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Project: 9/11 TimelineOpen-Content project managed by matt, Paul, KJF
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Congress approves a $15 billion federal aid package for the battered US airline industry, and sets up a government fund to compensate 9/11 victims' relatives. [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/2001] However, relatives are only allowed to sue US-designated terrorists, and if they sue anyone else, they are not entitled to any compensation money. The law also limits the airlines' liability to the limits of their insurance coverage—around $1.5 billion per plane. [Los Angeles Times, 1/17/2002] Nevertheless, some later sue entities that make them ineligible for the fund, such as the Port Authority, owner of the WTC.
Entity Tags: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, US Congress
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Other Events, 9/11 Related Lawsuits
The German government issues international arrest warrants for Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Said Bahaji, two members of the al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany, along with a few of the 9/11 hijackers. Bin al-Shibh was last seen in a Hamburg mosque in August 2001. Bahaji left Germany for Pakistan on September 3, and bin al-Shibh did the same on September 5 (see September 3-5, 2001). [Knight Ridder, 9/21/2001] Bin al-Shibh will be captured in Pakistan in September 2002 (see September 11, 2002). There will be no reports that Bahaji is ever captured or killed.
Entity Tags: Said Bahaji, Ramzi bin al-Shibh
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell, 9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings
During President Bush's presidential daily briefing (PDB), Bush is informed that the US intelligence community has found no evidence linking Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, nor any evidence of links between Hussein and al-Qaeda. The briefing has been prepared at the request of Bush, who is said to be eager to learn of any possible connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Yet during the briefing, he is told that the few believable reports of contact between the two were in fact attempts by Hussein to monitor the group, which he considered a threat to his secular regime. Analysts believe that at one point Hussein considered infiltrating al-Qaeda with Iraqi nationals or Iraqi intelligence operatives, so as to learn more about its inner workings. A former US administration official later will state, "What the president was told on September 21 was consistent with everything he has been told since—that the evidence [linking Iraq to 9/11] was just not there." The existence of the September 21 PDB will not be disclosed to the Senate Intelligence Committee until the summer of 2004, while the committee will be investigating whether the Bush administration misrepresented intelligence information in the period leading up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq. As of the end of 2005, the Bush administration will still refuse to turn over the briefing, even on a classified basis, and will say nothing more about it other than the fact that it exists. [National Journal, 11/22/2005; MSNBC, 11/22/2005; Agence France-Presse, 11/23/2005; Unger, 2007, pp. 217] According to journalist Ron Suskind, during the meeting, CIA Director George Tenet tells Bush about the alleged meeting hijacker Mohamed Atta had with an Iraqi agent in Prague, which has been reported in the media in recent days (see September 18, 2001). However, Tenet says: "Our Prague office is skeptical about the report. It just doesn't add up." He points out that credit card and phone records place Atta in Virginia during the time in question. [Suskind, 2006, pp. 23]
Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein, Bush administration (43), Al-Qaeda, George J. Tenet
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations
Lofti Raissi. [Source: Amnesty International]Lotfi Raissi, an Algerian pilot living in Britain, is arrested and accused of helping to train four of the hijackers. An FBI source says, "We believe he is by far the biggest find we have had so far. He is of crucial importance to us." [Las Vegas Review-Journal, 9/29/2001] However, in April 2002, a judge dismisses all charges against him, calling the charges "tenuous." US officials originally said, "They had video of him with Hani Hanjour, who allegedly piloted the plane that crashed into the Pentagon; records of phone conversations between the two men; evidence that they had flown a training plane together; and evidence that Raissi had met several of the hijackers in Las Vegas. It turned out, the British court found, that the video showed Raissi with his cousin, not Mr. Hanjour, that Raissi had mistakenly filled in his air training logbook and had never flown with Hanjour, and that Raissi and the hijackers were not in Las Vegas at the same time. The US authorities never presented any phone records showing conversations between Raissi and Hanjour. It appears that in this case the US authorities handed over all the information they had…" [Christian Science Monitor, 3/27/2002; Guardian, 9/26/2005] Raissi later says he will sue the British and American governments unless he is given a "widely publicized apology" for his months in prison and the assumption of "guilty until proven innocent." [Reuters, 8/14/2002] In September 2003, he does sue both governments for $20 million. He also wins a undisclosed sum from the British tabloid Mail on Sunday for printing false charges against him. [Guardian, 9/16/2003; BBC, 10/7/2003; Arizona Republic, 10/14/2003] Declassified documents will later reveal that the British arrested Raissi only days after the FBI requested that the British discretely monitor and investigate him, not arrest him. [Guardian, 9/26/2005] Raissi perfectly matches the description of an individual mentioned in FBI agent Ken Williams' "Phoenix memo" (see July 10, 2001), whom the FBI had attempted to investigate in May 2001 (see 1997-July 2001).
Entity Tags: Lotfi Raissi, Hani Hanjour, United Kingdom, Pentagon, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States
Category Tags: Hani Hanjour, 9/11 Investigations, Alleged Hijackers' Flight Training
A report in the Washington Times suggests, "Federal investigators may have video footage of the deadly terrorist attack on the Pentagon. A security camera atop a hotel close to the Pentagon may have captured dramatic footage of the hijacked Boeing 757 airliner as it slammed into the western wall of the Pentagon. Hotel employees sat watching the film in shock and horror several times before the FBI confiscated the video as part of its investigation. It may be the only available video of the attack. The Pentagon has told broadcast news reporters that its security cameras did not capture the crash. The attack occurred close to the Pentagon's heliport, an area that normally would be under 24-hour security surveillance, including video monitoring." [Washington Times, 9/21/2001] In a later report, an employee at a gas station across the street from the Pentagon that services only military personnel says the gas station's security cameras should have recorded the moment of impact. However, he says, "I've never seen what the pictures looked like. The FBI was here within minutes and took the film." [Richmond Times-Dispatch, 12/11/2001] In late 2006, the FBI will release the footage from the gas station's cameras, along with footage from atop the Doubletree Hotel near the Pentagon. Whether the Doubletree is the hotel referred to in the Washington Times report is unknown. Neither of the videos will show the impact on the Pentagon, though the Doubletree video shows the subsequent explosion (see September 13, 2006-Early December 2006). Footage taken by the Pentagon's security cameras and released earlier in 2006 will show that the Pentagon's claim—that its own cameras did not capture the impact on 9/11—was untrue (see May 16, 2006).
Entity Tags: Pentagon, US Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation
During an attempt at transcribing tape recordings of communications at NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) from September 11, a tape is damaged. [9/11 Commission, 10/28/2003 ; Farmer, 2009, pp. 274] In a corner of the NEADS operations floor, four Dictaphone multi-channel tape recorders recorded every radio channel on September 11. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] Technical Sergeant James Tollack, the resident expert in digital voice recording systems at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, arrived at NEADS on September 20, in order to transcribe the facility's recordings from September 11 (see (September 20-October 4, 2001)). Tape Reformatted during Rebooting - On the following day, one of the tapes Tollack is working from becomes damaged, causing much of the information on it to be lost. Interviewed by the 9/11 Commission in 2004, Tollack will explain what happens. He will say a civilian contractor assists him as they reboot the system, but this causes the tape to be re-formatted, and so the information on it is lost. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/21/2001; 9/11 Commission, 3/22/2004] Tollack has at least been able to transcribe a portion of the recording of the NEADS mission crew commander position on the tape before the malfunction occurs. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/21/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004] Colonel Robert Marr, the battle commander at NEADS, is subsequently informed of what has happened, including the loss of information. [9/11 Commission, 3/22/2004] Reason Tape Is Damaged Disputed - When members of the 9/11 Commission staff visit NEADS during their investigation of the September 11 attacks, they will be told that Tollack caused the tape to malfunction and reformat. However, Tollack will dispute this. He will deny having caused the tape to malfunction and profess ignorance as to why he was subsequently asked to stop listening to and transcribing the tapes. Unclear if Tollack Continues Transcribing Tapes - The Commission staff members will also be told that after the tape is damaged, Tollack is instructed to stop transcribing the tapes because Department of Defense officials are concerned that they could be permanently lost. [9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004; Farmer, 2009, pp. 274] And according to journalist and author Philip Shenon, by the time the Commission gains possession of the tapes, around December 2003, NORAD has still "not prepared transcripts itself" of their contents. [Shenon, 2008, pp. 208] However, Tollack will remain at NEADS for at least another 10 days after the equipment malfunction occurs, until the first week of October. Furthermore, two or three days after the tape is damaged, General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, visits NEADS and discusses with Tollack the importance of getting the information from the tapes (see (Between September 23 and September 24, 2001)). [9/11 Commission, 3/22/2004] It is therefore unclear when Tollack stops transcribing the tapes, and how much progress he has made before he stops. Recordings Not Backed Up, Later Restored - The Dictaphone tape recorders that record the radio channels at NEADS are run by General Dynamics. [9/11 Commission, 10/28/2003 ] Richard Crane, General Dynamics' technical representative to NEADS, will tell the 9/11 Commission that he believes, given the importance of 9/11, the NEADS tapes should have been copied immediately, but were not. Although General Dynamics lacks the capability to do this, Dictaphone could have made backups. And at some point after September 11, it is discovered that Dictaphone can transfer a digital audio tape to DVD for just $150. [9/11 Commission, 10/28/2003 ] However, most of the deleted information on the damaged tape is apparently later restored. In November 2003, it will be reported that Dictaphone "has recovered most of the tracks." [US Department of Defense, 11/25/2003]
Entity Tags: Northeast Air Defense Sector, Robert Marr, US Department of Defense, Richard Crane, James D. Tollack
Omar al-Bayoumi, suspected al-Qaeda advance man and possible Saudi agent, is arrested, and held for one week in Britain. He moved from San Diego to Britain in late June 2001 (see June 23-July 2001) and is a studying at Aston University Business School in Birmingham when he is taken into custody by British authorities working with the FBI. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 10/27/2001; Washington Post, 12/29/2001; MSNBC, 11/27/2002] During a search of al-Bayoumi's Birmingham apartment (which includes ripping up the floorboards), the FBI finds the names and phone numbers of two employees of the Saudi embassy's Islamic Affairs Department. [Newsweek, 11/24/2002] "There was a link there," a Justice Department official says, adding that the FBI interviewed the employees and "that was the end of that, in October or November of 2001." The official adds, "I don't know why he had those names." Nail al-Jubeir, chief spokesperson for the Saudi embassy in Washington, says al-Bayoumi "called [the numbers] constantly." [Los Angeles Times, 11/24/2002] They also discover jihadist literature, and conclude he "has connections to terrorist elements," including al-Qaeda. [Washington Post, 7/25/2003] However, he is released after a week. [Los Angeles Times, 11/24/2002; Newsweek, 11/24/2002] British intelligence officials are frustrated that the FBI failed to give them information that would have enabled them to keep al-Bayoumi in custody longer than the seven days allowed under British anti-terrorism laws. [London Times, 10/19/2001; KGTV 10 (San Diego), 10/25/2001] Even FBI officials in San Diego appear to have not been told of al-Bayoumi's arrest by FBI officials in Britain until after he is released. [Sunday Mercury (Birmingham, UK), 10/21/2001] Newsweek claims that classified sections of the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry indicate the Saudi Embassy pushed for al-Bayoumi's release— "another possible indicator of his high-level [Saudi] connections." [Newsweek, 7/28/2003] A San Diego FBI agent later secretly testifies that supervisors fail to act on evidence connecting to a Saudi money trail. The FBI is said to conduct a massive investigation of al-Bayoumi within days of 9/11, which shows he has connections to individuals who have been designated by the US as foreign terrorists. [Sunday Mercury (Birmingham, UK), 10/21/2001; US Congress, 7/24/2003 ; Newsweek, 7/28/2003] But two years later witnesses connecting him to Saudi money apparently are not interviewed by the FBI. Al-Bayoumi continues with his studies in Britain and is still there into 2002, and yet is still not rearrested. [Newsweek, 10/29/2001; Washington Post, 12/29/2001] He disappears into Saudi Arabia by the time he reenters the news in November 2002. [San Diego Magazine, 9/2003]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nail al-Jubeir, United Kingdom, Omar al-Bayoumi
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection
General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, visits NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, New York, and emphasizes to an officer there the importance of promptly transcribing the recordings of the NEADS operations floor from September 11. Technical Sergeant James Tollack, the resident expert in digital voice recording systems at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, arrived at NEADS on September 20, in order to transcribe the facility's tape recordings from September 11 (see (September 20-October 4, 2001)). Three or four days later, Eberhart comes to NEADS and sees Tollack personally. Eberhart stresses to Tollack the importance of getting the information from the tapes as quickly and as accurately as possible. He says the information is needed for a Congressional report or hearing. [9/11 Commission, 3/22/2004; 9/11 Commission, 7/29/2004] Presumably Eberhart is referring to his appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee on October 25, in which he will put forward the military's account of what happened on September 11. [US Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee, 10/25/2001; Farmer, 2009, pp. 248] When the 9/11 Commission interviews Tollack during its investigation of the terrorist attacks and asks him what order of priority his task of transcribing the tapes had been given, he will indicate that he knew it was a high-priority assignment when he was visited by Eberhart. [Farmer, 2009, pp. 274]
Entity Tags: Ralph Eberhart, James D. Tollack, Northeast Air Defense Sector
The first of many mainstream articles ridiculing 9/11 "conspiracy theories" is published. [Independent, 9/23/2001] Early articles of this type generally deride Middle Eastern views blaming Israel. [Associated Press, 10/3/2001; Washington Post, 10/13/2001; Dallas Morning News, 11/19/2001] Later articles mostly deride Western theories blaming President Bush, and criticize the Internet and Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney for spreading these ideas. [Chicago Sun-Times, 2/8/2002; ABC News, 4/17/2002; Orlando Sentinel, 5/18/2002; Toronto Sun, 5/19/2002] The title of one article, "Conspiracy Nuts Feed On Calamity," expresses the general tone of these articles. [Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 5/22/2002] An Ottawa Citizen article mockingly includes a Do-It-Yourself Conspiracy Theory section, where you can fill in the blanks for your own personal 9/11 theory. The article calls 9/11 conspiracy theories "delirious," "dangerous," and "viruses," while admitting, "[I]t's true that some of the events surrounding the September 11 attacks are hard to explain." [Ottawa Citizen, 9/1/2002] Another article attempts to discredit theories that oil was a motive for the US to attack Afghanistan by interspersing them with theories that space aliens were behind the 9/11 attacks. [Daily Telegraph, 9/5/2002]
Entity Tags: George W. Bush, Cynthia McKinney, Israel
Category Tags: Media, US Government and 9/11 Criticism
Secretary of State Colin Powell is asked in a television interview, "Will you release publicly a white paper which links [bin Laden] and his organization to this attack to put people at ease?" Powell responds, "We are hard at work bringing all the information together, intelligence information, law enforcement information. And I think in the near future we will be able to put out a paper, a document that will describe quite clearly the evidence that we have linking him to this attack." [MSNBC, 9/23/2001] The next day, the New York Times reports that this report is expected to be published "within days… Officials say they are still arguing over how much information to release…" [New York Times, 9/24/2001] But later that day, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says, "I think that there was just a misinterpretation of the exact words the secretary used on the Sunday shows.… I'm not aware of anybody who said white paper, and the secretary didn't say anything about a white paper yesterday." [White House, 9/24/2001] The New Yorker will report a short time later that, according to a senior CIA official, US intelligence had not yet developed enough information about the hijackers. "One day we'll know, but at the moment we don't know" (see Late September 2001). [New Yorker, 10/8/2001] But no such paper is ever released.
