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The anthropological record indicates that approximately 85 per cent of human societies have permitted men to have more than one wife (polygynous marriage), and both empirical and evolutionary considerations suggest that large absolute differences in wealth should favour more polygynous marriages. Yet, monogamous marriage has spread across Europe, and more recently across the globe, even as absolute wealth differences have expanded. Here, we develop and explore the hypothesis that the norms and institutions that compose the modern package of monogamous marriage have been favoured by cultural evolution because of their group-beneficial effects—promoting success in inter-group competition. In suppressing intrasexual competition and reducing the size of the pool of unmarried men, normative monogamy reduces crime rates, including rape, murder, assault, robbery and fraud, as well as decreasing personal abuses. By assuaging the competition for younger brides, normative monogamy decreases (i) the spousal age gap, (ii) fertility, and (iii) gender inequality. By shifting male efforts from seeking wives to paternal investment, normative monogamy increases savings, child investment and economic productivity. By increasing the relatedness within households, normative monogamy reduces intra-household conflict, leading to lower rates of child neglect, abuse, accidental death and homicide. These predictions are tested using converging lines of evidence from across the human sciences.
1. Introduction
Approximately 85 per cent of societies in the anthropological record permit men to marry multiple wives [1]. Taking wives is always positively associated with status, wealth or nobility [2], even among highly egalitarian foraging societies [3]. After the origins of agriculture, as human societies grew in size, complexity and inequality, levels of polygynous marriage intensified, reaching extremes in the earliest empires whose rulers assembled immense harems [4,5]. Today, however, with absolute wealth gaps greater than any seen in human history, monogamous marriage is both normative and legally enforced in most of the world's highly developed countries. While the roots of the package of norms and institutions that constitute modern marriage can be traced back to classical Greece and Rome [6,7], the global spread of this peculiar marriage system [6] has occurred only in recent centuries, as other societies sought to emulate the West, with laws prohibiting polygyny arriving in 1880 in Japan, 1953 in China, 1955 in India and 1963 in Nepal. Given its historical rarity and apparent ill-fit with much of our evolved psychology, why has this marriage package spread so successfully? Historically, the emergence of monogamous marriage is particularly puzzling since the very men who most benefit from polygynous marriage—wealthy aristocrats—are often those most influential in setting norms and shaping laws. Yet, here we are.
This paper develops and tests the hypothesis that the modern package of norms and institutions that constitutes monogamous marriage has been shaped by cultural evolution driven by inter-group competition—a set of processes termed cultural group selection [8]. The idea is that competition among communities—such as nations, polities or religious organizations—favours those norms, values, beliefs, practices and institutions that most effectively harness, reinforce and shape our motivations and behaviour in ways that generate success in inter-group competition. Over centuries, these processes can lead to the spread of social norms and institutions (formal and informal) that create societal-level benefits and reduce aggregate societal costs, thereby giving an edge in inter-group competition. Inter-group competition need not result in violent conflict as such processes can produce a differential diffusion of beliefs, norms and institutions from more successful to less successful societies [8,9]. This aspect of cultural group selection may be particularly important for spread of normative monogamy.
Researchers from biology to history have long noted the puzzle of monogamous marriage, and suggested that such norms spread because of their group-beneficial effects [6,10]. While historians considering the puzzle have shown how the European historical record is at least consistent with a process driven by cultural group selection, little work has focused on developing and testing predictions regarding how normative monogamy impacts individual psychology, or how (if at all) those effects aggregate up to impact groups (though see Moorad et al. [11]). Thus, our effort here focuses in developing the broader theoretical and empirical issues, rather than in detailing historical cases.
We pursue this hypothesis as follows. First, we distinguish mating strategies from marriage systems, and clarify which aspects of our evolved psychology can be harnessed or reinforced by cultural group selection, and which aspects need to be suppressed. Second, we develop a set of testable hypotheses and their empirical implications. We predict that imposing monogamous marriage reduces male reproductive competition and suppresses intra-sexual competition, which shrinks the size of the pool of low-status, risk-oriented, unmarried men. These effects result in (i) lower rates of crime, personal abuse, intra-household conflict and fertility, and (ii) greater parental investment (especially male), economic productivity (gross domestic product (GDP) per capita) and female equality. We draw on both longitudinal and cross-sectional evidence from diverse disciplines. In some cases, we provide solid empirical tests of specific predictions or implications. In other cases, the available evidence provides only qualified support, basic consistency or prima-facie plausibility. As usual, future work may find the theory wanting and specific hypotheses wrong. In closing, we (i) contrast the conditions favourable to the spread of monogamous versus polygynous marriage, (ii) consider alternative hypotheses for the spread of monogamous marriage, and (iii) speculate on how marriage systems might be linked to the rise of democratic institutions and industrial economic growth.
2. Building blocks
It is crucial to recognize that marriage norms are not the same as our evolved mating psychology. Humans, like all primates, possess an evolved psychology that influences our choices regarding mates, mating, reproduction and parental investment. For established evolutionary reasons, male and female mating psychologies differ in important ways. As in other primates, these different mating strategies yield a mating system (or range of systems), as individuals cooperate and compete under different ecological and economic circumstances (see electronic supplementary material). Here, we first summarize key points about human mating strategies, and then discuss marriage systems. Our approach considers how specific marriage systems might be favoured by cultural group selection because of how they harness aspects of our evolved psychology.
(a) Mating strategies
There is much evidence that the mating strategies of men and women differ. Like many mammals, human females invest more heavily in their offspring than males. Humans also pair-bond [12,13]—both monogamously and polygamously—in collaborations that encourage more extensive male parental investment and a division of labour. This means that men generally have higher variance in fitness than women [14]. When competition for mates is fierce, less-attractive low-status men risk being shut-out entirely from mating. Since the fitness difference between having one long-term mate and zero mates is—on average—large, low-status males should often pursue risky, high-stakes, strategies that provide some chance of avoiding fitness oblivion [15]. This means that cues that indicate intensive intra-sexual selection should spark competitive motivations, steep temporal discounting and risk proneness. Low intra-sexual competition means that nearly all males can find at least one mate, and status gains do not lead to steep increases in reproductive success. Here, pursuing safe, long-term strategies like pair-bonding is favoured—that is, men will be more risk-averse and more patient. All fathers must decide whether to invest in their offspring or in seeking additional mates. This decision should depend on paternity certainty, and on the marginal payoffs to investing in offspring versus additional matings. When the rich high-status men cannot easily gain additional mates, they should invest more in offspring (see electronic supplementary material).
Women also possess flexible mating strategies. However, their direct fitness is limited to the number of children that they can bear and rear. For our purposes, when males vary substantially in status (based on skill, resources, power, etc.), women prefer higher status males as long-term pair-bonded partners, though they may also seek 'good genes' via extra-pair copulations when pair-bonded to a low-quality male. Polygynous pair-bonding is more acceptable to women than is polyandrous pair-bonding to men. Polyandrous men face paternity uncertainty—they are rather uncertain about which children are theirs—and must compete for their mate's limited reproductive capacities (gestation, lactation, etc.). Polygynously mated women face neither maternal uncertainty nor (usually) competition for their mate's essentially unlimited sperm. This implies that under conditions in which men vary substantially in status, polygynous pair-bonding is a likely outcome of both male and female mating choices. The electronic supplementary material further details and supports these points.
(b) Marriage systems
Marriage systems are distinct from mating strategies. Humans, unlike other species, are heavily reliant on cultural learning for acquiring all manner of behaviours and practices, including social behaviour. Because humans also acquire the standards by which they judge others as part of this process, cultural evolution gives rise to social norms. Failure to conform to norms results in reputational damage, loss of status and various forms of sanctioning [16].
Different societies have evolved diverse sets of norms that regulate pair-bonds. Such marriage norms influence people's long-term pair-bonds, and thus their mating choices. Being married comes with economic, social and sexual expectations, prescriptions and prohibitions for both parties, who are accordingly evaluated—formally or informally—by their community. Marriage norms govern such areas as who (i) can marry whom (e.g. exogamy, incest taboos), (ii) pays for the marriage ritual, (iii) gets the children in the event of the groom's or bride's death, and (iv) is a 'legitimate' heir and can inherit property, titles, etc. Marriage norms also specify rules about partner number and arrangement (e.g. no group marriages). The key to understanding marriage versus pure pair-bonding is recognizing the role of a community in defining, sanctioning and enforcing marriage norms. This element of human social life is routinely missed in non-cultural approaches to monogamy [17,18].
Marriage norms are certainly not independent of our mating psychology, nor can they entirely subvert it. They can, however, influence behavioural patterns in two ways. First, humans readily internalize social norms, at least partially. This means norms become internalized such that norm adherence is intrinsically rewarding [16]. Work in neuroscience has shown how both adhering to local norms and punishing norm violators activates the brain's reward circuitry [19]. Second, the fact that people acquire and internalize norms means that norm violators can be condemned and sanctioned [20]. Sanctioning, independent of any internalization, results in norm violators suffering real costs. Thus, many marriage systems have culturally evolved to reinforce our evolved pair-bonding strategy, leading to more enduring male–female collaborations. This galvanizing effect of some marriage systems is thrown into stark relief by the existence of alternative systems like those possessed by (i) the Na in China, whose norms suppress long-term pair-bonding and operate without either marriage or paternal investment [21] or (ii) various South American societies, whose norms allow the spreading of perceived paternity, and paternal investment, across two or more fathers [22].
