administration the authority to conduct warrantless wiretaps and surveillance operations against US citizens in its resolution authorizing the use of military force (AUMF) against terrorists (see September 14-18, 2001). Tom Daschle (D-SD), the Senate Majority Leader, will write in December 2005 (after his ouster from Congress in November 2004) that the White House and the Justice Department will claim, falsely, that the AUMF grants the right for the NSA to conduct such a program (see Early 2002 and December 15, 2005). Instead, Daschle will write, the NSA merely usurps the authority, with the president's approval, to conduct such an extralegal surveillance program (see December 21-22, 2005). (Gellman 12/22/2005)
Administration Efforts to Rewrite AUMF - In an op-ed for the Washington Post, Daschle will observe that the AUMF authorizes Bush "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons" who "planned, authorized, committed or aided" the 9/11 attacks. But, Daschle will write, "Literally minutes before the Senate cast its vote, the administration sought to add the words 'in the United States and' after 'appropriate force' in the agreed-upon text. This last-minute change would have given the president broad authority to exercise expansive powers not just overseas—where we all understood he wanted authority to act—but right here in the United States, potentially against American citizens. I could see no justification for Congress to accede to this extraordinary request for additional authority. I refused."
No Vote for Domestic Surveillance - Daschle will also write that the White House attempted to add draft language to the AUMF resolution that would give the administration new and sweeping authority to use force to "deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States," even against nations and organizations not responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Bush officials such as Vice President Dick Cheney will claim that the AUMF "granted authority by the Congress to use all means necessary to take on the terrorists, and that's what we've done." But Daschle will write that Cheney is mistaken. "As Senate majority leader at the time, I helped negotiate that law with the White House counsel's office over two harried days. I can state categorically that the subject of warrantless wiretaps of American citizens never came up. I did not and never would have supported giving authority to the president for such wiretaps. I am also confident that the 98 senators who voted in favor of authorization of force against al-Qaeda did not believe that they were also voting for warrantless domestic surveillance." On September 12, six days before the September 18 AUMF vote, Bush officials demand that Congress authorize the use of military force to, in their words, "deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States." But Congress refuses, feeling that the request is "too broad and ill defined." Instead, on September 14, Congress choses to use language that authorizes Bush to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons [the president] determines planned, authorized, committed or aided" the 9/11 attacks. Daschle later writes, "With this language, Congress denied the president the more expansive authority he sought and insisted that his authority be used specifically against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.… The shock and rage we all felt in the hours after the attack were still fresh. America was reeling from the first attack on our soil since Pearl Harbor. We suspected thousands had been killed, and many who worked in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were not yet accounted for. Even so, a strong bipartisan majority could not agree to the administration's request for an unprecedented grant of authority." Instead, Daschle will write, the administration simply takes the authority anyway, and will argue in hindsight that the AUMF actually gives the administration the right to wiretap US citizens. However, Daschle will write, "at the time, the administration clearly felt they [didn't have the authority] or it wouldn't have tried to insert the additional language."
Breeding 'Fear and Suspicion' - He concludes, "[T]here are right and wrong ways to defeat terrorists, and that is a distinction this administration has never seemed to accept. Instead of employing tactics that preserve Americans' freedoms and inspire the faith and confidence of the American people, the White House seems to have chosen methods that can only breed fear and suspicion. If the stories in the media over the past week are accurate [detailing the breadth and apparent illegality of the NSA program], the president has exercised authority that I do not believe is granted to him in the Constitution, and that I know is not granted to him in the law that I helped negotiate with his counsel and that Congress approved in the days after Sept. 11. For that reason, the president should explain the specific legal justification for his authorization of these actions, Congress should fully investigate these actions and the president's justification for them, and the administration should cooperate fully with that investigation. In the meantime, if the president believes the current legal architecture of our country is insufficient for the fight against terrorism, he should propose changes to our laws in the light of day. That is how a great democracy operates. And that is how this great democracy will defeat terrorism." (Daschle 12/23/2005)
The US Congress adopts a joint resolution, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), that determines that "the president is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Congress also states that the "grave acts of violence" committed on the US "continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to [its] national security and foreign policy." (US Congress 9/14/2001) President Bush signs the resolution into law on September 18. (White House 9/18/2001) The passage of the AUMF served another purpose: to extend presidential power. While the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff intended the AUMF to define the conflict in narrow terms, and authorize the US to move militarily against al-Qaeda and its confederates, and the Taliban, Vice President Dick Cheney and his chief of staff, David Addington, had a larger goal. Attorney Scott Horton, who has written two major studies on interrogation of terrorism suspects for the New York City Bar Association, says in 2005 that Cheney and Addington "really wanted [the AUMF defined more broadly], because it provided the trigger for this radical redefinition of presidential power." Addington helped draft a Justice Department opinion in late 2001, written by lawyer John Yoo (see Late September 2001), that asserted Congress cannot "place any limits on the president's determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response." (Ravagan 5/21/2006)
In a secret 15-page memo to Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan, Justice Department lawyer John Yoo, a deputy in the Office of Legal Counsel, reasons that it is "beyond question that the president has the plenary constitutional power to take such military actions as he deems necessary and appropriate to respond to the terrorist attacks" of 9/11. Those actions can be extensive. "The president may deploy military force preemptively against terrorist organizations or the states that harbor or support them," Yoo writes, "whether or not they can be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of Sept. 11.… Force can be used both to retaliate for those attacks, and to prevent and deter future assaults on the nation. Military actions need not be limited to those individuals, groups, or states that participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon." The memo is solicited and overseen by White House lawyers.
Power Derives from Constitution, Congressional Authorization for War - This power of the president, Yoo states, rests both on the US Congress' Joint Resolution of September 14 (see September 14-18, 2001) and on the War Powers Resolution of 1973. "Neither statute, however, can place any limits on the president's determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response. These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the president alone to make." (Most experts believe that the Constitution strictly limits the president's power to declare and conduct war—see 1787).
Power More Extensive than Congress Authorized - Yoo argues further that the September 14 resolution does not represent the limits to the president's authority. "We think it beyond question" that Congress cannot "place any limits on the president's determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response. These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the president alone to make." Congress's "Joint Resolution is somewhat narrower than the president's constitutional authority," Yoo writes, as it "does not reach other terrorist individuals, groups, or states which cannot be determined to have links to the September 11 attacks." The president's broad power can be used against selected individuals suspected of posing a danger to the US, even though it may be "difficult to establish, by the standards of criminal law or even lower legal standards, that particular individuals or groups have been or may be implicated in attacks on the United States." Yoo concludes: "[W]e do not think that the difficulty or impossibility of establishing proof to a criminal law standard (or of making evidence public) bars the president from taking such military measures as, in his best judgment, he thinks necessary or appropriate to defend the United States from terrorist attacks. In the exercise of his plenary power to use military force, the president's decisions are for him alone and are unreviewable."