Entity Tags: Ari Fleischer, Colin Powell
Fox News claims that up to 12 other Middle Eastern men dressed in pilot uniforms were on other flights scheduled to take off on the morning of 9/11. Hijackings on all these flights were foiled when an unexpected ban on new flights prevented them from taking off. An FBI source says they had been invited into the cockpits under the impression that they were guest pilots from other airlines. It is standard practice to give guest pilots the spare seat in the cockpit known as the jump seat. [Fox News, 9/24/2001] Flight 93's cockpit voice recording has apparently shown that "one of the four hijackers had been invited into the cockpit area before the flight took off." Many pilot uniforms had gone missing prior to 9/11. It is claimed that Mohamed Atta was given a guided tour of Boston's Logan Airport the week before 9/11 when he turned up in a pilot uniform saying he was with Saudi Airlines. [Herald Sun (Melbourne), 9/25/2001]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation
The US freezes the bank accounts of 27 individuals and organizations, alleging that they had channeled money to al-Qaeda. The list includes the names of nine Middle Eastern groups that are members of bin Laden's International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders alliance announced in 1998 (see February 22, 1998). Such groups include the Islamic Army of Aden (based in Yemen), the GIA (Algeria), and Abu Sayyaf (the Philippines). Individuals named include obvious al-Qaeda figures such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command, and Muhammad Atef. [New York Times, 9/25/2001] Makhtab Al-Khidamat/Al-Kifah, a charity based in Pakistan. A Brooklyn, New York, branch was called the Al-Kifah Refugee Center and had ties to both the 1993 WTC bombing and the CIA (see 1986-1993). It appears it was shut down in Pakistan in late 1995 (see Shortly After November 19, 1995). The Wall Street Journal notes that it "may be defunct or at least operating in a much-diminished capacity only in Afghanistan." [Wall Street Journal, 9/25/2001] The Al-Rashid Trust. This is primarily a humanitarian organization that aims to eject western charities from Afghanistan by taking over their activities. The trust is also so closely linked to the Kashmiri-focused jihidist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed that the Asia Times will comment, "It is often difficult to distinguish between the two outfits, as they share offices and cadres." The Jaish-e-Mohammed was founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, an associate of 9/11 financier Saeed Sheikh, with the support of the ISI (see December 24-31, 1999). In addition, the trust also provides support to the Taliban, and, occasionally, al-Qaeda. The trust works closely with the Arab-run Wafa Humanitarian Organization. It will continue its social and humanitarian projects, as well as its support for militant Islamic activities, under various names and partnerships despite this ban. The Wafa Humanitarian Organization, an Arab-run charity. It is closely tied to the Al-Rashid Trust. [Asia Times, 10/26/2001; Washington Post, 12/14/2003] A company belonging to one of the hijackers' associates, the Mamoun Darkazanli Import-Export Company. It is not clear where the Mamoun Darkazanli Import-Export Company is or was based, as it was never incorporated in Hamburg, where Darkazanli lived and associated with some of the 9/11 hijackers. Darkazanli's personal assets are frozen in October (see September 24-October 2, 2001). [Chicago Tribune, 11/17/2002] However, according to some reports, some of the money transferred to the hijackers in the US in 2001 came through the Al-Rashid Trust (see Early August 2001) and possibly another account, and some of the money the hijackers received in 2000 may have come through Mamoun Darkazanli's accounts (see June 2000-August 2001). The move is largely symbolic, since none of the entities have any identifiable assets in the US. [New York Times, 9/25/2001] Reporter Greg Palast will later note that US investigators likely knew much about the finances of those organizations before 9/11, but took no action. [Santa Fe New Mexican, 3/20/2003]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Maktab al-Khidamat, Mamoun Darkazanli, Mohammed Atef, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Greg Palast, Abu Sayyaf, Groupe Islamique Armé, Al Rashid Trust, US Department of the Treasury, Al-Qaeda, Wafa Humanitarian Organization
Mustafa Ahmed Alhawsawi. [Source: FBI]In 2000, the 9/11 hijackers receive money from a man using "Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawi" and other aliases. On September 8-11, 2001, the hijackers send money to a man in the United Arab Emirates who uses the aliases "Mustafa Ahmed," "Mustafa Ahmad," and "Ahamad Mustafa." Soon the media begins reporting on who this 9/11 "paymaster" is, but his reported names and identities will continually change. The media has sometimes made the obvious connection that the paymaster is Saeed Sheikh—a British financial expert who studied at the London School of Economics, undisputedly sent hijacker Mohamed Atta money the month before the attacks, made frequent trips to Dubai (where the money is sent), and is known to have trained the hijackers. However, the FBI consistently deflects attention to other possible explanations, with a highly confusing series of names vaguely similar to Mustafa Ahmed or Saeed Sheikh: September 24, 2001: Newsweek reports that the paymaster for the 9/11 attacks is someone named "Mustafa Ahmed." [Newsweek, 10/1/2001] This refers to Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed, an Egyptian al-Qaeda banker who was captured in Tanzania in 1998 then later released. [Sydney Morning Herald, 9/28/2001; Newsday, 10/3/2001] October 1, 2001: The Guardian reports that the real name of "Mustafa Mohamed Ahmad" is "Sheikh Saeed." [Guardian, 10/1/2001] A few days later, CNN confirms from a "senior-level US government source" that this "Sheik Syed" is the British man Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh rescued from an Indian prison in 1999. [CNN, 10/6/2001; CNN, 10/8/2001] However, starting on October 8, the story that ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed ordered Saeed to give Mohamed Atta $100,000 begins to break. References to the 9/11 paymaster being the British Saeed Sheikh (and the connections to the ISI Director) suddenly disappear from the Western media (with one exception [CNN, 10/28/2001] ). October 2001: Other articles continue to use "Mustafa Mohammed Ahmad" or "Shaykh Saiid" with no details of his identity, except for suggestions that he is Egyptian. There are numerous spelling variations and conflicting accounts over which name is the alias. There is an Egyptian al-Qaeda financier leader named Mustafa Abu al-Yazid who uses some variant of Saeed Sheikh as an alias. [Evening Standard, 10/1/2001; BBC, 10/1/2001; Newsday, 10/3/2001; Associated Press, 10/6/2001; Washington Post, 10/7/2001; Sunday Times (London), 10/7/2001; Knight Ridder, 10/9/2001; New York Times, 10/15/2001; Los Angeles Times, 10/20/2001] October 16, 2001: CNN reports that the 9/11 paymaster "Sheik Sayid" is mentioned in a May 2001 trial of al-Qaeda members. However, this turns out to be a Kenyan named Sheik Sayyid el Masry. [Day 7. United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., 2/20/2001; United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., Day 8, 2/21/2001; CNN, 10/16/2001] November 11, 2001: The identity of 9/11 paymaster "Mustafa Ahmed" is suddenly no longer Egyptian, but is now a Saudi named Sa'd Al-Sharif, who is said to be bin Laden's brother-in-law. [United Nations, 3/8/2001; Newsweek, 11/11/2001; Associated Press, 12/18/2001] December 11, 2001: The federal indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui calls the 9/11 paymaster "Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi a/k/a 'Mustafa Ahmed,'" and gives him Sa'd's nationality and birth date. [MSNBC, 12/11/2001] Many articles begin adding "al-Hawsawi" to the Mustafa Ahmed name. [Washington Post, 12/13/2001; Washington Post, 1/7/2002; Los Angeles Times, 1/20/2002] January 23, 2002: As new information is reported in India, the media returns to the British Saeed Sheikh as the 9/11 paymaster. [Los Angeles Times, 1/23/2002; Daily Telegraph, 1/24/2002; Independent, 1/24/2002; Daily Telegraph, 1/27/2002] While his role in the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl is revealed on February 6, many articles connect him to 9/11, but many more do not. Coverage of Saeed's 9/11 connections generally dies out by the time of his trial in July 2002. June 4, 2002: Without explanation, the name "Shaikh Saiid al-Sharif" begins to be used for the 9/11 paymaster, presumably a combination of Saeed Sheikh and S'ad al-Sharif. [Associated Press, 6/5/2002; Independent, 9/15/2002; Associated Press, 9/26/2002; San Francisco Chronicle, 11/15/2002] Many of the old names continue to be used, however. [New York Times, 7/10/2002; Time, 8/4/2002; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002; Chicago Tribune, 9/5/2002; Knight Ridder, 9/8/2002; Knight Ridder, 9/9/2002; Washington Post, 9/11/2002; Los Angeles Times, 12/24/2002] June 18, 2002: FBI Director Mueller testifies that the money sent in 2000 is sent by someone named "Ali Abdul Aziz Ali" but the money in 2001 is sent by "Shaikh Saiid al-Sharif." The 9/11 Commission will later identify Aziz Ali as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's nephew and agree with Mueller that he sent the money in 2000. [US Congress, 9/26/2002; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 1] September 4, 2002: Newsweek says "Mustafa Ahmad Adin al-Husawi," presumably Saudi, is a deputy to the Egyptian "Sayyid Shaikh Al-Sharif." However, it adds he "remains almost a total mystery," and they are unsure of his name. [Newsweek, 9/4/2002] December 26, 2002: US officials now say there is no such person as Shaikh Saiid al-Sharif. Instead, he is probably a composite of three different people: "[Mustafa Ahmed] Al-Hisawi, Shaikh Saiid al-Masri, al-Qaeda's finance chief, and Saad al-Sharif, bin Laden's brother-in-law and a midlevel al-Qaeda financier." [Associated Press, 12/27/2002] Shaikh Saiid al-Masri is likely a reference the Kenyan Sheik Sayyid el Masry. Note that, now, al-Hisawi is the assistant to Shaikh Saiid, a flip from a few months before. Saiid and/or al-Hisawi still haven't been added to the FBI's official most wanted lists. [London Times, 12/1/2001; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2002; Wall Street Journal, 6/17/2002] Despite the confusion, the FBI isn't even seeking information about them. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2/14/2002] Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi is said to be arrested with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in Pakistan in 2003, but no photos of him are released, and witnesses of the supposed arrest did not see al-Hawsawi or Mohammed there (see February 29 or March 1, 2003). [Reuters, 3/3/2003] A few weeks later, it will be reported that "the man US intelligence officials suspected of being al-Qaeda's financial mastermind, Sheik Said al-Masri, remains at large." [Business Week, 3/17/2003]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Daniel Pearl, Mohamed Atta, Al-Qaeda, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Khalid el-Masri, Ahamad Mustafa, Mustafa, Mahmood Ahmed, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Sayyid Shaikh Al-Sharif, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Mustafa Ahmad Adin al-Husawi, Sa'd Al-Sharif, Saeed Sheikh, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawi, Osama bin Laden, Robert S. Mueller III
Category Tags: Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11, Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding
Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) later claims that about two weeks after 9/11, he is given a chart by friends of his from the Army's Information Dominance Center, in cooperation with special ops. The chart indicates various al-Qaeda cells that were identified by a military intelligence unit called Able Danger. Early in 2000, this unit identified, amongst others, an al-Qaeda cell based in Brooklyn, New York, which included Mohamed Atta and three other future 9/11 hijackers (see January-February 2000). Atta's name is said to be on the chart given to Weldon. Shortly after being given the chart, Weldon meets with Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, and shows the chart to him. Weldon claims, "Hadley looked at the chart and said, Congressman, where did you get that chart from? I said, I got it from the military.… Steve Hadley said, Congressman, I am going to take this chart, and I am going to show it to the man. The man that he meant… was the President of the United States. I said, Mr. Hadley, you mean you have not seen something like this before from the CIA, this chart of al-Qaeda worldwide and in the US? And he said, No, Congressman. So I gave him the chart." [US Congress. House, 6/27/2005; Delaware County Daily Times, 8/12/2005; Fox News, 8/22/2005] However, a spokesman for Hadley later disputes this account, and says, "Mr. Hadley does not recall any chart bearing the name or photo of Mohamed Atta. [National Security Council] staff reviewed the files of Mr. Hadley as well as of all [National Security Council] personnel… That search has turned up no chart." [Washington Post, 9/24/2005] Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) later recalls attending the meeting and remembers the chart, but can't recall if Atta was on it or not. [New York Times, 10/1/2005] Curt Weldon also later claims that the copy of the chart he gives to Hadley is his only one. [Time, 8/29/2005] However, apparently contradicting this, Weldon will give a speech in 2002 showing the chart (see May 23, 2002).
Entity Tags: Information Dominance Center, Mohamed Atta, Dan Burton, Curt Weldon, Al-Qaeda, Special Operations Command, Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen J. Hadley, Able Danger
Category Tags: Able Danger
Two weeks after 9/11, engineers Pablo Lopez and Andrew Pontecorvo are walking in the B2 basement level at the ruins of the World Trade Center, towards where the North Tower stood. They discover a "solid, rocklike mass where the basement levels of the tower had been," and see "the recognizable traces of twenty floors, very much like geologic strata revealed by a road cut, compressed into a ten-foot vertical span. In one place, the steel decks of half a dozen floors protruded like tattered wallpaper, so close together that they were almost touching where they were bent downward at the edge. Nothing between the decks was recognizable except as a rocky, rusty mishmash. In a few places what might have been carbonized, compressed stacks of paper stuck out edgewise like graphite deposits." As New York Times reporters James Glanz and Eric Lipton describe, Lopez and Pontecorvo have found "where the vanished floors [of the tower] had gone. They had not just fallen straight down. The forces had been so great and the floors so light that they had simply folded up like deflated balloons." Furthermore, they see the massive core columns of the tower, which are over two feet wide and made of four-inch thick steel plate, appearing to have suffered "a compound fracture: the upper sections looked as if they had been kicked, with incalculable fury, about a foot south of the sections they were resting on." Lopez remarks, "Can you imagine the force?" [Glanz and Lipton, 2004, pp. 292-293] At some later time, ironworker Danny Doyle, who is also working at Ground Zero, finds that floors of the South Tower have been compressed into a formation like what happened with the North Tower's. He discovers "a distinct mound of debris set into the pile, about six feet high, with strands of wire and pieces of rebar sticking out. It looked like layers of sediment that had turned into rock and been lifted up on some mountainside.… Here were ten stories of the South Tower, compacted into an area of about six feet." [Glanz and Lipton, 2004, pp. 310]
Entity Tags: Danny Doyle, Pablo Lopez, Andrew Pontecorvo, World Trade Center
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation
FAA Administrator Jane Garvey claims that before 9/11, "No one could imagine someone being willing to commit suicide, being willing to use an airplane as a lethal weapon." [CNN, 9/25/2001]
Entity Tags: Jane Garvey
Category Tags: Warning Signs, 9/11 Denials
FBI spokesman Rex Tomb says that it will take time for criminal proceedings to commence against the people thought to be responsible for 9/11: "There's going to be a considerable amount of time before anyone associated with the attacks is actually charged." He continues, "To be charged with a crime, this means we have found evidence to confirm our suspicions, and a prosecutor has said we will pursue this case in court." In mid-August 2007 Zacarias Moussaoui will be the only person charged in connection with 9/11 in the US, being sentenced to life in prison in spring 2006 (see May 3, 2006), but it is unclear if he was involved in the 9/11 plot or a planned follow up plot (see January 30, 2003). Osama bin Laden will not be charged in connection with his alleged participation (see June 6, 2006 and August 28, 2006). [Wired News, 9/27/2001]
Entity Tags: Rex Tomb, Federal Bureau of Investigation
As details of the passengers on the four hijacked flights emerge, some are shown to have curious connections to the defense company Raytheon, and possibly its Global Hawk pilotless aircraft program. Stanley Hall (Flight 77) was director of program management for Raytheon Electronics Warfare. One Raytheon colleague calls him "our dean of electronic warfare." [Associated Press, 9/25/2001] Peter Gay (Flight 11) was Raytheon's vice president of operations for Electronic Systems and had been on special assignment to a company office in El Segundo, California. [Associated Press, 9/25/2001] Raytheon's El Segundo's Electronic Systems division is one of two divisions making the Global Hawk. [Intelligence Surveillance Reconaissance Journal, 3/2002] Kenneth Waldie (Flight 11) was a senior quality control engineer for Raytheon's electronic systems. David Kovalcin (Flight 11) was a senior mechanical engineer for Raytheon's electronic systems. [CNN, 9/2001] Herbert Homer (Flight 175) was a corporate executive working with the Department of Defense. [CNN, 9/2001; Northeastern University Voice, 12/11/2001] A surprising number of passengers, especially on Flight 77, have military connections. For instance, William E. Caswell was a Navy scientist whose work was so classified that his family knew very little about what he did each day. Says his mother, "You just learn not to ask questions." [Chicago Tribune, 9/16/2001]
Entity Tags: Stanley Hall, William E. Caswell, Peter Gay, David Kovalcin, Kenneth Waldie, Herbert Homer
