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This is a scalable context timeline. It contains events related to the event August 1984: CIA Establishes Intelligence Link With Iraq. You can narrow or broaden the context of this timeline by adjusting the zoom level. The lower the scale, the more relevant the items on average will be, while the higher the scale, the less relevant the items, on average, will be.
President Harry Truman, without the approval of Congress, sends US troops to fight in the Korean War. Unlike his predecessor (see December 8, 1941), Truman asserts that he has the inherent right to do so as the commander in chief (see 1787 and 1793). Truman bases his decision in part on a UN Security Council resolution passed three days before—at the US's behest—approving military aid to South Korea, which was invaded by North Korean troops on June 25. In 2007, reporter and author Charlie Savage will write: "But the permission of foreign states was irrelevant to the domestic legal issue of who got to decide whether the United States would go to war. No president had ever before launched anything on the scale of the Korean War without prior permission from Congress, as the Constitution requires." Savage will explain why Congress allows Truman to usurp its prerogatives: "[M]embers of Congress, eager to appear tough against Communism and to support a war effort, did nothing to block Truman." [Savage, 2007, pp. 19; Truman Library, 3/2008]
Entity Tags: Harry S. Truman, United Nations Security Council, Charlie Savage
Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties
The CIA establishes a direct intelligence link with Iraq. [Washington Post, 12/15/1986]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
The Central Intelligence Agency authors a classified report acknowledging that Iraq is still using chemical weapons as an "integral part" of its military strategy and that it is a "regular and recurring tactic." [New York Times, 2/13/2003]
The CIA establishes "a direct, top-secret Washington-Baghdad link to provide the Iraqis with better and more timely satellite information." As a result, "The Iraqis receive the information from satellite photos 'several hours' after… bombing raid[s]…. " The US-provided intelligence information is considered "vital" to Iraqi military strategy. [Washington Post, 12/15/1986]
CIA Director William J. Casey meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Iraq's ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, to make sure the new Washington-Baghdad intelligence link (see August 1986) is helping the Iraqis and to encourage more attacks on Iranian economic targets. [Washington Post, 12/15/1986 Sources: Unnamed sources with first hand knowledge]
Entity Tags: William Casey, Central Intelligence Agency, Kizam Hamdoon, Tariq Aziz
Shortly after the Iran-Contra scandal is first revealed in the press, CIA Director William J. Casey meets with Iraq's ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, a second time (see October 1986) and assures him that the new Washington-Baghdad intelligence link (see August 1986) will remain open. [Washington Post, 12/15/1986]
Entity Tags: William Casey, Central Intelligence Agency, Kizam Hamdoon
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US-Iraq 1980s, Iran-Contra Affair
James A. Baker. [Source: Library of Congress]By this date, all international banks have cut off loans to Iraq. Notwithstanding, President Bush, ignoring warnings from his own departments about the alarming buildup of the Iraqi military and Iraq's continued development of weapons of mass destruction (see June 1989 and September 1989), signs the secret National Security Directive 26 establishing closer ties to the Baghdad regime and providing $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees to that government. These funds allow Iraq to continue its development of weapons of mass destruction. Four days later, Secretary of State James Baker meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and promises that the US will not curb restrictions on high-technology exports to Iraq. Baker is ignoring the CIA's warnings that Iraq is using some of this technology to develop a nuclear weapon. The State Department's minutes of the Baker-Aziz meeting reads in part, "[T]he Secretary admitted that the US does have concerns about proliferation, but they are worldwide concerns." [US President, 10/2/1989; Los Angeles Times, 2/23/1992; New Yorker, 11/2/1992; Wall Street Journal, 7/10/2002]
Entity Tags: James A. Baker, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of State, George Herbert Walker Bush, Tariq Aziz
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, US-Iraq 1980s
CIA Director William Webster meets with Kuwait's head of security, Brigadier Fahd Ahmed al-Fahd. Iraq will claim after its invasion and occupation of Kuwait (see August 2, 1990) that it had located a Kuwaiti memorandum summarizing their conversation, a memo both the CIA and Kuwaiti government officials will claim is a forgery, though both sides will admit the meeting actually took place. Iraq will accuse the CIA and Kuwait of collaborating to destabilize Iraq's economy and government (see Late August, 1990). The memo reads in part: "We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country's government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level." [NationMaster, 12/23/2007]
Entity Tags: William H. Webster, Central Intelligence Agency, Fahd Ahmed al-Fahd
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
Kuwait's Director General of State Security sends a memo to the Minister of the Interior summarizing a meeting with CIA Director William Webster. He writes: "We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country's government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level." When Iraq invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), Iraqi officials find this memo and confront the Kuwaiti foreign minister with it during an Arab summit meeting in mid-August 1990. Upon seeing the memo, the Kuwaiti official reportedly faints. [Ahmed, 10/2/2001] The US claims the memo is a forgery. [Office of Global Communications, 1/21/2003 ]
Entity Tags: William H. Webster, Central Intelligence Agency
The cover of 'Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf.' [Source: Laurie Mylroie (.com)]Neoconservative academic Laurie Mylroie and New York Times reporter Judith Miller—"a dear friend" of neoconservative Richard Perle, as Perle later says—collaborate on a so-called "instant" book, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf. The book is designed to hit bookstores concurrent with the escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf (see April 1990 and August 2, 1990). It also reflects Mylroie's beliefs that Hussein is responsible for virtually all Islamist terrorism (see October 2000 and July 9, 2003), and advocates the US overthrow of Hussein. [Unger, 2007, pp. 252]
Entity Tags: Judith Miller, Saddam Hussein, Richard Perle, Laurie Mylroie
Timeline Tags: Neoconservative Influence
Three months before Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), the Bush administration is still sharing intelligence information with Iraq (see August 1986). [New Yorker, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (41), Saddam Hussein
When Saddam Hussein begins massing his troops on the Kuwaiti border (see July 25, 1990), the US intelligence community believes in consensus that Hussein is mostly bluffing. He wants to gain leverage in the ongoing OPEC talks, the community believes, and at most will seize a Kuwaiti oil field just across the border. The intelligence consensus ignores the fact that Hussein is moving his elite Republican Guard units, the core of his forces and what reporters Franklin Foer and Spencer Ackerman will call "the very guarantors of his rule," from Baghdad to the southern desert. Even after invading Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), a National Intelligence Estimate released towards the end of the year concludes that Hussein will withdraw from Kuwait rather than risk a conflict with the US (see Late December 1990). Defense Secretary Dick Cheney becomes increasingly angry and frustrated at the US intelligence community. An intelligence analyst will recall being "whisked into a room, there's Dick Cheney, he's right in front of you, he starts firing questions at you, half an hour later and thirty questions later, I'm whisked out of the room, and I'm like, 'What the hell just happened?'" DIA analyst Patrick Lang, that agency's foremost Middle East expert and one of the few to predict the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, will recall: "He would ask you factual questions like, 'OK, about this thing you said. Do I understand you correctly that such-and-such is true? And are you sure about this, and how do you know that?' And I regard that as a legitimate question.… He wasn't hostile or nasty about it; he just wanted to know how you knew. And I didn't mind that in the least." [New Republic, 11/20/2003]
Entity Tags: Spencer Ackerman, Franklin Foer, Patrick Lang, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Saddam Hussein
Iraq begins massing troops near the Iraq-Kuwait border in preparation for a possible attack (see August 2, 1990). [PBS Frontline, 1/9/1996]
Entity Tags: Iraq
During a meeting with US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie (see July 25, 1990), Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein interrupts the meeting to take a phone call from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak has worked tirelessly to mediate the burgeoning dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. After the phone call, Hussein tells Glaspie that he has just told Mubarak the same thing he told her—that he will not invade Kuwait so long as there is an active negotiating process taking place. The US later learns that Hussein asked Mubarak not to share that piece of information with Kuwait in order to keep his "bluff" alive. Mubarak apparently honors the request, because Iraq's subsequent invasion (see August 2, 1990) is a complete surprise to Kuwait. Mubarak is reportedly infuriated at Hussein's apparent betrayal of his trust. [Wilson, 2004, pp. 98] In 2003, Glaspie's then-deputy, Joseph Wilson, will tell an interviewer that Hussein "lied to [Glaspie]. He lied to President Mubarak that he was going to allow the negotiating process to go forward." [PBS, 2/28/2003] In 2004, Wilson will write: "I believe that he met with Glaspie for the express purpose of deceiving us about his intentions, as he did with… Mubarak at the same time. In this way, he maintained the element of surprise. [Wilson, 2004, pp. 123]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, April Glaspie