Of course, the prescriptions and prohibitions of marriage systems (sets of norms) and the actual mating patterns in human societies often do not match up—nor should we expect them to. Consider that some societies possess marriage norms specifying that each man and woman shall marry once in their lifetime. After marriage they shall never seek any sexual or romantic relationship with anyone else, ever, and all resources must be devoted to the good of the household. As with other norm violations like theft and lying, this never quite works out, as our evolved mating psychology gives rise to broad societal-level patterns of infidelity, divorce, prostitution, etc. But there is little doubt that particular marriage systems shape and influence the resultant mating patterns, as well as parental investment. In nineteenth century Europe, for example, non-marital fertility was so slight as to be demographically negligible despite substantial rates of late marriage and of adults who never married [23]. Thus, social norms are powerful enough to buttress our pair-bonding psychology, such that most people in a society have only one long-term mate, or to curtail almost all long-term pair-bonding, or to allow women to actively seek extra-pair copulations while repressing male jealously.
Marriage systems found throughout the anthropological record reflect and amplify aspects of our mating psychology. As noted, most human societies permit polygynous marriage in some form, including most foraging societies [3,24]. In polygynous societies, a man's social status, hunting skill, nobility and wealth lead to more wives [25].The autocratic leaders of chiefdoms, empires and early states ranging from Tonga to China consistently assembled immense harems with 100 or more women/girls [5]. Meanwhile, polyandrous marriage is relatively rare, often involves brothers marrying the same wife, and is frequently intermixed with polygynous marriages within the same population (see the electronic supplementary material).
The 15 per cent or so of societies in the anthropological record with monogamous marriage fall into two disparate categories: (i) small-scale societies inhabiting marginal environments with little status distinctions among males and (ii) some of history's largest and most successful ancient societies. Researchers have labelled these 'ecologically imposed' and 'socially imposed' forms of monogamous marriage [6,7,26]. Ecologically imposed monogamy occurs because the societies lack sufficiently large differences in male wealth or status to motivate women to become second wives. Socially imposed monogamy covers situations in which norms or laws regulate spousal number (along with inheritance and divorce rights), including circumstances in which a noble class forcibly imposes monogamous marriage on commoners while retaining polygyny for themselves (see the electronic supplementary material).
3. Theory and evidence
We hypothesize that as social inequalities expanded over human history and societies became increasingly complex, the group-level benefits of normative monogamous marriage increased. In relatively egalitarian societies, including most foragers, the social implications of polygynous marriages are minor. Few men in these societies achieve sufficient status to attract additional wives, and if they do, this is typically limited to one [27]. Among these foraging groups, very successful men might rarely obtain three or at most four wives [28]. For example, among tropical African foragers, the rates of polygyny range from 3 to 20 per cent [29]. Often, there are fewer older men than women due to male mortality in hunting accidents and violent conflicts, so polygynous marriages soak up any 'extra' women (for an exception see Marlowe [27]).
As the wealth and inequality of societies increased over the course of societal evolution, our evolved psychology operating through within-group cultural evolutionary processes increased the degree of polygynous marriage among the richest and most powerful men [4,28]. This increase in polygynous marriage would have led to predictable effects (see below). In the most complex societies (high-end states [30]), where a society's competitive success is influenced by its economic output, standing armies, innovation rates, trade, division of labour and offspring quality, higher rates of polygynous marriage reduce a society's competitive success. Under these conditions, normative monogamy increases a society's competitiveness because of how it influences crime rates, male motivations, paternal investment, fertility and economic production. Lower crime rates favour more commerce, greater investment, more freely flowing information, greater economic production and a finer division of labour. Greater paternal investment and lower fertility favour higher quality offspring. Several of these factors favour greater innovation and more rapid economic growth.
(a) Monogamous marriage reduces the intensity of intrasexual competition
In this section, we present and empirically assess a series of inter-related hypotheses about how the extent and intensity of polygynous marriages negatively impact a group's success, stability or competitive ability, and clarify the effects created by normative monogamy. When we refer to 'normative monogamy' below, we mean to refer to the package of norms and laws governing modern marriage, not only to rules about spousal number. In particular, the customs and laws regulating divorce (e.g. division of assets) and inheritance are important. In referring to 'polygyny', we mean 'general' or 'non-sororal' polygyny [1], which does not limit men's spousal choices to the real or classificatory sisters of one's current wife (see electronic supplementary material).
Our approach predicts that increasing the extent and intensity of polygynous marriage increases male intrasexual competition. This implies that opportunities for sexual selection will be higher in more polygynous societies. Norms and institutions requiring monogamous marriage—or reducing polygyny—should reduce the strength of sexual selection. Here, we review two lines of evidence indicating that normative monogamy reduces intra-sexual competition. First, we present evidence indicating that the intensity of intra-sexual competition declined when monogamous marriage was gradually imposed on nineteenth century Mormon communities. Then, we show that the intensity of intrasexual competition is lower in normatively monogamous societies drawn from a sample of 18 societies with diverse marriage norms.
Data from Mormon communities between 1830 and 1890 show that intra-sexual competition declined dramatically as governmental forces suppressed polygynous marriage [11] through a series of civil, legal, legislative, financial and military manoeuvres that began in the 1840s and had mostly ended by 1890, when the Latter-day Saints church officially disavowed the practice of plural marriage. The estimated ratio of the opportunities for sexual selection on males (Im) versus that on females (If) provides a key measure. In 1830, Im/If was 2.4, which means that males faced nearly two-and-half times the selective intensity faced by females. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, this ratio had dropped and levelled off at 1.17, indicating that men faced only slightly more competition than women. The size of intrasexual competition had dropped by more than eight times during the period when monogamous marriage was imposed. Bateman gradients, which provide a different measure, tell the same story [11].
While this analysis is consistent with our hypothesis, it cannot causally isolate the effect of the imposition of monogamous marriage on intra-sexual competition because many other historical processes occurred over the same time period. However, further support emerges from comparing the Im/If ratios from diverse societies [14], where the arrays of particular historical processes differ. The 1830 Mormon value of 2.4 for Im/If is similar to that observed in other polygynous societies [14], such as the Yanomano of Venezuela (2.11), Arabs in Chad (2.28), or the Dogon (2.47) in Mali. The value of 1.17 among the late-nineteenth century American Mormons falls between the 1.25 of contemporary Americans and the 0.81 of historical Finland (1745–1900). Figure 1 contrasts the amount of sexual competition in societies with normative monogamy and those without it. When Im/If > 1, males face more reproductive competition than females; the larger Im/If, the fiercer is the competition. The mean values of Im/If for these two subsamples indicate that opportunities for sexual selection (mate competition) are 6.4 times greater in societies lacking normative monogamy.
This combination of longitudinal and cross-sectional evidence converges to suggest that normative monogamy does indeed reduce intrasexual competition. Next, we examine whether this competitive suppression actually results in lower crime rates.
(i) Implication: normative monogamy reduces crime
One important implication of suppressed intrasexual competition should be reduced crime. By expanding the pool of unmarried men and elevating the degree of intrasexual competition, more polygynous marriages will increase men's discounting of the future and risk-taking, resulting in more socially undesirable behaviours. Faced with high levels of intra-sexual competition and little chance of obtaining even one long-term mate, unmarried, low-status men will heavily discount the future and more readily engage in risky status-elevating and sex-seeking behaviours. This will result in higher rates of murder, theft, rape, social disruption, kidnapping (especially of females), sexual slavery and prostitution. As a by-product, these men will probably engage in more substance abuse. Even among high-status males, competition can intensify if the fitness gradient remains steep. This can lead to risky bids for political power motivated by the possibility of acquiring harems. By contrast, normative monogamy drains the pool of low-status unmarried men resulting in lower rates of social ills, including reduced rates of crime, social disruption and substance abuse.
To see why even a small increase in polygyny leads to a substantial increase in men without mates, imagine a society of 40 adults consisting of 20 males and 20 females. Suppose these 20 males vary from the unemployed high-school drop outs to CEOs. Let us assume that the 12 men with the highest status marry 12 of the 20 women in monogamous marriages. Then, the top five men (25% of the population) all take a second wife, and the top two (10%) take a third wife. Finally, the top guy takes a fourth wife. This means that of all marriages, 58 per cent are monogamous. Only men in the top 10 per cent of status married more than two women. The most wives that anyone has is four. While this degree of polygyny is not extreme in cross-cultural perspective [1,3], it creates a pool of 40 per cent of the male population who are shut out of the marriage market. To even enter the marriage market, a man has to be in the top 60 per cent of male status. Doubling one's number of long-term mates (to two) then requires entering the top 25 per cent of males. By contrast, normative monogamy means that no one is shut out, and increases in a man's relative status does not increase his number of long-term mates.
Several converging lines of evidence indicate that monogamous marriage reduces crime. First, we review evidence indicating that unmarried men gather in groups, engage in personally risky behaviour (gambling, illegal drugs, alcohol abuse) and commit more serious crimes than married men. Getting married substantially reduces a man's chances of committing a crime. Second, we review cross-national data showing that polygyny leads to a higher percentage of unmarried men, and that more unmarried men is associated with higher crime rates. Then, using within-country and historical data on sex ratio, we confirm that the more unmarried men or greater intrasexual competition are associated with higher crime rates. Finally, we discuss detailed anthropological cases that are consistent with this connection.
Cross-sectional data show that unmarried men are more likely than married men to commit murder [31], robbery and rape [32,33]. Moreover, unmarried men are more likely than married men to gamble and abuse drugs/alcohol [33]. These relationships hold controlling for socioeconomic status, age and ethnicity. Of course, these data do not prove that being unmarried causes criminal behaviour because individuals who are less likely to commit crimes, or abuse substances, might also be more marriageable or more likely to want to married.