According to analyst Maher Osseiran, a home video in which Osama bin Laden admits foreknowledge of 9/11 is made around this date, not on a later date suggested by US officials (see Mid-November 2001). Osseiran argues that the video was part of a sting operation run by the US (see January 19, 2001), and that the first part—making the video—was successful, but the second part—capturing or killing bin Laden—failed. [CounterPunch, 8/21/2006] This is supported by a report in the Observer, which will write that "several intelligence sources have suggested… that the tape, although absolutely genuine, is the result of a sophisticated sting operation run by the CIA through a second intelligence service, possibly Saudi or Pakistani." [Observer, 12/16/2001] Osseiran points out that the main person bin Laden talks to in the video, veteran fighter Khaled al-Harbi, actually left Saudi Arabia on September 21, and therefore presumably met bin Laden shortly after. A video expert also finds that two cameras were used to make the tape, on which footage of the confession is recorded over footage of a downed US helicopter, and that only part of the footage was transmitted by phone line or satellite. [Kohlmann, 2004, pp. 28-29; CounterPunch, 8/21/2006] On the tape, bin Laden and al-Harbi discuss events in Saudi Arabia immediately after 9/11. There are no references to events in October or November of 2001, such as the US attack on Afghanistan, which occurred on October 7 (see October 7, 2001), or the attack by the Northern Alliance against Kabul in mid-November (see November 13, 2001). [US Department of Defense, 12/13/2001 ]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Khaled al-Harbi, Maher Osseiran, Central Intelligence Agency
The Sydney Morning Herald discusses the connections between the CIA and Pakistan's ISI, and the ISI's long-standing control over the Taliban. Drugs are a big part of their operation: "opium cultivation and heroin production in Pakistan's northern tribal belt and adjoining Afghanistan were a vital offshoot of the ISI-CIA cooperation. It succeeded in turning some of the Soviet troops into addicts. Heroin sales in Europe and the US, carried out through an elaborate web of deception, transport networks, couriers, and payoffs, offset the cost of the decade-long war in Afghanistan." [Sydney Morning Herald, 9/27/2001]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11
A newspaper front page announcing the release of the hijacker photos. [Source: History Channel]The photos of all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers are released by the FBI for the first time. Some photos have been released by the media already; for instance, a photo of Mohammed Atta became very well known a couple of days after the 9/11 attacks. But this is the first time all of the hijackers are seen. The FBI also gives out some details about the hijackers, but these details are scanty. For instance, the only detail mentioned for Ahmed Alhaznawi is, "Possibly lived in Delray Beach, Florida." Interestingly, one detail mentioned for Khalid Almihdhar is, "May be an assumed name; there are reports he is still alive." It also is noted that the identities of Waleed Alshehri, Wail Alshehri, Abdulaziz Alomari, Mohand Alshehri, Salem Alhazmi, and Saeed Alghamdi are in dispute, and some of the information about them may be confused with other people with similar names. [CNN, 9/27/2001]
Entity Tags: Ahmed Alnami, Salem Alhazmi, Satam Al Suqami, Wail Alshehri, Waleed Alshehri, Ziad Jarrah, Abdulaziz Alomari, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Saeed Alghamdi, Mohamed Atta, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mohand Alshehri, Hamza Alghamdi, Khalid Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Ahmed Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, Hani Hanjour
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, Hani Hanjour, Ziad Jarrah
The first page of a letter attributed to Mohamed Atta. [Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation]The text of a handwritten, five-page document found in Mohamed Atta's luggage is made public. [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/28/2001; Washington Post, 9/28/2001; Observer, 9/30/2001] The next day, the London Independent will strongly question if the note is genuine. It points out that the "note suggests an almost Christian view of what the hijackers might have felt," and is filled with "weird" comments that Muslims would never say, such as "the time of fun and waste is gone." If the note "is genuine, then the [hijackers] believed in a very exclusive version of Islam—or were surprisingly unfamiliar with their religion." [Independent, 9/29/2001] Another copy of the document was discovered in a vehicle parked by a Flight 77 hijacker at Washington's Dulles airport. A third copy of essentially the same document was found in the wreckage of Flight 93. Therefore, the letter neatly ties most of the hijackers together. [CBS News, 9/28/2001] The Guardian comments, "The finds are certainly very fortunate, though some might think them a little too fortunate." [Guardian, 10/1/2001]
Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Mohamed Atta, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation
Osama bin Laden denies his involvement in the 9/11 attacks. In an interview with the Daily Ummat, a Pakistani newspaper, he says: "I have already said that I am not involved in the September 11 attacks in the United States (see September 16, 2001). As a Muslim, I try my best to avoid telling a lie. I had no knowledge of these attacks, nor do I consider the killing of innocent women, children, and other human beings as an appreciable act. Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and other people. Such a practice is forbidden even in the course of battle.… The United States should try to trace the perpetrators of these attacks within itself; the people who are a part of the US system but are dissenting against it. Or those who are working for some other system; persons who want to make the present century as a century of conflict between Islam and Christianity so that their own civilization, nation, country, or ideology can survive. They may be anyone, from Russia to Israel and from India to Serbia. In the US itself, there are dozens of well-organized and well-equipped groups capable of causing large-scale destruction. Then you cannot forget the American Jews, who have been annoyed with President Bush ever since the Florida elections and who want to avenge him.… Then there are intelligence agencies in the US, which require billions of dollars worth of funds from Congress and the government every year.… They needed an enemy.… Is it not that there exists a government within the government in the United Sates? That secret government must be asked who carried out the attacks." [Daily Ummat (Karachi), 9/28/2001] The newspaper says it conducted the interview with bin Laden by submittng questions for him to Taliban officials and then receiving written replies. [Ananova, 9/28/2001]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations
$2.5 million in put options on American Airlines and United Airlines are reported unclaimed. This is likely the result of the suspension in trading on the New York Stock Exchange after the attacks which gave the SEC time to be waiting if the owners showed up to redeem their put options placed the week before the 9/11 attacks. [San Francisco Chronicle, 9/29/2001]
Entity Tags: New York Stock Exchange, American Airlines, United Airlines
Category Tags: Insider Trading/ Foreknowledge
ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed meets with top Taliban leader Mullah Omar on September 17-18, 2001, and again on September 28. He is supposed to encourage the Taliban to extradite Osama bin Laden or face immediate US attack, but in fact he encourages the Taliban to fight and resist the upcoming US invasion (see Mid-September-October 7, 2001). He is also in regular communication with Omar and other Taliban leaders, and gives them advice on how to resist the US invasion (see Mid-September-October 7, 2001). The CIA quickly learns of Mahmood's double dealing, and informs Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf replaces Mahmood on October 7 (see October 7, 2001). But despite the ISI's obvious double dealing, the CIA continues to heavily rely on the ISI for its intelligence about the Taliban (see November 3, 2001). [Rashid, 2008, pp. 77]
Entity Tags: Mahmood Ahmed, Central Intelligence Agency, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Mullah Omar, Taliban
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, War in Afghanistan
Journalist Seymour Hersh will write in the New Yorker in late September 2001, "After more than two weeks of around-the-clock investigation into the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the American intelligence community remains confused, divided, and unsure about how the terrorists operated, how many there were, and what they might do next. It was that lack of solid information, government officials told me, that was the key factor behind the Bush Administration's decision last week not to issue a promised white paper listing the evidence linking Osama bin Laden's organization to the attacks" (see September 23-24, 2001). An unnamed senior official tells Hersh, "One day we'll know, but at the moment we don't know." Hersh further reports, "It is widely believed that the terrorists had a support team, and the fact that the FBI has been unable to track down fellow-conspirators who were left behind in the United States is seen as further evidence of careful planning. 'Look,' one person familiar with the investigation said. 'If it were as simple and straightforward as a lucky one-off oddball operation, then the seeds of confusion would not have been sown as they were.'" The hijackers left a surprisingly obvious trail of clues, even regularly paying for delivered pizzas using credit cards in their own name (see September 11-13, 2001). Hersh further reports, "Many of the investigators believe that some of the initial clues that were uncovered about the terrorists' identities and preparations, such as flight manuals, were meant to be found. A former high-level intelligence official told me, 'Whatever trail was left was left deliberately—for the FBI to chase.'" [New Yorker, 10/8/2001] Many newspaper reports in late September 2001 indicate doubt over the identities of many hijackers (see September 16-23, 2001). The 9/11 Congressional Inquiry's 2003 report will strongly suggest that the hijackers at least had numerous accomplices in the US (see July 24, 2003). But the 9/11 Commission's 2004 report will downplay any suggestions of US accomplices and will indicate no doubts about the hijackers' identities. [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 231, 238-9]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Seymour Hersh
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Key Hijacker Events
President Bush states on September 24, 2001: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." [US President, 9/24/2001] On the same day, he says, "As far as the Saudi Arabians go, they've been nothing but cooperative," and "[Am] I pleased with the actions of Saudi Arabia? I am." But in fact, Saudi Arabia refuses to help the US trace the names and other background information on the 15 Saudi hijackers. One former US official says, "They knew that once we started asking for a few traces the list would grow.… It's better to shut it down right away." Several experts claim the Saudi government is being "completely unsupportive" and is giving "zero cooperation" to the 9/11 investigation. [Los Angeles Times, 10/13/2001; New Yorker, 10/16/2001] On September 25, it is also reported that the Saudi government "has not granted visas to reporters for major US publications to trace the hijackers' roots." [Washington Post, 9/25/2001] By mid-October 2001, journalist Seymour Hersh will write in the New Yorker, "Other officials said that there is a growing worry inside the FBI and the CIA that the actual identities of many of those involved in the attacks may not be known definitively for months, if ever." [New Yorker, 10/16/2001]
Entity Tags: Saudi Arabia, George W. Bush
The ISI secretly assists the Taliban in its defense against a US-led attack. The ISI advises Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that the Taliban will hold out against the US invasion until the spring of 2002 at least, and then will be able to hold out through a guerrilla war. Encouraged, Musharraf allows the ISI to continue to supply the Taliban on a daily basis. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid will later explain, "The ISI justified its actions as stemming from fear of an Indian controlled Northern Alliance government after the overthrow of the Taliban. It also did not want to totally abandon the Taliban, its only proxy in Afghanistan. At the same time, the [Pakistani] army wanted to keep the Americans engaged, fearing that once Kabul had fallen, they would once again desert the region. With one hand Musharraf played at helping the war against terrorism, while with the other he continued to deal with the Taliban." ISI Supplies and Advisers - Fuel tankers and supply trucks cross the border so frequently that one border crossing in the Pakistani province of Balochistan is closed to all regular traffic so ISI supplies can continue to the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar with little notice. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 77-78] Between three and five ISI officers give military advice to the Taliban in late September. [Daily Telegraph, 10/10/2001] At least five key ISI operatives help the Taliban prepare defenses in Kandahar, yet none are punished for their activities. [Time, 5/6/2002] Secret advisers begin to withdraw in early October, but some stay on into November. [Knight Ridder, 11/3/2001] Large convoys of rifles, ammunition, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers for Taliban fighters cross the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan on October 8 and 12, just after US bombing of Afghanistan begins and after a supposed crackdown on ISI fundamentalists. The Pakistani ISI secretly gives safe passage to these convoys, despite having promised the US in September that such assistance would immediately stop. [New York Times, 12/8/2001] US Aware of ISI Double Dealing - Rashid will later comment, "Thus, even as some ISI officers were helping US officers locate Taliban targets for US bombers, other ISI officers were pumping in fresh armaments for the Taliban." On the Afghan side of the border with Pakistan, Northern Alliance operatives keep track of the ISI trucks crossing the border, and keep the CIA informed about the ISI aid. Gary Berntsen, one of the first CIA operatives to arrive in Afghanistan, will later say, "I assumed from the beginning of the conflict that ISI advisers were supporting the Taliban with expertise and material and, no doubt, sending a steady stream of intelligence back to [Pakistan]." [Rashid, 2008, pp. 77-78] Taliban Collapses as ISI Aid Slows - Secret ISI convoys of weapons and other supplies continue into November. [United Press International, 11/1/2001; Time, 5/6/2002] An anonymous Western diplomat will later state, "We did not fully understand the significance of Pakistan's role in propping up the Taliban until their guys withdrew and things went to hell fast for the Talibs." [New York Times, 12/8/2001]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Pervez Musharraf, Taliban, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Northern Alliance, Gary Berntsen
The New York Police and FBI are investigating the theft of over 250 tons of steel from the remains of the collapsed WTC towers. Apparently, the steel was hauled away by trucks involved in the official clear-up operation (see September 12-October 2001), but instead of being taken to Fresh Kills—the FBI-controlled dump on Staten Island where it was intended to go—the steel was driven to three independently-owned scrapyards, two in New Jersey and one on Long Island. The London Telegraph says the scrap metal value of the stolen steel would have been roughly $17,500. Investigators believe the theft was organized by one of New York's Mafia families. [Daily Telegraph, 9/29/2001] Consequently, on November 26, 2001, the city initiates use of an in-vehicle Global Positioning System (GPS), to monitor the locations of nearly 200 trucks removing steel from the WTC collapse site, at a cost of $1,000 per unit. This system sends out alerts if any truck travels off course or arrives late at its destination. One driver involved with the clear-up operation is subsequently dismissed simply for taking an extended lunch break. [Access Control and Security Systems, 7/2002]
Entity Tags: World Trade Center, New York City Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation
British Prime Minister Tony Blair says, "I have seen absolutely powerful incontrovertible evidence of [Osama bin Laden's] link to the events of the 11th of September." However, he says that because "much of this evidence comes to us from sensitive sources, from intelligence sources," there is a question over how much of it can be made public. [BBC, 9/30/2001; Daily Telegraph, 10/1/2001] Three days later, the two British opposition leaders meet for a 45-minute confidential briefing with Blair, where he shows them this evidence. Following this briefing, Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy says he now accepts there is "compelling evidence" of Bin Laden's guilt. [Daily Telegraph, 10/4/2001; Guardian, 10/4/2001] Blair refers to the evidence he has seen on October 4, 2001, when he presents to Parliament a paper indicating that al-Qaeda is responsible for 9/11 (see October 4, 2001), but again he says that because of sensitivity issues, "It is not possible without compromising people or security to release precise details." [CNN, 10/4/2001]
Entity Tags: Tony Blair, Al-Qaeda, Charles Kennedy, Osama bin Laden
Several media outlets report that, in addition to other transactions, the hijackers received $100,000 wired from Pakistan to two accounts of Mohamed Atta in Florida (see also Summer 2001 and before and Early August 2001). [ABC News, 9/30/2001; CNN, 10/1/2001; Fox News, 10/2/2001; Associated Press, 10/2/2001] For example, CNN says, "Suspected hijacker Mohamed Atta received wire transfers via Pakistan and then distributed the cash via money orders bought here in Florida. A senior law enforcement source tells CNN, the man sending the money to Atta is believed to be Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh." [CNN, 10/6/2001; CNN, 10/7/2001; CNN, 10/8/2001] The story will also be mentioned by Congressman John LaFalce at a hearing before the House of Representatives' Committee on Financial Services. [US Congress, 10/3/2001] However, Pakistan, a nuclear power, has already become a key US ally in the war on terror (see September 13-15, 2001). ISI Director Mahmood Ahmed, who is found to have had several telephone conversations with Saeed (see Summer 2000), is replaced (see October 7, 2001), and the story soon disappears from view (see September 24, 2001-December 26, 2002).