US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie delivers a letter written by President Bush to Saddam Hussein. The letter reads in part: "I was pleased to learn of the agreement between Iraq and Kuwait to begin negotiations in Jeddah [Saudi Arabia] to find a peaceful solution to the current tensions between you (see August 1, 1990). The United States and Iraq both have a strong interest in preserving the peace and stability of the Middle East. For this reason, we believe that differences are best resolved by peaceful means and not by threats involving military force or conflict. I also welcome your statement that Iraq desires friendship rather than confrontation with the United States. Let me reassure you, as my ambassador (see July 25, 1990), Senator Dole (see April 12, 1990), and others have done, that my administration continues to desire better relations with Iraq. We will also continue to support our friends in the region with whom we have had long-standing ties. We see no necessary inconsistency between these two objectives. As you know, we still have certain fundamental concerns about certain Iraqi policies and activities, and we will continue to raise these concerns with you in a spirit of friendship and candor.… Both our governments must maintain open channels of communication to avoid misunderstandings and in order to build a more durable foundation for improving our relations." Positive Tone - According to the later recollections of Glaspie's deputy, Joseph Wilson, the Iraqi leadership is "startled by the positive tone of the letter." The letter is overtly conciliatory towards Iraq and its aggression towards Kuwait (see July 22, 1990 and August 2, 1990), and, as then-Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Nizar Hamdun will recall, leaves "the impression that the American desire for good relations with Iraq might override its concerns about Iraqi aggression." Hamdun believes that the letter "had sent the wrong signal to Saddam by not explicitly warning him against taking any harsh military action, and not threatening harsh retaliation if he did." Hamdun believes that Hussein "concluded from the positive tone of the letter that the US would not react militarily and that he could survive the political criticism resulting from the aggressive action toward Kuwait." Letter Influences Saddam's Thinking - Wilson will conclude, "This letter, much more than any other United States statement (see July 25, 1990), appears to have influenced Saddam's thinking." Ultimately, Wilson will note, the US's influence with Hussein is limited at best, and his perceived reasons to annex Kuwait (see May 28-30, 1990 and July 17, 1990) will override any fears of US disapproval. [Wilson, 2004, pp. 101-104]
Entity Tags: Robert J. ("Bob") Dole, April Glaspie, George Herbert Walker Bush, Joseph C. Wilson, Nizar Hamdun
In the days preceding the Iraq invasion of Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), the two nations' Arab neighbors urge the US to use caution and moderation in trying to head off the invasion. They fear that overtly harsh tactics will provoke Iraq into the invasion they all wish to avoid. Saddam Hussein is bluffing (see July 25, 1990), several Arab leaders assert, and the problem can be handled with Arab-led diplomacy (see August 1, 1990). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) participates in a quick US-led joint military exercise, which they had requested, but criticize the US for making the exercise public, worried that it might provoke a reaction from Iraq. [Wilson, 2004, pp. 105]
Entity Tags: United Arab Emirates, Saddam Hussein
The day before sending US troops into battle with Iraq (see August 2, 1990, the Bush administration approves the sale of $695,000 in advanced data transmission devices to that country. [Washington Post, 3/11/1991]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (41)
Iraqi tanks poised to roll into Kuwait. [Source: Kristina Greve]Iraq invades Kuwait. In response, the US suspends National Security Directive 26 (see October 2-6, 1989), which established closer ties with Baghdad and mandated $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees to Iraq. [Los Angeles Times, 2/23/1992] The secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, begins pressing President Bush to go to war with Iraq without securing Congressional approval. His rationale is two-fold: he doesn't need Congressional authority, and he might not get it if he asks. Cheney moves the Pentagon onto a full war footing, even going so far as to create what author and former White House counsel John Dean calls "his own concocted high-risk plans of battle, which he tried but failed to sell at the White House." Bush will juggle Cheney's view with that of House Speaker Tom Foley, who will give the president a document signed by 81 Democratic members who insist that if Bush wants to go to war, he needs the authorization of Congress. Dean will write that Cheney's arguments "are based on bogus legal and historical arguments that have been made before, but no one has pushed them longer or harder than he has." [Dean, 2007, pp. 89-91] Bush decides not to follow Cheney's advice. In 2007, author and reporter Charlie Savage will observe: "By urging Bush to ignore the War Powers Resolution on the eve of the first major overseas ground war since Congress enacted the law, Cheney was attempting to set a powerful precedent. Had Bush taken his advice and survived the political fallout, the Gulf War would have restored [former President] Truman's claim that as president he had 'inherent' powers to send American troops to the Korean War on his own" (see June 30, 1950). [Savage, 2007, pp. 62]
Entity Tags: John Dean, George Herbert Walker Bush, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Bush administration (41), Charlie Savage, US Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, accompanied by senior aide Paul Wolfowitz and US CENTCOM commander-in-chief General Norman Schwarzkopf, visits Saudi Arabia just four days after Iraq invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990). [School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, 8/3/2000; Dubose and Bernstein, 2006, pp. 100] Cheney secures permission from King Fahd for US forces to use Saudi territory as a staging ground for an attack on Iraq. Cheney is polite, but forceful; the US will not accept any limits on the number of troops stationed in Saudi Arabia, and will not accept a fixed date of withdrawal (though they will withdraw if Fahd so requests). Cheney uses classified satellite intelligence to convince Fahd of Hussein's belligerent intentions against not just Kuwait, but against Saudi Arabia as well. Fahd is convinced, saying that if there is a war between the US and Iraq, Saddam Hussein will "not get up again." Fahd's acceptance of Cheney's proposal goes against the advice of Crown Prince Abdullah. [School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, 8/3/2000; Dubose and Bernstein, 2006, pp. 100-101] With Prince Bandar bin Sultan translating, Cheney tells Abdullah, "After the danger is over, our forces will go home." Abdullah says under his breath, "I would hope so." Bandar does not translate this. [Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9/2002; History News Network, 1/13/2003] On the same trip, Cheney also visits Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, who rejects Cheney's request for US use of Egyptian military facilities. Mubarak tells Cheney that he opposes any foreign intervention against Iraq. [School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, 8/3/2000] US forces will remain in Saudi Arabia for thirteen years (see April 30-August 26, 2003).
Entity Tags: US Central Command, Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, Paul Wolfowitz, Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Norman Schwarzkopf, Bandar bin Sultan
The US military's 'Desert Shield' logo. [Source: Eagle Crest (.com)]The US officially begins "Operation Desert Shield" in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (see August 2, 1990) and Saudi Arabia's request for US troops to defend it from possible Iraqi incursions. The first US forces, F-15 fighters from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, arrive in Saudi Arabia (see August 5, 1990 and After). [PBS Frontline, 1/9/1996; American Forces Press Service, 8/8/2000] The US opens a military response to the Iraq invasion as much to defend Saudi Arabia as to defend Kuwait. Both the US and Saudis fear that Iraq will occupy Saudi Arabia's Hama oil field near the countries' mutual border, one of its largest. Between its own oil fields and those of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia which Iraq could feasibly control, Iraq would control the majority of the world's oil reserves. Iraq would have difficulty in successfully occupying the Hama oil field, because of the large amount of inhospitable desert terrain it would have to cross to reach the field, and because of the likelihood of intense air strikes from the US-equipped Saudi Air Force. President Bush says the operation is "wholly defensive" in nature, a claim quickly abandoned. The US deploys two carrier groups and two battleship groups to the Persian Gulf, and deploys numerous Air Force units. Eventually, half a million American troops will join the other US forces. [NationMaster, 12/23/2007]
Entity Tags: US Department of the Air Force, George Herbert Walker Bush, US Department of the Navy
Nine days after Iraq invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton creates a front organization, "Citizens for a Free Kuwait," almost entirely funded by Kuwaiti money. Hill & Knowlton's point man with the Kuwaitis is Craig Fuller, a close friend and political adviser to President Bush (see July 23, 1986). Veteran PR reporter Jack O'Dwyer will later write, "Hill & Knowlton… has assumed a role in world affairs unprecedented for a PR firm." [Christian Science Monitor, 9/6/2002; Public Relations Watch, 6/3/2007] Citizens for a Free Kuwait is one of about twenty PR and lobbying groups formed by the Kuwaiti government. Other American PR firms representing these groups include the Rendon Group and Neill & Co. Citizens for a Free Kuwait will spread a false story of Kuwaiti babies being killed in their incubators by Iraqi troops, a story that will help inflame US public opinion and win the Bush administration the authority to launch an assault against Iraq (see October 10, 1990). Another public relations and lobbying effort includes a 154-page book detailing supposed Iraqi atrocities, entitled The Rape of Kuwait, that is distributed to various media outlets and later featured on television talk shows and in the pages of the Wall Street Journal. The Kuwaiti embassy also buys 200,000 copies of the book for distribution to American troops. Hill & Knowlton will produce dozens of "video news releases" that are offered as "news stories" to television news broadcasters throughout America; the VNRs are shown on hundreds of US television news broadcasts, usually as straight news reports without being identified as the product of a public relations firm. [Public Relations Watch, 6/3/2007]