Work using longitudinal datasets strengthens the case for a causal relationship. These data allow researchers to follow the same individuals over time to see how marriage impacts their behaviour relative to their own pre-marital behaviour. Sampson et al. [34] used longitudinal data that tracked boys once in a Massachusetts reform school from age 17 to 70. Most subjects were married multiple times, which allowed the researchers to compare their likelihood of committing a crime during married versus unmarried periods of their lives, using each individual as his own control. Across all crimes, marriage reduces a man's likelihood of committing a crime by 35 per cent. For property and violent crimes, being married cuts the probability of committing a crime by half. When men are divorced or widowed, their crime rates go up. Analyses also show that 'good marriages' are even more prophylactic than average marriages (though marrying a criminal wife has the opposite effect). This is consistent with prior work by Sampson & Laub [35].
Using data from Nebraska inmates, Horney et al. [36] examined the effects on criminal propensities of entering school, getting a job, moving in with a wife, moving in with a girlfriend and using drugs or alcohol. Controlling for all of these other factors, marriage reduces a man's probability of committing a crime by roughly half. This effect is strongest for assault and weakest for property crimes, but is significant for both of these as well as drug crimes. The size of this marriage effect is similar to entering school and much stronger than being on parole or probation. Interestingly, unmarried cohabitation does not reduce crime rates. Having a job had mixed effects, none of which were particularly large. The positive effect on crime of living with a wife is even larger than the negative effect of heavy drinking (for similar results from London see the study of Farrington & West [37]).
By far, the biggest factor in increasing an individual's criminal propensities was taking drugs [36]. This suggests that Horney et al.'s analysis may underestimate the total impact of marriage because marriage also reduces binge drinking and use of marijuana [38]. Thus, marriage probably has both direct effects on committing crimes, and indirect effects via a reduction in personal abuses. Cohabitation also reduces substance abuse, but less effectively than does marriage.
Researchers have explored several proximate mechanisms that explain how marriage reduces crime in men (electronic supplementary material). Though speculative, one interesting mechanism suggests that marriage in monogamous (but not polygynous) societies lowers men's testosterone levels. However, the selective forces generated by cultural group selection do not 'care' why marriage reduces criminal behaviour, only that it somehow does.
While marriage may reduce an individual's chances of committing a crime or personal abuse, two other important links are required to assess whether these individual effects aggregate up to impact whole societies: (i) does greater polygyny increase the size of the pool of unmarried men? and (ii) does this in turn increase crime rates? To examine this, we establish the first link using cross-national data to show that more polygyny is associated with a larger percentage of unmarried males in the population. Then, using the same dataset, we show that the higher the percentage of unmarried men in a country, the higher the rates of rape, murder, theft, robbery and fraud. Finally, to strengthen the case for a causal relationship, we then review within-country and historical analyses of the relationship between sex ratio and crime.
To establish the link between the degree of polygyny and the percentage of unmarried men, we use national-level data obtained from Kanazawa & Still ([39]; 2009, unpublished data) who compiled crime statistics, demographic information and economic data from multiple sources together with a measure of the degree of polygyny for 157 countries. To create a measure of polygyny, Kanazawa and Still coded all of the cultures in the Encyclopedia of World Cultures on a four-point scale (from 0 = monogamy is the rule and is widespread, to 3 = polygyny is the rule and is widespread), and then developed a country-level value by aggregating all of the cultures within a country, multiplying the values for each culture by the fraction of the country's population represented by that culture. In the electronic supplementary material, we extend Kanazawa and Still's work by regressing the percentage of unmarried men (age 15 and over) in the national population on this measure of polygynous intensity with controls for economic development (GDP per capita), economic inequality (sectoral Gini coefficients), population density and degree of democracy in 1980, as well as dummy variables for Africa and Asia [39]. The results across six different model specifications show that the greater the degree of polygyny across nations, the higher the percentage of unmarried men. Going from a negligible degree of polygyny (polygyny = 0 nationwide) to widespread polygyny (polygyny = 3 everywhere) increases the size of this excess pool by between 13 and 27 per cent.
Making the second linkage, the electronic supplementary material also shows that the greater the percentage of unmarried men in the national population, the greater the rates of rape, murder, assault, theft and fraud, controlling for the same variables in the regression described above. The percentage of unmarried men is a highly significant predictor of all these crime rates, except assaults where it is only marginally significant. In fact, the percentage of unmarried men is the only predictor that is consistently important across all five felonies. For rape and murder, adding the percentage of unmarried men to a regression with all the other variables increases the variance explained from 33 to 45 per cent and from 12 to 24 per cent, respectively. For assault, theft and fraud, the variance explained increases by about 5 per cent when the percentage of unmarried men is added as a predictor.
While providing an important step, we should not place too much confidence in these findings because (i) the measure for the degree of polygyny is crude, (ii) the data on inequality is incomplete, and (iii) using aggregate cross-sectional data at the country level limits inferential power. More work is needed to extend this preliminary analysis. Nevertheless, these findings converge with the crime-reducing effects of marriage and with the suppression of intrasexual competition shown above. Further, given these other results, it is difficult to argue for reverse causality in these regressions, that a greater surplus of unmarried males causes more polygyny, or that more crime causes men to forgo marriage (independent of income, etc.).
Analyses done within countries allow us to further strengthen the case for a causal relationship between an excess of unmarried males and crime, while avoiding the pitfalls of cross-national analyses. Unequal sex ratios have arisen in a variety of circumstances, most notably in modern India and China, where parental preferences for sons have shifted the sex ratio in favour of males [40], and on frontiers, such as in the American West. The empirical patterns from all such diverse cases tell the same story [40,41]: unmarried low-status men, often in bachelor-bands, engage in higher levels of aggressive, violent and anti-social activities. India and China are particularly informative since the data quality permit econometric analyses aimed at assessing causal relationships.
In China, sex ratios (males to females) rose markedly from 1.053 to 1.095 between 1988 and 2004, nearly doubling the number of unmarried or 'surplus' men [42]. At the same time, crime rates nearly doubled—90 per cent of which were committed by men. An increase in sex ratio was created by the gradual implementation of China's one-child policy, as well as by the ongoing demographic transition. The fortuitous fact that different provinces implemented the policy at different times for reasons unrelated to crime rates creates an opportunity for statistical analyses of the impacts of the policy and the alterations in sex ratio it produced. The implementation date of the policy across provinces provides an exogenous variable that can be used to establish the direction of causality.
Regression analyses [42] show that a 0.01 increase in sex ratio is associated with a 3 per cent increase in property and violent crimes, controlling for a number of demographic and economic variables. These analyses also indicate that the effect arises from an increase in the number of unmarried men and not the overall number of men. Increases in inequality, unemployment and urbanization also have positive effects on crime rates, but the effect of sex ratio is independent of these. To preclude the possibility that measurement errors in sex ratio correlate with crime rates, Edlund et al. [42] use the implementation year of the one-child policy as an instrumental variable in a two-stage least-squares analysis. They use implementation year to predict sex ratio, and then use the predicted (unbiased) sex ratio data to predict crime. This indicates that a greater surplus of males causes crime rates to increase. For more details see the electronic supplementary material.
In India, Dreze & Khera [43] show that sex ratio differences across districts are strongly associated with murder rates, controlling for many other factors. The effect is large: going from a male to female ratio of 1.12 (in Uttar Pradesh) to 0.97 (in Kerala) cuts the murder rate by half. Moreover, controlling for many other factors, the authors show that males living in districts with more males relative to females are more likely to commit murders; that is, the average male gets more murderous (takes more risks) when the intrasexual competition is higher. This is important because otherwise the increase in murder rates could be attributed merely to an increase in the number of males.
Historical data also link disproportionately large shares of unmarried men to higher crime, violence and drug abuse. Drawing on a range of evidence, Courtwright [41] argues that the violent character of the American West arose principally from the large pool of unmarried men who migrated there. Variation in crime rates in nineteenth century America corresponds to the spatial distribution of biased sex ratios. Over time, as sex ratios move towards unity in different regions, crime rates drop in those regions. Courtwright suggests that similar cases can be made for Australia's frontier in New South Wales and for the Argentinean Pampas.
Anthropological data provide an additional line of support for this view. In many non-industrialized societies, young unmarried men form groups of marauders who go on raids to steal wealth and wives, while raping and pillaging. Polygynous societies engage in more warfare [44], often with the goal of capturing women [1]. Cross-cultural analyses, though crude, indicate that polygynous societies also have more crime relative to more monogamous societies [45]. Ethnographic cases show why this is: among the Kuria in Tanzania, young males lacking sisters—who would bring substantial bridewealth—are much more likely to engage in cattle raiding, which they see as necessary to obtain sufficient resources to enter the polygynous marriage market [46]. The electronic supplementary material provides additional anthropological material.
This line of reasoning converges with three other areas of research. First, within economics, work on tournament theory predicts that when incentive gradients are steep (e.g. winner-take-all competitions), individuals should often prefer riskier strategies, especially when they are losing or perceive themselves as unlikely to win. These decision-theoretic models [47], which hinge on the same logic as our evolutionary approach [48], predict that even those who perceive themselves as winning or likely to win often need to pursue somewhat riskier strategy when incentive gradients (analogous to fitness gradients) are steeper, because they know that those who are currently losing will be pulling out all the stops. Empirically, field evidence from mutual funds, golf [49,50], auto-racing, distance running, basketball and poker shows that probable losers take more risks, and that both the size and spread of monetary prizes predict riskier choices by everyone [51]. Mutual fund managers [52,53], for example, who find their fund's performance behind other funds in the same category at mid-year, reallocate into riskier portfolios relative to those who did well in the first half of the year (a fund's ranking influences capital inflow, which influences managers' compensation). In auto-racing [54], races with larger spreads among the prizes have more accidents (accidents occur when drivers take risks that fail). Even in the laboratory, behavioural experiments show that players who are currently losing pursue the risky strategy more frequently (unless the outcomes of risky choices are highly correlated), and the choice of the risky strategy by the leading player depends on how big his lead is [55]. This work in economics supports earlier laboratory work by evolutionary psychologists showing similar effects [56].