Entity Tags: Saeed Sheikh, Mohamed Atta
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11
The local vice president of the air traffic controllers' union checks with a manager at the FAA's New York Center whether anyone has listened to an audio tape that was recorded on September 11, on which several controllers recalled their experiences of the attacks, and is assured that the tape is going to be destroyed. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ] Union Vice President Asks about Tape - Within a few hours of the 9/11 attacks, Kevin Delaney, the New York Center's quality assurance manager, tape-recorded witness statements from six controllers at the center that had been involved in handling or tracking two of the hijacked aircraft (see 11:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; Washington Post, 5/6/2004; Air Safety Week, 5/17/2004] On at least two occasions over the following few months, the local vice president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)—the controllers' union—asks Delaney whether anyone has listened to the tape of those statements. (Delaney will later recall that he speaks with the union vice president about the tape in October 2001 and again in February 2002.) Delaney Says He Will Destroy Tape - Delaney, who is the custodian of the tape, assures the union vice president that no one has listened to the tape, and it is not going to be provided to anyone. He also says he will "get rid of it" once the center's formal accident package, which will include the controllers' written statements about the 9/11 attacks, has been completed (see November 2001-May 2002). [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ] Center Manager Gave Similar Assurance - Before the taping of the six controllers commenced on September 11, New York Center manager Mike McCormick had given similar assurances to Mark DiPalmo, the local NATCA president. DiPalmo agreed to the recording going ahead on the condition that the tape would only be a temporary record until written statements were obtained, after which it would be destroyed (see (Shortly Before 11:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; New York Times, 5/6/2004] Tape-Recording Statements Not Standard Procedure - The Washington Post will report that, according to union officials representing air traffic controllers, the tape-recording of controllers' accounts of an accident is almost unheard of, and the normal procedure is for controllers to provide written statements after reviewing radar and other data. [Washington Post, 5/7/2004]
Entity Tags: Kevin Delaney, National Air Traffic Controllers Association
An emergency preparedness conference was originally scheduled, prior to 9/11, to take place some time this month at the World Trade Center. It was going to include a discussion on terrorism. Reportedly, "One of the topics they were going to talk about was the danger of collapsing buildings." Further details, such as who was organizing the event, are unknown. [Florida Times-Union, 9/12/2001]
Category Tags: Other Events
The 9/11 attacks result in significant extra funding for the Pentagon. Since 1993, the building has been undergoing major renovations. These were scheduled to be complete by 2014. But in October 2001 this is declared to be too long to leave major areas of the building unprotected, and Congress soon appropriates $300 million so the renovations will be finished four years sooner. Also that month, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz approves a $15 million package to protect command centers and other critical areas of the building against chemical, biological, and radiological attack. A road, Route 110, had been considered a security threat, as it ran within 40 yards of some of the most sensitive areas of the Pentagon. Previously, the possibility of moving it had been dismissed as too expensive, but now $40 million is promptly found to cover the cost of rerouting it, along with making other road-security improvements. Before 9/11, the renovation of the Pentagon was already the largest reconstruction project in the world, costing $2.1 billion. But, as the Washington Post reports in September 2003, following the attack on the Pentagon, "the renovation mushroomed and now encompasses about $5.3 billion worth of projects in and around the Pentagon." In an e-mail on October 1, 2001, Pentagon Renovation Program manager Lee Evey writes, "Recent events have shaken up complacency and there is unprecedented willingness" among the services to do whatever Paul Wolfowitz and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld want. [Washington Post, 9/7/2003; Vogel, 2007, pp. 472-473]
Entity Tags: Lee Evey, Paul Wolfowitz, Pentagon
Reports this month indicate that many hijacker e-mails have been recovered. USA Today reports many unencrypted e-mails coordinating the 9/11 plans written by the hijackers in Internet cafes have been recovered by investigators. [USA Today, 10/1/2001] FBI sources say, "[H]undreds of e-mails linked to the hijackers in English, Arabic and Urdu" have been recovered, with some messages including "operational details" of the attack. [Washington Post, 10/4/2001] "A senior FBI official says investigators have obtained hundreds of e-mails in English and Arabic, reflecting discussions of the planned September 11 hijackings." [Wall Street Journal, 10/16/2001] However, in April 2002, FBI Director Mueller says no documentation of the 9/11 plot has been found. By September 2002, the Chicago Tribune reports, "Of the hundreds, maybe thousands, of e-mails sent and received by the hijackers from public Internet terminals, none is known to have been recovered." [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/2002] The texts of some e-mails sent by Mohamed Atta from Germany are published a few months later. [Chicago Tribune, 2/25/2003]
Entity Tags: Mohamed Atta, Robert S. Mueller III, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Between October 2001 and September 11, 2002, the US Army's Military History Detachment works on the US Department of Defense's own book recording the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon. The 305th and 46th Military History Detachments interview every willing survivor and witness from the Pentagon attack. More than 1,000 witnesses are interviewed. The findings are to be published in book form, and kept at the Army Center of Military History in Washington, DC. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 12/16/2001; Fox News, 12/17/2001; Juniata Magazine (Juniata College), 9/2002; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/11/2002] The Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense will eventually publish a 250-page book in September 2007, which is based on many of these witness interviews (see September 2007). [Fayetteville Observer, 9/13/2007; Washington Post, 9/27/2007]
Entity Tags: Pentagon, Military History Detachment
A poster to help law enforcement officers locate the missing "black boxes" in the WTC debris. [Source: FBI/Smithsonian Institution]According to two men who work extensively in the wreckage of the World Trade Center, three of the four black boxes from Flight 11 and Flight 175 are actually found during this month, but the public is not told. New York City Firefighter Nicholas DeMasi will mention the finding in a book published in 2003. He claims to drive federal agents on an all-terrain vehicle during their search and to see the found boxes himself. The Philadelphia Daily News will report on the story in 2004 when another rescue worker, volunteer Mike Bellone, backs up DeMasi's account and claims to have seen one of the boxes as well. Spokesmen for the FBI and the New York City Fire Department will deny the claims of these two workers. [Philadelphia Daily News, 10/28/2004] In 2005, it will be reported: "A source at the National Transportation Safety Board, the agency that has the task of deciphering the data from the black boxes retrieved from crash sites—including those that are being handled as crimes and fall under the jurisdiction of the FBI—says the boxes were in fact recovered and were analyzed by the NTSB. 'Off the record, we had the boxes,' the source says. 'You'd have to get the official word from the FBI as to where they are, but we worked on them here.'" An NTSB spokesperson denies that the FBI ever gave them the boxes. [CounterPunch, 12/19/2005]
Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Nicholas DeMasi, Mike Bellone, National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York City Fire Department
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation, 9/11 Investigations, WTC Investigation
The Library Tower in Los Angeles. It is later renamed the US Bank Tower. [Source: Kim D. Johnson / Associated Press]9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) attempts to organize a follow up attack to the 9/11 attacks. Beginning in October 2001, KSM and Hambali, a top al-Qaeda leader in Southeast Asia, recruit four operatives for the new plot, all of them Malaysian: Mohamad Farik Amin (a.k.a. Zubair). Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie). Zaini Zakaria. Masran bin Arshad. The plan is for these operatives to blow up the doors to airplane cockpits using shoe bombs, take over flying the aircraft, and then crash them into US buildings—essentially the same technique as was used in the 9/11 attacks, except with the addition of the shoe bomb and the use of East Asians instead of Middle Easterners. Apparently several buildings are initially targeted. KSM will later name them as the Library Tower in Los Angeles (later renamed the US Bank tower), the Sears Tower in Chicago, the Empire State Building in New York, and a tall building in Washington State. But the plot soon focuses on just the Library Tower, the tallest building on the West Coast of the US, due to a lack of pilots. The members of the plot go to Afghanistan and swear an oath of loyalty to Osama bin Laden, and then continue to train with Hambali in Asia. However, the plot does not go far because Zakaria, the only trained pilot of the group (see (Spring 2000)), drops out in late 2001, saying he has small children to consider. In February 2002, bin Arshad, the leader of the four operatives, is arrested and other other members decide the plot has been canceled. Zakaria turns himself in to Malaysian authorities in 2002, and apparently remains in detention in Malaysia without being charged. Amin and Bin Lep will be arrested in 2003 with Hambali and taken into US custody (see August 12, 2003). Amin, Bin Lep, and Hambali will all be transferred to Guantanamo prison as high-value detainees in 2006 (see September 2-3, 2006). It is unknown who arrests bin Arshad or what becomes of him. [Time, 10/5/2003; Time, 10/6/2003; White House, 2/9/2006; Associated Press, 2/10/2006; US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 ]
Entity Tags: Mohamad Farik Amin, Masran bin Arshad, Hambali, Zaini Zakaria, Al-Qaeda, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep
Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Mohamed Daki. [Source: ANSA]Three weeks after 9/11, German investigators question Mohamed Daki, a Moroccan. Daki came to Germany on a student visa, but he never enrolled in college, instead associating with radical Islamists at the Al-Quds mosque in Hamburg. Daki admits that he knows members of the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell and that hijacker associate Ramzi bin al-Shibh was registered as his roommate in 1997 and 1998 (see December 1997-November 1998), but in retrospect, it appears he lies about some other things. The Germans let him go and do not investigate him any further. The New York Times will later report that "officials now concede they also lost track of him. And, apparently, his name was not added to any international list of suspicious persons." Involved in Militant Activity in Italy - In the spring of 2002, Daki will move to Milan, Italy, another center of al-Qaeda activity. Italian investigators believe Daki eventually joins an al-Qaeda-related operation to recruit fighters in Europe to fight against US forces in Iraq. In March 2003, Italian intelligence will monitor a call to Daki from Abderazek Mahdjoub in Syria. Mahdjoub also has ties to the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell, and had been under investigation in Germany since 2000, if not earlier (see 2000). Investigators believe he headed the al-Qaeda cell in Milan while living in Hamburg. Mahdjoub will tell Daki that he and others have been detected: "Listen to me attentively. Wait for my call. Move yourself to France and await orders." In April, Daki and some of his associates will be arrested in Italy. Italian officials will say that only after these arrests do they find out the intelligence Germany had on them, including their links to the 9/11 plotters. One Hamburg police investigator will later comment, "Looking back, I would say that we should have asked more pointed questions [about Daki] than we did." [New York Times, 3/22/2004] Convicted in Italy - In 2005, Daki will be acquitted on charges of sending fighters to oppose US-led forces in Iraq, when the Italian judge argues that it is not illegal to send "guerrillas" to fight there. But in 2007, this decision will be overturned and Daki will be sentenced to four years in prison. [La Repubblica (Rome), 10/24/2007]
Entity Tags: Mohamed Daki, Abderazek Mahdjoub, German intelligence community
Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, who was prime minister of Yemen at the time of the USS Cole attacks, tells the Guardian: "Khalid Almihdhar was one of the Cole perpetrators, involved in preparations. He was in Yemen at the time and stayed after the Cole bombing (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998) for a while, then he left." [Guardian, 10/15/2001]
Entity Tags: Abd al-Karim al-Iryani
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar
A suicide truck-bomb attack on the provincial parliamentary assembly in Indian-controlled Kashmir leaves 36 dead. It appears that Saeed Sheikh and Aftab Ansari, working with the ISI, are behind the attacks. [Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 3/3/2002; Vanity Fair, 8/2002] Indian intelligence claims that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is later given a recording of a phone call between Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Maulana Masood Azhar and ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed in which Azhar allegedly reports the bombing is a "success." [United Press International, 10/10/2001]
Entity Tags: Mahmood Ahmed, National Security Agency, Pervez Musharraf, Maulana Masood Azhar, Aftab Ansari, India, Saeed Sheikh
It is reported that "a worldwide hunt is under way for 14 young Muslims said to have been trained in secret to fly Boeing airliners at an air base in Afghanistan. A senior pilot for the Afghan state-owned airline Ariana has told how he and four colleagues were forced by the Taliban regime to train the men who are now thought to be hiding in Europe and the United States. The fourteen men, seven of whom are said to speak fluent English, are described as 'dedicated Muslim fanatics' who spoke of being involved in a holy war. They are thought to have left Afghanistan a year ago. All had close links with the Taliban and some had fought for the regime." [Evening Standard, 10/1/2001]
Entity Tags: Taliban
It is reported that soil and groundwater around the spot where Flight 93 crashed show no signs of jet fuel contamination. About a week after 9/11, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) started taking soil samples from the 50-foot hole dug around the crash crater, to check for contamination by the plane's fuel and other hazardous materials. Three test wells have also been sunk to monitor groundwater. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/17/2001; WTAE-TV, 10/2/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/3/2001] According to the National Transportation Safety Board, Flight 93 had about 37,500 lb of fuel remaining when it crashed. [National Transportation Safety Board, 2/13/2002, pp. 8 ] Some of the first people who arrived at the crash site reported that there was an "incredibly strong" and "overpowering" smell of jet fuel in the air. [Longman, 2002, pp. 213; Kashurba, 2002, pp. 32, 40, 43 and 64] Yet, so far, no contamination has been found in either the soil or the groundwater. Betsy Mallison, a spokeswoman for the DEP, says that whether it burned away or evaporated, much of the jet fuel spilled at the site seems to have dissipated. [WTAE-TV, 10/2/2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 10/3/2001] DEP Secretary David Hess says most of the hazardous fluids must have been consumed by the crash's fire. [Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 9/17/2001] Yet some of the first people who arrived at the site say they only saw a very small fire, if any at all, at the crash crater. [Longman, 2002, pp. 213; McCall, 2002, pp. 30-31]
Entity Tags: David Hess, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Betsy Mallison
A classified FBI report on this date indicates that alleged hijacker associate Osama Basnan has long-time links to both the bin Laden family and the Saudi government. The report states that Basnan has "been determined to have known Osama bin Laden's family in Saudi Arabia and to have telephonic contact with members of bin Laden's family who are currently in the US." It also states, "The possibility of [Basnan] being affiliated with the Saudi Arabian Government or the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service is supported by [Basnan] listing his employment in 1992 as the—." Unfortunately, the rest of that sentence remains redacted. The report further notes that the fact that in July 2001 Basnan moved into the same San Diego apartment building where hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and hijacker associate Omar al-Bayoumi lived right after al-Bayoumi moved away "could indicate he succeeded Omar al-Bayoumi and may be undertaking activities on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia" (see June 23-July 2001). The FBI report, which will be obtained by the website Intelwire.com in 2008, is heavily redacted, and all mentions of Basnan's name appear to be redacted. However, one can sometimes determine when Basnan is being referred to. For instance, the same paragraph that mentions his link to the bin Laden family also says the same person with that link hosted a party for Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman in 1992, and press reports have indicated that person was Basnan (see October 17, 1992). [Federal Bureau of Investigation, 10/3/2001 ]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Osama Basnan, Omar Abdul-Rahman, Omar al-Bayoumi
Category Tags: Bayoumi and Basnan Saudi Connection, Alhazmi and Almihdhar
A confidential list of people suspected of helping the al-Qaeda terrorist network leaks out on the Internet. The list of 370 individuals was put together by the FBI and European security agencies, and had been circulated to central banks and government financial authorities cooperating in the fight against terrorism. The 22-page document is posted on the website of Finland's Financial Supervision Authority, RATA. [Daily Telegraph, 10/5/2001; United Press International, 10/11/2001] It is the most extensive list of its kind yet made public by authorities anywhere in the world. [Helsingin Sanomat, 10/5/2001] Some of its entries include only a name. [United Press International, 10/11/2001] But, in many cases, aliases, last known addresses, dates of birth, and sometimes phone numbers are given. Many of the addresses are in the United States—with Florida featuring extensively—or Germany, particularly Hamburg. [Helsingin Sanomat, 10/4/2001; Daily Telegraph, 10/5/2001] More than 300 of the names on the list came from US sources, and are listed with US addresses or Social Security numbers. Out of the 370 individuals, all of whom have Arab names, the FBI and other security authorities have identified the nationalities of 163. Saudi Arabians form the largest group, with 59 being on the list. The FBI has been unable to identify the nationality of the other 207 individuals. According to UPI: "With the exception of the two Americans [on the list], all of those listed would have had to apply for American visas in their home countries to enter the United States legally. Yet the spreadsheet's sparse information seemed to indicate that the FBI apparently had been unable to locate the information that these applications normally would contain." At least 77 of those on the list lived near flight schools. Many of the individuals have aliases, with some having up to 20. [United Press International, 10/11/2001] The list includes all 19 of the alleged 9/11 hijackers, who are mostly listed as "possibly deceased." It also includes al-Qaeda conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui. It will be removed from the RATA website within 24 hours, at the recommendation of the Finnish data protection commissioner. The London Daily Telegraph cautions, "Like any police intelligence file," the list "is based on hearsay and unverified leads, and should have been kept strictly confidential to protect those falsely accused. It is far from clear whether the telephone numbers or email addresses are reliable." For example, "A random call to a suspect in Vero Beach, Florida, was answered by the receptionist of a commercial law firm, who angrily slammed down the receiver." [RATA, 10/3/2001 ; Daily Telegraph, 10/5/2001; Helsingin Sanomat, 10/5/2001]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, RATA, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
In a key speech about al-Qaeda's responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, British Prime Minister Tony Blair says that one of the hijackers played a "key role" in the 1998 African embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). Though he doesn't specify which one, he does say the individual was one of the three hijackers who were quickly identified after 9/11 as known al-Qaeda associates (see 9:53 p.m. September 11, 2001) and someone who had also played an important role in the USS Cole attacks (see October 14-Late November, 2000). [UK Prime Minister, 10/4/2001] Blair's description of this hijacker as being involved in the USS Cole and African Embassy attacks strongly suggests the person he is referring to is Khalid Almihdhar. Almihdhar allegedly had a hand in the Cole attack (see Early October 2001) and had links to one of the captured embassy bombers, Mohamed al-Owhali. Before the Cole attacks, al-Owhali stayed at an al-Qaeda communications hub in Yemen run by Almihdhar's father-in-law (see February 2001 and After). Additionally, al-Owhali met an al-Qaeda operative in Pakistan by the name of Khalid, although this may have been Khallad (aka Tawfiq bin Attash), or even Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [United State of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., Day 14, 3/7/2001; Guardian, 10/5/2001; CNN, 10/16/2001; Burke, 2004, pp. 174; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 222; Wright, 2006, pp. 309] It is also possible that the person alluded to in Blair's speech is Nawaf Alhazmi, who also had connections to the embassy bombings (see 1993-1999).