Entity Tags: Jack O'Dwyer, Hill and Knowlton, Craig Fuller, Neill and Company, Citizens for a Free Kuwait, Rendon Group
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda
A sketch of a 1990 US Army GPS system similar to that used by the Air Force. [Source: Department of the Army]Shortly after Iraq invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), a US Air Force official arrives at the Baghdad airport with a Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) receiver in a briefcase. He is driven to the US Embassy. At the embassy, he takes a position in the courtyard and takes a single GPS reading. He then flies to the US, where he gives the GPS receiver to CIA officials in Langley, Virginia. The CIA determines the precise GPS location of the embassy from the Air Force officer's reading. That set of grid coordinates will serve as the center of the large and sophisticated coordinate system used to designate military strike targets in and around Baghdad during Operation Desert Storm (see January 16, 1991 and After). [NationMaster, 12/23/2007]
Entity Tags: US Department of the Air Force, Central Intelligence Agency
Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), US ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie is confronted with transcripts of her July meeting with Saddam Hussein, where she told Hussein that the US had "no position" on Iraq's dispute with Kuwait, a statement that Hussein apparently took as tacit US permission to invade its neighbor (see July 25, 1990). A British reporter asks Glaspie, "You encouraged this aggression—his invasion. What were you thinking?" Glaspie replies, "Obviously, I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait," to which the astounded journalist asks, "You thought he was just going to take some of it? But how could you? Saddam told you that, if negotiations failed, he would give up his Iran [Shatt al Arab] goal for the 'whole of Iraq, in the shape we wish it to be.' You know that includes Kuwait, which the Iraqis have always viewed as an historic part of their country!" When Glaspie refuses to answer, the journalist continues, "America green-lighted the invasion. At a minimum, you admit signalling Saddam that some aggression was okay—that the US would not oppose a grab of the al-Rumalya oil field, the disputed border strip and the Gulf Islands—territories claimed by Iraq?" Again, Glaspie refuses to respond, and is driven away in a limousine before she can refuse to answer further questions. [New York Times, 9/19/1990] Speculation has always been rampant about why Bush, who formerly considered Hussein a staunch ally against Iran and Islamist influences in the Middle East, suddenly turned on his former ally. Author and investigative producer Barry Lando has a partial reason. Lando will write in 2007, "One of the reasons was [British prime minister] Margaret Thatcher, who had a talking to him. She told him he had to act like a man and react. But it was also the fear that Saddam would take over Kuwait, and then have a much stronger position in the world oil market. That really scared George Bush…. At that point, he totally turned around. They began calling the man who had been almost a de facto ally a few months earlier, a man worse than Hitler. And Bush started shipping thousands of American troops to the Gulf." [Buzzflash (.com), 2/23/2007]
Entity Tags: George Herbert Walker Bush, Barry Lando, Saddam Hussein, April Glaspie, Margaret Thatcher
'Nayirah' testifying before Congress. [Source: Web Fairy (.com)]An unconfirmed report of Iraqi soldiers entering a Kuwaiti hospital during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (see August 2, 1990) and removing newborns from their incubators causes a sensation in the US media. The rumor, which later turns out to be false, is seized upon by senior executives of the PR firm Hill & Knowlton, which has a $11.9 million contract from the Kuwaiti royal family to win support for a US-led intervention against Iraq—the largest foreign-funded campaign ever mounted to shape US public opinion. (Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the firm should have been held accountable for its marketing campaign, but the Justice Department fails to intervene.) The firm also has close ties to the Bush administration, and will assist in marketing the war to the US citizenry. [Christian Science Monitor, 9/6/2002; Independent, 10/19/2003; Public Relations Watch, 6/3/2007] Hill & Knowlton uses a front group, "Citizens for a Free Kuwait" (see August 11, 1990), to plant the stories in the news media. Congressional Hearings - Hearings on the story, and other tales of Iraqi atrocities, are convened by the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, chaired by Representatives Tom Lantos (D-CA) and John Porter (R-IL). Reporters John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton will later characterize the caucus as little more than an H&K-funded sham; Lantos and Porter are also co-chairs of the Congressional Human Rights Foundation, a legally separate entity that occupied free office space in Hill & Knowlton's Washington, DC offices. The star of the hearings is a slender, 15-year old Kuwaiti girl called "Nayirah." According to the Caucus, her true identity is being concealed to prevent Iraqi reprisals against her or her family. Sobbing throughout her testimony, "Nayirah" describes what she says she witnessed in a hospital in Kuwait City; her written testimony is provided to reporters and Congressmen in a media kit prepared by Citizens for a Free Kuwait. "I volunteered at the al-Addan hospital," she tells the assemblage. "While I was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns, and go into the room where… babies were in incubators. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators, and left the babies on the cold floor to die." [Christian Science Monitor, 9/6/2002; Los Angeles Times, 1/5/2003; Public Relations Watch, 6/3/2007] The hearings, and particularly "Nayirah's" emotional tale, inflame American public opinion against the Iraqis (see October 10, 1990 and After) and help drum up support for a US invasion of Iraq (see January 9-13, 1991). Outright Lies - Neither Lantos, Porter, nor H&K officials tell Congress that the entire testimony is a lie. "Nayirah" is the daughter of Saud Nasir al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti ambassador to the US. Neither do they reveal that "Nayirah's" testimony was coached by H&K vice president Lauri Fitz-Pegado. Seven other "witnesses" testify to the same atrocities before the United Nations; the seven use false names and identities. The US even presents a video made by Hill & Knowlton to the Security Council. No journalist investigates the claims. As author Susan Trento will write: "The diplomats, the congressmen, and the senators wanted something to support their positions. The media wanted visual, interesting stories." It is not until after the war that human rights investigators look into the charges. No other witnesses can be located to confirm "Nayirah's" story. Dr. Mohammed Matar, director of Kuwait's primary care system, and his wife, Dr. Fayeza Youssef, who runs the obstretrics unit at the maternity hospital, says that at the time of the so-called atrocities, few if any babies were in incubator units—and Kuwait only possesses a few such units anyway. "I think it was just something for propaganda," Dr. Matar will say. It is doubtful that "Nayirah" was even in the country at the time, as the Kuwaiti aristocracy had fled the country weeks before the Iraqi invasion. Amnesty International, which had supported the story, will issue a retraction. Porter will claim that he had no knowledge that the sobbing little girl was a well-rehearsed fabricator, much less an ambassador's daughter. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reporters will ask al-Sabah for permission to question his daughter about her testimony; he will angrily refuse. "Naiyrah" herself will later admit that she had never been in the hospital herself, but had learned of the supposed baby murders from a friend. In a subsequent interview about media manipulation during the war, Fitz-Pegado will say: "Come on.… Who gives a sh_t whether there were six babies or two? I believed her." She will later clarify that statement: "What I meant was one baby would be too many." [CounterPunch, 12/28/2002; Independent, 10/19/2003; Public Relations Watch, 6/3/2007]
Entity Tags: Susan Trento, Tom Lantos, Sheldon Rampton, US Congress, United Nations Security Council, Saud Nasir al-Sabah, US Department of Justice, Mohammed Matar, Lauri Fitz-Pegado, Citizens for a Free Kuwait, 'Nayirah', Amnesty International, Bush administration (41), John Stauber, Congressional Human Rights Caucus, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Fayeza Youssef, John MacArthur, John Porter, Hill and Knowlton, Congressional Human Rights Foundation, Jack O'Dwyer
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney testifies to the Senate on the upcoming invasion of Iraq (see August 2, 1990). Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) asks Cheney bluntly, "Now, barring an act of provocation, do you agree that the president must obtain the approval of Congress in advance before the United States attacks Iraq?" Cheney replies that he "does not believe the president requires any additional authorization from the Congress before committing US forces to achieve our objectives in the Gulf." Cheney cites "more than two hundred" earlier instances where presidents have committed US forces into conflicts, "and on only five of those occasions was their a prior declaration of war. And so I am not one who would argue… that the president's hands are tied, or that he is unable, given his constitutional responsibilities as commander in chief, to carry out his responsibilities." Author John Dean will note in 2007, "Cheney had announced to Congress, in essence, that he did not need their authority to go to war." Kennedy says of Cheney's statement after the hearings, "We've not seen such arrogance in a president since Watergate." [Dean, 2007, pp. 90]
Entity Tags: Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Edward M. ("Ted") Kennedy, John Dean
With Iraqi forces occupying much of Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), the US intelligence community releases a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that predicts, wrongly, that Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait rather than face a US invasion (see January 16, 1991 and After). [New Republic, 11/20/2003] This is a follow-up to the consensus among US intelligence agencies that Iraq would not invade Kuwait (see Mid-1990).
