text:
A POLITICAL TREATISE - Part 3
Introductions: Durant:650, Hampshire:179, Nadler:342.
Posthumously Published - 1677
Part 1 - Preface - Table of Contents - Chapters I to V
Part 2 - Table of Contents - Chapters VI and VII
Part 3 - Table of Contents
- Chapters VIII to XI
JBY Notes:
1. For the kind permission to
use the text see Page
JBY added sentence numbers.
2. [8:4] - Chapter Number:Paragraph Number.
Sentence numbers, added by JBY, are shown thus (zz:yy:xx).
zz = Chapter Number.
yy = Paragraph Number.
xx = Sentence Number.
3. Page numbers are those of Book II.
4. Citation
5. (Footnote or the Latin word),
{JBY Comment or endnote}.
6. Please e-mail
errors, clarification requests, disagreement,
or suggestions to firstname.lastname@example.com.
7. There is much in this work that you will not agree with or even
think nonsensealthough keep in mind that it was written 300
years ago. The work is hopelessly outdated; its main value is that it Bk.XII:310- 312.
shows Spinozistic ideas at play in the formation of advanced modern Hobbes: Leviathan.
governments and how they cope with the passions of men. Partake
of the work (and my commentaries) as you would a pomegranate;
relish the flesh, but spit-out the pits. See Introductions listed above.
8. Where applicable, I think it appropriate to substitute the term "State"
for "Clan" or "City" so as to understand the idea in today's terms.
Likewise, where applicable, substitute "Country" for "Dominion" and
"Congress" or "Parliament" for "Council." For antecedents to the USA
Constitution see 8:29, and 9:1ff.
9. Spinoza's purpose in writing the Treatise is to design a govern-
ment that will best cope with the passions of men; but for these
passions there would be no need for political parties, only
administrative officesrunning the Post Office. See also Title Page,
[7:2], and Self-interest.
Part Chapters
|Part 1
|Part 2
|Part 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Part
3: BkII:
Source Text
|What aristocracy is. Patricians.
|An aristocracy should consist of a large number of patricians.
|Difference between monarchy and aristocracy.
|Aristocracy approaches nearer to absolutism than monarchy.
|8:4, 5, 6.
|Is also fitter to maintain liberty. Foundations of an
where one city is head of a whole dominion.
|Of fortifying towns.
|Of the military and its leaders.
|Of the sale of lands and farms.
|Of the supreme council of patricians.
|Of the causes of the destruction of an aristocracy.
|The primary law of this dominion, to prevent its
lapsing into oligarchy.
|Patricians to be chosen out of certain families.
|8:14, 15.
|Of the place and time of assembling.
|Of the supreme council's functions.
|Of the ruler or chief of the council.
|Equality to be observed among patricians.
|Of the syndics and their functions.
|8:20, 21,
8:22, 23,
8:24, 25.
|Of the ministers of the dominion.
|8:26, 27.
|Voting to be by ballot.
|Of the senate or second council.
|8:29, 30
8:31, 32,
|Of the presidents of the senate and their deputies. Consuls.
|8:34, 35,
|Of the bench or college of judges.
|8:37, 38,
8:39, 40,
|Governors of cities and provinces. Right of the
|Judges to be appointed in every city.
|Ministers of dominion to be chosen from the commons.
|Of the tribunes of the treasury.
|Of freedom of worship and speech.
|Of the bearing and state of the patricians.
|Of the oath.
|Of academies and liberty of teaching.
|Of the aristocratic dominion held by more than one city.
|Confederate cities.
|Of points common to both kinds of aristocracy.
|Of the common bond of the cities by a senate and tribunal.
|Supreme council and senate.
|Of assembling this council, of choosing generals and
ambassadors, of the presidents of the orders, judges, &c.
|Of commanders of battalions and military tribunes.
|Of tributes.
|Of the senators' emoluments and place of meeting.
|Of the councils and syndics of the separate cities.
|Consuls of cities.
|Judges of cities.
|Of dependent cities.
|This kind of aristocracy to be preferred to the other.
|9:14, 15.
|Primary cause, why aristocracies are dissolved. Of a dictator.
|Of the supreme council.
|Of the tribunes of the commons among the Romans.
|Of the authority of the syndics.
|Sumptuary laws.
|Vices not to be forbidden directly, but indirectly.
|10:6, 7.
|Honours and rewards rejected.
|An aristocracy may be stable.
|10:9, 10.
|Difference between democracy and aristocracy.
|11:1, 2.
|Of the nature of democracy.
|Women to be excluded from government.
A Political Treatise - Part 1 , Part 2 , Part 3.
Author's Notes to the Treatise
[8:1] (8:1:1) So far of monarchy. (8:1:2) But now we will say, on what plan
an aristocracy is to be framed, so that it may be lasting. (8:1:3) We have
defined an aristocratic dominion as that, which is held not by one man,
but by certain persons chosen
out of the multitude, whom we shall
{ USA Congressman or Senators }
henceforth call patricians. (8:1:4) I say expressly, "that which is held by
certain persons
chosen." (8:1:5) For
the chief difference between this and
{ semantic confusion }
a democracy is, that the right of governing depends in an aristocracy on
election only, but in a democracy for the most part on some right either
congenital or acquired by fortune (as we shall explain in its place); and
therefore, although in any dominion the entire multitude be received into
the number of the patricians, provided that right of theirs is not inherited,
and does not descend by some law to others, the dominion will for all
that be quite an aristocracy, because none are received into the number
of the patricians save by express election. (8:1:6) But if these chosen
persons were but two, each of them will try to be more powerful than the
other, and from the too great power of each, the dominion will easily be
split into two factions; and in like manner into three, four, or five factions,
if three, four, or five persons were put into possession of it. (8:1:7) But
the factions will be the weaker, the more there are to whom the domin-
ion was delegated. (8:1:8) And hence it follows, that to secure the
stability of an aristocracy, it is necessary
to consider the proportionate
size of the actual dominion, in order to determine the minimum number
of patricians.
[8:2] (8:2:1) Let it be supposed, then, that for a dominion of moderate size
it suffices to be allowed a hundred of the best men, and that upon them
has been conferred the supreme authority of the dominion, and that
they have consequently the right to elect their patrician colleagues,
when any of PAGE 346 the number die. (8:2:2) These men will certainly
endeavour to secure their succession to their children or next in blood.
(8:2:3) And thus the supreme authority of the dominion will always be with
those, whom fortune has made children or kinsmen to patricians.
(8:2:4) And, as out of a hundred men who rise to office by fortune, hardly
three are found that excel in knowledge and counsel, it will thus come to
pass, that the authority of the dominion will rest, not with a hundred,
but only with two or three who excel by vigour of mind, and who will
easily draw to themselves everything, and each of them, as is the wont
of human greed, will be able to prepare the way to a monarchy.
(8:2:5) And so, if we make a right calculation, it is necessary, that the
supreme authority of a dominion, whose size requires at least a hundred
first-rate men, should be conferred on not less than five thousand.
(8:2:6) For by this proportion it will never fail, but a hundred shall be found
excelling in mental vigour, that is, on the hypothesis that, out of fifty that
seek and obtain office, one will always be found not less than first-rate,
besides others that imitate the virtues of the first-rate, and are therefore
worthy to rule.
[8:3] (8:3:1) The patricians are most commonly citizens of one city, which
is the head of the whole PAGE 349 dominion, so that the commonwealth or
republic has its name from it, as once that of Rome, and now those of
Venice, Genoa, etc. (8:3:2) But the republic of the Dutch has its name
from an entire province, whence it arises, that the subjects of this
dominion enjoy a greater liberty. (8:3:3) Now, before we can determine
the foundations on which this aristocratic dominion ought to rest, we
must observe a very great difference, which exists between the
dominion which is conferred on one man and that which is conferred on
a sufficiently large council. (8:3:4) For, in the first place, the power of one
man is (as we said, 6:5) very inadequate to support the entire dominion;
but this no one, without manifest absurdity, can affirm of a sufficiently
large council. (8:3:5) For, in declaring the council to be sufficiently large,
one at the same time denies, that it is inadequate to support the
dominion. (8:3:6) A king, therefore, is altogether in need of counsellors,
but a council like this is not so in the least. (8:3:7) In the second place,
kings are mortal, but councils are everlasting. (8:3:8) And so the power
PAGE 347 of the dominion which has once been transferred to a large
enough council never reverts to the multitude. (8:3:9) But this is otherwise
in a monarchy, as we showed (7:25). (8:3:10) Thirdly, a king's dominion is
often on sufferance, whether from his minority, sickness, or old age, or
from other causes; but the power of a council of this kind, on the con-
trary, remains always one and the same. (8:3:11) In the fourth place, one
man's will is very fluctuating and inconstant; and, therefore, in a mon-
archy, all law is, indeed, the explicit will of the king (as we said. 7:1), but
not every will of the king ought to be law; but this cannot be said of the
will of a sufficiently numerous council. (8:3:1)2 For since the council itself,
as we have just shown, needs no counsellors, its every explicit will
ought to be law. (8:3:13) And hence we conclude, that the dominion con-
ferred upon a large enough council is absolute, or approaches nearest
to the absolute. (8:3:14) For if there be any absolute dominion, it is, in fact,
that which is held by an entire multitude.