Entity Tags: Khallad bin Attash, Tony Blair, Salem Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ahmed al-Hada, Nawaf Alhazmi, Mohamed al-Owhali
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit, Yemen Hub, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, Other 9/11 Hijackers, Key Hijacker Events
Tony Blair presenting evidence on October 4, 2001. [Source: Associated Press]British Prime Minister Tony Blair publicly presents a paper containing evidence that al-Qaeda is responsible for the 9/11 attacks. [Los Angeles Times, 10/4/2001; Los Angeles Times, 10/5/2001] Secretary of State Powell and other US officials had promised on September 23 that the US would present a paper containing such evidence. [Los Angeles Times, 9/24/2001] However, the US paper is never released (see September 23-24, 2001). Apparently, the British paper is meant to serve as a substitute. [New Yorker, 5/27/2002] It begins, "This document does not purport to provide a prosecutable case against Osama bin Laden in a court of law." Nevertheless, it continues, "on the basis of all the information available [Her Majesty's Government] is confident of its conclusions as expressed in this document." [BBC, 10/4/2001] In his speech, Blair claims, "One of bin Laden's closest lieutenants has said clearly that he helped with the planning of the September 11 attacks and admitted the involvement of the al-Qaeda organization" and that "there is other intelligence, we cannot disclose, of an even more direct nature indicating guilt" of al-Qaeda in the attacks. [CNN, 10/4/2001; Time, 10/5/2001] There has been no confirmation or details since of these claims. Even though most of the evidence in the British paper comes from the US, pre-attack warnings, such as the August 6, 2001 memo (see August 6, 2001) to Bush titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US," are not included. In fact, Blair's paper states, "incorrectly, that no such information had been available before the attacks: 'After 11 September we learned that, not long before, bin Laden had indicated he was about to launch a major attack on America.'" [New Yorker, 5/27/2002]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Colin Powell, Tony Blair, Osama bin Laden
Bin Laden appears on Al Jareeza, in a taped statement broadcast shortly after US-led strikes on Afghanistan begin. [Source: Al Jazeera]In a recorded statement broadcast on television worldwide, Osama bin Laden issues a strongly worded message to the United States, but makes no claim of responsibility for 9/11. The recording is broadcast on the Al Jazeera television network within an hour of the first US strikes on Afghanistan, and is then shown by CNN. There is no date on the tape and no immediate way of determining where it was made. [New York Times, 10/8/2001] Bin Laden is shown sitting in a stone cave. His top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, appears at his side. [Associated Press, 10/8/2001] Referring to the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden says, "What the United States tastes today is a very small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years." He praises those responsible, saying, "I ask God Almighty to elevate their status and grant them paradise." [BBC, 10/7/2001] It is the first time he has spoken publicly about 9/11. But he makes no claim in his statement of having been responsible for the attacks. [Associated Press, 10/8/2001] He has previously explicitly denied responsibility for 9/11 (see September 16, 2001 and September 28, 2001). Bin Laden concludes his message warning, "[N]either the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Mohammed." [BBC, 10/7/2001] The following day, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer will tell reporters that, after watching this message, President Bush concluded that bin Laden "virtually took responsibility" for 9/11. [CNN, 10/8/2001]
Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden
The on-line Wall Street Journal article discussing the connections between Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, Saeed Sheikh, and Mohamed Atta. [Source: Public domain]ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed is replaced in the face of US pressure after links are discovered between him, Saeed Sheikh, and the funding of the 9/11 attacks. Mahmood instructed Saeed to transfer $100,000 into hijacker Mohamed Atta's bank account prior to 9/11. This is according to Indian intelligence, which claims the FBI has privately confirmed the story. [Press Trust of India, 10/8/2001; Times of India, 10/9/2001; India Today, 10/15/2001; Daily Excelsior (Jammu), 10/18/2001] The story is not widely reported in Western countries, though it makes the Wall Street Journal. [Australian, 10/10/2001; Agence France-Presse, 10/10/2001; Wall Street Journal, 10/10/2001] It is reported in Pakistan as well. [Dawn (Karachi), 10/8/2001] The Northern Alliance also repeats the claim in late October. [Federal News Service, 10/31/2001] In Western countries, the usual explanation is that Mahmood is fired for being too close to the Taliban. [London Times, 10/9/2001; Guardian, 10/9/2001] The Times of India reports that Indian intelligence helped the FBI discover the link, and says, "A direct link between the ISI and the WTC attack could have enormous repercussions. The US cannot but suspect whether or not there were other senior Pakistani Army commanders who were in the know of things. Evidence of a larger conspiracy could shake US confidence in Pakistan's ability to participate in the anti-terrorism coalition." [Times of India, 10/9/2001] There is evidence some ISI officers may have known of a plan to destroy the WTC as early as July 1999. Two other ISI leaders, Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz Khan and Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Usmani, are sidelined on the same day as Mahmood (see October 8, 2001). [Fox News, 10/8/2001] Saeed had been working under Khan. The firings are said to have purged the ISI of its fundamentalists. However, according to one diplomat, "To remove the top two or three doesn't matter at all. The philosophy remains.… [The ISI is] a parallel government of its own. If you go through the officer list, almost all of the ISI regulars would say, of the Taliban, 'They are my boys.'" [New Yorker, 10/29/2001] It is believed Mahmood has been living under virtual house arrest in Pakistan (which would seem to imply more than just a difference of opinion over the Taliban), but no charges have been brought against him, and there is no evidence the US has asked to question him. [Asia Times, 1/5/2002] He also has refused to speak to reporters since being fired [Associated Press, 2/21/2002] , and outside India and Pakistan, the story has only been mentioned infrequently in the media since. [Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 2/24/2002; London Times, 4/21/2002] He will reemerge as a businessman in 2003, but still will not speak to the media (see July 2003).
Entity Tags: Muzaffar Usmani, Mohamed Atta, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Northern Alliance, Mohammed Aziz Khan, Taliban, Saeed Sheikh, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Mahmood Ahmed, India, World Trade Center
Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq. [Source: ISI Public Relations]When Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf fires ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed on October 7, 2001 (see October 7, 2001), the US government and the international media hail the move as an attempt to purge Islamist extremists from the ISI. But authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment in a 2007 book, "But far from it being an attempt to come clean with the US, it was a move that further entrenched the extremist element in the military, as well as strengthening the hand of Musharraf." They point out that only Mahmood and Lt. Gen. Muzzaffar Usmani had the background and power base to stand up to Musharraf, and both of them are fired. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 317-319] The new ISI director is Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, a long-time friend of Musharraf. [Knight Ridder, 10/9/2001; Independent, 11/10/2001] While ul-Haq is presented as more moderate than Mahmood, media accounts from earlier in the year indicate that he is an Islamist extremist as well. He is quoted as saying, "There's the American New World Order and this world order," pointing to the Koran. "The whole of the globe belongs to Allah, and the whole of Allah's law has to be executed on the globe." [Boston Herald, 9/17/2001] And in a Newsweek profile, he proclaims that he is fighting a holy war for Allah, praising martyrdom and even saying that his forces in Kashmir have been aided by angels: "I have seen corpses where the heads were chopped off—not by man, but by angels." [Newsweek International, 2/19/2001] Musharraf also promotes two loyal allies, Lt. Gen. Mohammed Aziz Khan, and Gen. Mohammed Yusaf. Aziz Khan, who is promoted to chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (a mostly ceremonial position), has been particularly close to Islamist groups, and had previously convinced Musharraf not to clamp down on the Taliban and bin Laden in the face of US pressure. Yusaf is promoted to vice chief of army staff. Both are members of the Tablighi Jamaat movement, which advocates replacing Pakistan's civilian government with a clerical one. Sharifuddin Pirzada, Musharraf's legal counselor, will comment in 2007, "Although Musharraf had been presented to the outside world as leader since the coup of 1999, it was really a cabal of generals who had pitched in and elevated him. But after 9/11, those who acted as balances and power breaks were disposed of or died accidentally, leaving Musharraf preeminent." [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 317-319]
Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Sharifuddin Pirzada, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Muzaffar Usmani, Mahmood Ahmed, Ehsan ul-Haq, Tablighi Jamaat, Mohammed Aziz Khan
It is reported that the FBI and Justice Department have ordered FBI agents across the US to cut back on their investigation of the September 11 attacks, so as to focus on preventing future, possibly imminent, attacks. According to the New York Times, while law enforcement officials say the investigation of 9/11 is continuing aggressively, "At the same time… efforts to thwart attacks have been given a much higher priority." Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller "have ordered agents to drop their investigation of the [9/11] attacks or any other assignment any time they learn of a threat or lead that might suggest a future attack." Mueller believes his agents have "a broad understanding of the events of September 11," and now need "to concentrate on intelligence suggesting that other terrorist attacks [are] likely." The Times quotes an unnamed law enforcement official: "The investigative staff has to be made to understand that we're not trying to solve a crime now. Our number one goal is prevention." [New York Times, 10/9/2001] At a news conference the previous day, Ashcroft stated that—following the commencement of the US-led attacks on Afghanistan—he had placed federal law enforcement on the highest level of alert. But he refused to say if he had received any specific new threats of terrorist attacks. [US Department of Justice, 10/8/2001] The New York Times also reports that Ashcroft and Mueller have ordered FBI agents to end their surveillance of some terrorist suspects and immediately take them into custody. However, some agents have been opposed to this order because they believe that "surveillance—if continued for days or weeks—might turn up critical evidence to prove who orchestrated the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon." [New York Times, 10/9/2001] Justice Department communications director Mindy Tucker responds to the New York Times article, saying it "is not accurate," and that the investigation into 9/11 "has not been curtailed, it is ongoing." [United Press International, 10/9/2001]
Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, John Ashcroft, Mindy Tucker, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller III
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation
It is reported that Globe Aviation Services Corp., in charge of the baggage handlers for Flight 11 and all other American Airlines Flights at Boston's Logan Airport, have been cleared of any wrongdoing. Globe Aviation supervisors claim that none of the employees working that day was in the US illegally. Supposedly, no weapons were detected, but a baggage handler for Globe Aviation and American Airlines has told the FBI that one of the hijackers—believed to be either Wail or Waleed Alshehri—was carrying one wooden crutch under his arm when he boarded Flight 11. Crutches are apparently routinely scanned through X-ray machines. [Boston Globe, 10/10/2001]
Entity Tags: Logan International Airport, American Airlines, Globe Aviation Services Corp., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Wail Alshehri, Waleed Alshehri
The Bush administration asks the major US television networks to refrain from showing unedited video messages taped by Osama bin Laden. They agree. A Newsweek article is critical of the decision, pointing out that "all but one [of these networks] are controlled by major conglomerates that have important pending business with the government." The article openly questions if the media is "doing too much of the government's bidding" in reporting on 9/11. Says one expert, "I'm not saying that everything is a horrible paranoid fantasy, but my sense is there's an implicit quid pro quo here. The industry seems to be saying to the administration, 'We're patriotic, We're supporting the war, we lost all of this advertising, now free us from [business] constraints.'" [Newsweek, 10/13/2001]
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43), Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Events Leading to Iraq Invasion, Domestic Propaganda
Category Tags: Media
Suliman abu Ghaith in an October 2001 video. [Source: Al Jazeera]Al-Qaeda spokesperson Suliman abu Ghaith calls the 9/11 attacks a "good deed" and threatens new attacks. The statement is made public in a video broadcast on Al Jazeera on this day, but it was recorded a few days earlier. Abu Ghaith does not explicitly state that al-Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks, but he does not deny it either. He says: "The actions by these young men who destroyed the United States and launched the storm of planes against it have done a good deed. They transferred the battle into the US heartland. Let the United States know that with God's permission, the battle will continue to be waged on its territory until it leaves our lands, stops its support for the Jews, and lifts the unjust embargo on the Iraqi people who have lost more than one million children." [BBC, 10/10/2001] Several days later, he will make another video statement. He warns Muslims in the US and Britain not travel by plane or live in skyscrapers, and tells all non-Muslims to leave the Arabian Peninsula. [BBC, 10/14/2001]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Suliman abu Ghaith
Mohammed Heikal. [Source: Publicity photo]Mohammed Heikal, longtime Egyptian journalist, former government spokesman, and the "Arab world's foremost political commentator," expresses disbelief that bin Laden and al-Qaeda could have conducted the 9/11 attack without the US knowing. "Bin Laden has been under surveillance for years: every telephone call was monitored and al-Qaeda has been penetrated by American intelligence, Pakistani intelligence, Saudi intelligence, Egyptian intelligence. They could not have kept secret an operation that required such a degree of organization and sophistication." [Guardian, 10/10/2001]
Entity Tags: Mohammed Heikal, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism
It is reported that Attorney General John Ashcroft and his Justice Department is assuming control of all terrorism-related prosecutions from the US Attorney's office in New York, which has had a highly successful record of accomplishment in prosecuting cases connected to bin Laden. 15 of the 22 suspects listed on a most wanted terrorism list a month after 9/11 had already been indicted by the New York office in recent years. A former federal prosecutor says of the New York office, "For eight years, they have developed an expertise in these prosecutions and the complex facts that surround these groups. If ever there was a case where you'd want to play to your strength, this is it." [New York Times, 10/11/2001] A grand jury in the New York district began investigating the 9/11 attacks one week after 9/11. But media accounts of this grand jury's activity stop by late October 2001 and there appears to be no other grand jury taking its place (see September 18, 2001).
Entity Tags: US Department of Justice, Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties
According to an FBI report, "FBI investigators have officially concluded that 11 of the 19 terrorists who hijacked the aircraft on September 11 did not know they were on a suicide mission." "Unlike the eight 'lead' attackers, who were all trained pilots, they did not leave messages for friends and family indicating they knew their lives were over," and they did not have copies of Mohamed Atta's final prayer note (see September 28, 2001). Personal items found suggest the men thought they were taking part in a conventional hijacking and were preparing for the possibility of prison. [Observer, 10/14/2001] This is later contradicted by video filmed in Afghanistan in March 2001 showing several of the 11 non-lead hijackers proclaiming their willingness to die on an upcoming suicide mission (see (December 2000-March 2001)).
Dr. Eileen Preisser testifies before a congressional briefing. Dr. Preisser was one of four analysts in the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) supporting Able Danger in late 1999 and 2000 (see Fall 1999). While her testimony remains classified, the next day, Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT) gives a brief summary: "In a briefing we had yesterday, we had Eileen [Preisser], who argues that we don't have the data we need because we don't take all the public data that is available and mix it with the security data. And just taking public data, using, you know, computer systems that are high-speed and able to digest, you know, literally floors' worth of material, she can take relationships that are seven times removed, seven units removed, and when she does that, she ends up with relationships to the bin Laden group where she sees the purchase of chemicals, the sending of students to universities. You wouldn't see it if you isolated it there, but if that unit is connected to that unit, which is connected to that unit, which is connected to that unit, you then see the relationship. So we don't know ultimately the authenticity of how she does it, but when she does it, she comes up with the kind of answer that you have just asked, which is a little unsettling." [US Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, 10/12/2001] Note that according to some media accounts, the CIA monitored Mohamed Atta purchasing large quantities of chemicals in Germany in the spring of 2000 (see January-May 2000). Atta also sends a series of e-mails to the US in the spring of 2000, inquiring about flight school opportunities for himself and a "small group" of his associates (see January-March 2000). Dr. Preisser is apparently willing to testify about her role in how Able Danger uncovered Atta's name, but in September 2005 she is prohibited from publicly testifying before Congress (see September 21, 2005).