Entity Tags: US intelligence
One of the many air strikes launched against Iraqi targets during Operation Desert Storm. [Source: US Air Force]The US launches a massive air assault against Iraq in retaliation for that country's invasion of Kuwait (see August 2, 1990). The air assault begins the day after a UN deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait expires (see November 29, 1990). F-117 Stealth bombers hit Baghdad with an array of high-tech bombs and missiles; many of the explosions are televised live, or on briefly delayed feeds, on CNN, which launches virtually 24-hour coverage of the air strikes. In the first 48 hours of the war, 2,107 combat missions drop more than 5,000 tons of bombs on Baghdad alone, nearly twice the amount that incinerated Dresden in World War II. 'Thunder and Lightning of Desert Storm' - US Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, chief of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), announces the beginning of hostilities by transmitting the following: "Soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines of the United States Central Command, this morning at 0300, we launched Operation Desert Storm, an offensive campaign that will enforce the United Nation's resolutions that Iraq must cease its rape and pillage of its weaker neighbor and withdraw its forces from Kuwait. My confidence in you is total. Our cause is just! Now you must be the thunder and lightning of Desert Storm. May God be with you, your loved ones at home, and our country." [US Navy, 9/17/1997] Initial Attacks Obliterate Iraqi Navy, Much of Air Force, Many Ground Installations - The attack begins with an assault of over 100 Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) launched from US naval vessels in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and attack helicopter strikes on Iraqi radar installations near the Iraq-Saudi Arabian border. The assaults destroy much of Iraq's air defense and command-and-control capabilities. The missile assault is quickly followed by fighter, bomber, and assault helicopter strikes which continue pounding at Iraqi government buildings, power stations, dams, military sites, radio and television stations, and several of Saddam Hussein's palaces. The strikes essentially obliterate the Iraqi Navy, and drastically cripple the Iraqi Air Force. (Between 115 and 140 aircraft and crews of the Iraqi Air Force flees to Iran over the course of the war, a move that surprises US commanders, who expected the aircraft and their crews to attempt to flee to Jordan, not Iran. The Iranians will never give Iraq back its aircraft, and will not release Iraqi air crews for years to come.) A US Navy review later calls the combined Navy-Marine air campaign, conducted in concert with US Air Force strikes, "successful beyond the most optimistic expectations." The Navy later reports that "allied air forces dropped over 88,500 tons of ordnance on the battlefield." [US Navy, 9/17/1997; NationMaster, 12/23/2007] Iraqi anti-aircraft counterattacks are surprisingly effective, downing around 75 US and British aircraft in the first hours of attacks. The US media does not widely report these downings, nor does it give much attention to the dozens of pilots and air crew captured as POWs. [NationMaster, 12/23/2007] 'The Mother of All Battles' - Five hours after the first attacks, Baghdad state radio broadcasts a voice identified as Saddam Hussein. Hussein tells his people that "The great duel, the mother of all battles has begun. The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins." [NationMaster, 12/23/2007] US Embassy Helped Locate Targets for Air Strikes - Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph Wilson, the last American to leave Baghdad (see January 12, 1991), and his staff provided critical assistance to the US battle planners in choosing their initial targets. Over the months, Wilson and his staff developed a "hostage tracking system," monitoring and recording the movements of the American hostages as they were transferred from site to site to be used as human shields in the event of a US strike (see August 4, 1990 and August 8, 1990). Wilson and his staff were able to identify some 55 sites that were being used around the country, presumably some of the most critical military and infrastructure sites in Iraq. Wilson gave that information to the Pentagon. He will later write, "I was gratified when several months later, on the first night of Desert Storm, long after the hostages had been released, many of those sites were ones hit by American bombs." [Wilson, 2004, pp. 141]
Entity Tags: US Department of the Navy, United Nations, US Department of the Marines, US Department of the Air Force, US Department of the Army, CNN, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Norman Schwarzkopf, Joseph C. Wilson, US Department of Defense, US Department of State, Saddam Hussein
Iraq masses its armored forces on its southern border, obviously threatening another incursion into Kuwait (see August 2, 1990). The Clinton administration responds forcefully, warning the Iraqis that it will deploy 40,000 US troops inside Kuwait within a week if the Iraqis remain in place. The US also increases its Air Force presence inside Kuwait. In response, Iraq withdraws its forces. However, the Iraqi threat impels the US to steadily increase its military presence in Kuwait. By 2000, the US will have increased its Kuwaiti troop deployment from 8,000 to 30,000. [GlobalSecurity (.org), 4/27/2005; Roberts, 2008, pp. 121]
Entity Tags: Clinton administration, Iraq
Diane Sawyer with President Bush. [Source: USA Today]President Bush gives a rare one-on-one interview to ABC's Diane Sawyer. Among other topics addressed, he reaffirms his belief that terrorists operated in Iraq before the March 2003 invasion (citing Ansar al-Islam, "a al-Qaeda affiliate, I would call them al-Qaeda, was active in Iraq before the war, hence—a terrorist tie with Iraq…") and that his insistence that Iraq had an active and threatening WMD program was based on "good solid intelligence[, t]he same intelligence that my predecessor [Bill Clinton] operated on." [ABC News, 12/17/2003] In 2004, former Nixon White House counsel John Dean will respond, "His predecessor, however, never claimed that Saddam [Hussein] had imminent… nuclear capacity, nor did his predecessor say that Iraq had ties to al-Qaeda." [Dean, 2004, pp. 153] Iraq Had WMD Program, Bush Insists - Bush insists that weapons inspector David Kay proved Iraq did have a burgeoning and active WMD program (see October 2, 2003), and implies that it is just a matter of time before the actual weapons are found. Sawyer says, "But stated as a hard fact, that there were weapons of mass destruction as opposed to the possibility that he could move to acquire those weapons still," to which Bush replies, "So what's the difference?" Sawyer appears taken aback by the answer, and Bush continues that since it was possible Hussein would acquire WMDs, it was necessary to "get rid of him" to make "the world a safer, freer place." Sawyer presses the point home: "What would it take to convince you he didn't have weapons of mass destruction?" and Bush responds: "Saddam Hussein was a threat. And the fact that he is gone means America is a safer country." Sawyer asks, "And if he doesn't have weapons of mass destruction?" and Bush replies tartly: "Diane, you can keep asking the question. I'm telling you, I made the right decision for America. Because Saddam Hussein used weapons of mass destruction, invaded Kuwait (see August 2, 1990). But the fact that he is not there is, means America's a more secure country." [ABC News, 12/17/2003] White House press secretary Scott McClellan will later write, "Bush's response was telling, much more so than I stopped to contemplate at the time." [McClellan, 2008, pp. 200] Why Read the News? - Sawyer asks Bush about his reported penchant for not reading the news for himself. Bush confirms that he gets his news from National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and White House chief of staff Andrew Card, who, Sawyer says, "give you a flavor of what's in the news." Bush agrees that this is the case, and says: "Yeah. I get my news from people who don't editorialize. They give me the actual news. And it makes it easier to digest, on a daily basis, the facts." Sawyer asks, "Is it just harder to read constant criticism or to read?" to which Bush replies: "Why even put up with it when you can get the facts elsewhere? I'm a lucky man. I've got, it's not just Condi and Andy. It's all kinds of people in my administration who are charged with different responsibilities. And they come in and say, 'this is what's happening, this isn't what's happening.'" Laura Bush, who joins her husband halfway through the interview, says she reads the newspapers, including the opinion columns, but says: "I agree with him that we can actually get what is really happening from the people who really know what's happening. And that isn't always what you get in the newspapers.… There are certain columnists I won't read. I mean, what, you know, why would I?" [ABC News, 12/17/2003] Wilson: Bush 'Systematically Deceived' US, 'Betrayed' Military - Months later, former ambassador Joseph Wilson will write: "It was clear, from this one statement, […] that the administration, from the president on down, had systematically deceived the American people, Congress, and the world. Most of all, the president had betrayed the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who so bravely march out when ordered into war to defend our country against immiment threats, or even from grave and gathering dangers. Iraq had posed neither. The difference, Mr. President, I thought, is that war was not the only option, or even the best one. We had gone to war over capacity, not stockpiles, not mushroom clouds (see September 4, 2002), not intent, or, as John Bolton had earlier said more directly, because scientists were on Saddam's payroll. Our troops had died—and were continuing to die—in vain. I came away from this sad revelation resolved that, unlike the other bitterly divisive war debate of my lifetime, over the war in Vietnam, we should admit this terrible fact sooner, rather than later, and thereby revise our national policies accordingly." [Wilson, 2004, pp. 414-415]
Entity Tags: Laura Bush, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, Scott McClellan, Joseph C. Wilson, David Kay, Diane Sawyer, Al-Qaeda, George W. Bush, Andrew Card, Condoleezza Rice, Ansar al-Islam, Saddam Hussein
Timeline Tags: Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Iraq under US Occupation
Saddam Hussein in US custody. [Source: US Department of Defense]The FBI sends veteran interrogator George Piro to question captured Iraqi despot Saddam Hussein. Over a period of months, Piro uses a combination of friendliness, warmth, and verbal provocations to tease a wealth of information from Hussein. At no time does Piro or other FBI interrogators use "aggressive" or "harsh" interrogation methods against Hussein. Piro works closely with a team of FBI and CIA analysts to pore over Hussein's responses. He will later recall his sessions with Hussein for CBS News interviewer Scott Pelley. 'Mr. Saddam' - Piro begins calling the dictator "Mr. Saddam," as a sign of respect; by the end of their time, they are on a first-name basis with one another. Hussein never finds out that Piro is "just" an FBI agent; he believes that Piro is far more influential than he actually is, and is directly briefing President Bush on their conversations. "He didn't know I worked for the FBI, he didn't know I was a field agent," Piro will recall. Had he found out, "I think initially he would have been angry. He would feel that I was way beneath him, and would not respond well to the interrogation. Or even to me.… I think he thought, and actually on a couple of occasions talked around the issue that I was directly answering to the president." Piro will recall setting several strategies of deception into motion, including his barking orders at the guards to send them into a panic to obey his instructions. "[I]t was all part of our strategy," Piro will explain. Controlling the Dictator - Piro will say that he gained physical control of the setting—a small, windowless room with chairs and a table—merely by placing himself between Hussein and the door. "I purposely put his back against the wall," Piro will recall. "And then mine against the door, psychologically to tell him that his back was against the wall in the interview room. And that I stood between him and the door, psychologically. Between him whether it's to go back to his cell, freedom, whatever he was projecting to be outside of that door. I was kind of that psychological barrier between him and the door." Piro will add, "I basically said that I was gonna be responsible for every aspect of his life, and that if he needed anything I was gonna be the person that he needed to talk to." Piro controls Hussein's food and cleaning materials—Piro will describe Hussein as a "clean freak" who uses large numbers of baby wipes to disinfect his cell and his food. Piro allows Hussein pen and paper to write what Piro will describe as inordinate amounts of "terrible" poetry. "We had the guards remove their watches," Piro will recall. "And the only person that was wearing a watch was me. And it was very evident to him, 'cause I was wearing the largest wristwatch you could imagine. And it was just the act of him asking for the time—was critical in our plan." Pelley says, "So you controlled time itself," and Piro answers, "Yes." No Coercive Interrogation Methods - Piro will say that no coercive interrogations, such as sleep deprivation, excessive heat or cold, bombardment with loud music, or waterboarding are ever used. "It's against FBI policy, first," Piro will explain. "And wouldn't have really benefited us with someone like Saddam.