[8:4] (8:4:1) Yet in so far as this aristocratic dominion never (as has just
been shown) reverts to the multitude, and there is under it no consulta-
tion with the multitude, but, without qualification, every will of the council
is law, it must be considered as quite absolute, and therefore its founda-
tions ought to rest only on the will and judgment
of the said council, and
not on the watchfulness of the multitude, since the latter is excluded
from giving its advice or its vote. (8:4:2) The reason, then, why in practice
aristocracy is not absolute, is that the multitude is a cause of fear to the
rulers, and therefore succeeds in retaining for itself some liberty, which
it asserts and holds as its own, if not by an express law, yet on a tacit
[8:5] (8:5:1) And thus it is manifest that this kind of dominion will be in the
best possible condition, if its institutions are such that it most nearly
approaches the absolute that is, that the multitude is as little as
possible a cause of fear, and retains no liberty, but such as must neces-
sarily be assigned it by the law of the dominion itself, and is therefore
not so much a right of the multitude as of the whole dominion, asserted
and maintained by the aristocrats only as their own. (8:5:2) For thus prac-
tice agrees best with theory, as appears from the last section, and is
also self-evident. PAGE 348 (8:5:3) For we cannot doubt that the dominion
rests the less with the patricians, the more rights the commons assert
for themselves, such as those
which the corporations of artisans in
Lower Germany, commonly called Guilds, generally possess.
[8:6] (8:6:1) But the commons need not apprehend any danger of a hateful
slavery from this form of dominion, merely because it is conferred on the
council absolutely. (8:6:2) For the will of so large a council cannot be so
much determined by lust as by reason; because men are drawn asun-
der by an evil passion, and cannot be guided, as it were, by one mind,
except so far as they desire things honourable, or that have at least an
honourable appearance.
[8:7] (8:7:1) In determining, then, the foundations of an aristocracy, it is
above all to be observed, that they should rest on the sole will and
power of the supreme council, so that it may be as independent as
possible, and be in no danger from the multitude. (8:7:2) In order to deter-
mine these foundations, which are to rest, I say, upon the sole will and
power of the council, let us see what foundations of peace are peculiar
to monarchy, and unsuited to this form of dominion. (8:7:3) For if we sub-
stitute for these equivalent foundations fit for an aristocracy, and leave
the rest, as they are already laid, we shall have removed without doubt
every cause of seditions; or, at least, this kind of dominion will be no
less safe than the monarchical, but, on the contrary, so much the more
so, and of so much better a condition, as, without danger to peace and
liberty, it approaches nearer than monarchy to the absolute (8:3, 8:6).
(8:7:4) For the greater the right of the supreme authority, the more the form
of dominion agrees with the dictate of reason (3:5 , Ought not this reference
to be to 3:6 ?),
and, therefore, the fitter it is to maintain peace and liberty.
(8:7:5) Let us run through, therefore, the points we stated in our sixth
chapter, beginning with the ninth section, that we may reject what is
unfit for this kind
of dominion, and see
what agrees with it.
[8:8] (8:8:1) That it is necessary, in the first place, to found and fortify one
or more cities, no one can doubt. (8:8:2) But that city is above all to be
fortified, which is the head of the whole dominion, and also those that
are on its frontiers. (8:8:3) For that which is the head of the whole domin-
ion, and has the supreme right, ought to be more powerful than the rest.
(8:8:4) But under this kind of dominion it is quite unnecessary to divide all
the inhabitants into clans.
[8:9] (8:9:1) As for the military, since under this dominion equality is not to
be looked for among all, but between the patricians only, and, in partic-
ular, the power of the patricians is greater than that of the commons, it
is certain that it makes no difference to the laws or fundamental prin-
ciples of this dominion,
that the military be formed
of others besides
subjects (Cf. 6:10). (8:9:2) But it is of the first importance that no one be
admitted into the number of the patricians, that has not a proper know-
ledge of the art of war. (8:9:3) But for the subjects to be excluded, as
some would have it, from military service, is surely folly. (8:9:4) For
besides that the military pay given to subjects remains within the realm,
whereas, on the contrary, what is paid to a foreign soldiery is altogether
lost, the greatest strength of the dominion is also thereby weakened.
(8:9:5) For it is certain that those fight with peculiar valour who fight for
altar and hearth. (8:9:6) Whence, also, it is manifest that those are no less
wrong, who lay down that military commanders, tribunes, centurions,
etc., should be chosen from among the patricians only. (8:9:7) For with
what courage will those soldiers fight who are deprived of all hope of
gaining glory and advancement? (8:9:8) But, on the other hand, to estab-
lish a law forbidding the patricians to hire foreign soldiers when circum-
stances require it, whether to defend themselves, and suppress sedi-
tions, or for any other reason,
besides being inconsiderate, would also
be repugnant to the supreme right of the patricians, concerning which
see 8:3, 8:4, 8:5 . (8:9:9) But the general of a single army, or of the entire
military, is to be chosen but in time of war, and among the patricians
only, and is to hold the command for a year at most, without power of
being continued therein, or afterwards reappointed. (8:9:10) For this law,
necessary as it is under a monarchy, is so above all under this kind of
dominion. (8:9:11) For although it is much easier, as we have said above,
to transfer the dominion PAGE 350 from one man to another than from a
free council to one man; yet it does often happen, that patricians are
subdued by their own generals, and that to the much greater harm of
the commonwealth. (8:9:12) For when a monarch is removed, it is but a
change of tyrant, not of the form of dominion; but, under an aristocracy,
this cannot happen, without an upsetting of the form of dominion, and a
slaughter of the greatest men. (8:9:13) Of which thing Rome has offered
the most mournful examples. (8:9:14) But our reason for saying that, under
a monarchy, the militia should serve without pay, is here inapplicable.
(8:9:15) For since the subjects are excluded from giving their advice or
votes, they are to be reckoned as foreigners, and are, therefore, to be
hired for service on no worse terms than foreigners. (8:9:16) And there is
in this case no danger of their being distinguished above the rest by the
patricians: nay, further, to avoid the partial judgment which everyone is
apt to form of his own exploits, it is wiser for the patricians to assign a
fixed payment to the soldiers for their service.
[8:10] (8:10:1) Furthermore, for this same reason, that all but the patricians
are foreigners, it cannot be without danger to the whole dominion, that
the lands and houses and the whole soil should remain public property,
and be let to the inhabitants at a yearly rent. (8:10:2) For the subjects
having no part in the dominion would easily, in bad times, all forsake
their cities, if they could
carry where they pleased what
goods they
possess. (8:10:3) And, therefore, lands and farms are not to be let, but
sold to the subjects, yet on condition that they pay every year an
aliquot part of the year's produce, etc., as is done in
[8:11] (8:11:1) These points considered, I proceed to the foundations on
{ all patricians }
which the supreme council should rest and be established. (8:11:2) We
have shown (8:2) that, in a moderate-sized dominion, this council ought
to have about five thousand members. (8:11:3) And so we must look for
means of preventing the dominion
from gradually getting into
hands, and of insuring, on the contrary, that the number of members be
increased in proportion to the growth of the dominion itself; and, next,
that between the patricians, equality be as far as possible maintained;
and, further, that there may be speed and expedition in their counsels,
and that they PAGE 351 tend to the general good; and, lastly, that the
power of the patricians or council exceed the power of the multitude,
yet so that the multitude suffer no harm thereby.
[8:12] (8:12:1) But jealousy causes a great difficulty in maintaining our first
{ In a jungle }
point. (8:12:2) For men are, as we have said, by nature enemies, so that
however they be associated, and
bound together by laws, they still
{ because it is still a part-jungle }
retain their nature. (8:12:3) And hence I think it is, that democracies change
into aristocracies, and these at length into monarchies. (8:12:4) For I am
fully persuaded that most aristocracies were formerly democracies.
(8:12:5) For when a given multitude,
in search of fresh territories, has found
and cultivated them, it retains, as a whole, its equal right of dominion,
because no man gives dominion to another spontaneously. (8:12:6) But
although every one of them thinks it fair, that he should have the same
right against another that that other has against him, he yet thinks it
unfair, that the foreigners that join them should have equal right in the
dominion with themselves, who sought it by
their own toil, and won it at
{ How little have things changed. }
the price of their own blood. (8:12:7) And this not even the foreigners them-
selves deny, for, of course, they migrate thither, not to hold dominion,
but for the benefit of their own private business, and are quite satisfied if
they are but allowed the liberty of transacting that business in safety.
(8:12:8) But meanwhile the multitude is augmented by the influx of foreign-
ers, who gradually acquire the national manners, until at last they are
distinguished by no other difference than that of incapacity to get office;
and while their number daily increases, that of the citizens, on the con-
trary, is by many causes diminished. (8:12:9) For families often die out,
and some persons are disqualified for their crimes, and a great many
are driven by domestic poverty to neglect affairs of state, and mean-
while the more powerful aim
at nothing else, but to govern alone; and
thus the dominion is gradually limited to a few, and at length by faction
to one. (8:12:10) And here we might add other causes that destroy domin-
ions of this sort; but as they are well known, I pass them by, and pro-
ceed now to state the laws by which this dominion, of which we are
treating, ought to be maintained.