'Unenumerated' Presidential Powers - Yoo even asserts that the president has more power than his memo claims: "[T]he president's powers include inherent executive powers that are unenumerated in the Constitution," including but not limited to the power to take the country to war without Congressional input. (US Department of Justice 9/25/2001; Savage 2007, pp. 121-122)
Memo Remains Secret for Three Years - The contents of this memo are not disclosed until mid-December 2004. (Isikoff 12/18/2004; Isikoff, Klaidman, and Hirsh 12/27/2004)
In the weeks following 9/11, government lawyers begin to formulate a legal response to the newly perceived threat of terrorism. Four related issues are at hand: forceful prevention, detention, prosecution, and interrogation. What degree of force can the government employ to prevent acts of terrorism or apprehend suspected terrorists? How and where can it best detain terrorists if captured? How can it best bring them to trial? And how can it best obtain information from them on terrorist organizations and plots? These questions are handled in a new atmosphere that is more tolerant towards flexible interpretations of the law. Bradford Berenson, an associate White House counsel at this time, later recalls: "Legally, the watchword became 'forward-leaning' by which everybody meant: 'We want to be aggressive. We want to take risks.'" (Golden 10/24/2004) This attitude is seemingly in line with the president's thinking. Counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke will later recall President Bush saying, "I don't care what the international lawyers say. We are going to kick some ass" (see (9:00 p.m.-10:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). (Clarke 2004, pp. 23-24) At the center of legal reconstruction work are Alberto R. Gonzales, the White House counsel, his deputy Timothy E. Flanigan, and David S. Addington, legal counsel to Vice President Cheney. (Golden 12/19/2004) They will find a helpful hand in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), most notably its head, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee (Savage and Schmitt 6/10/2004) and his deputies John C. Yoo (Rosen 8/15/2004) and Patrick F. Philbin. Most of the top government lawyers dwell in fairly conservative circles, with many being a member of the Federalist Society, a conservative legal fraternity. Some have clerked for conservative Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, whose ruling effectively lead to the presidency being awarded to George W. Bush after the 2000 presidential election. (Golden 10/24/2004) Others worked for Judge Lawrence H. Silberman, who set up secret contacts with the Iranian government under President Reagan leading to the Iran-Contra scandal, and who advised on pursuing allegations of sexual misconduct by President Clinton. (Lobe 2/6/2004)
President Bush sends a letter to Congress informing legislators that he has ordered US armed forces into combat against the Taliban (see October 7, 2001). Bush does not rely on Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF—see September 14-18, 2001), but instead asserts his unilateral authority as president to take the country into war. "I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct US foreign relations as commander in chief and chief executive," he writes (see 1787). His letter goes on to express his appreciation to Congress for its "support" in his decision to begin a war against a foreign entity. (Savage 2007, pp. 127-128)
US senators vote 77 to 23 in favor of SJ Res. 46 (see October 2, 2002) authorizing the president to use military force against Iraq, despite significant opposition from their constituencies. (US Congress 10/2/2002; VandeHei and Eilperin 10/11/2002) Democratic senators Carl Levin (D-MI), Richard Durbin (D-IL), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Robert Byrd (D-WV), and Mark Dayton (D-MN) attempt to come up with an alternative, SJ Res. 45, but discussion on it is postponed indefinitely by a 75 to 25 vote. (US Congress 9/26/2002)
Sen. Carl Levin. SJ Res. 45 with Amendments 4858-62 (Rejected) - "To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces, pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security Council, to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range ballistic missiles, and related facilities, and for other purposes." (US Congress 10/10/2002)
Sen. Richard Durbin. SJ Res. 45 with Amendments 4865 (Rejected) - To amend the authorization for the use of the Armed Forces to cover an imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction rather than the continuing threat posed by Iraq.
Sen. Barbara Boxer. SJ Res. 45 with Amendments 4866-67 (Not Voted On) - "In families with minor children where both parents serve on active duty in the Armed Forces or where both parents are members of the National Guard or Reserves, the secretary of defense shall make every effort to ensure that not more than one of the parents is deployed in combat."
Sen. Robert Byrd. SJ Res. 45 with Amendments 4868 (Rejected) - To provide statutory construction that constitutional authorities remain unaffected and that no additional grant of authority is made to the president not directly related to the existing threat posed by Iraq. (US Congress 10/10/2002)
Sen. Robert Byrd. SJ Res. 45 with Amendments 4869 (Rejected) - To provide a termination date for the authorization of the use of the Armed Forces of the United States, together with procedures for the extension of such date unless Congress disapproves the extension. (US Congress 10/10/2002)
Sen. Mark Dayton. SJ Res. 45 with Amendments 4870 (Rejected) - Allows the president to prepare for the deployment—not use—of the US Armed Forces. If he determines that the use of force is necessary to protect the US from an imminent threat posed by Iraq, he may request a declaration of war to be voted upon by Congress. (US Congress 10/10/2002)
Many Opponents Believe Iraq a Threat - Even some of the most ardent opponents of the war believe the allegations about Iraq's WMD: Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) says, "I believe that Iraq presents a genuine threat, especially in the form of weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological, and potentially nuclear weapons." (Unger 2007, pp. 266)
Senators Lack Key Information for Informed Vote - Virtually none of the senators, for or against the use of force, bothered to read the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq to help them ascertain the reality behind the administration's insistence on the necessity for military action (see October 1, 2002). Almost all of them relied instead on briefings from administration officials. They were not told of the doubts about the Niger documents (see October 9, 2002), or the doubts surrounding the intelligence source dubbed "Curveball" (see Mid- and Late 2001). Nor are they aware that the CIA has "turned" Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, who says that Iraq has long since terminated its WMD programs (see Late September 2002). (Unger 2007, pp. 265)
Senate Leadership 'Caved in,' Former Ambassador Says - Former ambassador Joseph Wilson will write in 2004 that while a number of Senate Democrats opposed giving Bush a "blank check" to use military force as he sees fit, the efforts fail because "the Democratic leadership essentially caved in. The combination of threats of defeat at the polls with presidential promises that the congressional resolution would provide him the ammunition he needed to negotiate a strong UN resolution on disarmament proved to be too much for careerist politicians." (Wilson 2004, pp. 328)
Former Senator Says Electoral Politics Were Key to Vote - In 2009, Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, will reflect: "Unlike the first George Bush, who had purposefully put off the vote on the Persian Gulf War until after the elections of 1990—we voted in January of 1991 (see January 9-13, 1991)—here they put the vote in October of 2002, three weeks before a congressional election. I think there were people who were up for election who didn't want, within a few days of meeting the voters, to be at such stark opposition with the president." (Murphy and Purdum 2/2009)
President Bush asserts his own authority to take the nation to war over Congress's constitutional powers. In a letter to Congress announcing the military strikes against Iraq, Bush briefly notes Congress's authorization for military action (see October 11, 2002), but writes that he has ordered US troops into battle "pursuant to my authority as commander in chief." The letter is sent to House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and Senate President Pro Tempore Ted Stevens (R-AK). Bush made a similar, and similary unchallenged, assertion when he sent US troops into Afghanistan (see October 7, 2001). (Letter to congressional leaders reporting on the commencement of military operations against Iraq 3/21/2003; Savage 2007, pp. 158)
A three-judge panel of the Second US Circuit Court of Appeals in New York votes two to one that the military must either charge alleged al-Qaeda terrorist Jose Padilla with a crime, or release him within 30 days. "The government," the court says, "can transfer Padilla to appropriate civilian authorities who can bring criminal charges against him." Until now, no court in the US has ruled against the government's contention that even American citizens arrested on US soil can be held indefinitely based on wartime government prerogatives. Neither the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (see September 14-18, 2001) nor the president's "inherent power" as commander in chief is enough to hold Padilla without a trial, the court finds: "The president, acting alone, possesses no inherent constitutional authority to detain American citizens seized within the United States, away from a zone of combat, as enemy combatants." The two judges in the majority are a 1998 Clinton appointee and a 2001 Bush appointee; the dissenter, who advocates granting the president new and sweeping powers, is a 2003 Bush appointee. "So far," Office of Legal Counsel lawyer John Yoo comments, "the Second Circuit is the only court that has rejected the idea that the war on terrorism is, in fact, a war." Because this ruling conflicts with the Fourth Circuit's ruling in favor of the Bush administration, the Supreme Court will be forced to resolve the issue (see June 28, 2004); in light of the appeal, the court later agrees to suspend its 30-day ruling. (Montgomery 12/29/2003; Savage 2007, pp. 153)
The White House and the Justice Department are at odds over the legality of the National Security Agency's "data mining" program, which involves the NSA combing through enormous electronic databases containing personal information about millions of US citizens, ostensibly for anti-terrorism purposes and often without court warrants (see February 2001, Spring 2001, After September 11, 2001, After September 11, 2001, October 2001, and Early 2002). Such data mining by the NSA potentially threatens citizens' constitutional right to privacy. This clash between the White House and the Justice Department is one of the reasons that White House counsel Alberto Gonzales and chief of staff Andrew Card will try to pressure Attorney General John Ashcroft, while Ashcroft is recuperating from surgery, to reauthorize the NSA program over the objections of Deputy Attorney General James Comey. That attempt to force reauthorization over Justice Department complaints will result in the protest resignations of Ashcroft, Comey, and other Justice officials (see March 10-12, 2004). In 2007, Gonzales will deny that any such attempt to pressure Ashcroft to overrule Comey ever happened (see July 24, 2007), and will deny that there was any such dispute between the White House and Justice Department over the NSA program. Those denials will lead to calls to investigate Gonzales for perjury (see May 16, 2007). In late 2005, President Bush will admit, after the New York Times reveals the existence of the NSA warrantless wiretapping program (see Early 2002), that the program indeed exists, but will not acknowledge the data mining. Several current and former administration officials, interviewed by reporters in 2007, refuse to go into detail about the dispute between the White House and Justice Department, but say that it involves other issues along with the data mining. They will also refuse to explain what modifications to the surveillance program Bush will authorize to mollify Justice Department officials. Bush and his officials, including Gonzales, who will ascend to the position of attorney general in 2005, will repeatedly insist that he has the authority, both under the Constitution and under Congress's authorization to use military force against terrorists passed after the 9/11 attacks (see September 14-18, 2001), to bypass the requirements for court warrants to monitor US citizens. Critics will say that such surveillance is illegal under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. (Shane and Johnston 7/29/2007)
Domestic Surveillance Began Before 9/11? - Though Bush officials eventually admit to beginning surveillance of US citizens only after the 9/11 attacks, that assertion is disputed by evidence suggesting that the domestic surveillance program began well before 9/11 (see Late 1999, February 27, 2000, December 2000, February 2001, February 2001, Spring 2001, July 2001, and Early 2002).