Second, much empirical work from public health and psychology shows how increasing the steepness of the status/income hierarchies within societies influences outcomes in ways consistent with much evolutionary theorizing. Controlling for other variables, populations with steeper income gradients (more inequality) have worse social outcomes, based on evidence related to crime, violence, drug abuse, education and longevity [57]. Several of these patterns have been examined not only across nations but also among states within the US, and even among Chicago neighbourhoods [56,58].
Third, we posited that heightened intra-sexual competition influences crime rates and personal abuses—in part—by increasing individuals' risk tolerance and temporal discounting. While these specific proximate psychological mechanisms are not crucial to the larger theory, we note that existing experimental work provides preliminary support by showing that (i) prisoners are willing to risk greater financial penalties compared with students in identical behavioural experiments [59], (ii) inter-temporal choice experiments show that both drug addicts and smokers discount the future more steeply than control groups [60,61], and (iii) risk-preference experiments indicate that drug users are less risk-averse compared with non-users [62]. Thus, such preliminary evidence suggests that crimes and personal abuses tend to be committed more by those who are relatively more inclined towards risky choices and future discounting.
(ii) Implication: monogamous marriage reduces the spousal age gap, gender inequality and fertility
Polygynous marriage increases competition for wives, as married men remain on the marriage market. This increased competition drives down the age of first marriage for females and increases the spousal age gap. The reduced supply of unmarried women, who are absorbed into polygynous marriages, causes men of all ages to pursue younger and younger women. The competition also motivates men to use whatever connections, advantages or alliances they have in order to obtain wives, including striking financial and reciprocal bargains with the fathers and brothers of unmarried females (see electronic supplementary material for North American examples). Once adolescent girls and young women become wives, older husbands strive to 'protect' their young wives from other males (guarding the paternity of any offspring) and dominate household decision-making. More competition also motivates men to seek to control their female relatives (e.g. sisters), as demand for wives increases. This results in suppressing women's freedoms, increasing gender inequality and stimulating domestic violence. Women's loss of influence on household decision-making and their lower age of marriage results in higher fertility. By contrast, normative monogamy diffuses the pressure to bring younger brides into the marriage market, and thereby reduces the spousal age gap, male efforts to control ('protect') women, gender inequality and total fertility. We address below whether the effects on gender equality or the spousal age gap create—in themselves—any group-level benefits.
Table 1 compares (i) highly polygynous countries (HPCs) in which more than 10 per cent of married men have two or more wives, (ii) less-polygynous African countries (LPACs) in which less than 10 per cent of married men have two or more wives, (iii) comparable monogamous countries (CMCs) that lie between 20° North and South latitudes (developing countries), and (iv) North America and Western Europe, which provide a reference point. The HPCs are all African save for Bangladesh and Kuwait. The variables are mostly self-explanatory, though note that age gap gives the difference between the mean age of the husband or wife at their respective first marriages. In a polygynous society, the gap would further increase if the mean age for males included all subsequent wives [63,64].
HPCs have the lowest age of first marriage for females at 19.9 years, and the largest age gap between husbands and their first wife. The age of 19.9 years is significantly lower than in LPACs (at 22.7 years) and much lower than CMCs, where the mean age is 25. In HPCs, 36.7 per cent of women are married between the ages of 15 and 19. The age gap increases from 2.8 years in CMCs to 6.4 years in HPCs. In HPCs, the age gap goes as high as 9 years. Fertility drops from 6.78 in HPCs to 4.62 in CMCs. Similar patterns are obtained if one uses GDP per capita instead of latitude to create these categories [63].
These patterns are supported by other analyses. Using a country-level measure of the degree of polygyny, regression analyses also show that greater polygyny is associated with (i) lower ages at first marriage for females, (ii) larger spousal age gaps, and (iii) higher fertility rates, controlling for GDP [65]. The electronic supplementary material also reviews convergent findings derived from comparing monogamous and polygynous households within the same society.
(iii) Implication: normative monogamy increases gross domestic product per capita
Tertilt [63] constructed a decision model to investigate how marriage systems influence economic productivity and fertility. She assumes that men and women both care about having children and consuming other goods, but that men can continue to reproduce their entire lives, while women are limited to only a portion of their lives. She shows that this model produces polygynous mating patterns under a wide range of conditions, and that once calibrated, it generates predictions that qualitatively fit the empirical patterns of polygynous countries. Tertilt then uses the model calibrated to HPCs to investigate what would happen if monogamy were imposed on everyone. The model predicts that: (i) fertility rates go down, (ii) spousal age gaps shrink, (iii) saving rates increase, (iv) bride prices disappear, and (v) GDP per capita goes up substantially. The main cause of these effects is that men cannot invest in obtaining additional wives or selling daughters, so instead they have fewer children, invest in production, and both save and consume more. That is, the population looks less like a HPC and more like a CMC.
Interestingly, Tertilt [64] shows that imposing monogamy has a much bigger effect on GDP per capita than increasing the decision-making power of women. To explore this, Tertilt alters her model so that reproductive decisions are made by women instead of men, but permits polygyny. In this version of the model, the number of wives per husband declines a bit (monogamy does not emerge), as does fertility. GDP per capita increases and saving rates go up substantially, but the magnitudes of the effects are much smaller than the effects of imposing monogamy. This suggests that cultural group selection should act most directly on social norms that fortify monogamous marriage rather than directly on those that increase gender equality.
(b) Normative monogamy reduces intra-household conflict
Our reasoning predicts that increasing the extent and intensity of polygynous marriage will increase conflict within households because it (i) creates competition among co-wives, (ii) expands the spousal age gap, (iii) decreases the relatedness within households, and (iv) reduces paternity certainty (which increases male sexual jealousy). Allocations of household resources to another wife's children mean fewer resources for one's own children. Since co-wives are generally unrelated to each other and to each other's offspring, genetic relatedness does not provide the same degree of prophylaxis against intra-household violence as in monogamous households. Overall, lower mean relatedness and more unrelated pairs in polygynous households mean a greater threat of abuse, violence and homicide. By contrast, normative monogamy (i) eliminates conflict between co-wives, (ii) decreases child abuse, neglect and homicide by increasing the mean relatedness in households and reducing the number of unrelated adult–child dyads, and (iii) reduces spousal homicide and domestic abuse by decreasing the spousal age gap, male mate competition and paternity uncertainty, and by increasing the age of women's first marriage.
Co-wife conflict is ubiquitous in polygynous households. From anthropology, a review of ethnographic data from 69 non-sororal polygynous societies from around the globe [66] reveals no case where co-wife relations could be described as harmonious, and no hint that women's access to the means of production had any mitigating impact on conflict. Consistent with this, an in-depth study of a fundamentalist Mormon community in the US [67] found substantial conflict among co-wives. The electronic supplementary material provides more background and reviews additional evidence. From health psychology, a comprehensive review of psychological studies [68] concludes that children from polygamous families experience higher incidences of marital conflict, household violence and family disruptions than do children of monogamous families. This work also suggests that the creation of step-parents is more common as men often leave their first wives to be with their newer wives, but they keep the children, which opens the door for abuse and neglect by unrelated mothers.
Polygynous marriages also create elevated risks of intra-household abuse, neglect and homicide because such households have lower average relatedness, and more unrelated dyads. Each additional wife is unrelated to the existing co-wives, and to all of these wives' children. The number of unrelated dyads in such a household, in fact, increases with the square of the number of wives (see electronic supplementary material). Much empirical work in monogamous societies indicates that higher degrees of relatedness among household members are associated with lower rates of abuse, neglect and homicide [69,70]. Living in the same household with genetically unrelated adults is the single biggest risk factor for abuse, neglect and homicide of children. Stepmothers are 2.4 times more likely to kill their stepchildren [71] than birth mothers, and children living with an unrelated parent are between 15 and 77 times more likely to die 'accidentally' [72].
Converging with these ideas is long-term research in the Caribbean, which shows how different household compositions impact cortisol levels (a stress hormone) in children. Children in nuclear families with only genetic parents showed the lowest cortisol levels. By contrast, children in households with distant relatives, stepfathers and half-siblings showed the highest cortisol levels of any household composite in the sample [73]. This suggests that the children of polygynous households will run higher cortisol levels owing to the presence of unrelated mothers and half-siblings.
The above-described effects of relatedness emerge from work in monogamous societies, so one could argue that they are somehow not applicable to polygynous households. However, research among fundamentalist Mormon communities reveals that the effects of relatedness are evident within polygynous households: full siblings show greater association, effect, solidarity and altruism when compared with half-siblings in the same household [74].
Finally, as explained above, normative monogamy may reduce spousal homicide, domestic violence and the use of physical coercion by decreasing the spousal age gap, gender inequality, paternal uncertainty and mate competition. Research indicates that both spousal age gaps and paternity uncertainty are important predictors of spousal homicides [75]. Meanwhile, cross-national regressions reveal that stronger monogamous marriage norms are associated with less (i) domestic violence, (ii) maternal mortality, (iii) female genital mutilation, and (iv) sex trafficking, even after controlling for GDP [65]. The electronic supplementary material expands these points.