[8:13] (8:13:1) The primary law of this dominion ought to be that which
determines the proportionate numbers of patricians PAGE 352 and multi-
tude. (8:13:2) For a proportion (8:1) ought to be maintained between the
multitude and the patricians, so that with the increase of the former the
number of the latter should be raised. (8:13:3) And this proportion (in
accordance with our remarks
in the second section) ought to
be about
fifty to one, that is, the inequality between the members of each should
never be greater. (8:13:4) For (8:1) without destroying the form of dominion,
the number of patricians may be greater than the number of the multi-
tude. (8:13:5) But there is no danger except in the smallness of their num-
ber. (8:13:6) But how it is to be provided that this law be kept unbroken,
I will presently show in its own place.
[8:14] (8:14:1) Patricians, in some places, are chosen only out of particular
families. (8:14:2) But it is ruinous to lay this down expressly by law.
(8:14:3) For not to mention that families often die out, and that the other
families can never be excluded without
disgrace, it is also repugnant to
the form of this dominion, that the dignity of patrician should be heredi-
tary (8:1). (8:14:4) But on this system a dominion seems rather a democ-
racy, such as we have described in 8:12, that is in the hands of very
few citizens. (8:14:5) But, on the other hand, to provide against the patri-
cians choosing their own sons and kinsmen, and thereby against the
right of dominion remaining in particular families, is impossible, and
indeed absurd, as I shall show (8:39). (8:14:6) But provided that they hold
that right by no express law, and that the rest (I mean, such as are born
within the dominion, and use the vulgar tongue, and have not a foreign
wife, and are not infamous, nor servants, nor earning their living by any
servile trade, among which are to be reckoned those of a wine-merchant,
or brewer) are not excluded, the form of the dominion will, notwithstand-
ing, be retained, and it will be possible to maintain the proportion
between the patricians and the multitude.
[8:15] (8:15:1) But if it be further by law appointed that no young men be
chosen, it will never happen that a
few families hold the right of govern-
ment in their hands. (8:15:2) And, therefore, be it by law appointed, that
no man that has not reached his thirtieth year be put on the list of
[8:16] (8:16:1) Thirdly, it is next to be ordained, that all the patricians must
be assembled at certain fixed times in a particular part of the city, and
that whoever does not attend the council, unless he be hindered by
illness or some public business, shall be fined some considerable
amount. (8:16:2) For, were it otherwise, most of them would neglect the
public, for the sake of their own private affairs.
[8:17] (8:17:1) Let this council's functions be to pass and repeal laws, and
to choose their patrician colleagues, and all the ministers of the domin-
ion. (8:17:2) For he, that has supreme right, as we have decided that this
council has, cannot give to anyone authority to pass and repeal laws,
without at the same time abdicating his own right, and transferring it to
him, to whom he gives that power. (8:17:3) For he, that has but for one
day only authority to pass and repeal laws, is able to change the entire
form of the dominion. (8:17:4) But one can, without forfeiting one's
supreme right, temporarily entrust to others the daily business of domin-
ion to be administered according to the established laws. (8:17:5) Further-
more, if the ministers of dominion were chosen by any other but this
council, then its members would be more properly called wards than
[8:18] (8:18:1) Hence some are accustomed to create for the council a
ruler or prince, either for life, as the Venetians, or for a time, as the
Genoese; but yet with such great precautions, as make it clear enough,
that it is not done without
great risk. (8:18:2) And
assuredly we cannot
doubt but that the dominion thereby approaches the monarchical form,
and as far as we can conjecture from their histories, it was done for no
other reason, than that before the institution of these councils they had
lived under a ruler, or doge, as under a king. (8:18:3) And so the creation
of a ruler is a necessary requisite indeed for the particular nation, but
not for the aristocratic dominion considered
in itself.
[8:19] (8:19:1) But, inasmuch as the supreme authority of this dominion
rests with this council as a whole, not with every individual member of it
(for otherwise it would be but the gathering of an undisciplined mob),
it is, therefore, necessary that all the patricians be so bound by the laws
as to form, as it were, one body governed by one mind. (8:19:2) But the
laws by themselves alone are weak and easily broken, when their
vindicators are the very persons who PAGE 354 are able to transgress
them, and the only ones who are to take warning by the punishment,
and must punish their colleagues in order by fear of the same punish-
ment to restrain their own desire: for all this involves a great absurdity.
(8:19:3) And, therefore, means must be sought to preserve order in this
supreme council and keep unbroken the constitution of the dominion,
so that yet the greatest possible
equality may exist between patricians.
[20] (8:20:1) But since, from a single ruler or prince, able also to vote in the
debates, there must necessarily arise a great inequality, especially on
account of the power, which must of necessity be granted him, in order
to enable him to discharge his
duty in safety; therefore, if we consider
the whole matter aright, nothing can be devised more useful to the
general welfare than the institution of another council of certain patri-
cians subordinate to the supreme council, whose only duty should be to
see that the constitution, as far as it concerns the councils and ministers
of the dominion, be kept
unbroken, and who should, therefore, have
{ USA Supreme Court }
authority to summon to judgment and, in conformity with established law,
to condemn any delinquent who, as a minister of the dominion, has
transgressed the laws
concerning his office. (8:20:2)
And these patricians
we shall hereafter call syndics.
[8:21] (8:210:1) And they are to be chosen for life. (8:210:2) For, were they to
be chosen for a time, so that they should afterwards be eligible for other
offices in the dominion, we should fall into the very absurdity which we
have just pointed out in the nineteenth section. (8:210:3) But lest they
should become quite haughty by very long rule, none are to be elected
to this office, but those who have reached their sixtieth year or more,
and have discharged the duties of senator, of which below.
[8:22] (8:22:1) Of these, too, we shall easily determine the number, if we
consider that these syndics stand to the patricians in the same relation
as the whole body of patricians together does to the multitude, which
they cannot govern, if they are fewer than a proper number. (8:22:2) And,
therefore, the number of the syndics should be to that of patricians as
their number is to that of the multitude, that is (8:13),
as one to fifty.
[8:23] (8:23:1) Moreover, that this council may discharge its functions
PAGE 355 in security, some portion of the soldiery must be assigned to it,
and be subject to its orders.
[8:24] (8:24:1) The syndics and other ministers of state are to have no
salary, but such emoluments, that they cannot maladminister affairs of
state without great loss to themselves. (8:24:2) For we cannot doubt that it
is fair, that the ministers of this kind of dominion should be awarded a
recompense for their time, since the commons are the majority in this
dominion, and the patricians look after their safety, while they them-
selves have no trouble with affairs of state, but only with their own
private ones. (8:24:3) But since, on the other hand, no man (7:4) defends
another's cause, save in so far as he thereby hopes to establish his own
interest, things must, of necessity, be so ordered that the ministers, who
have charge of affairs of state, should most pursue their own interest,
when they are most watchful for the general good.
[8:25] (8:25:1) To the syndics then, whose duty, as we said, it is to see
that the constitution is kept unbroken, the following emoluments are to
be awarded: namely, that every householder that inhabits any place in
the dominion, be bound to pay every year a coin of small value, say a
quarter of an ounce of silver, to the syndics, that thus they may know
the number of inhabitants, and so observe what proportion of them the
patricians constitute; and next that every new patrician on his election
must pay the syndics some large sum, for instance, twenty or twenty-five
pounds of silver. (8:25:2) Moreover, that money, in which the absent patri-
cians (I mean those who have failed to attend the meeting of the council)
are condemned, is also to be awarded to the syndics; and a part, too,
of the goods of defaulting ministers, who are bound to abide their judg-
ment, and who are fined a certain sum of money, or have their goods
confiscated, should be devoted to them, not to all indeed, but to those
only who sit daily, and whose duty it is to summon the council of syndics,
concerning whom see 8:28. (8:25:3) But, in order that the council of syndics
may always be maintained at its full number, before all other business in
the supreme council, when it is assembled at the usual time, inquiry is to
be made about this. (8:25:4) Which, if the syndics neglect, let it then
devolve upon the president PAGE 356 of the senate (concerning which we
shall soon have occasion to speak), to admonish the supreme council
on this head, to demand of the president of the syndics the reason of
his silence, and to inquire what is the supreme council's opinion in the
matter. (8:25:5) But if the president of the senate is likewise silent, let the
case be taken up by the president of the supreme court of justice, or if
he too is silent by some other patrician, and let him demand an explana-
tion of their silence from the presidents of the senate and the court of
justice, as well as from the president of the syndics. (8:25:6) Lastly, that
that law, whereby young men are excluded, may likewise be strictly
observed, it is to be appointed that all who have reached the thirtieth
year of their age, and who are not by express law excluded, are to have
their names inscribed on a list, in presence of the syndics, and to
receive from them, at a fixed price, some sign of the honour conferred
on them, namely, that they may be allowed to wear a particular orna-
ment only permitted to them,
to distinguish them and make them to be
had in honour by the rest; and, at the same time, be it ordained, that in
elections none may nominate as patrician anyone whose name is not
inscribed on the general list, and that under a heavy penalty. (8:25:7) And,
further, let no one be allowed to refuse the burden of a duty or office,
which he is chosen to bear. (8:25:8) Lastly, that all the absolutely funda-
mental laws of the dominion may be everlasting, it must be ordained that
if anyone in the supreme council raise a question about any funda-
ental law, as of prolonging the command of any general of an army,
or of diminishing the number of patricians, or the like, he is guilty of
treason, and not only is he to be condemned to death, and his goods
confiscated, but some sign of
his punishment is to remain visible in
public for an eternal memorial of the event. (8:25:9) But for the confirming
of the other general rights of the dominion, it is enough, if it be only
ordained, that no law can be repealed nor new law passed, unless first
the college of syndics,
and then three-fourths or four-fifths of
supreme council agree thereto.