President Bush meets privately with acting Attorney General James Comey to discuss the Justice Department's refusal to reauthorize the administration's warrantless wiretapping program (see Late September, 2001). (Comey will later refuse to discuss the conversation during testimony before Congress.) After the meeting, Bush meets privately with FBI Director Robert Mueller, Comey's partner in opposing the program (see March 10-12, 2004). After his meeting, Mueller tells Comey, "[W]e have the president's direction to do what we believed, what the Justice Department believed was necessary to put this matter on a footing where we could certify its legality." Author and reporter Charlie Savage will later write, "Comey, [Office of Legal Counsel chief Jack] Goldsmith, and their colleagues spent the next several weeks making a series of undisclosed changes to the warrantless surveillance program—during which time the original program continued to operate, even though the president had been told it was illegal." Outside experts will later speculate that Comey and Goldsmith had constrained the program's scope by imposing stricter controls on who can be monitored without a warrant. Some will decide that the program now monitors only communications specifically suspected to have a connection to al-Qaeda, not the more general "suspected terrorism" communications. They will also speculate that the authorization for the program now relies on Congress's Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF—see September 14-18, 2001), not the president's inherent authority as commander in chief. But, Savage will write, the program still allows wiretapping without a judge's approval, and therefore is still illegal. (Savage 2007, pp. 188)
In the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi v. Donald Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court rules 8-1 that, contrary to the government's position, Hamdi (see December 2001), as a US citizen held inside the US, cannot be held indefinitely and incommunicado without an opportunity to challenge his detention. It rules he has the right to be given the opportunity to challenge the basis for his detention before an impartial court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writes for the majority: "It would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government, simply because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge. Absent suspension of the writ by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this process." Hamdi, on the other hand, apart from military interrogations and "screening processes," has received no process. Due process, according to a majority of the Court, "demands some system for a citizen detainee to refute his classification [as enemy combatant]." A "citizen-detainee… must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker." However, O'Connor writes, "an interrogation by one's captor… hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral decisionmaker."
Conservative Dissent: President Has Inherent Power to Detain Citizens during War - Only Justice Clarence Thomas affirms the government's opinion, writing, "This detention falls squarely within the federal government's war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision." (Supreme Court opinion on writ of certiorari. Shafiq Rasul, et al. v. George W. Bush, et al. 6/28/2004) Thomas adds: "The Founders intended that the president have primary responsibility—along with the necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the nation's foreign relations. They did so principally because the structural advantages of a unitary executive are essential in these domains." (Dean 2007, pp. 105)
'A State of War Is Not a Blank Check for the President' - The authority to hold Hamdi and other such US citizens captured on enemy battlefields derives from Congress's Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF—see September 14-18, 2001). Justice Antonin Scalia dissents from this portion of the majority ruling, saying that because Congress had not suspended habeas corpus, Hamdi should either be charged with a crime or released. The Court also finds that if Hamdi was indeed a missionary and not a terrorist, as both he and his father claim, then he must be freed. While the Court does not grant Hamdi the right to a full criminal trial, it grants him the right to a hearing before a "neutral decision-maker" to challenge his detention. O'Connor writes: "It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in these times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.… We have long made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the nation's citizens."
Affirms President's Right to Hold US Citizens Indefinitely - Although the media presents the ruling as an unmitigated defeat for the Bush administration, it is actually far more mixed. The White House is fairly pleased with the decision, insamuch as Hamdi still has no access to civilian courts; the administration decides that Hamdi's "neutral decision-maker" will be a panel of military officers. Hamdi will not have a lawyer, nor will he have the right to see the evidence against him if it is classified. This is enough to satisfy the Court's ruling, the White House decides. In 2007, author and reporter Charlie Savage will write: "[T]he administration's legal team noted with quiet satisfaction that, so long as some kind of minimal hearing was involved, the Supreme Court had just signed off on giving presidents the wartime power to hold a US citizen without charges or a trial—forever." The Justice Department says of the ruling that it is "pleased that the [Court] today upheld the authority of the president as commander in chief of the armed forces to detain enemy combatants, including US citizens.… This power, which was contested by lawyers representing individuals captured in the War on Terror, is one of the most essential authorities the US Constitution grants the president to defend America from our enemies." (Savage 2007, pp. 193-194)
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and NSA chief Lieutenant General Michael Hayden conduct their own "briefing" on the recently revealed NSA wiretapping program (see December 15, 2005) with the White House press corps. Gonzales and Hayden make the following points:
Gonzales says that he will not discuss the internal workings of the still-classified program, only what he calls its "legal underpinnings."
He claims that the program, which he calls "the most classified program that exists in the United States government," is legal because President Bush authorized it, and says that the idea that "the United States is somehow spying on American citizens" is wrong: it is "[v]ery, very important to understand that one party to the communication has to be outside the United States."
He says that for the NSA to eavesdrop on a US citizen's telephone or e-mail communications, "we have to have a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al-Qaeda, affiliated with al-Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al-Qaeda, or working in support of al-Qaeda." The wiretapping program is an essential part of the administration's war against terror, he says.
He goes on to claim that "the authorization to use force, which was passed by the Congress in the days following September 11th, constitutes" legal grounds for "this kind of signals intelligence." (White House 12/19/2005) The White House signed Congress's Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) into law on September 18, 2001 (see September 14-18, 2001. (White House 9/18/2001)
Hayden Claims Supreme Court Backing - While he admits that the Congressional authorization to use force against international terrorism does not specifically mention any kind of electronic surveillance, he refers the listeners to the Supreme Court case concerning alleged US terrorist Yaser Esam Hamdi (see June 28, 2004), in which the Court ruled that Hamdi had the legal right to challenge his detention. "[T]he United States government took the position that Congress had authorized that detention in the authorization to use force, even though the authorization to use force never mentions the word 'detention.' And the Supreme Court, a plurality written by Justice O'Connor agreed. She said, it was clear and unmistakable that the Congress had authorized the detention of an American citizen captured on the battlefield as an enemy combatant for the remainder—the duration of the hostilities. So even though the authorization to use force did not mention the word, 'detention,' she felt that detention of enemy soldiers captured on the battlefield was a fundamental incident of waging war, and therefore, had been authorized by Congress when they used the words, 'authorize the President to use all necessary and appropriate force.' For the same reason, we believe signals intelligence is even more a fundamental incident of war, and we believe has been authorized by the Congress. And even though signals intelligence is not mentioned in the authorization to use force, we believe that the Court would apply the same reasoning to recognize the authorization by Congress to engage in this kind of electronic surveillance."
Bush 'Very Concerned' With Protecting Civil Liberties - Gonzales insists, Bush "is very concerned about the protection of civil liberties, and that's why we've got strict parameters, strict guidelines in place out at NSA to ensure that the program is operating in a way that is consistent with the President's directives." He adds, "[W]e feel comfortable that this surveillance is consistent with requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the Supreme Court has long held that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement in—when special needs outside the law enforcement arena. And we think that that standard has been met here."
Wiretapping Essential in Catching Terrorists - Hayden reiterates how important the wiretapping is to catching terrorists and stopping potential attacks against US targets, though he and Gonzales both refuse to say what, if any, terrorist plots or what terror suspects might have been captured through the NSA wiretapping program. Hayden does say, "This program has been successful in detecting and preventing attacks inside the United States.…I can say unequivocally, all right, that we have got information through this program that would not otherwise have been available," though he refuses to cite specifics. He admits that there have been some errors in surveilling innocent US citizens, though he refuses to give any details, and says those errors were quickly corrected.
Administration Not Required to Go Through FISA - Gonzales, who is the main speaker in the briefing, reiterates that while the administration continues to seek warrants from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) court, "we are not legally required to do, in this particular case, because the law requires that we—FISA requires that we get a court order, unless authorized by a statute, and we believe that authorization has occurred." He justifies the administration's refusal to use the FISA court for obtaining warrants by insisting that NSA officials "tell me that we don't have the speed and the agility that we need, in all circumstances, to deal with this new kind of enemy. You have to remember that FISA was passed by the Congress in 1978. There have been tremendous advances in technology… since then." Hayden adds, "I don't think anyone could claim that FISA was envisaged as a tool to cover armed enemy combatants in preparation for attacks inside the United States. And that's what this authorization under the President is designed to help us do."