… I think Saddam clearly had demonstrated over his legacy that he would not respond to threats, to any type of fear-based approach." The best methods for use with Hussein are, according to Piro, time and patience. Using Emotions to Create Vulnerability - Piro uses their time to build a relationship with Hussein based on dependency, trust, and emotion. He alternates between treating Hussein with courtesy and kindness, and provoking him with pictures and video images designed to anger and embarrass the former dictator. He uses pictures of the toppling of Hussein's statues and news videos documenting his overthrow. "I wanted him to get angry. I wanted him to see those videos and to get angry," Piro will say. "You want to take him through those various emotions. Happy, angry, sad. When you have someone going through those emotions they're not able to really control themselves. And they're more vulnerable during the interview." Insult Drove Kuwait Invasion - Piro learns that one of the driving forces behind Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (see August 2, 1990) was personal insult. "What really triggered it for him, according to Saddam, was he had sent his foreign minister to Kuwait to meet with the Emir Al Sabah, the former leader of Kuwait, to try to resolve some of the… issues" between Kuwait and Iraq, Piro will recall. "And the Emir told the foreign minister of Iraq that he would not stop doing what he was doing until he turned every Iraqi woman into a $10 prostitute. And that really sealed it for him, to invade Kuwait. He wanted to punish, he told me, Emir Al Sabah, for saying that." The 1991 US invasion of Iraq (see January 16, 1991 and After) soured Hussein on then-President George H. W. Bush, a feeling that Hussein transferred to the son. "He didn't like President [George W.] Bush," Piro will say. "He would have liked meeting President Reagan. He thought he was a great leader. Honorable man. He liked President Clinton. But he did not like President Bush, the first or the current." Small Things, Big Impact - Piro will recall the outsized impact relatively small incidents have on Hussein. One night the FBI flies Hussein to a hospital. He is manacled and blindfolded. Piro will remember: "And once I saw how beautiful Baghdad was in the middle of the night, so I took advantage of it. I allowed him to look out and the lights were on. There was traffic. And it looked like any other major metropolitan city around the world. And for him to see that. And as I mentioned, you know, big Baghdad is moving forward without you. I mean, little things like that didn't require a lot of suggestion on our part. It made its point." Piro even uses Hussein's birthday, a former national holiday, to drive home his point. "In 2004, no one celebrated his birthday on April 28th. So the only one that really knew and cared was us. I'd brought him some cookies, and we, the FBI, celebrated his birthday for him." Piro gives Hussein packets of flower seeds and allows him to plant his own small garden, which he must tend with his hands because the FBI will not allow him to use tools. Piro will recall that their strolls in Hussein's tiny garden are often the site of large revelations. Avoiding Capture - Hussein tells Piro that US forces simply missed him during the first days of the invasion, the "shock and awe" assault. "He said that he was at one of the locations. He said it in a kind of a bragging fashion, that he was there, but that we missed him," Piro later says. "He told me he changed the way he traveled. He got rid of his normal vehicles. He got rid of the protective detail he traveled with. Really just to change his signature so he would be much harder to identify." And Hussein denies ever using body doubles or decoys, as US intelligence had long asserted. WMD - Five months into the sessions, Hussein finally opens up to Piro regarding the subject of Iraq's WMD programs. Using indirection, Piro begins to tease information out of Hussein. "He told me that most of the WMD had been destroyed by the UN inspectors in the '90s. And those that hadn't been destroyed by the inspectors were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq," Piro will recall. So why, Pelley will ask, did Hussein "put your nation at risk, why put your own life at risk to maintain this charade?" Piro will respond: "It was very important for him to project that because that was what kept him, in his mind, in power. That capability kept the Iranians away. It kept them from reinvading Iraq." It is apparent, Piro says, that Hussein did not believe he could survive without the perception that he had WMD. But Piro confirms that Hussein always intended to restart his WMD program someday. "The folks that he needed to reconstitute his program are still there," Piro will observe. "He wanted to pursue all of WMD. So he wanted to reconstitute his entire WMD program." Did Not Believe US Would Invade - From there, Hussein begins to explain why he let the US continue to believe he had such weapons even as troops began massing on his borders. He didn't believe the US would actually invade, he says. As Piro will recall: "[H]e told me he initially miscalculated President Bush. And President Bush's intentions. He thought the United States would retaliate with the same type of attack as we did in 1998 under Operation Desert Fox (see December 16-19, 1998). Which was a four-day aerial attack. So you expected that initially." Hussein says that Iraq would have survived a relatively limited aerial bombardment. "He survived that once," Piro will recall. "And then he was willing to accept that type of attack. That type of damage." But he never believed the US would invade until almost the moment of the initial assault. 'The Secret War' - Hussein knew his military could not win in any confrontation with the US. Instead, as Piro will recall: "What he had asked of his military leaders and senior government officials was to give him two weeks. And at that point it would go into what he called the secret war.… Going from a conventional to an unconventional war." Pelley will remark, "So the insurgency was part of his plan from the very beginning," to which Piro will say, "Well, he would like to take credit for the insurgency." Iraq and al-Qaeda - Hussein confirms that his regime had no dealings with al-Qaeda, as many Bush officials have long believed. Hussein considered Osama bin Laden "a fanatic," according to Piro. "You can't really trust fanatics," Hussein tells the interrogator. And he had no interest in any alliance with al-Qaeda. "He didn't wanna be seen with bin Laden," Piro will recall. "And didn't want to associate with bin Laden." Hussein viewed bin Laden as a threat to him and his regime. Independent Confirmation and Praise for Piro's Efforts - Hussein's claims are later verified by independent interrogations with other high-ranking Hussein regime officials. Piro's boss, FBI Assistant Director Joe Persichini, will say that Piro's interrogation is a high mark of the bureau's recent efforts. "The FBI will be celebrating its 100th anniversary this year and I would have to say that the interview with Saddam Hussein is one of the top accomplishments of our agency in the last 100 years," Persichini will say, and gives credit to Piro's language skills. Only about 50 of the 10,000 FBI agents speak Arabic, he will note. Piro will credit his FBI and CIA colleagues for their work in analyzing Hussein's statements, and their extensive knowledge of Hussein and his regime. "The more you know about your subject, the better of an interview… that you're gonna conduct," he will say. "You'll be able to recognize inconsistencies, deception, things like that. Plus it really establishes your credibility within the interview." No Regrets - One thing Hussein never shows during his long interviews, Piro later recalls, is remorse. "No remorse," Piro will say. "No regret." [CBS News, 1/27/2008]
Entity Tags: George Herbert Walker Bush, Ronald Reagan, George Piro, George W. Bush, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Joe Persichini, CBS News, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, Scott Pelley, Al-Qaeda, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Iraq under US Occupation
A Central Intelligence Agency assessment conducted before Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit to Washington in late September 2006 warns that Karzai's government is increasingly weak and unpopular, and is failing to exert authority and security beyond Kabul. [New York Times, 11/5/2006]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Hamid Karzai
Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan
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text:
No place like elsewhere for the lodgepole pine
Last updated: 11 Feb, 2014
Thanks to its excellent growth, the Canadian lodgepole pine has become a popular feature of forestry in Northern Sweden. Researchers from the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences are now able to demonstrate that organisms in the Swedish soil most likely contribute to the success of this exotic tree species. When the researchers studied the growth of the lodgepole pine in sterilized and unsterilized Swedish and Canadian soil samples, they discovered clear differences in growth: it grew better in soil inoculated with Swedish soil biota compared to Canadian soil biota. These results improve our understanding of why some exotic tree species and invasive plants at times can function so well in new environments.
Click here to view the original article currently published on early view in New Phytologist http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nph.12699/abstract.
A Pinus contorta landscape in northern British Columbia, Canada, which is the general region where much of the Swedish P. contorta originated. Photo: Michael Gundale
Plants are often moved away from their natural provenance, and sometimes they become stronger competitors in their new habitat. This may be welcomed by agriculture and forestry, while an introduced plant spreading uncontrollably in nature can become a major concern. The reason why plants sometimes function very differently in a new environment is a question that many researchers are currently focusing on.
Michael Gundale and his colleagues from the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) have focused on what the organisms found in Swedish and Canadian soils mean for the growth of the lodgepole pine*. There is a multitude of life forms in soil, some of which may be harmful (such as diseases and herbivores), and some of which may be beneficial (such as mycorrhizal fungi). By conducting a series of experiments on young plants, the researchers have shown that the growth of the lodgepole pine is greatly affected by which organisms live in the soil.
A Pinus contorta plantation in Norrbotten, the northernmost county in Sweden. Photo: Marie-Charlotte Nilsson Hegethorn
A first greenhouse trial indicated that the plants grew much better in soil samples from the areas in northern Sweden where the lodgepole pine has been introduced, compared with the soil samples from its original habitat in Canadian British Columbia. When the experiment was repeated in soil samples that had been sterilised through gamma irradiation, the growth was no longer affected by the soil being Swedish or Canadian. It also turned out that sterilised soil (regardless of origin) inoculated with Canadian organisms showed stunted growth, while "Swedish inoculation" improved growth.
"We have therefore clear evidence that differences in soil organisms between Pinus contorta's Canadian and Swedish ranges have a great impact on the trees growth," says Michael Gundale. "One plausible explanation is that plants growing in Canadian soil are exposed to antagonistic microorganisms that are specialised to lodgepole pine, while the Swedish soil offers an enhanced mutualism with mycorrhizal fungi. But we have not yet had the opportunity to examine this."
Pinus contorta plants in a greenhouse trial. Photo: Michael Gundale
Earlier experiments have looked at why a certain species does better in a new environment than in its natural habitat. However, these experiments have often only looked at one or a few of the many factors that could contribute to such a success, and no statements can therefore be made in respect to the importance of various factors in relation to each other. What makes this SLU study unique is that the researchers have not only examined the importance of soil biota, but have also considered a number of other factors that could also affect growth differences between the countries; they used soil samples from several places in Sweden and Canada, collected seeds from several areas, tested different fertilisation levels and took into account chemical and physical variations in the soil. However, the importance of Swedish and Canadian soil biota for growth remained the same, regardless of how all of these other factors were altered.
"I would love to conduct an equivalent study on Swedish pines," concludes Michael Gundale. "If it were to turn out that the Swedish pines (Pinus sylvestris) are equally stunted by the indigenous soil organisms, it would be interesting to examine which soil biota are responsible for it, and what could be done to protect the plants.