[8:26] (8:26:1) Let the right also of summoning the supreme council and
proposing the matters to be decided in it, rest with the syndics, and let
them likewise be given the first place in PAGE 357 the council, but without
the right to vote. (8:26:2) But before they take their seats, they must swear
by the safety of that supreme council and by the public liberty, that they
will strive with the utmost zeal to preserve unbroken the ancient laws.
and to consult the general good. (8:26:3) After which let them through their
secretary open in order the subjects of discussion.
[8:27] (8:27:1) But that all the patricians may have equal authority in
making decrees and electing the ministers of the dominion, and that
speed and expedition in all matters may be possible, the order
observed by the Venetians is altogether to be approved, for they
appoint by lot a certain number of the council to name the ministers,
and when these have named in order the candidates for office, every
patrician signifies by ballot his opinion, approving or rejecting the candi-
date in question, so that it is not afterwards known, who voted in this or
that sense. (8:27:2) Whereby it is contrived, not only that the authority of
all the patricians in the decision is equal, and that business is quickly
despatched, but also, that everyone has absolute liberty (which is
of the first necessity in councils) to give his opinion without danger of
[8:28] (8:28:1) But in the councils of syndics and the other councils, the
same order is to be observed, that voting is to be by ballot. (8:28:2) But
the right of convoking the council of syndics and of proposing the
matters to be decided in the same ought to belong to their president,
who is to sit every day with ten or more other syndics, to hear the
complaints and secret accusations of the commons against the ministers,
and to look after the accusers, if circumstances require, and to summon
the supreme council even before the appointed time, if any of them
judge that there is danger in the delay. (8:28:3) Now this president and
those who meet with him every day are to be appointed by the supreme
council and out of the number of syndics, not indeed for life, but for six
months, and they must not have their term renewed but after the lapse
of three or four years. (8:28:4) And these, as we said above, are to be
awarded the goods that are confiscated and the pecuniary fines,
or some part of them. (8:28:5) The remaining points which concern the
syndics we will mention in their proper places.
Bk.XIB:166. { a subcommitee of }
[8:29] (8:29:1) The second council, which is subordinate to the supreme
one, we will call the senate, and let its duty be to transact public busi-
ness, for instance, to publish the laws of the dominion, to order the forti-
fications of the cities according to law, to confer military commissions,
to impose taxes on the subjects and apply the same, to answer foreign
embassies, and decide where embassies are to be sent. (8:29:2) But let
the actual appointment of ambassadors be the duty of the supreme
council. (8:29:3) For it is of the greatest consequence to see that no patri-
cian be called to any office in the dominion but by the supreme council
itself, lest the patricians themselves should try to curry favour with the
senate. (8:29:4) Secondly, all matters are to be referred to the supreme
council, which in any way
alter the existing state of things,
as the
deciding on peace and war. (8:29:5) Wherefore, that the senate's decrees
concerning peace and war may be valid, they must be confirmed by the
supreme council. (8:29:6)
And therefore I should say,
that it belonged to
{ all patricians } { USA House of Representatives }
the supreme council only, not to the senate, to impose new taxes.
[8:30] (8:30:1) In determining the number of senators these points are to be
taken into consideration: first, that all the patricians should have an
equal hope of gaining senatorial rank; secondly, that notwithstanding
the same senators, whose time (for which they were elected) is elapsed,
may be continued after a short interval, that so the dominion may always
be governed by skilled and experienced men; and lastly, that among the
senators many may be found illustrious for wisdom and virtue. (8:30:2) But
to secure all these conditions, there can be no other means devised,
than that it should be by law appointed, that no one who has not
reached his fiftieth year, be
received into the number of senators, and
that four hundred, that is about a twelfth part of the patricians, be
appointed for a year, and that two years after that year has elapsed,
the same be capable of re-appointment. (8:30:3) For in this manner about
a twelfth part of the patricians will be constantly engaged in the duty of
senator, with only short intervening periods; and this number surely,
together with that made up by the syndics, will be little less than the
number of patricians that have attained their fiftieth year. (8:30:4) And so
all the patricians will always have a great hope of gaining the rank
PAGE 359 of senator or syndic, and yet notwithstanding, the same patri-
cians, at only short intervals, will always hold senatorial rank, and
(according to what we said, 8:2) there will never be wanting in the
senate distinguished men, excelling in counsel and skill. (8:30:5) And
because this law cannot be
broken without exciting great jealousy on
the part of many patricians, it needs no other safeguard for its constant
validity, than that every patrician who has reached the age we men-
tioned, should offer the proof thereof to the syndics, who shall put his
name on the list of candidates for the senatorial duties, and read the
name before the supreme council, so that he may occupy, with the rest
of the same rank, a place set apart in this supreme council for his
fellows, next to the place of the senators.
[8:31] (8:31:1) The emoluments of the senators should be of such a kind,
that their profit is greater from peace than from war. (8:31:2) And therefore
let there be awarded to them a hundredth or a fiftieth part of the
merchandise exported abroad from the dominion, or imported into it
from abroad. (8:31:3) For we cannot doubt, that by this means they will,
as far as they can, preserve peace, and never desire to protract war.
(8:31:4) And from this duty not even the senators themselves, if any of
them are merchants, ought to be exempt; for such an immunity cannot
be granted without great risk to trade, as I think no one is ignorant.
(8:31:5) Nay, on the contrary, it must be by law ordained, that no senator
or ex-senator may fill any military post; and further, that no one may be
declared general or praetor, which officers we said (8:9) were to be
only appointed in time of war, whose father or grandfather is a senator,
or has held the dignity of senator within two years. (8:31:6) Which laws
we cannot doubt, that the patricians outside the senate will defend with
all their might: and so it will be the case, that the senators will always
have more profit from peace than from war, and will, therefore, never
advise war, except the utmost need of the dominion compels them.
(8:31:7) But it may be objected to us, that on this system, if, that is, syndics
and senators are to be allowed so great profits, an aristocracy will be as
burdensome to the subjects as any monarchy. (8:31:8) But not to mention
that royal courts require larger expenditure, and are yet not provided in
order to secure peace, PAGE 360 and that peace can never be bought too
dear; it is to be added, first, that all that under a monarchy is conferred
on one or a few, is here conferred upon very many. (8:31:9) Next kings
and their ministers do not bear the burden of the dominion with the
subjects, but under this form of dominion it is just the reverse; for the
who are always chosen from the rich, bear the
largest share
of the weight of the commonwealth. (8:31:10) Lastly, the burdens of a
monarchy spring not so much from its king's expenditure, as from its
secret policy. (8:31:11) For those burdens of a dominion, that are imposed
on the citizens in order to secure peace and liberty, great though they
be, are yet supported
and lightened
by the usefulness of peace.
(8:31:12) What nation ever had to pay so many and so heavy taxes as the
Dutch? (8:31:13) Yet it not only has not been exhausted, but, on the con-
trary, has been so mighty by its wealth, that all envied its good fortune.
(8:31:14) If therefore the burdens of a monarchy were imposed for the sake
of peace, they would not oppress the citizens; but, as I have said, it is
from the secret policy of that sort of dominion, that the subjects faint
under their lord; that is, because the virtue of kings counts for more in
time of war than in time of peace, and because they, who would reign
by themselves, ought above
all to try and have their subjects poor; not
Bk.XIB:2143, 44. (Note 1, 360)
to mention other things, which that most prudent Dutchman V. H.
formerly remarked, because they do not concern my design,
which is only to describe
the best state of every kind of dominion.
[8:32] (8:32:1) Of the syndics chosen by the supreme council, some should
sit in the senate, but without the right of voting, so that they may see
whether the laws concerning that assembly be duly observed, and may
have the supreme council convoked, when anything is to be referred to
it from the senate. (8:32:2) For the supreme right of convoking this council,
and proposing to it subjects of discussion, is, as we have already said,
with the syndics. (8:32:3) But before the votes of the contemporaries of
the senators be taken, the president PAGE 361 of the senate for the time
being shall explain the state of affairs, and what the senate's own
opinion is on the matter in question, and why; after which the votes
shall be collected in the accustomed order.
[8:33] (8:33:1) The entire senate ought not to meet every day, but, like all
great councils, at a certain fixed time. (8:33:2) But as in the mean time the
business of the dominion must be executed, it is, therefore, necessary
that some part of the senators be chosen, who, on the dismissal of the
senate, shall supply its place, and whose duty it shall be to summon the
senate itself, when need is; to execute its orders about affairs of state;
to read letters written to the senate and supreme council; and, lastly,
to consult about the matters to be proposed in the senate. (8:33:3) But
that all these points, and the order of this assembly, as a whole, may be
more easily conceived, I
will describe the whole matter more precisely.