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Christopher Shays, Eileen Preisser
The US and Britain freeze the assets of 39 additional individuals and organizations designated by the US as connected to terrorism. $24 million is seized. The British also freeze the assets of 27 other entities named by the US in late September 2001 (see September 24, 2001). The new list includes 33 individuals and six organizations. Twenty-two of the individuals appeared on the FBI's latest "most wanted terrorists" list. Saudi multimillionaire businessman Yassin al-Qadi is named (see October 12, 2001). So is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who will later be identified as the mastermind of 9/11. Five of the names were al-Qaeda leaders on a United Nations list published in March 8, 2001, with a recommendation that all nations freeze their assets. Other countries froze the assets of those on that list before 9/11, but the US did not (see March 8, 2001). [Associated Press, 10/12/2001; Guardian, 10/13/2001; Los Angeles Times, 10/15/2001]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United Kingdom, United Nations, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Yassin al-Qadi
Yassin al-Qadi, a Saudi multimillionaire businessman, was officially declared a terrorist financier in October 2001 (see October 12, 2001). [Arab News, 9/26/2002] That same month, a number of employees at Ptech, a Boston-based computer company that al-Qadi and other individuals suspected of financing officially designated terrorist groups invested in (see 1994), tell the Boston FBI about the connections between Ptech and al-Qadi. However, FBI agents do little more than take their statements. A high-level government source later will claim the FBI does not convey the Ptech-al-Qadi link to Operation Greenquest, a Customs Department investigation into al-Qadi and other suspected financiers, and none of the government agencies using Ptech software are warned about the possible security threat Ptech represents. [Boston Globe, 12/7/2002; WBZ 4 (Boston), 12/9/2002] According to a private counterterrorism expert involved in investigating Ptech at the time, "Frighteningly, when an employee told [Ptech president Oussama Ziade] he felt he had to contact the FBI regarding al-Qadi's involvement in the company, the president allegedly told him not to worry because Yaqub Mirza, who was on the board of directors of the company and was himself a target of a [Greenquest] terrorist financing raid in March 2002 (see March 20, 2002), had contacts high within the FBI." [National Review, 5/27/2003] A Ptech investigation will finally begin in 2002 after more whistleblowers come forward (see May-December 5, 2002).
Entity Tags: US Customs Service, Yacub Mirza, Operation Greenquest, Yassin al-Qadi, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ptech Inc., Oussama Ziade
Category Tags: FBI 9/11 Investigation, 9/11 Investigations
The Bank of Nova Scotia gold vault, located under WTC Building 4, is examined in late October 2001. [Source: Leslie E. Robertson and Associates]Workers at Ground Zero discover large amounts of gold and other precious metals stored below the ruins of the WTC. As debris is removed they are able to access parts of the 16-acre WTC basement, which drops 70 feet below ground level. Precious metals are stored in numerous vaults within this area. The London Times says the quantity of these "has been a carefully guarded secret," but estimates $750 million of gold and silver in vaults belonging to the Comex metals trading division of the New York Mercantile Exchange. There appears to have been an attempt, since 9/11, to break into a Comex vault containing $200 million of precious metals belonging to the Bank of Nova Scotia. A government official involved in the recovery work says, "It looked like they used a blowtorch, a crowbar," but a bank spokeswoman denies there has been any attempted break-in. The banks later states that "All of the silver, gold, platinum, and palladium stored in its vaults at 4 World Trade Center" has been relocated to a depository in Brooklyn. Other gold is discovered in a service tunnel below WTC 5. According to the London Times, this was being transported through the tunnel on the morning of 9/11 (see (Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [New York Daily News, 10/31/2001; London Times, 11/1/2001; New York Times, 11/1/2001; Reuters, 11/17/2001]
Entity Tags: Comex
Mohamed Kamel Bellahouel is arrested and held for five months after investigators discover he worked at a restaurant where Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi sometimes ate lunch in South Florida. In a sworn statement, Michael Rolince, head of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section, says, "It is likely that Bellahouel would have waited on both Atta and Alshehhi since Bellahouel had worked at the restaurant for 10 months, and both Atta and Alshehhi were frequent patrons during shifts that Bellahouel worked." Rolince also alleges Bellahouel may have waited on a third hijacker, Saeed Alghamdi, and says that a cinema employee claims Bellahouel saw a film with a fourth hijacker, Ahmed Alnami. However, Bellahouel, who denies going to the cinema with Alnami, has trouble gaining access to the evidence used against him. His attorney comments, "They won't call it secret evidence and they won't call it classified, but they won't give it to you, either." He is held in prison without bond and without charge from October 15, 2001 to March 1, 2002. After he is released, US authorities attempt to deport him, as he entered the US as a student, but then dropped out of college and started work, marrying a US citizen in June 2001. His attorney says the problem is that he is a Muslim. "If he were a Catholic coming from Venezuela or Colombia, they would have let him adjust his immigration status." Bellahouel sues the government over his incarceration, but the case is shrouded in secrecy and the press only learns the case is ongoing due to a court error. [Miami Daily Business Review, 3/14/2003] For example, a journalist, who does not event know Bellahouel's name, attempts to attend a hearing in March 2003. But the court is closed. After some effort, the reporter finally finds the name in the electronic docket. When he tells a court official Bellahouel's name is on the docket, the official replies, "Is it? We'll have to fix that, too," and the name disappears. [Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 12/2004] In February 2004 the Supreme Court declines an appeal from Bellahouel to have an open hearing, and media organizations are prevented from accessing sealed court proceedings. [New York Times, 1/5/2004; CNN, 2/23/2004]
Entity Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Michael Rolince, Ahmed Alnami, Mohamed Kamel Bellahouel, Saeed Alghamdi, Mohamed Atta
Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Other Events
"The Financial Services Authority—Britain's main financial regulator—has cleared bin Laden and his henchmen of insider trading. There has been a widespread suspicion that members of the al-Qaeda organization had cashed in on the US attacks, dumping airline, aerospace and insurance company shares before September 11th. The Authority says that after a thorough investigation, it has found no hard evidence of any such deals in London." [American Public Media, 10/17/2001] On September 24, Belgium's Financial Minister had claimed there were strong suspicions that British markets may have been used for 9/11-related insider trading in early September. [CNN, 9/24/2001]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Financial Services Authority
The government releases flight control transcripts of three of the four hijacked planes [New York Times, 10/16/2001; New York Times, 10/16/2001; New York Times, 10/16/2001] ) . Strangely, Flight 93 is left out. Yet even the three released transcripts are incomplete (for instance, Flight 77's ends at least 20 minutes before it crashes), and certain events that are part of the official story do not show up on these transcripts.
Entity Tags: Bush administration (43)
Gen. Richard Myers, acting Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman on 9/11, says of 9/11, "You hate to admit it, but we hadn't thought about this." He was promoted from Vice-Chairman to Chairman three days after 9/11. [American Forces Press Service, 10/23/2001]
Entity Tags: Richard B. Myers
Governor of the United Emirates Central Bank Sultan Nasser al-Suwaidi first says that hijacker pilots Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi had accounts in the United Arab Emirates, but then later contradicts this saying that Atta did not have one. Initially, he admits that Atta had an account at a Citibank branch in Dubai, but says it was closed a year before the attacks. "Mohamed Atta was like any adult expatriate in the UAE," he says. The account was apparently busier than normal, with frequent transfers of $10,000 to $15,000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/20/2001; CNN, 10/22/2001] Although the existence of Alshehhi's account is confirmed (see July 1999-November 2000), al-Suwaidi denies Atta had an account a few days later. He says that his bank had confused Atta with an Afghan who had a similar name, but different photo, age, and occupation. "They are different people, different nationalities," he insists. The Afghan had an account with Citibank from 1997 to December 2000, but there were apparently no suspicious transfers to Afghanistan. [UAE Interact, 10/25/2001; Gulf News, 10/25/2001]
Entity Tags: Sultan Nasser al-Suwaidi, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta
Category Tags: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta
Hassan Almrei. [Source: Public domain via CBC]Hassan Almrei, a Syrian national and an associate of Nabil al-Marabh, is arrested in Canada. He was al-Marabh's Toronto apartment roommate in early 2001. Canadian authorities say Almrei's honey and perfume business in the Middle East helped finance al-Qaeda. Following a raid on his apartment, police say they confiscated computers and disks that hold information about Osama bin Laden, numerous images of bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members, a hijacking planner, diagrams of plane cockpits and military weapons, and copies of passports and official IDs. Within a week of his arrest, the Canadian government declares Almrei a "threat to national security" and announces its intention to deport him to Syria. The Federal Court of Canada will later agree with investigators that Almrei is a "a member of an international network of extremist individuals who support the Islamic extremist ideals espoused by Osama bin Laden," and was "involved in a forgery ring with international connections that produces false documents." The court will approve his deportation. [Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/27/2001; Toronto Sun, 1/14/2002; ABC News 7 (Chicago), 1/31/2002] Almrei will admit to attending training camps in Afghanistan and lying about his past to get into Canada as a refugee claimant in 1999, but will deny any link to al-Qaeda. As of late 2005, he will still be in a Canadian prison, appealing his deportation. He will say he fears death or torture if he is returned to Syria. [Toronto Sun, 10/20/2005] Almrei will be released from prison in Canada in December 2009 when he wins an appeal against the security certificate he is being held under. The judge, Justice Richard Mosley, says there were "reasonable grounds to believe that Hassan Almrei was a danger to the security of Canada when he was detained in 2001, [but] there are no longer reasonable grounds to believe that he is a security risk today." [Toronto Star, 12/15/2008]
Entity Tags: Hassan Almrei, Nabil al-Marabh, Richard Mosley, Canada
Category Tags: Nabil Al-Marabh
The German government issues an international arrest warrant for Zakariya Essabar, a member of the al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany, with a few of the 9/11 hijackers. Essabar left Germany to fly to Pakistan in late August 2001 (see Late August 2001). This is the third 9/11-related international warrant issued by Germany, following warrants for cell members Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Said Bahaji issued in late September 2001 (see September 21, 2001). [CNN, 10/19/2001] Essabar was seen in an al-Qaeda training camp in late September 2001 (see September 10, 2001). He has not been heard of since.
Entity Tags: Zakariya Essabar
Osama bin Laden admits "inciting" the 9/11 attacks in a controversial interview by the Qatar-based Al Jazeera TV station. The interview is conducted by Tayseer Allouni, Al Jazeera's Kabul correspondent. Allouni had discussed a possible interview of bin Laden with al-Qaeda about a week previously (see Mid-October 2001), but nothing further had been said and Allouni assumed the interview would not be conducted. Taken Blindfolded to Bin Laden - However, he is contacted by al-Qaeda representatives, who tell him they will take him to a story. He is blindfolded and driven around in circles outside Kabul for some time, until the car stops, the blindfold is taken off, and he finds himself in an unknown place, face-to-face with bin Laden. The al-Qaeda leader is wearing camouflage fatigues and has a sub-machine gun close by; there are other armed men present. Allouni is told he cannot use his own questions, but will ask a set of questions prepared by al-Qaeda. Bin Laden 'Ambiguously' Discusses Responsibility for 9/11 - The interview lasts for over an hour and covers several topics. On the key question of responsibility for 9/11, author Hugh Miles will point out that bin Laden speaks "ambiguously, seeming first to deny, then confirm, his involvement in the attacks." When asked about US allegations of his responsibility, bin Laden answers: "America has made many accusations against us and many other Muslims around the world. Its charge that we are carrying out acts of terrorism is unwarranted." However, a few seconds later he adds, "If inciting people to do that is terrorism, and if killing those who kill our sons is terrorism, then let history be witness that we were terrorists." He then says: "We kill the kings of the infidels, kings of the crusaders, and civilian infidels in exchange for those of our children they kill. This is permissible in Islamic law and logically." Allouni interrupts him and asks, "They kill our innocents, so we kill their innocents?" The reply is, "So we kill their innocents." Bin Laden also gives a vague non-answer to a question about his responsibility for the recent anthrax attacks in the US: "These diseases are a punishment from God and a response to oppressed mothers' prayers in Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and everywhere." Interview Not Broadcast - Al Jazeera decides not to broadcast the interview. Its media relations manager, Jihad Ballout, will later say the decision is taken because the questions Allouni was forced to ask came from bin Laden, and because "bin Laden was using Al Jazeera to give out a very edited and sanitized statement to his people. It was a message, a pure message." Neither does Al Jazeera inform CNN of the interview. However, western intelligence services will obtain it (see Before November 11, 2001) and it will eventually be broadcast on CNN in early 2002 (see January 31, 2002). [CNN, 2/5/2002; Miles, 2005, pp. 177-179, 182]
Entity Tags: Jihad Ballout, Al-Qaeda, Al Jazeera, Tayseer Allouni, Osama bin Laden
Mohammed Azmath, left, and Syed Gul Mohammad Shah/ Ayub Ali Khan, right. [Source: Associated Press]The New York Times reports that, although 830 people have been arrested in the 9/11 terrorism investigation (a number that eventually exceeds between 1,200 and 2,000 (see November 5, 2001), there is no evidence that anyone now in custody was a conspirator in the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, "none of the nearly 100 people still being sought by the [FBI] is seen as a major suspect." Of all the people arrested, only four, Zacarias Moussaoui, Ayub Ali Khan, Mohammed Azmath, and Nabil al-Marabh, are likely connected to al-Qaeda. [New York Times, 10/21/2001] Three of those are later cleared of ties to al-Qaeda. After being kept in solitary confinement for more than eight months without seeing a judge or being assigned a lawyer, al-Marabh pleads guilty to the minor charge of entering the United States illegally (see September 3, 2002) and is deported to Syria (see January 2004). There is considerable evidence al-Marabh did have ties to al-Qaeda and even the 9/11 plot (see September 2000; January 2001-Summer 2001; January 2001-Summer 2001; Spring 2001; Early September 2001). [Washington Post, 6/12/2002; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 8/27/2002] On September 12, 2002, after a year in solitary confinement and four months before he was able to contact a lawyer, Mohammed Azmath pleads guilty to one count of credit card fraud, and is released with time served. Ayub Ali Khan, whose real name is apparently Syed Gul Mohammad Shah, is given a longer sentence for credit card fraud, but is released and deported by the end of 2002. [Village Voice, 9/25/2002; New York Times, 12/31/2002] By December 2002, only 6 are known to still be in custody, and none have been charged with any terrorist acts (see December 11, 2002). On September 24, 2001, Newsweek reported that "the FBI has privately estimated that more than 1,000 individuals—most of them foreign nationals—with suspected terrorist ties are currently living in the United States." [Newsweek, 10/1/2001]
Entity Tags: Nabil al-Marabh, Al-Qaeda, Mohammed Azmath, Syed Gul Mohammad Shah, Zacarias Moussaoui, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Furious government intelligence officials accuse the NSA of destroying data pertinent to the 9/11 investigation. The details of the data involved remain unknown. They claim that possible leads are not being followed because of the NSA's lack of cooperation. [Boston Globe, 10/27/2001]
Entity Tags: National Security Agency
From left to right: Oded Ellner, Omer Marmari, and Yaron Shmuel. Three of the five accused Israelis briefly appear on Israeli television in November 2001 after being released and deported. [Source: Public domain via Israeli television] (click image to enlarge)Around this time intense political pressure is put on US officials holding five Israeli men arrested for suspicious behavior at the time of the 9/11 attacks (see 3:56 p.m. September 11, 2001). According to the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and two unidentified "prominent New York congressmen" lobby heavily for their release. According to a source at ABC News, well-known criminal lawyer Alan Dershowitz also becomes involved as a negotiator to help get the men released. (Dershowitz will later refuse to comment on the matter.) [CounterPunch, 2/7/2007] ABC News will later report that was "high-level negotiations between Israeli and US government officials" over the five men, resulting in a settlement. [ABC News, 6/21/2002] Apparently the political pressure will succeed because the men will be released a few weeks later (see November 20, 2001]).