'Balancing' of Civil Liberties, National Security - Hayden says the warrantless wiretapping program is part of "a balancing between security and liberty," a more "aggressive" operation "than would be traditionally available under FISA. It is also less intrusive. It deals only with international calls. It is generally for far shorter periods of time. And it is not designed to collect reams of intelligence, but to detect and warn and prevent about attacks. And, therefore, that's where we've decided to draw that balance between security and liberty."
Media Leaks Damaging to National Security - Gonzales refuses to talk about when any members of Congress were briefed on the program or what they were told, but he does imply that there will be some sort of leak investigation as to how the New York Times found out about the program: "[T]his is really hurting national security, this has really hurt our country, and we are concerned that a very valuable tool has been compromised. As to whether or not there will be a leak investigation, we'll just have to wait and see."
No Evidence of Compromised National Security - When asked whether he can cite any evidence that the revelation of the program's existence has actually compromised anything—"Don't you assume that the other side thinks we're listening to them? I mean, come on," one reporter says—Gonzales responds, rather confusingly, "I think the existence of this program, the confirmation of the—I mean, the fact that this program exists, in my judgment, has compromised national security, as the President indicated on Saturday."
Easier to Sidestep FISA Instead of Seek Congressional Approval - He does admit that the administration decided to sidestep the FISA court entirely instead of attempt to work with Congress to rewrite the FISA statutes because "we were advised that that would be difficult, if not impossible" to amend the law to the White House's satisfaction. Gonzales says those who are concerned about the program being excessively intrusive or a threat to American civil liberties simply "don't understand the specifics of the program, they don't understand the strict safeguards within the program.… Part of the reason for this press brief today is to have you help us educate the American people and the American Congress about what we're doing and the legal basis for what we're doing." He adds that any legal experts who believe the program is illegal are basing their judgments "on very limited information."
Tough Questioning - One reporter asks an unusually tough series of questions to Gonzales: "Do you think the government has the right to break the law?", to which Gonzales replies, "Absolutely not. I don't believe anyone is above the law." The reporter then says, "You have stretched this resolution for war into giving you carte blanche to do anything you want to do," to which Gonzales replies cryptically, "Well, one might make that same argument in connection with detention of American citizens, which is far more intrusive than listening into a conversation." The reporter insists, "You're never supposed to spy on Americans," and Gonzales deflects the responsibility for the decision back onto the Supreme Court.
Administration Will Tell Nation What It Needs to Know - Gonzales says the administration has no intention of releasing any of the classified legal opinions underpinning the program, and this press briefing is one of the methods by which the administration will "educat[e] the American people…and the Congress" to give them what they need to know about the program. (White House 12/19/2005)
Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) writes that Congress explicitly rejected several attempts by the Bush administration to provide him with war-making authority and the authority to wiretap and monitor US citizens "in the United States" when it approved the September 18, 2001 authorization to use military force (AUMF) against terrorists (see September 14-18, 2001). Instead, the Bush administration merely usurped that authority and launched—or expanded (see Spring 2001)—its warrantless wiretapping program, conducted by the NSA. Since then, the Bush administration and the Justice Department have both repeatedly asserted that the AUMF gave them the right to conduct the wiretapping program, an assertion that Daschle says is flatly wrong. On December 21, the Justice Department admitted in a letter that the October 2001 presidential order authorizing warrantless eavesdropping on US citizens did not comply with "the 'procedures' of" the law that has regulated domestic espionage since 1978, known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA established a secret intelligence court and made it a criminal offense to conduct electronic surveillance without a warrant from that court, "except as authorized by statute." However, the letter, signed by Assistant Attorney General William Moschella, argues that the AUMF gave the administration the authority to conduct the program. (Gellman 12/22/2005) The letter continues the argument that Congress gave President Bush the implict authority to create an exception to FISA's warrant requirements, though the AUMF resolution did not mention surveillance and made no reference to the president's intelligence-gathering authority. The Bush administration kept the program secret until it was revealed by the New York Times on December 15, 2005. Moschella argues that secret intelligence-gathering, even against US citizens, is "a fundamental incident to the use of military force" and that its absence from the resolution "cannot be read to exclude this long-recognized and essential authority to conduct communications intelligence targeted at the enemy." Such eavesdropping, he argued, must by necessity include conversations in which one party is in the United States. (William Moschella 12/22/2005 ) Daschle, one of the primary authors of the resolution, says that Moschella and the Bush administration are wrong in their assertions: "I did not and never would have supported giving authority to the president for such wiretaps. I am also confident that the 98 senators who voted in favor of authorization of force against al-Qaeda did not believe that they were also voting for warrantless domestic surveillance" (see September 12-18, 2001). (Daschle 12/23/2005)
Fourteen law professors and former federal officials send a letter criticizing the Justice Department's recent legal arguments supporting the legality of the secret NSA surveillance program (see December 19, 2005 and December 21-22, 2005). The letter is signed by law professors Curtis A. Bradley, a former State Department legal advisor; David Cole; Walter Dellinger, a former acting solicitor general and assistant attorney general; Ronald Dworkin; Richard Epstein; Harold Koh, a former assistant secretary of state and a former Justice Department official; Philip B. Heymann, a former deputy attorney general; Martin Lederman, a former Justice Department official; Beth Nolan, a former presidential counsel and a former Justice Department official; William S. Sessions, the former director of the FBI; Geoffrey R. Stone; Kathleen M. Sullivan; Laurence H. Tribe; and William Van Alstyne, a former Justice Department attorney. The letter is couched in legal language, but clearly states that the signees consider the NSA surveillance program entirely illegal: "[T]he program appears on its face to violate existing law." The signees consider and reject the Justice Department's argument that Congress "implicitly authorized the NSA program when it enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against al-Qaeda" in 2001 (see September 14-18, 2001), writing: "[T]he AUMF cannot reasonably be construed to implicitly authorize warrantless electronic surveillance in the United States during wartime, where Congress has expressly and specifically addressed that precise question in FISA and limited any such warrantless surveillance to the first 15 days of war." The signees also reject the Justice Department's argument that the president's "inherent constitutional authority as commander in chief to collect 'signals intelligence'" is not prohibited by FISA. The signees conclude that the Justice Department has failed "to offer a plausible legal defense of the NSA domestic spying program. If the administration felt that FISA was insufficient, the proper course was to seek legislative amendment, as it did with other aspects of FISA in the Patriot Act, and as Congress expressly contemplated when it enacted the wartime wiretap provision in FISA. One of the crucial features of a constitutional democracy is that it is always open to the president—or anyone else—to seek to change the law. But it is also beyond dispute that, in such a democracy, the president cannot simply violate criminal laws behind closed doors because he deems them obsolete or impracticable." (Marty Lederman 1/9/2006; Dworkin et al. 1/9/2006 )