[8:34] (8:34:1) The senators who, as we have said already, are to be
chosen for a year, are to be divided into four or six series, of which let
the first have the first seat in the senate for the first three or two months
in the year; and at the expiration of this time, let the second series take
the place of the first, and so on, observing their turns, so that that
series which was first in the first months may be last in the second
period. (8:34:2) Furthermore, there are to be appointed as many presi-
dents as there are series, and the same number of vice-presidents to
fill their places when required that is, two are to be chosen out of
every series, one to be its president, the other its vice-president.
(8:34:3) And let the president of the first series preside in the senate also,
for the first months; or, in his absence, let his vice-president fill his
place; and so on with the rest, observing the same order as above.
(8:34:4) Next, out of the first series, some are to be chosen by vote or lot
to fill the place of the senate, when it is dismissed, in conjunction with
the president and vice-president of the same series; and that, for the
same space of time, as the said series occupies the first place in the
senate; and thus, when that time is past, as many are again to be
chosen out of the second series, by vote or lot, to fill, in conjunction
with their president and vice-president, the place of the first series, and
supply the lack PAGE 362 of a senate; and so on with the rest. (8:34:5) And
there is no need that the election of these men I mean those that I
have said are to be chosen for periods of three or two months, by vote
or lot should be made by the supreme council. (8:34:6) For the reason
which we gave in the twenty-ninth section is not here applicable, much
less the reason stated in the seventeenth. It suffices, then, that they be
elected by
the senate and the syndics
present at its meeting.
[8:35] (8:35:1) But of these persons we cannot so precisely ascertain the
number. (8:35:2) However, this is certain, that they must be too numerous
to be easily susceptible of corruption. (8:35:3) For though they can by
themselves determine nothing concerning affairs of state, yet they can
delay the senate, or, what would be worst of all, delude it by putting
forward matters of no importance, and keeping back those that are of
greater not to mention that, if they were too few, the absence of one
or two might delay public business. (8:35:4) But as, on the contrary, these
consuls are for that very reason appointed, because great councils
cannot devote themselves every day to public business, a remedy must
be looked for necessarily here, and their inadequacy of number be
made up for by the shortness of their term of office. (8:35:5) And thus,
if only thirteen or so be chosen for two or three months, they will be too
many to be corrupted in this short period. (8:35:6) And for this cause, also,
did I recommend that their successors should by no means be
appointed, except at the very time when they do succeed, and the
others go away.
[8:36] (8:36:1) We have said, that it is also their duty, when any, though
few, of them think it needful, to convoke the senate, to put before it the
matters to be decided, to dismiss it, and to execute its orders about
public business. (8:36:2) But I will now briefly state the order in which this
ought to be done, so that business may not be long protracted by
useless questions. (8:36:3) Let, then, the consuls consult about the
matter to be proposed in the senate, and what is required to be done;
and, if they are all of one mind about it, then let them convoke the
senate, and, having duly explained the question, let them set forth what
their opinion is, and, without waiting for another's opinion, collect the
votes in their order. (8:36:4) But if the consuls support more than one
opinion, PAGE 363 then, in the senate, that opinion is first to be stated on
the question proposed, which was supported by the larger number of
consuls. (8:36:5) And if the same is not approved by the majority of senate
and consuls, but the waverers and opponents together are in a majority,
which is to be determined by ballot, as we have already mentioned,
then let them set forth the second opinion, which had fewer votes than
the former among the consuls, and so on with the rest. (8:36:6) But if
none be approved by a majority of the whole senate, the senate is to
be adjourned to the next day, or for a short time, that the consuls mean-
while may see, if they can find other means, that may give more satis-
faction. (8:36:7) But if they do not succeed in finding other means, or if the
majority of the senate refuses to approve such as they have found, then
the opinion of every senator is to be heard; and if the majority of the
senate also refuses to support any of these, then the votes are to be
taken again on every opinion, and not only the affirmative votes, as
hitherto, but the doubtful and negative are to be counted. (8:36:8) And if
the affirmative prove more numerous than the doubtful or negative, then
that opinion is to hold good; but, on the contrary, to be lost, if the nega-
tive prove more numerous than the doubtful or affirmative. (8:36:9) But if
on every opinion there is a greater number of doubters than of voters
for and against, then let the council of syndics join the senate, and vote
with the senators, with only affirmative and negative votes, omitting
those that signify a hesitating mind. (8:36:10) And the same order is to be
observed about matters referred by the senate to the supreme council.
(8:36:11) So much for the senate.
[8:37] (8:37:1) As for the court of justice or bench, it cannot rest upon the
same foundations as that which exists under a monarch, as we
described it in 6:26, and following. (8:37:2) For (8:14) it agrees not with
the foundations of our present dominion, that any account be made of
families or clans. (8:37:3) And there must be a further difference, because
judges chosen from the patricians only might indeed be restrained by
the fear of their patrician successors, from pronouncing any unjust
judgment against any of the patricians, and, perhaps, would hardly
have the courage to punish them after their deserts; but they PAGE 364
would, on the other hand, dare everything against the commons, and
daily carry off the rich among them for a prey. I know that the plan of
the Genoese is therefore approved by many, for they choose their
judges not among the patricians, but among foreigners. (8:37:4) But this
seems to me, considering the matter in the abstract, absurdly ordained,
that foreigners and not patricians should be called in to interpret the
laws. (8:37:5) For what are judges but interpreters of the laws? (8:37:6) And I
am therefore persuaded that herein also the Genoese have had regard
rather to the genius of their own race, than to the very nature of this
kind of dominion. (8:37:7) We must, therefore, by considering the matter in
the abstract, devise the means which best agree with the form of this
[8:38] (8:38:1) But as far as regards the number of the judges, the theory
of this constitution requires no peculiar number; but as under monarch-
ical dominion, so under this, it suffices that they be too numerous to be
corrupted by a private man. (8:38:2) For their duty is but to provide
against one private person doing wrong to another, and therefore to
decide disputes between private persons, as well patricians as
commons, and to exact penalties from delinquents, and even from
patricians, syndics, and senators, as far as they have offended against
the laws, whereby all are
bound. (8:38:3) But
disputes that may arise
between cities that are subject to the dominion, are to be decided in the
supreme council.
[8:39] (8:39:1) Furthermore the principle regulating the time, for which the
judges should be appointed, is the same in both dominions, and also
the principle of a certain part of them retiring every year; and, lastly,
although it is not necessary for every one of them to be of a different
family, yet it is necessary that two related by blood should not sit on the
same bench together. (8:39:2) And this last point is to be observed also in
the other councils, except the supreme one, in which it is enough, if it
be only provided by law that in elections no man may nominate a rela-
tion, nor vote upon his nomination by another, and also that two rela-
tions may not draw lots from the
urn for the nomination of any minister
of the dominion. (8:39:3) This, I say, is sufficient in a council that is com-
posed of so large a number of men, and has no special profits assigned
to it. (8:39:4) And so utterly unharmed PAGE 365 will the dominion be in this
quarter, that it is absurd to pass a law excluding from the supreme
council the relations of all the patricians, as we said in the fourteenth
section. (8:39:5) But that it is absurd is manifest. (8:39:6) For that law could
not be instituted by the patricians themselves, without their thereby all
absolutely abdicating their own right, and therefore not the patricians
themselves but the commons would defend this law, which is directly
contrary to what we proved in 8:5 and 8:6. (8:39:7) But that law of the
dominion, whereby it is ordained that the same uniform proportion be
maintained between the numbers of the patricians and the multitude,
chiefly contemplates this end of preserving the patricians' right and
power, that is, provides against their becoming too few to be able to
govern the multitude.
[8:40] (8:40:1) But the judges are to be chosen by the supreme council out
of the patricians only, that is (8:17) out of the actual authors of the laws,
and the judgments they pass, as well in civil as criminal cases, shall be
valid, if they were pronounced in due course of justice and without parti-
ality; into which matter the syndics shall be by law authorized to inquire,
and to judge and determine thereof.
[8:41] (8:41:1) The judges' emoluments ought to be the same, as we men-
tioned in the twenty-ninth section of the sixth chapter; namely, that they
receive from the losing party upon every judgment which they pass in
civil cases, an aliquot part of the whole sum at stake. (8:41:2) But as to
their sentences in criminal cases, let there be here this difference only,
that the goods which they confiscate, and every fine whereby lesser
crimes are punished, be assigned to themselves only, yet on this con-
dition, that they may never compel anyone to confess by torture, and
thus, precaution enough will be taken against their being unfair to the
commons, and through fear too lenient to the patricians. (8:41:3) For
besides that this fear is tempered by avarice itself, and that veiled
under the specious name of justice, they are also numerous, and vote,
not openly, but by ballot, so that a man may be indignant at losing his
case, but can have no reason to impute it to a particular person.
(8:41:4) Moreover the fear of the syndics will restrain them from pronoun-
cing an inequitable, or at least absurd sentence, or from acting PAGE 366
any of them treacherously, besides that in so large a number of judges
there will always be one or two, that the unfair stand in awe of.