Before proceeding, we emphasize that it is not entirely clear that reducing the spousal age gap, intra-household conflict or gender inequality will increase success in inter-group competition. However, here are three reasons to suspect that this might be the case. First, later marriage and less conflict means a greater fraction of children in a society will be reared by older, more skilled mothers who have had more time to acquire experience and education. These women will have more influence in household decisions and thus have fewer children. These factors can create group advantages in socioecologies in which greater parental investment improves cognitive abilities or skills, increases trust, or instantiates patience. Second, the lower childhood mortality and better health outcomes created by greater parental investment implies that resources are not 'wasted' on children who never become productive adults. Third, in addition to fully harnessing the economically productive talents of women, reducing gender inequality may suppress the tendency for polygynous societies to culturally evolve norms and institutions aimed at controlling women, such as arranged marriage, female circumcision, purdah (seclusion of women) and brideprice [76], many of which appear costly at the societal level. However, even if reduced gender inequality and household conflict spread merely as by-products of cultural group selection operating to reduce crime rates (to increase trade and reduce transaction costs), they still provide predictions to test the more general theory.
(i) Monogamous marriage increases paternal investment and improves childhood outcomes
Increasing polygynous marriages decreases overall male parental investment by (i) eliminating opportunities for low-status males to establish pair-bonds (and invest in offspring), (ii) diluting the per-child investment in larger families, and (iii) shifting investment by high-status males from offspring into obtaining more long-term mates. While allowing the resources of richer men to be distributed among more children, the net effect of polygyny on male parental investment will often be to reduce the average investment per child. Normative monogamy provides increased opportunities for low-status males to marry, save and invest for the long term. The labour and talents of these would-be risk-taking criminals (and/or substance abusers) are instead channelled into long-term investments in family and child-rearing (reliable economic productivity). Their pair-bonding and paternal investment psychologies are tapped and harnessed relatively more than their risky, status-seeking mindsets. For married high-status males, normative monogamy raises the cost of seeking additional mates and thereby shifts efforts from mate-seeking to improving offspring quality.
We lack direct evidence for the effect of monogamous marriage on paternal investment, though ethnographic accounts suggest, for example, that highly polygynous fathers do not even know all of their children's names [77]. Nevertheless, both cross-cultural and historical evidence do indicate that the children of polygynous households have worse health outcomes compared with those in monogamous households, even after controlling for wealth, income and other demographic differences. We suspect that part of this difference results from the increased paternal investment in monogamous families, though it may also arise from the associations of monogamy with lower rates of household conflict, maternal mortality [65] or psycho-social stress (see the electronic supplementary material).
In Africa, diverse studies show that, relative to children from monogamous households, children from polygynous household risk diminished nutritional status, poorer health outcomes and elevated mortality. Table 1 shows that both infant and child mortality in HPCs are roughly twice that of CMCs. Much work supports this view [78–81]. Using data from 22 sub-Saharan African countries, Omariba & Boyle [80] found that children in polygynous families were 24.4 per cent more likely to die compared with children in monogamous families. Similarly, a study of six West African countries found that infants in polygynous families had a substantially greater risk of dying compared with children in monogamous households [82]. Community-level studies in Tanzania and Chad found that children in polygynous households had poorer nutrition than their counterparts in monogamous households from the same communities [83–85]. See electronic supplementary material for details.
Similar effects occur in North America. Using data from nineteenth century Mormons, Heath & Hadley [25] compare data from 90 households consisting of 45 headed by wealthy men (top 2% of wealth in that community) and 45 headed by poor married men (from the bottom 16%). These data show that wealthy males had on average 3.2 wives compared to 1.4 among the poor. All but five of the wealthy men had more than one wife. One rich man had 11 wives. Overall, the wealthy men controlled 120 women while the poor controlled 63. This means that 90 husbands had 183 wives, which implies roughly 93 missing men had no wives. While wealthy men had more total offspring and longer reproductive careers (33 years for wealthy men compared to 22 for poor men), the children of poor men had better survival rates for their children to age 15. For poor men, 6.9 of their offspring (per wife) survived on average to age 15, while for wealthy men only 5.5 of their offspring (per wife) survived to age 15. This is amazing, given that the poor men had less than 10 per cent of the wealth of the rich men, and the rich men had significantly more total offspring (including those that did not make it to 15). Perhaps, most telling is a comparison of rich with poor men, both with one or two wives: poor men's children out-survived rich men's 6.9 to 5.7 (mean number of offspring surviving to age 15 per wife). This supports the idea that poor men with insufficient resources for another wife tend to invest more in their existing offspring while rich men with the same number of wives invest less in offspring because they are expending resources seeking additional wives (see electronic supplementary material).
4. Discussion
We propose that the unusual package of norms and institutions that constitute modern monogamous marriage systems spread across Europe, and then the globe, because of the package's impact on the competitive success of the polities, nations and religions that adopted this cultural package. Reducing the pool of unmarried men and levelling the reproductive playing field would have decreased crime, which would have spurred commerce, travel and the free flow of ideas and innovations. Greater security would have reduced transaction costs and both public and private security expenditures. Instead of engaging in risky status-seeking endeavours, low-status males would be more likely to marry, thus becoming risk-averse and future-oriented, and focus on providing for their offspring in the long run. Higher status males, instead of seeking to attract additional wives, would make long-term investments and attend to their offsprings' security. More personal security and less crime would have meant that many more individuals could shift to investing in long-term payoffs, including businesses, apprenticeships and education. Reduced demand for brides would have increased the age of first marriage for women and gender equality, which would have reduced total fertility. These expectations are broadly consistent with historical patterns in pre-modern England during the lead up to the industrial revolution [86].
The conditions in which inter-group competition favours normative monogamy are probably limited to situations involving competition among very complex human societies: those with substantial divisions of labour, well-developed commerce, inter-community trade, standing armies and highly skilled occupations. Competition among less complex societies need not favour normative monogamy. Some circumstances, such as those in which subsistence economies are dominated by female or child labour, would appear to favour greater polygynous marriage. When inter-group competition relies on large numbers of motivated young men to engage in continuous raiding and warfare to obtain resources, slaves, territory and concubines, groups with greater polygyny may generate larger and more motivated pools of males for these risky activities. If these larger pools of men more effectively expand their territories, populations and resources at the expense of groups that constrain this pool, cultural group selection could favour greater polygyny. Supporting ethnographic cases are numerous [46,87], and cross-cultural analyses confirm several of the above proposed associations [44].
Religion may also be important in the spread of normative monogamy. The infusion of norms related to monogamous marriage into the supernaturally reinforced set of beliefs propounded by Christianity [88] may have been crucial to the long-term success of this marriage system and one element in the set of effects on religion created by cultural group selection [89]. The central challenge to monogamous marriage norms comes from wealthy and politically powerful men who have substantial fitness-related motivations and incentives to resist such practices. Imbuing monogamy with supernatural sanction, including the ability to create legitimate, divinely recognized, heirs in hereditary monarchies may have made all the difference in the pre-industrial world.
More generally, it is important to realize that the evolutionary processes we have highlighted should be thought of as favouring cultural practices that are 'polygyny-inhibiting', with prescriptive monogamy at the extreme. Islam, for example, contains polygyny-inhibiting elements [90] that attempt to constrain men's ability to accumulate wives by (i) placing an upper limit of four wives, (ii) requiring men to deal justly with all of their wives, and (iii) permitting a potential bride to contractually stipulate that her marriage becomes invalid if her husband marries again.
Other economic and evolutionary approaches posit that monogamous marriage arises from some form of fitness- [17] or utility-maximizing [18] decision. Such models are useful if they help us understand how cultural evolution could shape sets of inter-related social norms and institutions. There is little doubt that norms about spousal number, for example, coevolve with norms regarding inheritance, transfer payments and sexual fidelity. However, as the electronic supplementary material explains, such non-cultural approaches fail to account for (i) the normative nature of marriage systems (third-party condemnation of norm violators), (ii) the broad historical patterns in the expansion of monogamous marriage, (iii) the lack of polygynous marriage among wealthy North Americans, or (iv) the persistent challenges that nation states face in suppressing the spread of polygynous communities. Moreover, such accounts would have to assume that the empirical patterns we reviewed above are mere epiphenomena, which did not impact cultural evolution.
In closing, it is worth speculating that the spread of normative monogamy, which represents a form of egalitarianism, may have helped create the conditions for the emergence of democracy and political equality at all levels of government [7,91]. Within the anthropological record, there is a statistical linkage between democratic institutions and normative monogamy [92]. Pushing this point, these authors argue that dissipating the pool of unmarried males weakens despots, as it reduces their ability to find soldiers or henchman. Reduced crime would also weaken despots' claims to be all that stands between ordinary citizens and chaos. Historically, we know that universal monogamous marriage preceded the emergence of democratic institutions in Europe, and the rise of notions of equality between the sexes (see our historical sketch in the electronic supplementary material). In Ancient Greece, we do not know which came first but we do know that Athens, for example, had both elements of monogamous marriage and of democracy. In the modern world, analyses of cross-national data reveal positive statistical relationships between the strength of normative monogamy with both democratic rights and civil liberties [65]. In this sense, the peculiar institutions of monogamous marriage may help explain why democratic ideals and notions of equality and human rights first emerged in the West [6].
Special thanks to Natalie Henrich for her research assistance and insights. Thanks also to Monique Borgerhoff Mulder and Craig Jones for many helpful comments and suggestions, and to Satoshi Kanazawa for supplying his dataset.
One contribution of 12 to a Theme Issue 'The biology of cultural conflict'.
- This journal is © 2012 The Royal Society


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Skip to comments.Fannie Mae taps $7.8 billion from Treasury, loss widens
Posted on 11/08/2011 4:55:47 PM PST by Sub-Driver
Fannie Mae taps $7.8 billion from Treasury, loss widens Photo 6:42pm EST
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Fannie Mae, the biggest source of money for U.S. home loans, on Tuesday said it needed a further $7.8 billion in federal aid to stay afloat as a shaky housing market widened its third-quarter loss to $5.1 billion.