The Justice Department (DOJ) issues a 42-page "white paper" detailing its arguments that the National Security Agency's warrantless wiretapping program (see February 2001, Spring 2001, After September 11, 2001, After September 11, 2001, October 2001, Early 2002, September 2002, Late 2003-Early 2004, April 19-20, 2004, June 9, 2005, June 9, 2005, December 15, 2005, December 17, 2005, December 19, 2005, December 24, 2005, January 5, 2006, January 18, 2006, January 18, 2006, January 23, 2006, and January 30, 2006) is legal. The DOJ reiterates two previous arguments (see December 19, 2005 and December 21-22, 2005)—that Congress implicitly authorized the program in 2001 when it authorized the Bush administration to begin military actions against al-Qaeda (see September 14-18, 2001), and that the president has the authority as commander in chief to conduct such a program—even though these arguments have been thoroughly refuted (see January 9, 2006) and overridden by the Supreme Court's recent Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ruling (see December 15, 2005 and July 8, 2006). In its paper, the DOJ declares that if necessary, it will attack the legality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in order to stop that law from "imped[ing]" the president's power to order domestic surveillance. In essence, according to columnist and civil liberties lawyer Glenn Greenwald, the DOJ is asserting that the president's powers are limitless as long as he or she declares a given action necessary to battle terrorism. "Because the president has determined that the NSA activities are necessary to the defense of the United States from a subsequent terrorist attack in the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, FISA would impermissibly interfere with the president's most solemn constitutional obligation—to defend the United States against foreign attack," the DOJ claims. Neither Congress nor the court system has the right to limit or even review the president's powers, according to the DOJ. Greenwald calls the DOJ's argument "a naked theory of limitless presidential power." In fact, Greenwald argues, the DOJ is asserting that FISA itself is unconstitutional, because no law can in any way limit the president's power to conduct foreign policy or protect the nation's security. The document is part of a larger Bush administration defense of the USA Patriot Act, and part of the administration's push to convince Congress to reauthorize that legislation. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sends the document to Congress. Justice Department official Steven Bradbury says, "When it comes to responding to external threats to the country… the government would like to have a single executive who could act nimbly and agilely." (US Department of Justice 1/19/2006 ; Glenn Greenwald 1/20/2006; Leonnig 1/20/2006)
Dubious Legality - The program has already been found to be of questionable legality by two reports recently released by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (see January 5, 2006 and January 18, 2006). And author James Bamford, a US intelligence expert who has written extensively about the NSA, says that the Justice Department's arguments are specious in light of Congress's clear intent in its 1978 passage of FISA to block warrantless wiretapping, and its demonstrated lack of intent to allow any such operations within US borders in the October 2001 legislation. "You could review the entire legislative history in the authorization to use military force and I guarantee you won't find one word about electronic surveillance," he says. "If you review the legislative history of FISA, you will find Attorney General Griffin Bell testifying before the intelligence committee saying this was specifically passed to prevent a president from claiming inherent presidential powers to do this again." (Leonnig 1/20/2006)
Self-Contradictory Justifications - In 2007, author and reporter Charlie Savage will write of the "shaky foundation" supporting the administration's "two-pronged attacks on critics of the wiretapping program and the Patriot Act," which some officials have claimed authorizes the program. "Beneath the simplistic rhetoric, the administration's position was self-contradicting," Savage will write. If Bush has the inherent presidential authority to order warrantless wiretapping, then he needs no authorization from the Patriot Act or any other legislation. But if Congress is endangering the nation by delaying in reauthorizing the Patriot Act and thusly not rendering the program legal, then the wiretapping program is illegal after all. The memo attempts to "paper… over" this problem by claiming that, while Bush has the inherent authority to do whatever he feels is necessary to protect the country, the Patriot Act's extra police powers are still necessary in "contexts unrelated to terrorism." Savage will write, "In other words, the administration's own position, hidden in the fine print, was that the Patriot Act was superfluous and irrelevant to the war on terrorism—a somewhat absurd stance made necessary by their desire to say the wiretapping program was legal." (Savage 2007, pp. 315)
Failure to Address Probable Beginning of Program Before Attacks - The Justice Department says nothing about the program apparently beginning well before 9/11 (see Late 1999, February 27, 2000, December 2000, February 2001, February 2001, Spring 2001, July 2001, and Early 2002).
Speaking to a cheering crowd of military families in Kansas, President Bush declares that he has no intention of following the laws requiring warrants for wiretaps (see December 15, 2005 and December 18, 2005) because Congress authorized the use of military force against terrorists (AUMF—see September 14-18, 2001), and because he has the power to bypass laws at his own discretion in the interest of national security. The Kansas appearance is part of an election-style "blitz" of appearances around the country designed to build support for the warrantless wiretapping program, and to bolster support for Republicans in the midterm elections (see January 20, 2006). "I'm not a lawyer, but I can tell you what [the AUMF] means," he says. "It means Congress gave me the authority to use necessary force to protect the American people but it didn't prescribe the tactics.… If [terrorism suspects] are making phone calls into the United States, we need to know why, to protect you." (Savage 2007, pp. 203)
The Bush administration confirms that it believes US citizens can be designated as "enemy combatants" under the Military Commissions Act (MCA—see October 17, 2006). The confirmation comes during the trial of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a Qatari and the only person on the American mainland being held as an enemy combatant. Al-Marri, currently held at the Charleston, South Carolina Naval brig, is a legal US resident accused of being a sleeper agent for al-Qaeda (see September 10, 2001). He was arrested in December 2001, while living with his family and studying computer science at Bradley University in Illinois. Al-Marri is charged, not with any direct terrorist activities, but with credit card fraud and lying to federal agents. He is challenging his indefinite detention in federal court, and the government is using the MCA to argue that al-Marri has no status in the courts because of his designation as an enemy combatant. One of the appellate court judges, Roger Gregory, asks Justice Department lawyer David Salmons, "What would prevent you from plucking up anyone and saying, 'You are an enemy combatant?'" Salmons responds that the government can do just that, without interference from the courts, and adds, "A citizen, no less than an alien, can be an enemy combatant." Gregory and the second of the three appellate judges, Diana Gribbon Motz, seem uncomfortable with the law's provisions that the US judiciary has no role in such designations. When Motz asks Salmons about the difference between nations making war and individuals committing acts of terrorism, Salmons retorts with a familiar, and long-disputed, argument that the US Congress gave the government the right to detain terrorist suspects without charge or recourse to the judiciary when it granted the administration the right to use military force against terrorists after the 9/11 attacks (see September 14-18, 2001).
Theoretically Declaring War on PETA - Motz is skeptical of the argument, and asks a series of hypothetical questions about just what organizations or individuals President Bush could designate as enemy combatants. Using the animal rights group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) as an example, Motz asks, "Could the president declare war on PETA?" Salmons says the question is unrealistic, but refuses to say that Bush could not do so if he chose. The Bush administration is careful in its use of the enemy combatant designation, Salmons says, therefore, "The representative of PETA can sleep well at night." (Liptak 2/2/2007)
Ignoring Constitutional Concept of 'Inalienable Rights' - Author and investigative journalist Robert Parry notes that in the al-Marri case, the Bush administration is arguing against the concept of "inalienable," or "unalienable," rights as granted by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. According to the administration, as long as the US is embroiled in what it calls the "war on terror," Bush can use his "plenary," or unlimited, executive powers to essentially waive laws and ignore Constitutional rights if he so chooses. Parry writes that "since the 'war on terror' will go on indefinitely and since the 'battlefield' is everywhere, Bush is asserting the president's right to do whatever he wants to whomever he wants wherever the person might be, virtually forever." Parry concludes, "The Justice Department's arguments in the [al-]Marri case underscore that Bush still sees himself as a modern-day version of the absolute monarch who gets to decide which rights and freedoms his subjects can enjoy and which ones will be denied." (Parry 2/3/2007)
A federal appeals court rules that "enemy combatant" Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (see December 12, 2001 and February 1, 2007) must be released from military custody. "To sanction such presidential authority to order the military to seize and indefinitely detain civilians," writes Judge Diana Gribbon Motz, "even if the President calls them 'enemy combatants,' would have disastrous consequences for the Constitution—and the country." She adds, "We refuse to recognize a claim to power that would so alter the constitutional foundations of our Republic." (Liptak 6/11/2007) Motz continues, "The president cannot eliminate constitutional protections with the stroke of a pen by proclaiming a civilian, even a criminal civilian, an enemy combatant subject to indefinite military detention."