(8:41:5) Lastly, as far as the commons are concerned, they also will be
adequately secured if they are allowed to appeal to the syndics, who,
as I have said, are by law authorized to inquire, judge, and determine
about the conduct of the judges. (8:41:6) For it is certain that the syndics
will not be able to escape the hatred of the patricians, and on the other
hand, will always be most popular with
the commons, whose applause
they will try as far as they can to bid for. (8:41:7) To which end, oppor-
tunity being given them, they will not fail to reverse sentences pro-
nounced against the laws of the court, and to examine any judge, and
to punish those that are partial, for nothing moves the hearts of a multi-
tude more than this. (8:41:8) Nor is it an objection, but, on the contrary, an
advantage, that such examples can but rarely occur. (8:41:9) For not to
mention that that commonwealth is ill ordered where examples are daily
made of criminals ( as we showed 5:2), those events must surely be
very rare that are most renowned by fame.
[8:42] (8:42:1) Those who are sent as governors to cities and provinces
ought to be chosen out of the rank of senators, because it is the duty
of senators to look after the fortifications of cities, the treasury, the
military, etc. (8:42:2) But those, who were sent to somewhat distant
regions, would be unable to attend the senate, and, therefore, those
only are to be summoned from the senate itself, who are destined to
cities founded on their native soil; but those whom they wish to send to
places more remote are to be chosen out of those, whose age is consis-
tent with senatorial rank. (8:42:3) But not even thus do I think that the
peace of the dominion will be sufficiently provided for, that is, if the
neighbouring cities are altogether denied the right of vote, unless they
are so weak, that they can be openly set at naught, which cannot
surely be supposed. (8:42:4) And so it is necessary, that the neighbouring
cities be granted the right of citizenship, and that from every one of
them twenty, or thirty, or forty chosen citizens (for the number should
vary with the size of the city) be enrolled among the patricians, out of
whom three, four, or five ought to be yearly elected to be of the senate,
and one for life to be a syndic. (8:42:5) And let PAGE 367 those who are of
the senate be sent with their syndic, to govern the city out of which they
were chosen.
[8:43] (8:43:1) Moreover, judges are to be established in every city, chosen
out of the patricians of that city. (8:43:2) But of these I think it unnecessary
to treat at length, because they concern not the foundations of this sort
of dominion in particular.
[8:44] (8:44:1) In every council the secretaries and other officials of this
kind, as they have not the right of voting, should be chosen from the
commons. (8:44:2) But as these, by their long practice of business, are
the most conversant with the affairs to be transacted, it often arises that
more deference than right is shown to their advice, and that the state of
the whole dominion depends chiefly on their
guidance: which thing has
been fatal to the Dutch. (8:44:3) For this cannot happen without exciting
the jealousy of many of the noblest. (8:44:4) And surely we cannot doubt,
that a senate, whose wisdom is derived from the advice, not of senators,
but of officials, will be most frequented by the sluggish, and the condi-
tion of this sort of dominion will be little better than that of a monarchy
directed by a few counsellors of the king. (6:5, 6:6, 6:7). (8:44:5) However,
to this evil the dominion will be more or less liable, according as it was
well or ill founded. (8:44:6) For the liberty of a dominion is never defended
without risk, if it has not firm enough foundations; and, to avoid that risk,
patricians choose from the commons ambitious ministers, who are
slaughtered as victims to appease the wrath of those, who are plotting
against liberty. (8:44:7) But where liberty has firm enough foundations,
there the patricians themselves vie for the honour of defending it, and
are anxious that prudence in the conduct of affairs should flow from
their own advice only; and in laying the foundations of this dominion we
have studied above all these two points, namely, to exclude the com-
mons from giving advice as much as from giving votes (Secs. 3, 4), and,
therefore, to place the whole authority of the dominion with the whole
body of patricians, but its exercise with the syndics and senate, and,
lastly, the right of convoking the senate, and treating of matters
affecting the common welfare with consuls chosen from the senate
itself. (8:44:8) But, if it is further ordained that the secretary, whether in
PAGE 368 the senate or in other councils, be appointed for four or five
years at most, and have attached to him an assistant-secretary
appointed for the same period, to bear part of the work during that time,
or that the senate have not one, but several secretaries, employed one
in one department, and another in another, the power of the officials
will never become of any consequence.
[8:45] (8:45:1) Treasurers are likewise to be chosen from the commons,
and are to be bound to submit the treasury accounts to the syndics as
well as to the senate.
[8:46] (8:46:1) Matters concerning religion we have set forth at sufficient
length in our Theologico-Political Treatise. (8:46:2) Yet certain points we
then omitted, of which it was not there the place to treat; for instance,
that all the patricians
must be of the same religion, that is, of that most
Bk.XIB:17578. { JBY Note 1 }
simple and general religion, which in that treatise we described.
(8:46:3) For it is above all to be avoided, that the patricians themselves
should be divided into sects, and show favour, some to this, and others
to that, and thence become mastered by superstition, and try to deprive
the subjects of the liberty of speaking out their opinions. (8:46:4) In the
second place, though everyone
is to be given liberty to speak out his
opinion, yet great conventicles are to be forbidden. (8:46:5) And, therefore,
those that are attached to another religion are, indeed, to be allowed to
build as many temples as they please; yet these are to be small, and
limited to a certain standard of size, and on sites at some little distance
one from another. (8:46:6) But it is very important, that the temples conse-
crated to the national religion should be large and costly, and that only
patricians or senators should be allowed to administer its principal rites,
and thus that patricians only be suffered to baptize, celebrate marriages,
and lay on hands, and that in general they
be recognized as the priests
of the temples and the champions and interpreters of the national reli-
gion. (8:46:7) But, for preaching, and to manage the church treasury and
its daily business, let some persons be chosen from the commons by
the senate itself, to be, as it were, the senate's deputies, and, therefore,
bound to render it account of everything.
[8:47] (8:47:1) And these are points that concern the foundations of this
sort of dominion; to which I will add some few PAGE 369 others less
essential indeed, but yet of great importance. (8:47:2) Namely, that the
patricians, when they walk, should be distinguished by some special
garment, or dress, and be saluted by some special title; and that every
man of the commons should give way to them; and that, if any patrician
has lost his property by
some unavoidable misfortune, he should be
restored to his old condition at the public expense; but if, on the con-
trary, it be proved that he has spent the same in presents, ostentation,
gaming, debauchery, &c., or that he is insolvent, he must lose his
dignity, and be held unworthy of every honour and office. (8:47:3) For he,
that cannot govern himself and his own private affairs, will much less be
able to advise on public affairs.
[8:48] (8:48:1) Those, whom the law compels to take an oath, will be much
more cautious of perjury, if they are bidden to swear by the country's
safety and liberty and by
the supreme council, than if they are told to
swear by God. (8:48:2) For he who swears by God, gives as surety some
private advantage to himself, whereof he is judge; but he, who by his
oath gives as surety his country's liberty and safety, swears by what is
the common advantage of all, whereof he is not judge, and if he
perjures himself, thereby
declares that he is his country's enemy.
[8:49] (8:49:1) Academies, that are founded at the public expense, are
instituted not so much to cultivate men's natural abilities as to restrain
them. (8:49:2) But in a free commonwealth arts and sciences will be best
cultivated to the full, if
everyone that asks leave is allowed to teach
publicly, and that at his own cost and risk. (8:49:3) But these and the like
Bk.XIB:17986. Note 1 - PAGE 369
points I reserve for another place. (8:49:4) For here I determined to
treat only such
matters as concern an aristocratic
dominion only.
[9:1] (9:1:1) HITHERTO we have considered an aristocracy, so far as it
takes its name from one city, which is the head of the whole dominion.
(9:1:2) It is now time
to treat of that, which is in the hands of more than one
city, and which I think preferable to the former. (9:1:3) But that we may
notice its difference and its superiority, we will pass in review the founda-
tions of dominion, one by one, rejecting those foundations, which are
unsuited to the present kind, and laying in their place others for it to rest
[9:2] (9:2:1) The cities, then, which enjoy the right of citizenship, must be
so built and fortified, that, on the one hand, each city by itself may be
unable to subsist without the rest, and that yet, on the other hand, it can-
not desert the rest without great harm to the whole dominion. (9:2:2) For
thus they will always remain united. (9:2:3) But cities, which are so con-
stituted, that they can neither maintain themselves, nor be dangerous to
the rest, are clearly not independent,
but absolutely subject to the rest.
[9:3] (9:3:1) But the contents of the ninth and tenth sections of the last
chapter are deduced from the general nature of aristocracy, as are also
the proportion between the numbers of the patricians and the multitude,
and the proper age and condition of those that are to be made patricians;
so that on these points no difference can arise, whether the dominion be
in the hands of one or more cities. (9:3:2) But the supreme council must
here be on a different footing. (9:3:3) For if any city of the dominion were
assigned for the meeting of this supreme council, it would in reality be
the head of the dominion; and, therefore, either they would have to take
turns, or a place would have to be assigned for
this council, that has not
{ Washington, D.C. }
the right of citizenship, and belongs PAGE 371 equally to all. (9:3:4) But either
alternative is as difficult to effect, as it is easy to state; I mean, either that
so many thousands of men should have to go often outside their cities,
or that they should have to assemble sometimes in one place, some-
times in another.