Michael Gundale. Photo: Michael Gundale
* The lodgepole pine (Pinus contorta) originates from western North America. In the north of Sweden, the lodgepole pine has been planted on hundreds of thousands of acres. This introduction started in the 1970s and, at the time, it was thought that a natural rejuvenation could only take place in connection with a fire - which would prevent an uncontrollable spread. This however has not proven to be entirely true.
Further information
Michael J. Gundale, Associate Professor
Department of Forest Ecology and Management
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Umeå, Sweden
+46 (0)90-786 84 27, email@example.com
Original news article by David Stephansson produced by the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences http://www.slu.se/en/about-slu/fristaende-sidor-eng/whats-on/news/2014/2/no-place-like-elsewhere-for-the-lodgepole-pine/
Gundale MJ, Kardol P, Nilsson M-C, Nilsson U, Lucas RW, Wardle DA. 2014. Interactions with soil biota shift from negative to positive when a tree species is moved outside its native range. New Phytologist, in press.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
I have a dataset that describes a few million incidents along Texas roadways. The vast majority of incidents only list a highway name and a milepost. For example, milepost 120 on I-20 or milepost 263 on US 60.
How would I convert these milepost/highways to latitude and longitude?
This is for a low-budget academic project, so trying to stick with free tools as much as possible.
My Google searching hasn't turned up much fruit, although some indications are that TxDOT may have data I could request through the Texas Public Information Act, but not sure yet.


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iluvk9 wrote:Erin, do you ever sleep or ya know, sit around and do nothing for 5 minutes?
TheRedQueen wrote:Hudson has a potential adopter!
That leaves Falcon, Galaxie and Gremlin. Galaxie is my pick for performance...I'm trying to find her a home without small kids...same with Gremlin. I'm surprised that Gremlin hasn't had more interest, as I think he's cute.
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Gangsta Chick From Louisana Responds To Almost Droppin The Clip & The South In Her Comes Out! "Bitch I Got Children In Here. I Aint Hood M*thaF*cka. Best Believe. When I Leave My House That MuthaF*cka Is Already Cocked & F*ckin Ready"
Female from Lousiana returns
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VLC player is an incredibly powerful tool, usually one of the first things many people install on a new computer. With Windows 8 growing at its current rate, developers are beginning to realize that they might actually have to supportit.
The VideoLan project is comprised mostly of developers who contribute in their free time, and since the release of the VLC for Windows 8 demo it has become clear that more help is needed. In order to support Modern UI (aka Metro) in a timely fashion, the VideoLan team have taken to Kickstarter in order to fund the development of VLC for Windows 8.
"The current application has more than 15,000 forbidden calls. Fixing that will take a lot of time (or money)." – VideoLan CTO Jean-Baptiste Kempf
According to the VideoLan team, VLC media player is installed on over 100,000,000 machines across the world. The project supports Linux, Mac, Windows, iOS, Android, and more. Instead of having a program that forces the user to Desktop Mode to use VLC (as it's currently designed), the goal is to release a native Windows 8 app. Unfortunately, in order to support Windows 8 and the Modern UI, a lot has to change. Since the team wants to get Windows 8 support up and running as fast as possible, they have turned to Kickstarter.
The 40,000 ($51,975) project will allow the VideoLan team to hire professional graphic designers and developers to create a functional UI that supports Windows 8′s design language. Initially the plan is to support x86 versions of Windows 8, but Windows RT support is in the pipeline as well.
The Kickstarter features multiple levels of participation, offering everything from small gifts with the VLC logo on it to banners on the VideoLan website announcing your contribution . Every contribution includes acknowledgment inside the Windows 8 app itself, separated by participation level.
VLC media player for Windows 8 would provide a usable alternative to Windows Media Center, which is something users will need to pay extra for if they haven't purchased Windows 8 Pro. Media Center is needed in order to watch DVD or BluRay discs in a Windows 8 computer. While Microsoft is including Media Center for free to early adopters of Windows 8, the $10 add on will be a requirement to users who want to watch movies on their computers. With VLC for Windows 8, users will not need to ever purchase the add on, and instead enjoy the massive list of supported codecs from VideoLan.
Read more at Kickstarter


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Never miss a moment of trail action again! This patent pending Rugged Ridge Dash Multi-Mount System is the most versatile dashboard accessory mounting system available. Featuring a universal ball mount for driver info gadgets and a tripod stud for point and shoots or POV cameras, this mounting system allows the driver to use either one individually or both at the same time! Mounts to the dash recess of the JK wrangler with no drilling required.
These wheel & tire packages from Rugged Ridge fits 13-14 Jeep Wranglers. It includes a XHD/Drakon wheel and a Mickey Thompson ATZ P3 tire. The tire is mounted & balanced with a TPMS sensor. Note: To fit our 2013-2014 Wheel and Tire Packages on 2007-2012 Jeep Wrangler applications, we recommend removing the TPMS sensors in our tire-wheel combos and re-using the existing factory Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) sensors instead.
We are always coming out with Floor Liner Sets. Need an affordable solution to keep the cabin floors looking factory fresh? Try Rugged Ridge's All Terrain Floor Liners! Made of a durable OE-quality thermoplastic material that can withstand the rigor of daily abuse, each liner is perfectly contoured to your vehicle's floor for precise secure fitment (floor hook attachment where applicable). The raised lip captures all spills, water and debris keeping your interior pristine. Features a chevron shape patented deep tread technology.


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Adding credence to rumours spread last week, Audi officially announced Wednesday there is the new owner of Italian motorcycle company Ducati. Buying share holdings from Investindustrial the Canadian-based Hospitals of Ontario Pension Plan and BS Investimenti, the purchase of Ducati by Audi has been quoted to be in excess of 1.1 billion US dollars. In presenting this major acquisition, Chairman of the Board of Management of Audi AG Rupert Stadler declared, "As a sporty, global premium brand, Ducati is an excellent fit for Audi."
In the announcement, Audi pinpoints several desirable attributes in the Ducati company that made the acquisition mutually beneficial for both companies. Citing Ducati's knowledge of lightweight material and engineering, Audi has describe this information could offer great opportunities for future Audi and Volkswagen Group products. Audi has also been impressed by Ducati's small engine technology and their utilization of a special combustion chamber process for creating sport power.
An Italian company founded in 1926 by Antonio Cavalieri Ducati and his sons, Ducati business was initially a producer of radio equipment. It was after the Second World War when the Ducati name would be associated with motorized bikes when they proceeded to assemble the Cucciolo in post-war Italy. Ducati swiftly expanded their product line-up to include higher performance motorcycles that would eventually blossom across Europe and overseas in the Americas. North American customers were introduced to the Ducati name with the Scrambler in 1962 where the company quickly assembled a following. Similar to many transportation-oriented companies, Ducati has been setting focus on growing in Asian markets. "Ducati has thrived with us as a result of the intensive industrial turnaround and the commercial push into new, fast-growing markets. We are convinced that the company will continue to provide a bright and rewarding future to its customers and employees in the very capable hands of Audi." said Andrea C. Bonomi, Chairman of Investindustrial (the major outgoing owner of Ducati).
Part of the brand fostering efforts for Ducati has been a company's prominent motorsport presence. Under the motorcycle manufacturer's racing arm Ducati Corse, the company's bikes propelled 14 FIM Superbike World Championship riders. Ducati in the FIM Superbike World Championship earned the yearly manufacturer title on a record 17 occasions including 2011. A Ducati also carried Australian rider Casey Stoner to a 2007 MotoGP title. Audi's heavy involvement presently in motorsports should bode well for Ducati's future in motorcycle racing accepting that the adage "Race on Sunday, sell on Monday" appears to be shared.
The pairing of Audi and Ducati might sound surreal to modern era fans of the four-ring badge. However, one of the four rings in Audi's famous Auto Union emblem represents their historical connection to motorcycle construction. Under the DKW banner, Auto Union sold numerous varieties of two-wheeled motorcycles and scooters. After the Second World War, DKW were required to give up their designs to the very popular RT125 motorcycle to industries in ally nations including American company Harley-Davidson. Known as the Hummer in the United States, almost 32,000 motorbikes using the DKW design were produced by Harley-Davidson from 1948 until the mid-1960s (coincidently, the same time the DKW brand would be discontinued). The DKW RT125 would also influence motorbikes in Britain, Poland and Japan up to the 1980s.
Along with the DKW motorcycle history, Audi was also connected to a second foray into the two-wheel sector. In 1969, Audi's parent company Volkswagen merged with NSU Motorenwerke AG that built cars and motorcycles. At one time itself a one of world's largest motorcycle manufacturers during 1950s, NSU was a notable in motorsports. NSU had exited the motorcycle business in 1965 prior to the merger with VW Group.
Pending approval by the competition authorities, the inclusion of the Italian motorcycle builder with Audi is certainly going to present some unknowns for how the companies will collaborate over time. Will this acquisition lead to the presence of Ducati motorcycles on the showrooms of Audi dealerships? Could the small Ducati engines lend engine to a production-based interpretation of the Audi's Urban Concept vehicle? The options seem wide open for where the newest joining of two and four wheels can lead.
Information and photo source: Audi AG, Ducati Motor Holding S.p.A.


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by Javier Grillo–Marxuach on May 6, 2014 in Nonfiction | 16 comments
One of the many perks afforded a journeyman writer/producer in television is receiving scripts for network television pilots as they are being made. It's like the best possible version of the TV Guide Fall Preview Issue I used to compulsively reread under the covers with a flashlight as a kid. Except that now I have the added thrill: if my agents do their job, if I am good in the interview, if a million other moving parts click in the correct order, I help the people who created these shows realize their vision.
This inside window into the totality of network development puts us journeyman television writers and producers in an interesting position to spot and track trends as they develop, fade, or mature. One trend that persists — almost a decade after its inception — is every broadcaster's ongoing quest to put on the air the next great serialized high–concept sci–fi show: to find the next Lost.