Military Commissons Act Does Not Apply - The Military Commissions Act (MCA) (see October 17, 2006) does not apply to al-Marri, the court rules. (Schmidt 6/11/2007) Motz writes that the MCA does not apply to al-Marri and the court also rules that the government failed to prove its argument that the Authorization for Use of Military Force, enacted by Congress immediately after the 9/11 attacks (see September 14-18, 2001), gives President Bush the power to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant. (Associated Press 6/11/2007) Motz also notes that even though the government says the MCA applies to al-Marri's case, it did not follow its own guidelines under that law. The MCA requires all such detainees to be granted a Combat Status Review Tribunal (CRST) determination; all Guantanamo-based detainees have been given such a procedure. Al-Marri has not. The government did not suggest the procedure for al-Marri until the day it filed its motion to dismiss al-Marri's case. (Richey 6/13/2007) The case, al-Marri v. Wright, was filed against Navy Commander S.L. Wright, who oversees the Charleston military prison that houses al-Marri. (Schmidt 6/11/2007)
Government Arguments Repudiated - The 2-1 decision of the US Court of Appeals in Richmond was written for the majority by Motz. Al-Marri is the only person held on the US mainland as an enemy combatant, and has been held in isolation for four years (see August 8, 2005). The government has alleged since 2002 that al-Marri was an al-Qaeda sleeper agent sent to the US to commit mass murder and disrupt the US banking system (see June 23, 2003). Motz writes that while al-Marri may well be guilty of serious crimes, the government cannot sidestep the US criminal justice system through military detention. The al-Marri ruling apparently does not apply to enemy combatants and other detainees held without charges or legal access at the facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The dissenting judge, Henry Hudson, writes that President Bush "had the authority to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant or belligerent" because "he is the type of stealth warrior used by al-Qaeda to perpetrate terrorist acts against the United States." Hudson is a Bush appointee. Motz and Judge Roger Gregory, the concurring judge, were appointed by former president Bill Clinton. Motz orders the Pentagon to issue a writ of habeas corpus for al-Marri "within a reasonable period of time." The Pentagon may release him, hold him as a material witness, or charge him in the civilian court system. Al-Marri "can be returned to civilian prosecutors, tried on criminal charges, and, if convicted, punished severely," she writes, "But military detention of al-Marri must cease." (Liptak 6/11/2007; Schmidt 6/11/2007)
Democracy Vs. 'Police State' - Hafetz says: "We're pleased the court saw through the government's stunning position in this case. Had it not, the executive could effectively disappear people by picking up any immigrant in this country, locking them in a military jail, and holding the keys to the courthouse.… This is exactly what separates a country that is democratic and committed to the rule of law from a country that is a police state." (Richey 6/13/2007)
Justice Department to Challenge Decision - The Justice Department intends to challenge the decision (see June 11, 2007 and Late October-Early November, 2007). The case is expected to reach the Supreme Court, and may help define what authority the government has to indefinitely detain terror suspects and to strip detainees of their right to challenge the legality and conditions of their detention. (Associated Press 6/11/2007) For the time being, al-Marri will remain in military custody in the Charleston naval brig. (Cincinnati Post 6/12/2007)
A federal appeals court hears the case of alleged al-Qaeda sleeper agent Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, who was the victor in a recent court decision that ruled he could no longer be held in military detention with no access to the US court system (see June 11, 2007). Al-Marri's lawyer, Jonathan Hafetz, asks the Fourth US Court of Appeals to uphold the recent verdict, which was rendered by a three-judge panel from the same court. Now the entire court is reconsidering the case at the government's request. Hafetz says the court must uphold the decision. "To rule otherwise is to sanction a power the president has never had and was never meant to have."
Authorization for the Use of Military Force - Judge Paul Neimeyer, a George H. W. Bush appointee, challenges Hafetz's assertion that al-Marri cannot be held in military custody because he was not captured on a battlefield; to make such a claim would mean "25 or 30 terrorists could sneak into the US" and the military could not stop them. Justice Department lawyer Gregory Garre makes the same argument that the appeals court panel rejected—that Congress gave the president the authority to seize and detain anyone affiliated with al-Qaeda, regardless of where they were captured, when it passed its Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) after the 9/11 attacks (see September 14-18, 2001). Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, appointed to the bench by former president Ronald Reagan, says that Congress could appeal or revise the AUMF whenever it likes. (O'Dell 10/31/2007) Wilkinson acknowledges that many have concerns that the AUMF "may have authorized some sweeping detention problem… [, b]ut people are not being swept off the streets of Omaha." Judge Diana Gribbon Motz interjects, "No, it was Peoria."
Question of Constitutionality - Wilkinson wonders why the "carefully targeted response by the government" has created "all this hoopla?" Comparing the detention of al-Marri and another enemy combatants, Jose Padilla, to the round-ups of German-Americans during World War I and of Japanese-Americans during World War II, Wilkinson asks if "we've lost our sense of perspective." Judge Roger Gregory says: "The calculus for determining constitutionality is not whether we have a good king or a bad king. It's not whether he stays his hand in generosity." Motz and Gregory were the majority judges in the June decision. When Garre argues that al-Marri had ample opportunity to challenge his detention, and "squandered" those opportunities, Judge William Traxler asks, "How does a person who's held incommunicado challenge" his detention? (Elkins 11/1/2007)
The Electronic Frontier Foundation joins the American Civil Liberties Union in its skeptical response to the news of a secret October 2001 Justice Department memo that says the Fourth Amendment does not apply in government actions taken against terrorists (see April 2, 2008). "Does this mean that the administration's lawyers believed that it could spy on Americans with impunity and face no Fourth Amendment claim?" it asks in a statement. "It may, and based on the thinnest of legal claims—that Congress unintentionally allowed mass surveillance of Americans when it passed the Authorization of Use of Military Force in… 2001 (see September 14-18, 2001) .… In short, it appears that the administration may view NSA domestic surveillance, including the surveillance of millions of ordinary Americans… as a 'domestic military operation.' If so, this Yoo memo would blow a loophole in the Fourth Amendment big enough to fit all of our everyday telephone calls, web searches, instant messages and emails through.… Of course, the [Justice Department's] public defense of the NSA program also asserted that warrantless surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment.… But the memo referenced above raises serious questions. The public deserves to know whether the 2001 Yoo memo on domestic military operations—issued the same month that the NSA program began—asserted that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to domestic surveillance operations conducted by the NSA. And of course it reinforces why granting immunity aimed at keeping the courts from ruling on the administration's flimsy legal arguments is wrongheaded and dangerous." (Electronic Frontier Foundation 4/2/2008)
A federal judge denies the US government's request (see May 25, 2012) to reconsider her order (see May 16, 2012) blocking enforcement of a law authorizing indefinite military detention, without charge or trial, of anyone, including US citizens arrested in the United States, accused of supporting groups hostile to the United States. Section 1021 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA—see December 15, 2011) is under review in the case of Hedges v. Obama (see January 13, 2012) and Judge Katherine B. Forrest of the US District Court, New York Southern Division had issued a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the law after finding it unconstitutional.
Controversy over Scope of Detention Authority - The US government had also stated in its request for reconsideration that it was interpreting Forrest's order as applying only to the plaintiffs in the case. Forrest clarifies in her subsequent Memorandum Opinion and Order that by enjoining enforcement of § 1021(b)(2), the only remaining persons the law can be applied to are those defined in § 1021(b)(1): "A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks." This definition of covered persons is the same as the one given in the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, passed by Congress following the September 11 attacks (see September 14-18, 2001). The Supreme Court has only ruled on a narrow range of relevant detention issues; one oft-cited case is Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (see June 28, 2004). Lower courts have produced a variety of opinions, some upholding an expansive view of detention authorities, others challenging it. In § 1021 of the NDAA, Congress asserted that it "affirms" detention authority granted under the AUMF, and does not "expand… the scope of the [AUMF]." Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), during a debate on the NDAA, explained the language in this way: "[W]e make clear whatever the law is. It is unaffected by this language in our bill" (see December 15, 2011). Congress included a separate, broader definition of covered persons in § 1021(b)(2) that potentially covered anyone alleged by the government to have supported groups hostile to the US, including US citizens arrested in the United States. This section is what prompted Hedges to sue, alleging these provisions violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights (see January 13, 2012). Forrest found the bill's broad and vague provisions for indefinite military detention to be unconstitutional, and Congress's statement that it was only affirming established law to be "contrary to basic principles of legislative interpretation that require Congressional enactments to be given independent meaning" (see May 16, 2012). (MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: Hedges et al v. Obama 12 Civ. 331 (KBF) affirming preliminary injunction and scope 6/6/2012)
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text:
Of all the words I tend to overuse hideously when writing about music - and I'm hankering after the now-blacklisted 'sophomore' here - 'pop' is the one I'd swear by the most. More so than 'indie', whose rep has taken a bit of a battering of late, 'pop' is the bandwagon whose wheels I'm happiest throwing myself under time and again. Rather than get bogged down too much into a discussion about semantics (pop-ular? pop-ulist? Etc), let's instead look at pop in all its vague and polymorphous glory. (As an aside, one colleague's best stab at defining the word neatly was 'anything you dance to at a family wedding', to which the obvious riposte is I would dance to Joy Division records at a family wedding, and do it with a shit-eating grin on my face that scares the crap out of the kids.)
For music critics, pop seems more of an ill-defined sensibility than anything, a platonic ideal that has no meaning outside of their own twisted logic. Animal Collective? Pop, innit. Deerhoof? Fahckin' blinding tunes, geezer. Of course, critics are also by and large overgrown mummies' boys that never quite recovered from their adolescences and therefore aren't best equipped to understand when the public at large chooses not to see things their way. Take M.I.A., for instance. Capable of transforming even the most dour of post-rock worshipping musos into rabid, delirious disciples of POP, she is nonetheless incapable of persuading the great unwashed of her universal appeal – 27,000 sales of Arular to date and a little over 2,000 of Kala midway through its first week of release. At the other end of the spectrum to M.I.A's consummate sense of 'now-ness', there's the whole raft of Brian Wilson-aping indie-poppers, regularly written about in hallowed terms as 'perfect pop' but again selling generally bugger all records - The Shins may be a big deal in America but they've barely made a dint in the national consciousness over here, of Montreal have only recently transcended toilet venue status ten years into their careers, and New Pornographers have yet to make a splash four albums in.