[9:4] (9:4:1) But that we may conclude aright what should be done in this
matter, and on what plan the councils of this dominion ought to be
formed, from its own very nature and condition, these points are to be
considered; namely, that every city has so much more right than a pri-
vate man, as it excels him in power (2:4), and consequently that every
city of this dominion has as much right within its walls, or the limits of its
jurisdiction, as it has power; and, in the next place, that all the cities are
mutually associated and united, not as under a treaty, but as forming
one dominion, yet so that every city has so much more right as against
the dominion than the others, as it exceeds the others in power. (9:4:2) For
he who seeks equality between unequals, seeks an absurdity. (9:4:3) Citi-
zens, indeed, are rightly esteemed equal, because the power of each,
compared with that of the whole dominion, is of no account. (9:4:4) But
each city's power constitutes a large part of the power of the dominion
itself, and so much the larger, as the city itself is greater. (9:4:5) And, there-
fore, the cities cannot all be held equal. (9:4:6) But, as the power of each,
so also its right should be estimated by its greatness. (9:4:7) The bonds,
however, by which they should be bound
into one dominion, are above
{ USA Supreme Court }
all a senate and a court of justice (4:1). (9:4:8) But how by these bonds
they are all to be so united, that each of them may yet remain, as far as
possible, independent, I will here briefly show.
[9:5] (9:5:1) I suppose then, that the patricians of every city, who, accord-
ing to its size, should be more, or fewer (9:3), have supreme right over
their own city, and that, in that city's supreme council, they have
supreme authority to fortify the city and enlarge its walls, to impose
taxes, to pass
and repeal laws, and, in general, to do everything
they judge necessary to their city's preservation and increase. (9:5:2) But
to manage the common business of the dominion, a senate is to be
created on just the same footing as we described in the last chapter,
so that there be PAGE 372 between this senate and the former no differ-
ence, except that this has also authority to decide the disputes, which
may arise between cities. (9:5:3) For in this dominion, of which no city
is head, it cannot
be done by the supreme council.
(See 6:38.)
[9:6] (9:6:1) But, in this dominion, the supreme council is not to be called
together, unless there is need to alter the form of the dominion itself, or
on some difficult business, to which the senators shall think themselves
unequal; and so it will very rarely happen, that all the patricians are sum-
moned to council. (9:6:2) For we have said (8:17), that the supreme coun-
cil's function is to pass and repeal laws, and to choose the ministers of
the dominion. (9:6:3) But the laws, or general constitution of the whole
dominion, ought not to be changed as soon as instituted. (9:6:4) If, how-
ever, time and occasion suggest the institution of some new law or the
change of one already ordained, the question may first be discussed in
the senate, and after the agreement of the senate in the matter, then let
envoys next be sent to the cities by the senate itself, to inform the patri-
cians of every city of the opinion of the senate, and lastly, if the majority
of the cities follow that opinion, it shall
then remain good, but otherwise
be of no effect. (9:6:5) And this same order may be observed in choosing
the generals of the army and the ambassadors to be sent to other
realms, as also about decrees concerning the making of war or accept-
ing conditions of peace. (9:6:6) But in choosing the other public officials,
since (as we showed in 9:4) every city, as far as can be, ought to
remain independent, and to have as much more right than the others in
the dominion, as it exceeds them in power, the following order must
necessarily be observed. (9:6:7) The senators are to be chosen by the
patricians of each city; that is, the patricians of one city are to elect in
their own council a fixed number of senators from their colleagues of
their own city, which number is to be to that of the patricians of that city
as one to twelve (8:30); and they are to designate whom they will to be
of the first, second, third, or other series; and in like manner the patri-
cians of the other cities, in proportion to their number, are to choose
more or fewer senators, and distribute them among the series, into a
certain number of PAGE 373 which we have said the senate is to be
divided. (8:34.) (9:6:8) By which means it will result, that in every series
of senators there will be found senators of every city, more or fewer,
according to its size. (9:6:9) But the presidents and vice-presidents of the
series, being fewer in number than the cities, are to be chosen by lot by
the senate out of the consuls, who are to be appointed first. (9:6:10) The
same order is to be maintained in appointing the supreme judges of the
dominion, namely, that the patricians of every city are to elect from their
colleagues in proportion to their number more or fewer judges. (9:6:11) And
so it will be the case, that every city in choosing officials will be as inde-
pendent as possible, and that each, in proportion to its power, will have
the more right alike in the senate and the court of justice; supposing,
that is, that the order observed by senate and court in deciding public
affairs, and settling disputes is such in all respects, as we have de-
scribed it in 8:33 and 8:34 of the last chapter. (Note 1, Page 373: So the
text: but the court of justice is not described till 8:37 and following sections
of Chap. VIII.)
[9:7] (9:7:1) Next, the commanders of battalions and military tribunes are
also to be chosen from the patricians. (9:7:2) For as it is fair, that every
city in proportion to its size should be bound to levy a certain number of
soldiers for the general safety of the whole dominion, it is also fair, that
from the patricians of every city in proportion to the number of regiments,
which they are bound to maintain, they may appoint so many tribunes,
captains, ensigns, etc., as are needed to discipline that part of the mili-
tary, which they supply to the dominion.
[9:8] (9:8:1) No taxes are to be imposed by the senate on the subjects;
but to meet the expenditure, which by decree of the senate is necessary
to carry on public business, not the subjects, but the cities themselves
are to be called to assessment by the senate, so that every city, in pro-
portion to its size, should pay a larger or smaller share of the expense.
(9:8:2) And this share indeed is to be exacted by the patricians of every
city from their own citizens in what way they please, either by compel-
ling them to an assessment, or, as is much fairer, by imposing taxes on
[9:9] (9:9:1) Further, although all the cities of this dominion are not mari-
time, nor the senators summoned from the maritime cities only, yet may
the same emoluments be awarded to the senators, as we mentioned in
8:31 of the last chapter. (9:9:2) To which end it will be possible to devise
means, varying with the composition of the dominion, to link the cities to
one another more closely. (9:9:3) But the other points concerning the
senate and the court of justice and the whole dominion in general,
which I delivered in the last chapter, are to be applied to this dominion
also. (9:9:4) And so we see, that in a dominion which is in the hands of
several cities, it will not be necessary to assign a fixed time or place for
assembling the supreme council. (9:9:5) But for the senate and court of
justice a place is to be appointed in a village, or in a city, that has not
the right of voting. (9:9:6) But I return to those points, which concern the
cities taken by themselves.
[9:10] (9:10:1) The order to be observed by the supreme council of a
single city, in choosing officials of the dominion and of the city, and in
making decrees, should be the same that I have delivered in 8:27 and
8:36 of the last chapter. (9:10:2) For the policy is the same here as it was
there. (9:10:3) Next a council of syndics is to be formed, subordinate to
the council of the city, and having the same relation to it as the council
of syndics of the last chapter had to the council of the entire dominion,
and let its functions within the limits of the city be also the same, and let
it enjoy the same emoluments. (9:10:4) But if a city, and consequently the
number of its patricians be so small that it cannot create more than one
syndic or two, which two are not enough to make a council, then the
supreme council of the city is to appoint judges to assist the syndics in
trials according to the matter at issue, or else the dispute must be re-
ferred to the supreme council of syndics. (9:10:5) For from every city some
also out of the syndics are to be sent to the place where the senate sits,
to see that the constitution of the whole dominion is preserved unbroken,
and they are to sit in the senate without the right of
[9:11] (9:11:1) The consuls of the cities are likewise to be chosen by the
patricians of their city, and are to constitute a sort of senate for it.
(9:11:2) But their number I cannot determine, PAGE 375 nor yet do I think it
necessary, since the city's business of great importance is transacted
by its supreme council, and matters concerning the whole dominion by
the great senate. (9:11:3) But if they be few, it will be necessary that they
give their votes in their council openly, and not by ballot, as in large
councils. (9:11:4) For in small councils, when votes are given secretly,
by a little extra cunning one can easily detect the author of every vote,
and in many ways deceive the less attentive.
[9:12] (9:12:1) Besides, in every city judges are to be appointed by its
supreme council, from whose sentence, however, let everyone but an
openly convicted criminal or confessed debtor have a right of appeal to
the supreme court of justice of the dominion. (9:12:2) But this need not be
pursued further.
[9:13] (9:13:1) It remains, therefore, to speak of the cities which are not
independent. (9:13:2) If these were founded in an actual province or dis-
trict of the dominion, and their inhabitants are of the same nation and
language, they ought of necessity, like villages, to be esteemed parts of
the neighbouring cities, so that each of them should be under the gov-
ernment of this or that independent city. (9:13:3) And the reason of this is,
that the patricians are chosen by the supreme council, not of the domin-
ion, but of every city, and in every city are more or fewer, according
to the number of inhabitants within the limits of its jurisdiction (9:5).
(9:13:4) And so it is necessary, that the multitude of the city, which is not
independent, be referred to the census of another which is independent,
and depend upon the latter's government. (9:13:5) But cities captured by
right of war, and annexed to the dominion, are either to be esteemed
associates in the dominion, and though conquered put under an obliga-
tion by that benefit, or else colonies to enjoy the right of citizenship
are to be sent thither, and the natives removed elsewhere or utterly
[9:14] (9:14:1) And these are the things, which touch the foundations of
the dominion. (9:14:2) But that its condition is better than that of the aris-
tocracy, which is called after one city only, I conclude from this, namely,
that the patricians of every city, after the manner of human desire, will
be eager to keep, and if possible increase their right, both in their city
and in the senate; and therefore will try, as far as PAGE 376 possible,
to attract the multitude to themselves, and consequently to make a stir
in the dominion by good deeds rather than by fear, and to increase their
own number; because the more numerous they are, the more senators
they will choose out of their own council (9:6), and hence the more right
(9:6) they will possess in the dominion. (9:14:3) Nor is it an objection, that
while every city is consulting its own interest and suspecting the rest,
they more often quarrel among themselves, and waste
time in disputing.