Fannie Mae also attributed the deeper cash drain to losses on derivatives that are used to hedge the firm's exposure to swings in interest rates and expenses related to home loans made prior to the 2008 financial collapse. In the year-earlier quarter it had a loss of a $1.3 billion.
Fannie Mae, seized by the government in 2008, has drawn $112.6 billion in bailout funds from the Treasury Department since 2008 and has paid $17.2 billion to the government in the form of dividends.
"Fannie Mae is working to reduce losses on our legacy book and limit taxpayer exposure," Susan McFarland, the company's executive vice president and chief financial officer, said in a statement.
The government-owned company and its smaller rival Freddie Mac were taken over in the financial crisis as losses on subprime mortgages threatened insolvency. Given the crucial role the two play in U.S. housing finance, owning or guaranteeing about half of all mortgages, the government has pledged unlimited funds to keep the firms afloat through the end of 2012.
(Excerpt) Read more at reuters.com ...
I take Whiskey Tango Foxtrot and raise you a Facepalm. :O)
Put FM and FM down, NOW!
The CEO resigned last week too. But only after receiving millions in bonuses.
Let it fail, it's better in the long run.
No, that was the CEO of Freddie Mac, not Fannie Mae.
I suggest you and I get a turn at being CEO of Fannie Mae. Whiskey Tango Foxtrot. I'll even let you go first.
As the CEO's get millions in bonuses.
Yep. That makes total sense!
i'm reading "reckless endangerment" just now.
these people and some in the u.s. congress need to be in jail.
Let Barney and Chris ante up. They brought all this on (with a little help from their friends).
those damn pwedatowy wenders!
How would a Fortune 500 Company be treated by the gubmit if they claimed their losses were un-calculable?
How is this possible? Barney Frank said there were no problems with Fannie.
Video: Comparing Fannie/Freddie to Enron/Worldcom/Tyco
Bernard Ebbers, Worldcom: 25 years in prison
Ken Lay, Enron: Convicted on 10 counts, died before serving sentence
Jeff Skilling, Enron: 24 years in prison
Andrew Fastow, Enron: 10 years in prison
Dennis Koslowski, Tyco: 8 years in prison
Mark Schwartz, Tyco: 8 years in prison
So how about the officers of Fannie Mae, who conducted similar kinds of fraud in their financial statements in order to pad bonuses and keep regulators from discovering their precarious position until it was too late? Franklin Raines never faced criminal charges, and instead settled a civil suit with a $2 million payoff which came from Fannie Maes insurance company. Jim Johnson didnt even have to do that much.
And where are they now? The Washington Post reported twice that Raines was advising the Barack Obama campaign, although they denied it. Jim Johnson still advises the Obama campaign and had briefly led the search for a running mate. Supposedly the FBI has begun a criminal probe into the actions of Fannie Mae management over the years, but well see if that proceeds.
That's another $7.8 billion that has not been appropriated by our legislature. They might as well go ahead and dissolve Congress. The fiscal year expired over a month ago, yet our government continues to operate without any monetary authorization from Congress. Our Republic is dead.
Shut it down...propping up the housing market *delays* the recovery (because real re-investment won't return to the housing market until after housing prices bottom).
Now comes the "we have to do this or the system collapses". Thats followed by libs saying lets cut principal on mortgages which guarantees more losses. It's a lovely system they have for themselves.
FBI can get a Raines but much of what they did will be covered by the fact they were following policy set by congress. We know those people are invincible. They only make mistakes after all.
If you or i had done what some of these people did we'd be facing life sentences.
A $5.1 Billion loss needs a $7.8 Billion amount to cover the losses???
Where is the rest of the money going? Into Barry the Imposter's bank accounts???
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subset: commoncrawl


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LOS ANGELES – January 27, 2009 – D3Publisher, a publisher and developer of interactive entertainment software, today announced that the Coraline videogame is now available in stores nationwide. Based on LAIKA's exciting new movie Coraline – the first-ever stop-motion animated feature to be made in 3-D – the Coraline videogame will let players take on the role of the adventurous heroine Coraline and interact with the wondrous characters from the movie while navigating the scheming Other Mother's web of deceit in a fantastical adventure through two distinct and interactive worlds. The videogame will feature the voice talents of Dakota Fanning, Keith David, and Robert Bailey Jr. All three actors reprise their onscreen voiced roles of Coraline Jones (Fanning), Cat (David) and Wybie Lovat (Bailey Jr.). The Coraline videogame will ship to North American retail stores for the Wii system, Nintendo DS and the PlayStation 2 computer entertainment system on January 27, 2009 to coincide with Focus Features' nationwide domestic release of the movie on February 6, 2009, in both 3-D and non-3-D theaters.
"The Coraline videogame wonderfully captures the humor, spookiness and thrilling adventure of the movie," said Alison Quirion, vice president of marketing, D3Publisher. "Coraline fans of all ages will enjoy the journey through the peculiar Normal World and mesmerizing Other World to relive memorable moments from the movie and experience new ones that go beyond the feature film."
The only videogame based on the upcoming movie, the Coraline videogame will allow players to explore and interact with such immersive 3-D environments from the movie as the Pink Palace, its nooks and crannies and apartments, and the unpredictable Other World. Players will engage in unique mini-games and adventures with Coraline's friends, Wybie and Cat, as they collect items that will unlock the mysteries of the Other World.
The Coraline videogame for Wii and the PlayStation 2 system was developed by Papaya Studios and is rated "E 10+" (Everyone 10 and up – Mild Cartoon Violence, Mild Suggestive Themes) by the ESRB. Coraline for Nintendo DS is developed by Art Co. Ltd., and is rated "E" (Everyone – Mild Cartoon Violence, Mild Suggestive Themes) by the ESRB. The Coraline videogame has the suggested retail price of $29.95.
For more information on the Coraline videogame please visit: www.CoralineTheGame.com.
About Coraline (the movie)
Combining the visionary imaginations of two premier fantasists, director/screenwriter Henry Selick (The Nightmare Before Christmas) and author Neil Gaiman (Sandman), Coraline is a wondrous and thrilling, fun and suspenseful adventure that honors and redefines two moviemaking traditions. It is a stop-motion animated feature – and, as the first one to be conceived and photographed in stereoscopic 3-D, unlike anything moviegoers have ever experienced before. The movie opens in theaters everywhere on February 6.
Coraline Jones is a girl of 11 who is feisty, curious, and adventurous beyond her years. She and her parents have just relocated from Michigan to Oregon. She uncovers a secret door in the house. Walking through the door and then venturing through an eerie passageway, she discovers an alternate version of her life and existence. On the surface, this parallel reality is similar to her real life – only much better. But when her wondrously off-kilter, fantastical visit turns dangerous, Coraline musters all of her resourcefulness, determination, and bravery to get back home – and save her family.
About Focus Features (Domestic Distributor)
Focus Features (www.filminfocus.com) exists to produce, acquire and distribute original and daring films that challenge the mainstream to embrace and enjoy voices and visions from around the world that deliver global commercial success. The company's Oscar-winning films have included Brokeback Mountain, The Pianist, Lost in Translation, The Constant Gardener, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, The Motorcycle Diaries, and Atonement.
About LAIKA, Inc.
LAIKA, Inc. (www.laika.com) is the Portland-based entertainment and media company specializing in animated feature films, television commercials, music videos, broadcast graphics and short films. It is a dynamic community of filmmakers, designers and animators fueled by the vision of its owner and Chairman, Philip H. Knight, co-founder and Chairman of Nike, Inc.
About Universal Pictures Digital Platforms Group
Universal Pictures Digital Platforms Group (UPDPG) is responsible for global digital product development, production, licensing, distribution, and growth strategy for the extensive catalogue of Universal's properties across new and emerging digital platforms, including mobile, video game consoles, personal computers, and other portable devices. With a worldwide mandate to help shape the digital future of Universal Pictures, the Group has offices in Universal City, California; London, England; and Tokyo, Japan.
Universal Pictures Digital Platforms Group is a unit of Universal Studios Home Entertainment and Universal Pictures. Universal Pictures is a division, and Focus Features is part, of NBC Universal, one of the world's leading media and entertainment companies in the development, production, and marketing of entertainment, news, and information to a global audience. Formed in May 2004 through the combining of NBC and Vivendi Universal Entertainment, NBC Universal owns and operates a valuable portfolio of news and entertainment networks, a premier motion picture company, significant television production operations, a leading television stations group, and world-renowned theme parks. NBC Universal is 80% owned by General Electric and 20% owned by Vivendi.
About D3Publisher
D3Publisher, a subsidiary of D3, Inc., is a leading interactive entertainment publisher and distributor for licensed and original titles for personal computers, major console platforms and handheld systems. D3Publisher has operations in the U.S., U.K., and Japan. The company also owns development studio Vicious Cycle Software, Inc., and its technology platform, Vicious Engine. Recent releases have included Dark Sector, Dead Head Fred, Puzzle Quest: Challenge of the Warlords, and Ben 10: Protector of Earth. For more information about D3Publisher, please visit: www.d3publisher.com.


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How to handle feline aortic thromboembolism
A blocked artery caused by a thromboembolus occurs in almost one-third of cats with heart disease, resulting in devastating consequences that often start with pelvic limb paralysis. These clinicians help you detect the blockage, explore newer treatment options, recognize which treatments are not recommended, and identify prevention strategies.
Nov 01, 2010
This article discusses alterations in normal hemostasis that may predispose cats to thromboembolism; ATE's clinical presentation, diagnosis, and treatment; and possible prevention strategies.