At worst, a literate approach to pop music amounts to the kind of convoluted snobbery that's very much the preserve of indie fandom, but it's also resulted in some of the best groups of the past few decades, and ones that actually sold a few records, too – from the brainy end of glam (Bowie, Roxy Music) through to the entryist approach of the early new romantic bands (Scritti Politti, Heaven 17) and new pop vanguardists like Orange Juice, Associates et al.
Arguably, though, pop doesn't need indie lending its music a veneer of credibility right now. As the chart-bothering indie music du jour scrabbles for the centre ground with the unprincipled indignity of a New Labour rally in the home counties, ripe with poorly-observed platitudes or solipsistic epic-isms and riddled with presumptions about the primacy of guitar music over subnormal pop, cred-pop continues to deliver tunes by the spadeful with none of the pomposity – Amy Winehouse, Lily Allen, Rihanna, Sugababes, Girls Aloud, Timbaland (okay, maybe he's a bit pompous). To put it another way, would you rather hear Timbaland's crisp, sexy production on Nelly Furtado's 'Say It Right', or would you prefer to hear Kele Okereke bleat his way earnestly through the track for Jo Whiley's Live Lounge?
Should this be allowed to happen, ever?
We're used to hearing bands drone on about the perils of being pigeonholed, but where it's accurate at least, no band worth their salt would get haughty about being tagged 'pop'; pop being spritely, irreverent, aware where rock is merely leaden and self-important.
Which brings us, albeit in a very roundabout fashion, to the big question: what are the arty pop acts you'd like to see / have seen selling records by the bucketload? Does pop even need art meddling in its affairs?

subset: commoncrawl


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Chinese lighting manufacturer Triopo have released a more compact 400Ws version for their original cordless TTL strobe in the new F1-400.
Like the F3-500W, the F1-400 are Lithium-ion powered IGBT strobes, with both Canon and Nikon compatible 2.4GHz TTL and HSS enabled radio receiver built inside.
Interestingly Triopo have actually implemented a Profoto style modifier mount this time, which also doubles as a Bowens S-type mount when using an included slide on adapter.
The F1-400's flash tube is also recessed behind a protective toughened glass cover, again more closely resembling the Profoto B1 strobes.
The F1-400's 14.8V, 3200mAh, Lithium-ion battery provides around 350 full power pops per charge, with 2.5 second full power recycle time.
Weight is 1.96kg including battery, down from 3.2kg for the sizable F3-500W.
A 10 watt LED modelling light is also provided, and the F1-400 can also run off mains AC power with an optional adapter.
The F1-400 also feature a large TFT LCD display, and interface again more closely resembling the original Profoto B1.
4 individual groups A / B / C / D, and 16 Channels are provided.
Triggering and remote control are via a low profile radio transmitter, which uniquely provides both Canon and Nikon master modes in the one unit.
Again supporting up to 4 groups A / B / C / D, and 16 channels. TTL and Remote Manual groups can be mixed together, and turned off individually.
The 2.4GHz transmitter provides an AF assist light, and up to 100 meter radio range.
- 400Ws (Guide N0. 63M – ISO 100)
- 10W LED Modelling Light (5600K)
- Fan Cooled
- Profoto and Bowens S-type Accessory Mount
- Built in (removable) 14.8V / 3200mAh Lithium-ion Battery
- 350 Full Power Pops Per Battery Charge
- 0.01 – 2.5 Seconds Recycle Time
- Flash Modes – TTL / M / Multi
- HSS to 1/8000th
- Second Curtain Sync
- Manual Flash – 1/128 – 1/1 Output (1/3rd Increments)
- Triopo 2.4GHz Radio Receiver Built-in
- ETTL & ITTL Radio Slave Modes
- Range – up to 100m
- 4 Groups – A / B / C / D
- 16 Channels
- Canon and Nikon Optic Wireless Slave Modes
- S1 and S2 Optic Slave Modes
- Flash Duration – 1/312s – 1/5260s
- Color Temperature – 5600K +/-200K
- TFT LCD Display
- Auto Memory Function
- Sound Prompt
- Overheat, Over-voltage, Over-current, Protection
- USB Port for Firmware Upgrades
- 3.5mm Sync Port
- External Power Port (DC 15V/15A)
- Weight Approx 1.96kg (With Battery)
The Triopo transmitter unit provides control of 4 remote flash groups in TTL, Manual or Multi Modes.
(Its not completely clear, though Nikon master mode may only provide 3 groups).
And TTL and Manual Groups can be mixed together, or turned OFF individually as required.
Remote modelling light control via group is also provided from the transmitter.
Uniquely the Triopo transmitter provides both Canon and Nikon master modes in the one unit. This requires multiple TTL contacts on the transmitters foot to accommodate both camera systems.
The transmitter also features an AF assist light, fast level lock, and is powered by 2 AA batteries.
As well as controlling the F1-400, and F3-500W strobes, Triopo also have their own TTL slave speedlites compatible with the Triopo radio system.
(At the time of writing this there is no master speedlite, or receiver units available to fire other "non Triopo" strobes from the same transmitter).
As well as radio mode, the F1-400 also provide both Canon and Nikon Optic Wireless slave modes in the one unit, as well as basic S1 and S2 optic slave modes.
A TR-06 Bowens S-type accessory mount slides over the nose of the flash, and provides variable depth adjustment of the flash tube into the modifier.
A diffuser dome is also supplied, and similar colored gel caps have also been spotted around the internet.
Another nice advancement and feature and of the F1-400 is an included weatherproof hard case with internal foam padding.
|Li-ion battery
|14.8v / 3200mAh
|Flash times (full power)
|350 times
|Recycling time
|0.1 – 2.5s
|Battery-charging time
|6 hours (with self-protection)
|Power range
|1/128-1/1 (8 steps)
|High speed sync
|Flash mode
|Auto / M(S1/S2)/ Multi / DV .
SLAVE C / SLAVE N / RX-C / RX-N four wireless flash mode
|Battery-charging way
|Plug-in charging type
|Protection device
|Overheating protection
|Triggering way
|Up to 100m, with built-in 2.4GHz remote control
|LED Modeling bulb
|10W (manual ON/OFF)
|Yes (ON/OFF)
|Approx 1.96Kg
|Color temperature
Again Spanish dealer KubeStudio.com has provided a nice overview video of the Triopo F1-400 with comparison to the F3-500W.
Triopo products have not been widely available in the USA at this stage, though Neewer have the F1-400 and F3-500W kits available under Neewer branding on Amazon from $399 with transmitter.
Neewer provide 12 months warrant and multilingual email support.
The Triopo F1-400 TTL strobes and transmitter are available now from around $400 –
Triopo – Website


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After expenses covered by Medicare are taken into account, many of your clients retiring this year are likely to incur about $240,000 per couple in out-of-pocket health care expenses during retirement. In 15 years, this amount will consume about 61 percent of their Social Security benefits. And some will live longer, incurring expenses above and beyond this quarter-million-dollar average. These figures cannot be ignored when you are working through estimated retirement cash flows, but how do you advise clients to cover these expenses on a fixed income? You may be able to alleviate the retiree health-expense problem by using guaranteed income annuities or life insurance alternative funding solutions.
Annuity Solution
Your clients have planned for retirement expenses, carefully tucking funds away into IRAs and 401(k)s. Despite this, many are likely relying on Medicare to cover the bulk of their health-related expenses after they reach age 65. Contrary to most of their beliefs, for the average retiree, Medicare will not be sufficient. A recent Fidelity Investments report found that a couple retiring in 2012 will need an additional $240,000 above and beyond the expenses Medicare does pick up.
Some of your clients can plan for these extra expenses by purchasing guaranteed income annuities and earmarking the funds specifically for health-related costs. For a lump sum, these guaranteed annuities will pay a monthly income for life, no matter how long your client lives.
This may be the most practical way to provide peace of mind for your clients. They can retire knowing that they will be able to pay for the surprising number of health-related expenses that are not covered by Medicare programs. The monthly annuity payment can allow your clients to purchase extra health insurance to cover their specific needs for the rest of their lives.