Of course, it seldom works.
My own modest contribution to the evolution of Lost — and having worked on a number of shows with similar goals in the years since — provides something of a vantage point from which to judge the success — and failure — of these attempts. More often than not, it boils down to the presence or absence of a crucial element I call "the operational theme."
In high school and college, most of us could pick a lofty word or idea and designate it the "theme" of a play or novel: "power," "alienation," "banality of evil," or (my personal favorite) "the shallowness of modern life." We could then write a coffee–and–Red–Bull–fueled paper, using choice quotes from the partially–skimmed bit of required reading, and have a pretty good shot at not winding up ashamed to show the report card to our parents in the morning. Sadly, for the professional television writers — even the really astute ones — this is neither enough to create something that will connect with an audience — nor will it survive the production goal of many seasons and possible syndication.
Television is a populist medium with little patience for intellectual phumphering. Hour–long drama is — first and foremost — about creating characters driven by internal forces that, melded to the right situation, can fuel every action, every line, every scene, and every plot for hundreds of successful episodes. This is the operational theme: a situational vector that cleanly delineates the potential variations of action in service of the protagonist's consistent emotional need. This is crucial to the success of a television pilot. It is crucial to the successful episodes to come. It is, indeed, what television pilots should see as the first order of business to establish. And yet, it is most often the part that's missing — especially from the sci–fi shows.
In a procedural series, the operational theme of the protagonist is usually pretty cut–and–dry. He or she is — sometimes quite literally — dedicated to bringing about law and order. The reason cops, doctors, and lawyers rule — and will probably always rule — the airwaves in some form or another is that their operational theme is baked into their personality. It is a function of their job — the eradication of suffering and injustice at any cost — and is usually fused with personal obsession brought about by past trauma.
If television is to be believed, the most dangerous thing to be in the world is the spouse of a detective. Most of them wind up dead at the hands of some psychopath who remains uncatchable for the span of episodes it takes to score a lucrative syndication deal for the series. Television thrives on workaholic protagonists who sacrifice — or have sacrificed for them — their personal relationships in favor of protecting people like us — the viewer!
As television has evolved to include more serialized, heavily "mythologized" drama — even in the stock genres of crime, medicine, and the law — the operational theme of the protagonist must remain front and center for the series to succeed. In Breaking Bad, Walter White's operational theme — "to save everything I love I must become something everyone hates" — creates an endless supply of drama. Every situation Walter enters requires him to tell, develop, and sustain a lie.
This brilliant operational theme requires every single scene in the show to be front–loaded with deception and subterfuge. It's a recipe for perfect ongoing drama that allowed the show to slowly string out and develop its more academic theme: the seduction of a good man by the infinite charms of wealth, power, and his descent into darkness. But make no mistake, academic is the right word for those themes. It was the initial simplicity of Walter White's operational theme that consistently opened dramatic avenues episode after episode.
It doesn't end with Walter White. The current "golden era" of television is littered with very easily identifiable operational themes that burden their protagonists. Tony Soprano wants to remain a sadistic mobster even though his unconscious musters every weapon at its disposal to get him to turn away from his horrific life. Don Draper continually tries to keep up the idealized appearance of the successful mid–century man in the grey flannel suit as his inner demons plague him with the truth that his entire life is a lie. Doctor House wants to be left in peace to be a belligerent drug addict but is forced to put his basic instincts aside and perform the job of genius diagnostician.
Outside of TV, my favorite example of the perfect fusion of situation and character into operational theme is the film Die Hard. The entire narrative is an extended metaphor for marital therapy: a husband trying to earn back his estranged wife. The terrorists are the physical manifestation of the emotional barriers that keep John McClane from familial bliss. As with any person in couples counseling, McClane systematically loses his metaphorical armor as he fights to the point of exhaustion. He ends up shoeless and bloody, blubbering to his "therapist" about his love for his wife — bleeding both thematically and practically.
The bathroom confession in Die Hard could have just easily been an episode of HBO's In Treatment: a man denuded through adversity of all the trappings of macho pride, forced to confront his raw emotional wounds.
It seems obvious, and, frankly, inevitable — in the way that a Mark Rothko painting, or an Arne Jacobsen chair, appear inevitable — that simple operational themes are the key to serialized success. And yet, by and large, most attempts at serialized, mythologized sci–fi fail to pull off this trick. Think of all the genre series that have attempted to capitalize on the serialized mystery/heavy–mythology vogue triggered by Lost: Flash Forward, Kingdom Hospital, Surface, The Event, Invasion, V, Threshold, Awake, Journeyman, Dollhouse, Persons Unknown, Terra Nova, the American remake of Life on Mars — the list goes on and on.
Most of the sci–fi shows we now regard as classics — and the majority that are currently successful and truly long–running, like Supernatural — are not Lost clones. Rather, they are straightforward procedural franchises with simple operational themes.
The brothers Winchester, Nick Burkhardt in Grimm, Mulder and Scully in The X–Files — even Buffy, the Vampire Slayer — are all basically cops: rolling into a new case week after week, interrogating suspects, finding lore that matches the methodology of the villains, confronting evildoers, serving justice, and moving on to the next week's transgressor. In the best of these series, an overarching theme buttresses the set–up: Mulder and Scully's dynamic was defined by opposing viewpoints which fueled every scene. In addition to being thrust into stories by their occupation every week, they always had a basic ideological conflict that spoke to their character.
Even the beloved crew of the Starship Enterprise are hyper–competent trouble–shooters placed into stories weekly by dint of external mission as opposed to internal need. In the best Star Trek series, this necessity was supported by an interesting character dynamic: Captain Kirk, Spock, and McCoy are a three–man representation of the ego, superego, and id. The drama of the series lied in watching these three archetypes integrate into a coherent solution to the planet–of–the–week's problem: McCoy would shout, "dammit, man, we gotta do something!" Spock would reply that "to do something would be illogical." Kirk would eventually say "I have a plan."
Compare that infinitely fruitful character interaction with the first two seasons of Star Trek: The Next Generation — a long and tedious stew of underdeveloped, under–thought characters kept afloat by the exigencies of a procedural franchise. On Star Trek: The Next Generation's first two years there was always a potentially interesting issue with the planet–of–the–week. But it took almost two years for the characters to become anywhere as interesting as the show's premise. (It's a miracle of the extant love of Star Trek in the core audience, or the innate intrigue of the show's premise, or the economics of first–run syndication in the late eighties — or maybe some combination of the three — that the show survived long enough for its characters to find their way into being fully–realized people who could carry a story like "The Inner Light," "Chains of Command," or "Tapestry.")
Had the writers merely dropped the original characters of Star Trek: The Next Generation on a desert island — a place with no innate sense of mission — the series would have surely collapsed.
Lost succeeded in telling a longitudinal story because it managed to create a central operational theme for every single one of the characters in its voluminous ensemble. In the earliest days of the creation of the series, the creative team behind Lost — co–creators Damon Lindelof and J.J. Abrams, with the assistance of Paul Dini, Christian Taylor, Jennifer Johnson, and myself — came upon the idea of using flashbacks to develop the operational themes for each character. The flashbacks to the crash of Oceanic 815 first presented in the pilot transformed into full–blown plots extending through the course of the series. The island stories were presented in direct contrast to who the characters were in their former everyday lives. Every action in the island — present became an attempt to compensate for shortcomings in the past's real world.
The operating theme of Lost is simple and applies to every character: who do you say you are when you can reinvent yourself with impunity? Every member of the Lost ensemble was living a lie on the island. These lies dictated their behavior and led them to try — either successfully or unsuccessfully — to remake themselves into their most desired version of themselves.
Jack strove to lead in spite of a life of personal failure and the scorn of an unloving father. Kate yearned to prove herself a good person in spite of being a wanted criminal. Michael tried to be an able parent after being absent from his son's entire life. Charlie struggled to be a caretaker to Claire and her unborn child while concealing his drug addiction. John Locke — mysteriously healed of his paralysis by the island — was hell–bent on proving himself a man of action and principle after a lifetime of meek submission. Sun pretended to be a dutiful Korean wife, concealing even her fluency in the English from the brutal husband — whose brutality itself was a smokescreen to conceal a deep yearning for his own broken dreams — whom she was preparing to escape. The list goes on. What's important is that every character had the same operational theme. The synthesis of personal desire for reinvention in contrast to the reality of each character's previous life propelled one story after another for the course of Lost's first two seasons: forty–eight hours of television that cemented the show's place in the popular culture.
The operational theme of Lost — obvious as it seems in retrospect — did not become clear to the creative team until after the pilot had been shot and we were tasked with figuring out how exactly the series would work in episode after episode. We were very close to falling prey to the fallacy that makes for the downfall of most of the proposed serialized sci–fi pilots that come down the pike: we were almost — almost — seduced by a shiny concept — the mysteries of the island, from the smoke monster to the presence of ghosts from the past in the present. We almost focused on the mystery instead of the operational theme of the characters.
To this day, I thank god we had the epiphany early.
By dealing with the unknown, beguiling, and generally spectacular (aliens! robots! vampires! alien robot vampires!), sci–fi as a genre has the sneaky ability to fool otherwise extremely capable writers into believing that a nifty concept with a lot of unanswered questions is enough to carry a television series. It isn't.
To have something spectacular take place — the arrival of aliens, a space/time conflagration that causes everyone to see a few minutes of their future, a plane crash in a mysterious island — and then spend twenty–two episodes showing how the characters figure out merely what happened, how, and whether it can be fixed, is not only the biggest failure of the imagination possible in sci–fi drama, it is also an insult to the genre. It assumes that sci–fi is somehow "easier" than a deeply character–driven kitchen–sink narrative (like Mad Men) that requires the protagonist to have a rich inner life in order to motivate conflict.