Entity Tags: Sivan Kurzberg, Yaron Shmuel, Paul Kurzberg, Oded Ellner, Alan M. Dershowitz, Omer Marmari, Richard Armitage
Category Tags: 9/11 Investigations, Alleged Israeli Spy Ring
An air traffic controller at the FAA's New York Center who was recorded recalling her actions during the 9/11 attacks is denied a request to listen to her taped statement, possibly while she is preparing a written statement about the attacks. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ] Six controllers at the New York Center who communicated with, or tracked, two of the hijacked aircraft on 9/11 were recorded later that day giving their personal accounts of what happened (see 11:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 5/6/2004] Mike McCormick, the center's manager, told the union official representing these controllers that they would be able to use their taped statements to help them prepare written ones (see (Shortly Before 11:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Controller Told No One Can Hear Tape - However, when one of the controllers asks to listen to her own oral statement, she is told by Kevin Delaney—the New York Center's quality assurance manager, who is the tape's custodian—that the tape is not meant for anyone to hear. It is unclear if the controller wants to hear the tape to help her prepare a written statement about the attacks. According to a 2004 report by the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General (see May 6, 2004), she asks "to listen to the tape in preparing her written statement." The five controllers that were recorded on September 11 who subsequently provide written statements prepare those statements within three weeks of 9/11 (see (Between September 11 and October 2, 2001)), but, according to Delaney, this controller asks to listen to the tape in November 2001, which would be after the written statements are provided. Controller Requests Tape Again in 2003 - The tape of the controllers' statements will be destroyed at some point between December 2001 and February 2002 (see Between December 2001 and February 2002), without any of the controllers having listened to it. The controller who requests to hear her own recorded statement will again ask to listen to the tape around September or October 2003, when she is to be interviewed by the 9/11 Commission, but, as it has already been destroyed by then, the tape cannot be located. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; Air Safety Week, 5/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Kevin Delaney
The FAA's New York Center submits a "formal accident package" of evidence relating to the 9/11 attacks to FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, but a manager at the center deliberately excludes from it an audio tape on which several air traffic controllers recalled their experiences with the hijacked aircraft. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; Washington Post, 5/6/2004] This tape was created on September 11, shortly after the attacks occurred, when six controllers at the New York Center who communicated with, or tracked, two of the hijacked aircraft were recorded giving their personal accounts of what happened (see 11:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Washington Post, 5/6/2004] The tape was then logged into the center's formal record of evidence. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ] Evidence Package Required for Air Accidents - FAA policy requires that a formal accident package be provided for all aircraft accident investigations, including military investigations, when FAA air traffic facilities were, or may have been, involved in the accident. A formal accident package must include "all pertinent records, personnel statements, transcriptions of voice recordings, charts, operation letters, letters of agreement, and facility memoranda." [Federal Aviation Administration, 8/16/2000 ] Kevin Delaney, the New York Center's quality assurance manager, has had an argument with FAA headquarters over whether the events of 9/11 should be declared an aircraft accident or an incident. Less information needs to be provided in an incident package than in an accident package. But as the 9/11 attacks are deemed an accident, Delaney is supposed to provide the names of everyone involved in them, including those that died at the World Trade Center. He must also provide transcripts and other information relating to the status of the aircraft involved, which would not be included in an incident package. [9/11 Commission, 9/30/2003 ] Package Returned for Extra Work - The New York Center submits its formal accident package to FAA headquarters in November 2001, but the package is returned to the center the following month for additional work. It is re-sent and finalized in May 2002. Delaney Decides to Omit Tape - The formal accident package includes written statements about the 9/11 attacks that have been provided by controllers whose accounts were recorded on the audio tape (see (Between September 11 and October 2, 2001)). But Delaney makes a conscious decision not to also include that tape in the package. His reason for this, he will later say, is that including it would mean losing control of the tape, thereby being unable to keep a promise he made to the National Air Traffic Controllers Association that he would "get rid of" it (see October 2001-February 2002). At some point after the initial submission of the package, between December 2001 and February 2002, Delaney deliberately destroys the tape of the controllers' statements (see Between December 2001 and February 2002). [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ]
Entity Tags: New York Air Route Traffic Control Center, Kevin Delaney, Federal Aviation Administration
A classified report by the FBI's Investigative Services Division says: "In addition to frequent and sustained interaction between and among the hijackers of the various flights before September 11, the group maintained a web of contacts both in the United States and abroad. These associates, ranging in degrees of closeness, include friends and associates from universities and flight schools, former roommates, people they knew through mosques and religious activities, and employment contacts. Other contacts provided legal, logistical, or financial assistance, facilitated US entry and flight school enrollment, or were known from [Osama bin Laden]-related activities or training." [Sperry, 2005, pp. 67-68] But in June 2002, FBI Director Robert Mueller will contradict this, saying: "To this day we have found no one in the United States except the actual hijackers who knew of the plot.… As far as we know, they contacted no known terrorist sympathizers in the United States" (see June 18, 2002).
Category Tags: Possible Hijacker Associates in US, 9/11 Investigations, FBI 9/11 Investigation
When investigators search the home of Amer el-Azizi, a known al-Qaeda operative, they find an e-mail address that connects him to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). El-Azizi helped arrange a meeting between lead hijacker Mohamed Atta and an associate, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, in the run-up to 9/11 (see July 8-19, 2001), although he was monitored by Spanish authorities at the time (see Before July 8, 2001) and arrested in Turkey in 2000 (see October 10, 2000). His arrest shortly after 9/11 will be frustrated by Spanish intelligence (see October 2001 and Shortly After November 21, 2001) and he will go on to be involved in the 2004 Madrid bombings (see Before March 11, 2004 and 7:37-7:42 a.m., March 11, 2004). An indictment released in 2004 will say, "A fundamental document… connects Amer el-Azizi directly with those responsible for the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and concretely with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed via the e-mail address identified as firstname.lastname@example.com." The e-mail address "was being used by an individual who facilitated trips for al-Qaeda members in direct connection with [KSM], organizer of the attacks." A detainee will also later say that el-Azizi was in contact with the 9/11 plotters via e-mail. [Los Angeles Times, 4/29/2004] After 9/11, however, when the Spanish want to indict el-Azizi, the US will be reluctant to turn the information over to them, and it will take six months to get it. Despite this, problems persist in information sharing between the US and Spain and this has an impact on prosecutions (see Mid-2002-June 1, 2006). [Wall Street Journal, 5/4/2004]
Entity Tags: Amer el-Azizi, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, 9/11 Investigations
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani angers firefighters when he decides to severely reduce the number of them that can search for remains at Ground Zero. Until now, up to 300 firefighters at a time have been involved in the search and recovery effort. Giuliani's decision will mean no more than 25 at a time can do so in future. The International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) later alleges that, also at this time, Giuliani makes "a conscious decision to institute a 'scoop-and-dump' operation to expedite the clean-up of Ground Zero in lieu of the more time-consuming, but respectful, process of removing debris piece by piece in hope of uncovering more remains." So far, the bodies or remains of 101 firefighters have been recovered, out of the 343 who died at the World Trade Center on 9/11. According to the IAFF, the mayor refuses to even meet with local union presidents about the decision. Due to the ensuing public outcry, Giuliani will modify his policy and allow firefighters back on the pile at Ground Zero. The remains of another 113 firefighters will subsequently be found. The IAFF later alleges that "the mayor's switch to a scoop-and-dump coincided with the final removal of tens of millions of dollars of gold, silver and other assets of the Bank of Nova Scotia that were buried beneath what was once the towers" (see (Mid-October-mid November 2001)). "Once the money was out, Giuliani sided with the developers that opposed a lengthy recovery effort, and ordered the scoop-and-dump operation so they could proceed with redevelopment." [Firefighting News (.com), 3/8/2007; Bloomberg, 3/9/2007; Associated Press, 3/10/2007] IAFF President Harold Schaitberger later says, "in my opinion, it was more important for him [to] find the gold than it was to continue to find and recover remains." [MSNBC, 7/12/2007]
Entity Tags: Rudolph ("Rudy") Giuliani, International Association of Fire Fighters, New York City Fire Department
The Italian newspaper La Repubblica reports that Saddam Hussein's interpreter, known only by the alias A.S., claims Mohamed Atta was an agent of Mukhabarat, the Iraqi secret services. A.S. is sponsored by the Iraqi exile group the Iraqi National Congress (INC). He claims that it was Atta who planned the 9/11 attacks, not with bin Laden or the other 18 hijackers but with two officials of the Iraqi secret services: Farouk Hijazi, a former Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, and Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, a member of the Iraqi diplomatic corps in Prague, Czech Republic. [La Repubblica (Rome), 11/3/2001]
Entity Tags: Farouk Hijazi, Mohamed Atta, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani
Category Tags: Mohamed Atta
In the months following 9/11, Vice President Dick Cheney is frequently moved away to undisclosed locations, supposedly for security reasons (see September 12, 2001-2002). He will tell CBS News, "[W]e feel it's important, especially when the threat level goes up, to keep the president or myself separated." He suggests there is a risk that terrorists could "take out the entire leadership of our government." [CBS News, 11/14/2001] Yet, in spite of this supposed threat, Cheney goes ahead with a pheasant-hunting trip at the Paul Nelson Farm in South Dakota. He goes to this private retreat each year with friends, and on this occasion is joined by his daughter Mary. The trip had been planned before January this year, and the party has the entire facility to itself. [Associated Press, 11/5/2001; Washington Post, 11/19/2001; Hayes, 2007, pp. 363] CBS News's Gloria Borger later questions Cheney about this trip, saying, "The American people are on a terror alert. You're at an undisclosed location. Then the other week we learned that you went on a hunting trip. So did the Secret Service give you the all clear and say it's fine to do that?" Cheney replies, "Well, the key thing here was I was away from the president. I wasn't in the same location he was. We could not have both been eliminated at the same time by a terrorist attack." [CBS News, 11/14/2001]
Entity Tags: Mary Cheney, Richard ("Dick") Cheney
The Justice Department announces that it has put 1,182 people into secret custody since 9/11. Most all of them are from the Middle East or South Asia. [New York Times, 8/3/2002] After this it stops releasing new numbers, but human rights groups believe the total number could be as high as 2,000. [Independent, 2/26/2002] Apparently this is roughly the peak for secret arrests, and eventually most of the prisoners are released, and none are charged with any terrorist acts (see July 3, 2002; December 11, 2002). Their names will still not have been revealed (see August 2, 2002).
Entity Tags: US Department of Justice
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline, Civil Liberties
A US grand jury secretly indicts Saeed Sheikh for his role in the 1994 kidnapping of an American. The indictment is revealed in late February 2002. The US later claims it begins asking Pakistan for help in arresting and extraditing Saeed in late November. [Associated Press, 2/26/2002; Newsweek, 3/13/2002] However, it is not until January 9, 2002, that Wendy Chamberlin, the US ambassador to Pakistan, officially asks the Pakistani government for assistance. [Associated Press, 2/24/2002; CNN, 2/24/2002; Los Angeles Times, 2/25/2002] Saeed is seen partying with Pakistani government officials well into January 2002. The Los Angeles Times later reports that Saeed "move[s] about Pakistan without apparent impediments from authorities" up until February 5, when he is identified as a suspect in the Daniel Pearl kidnapping. [Los Angeles Times, 2/13/2002] The London Times reports: "It is inconceivable that the Pakistani authorities did not know where he was" before then. [London Times, 4/21/2002]
Entity Tags: Saeed Sheikh, Wendy Chamberlin, Daniel Pearl, Pakistan
A video still of bin Laden filmed during his interview with Hamid Mir in November 2001. [Source: National Geographic]Pakistani reporter Hamid Mir is taken blindfolded to a location somewhere in the mountains of Afghanistan to interview bin Laden. The sound of antiaircraft fire can be heard in the distance. Bin Laden looks paler and his beard is greyer. While he doesn't claim responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, he says that Muslims were behind it and that Muslims have the moral right to commit such attacks because they are done in self-defense. He says, "I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent." He also says, "This place may be bombed. And we will be killed. We love death. The US loves life. That is the big difference between us." [Reuters, 11/10/2001; Newsweek, 11/26/2001]
Entity Tags: Hamid Mir, Osama bin Laden
Italian police raid Youssef Nada's villa in Lugano, Italy. [Source: Keystone]The US and other countries announce the closure of the Al Taqwa Bank and the Al Barakaat financial network. President Bush says, "Al Taqwa and Al Barakaat raise funds for al-Qaeda. They manage, invest and distribute those funds." US officials claim that both entities skimmed a part of the fees charged on each financial transaction it conducted and paid it to al-Qaeda. This would provide al-Qaeda with tens of millions of dollars annually. Additionally, Al Taqwa would provide investment advice and transfer cash for al-Qaeda. Al Taqwa is based in Switzerland while Al Barakaat is based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Over 100 nations are said to be cooperating with efforts to block the funds of these two groups. [New York Times, 11/8/2001] Swiss authorities raid Al Taqwa-related businesses and the homes of bank leaders Youssef Nada, Ali Himmat, and Ahmad Huber, but no arrests are made. In January 2002, Nada will announce that the Al Taqwa Bank is shutting down, due to bad publicity after the raids. He will maintain that he and his organization are completely innocent. [Newsweek, 11/7/2001; Reuters, 1/10/2002] Days after 9/11, Huber called the 9/11 attacks "counterterror against American-Israeli terror," the World Trade Center a "the Twin Towers of the godless," and the Pentagon "a symbol of Satan," yet he will claim to have no ties to the attackers. [Playboy, 2/1/2002; Newsweek, 3/18/2002] In searching Nada's house, Swiss authorities discover a document entitled "The Project," which is a strategic plan for the Muslim Brotherhood to infiltrate and defeat Western countries (see December 1982). By late 2002, both the US and UN will declare Al Taqwa Bank, Nada, and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin, another founder and director of the bank, supporters of terrorism. All of their accounts will be declared frozen worldwide. [US Department of the Treasury, 8/29/2002] However, while Al Taqwa itself will be shut down, later reports will indicate that other financial entities operated by the directors will continue to operate freely (see June-October 2005).
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, US Department of the Treasury, Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Himmat, Al Taqwa Bank, George W. Bush, Youssef Nada, Ahmad Huber, Al Barakaat
In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush states, "We must speak the truth about terror. Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the attacks of September the 11th; malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame away from the terrorists, themselves, away from the guilty." [US President, 11/19/2001]
Entity Tags: UN General Assembly, George W. Bush
Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism, Media
Aysel Senguen. [Source: CBC]Authorities in the US discover a letter apparently written by Flight 93 hijacker Ziad Jarrah. It is believed the four-page letter, dated September 10, was written just hours before the 9/11 attacks. It is part of a package Jarrah mailed from the US to his Turkish girlfriend Aysel Senguen, a medical student living in the western German city of Bochum. The letter says, "I have done what I had to do.… You should be very proud, because it is an honor and in the end you will see that everyone will be happy." It adds, "Hold on to what you have until we see each other again." The package arrived in Germany shortly after September 11. However, due to Jarrah having made an error in writing the address, it was returned to the US and ended up in the hands of the FBI. Oddly, considering the letter is supposedly Jarrah's farewell to Senguen, the rest of his package reportedly includes papers about his flight training and scuba-diving instructions. It is believed to also contain some small presents. Ziad's uncle Jamal Jarrah says he thinks the letter is fabricated, and that it is suspicious that the address on it contained a mistake, as Ziad had known his girlfriend for five years and would not have made such an error. [Associated Press, 11/17/2001; Los Angeles Times, 11/18/2001; Observer, 11/18/2001; Daily Telegraph, 11/18/2001; BBC, 11/19/2001]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jamal Jarrah, Aysel Senguen, Ziad Jarrah
For the first time, a major newspaper publishes an article strongly suggesting Flight 93 was shot down. The Philadelphia Daily News quotes numerous eyewitnesses who believe the plane was shot down. The FBI has reported a half-ton piece of an engine was found "a considerable distance" from the main crash site. "That information is intriguing to shootdown theory proponents, since the heat-seeking, air-to-air Sidewinder missiles aboard an F-16 would likely target one of the Boeing 757's two large engines." The article concludes, "No one has fully explained why the plane went down, or what exactly happened during an eight-minute gap from the time all cell phone calls from the plane stopped and the time it crashed." [Philadelphia Daily News, 11/15/2001]
Atif Ahmed, an alleged co-conspirator of Zacarias Moussaoui, is arrested in London, but is released soon after. Ahmed was named as an associate by Moussaoui in August (see August 17, 2001) and the arrest follows a search of his flat, which produces enough evidence for an arrest warrant. The FBI works closely on the case with the New York Police Department and London police, and evidence about Ahmed comes from various parts of the FBI's 9/11 investigation. Investigators also find a phone call that suggests Ahmed and Moussaoui were working together. [ABC News, 11/14/2001] However, Ahmed is released a few days later and British security sources will later describe Ahmed as a minor figure in the London Islamist underground. [Financial Times, 9/19/2002] Moussaoui will later claim that Ahmed is a British agent and had foreknowledge of 9/11 (see July 25, 2002).