INCIDENCE AND BACKGROUNDThromboembolism is a fairly common and potentially devastating complication of heart disease in cats. ATE has been found in 12% to 28% of cats with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM) and 27% of cats with unclassified cardiomyopathy.2-5 Less commonly, ATE has been reported in cats with arrhythmogenic right ventricular cardiomyopathy and atrial fibrillation.6,7


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I'm really hoping one of those last two series is Robotics;Notes.
AzureNights wrote:
I'm really hoping one of those last two series is Robotics;Notes.
FUNimation's already got it.
Oh looks interesting might give it all a try XD
wow, thread got hijacked twice.
Really happy that Ebiten is here, also looks like 1 box is left, curious as to when we'll get to find out what that is, I would imagine not today.
Also very interested in finding out when we're going to get actual episodes of Lychee and Ebiten. As far as Ebiten goes Wednesdays would be an actual simulcast so it would be cool if they get it all caught up before next week.
The number of shows the "last" announcement could be are certainly narrowing at this point, but there are a couple left out there that I wouldn't be all that excited over. Where are all the "WHERES LITTLE BUSTERS" comments?
Just also wanted to add in that for NEW simulcasts between all 4 companies (cr, tan, funi, viz) that brings the count up to 27 (I think that's about right) announced simulcasts, with another on the way from CR... of course that is including the 4 that TAN is really delayed on presumably because of their To Love-ru Darkness boner (no pun intended).
So far behind on anime... need to catch up
Thanks for the Ebiten annoucement. Even though I have seen the fansubs, I'll re-watch with proper Crunchyroll subs and see if I can spot what the TV broadcast version added(and this gives me some hope of seeing Seitokai no Ichizon Lv. 2 next season as an annoucement too)
For anyone who hasn't seen Ebiten , it has a lot of 80s and 90s anime references( Saint Seiya , Sailor Moon , Urusai Yatsura: Beautiful Dreamer, Dragonball Z) and it is hilarious.
dokudokugwo wrote:
The number of shows the "last" announcement could be are certainly narrowing at this point, but there are a couple left out there that I wouldn't be all that excited over. Where are all the "WHERES LITTLE BUSTERS" comments?
Little Busters is one of those shows that I really couldn't see going without a simulcast unless either one of the companies on the production committee is dead set against simulcasts (i.e., they like to believe fansubs don't exist), or they are simply asking too dear of a price for it to be financially feasible for any company to simulcast, even as a slight loss leader. (I expect those same companies might be willing to crawl out further on the financial limb if it was being handled by KyoAni instead of J.C.Staff).
Regarding Ebiten, and those that point out that it streamed last season on niconico.jp (which would be where the rips for any fansubs you might have seen came from), it is only being broadcast on TV this season. (It started October 3, so hopefully CR will be catching up). Perhaps more important, it won't be exactly the same as the Nico Nico stream, as per ANN:
While the title was originally distributed via live streaming on the niconico (formerly Nico Nico Douga) video service, the television broadcast for the series will feature longer episodes.
Yes, that's my real age
Thank you for picking up Litchee was one of the titles I was looking forward to most! Hoping for Chiisana Ojisan, Jojo's Bizarre Adventure, and Suki-tte li na yo!
So far behind on anime... need to catch up
Ebiten is pretty ecchi unless I am thinking of the wrong one. Wasn't expecting any of today's announcements but I am looking forward to them.
Still wish CRUNCHYROLL had got them all. Just watched one show on Funi and then the next tells me the website is offline... Crunchyroll is so reliable I'm spoiled. Robotics; Notes is good though.
in a CR post a couple days ago they stated that the number of checkmark boxes does not indicate the number of anouncements left (not sure about my spelling lol)
its surprise announcement day at CR apparently!
the most out of nowhere titles I would have never expected CR to get but is extremely happy CR got Ebiten as well, great work CR
What even
Yes, that's my real age
Woot thanks for getting Aoi Sekai no Chuushin de. Can't careless about Ebiten and the other keionbu anime.
"Memento Mori. When the nineth lion ate the sun."
Aoi Sekai no Chushin de is the third series to be released in Spain...Looking at the picture looks like a boring, too serious show, but the description mentions Nintendo and Sega in a war...so wait, is this a comedy?


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Brooks Hays of Arkansas was a wispy, balding man who was a presence in Washington for almost half of his 83 years--a favorite character, a beloved storyteller and a moral force of almost unequaled dimension, from his election to the House in 1942 until his death last month.
His is an appropriate story for Thanksgiving week, because it is an authentically American tale of high good humor and remarkable courage. He was born in London--"London, Hope County, Arkansas," as Sen. Dale Bumpers of Arkansas reminded the Senate in his eulogy. He became that familiar American character, the small-town lawyer and Southern Baptist deacon.
He came to Congress at the age of 44 and left it in defeat at age 60 to take up a second career as a White House aide, teacher, writer and leader of his church.
When he died, there were only 20 members in the House who had served with him. But listening to the tales told of him when the House memorialized him earlier this month, it was clear that Brooks Hays had become one of the enduring and even mythical figures of the Congress which, like all institutions, craves its heroes and legends.
Much of the legend is based on his storytelling, his way with an anecdote. Congress is a body of raconteurs, but few have been able to do with a story what Hays could do: create characters and scenes you could see and feel, and slip in a telling point of view while your guard was down.
Some of his lines were so perfect you just wanted to marvel. When he was serving on the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, the Russians were pressing for the admission of Outer Mongolia as a separate nation. "Fair enough," Hays said, "if the U.N. will also admit Texas and call it Outer Arkansas."
His courage was demonstrated most clearly by the events that brought him defeat. As the congressman from Little Rock and a moderate on racial issues, Hays sought to mediate the conflict between Arkansas Gov. Orval E. Faubus and the federal authorities over the 1957 desegregation of Little Rock Central High School. He managed to bring Faubus and President Eisenhower together for a meeting that fleetingly raised hopes, but ultimately failed to avert the violence and the dispatch of federal troops.
A year later, in 1958, Faubus turned on Hays and supported a segregationist write-in candidate, who defeated the congressman with a well-executed sneak attack.
Hays' loss shocked and shamed his home city and the Congress in which he served. In both arenas, it served to strengthen the resolve of those who shared his tolerant and moderate views.
The defeat did not shock him. As Billy Graham said at a testimonial dinner for Hays a month after his defeat, "Little Rock realizes it has made a tragic mistake . . . but that doesn't dismay our friend. . . . Congressman Hays' good humor, common sense and integrity will take him through."
And so they did, for another 23 years of a life that left a permanent mark on the institutional memory of Congress and his church and of the institutions he founded and inspired. They ranged from the Former Members of Congress Association to the Close-Up Foundation, which brings hundreds of young people to Washington each year for a firsthand view of their government.
If Congress is to remain an institution to which alumni can return with pride and which youngsters can view without cynicism, today's lawmakers will need the qualities Brooks Hays exemplified.
They could find no better guide than the words Hays himself spoke at that dinner in 1958.
"I have cheerfully accepted several defeats, because I acknowledge the principle of majority rule," he said. "That rule will be frustrated, however, unless the people are given an opportunity to secure and deliberate upon the facts and the issues. . . .
"And throughout the structure of popular government, there must be such respect for the minority that public policy is built on wisdom and justice in representative functions, not on the sophistry that the majority's judgment is always wise and best for the people.
"In the 1958 campaigning," this wise and just politician said, "I was not trying to ride a popular idea. I was trying to popularize an idea that had become so much a part of me I could not rid myself of it if I had tried."
Wherever a politician can speak honestly of himself or herself in those terms, the spirit of Brooks Hays will live.


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Carolyn Krause finishes her efforts to chronicle the amazing story of my friend, Lester Fox, featuring segments of his oral history that can be found at the Center for Oak Ridge Oral History at the Oak Ridge room in the Oak Ridge Public Library or online at http://www.orpl.org/ select departments, COROH and "view oral histories") Enjoy Carolyn's excellent concluding article in the Historically Speaking series on Lester Fox.
Carolyn Krause finishes her efforts to chronicle the amazing story of my friend, Lester Fox, featuring segments of his oral history that can be found at the Center for Oak Ridge Oral History at the Oak Ridge room in the Oak Ridge Public Library or online at http://www.orpl.org/ select departments, COROH and "view oral histories") Enjoy Carolyn's excellent concluding article in the Historically Speaking series on Lester Fox.
Wheels, deals and lots of luck have been keys to the prosperous life of former auto dealer Lester Fox.
He started out delivering milk on a bicycle and then, at the age of 13, drove a wrecker, a car and buses in need of repair to support the war effort. He got his first driver's license when he was 14.
In his interview with filmmaker Keith McDaniel, Lester told lots of stories. Once a state trooper stopped him for driving a wrecker that pulled two broken-down buses Lester had chained together.
"Don't you know not to pull a train on a road in Tennessee?" the trooper said. "You've got to put the train on a track."
A short man in his 20s who ate with Lester in Lake City, where a bus repair shop was located, asked him if he could borrow a pair of Lester's greasy coveralls. Lester asked why and the man revealed he was an FBI agent.
"If you ever tell anybody, this could get me killed," the agent said. "I've got to work in a shop where there is some loose talk going around. The government wants nobody to talk about what they are doing."
At war's end the Fox brothers were operating 103 buses and had a crew of mechanics. Lester learned how to repair and maintain vehicles skillfully from an excellent mechanic who had worked on race cars in North Carolina. Why did he work for the Fox brothers instead of getting a better-paying job with the Manhattan Project?
Lester found out that this North Carolina resident was wanted there for hauling moonshine liquor. If he had applied for a job at an Oak Ridge plant, he would have been investigated and the North Carolina authorities would have found him.