The island on Lost served the same purpose as the ad agency on Mad Men: it was a space where the protagonist sought to invent a new life in spite of all evidence to the impossibility of that endeavor. The conspiracy inOrphan Black is nothing more or less than a perfect physicalization of a young woman's struggle to define her own identity: one which just so happens to cause her to come into conflict and allegiance with numerous clones of herself, all of them living vastly different lives with remarkably different outcomes.
Many big and shiny ideas can tap dance around a lack of an operational theme for a while — the length of a pilot, maybe even a season of decompressed cable–style narrative. But no amount of spectacle can obscure the truth that a protagonist or ensemble with a stark, robust, and recognizable operational theme is the source of all televisual drama.
Ironically, sci–fi, the genre that most often suffers from underdeveloped characters on TV probably demands more character from its characters than any other genre. Why? Because it is, at the core, a metaphorical exercise. Sci–fi poses a question that extends beyond the easily understandable stakes of the cop, doctor, or lawyer. How are the aliens, robots, mysterious islands, viral outbreaks, and vampires an external manifestation of your main character's self–concept?
If you are writing a genre pilot and your premise can't answer that question — while placing your protagonist in a place where the pursuit of their most prescient emotional issue is in consistent, discernible, and direct opposition of those aliens, robots, islands, viral outbreaks, and vampires — then, like any other writer in any other genre, you have to dig deeper. Because the privilege of having a scholar find and explain your lofty thematic concern like "power," "alienation," or (still my personal favorite,) "the shallowness of modern life" doesn't come right away. Scholars and bloggers don't proclaim the deep meaningful metaphors of your creation you have done the hard spade–and–trowel labor of putting an interesting main character on the screen. You must first put your characters in the one, singular (and preferably, for my money, science–fictional!) situation that mostchallenges their true self. That's your operational theme: challenge your character's innermost identity, do it week after week, then have your agent call my agent.
Though best known as one of the Emmy Award–winning producers of Lost, Javier Grillo–Marxuach is a prolific writer of TV shows, movies, and comic books. His credits include seaQuest, The Pretender, Charmed,Boomtown, The Chronicle, Jake 2.0, Medium, and SyFy's Helix. Grillo–Marxuach is also creator of The Middleman graphic novels and ABC Family TV show, and co–hosts the Children of Tendu podcast, in which he dispenses advice on breaking into and staying in the TV business with fellow writer/producer Jose Molina.
Well said, sir.
Any thoughts on the one current SF show that has perhaps fused the operational theme and the mystery-reveal most successfully to date – Person Of Interest?
What a wonderful essay! I have not read anything like this that so clearly explains what really makes for a successful TV series. This is one that any hopeful screenwriter should be required to read. Thanks.
Nice insights. You put into words what many writers feel on a gut level.
Related to the series operational theme, it's helpful for the writer to identify a unifying story/series thematic statement.
When asked what the theme for a particular work they created is, writers often come up with nebulous meanderings about "being human," or exploring "what freedom is" or similar unfocused thoughts.
A thematic statement is a great way to help make sure the story is cohesive. It should be a sentence – a real statement.
Assuming the story works on multiple levels, there should be more than one valid thematic statement. However, only one core thematic statement is needed to make sure all plot elements tie into it and unify the tale.
Lost is the show that ruined television for me. Ever since it's finale, I just can't get into another show the way I did with it.
I think part of that comes from how I saw Lost as being less like a TV show, but more like a novel. There was the promise of a finite ending, characters informed by specific themes, and sure there was that "operating theme," you're talking about, but I don't think it felt as obvious as Buffy or Law and Order. Every episode felt so connected that it was like coming back to the same book week after week, rather than checking in with Buffy to see what she monster she beat up this week.
I guess what I'm trying to say is that it just felt important.
Sam and Dean Winchester are the reason fans keep coming back to Supernatural. No matter the plot line of the season, these characters stay true to who they are.
Lost moves the characters forward from the point in time of a disaster, while Thornton Wilder's novel "The Bridge at San Luis Rey," with its spokes-of-a-wheel plot structure brings them all together for one common end.
First off: this is good advice. BUT. The author buries a lot of the practical application of the concept under layers of impenetrable jargon. He seems so happy with himself for coming up with a catchy, clinical new term that he doesn't even bother to walk you through the process of developing your own "Operational Theme." He doesn't even give you a single tip or piece of advice on how he does it.
I think this is just a fancy way of saying that you, and your main character, have to have a motivating perspective. Which… Duh. That's something we already know! And it's really hard to execute! Devising a new term for it without helping us understand how to develop it ourselves is utterly unhelpful. Without any practical tips, this reads like the author is jerking himself off for successfully identifying a trend.
If your goal is helping writers be better writers, YOU HAVE TO GO ALL THE WAY. You can't just stop when you identify the pattern. You have to go an extra step further and at least say, "and this is how I do it." Otherwise you just spent an entire essay blowing yourself.
I think it's really worthwhile to take a look at Continuum, which is genius in the respect of operational themes.
Of course, even if you have an operational theme, if you bungle the shiny concept, people are still going to say you failed (in an SF story, that is). E.g., the creators of Lost quite clearly felt a shiny concept that resolved at the end was *an* essential ingredient, and they made a serious effort to supply answers to the mysteries and did in fact supply them–unfortunately the answer to virtually every shiny concept mystery turned out to be "It's magic!"
Phenomenal article, but I have to say, there has been a successful "next Lost", only 1, and it's Once Upon A Time, of which Lost shares not only the flashbacks format but much of the character complexity and "operational" themes you are talking about. In fact there is more room for layering the themes of power and uneven family dynamics (parent/offspring) in Once than Lost, themes that have dominated the most critically praised shows of this era like Sopranos/etc Note two major differences between the flashback shows is in Once the magic is in the characters, in Lost it's on the island. And in Once in the flashbacks everyone knew each other, while in Lost they were strangers. Because the magic is in the characters in Once, this allows them to abuse power, to unleash huge consequences on others by following their own selfish desires, trying to fill their need to be loved (everyone on the show feels unloved), etc. The characters want the magic in the first place to fill something in themselves, then can't let go of it. As for the histories this also allows a deeper "consequential affect" on each other – characters did things decades or centuries ago to each other that has an impact much later etc., which creates a more layered non-literal family or community dynamic. In addition to admittedly how the show has made tons of characters related to each other and leaned on the 'bad parent' leading to the next generation of unloved characters.
The flipside in Lost's favor is it's actual plot… and how cool it is to have this crazy island… is a little better than what Once has to work with after they blew up their best series arc at end of S1. Since then for the overall seasonal arcs they've had to bring in regular big bads, which I think start to got weary by the end S3.
Nevertheless 90% of the difference in how the shows are received critically, water cooler, etc. is Lost was cooler to like and had people take it more seriously for surface reasons.
Wow, this is a topic I'd love to hash out over a few beers.
One of the few "mythology" shows that truly impressed me was "Fringe." Rewatching it on Netflix reminded me that after a bit of fumbling in season one, the show managed to have a heart while still juggling a mythology that was truly complex. The ending was pitch perfect: honest emotions, a storyline that wrapped up the mythology and viewers were left with the feeling that this story was at its logical end.
As for the "Lost" finale, I don't know that I'm the best judge of it, since I loved the "Seinfeld" finale. But as much as I enjoyed it, it also ruined the show for me and I stay away from the reruns.
I agree that finding the operational theme for "Lost" was the factor that allowed the show to thrive and I wouldn't change any of those flashback segments that filled out the characters. My problem with the finale was that everyone involved with the show kept talking in interviews about how much time they spent tracking the backstory and all of the mythology so that it would be consistent. Then much of it was discarded as "just facts" in the end.
I loved Fringe, but the final season infuriated me. From the first pilot episode Fringe, for me, was all about Olivia, and everyone else was supporting cast. Anna Torv carried that show for the whole first season through sheer will.
And then when everything comes together at the end, when the whole story is to culminate, what happens? They practically exile Olivia!!! I couldn't believe it. It's as if Riker became the main character of TNG in the seventh season and you only saw Picard for a couple of scenes per episode.
Great post. I totally agree. Since Lost ended, I always lament how many shows come and go that seem to be trying to capture that same "big mystery" magic without actually putting the heavy lifting into crafting interesting empathetic characters.
I know you mentioned Journeyman in your post, and honestly I felt like Journeyman was one of the few shows that got it mostly right. I really enjoyed that show for its short run, and was sad to see it go.
Yeah, this is a great essay. But it never explained how the show's writing managed to decline over the years or how it failed to maintain steady writing, instead of flip flopping in quality.
Insightful glimpse into the bones of TV writing. But calling McCoy the id figure in that particular trio read to me, even as a gloss, as off the mark, and took me out of the analysis. I'm not a trekkie, but the show's schtick seems pretty clear: McCoy constantly stakes his claim as a moralist, a critic, a naysayer, a humanistic pessimist, a cassandra– in other words, a drag— certainly not the seat of all urges. Whereas Kirk screws every alien woman he meets, starts fistfights, plays chicken with the Klingons, constantly plies Spock to act on his emotions, and frequently resolves conflict with an intuitive response. While Spock in his turn is the epitome of reason, and often rationalization, an intellect caught mediating between impulse and rebuke. Of course when the writing's good, a character would manifest different mixtures of all three. Hence the little thrill we're meant to feel in the reboots when Spock acts purely out of anger, or Kirk learns how to sacrifice, or McCoy goes into seduction mode.
Thanks for this, Javi. It is SOOOOOOO helpful.