Entity Tags: Atif Ahmed, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Zacarias Moussaoui
Category Tags: Zacarias Moussaoui
Khaled al-Harbi (right) talking to Osama bin Laden or one of his doubles. [Source: US Department of Defense]A conversation between Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda spokesman Suliman abu Ghaith, and Khaled al-Harbi, a veteran of al-Qaeda's jihad in Bosnia, is videotaped. A portion of the taped conversation is later said to be found by the US and will be used as evidence of bin Laden's involvement in 9/11. [Unknown, 2001; Guardian, 12/13/2001; Kohlmann, 2004, pp. 28-9] According to a translation released by the Pentagon, the man said to be bin Laden says: "[W]e calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most optimistic of them all… (inaudible)… due to my experience in this field, I was thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all the floors above it only. This is what we had hoped for." He continues: "We had notification since the previous Thursday that the event would take place that day. We had finished our work that day and had the radio on. It was 5:30 p.m. our time.… Immediately, we heard the news that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. We turned the radio station to the news from Washington.… At the end of the newscast, they reported that a plane just hit the World Trade Center.… After a little while, they announced that another plane had hit the World Trade Center. The brothers who heard the news were overjoyed by it." [US Department of Defense, 12/13/2001 ] The release of the tape, which is said to be found by US intelligence officers in Jalalabad, will be a major news story, and the tape will be taken by the media as proof of bin Laden's responsibility for 9/11. President Bush will comment, "For those who see this tape, they'll realize that not only is he guilty of incredible murder, he has no conscience and no soul, that he represents the worst of civilization." British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw will add, "By boasting about his involvement in the evil attacks, bin Laden confirms his guilt." [BBC, 12/14/2001; Fox News, 12/14/2001; CNN, 12/16/2001] However, the tape will later be disputed from three points of view: The accuracy of the translation will be questioned (see December 20, 2001). For example, the man thought to be bin Laden does not say "we calculated in advance the number of casualties," but "we calculated the number of casualties"; An analyst will conclude that the tape was actually made earlier as a part of a US-run sting operation (see (September 26, 2001)); Some commentators will question whether the person in the video is actually bin Laden (see December 13, 2001). In mid-2002, Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda will allegedly interview al-Qaeda figures Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see April, June, or August 2002). In a 2003 book he will co-write, Fouda will claim that he asked an unnamed al-Qaeda operative who was setting up the interview if the bin Laden video was fake. This person will supposedly reply: "No. The tape, the brothers said—I am not sure whether they left it behind or not—but the Sheikh [bin Laden], yes, was talking to someone from Mecca." [Fouda and Fielding, 2003, pp. 135]
Entity Tags: Jack Straw, George W. Bush, Khaled al-Harbi, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bush administration (43), Suliman abu Ghaith, Yosri Fouda
Oded Ellner, one of the five Israelis arrested on 9/11. [Source: Public domain via Israeli television]The five Israelis arrested on 9/11 for videotaping the WTC attack and then cheering about it (see 3:56 p.m. September 11, 2001) are released and deported to Israel. Some of the men's names had appeared in a US national intelligence database, and the FBI has concluded that at least two of the men were working for the Mossad, according to ABC News. However, the FBI says that none of the Israelis had any advanced knowledge of the 9/11 attacks, and they were released as part of a deal between the US and the Israeli government. After their release, they claim to have been tortured. [Forward, 3/15/2002; ABC News, 6/21/2002]
Entity Tags: Sivan Kurzberg, Paul Kurzberg, Oded Ellner, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (Mossad), Israel, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Omer Marmari, Yaron Shmuel
The remains of all but one of the people on board Flight 77, including the hijackers, are identified. However, the identities of the hijackers have still not been confirmed through their remains, and the FBI does not provide DNA profiles of the hijackers to medical examiners for identification. [NFPA Journal, 11/1/2001; Washington Post, 11/21/2001; Mercury, 1/11/2002] As of mid-2004, there still have been no reports that the hijackers' remains have been identified by their DNA, except possibly for two unnamed hijackers.
The Boston Globe reports information strongly suggesting that at least one hijacker was inside each of the cockpits when the hijackings began. An airplane captain theorizes how they took control: "The most likely scenarios are something that was swift, where the pilots couldn't have changed their transponder code and called the controllers. You think four times in one morning one of those crews would have done that. That means they had to be upon them before they could react." On practice flights before 9/11, the hijackers repeatedly obtained access to cockpits by various methods. Perhaps the most important method was jumpseating, which allows certified airline pilots to use a spare seat in the cockpit when none is available in the passenger cabin. Airlines reciprocate to help pilots get home or to the city of their originating flight. Officials say they do not believe any of the hijackers were jumpseating on 9/11 despite media reports to the contrary. However, since 9/11 the FAA has banned the practice unless a pilot works for the airline in whose cockpit that person wants to ride. [Boston Globe, 11/23/2001] The 9/11 Commission later concludes that the hijackers didn't use jumpseating because they couldn't find any paperwork relating to jumpseat requests.
Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, 9/11 Commission
The Washington Post reports that "[a]t least 60 young Israeli Jews have been arrested and detained around the country on immigration charges since the September 11 attacks, many of them held on US government officials' invocation of national security." An INS official who requested anonymity says the use of the term "special interest" for Israelis being held in Cleveland, St. Louis, and other places means the case in question is "related to the investigation of September 11th." [Washington Post, 11/23/2001] Most of them are deported. However, Intelligence Online claims that "For the overwhelming majority of the ring's members expelled, there was no problem at all with visas, and in the lists we only found a few minor cases of expired visas."" [Agence France-Presse, 3/6/2002]
Entity Tags: US Immigration and Naturalization Service
Category Tags: Alleged Israeli Spy Ring
The German government arrests Mounir El Motassadeq in Hamburg on the "urgent suspicion of supporting a terrorist group." El Motassadeq, a Moroccan student, is believed to be part of al-Qaeda's Hamburg cell, along with a few of the 9/11 hijackers. After 9/11, he did not attempt to leave Germany, and he was under surveillance for weeks before his arrest. He fell under suspicion when investigators discovered that he had power of attorney over a bank account in the name of 9/11 hijacker Marwan Alshehhi. [Washington Post, 11/29/2001] El Motassadeq will be charged with a role in the 9/11 plot in late 2002 (see August 29, 2002). He will be convicted in 2003 (see February 18, 2003).
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Marwan Alshehhi, Mounir El Motassadeq
Mahfouz Walad Al-Walid. [Source: Globalsecurity.org]Al-Qaeda leader Mahfouz Walad Al-Walid (a.k.a. Abu Hafs the Mauritanian) gives the only media interview by any al-Qaeda leader besides bin Laden in the months after the 9/11 attacks. Speaking to an Al Jazeera reporter in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he says, "We are not responsible for [the 9/11 attacks] and therefore we are not responsible for religious explanations for it. That's on the one hand. However, many clerics have issued clear religious rulings [in this matter]… and have proved that if this act was carried out by mujaheddin Muslims, then it was an unblemished act of jihad." He also adds, "In the US there are [agencies] legally responsible for safeguarding the security of America and the Americans. It is they who should be held accountable.… Where were these apparatuses when these things occurred? These apparatuses have satellites, ground stations, millions of spies, and huge budgets. It is said that they know what is happening in the bedrooms, that they know the shoe sizes of the wanted [men]. How did a group of people manage to stay for years, to train inside the US, and to plan this operation?" [Al Jazeera, 11/30/2001]
Entity Tags: Mahfouz Walad Al-Walid
The New York Times will later report that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) hides in Qatar for two weeks with the support of some members of the Qatari royal family. KSM stays there "with the help of prominent patrons" after fleeing from Kuwait. One of the Qatari royals sheltering KSM is possibly Abdul Karim al-Thani, who has repeatedly sheltered Islamist militant leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and given passports and more than $1 million to al-Qaeda. It is also possible that KSM may have received help from Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, who is Qatar's Interior Minister by this time and who allowed KSM live on his farm for several years until 1996 (see January-May 1996). CIA Director George Tenet is reportedly infuriated, but no action is taken. In fact, the US military will base its headquarters for the Iraq war in Qatar (see March 28, 2003). [New York Times, 2/6/2003]
Entity Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abdul Karim al-Thani, Abdallah bin Khalid al-Thani, Al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
In September 2002, shortly after the arrest of al-Qaeda leader Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Karachi, Pakistan (see September 11, 2002), the New York Times will report: "Even before Mr. bin al-Shibh's arrest, European officials warned that al-Qaeda appeared to have shifted much of its operations in Pakistan to Karachi. A year ago, 90 percent of communications and other links between suspected al-Qaeda members in Europe and individuals in Pakistan were traced to the city of Peshawar, near the Afghan border, a European law enforcement official said. As of this spring, roughly half of intercepted communications and other links were being traced to Karachi." A European diplomat comments, "Obviously the brains and money for the terrorists have shifted from Peshawar to Karachi." [New York Times, 9/15/2002] Presumably many of the communications to Peshawar involve al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida, considered a key communications hub and who has been monitored by a number of intelligence agencies, including the French, since at least 1998 (see October 1998 and After). Zubaida moves from his long-time base in Peshawar to the Pakistani city of Faisalabad after 9/11 and is captured there in March 2002 (see March 28, 2002). Al-Qaeda leaders Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh are interviewed in Karachi around June 2002, a fact that is quickly shared with US intelligence (see June 14, 2002 and Shortly After).
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, Abu Zubaida, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
A manager at the FAA's New York Center deliberately destroys an audio tape that was made on September 11, on which several of the center's air traffic controllers recounted their interactions with the hijacked aircraft. [New York Times, 5/6/2004; Washington Post, 5/7/2004] Within hours of the 9/11 attacks, Kevin Delaney, the New York Center's quality assurance manager, was instructed to make the tape recording, on which six controllers at the center involved in handling or tracking two of the hijacked aircraft recalled their experiences of what happened (see 11:40 a.m. September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 10/1/2003 ; Washington Post, 5/6/2004; Air Safety Week, 5/17/2004] Crushes Cassette, Cuts Tape into Small Pieces - But a few months later, some time between December 2001 and February 2002, Delaney destroys the tape. He will later recall that he does so by "crushing the cassette case in his hand, cutting the tape into small pieces, and depositing the pieces in trash cans throughout the center." A Department of Transportation (DOT) report in 2004 will point out, "It is clear [Delaney] went to great lengths to destroy the tape so that it would never leave the center intact." Superiors Not Consulted - Delaney disposes of the tape of his own volition, and without consulting his superiors. However, Mike McCormick, the New York Center manager, will later say that, had Delaney asked for his permission to destroy the tape, he would have given it, since he viewed the tape as only a temporary record. Two Reasons for Destroying Tape - Delaney will later tell DOT investigators that he destroys the tape for two reasons. Firstly, he considers the creation of the tape to have been contrary to FAA policy for aircraft accidents and incidents, which requires that handwritten statements be made after controllers are able to review certain materials, such as radio transmissions and radar data. (The DOT investigators will dispute this conclusion (see May 6, 2004).) He therefore feels the tape is of limited value relative to the controllers' written statements (see (Between September 11 and October 2, 2001)). Secondly, Delaney feels the controllers were distressed on 9/11, and therefore not in the correct frame of mind to properly consent to the taping. He bases this assessment partly on what he has seen on television crime shows, about due process and legal rights associated with investigations. But the 2004 DOT report will state, "Under FAA policy, and as supported by air traffic policy experts at FAA headquarters, the tape should have been considered an original record and retained for five years." A former criminal investigator will comment, "Ray Charles [the blind musician] could see that this was a cover-up." Others Not Notified - Delaney destroys the tape without anyone having listened to, copied, or transcribed it. He will not inform the New York Center's management that he has destroyed the tape until he is asked about it in September 2003, following inquiries by the 9/11 Commission. Materials the New York Center prepares for submission to the Commission will even include a chain-of-custody index that mistakenly indicates the tape still exists. And prior to an investigation by the DOT's Office of Inspector General in late 2003 and early 2004, apparently no one outside the New York Center will be aware of the existence of the tape, or of its destruction. Union Told Tape Would Be Destroyed - Delaney previously assured the local vice president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) that he would "get rid of" the tape once the center's formal accident package had been completed (see October 2001-February 2002). (This package has now been submitted to FAA headquarters (see November 2001-May 2002).) But Delaney will tell DOT investigators that he did not feel under any pressure from NATCA to destroy the tape. McCormick made a similar agreement with the local NATCA president, that the tape would be destroyed after written statements had been obtained from the controllers (see (Shortly Before 11:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but Delaney is unaware of this. No Regrets - Delaney apparently has no subsequent regrets about destroying the tape. He will later say that, under similar circumstances, he would again follow the same course of action. [US Department of Transportation, 5/4/2004 ; Air Safety Week, 5/17/2004]
Entity Tags: Kevin Delaney, Mike McCormick
A sample of WTC steel eroded and corroded due to eutectic formations. [Source: FEMA]The Journal of the Minerals, Metals and Materials Society (JOM) reports that the examination of a beam from the remains of WTC Building 7—which collapsed late in the afternoon of 9/11 (see (5:20 p.m.) September 11, 2001)—has revealed "unexpected erosion" of the steel. The article states: "The formation of the eutectic mixture of iron oxide and iron sulfide lowers the temperature at which liquid can form in this steel. This strongly suggests that the temperatures in this region of the steel beam approached around 1,000°C, forming the eutectic liquid by a process similar to making a 'blacksmith's weld' in a hand forge." [Barnett, Biederman, and Sisson, 12/2001] The New York Times will call this "perhaps the deepest mystery uncovered in the investigation." [New York Times, 2/2/2002] FEMA's World Trade Center Building Performance Study, released in May 2002 (see May 1, 2002), will add that the same "unusual erosion patterns" have been observed in a sample of the remaining structural steel from one of the Twin Towers. It will state, "This sulfur-rich liquid penetrated preferentially down grain boundaries of the steel, severely weakening the beam and making it susceptible to erosion." FEMA is unable to explain this phenomenon, saying, "The severe corrosion and subsequent erosion… are a very unusual event. No clear explanation for the source of the sulfur has been identified.… It is possible that this is the result of long-term heating in the ground following the collapse of the buildings. It is also possible that the phenomenon started prior to collapse and accelerated the weakening of the steel structure." [Federal Emergency Management Agency, 5/1/2002, pp. C-1 - C-13] Despite FEMA's call for further research, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will make no mention of the eutectic formations in its final report into the WTC collapses, released in late 2005, following its three-year investigation. [National Institute of Standards and Technology, 9/2005, pp. 13]
Entity Tags: National Institute of Standards and Technology, World Trade Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency
With help from the US, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, a German and Syrian citizen believed to be a member of the al-Qaeda Hamburg cell with three of the 9/11 hijackers, is taken in secret to Syria. He had been arrested while visiting Morocco (see October 27-November 2001). When the German government learns of the arrest and transfer, it strongly protests the move. After his arrival in Syria, according to a former fellow prisoner, Zammar is tortured in the Far' Falastin, or "Palestine Branch," detention center in Damascus. [Daily Telegraph, 6/20/2002; Washington Post, 12/26/2002; Human Rights Watch, 6/2004] The center is run by military intelligence and reportedly is a place "where many prisoners remain held incommunicado." [Washington Post, 1/31/2003] His Syrian interrogators are reportedly provided with questions from their US counterparts. [Human Rights Watch, 6/2004] This is alleged by Murhaf Jouejati, Adjunct Professor at George Washington University, who tells the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States that, "Although US officials have not been able to interrogate Zammar, Americans have submitted questions to the Syrians." [911 Commission, 7/9/2003] In the "Palestine Branch" prison, Zammar is locked up in cell number thirteen. According to Amnesty International, the cell measures 185 cm long, 90 cm wide and less than two meters high. Zammar is said to be about six feet tall and now "skeletal" in appearance. [Amnesty International, 10/8/2004]
Entity Tags: Mohammed Haydar Zammar
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell
The CIA realizes that a reported visit by Mohamed Atta to Prague, Czech Republic, was actually made by a Pakistani businessman with a similar name (see May 31, 2000), not by the 9/11 hijacker. Hijacker Atta's alleged Prague visit was used to bolster the theory that he met an Iraqi intelligence agent there in April 2001 (see September 14, 2001), and that Iraq was connected to 9/11. The Pakistani arrived on May 31, 2000 and was deported, as he did not have a Czech visa. Hijacker Atta arrived two days later on his way to the US on a Czech visa that came into effect on June 1. Shortly after 9/11, it was thought that Atta's business in Prague in May 2000 was so urgent that he had to fly into the airport and be deported one day before his visa came into effect (note: the theory was that he must have met someone at the airport while waiting for his deportation flight). However, investigation by the CIA, Czech and German authorities finds that the May 30 entry was made by a namesake, not the hijacker. [Chicago Tribune, 8/29/2004]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Mohamed Atta
Category Tags: Mohamed Atta, Mohamed Atta
Key Events
Day of 9/11
The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases
Projects and Programs
Before 9/11
Warning Signs: Specific Cases
The Post-9/11 World
Investigations: Specific Cases
Other Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures
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