Lester said his interest in the car business likely started when he was 13. He bought for $15 a car he saw in front of an Oliver Springs house on his newspaper route. It had a bad transmission, but his brother bought him a new one for $5 to pay him for cleaning buses.
When he drove the $15 car, the brakes screeched, attracting attention. A new hire for the Manhattan Project asked him if he would take $60 for his car. Lester wanted $75, but sold it to him for $60 and walked three miles home with a nice profit.
When he was 16, Lucky Lester won a Jeep from the American Legion after buying a chance on winning it for $1 at the Clinton fairgrounds. Then he answered an ad from someone offering to trade a 1941Chevrolet for a Jeep.
Lester had saved his earnings during the war. In the fall of 1946 the government scheduled an auction in Oak Ridge for selling its surplus vehicles. Only veterans could buy them. He convinced six Army veterans, who had returned to his high school so they could receive $50 a month from the government for graduating, to get Veterans Administration permits so they could buy vehicles at the auction.
"For each vehicle that you buy for me at the auction, I'll give you $50 and I'll pay for the vehicle," Lester told the boys. He bought the surplus vehicles and resold them for a profit while still in high school.
He joined the Army after getting married in 1950. (He and his wife had three sons.) Then he worked as a bulldozer operator in the Army Reserve at Elza Gate. Lester got a job at K-25 as a maintenance mechanic and welder. In 1954 K-25 was laying off workers, so Lester convinced the personnel office to save his friend's job and lay off Lester so he could help his brother sell cars.
"I went into the car business and was always at the right place at the right time," Lester told McDaniel. "One day in 1966 my brother was out of town for a week and a guy said, 'I'd like to sign you up for a Toyota franchise.' " So Lester filled out the paperwork and Fox Toyota in Clinton was born. Two years later his brother was killed in an automobile accident.
Toyota never did really catch on until the energy crunch of '73," Lester said. Earlier in that year his district manager called him, saying, "Well, I've got a bunch of cars that dealers didn't take. How many do you want?" Lester said, "I'll take all of them."
Instead of receiving 30 Toyota cars a month, he got 100.
"It was a real lucky move," Lester said. "Gasoline got scarce and people wanted smaller cars like Toyotas. I had all those cars in stock when they were really scarce."
As a member of the Masonic Lodge, Lester annually met with all the car dealers in Anderson County to solicit donations for the Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children. In 1975 he told the owner of Tri-Co Motors, the Oldsmobile franchise in Oak Ridge, that he would be interested in buying this franchise if the owner wanted to sell it.
The next year the owner, who had developed serious health problems, agreed to sell the franchise to him. Lester noted that, while Toyota approved his franchise in one day, it took six months for General Motors to approve his Oldsmobile dealership.
In 1979 Lester bought the Chrysler and Dodge dealerships; in 1982, the Nissan franchise; in 1991, the Buick and Pontiac franchise, and in 1997, the Chevrolet dealership. By then he owned all the GM franchises in Oak Ridge, as well as Subaru and GMC dealerships in South Clinton.
Seeing that demand for American autos was falling, Lester sold his auto dealerships in 2005.
"How did you know that the time was right to sell and that the economy was going to turn down?" people asked him. His answer: "I smelled the air and I didn't smell any cheese in it, so I figured I better sell." Lucky Lester always seemed to know the right time to make a deal.
Thanks again Carolyn for an excellent treatment on the history of Lester Fox, an extraordinary life indeed.


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Presents for A Geek: Motherboard Gifts
We all have at least one or two geekie or tech savvy friends in our life. Make their day with a cool gadget inspired gift made out of reclaimed circuit boards originally designed for computers, televisions, and other electronics.
Since 1991 Motherboard Gifts & More has specialized in gifts such as business card cases, luggage tags, coasters, Christmas ornaments, pictures frames, and even jewelry using reclaimed circuit boards.
Here are some of our favorites (as shown above):
1. Votive Lights (set of 4), $35.95
2. Circuit Coaster Set, $27.50
3. Square Desk Clock with Metal Taper Pin, $26.95
4. Nightlight, $17.50
5. Business Card Case, $28.95


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Olney is a beautiful Buckinghamshire market town located about 12 miles from Milton Keynes, Northampton and Bedford (see map). Many visitors enjoy Olney's history and culture.
Olney Town Council aims to represent the views of local people and to work with Milton Keynes Council (the local authority for the town) for the benefit of those who live and work here.
Olney Town Council 2010 Website copyright and all rights reserved.


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Alphabetical Listing
Wealth Effects of Intraholding Company Bank Mergers: Evidence from Shareholder Returns
by Gary Whalen
OCC Working Paper 94-4, May 1994.
Using an event study approach, this analysis examines whether or not intracompany mergers of subsidiary banks by multibank holding companies result in significant, positive, abnormal stock returns. Such a result implies that investors expect this type of merger will improve future profitability, presumably by permitting efficiencies to be realized or revenues to increase. The analysis of the stock returns for a sample of 39 consolidating companies indicates that this is the case.
These findings appear to be quite robust. Furthermore, the findings imply that permitting holding companies with interstate operations to consolidate their banking units across state lines could yield efficiencies as proponents of interstate branching claim.
As with all OCC Working Papers, the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Department of the Treasury.
Any whole or partial reproduction of material in this paper should include the following citation: Whalen, Gary, "Wealth Effects of Intraholding Company Bank Mergers: Evidence from Shareholder Returns," Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, E&PA Working Paper 94-4, May 1994.


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Fender Hot Rod DeVille 410 - One of the world's best amps!
Save over £200 off SRP when you buy the Fender Hot Rod DeVille 410, one of the most sought-after guitar amps right now, as used by several top bands such as The Strokes, Bloc Party, Manic Street Preachers and Coldplay.
Four 10" speakers that deliver big, bright tone! The Fender Hot Rod DeVille 410 sends 60 scorching watts straight into a quartet of 10" Fender Special Design Eminence speakers, courtesy of two 6L6 Groove Tube output tubes and three 12AX7 preamp tubes.
RANGE OF THE WEEK: Jose Ferrer acoustic guitars
Think classical guitars are not for you? Think again! Find out why many pop & rock acts, from the Beatles to Franz Ferdinand and Pete Doherty, sometimes turned to one! And why Jose Ferrer may be a good choice for you... Find out more
HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK: Vox Time Machine
The "time machine" dual-mode delay pedal is the second effect pedal created in collaboration between the world-renowned guitarist Joe Satriani and VOX. Sounds amazing.... Read more!
BARGAIN OF THE WEEK: Gretsch Junior Jet guitars
What? An affordable Gretsch? Yes, you heard it right! The Junior Jet and Junior Jet II are straightforward, rockin' axes, with classic looks and no compromise on quality. Prices start under £200. IN STOCK NOW!
Coming Soon in Liverpool: Shred With Dolphin!
Bring your friends and have fun Saturday 18th April at our Shred With Dolphin event in Liverpool! Show off your shredding skills for the chance to win a Dolphin goodie bag! Read more...
Other News:
Coldplay vs. Joe Satriani: band challenge 'copy' claims
Hayden Releases the MoFo - Valve Amp Handwired in the UK!
Buyer Pays £310,000 for Roy Rogers' Martin Acoustic
Michelle Obama Gives French First Lady an acoustic Guitar
Credit Crunch Shopping: How To Sound Like Your Idols...On The Cheap
Guitar Shredding Tips: 8-Finger Tapping
Beat the credit crunch!
Clearance Sale on brands Boss, Maxon, Z-Vex, BBE, Vox, Carl Martin, Toadworks, Digitech and Line 6!


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Reserve online or call 01993 824 252
Start your shortlist by clicking on the icon next to any property
Villa 72 is an individually designed villa positioned in a great location on the edge of the South Course, on the Calle de Las Palmeras. It enjoys a large, private plot plus a good sized private pool and great terrace space for outdoor entertaining. As you would expect with a villa of this specification, it has air conditioning throughout. Maintained to the highest of standards, it provides great holiday accommodation for families or groups of friends in a good location at La Manga Club. Access to the Club's facilities is one minute in a car or about 10 minutes by foot. The villa accommodates 8 people very comfortably.
A stunning private villa which is an excellent option for people looking for a high quality stay at La Manga Club
The villa has its own fenced private pool. Pool heating is available at a cost of £243 per week or part week or £243 per week pro rata for stays over 7 nights. The property also offers free wi-fi and a table tennis table.
On the ground floor are the 4 double bedrooms, all with patio doors leading to the garden.
Master bedroom has zip and link beds, so can be configured as either a king size or 2 single beds and an en-suite full bathroom with twin wash basins and additional walk in shower. There is also a safe for guests' use. Bedroom 2 has twin beds which can be made into a double bed if preferred, and has use of the separate full bathroom. Bedroom 3 has twin beds and an en-suite shower room.
Bedroom 4 has a double bed and an en-suite shower room.
A small child's bed and cot are also available which can be used in any of the bedrooms. There are built-in stairgates at the top and bottom of the stairs to the first floor.
A utility room can also be found of this floor with washing machine and tumble drier.
First Flooor
Fully fitted kitchen which is well equipped with dish washer, microwave, oven, hob and extractor, and fridge freezer.
The spacious living room is well furnished with sofas and has a flat screen TV and DVD player. Patio doors lead to a lovely terrace with table, chairs and built in barbeque. From here you have views over the pool and garden, to the Mar Menor beyond. The separate dining area has a ceiling fan, and patio doors leading to a sun terrace. Steps lead from this terrace to the garden below.
Pool dimensions 10m x 5m. Depth 1.5m to 1.7m.
Please note: Saturday changeovers only in school holidays including all of July.