Life Insurance Option
If your client is averse to using an annuity strategy, he or she can use life insurance as an alternate funding solution. Your client can purchase a life insurance contract and use the cash value of the policy to pay health-related expenses during retirement. As the policyholder withdraws funds against the cash value of the policy to pay for health care, the death benefits will decrease. Any remaining value would be treated as any other life insurance policy payable on the insured's death.
The advantage of using life insurance to fund post-retirement health care expenses is that the funds can be withdrawn as needed, where an annuity will pay out each month regardless of whether your client needs funds to pay health care expenses during that month.
Additional Planning Techniques
What if your client is considering retirement and does not have the funds to purchase life insurance or an annuity to guarantee lifetime income? The most important advice you may be able to give your clients relates to the expenses that remain outside Medicare coverage. Many of your clients assume that basic expenses relating to dental care and hearing aids are covered by Medicare. They are not. Neither is the rapidly increasing cost of long-term care.
If your client has not retired, knowledge may be the best planning tool. He or she still has time to re-examine anticipated retirement budgets and may be able to rethink planned expenditures. Further, those clients planning to retire before age 65 especially may want to rethink their strategy once they realize how high their health insurance bills are likely to be in the pre-Medicare years.
Contributing to health savings accounts (HSAs) can provide another solution for your clients who have yet to retire because amounts contributed to an HSA can be accumulated over the years and withdrawn tax-free during retirement. It may be possible for your clients to build substantial reserves within HSAs during their working years.
Your clients who have already retired should be advised to carefully examine their health plans each year to ensure that they are getting the most for their money. Plans change each year, so it is important that retired clients not assume that last year's coverage will extend into the future.
The reality for most of your clients is that relying on Medicare will not be enough. Medicare will not cover a huge chunk of the health expenses that today's retirees will encounter during retirement. Your advice is crucial to those considering retirement today—it is one area where knowledge really can be power.
For the entire story on Advisor One, click here.


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Amhoanna, ū'iáⁿ në! Cánghng'a mng- cìt'ê Tiôciu pîng'iú, i māsī anni kóng.amhoanna wrote:Niuc, goânlâi Bâgán pún ciong chù kóng cò "lāi", kah Tiôciu-ōe kāng.
Bāgán'uē "laī/naī" ingkai sī tuì "chùlaī" laî ë. Nāsī "chù" niā, gún sī īnglaî kóng kuikingkuiking ê chù (the building itself).
My answer is valid for my variant. May be what you learned is valid for some other variants?I also benefited from Niuc's answer regarding the use of gún. I learned or thought I learned somewhere that "gún lāupē" is used whenever there's at least one sibling, but I guess it's used w/ or w/o siblings.
Yeah, you explain it better on this aspect! So for human relationships, gún is the norm. However, for other things, it is more ambiguous. For big stuffs, gún is used to mean both "my" and "our", while "guá ê" is used to emphasize "my" e.g. "gún ê tiàm" vs "guá ê tiàm".My "interpretation" of gún vs. goá ê -- Niuc, pls correct if off -- is that gún is used when it refers to something that the speaker is part of something with. "Gún bó͘" would be correct b/c the speaker and his wife are part of something -- a marriage, a coupling, a ความรัก.
Yes, I concur.On the other hand, I've also heard "goá ê bó͘" used. It seems to be a "marked form" with an emphasis on the speaker's possession of his wife, e.g. "Cò mihⁿ àmsî ca̍p tiám khà lâi chē góa ê bó͘?"


text:
A Wisconsin man with plans to open a gentleman's club in the Milwaukee area is in hot water because of one of his signs.
Not a neon sign showing scantly dressed woman dancing on a pole, but one that says, "No Negros Allowed."
Mark Prior plans on opening his club, in a building next to the Abbotsford city hall and library but he doesn't plan on letting blacks in.
"I'm going to stick to my guns because I think I have the right as a business owner to reject service to anyone. It's not all the black people there are just a few bad ones," says Prior.
Prior posted the sign after he says he had some problems with black people in the past and needed to make a policy against them.
Under federal and state law, it is illegal for a businesses open to the public to deny patrons based on race. That wont stop Prior from trying.
"If I've got a problem with you it's going to be on the front of my store," says Prior.
He has since moved the sign inside do to the number of complaints. But if he keeps true to his racist mandate, according Dr. Selika Ducksworth-Lawton, an African American historian at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, the second he opens his business, he'll be in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.


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- This event has passed.
Behind the Scenes Distillery Tour
December 7, 2019 @ 3:00 pm - 4:30 pm
|Recurring Event (See all)
Weekly on the same day
Event Navigation
Want to see what makes Industry City Distillery tick? On our "hard hat" tour we take you through the distillery to see not only how we make our spirits, but how the machines that make our spirits are made. It's a pretty nerdy tour… Sign up here!


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Courtney Waid-Lindberg, assistant professor of criminal justice at Bemidji State University, will deliver an Honors Council Lecture on what measures can be taken to ensure young adults and college students feel safe in a world where social media is a large part of their daily routines.
Waid-Lindberg's presentation, "Fear of Crime and Punitive Attitudes Among College Students: A Review of the Research," will be held April 11 at 7 p.m. in Hagg Sauer 112 on the Bemidji State campus.
Honors Council Lectures are open to the public free of charge.
Waid-Lindberg received her bachelor's degree in psychology from the University of Kentucky, her master's in criminal justice from the University of Alabama and her doctorate in criminology from Florida State University.
Her current research interests include historical perspectives of correction practices, the culture of control, the subculture of prison, school crime, issues in juvenile justice processing, punitive attitudes of the public, and the fear of crime.
The Honors Council Lecture Series is hosted by the Bemidji State University Honors Council. The council is the advisory group to the honors program comprised of 12 faculty members from each of the University's colleges. Student representatives are also elected to the council by their cohorts for one-year terms.
For more information about the Honors Council Lecture Series, please contact the honors program at (218) 755-3984.


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Dr. Juliette Bell is the Council of 1890 Universities new chair.
WASHINGTON, D.C. - (Nov. 14, 2013) - A national education group recognized the University of Maryland Eastern Shore earlier this week for its recent success in training educators and for its work in coordinating international research.
The Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities named 15 recipients of its inaugural 1890 Land-grant Universities Teaching, Research and Innovation Awards as a part of an ongoing effort highlighting exemplary achievements at historically black institutions.
UMES took honors in two of those categories during a ceremony held in conjunction with the association's 126th annual meeting here.
UMES President Juliette B. Bell also moved into the leadership post of chair of the association's Council of 1890 Universities , a group of 20 institutions that trace their roots to financial support from the federal government when it adopted the Morrill Act of 1890.
Bell had been the council's chair-elect, which put her in position to move into heading the panel of her peers during the next academic year. When Gilbert Rochon resigned Oct. 22 as Tuskegee University's president, he relinquished the chairmanship of the council and Bell took the reins.
The APLU's new 1890 Awards were created to recognize advances in teaching, research and innovation on 1890 university campuses and encourage "advancement and development in these areas of national importance." The awards are sponsored by the Kresge Foundation.
UMES received the inaugural Education Degree Completion Award for having the highest increase - 180 percent - in Teacher Education bachelor's degrees from 2011-2012 through 2012-2013.
The university also was recognized for having the largest increase - 22 percent - in international research awards from 2011-2012 through 2012-2013.


text:
Many new college graduates have this problem: How do you get hired if all the jobs require experience?
You probably do have experience, it's just a different kind of experience. Volunteering, internships and part-time jobs helped you gain skills you can use to show potential employers what you can do for them as an employee.
You probably volunteered on campus, in a social organization or in the community. Chances are, put in a lot of time and gained hands-on experience.
If you had internships or part-time jobs, those are skill-building activities that should be on your resume.
As you relate the skills you've gained to after-graduation jobs, you'll be surprised how much experience you do have — it's just nontraditional experience.
Here are some ideas for re-examining your resume to keep it from minimizing this experience:
- Make sure you list all your volunteer experience, especially that with community involvement.
- Keep in mind employers look for leadership experience and your ability to successfully communicate. Highlight examples that demonstrate these skills.
- A one-page resume probably will be sufficient to market your skills and experience. Show the results of your efforts, and quantify or qualify accomplishments.
- Be concise and relate how your coursework can bring value to the employer.
- Keep in mind employers want to know what you can do for them not what they can do to help you reach your goals.
- Including your GPA helps develop credibility and demonstrates discipline.
- List honors and awards. In some cases you may need to explain them.
- Refrain from exaggerating, keep your achievements realistic.
- Be prepared to customize your resume to an employers needs.
- References will back up your resume, so make sure the content is accurate.