( Note1, 376 )
(9:14:4) For if, while the Romans are debating, Saguntum is lost: on the
other hand, while a few are deciding everything in conformity with their
own passions only, liberty and the general good are lost. (9:14:5) For
men's natural abilities are too dull to see through everything at once;
but by consulting, listening, and debating, they grow more acute, and
while they are trying all means, they at last discover those which they
want, which all approve, but
no one would have thought of in the first
instance. (9:14:6) But if anyone retorts, that the dominion of the Dutch
has not long endured without a count or one to fill his place, let him
have this reply, that the Dutch thought, that to maintain their liberty it
was enough to abandon their count, and to behead the body of their
dominion, but never thought of remoulding it, and left its limbs, just as
they had been first constituted, so that the county of Holland has re-
mained without a count, like a headless body, and the actual dominion
has lasted on without the name. (9:14:7)
And so it is no wonder that most
of its subjects have not known, with whom the authority of the dominion
lay. (9:14:8) And even had this been otherwise, yet those who actually
held dominion were far too few to govern the multitude and suppress
their powerful adversaries. (9:14:9) Whence it has come to pass, that the
latter have often been able to plot
against them with impunity, and at
last to overthrow them. (9:14:10) And so the sudden overthrow of the said
( Note2, 376 )
republic has not arisen from a useless waste of time in debates, but
Bk.XIB:15332, 154.
from the misformed state of the said dominion and the fewness of its
[9:15] (9:15:1) This aristocracy in the hands of several cities is also prefer-
able to the other, because it is not necessary, as in the first described,
to provide against its whole supreme council being overpowered by a
sudden attack, since (9:9) no time or place is appointed for its meeting.
(9:15:2) Moreover, powerful citizens in this dominion are less to be feared.
(9:15:3) For where several cities enjoy liberty, it is not enough for him, who
is making ready his way to dominion,
to seize one city, in order to hold
dominion over the rest. (9:15:4) And, lastly, liberty under this dominion is
common to more. (9:15:5) For where one city reigns alone, there the ad-
vantage of the
rest is only so far considered, as suits that reigning
[10:1] (10:1:1) HAVING explained and made proof of the foundations of
both kinds of aristocracy, it remains to inquire whether by reason of
any fault they are liable to be dissolved or changed into another form.
(10:1:2) The primary cause, by which dominions of this kind are dissolved,
is that, which that most acute Florentine ( Machiavelli ) observes in his
"Discourses on Livy" (Bk. iii. Chap. I.), namely, that like a human body,
"a dominion has daily added to it something that at some time or other
needs to be remedied." (10:1:3) And so, he says, it is necessary for some-
thing occasionally to occur, to bring back the dominion to that first prin-
ciple, on which it was in the beginning established. (10:1:4) And if this
does not take place within the necessary time, its blemishes will go on
increasing, till they cannot be removed, but with the dominion itself.
(10:1:5) And this restoration, he says, may either happen accidentally, or
by the design and forethought of the laws or of a man of extraordinary
virtue. (10:1:6) And we cannot doubt, that this matter is of the greatest im-
portance, and that, where provision has not been made against this in-
convenience, the dominion will not be able to endure by its own excell-
ence, but only by good fortune; and on the other hand that, where a pro-
per remedy has been applied to this evil, it will not be possible for it to
fall by its own fault, but only by some inevitable fate, as we shall pre-
sently show more clearly. (10:1:7) The first remedy, that suggested itself
for this evil, was to appoint every five years a supreme dictator for one
or two months, who should have the right to inquire, decide, and make
ordinances concerning the acts of the senators and of every official,
and PAGE 379 thereby to bring back the dominion to its first principle.
(10:1:8) But he who studies to avoid the inconveniences, to which a domin-
ion is liable, must apply remedies that suit its nature, and can be de-
rived from its own foundations; otherwise in his wish to avoid Charybdis
he falls upon Scylla. (10:1:9) It is, indeed, true that all, as well rulers as
ruled, ought to be restrained by fear of punishment or loss, so that they
may not do wrong with impunity or even advantage; but, on the other
hand, it is certain, that if this fear becomes common to good and bad
men alike, the dominion must be in the utmost danger. (10:1:10) Now as
the authority of a dictator is absolute, it cannot fail to be a terror to all,
especially if, as is here required, he were appointed at a stated time,
because in that case every ambitious man would pursue this office with
the utmost energy; and it is certain that in time of peace virtue is thought
less of than wealth, so that the more haughty a man he is, the more
easily he will get office. (10:1:11) And this perhaps is why the Romans
used to make a dictator
at no fixed time,
but under pressure of some
accidental necessity. (10:1:12) Though for all that, to quote Cicero's words,
(Note 1, 379)
"the tumour of a dictator was displeasing to the good." (10:1:13) And to be
sure, as this authority of a dictator is quite royal, it is impossible for the
dominion to change into a monarchy without great peril to the republic,
although it happen for ever so short a time. (10:1:14) Furthermore, if no
fixed time were appointed for creating a dictator, no notice would be paid
to the interval between one dictator and another, which is the very thing
that we said was most to be observed; and the whole thing would be
exceedingly vague, and therefore easily neglected.
(10:1:15) Unless, then,
this authority of a dictator be eternal and fixed, and therefore impossible
to be conferred on one man without destroying the form of dominion, the
dictatorial authority itself, and consequently the safety and preservation
of the republic will be very uncertain.
[10:2] (10:2:1) But, on the other hand, we cannot doubt (6:3), that, if with-
out destroying the form of dominion, the sword of the dictator might be
permanent, and only PAGE 380 terrible to the wicked, evils will never
grow to such a pitch, that they cannot be eradicated or amended.
(10:2:2) In order, therefore, to secure all these conditions, we have said,
that there is to be a council of syndics subordinate to the supreme coun-`
cil, to the end that the sword of the dictator should be permanent in the
hands not of any natural person, but of a civil person, whose members
are too numerous to divide the dominion amongst
themselves (9:1, 9:2),
or to combine in any wickedness. (10:2:3) To which is to be added, that
they are forbidden to fill any other office in the dominion, that they are
not the paymasters of the soldiery, and, lastly, that they are of an age to
prefer actual security to things new and perilous. (10:2:4) Wherefore the
dominion is in no danger from them, and consequently they cannot, and
in fact will not be a terror to the good, but only to the wicked. (10:2:5) For
as they are less powerful to accomplish criminal designs, so are they
more so to restrain wickedness. (10:2:6) For, not to mention that they can
resist it in its beginnings (since the council lasts for ever), they are also
sufficiently numerous to dare to accuse and condemn this or that influ-
ential man without fear of his enmity; especially as they vote by ballot,
and the sentence is pronounced
in the name of the entire council.
[10:3] (10:3:1) But the tribunes of the commons at Rome were likewise
regularly appointed; but they were too weak to restrain the power of a
Scipio, and had besides to submit to the senate their
plans for the public
( Note 1, 380 )
welfare, which also frequently eluded them, by contriving that the one
whom the senators were least afraid of should be most popular with the
commons. (10:3:2) Besides which, the tribunes' authority was supported
against the patricians by the favour of the commons. and whenever they
convoked the commons, it looked as if they were raising a sedition
rather than assembling a council. (10:3:3) Which inconveniences have
certainly no place in the dominion which we have described in the last
two chapters.
[10:4] (10:4:1) However, this authority of the syndics will only be PAGE 381
able to secure the preservation of the form of the dominion, and thus to
prevent the laws from being broken, or anyone from gaining by trans-
gressing; but will by no means suffice to prevent the growth of vices,
which cannot be forbidden by law, such as those into which men fall
from excess of leisure, and from which the ruin of a dominion not uncom-
monly follows. (10:4:2) For men in time of peace lay aside fear, and grad-
ually from being fierce savages become civilized or humane, and from
being humane become soft and sluggish, and seek to excel one another
not in virtue, but in ostentation and luxury. (10:4:3) And hence they begin
to put off their native manners and to put on foreign ones, that is,
to become slaves.
[10:5] (10:5:1) To avoid these evils many have tried to establish sumptuary
laws; but in vain. (10:5:2) For all laws which can be broken without any
injury to another, are counted but a laughing-stock, and are so far from
bridling the desires and lusts of men, that on the contrary they stimulate
them. (10:5:3) For "we are ever eager for forbidden fruit, and desire what
is denied" (Ovid, "Amores," III. iv. 17). (10:5:4) Nor do idle men ever lack
ability to elude the laws which are instituted about things, which cannot
absolutely be forbidden, as banquets, plays, ornaments, and the like,
of which only the excess is bad; and that is to be judged according to
the individual's fortune, so that it cannot be determined by any general
[10:6] (10:6:1) I conclude, therefore, that the common vices of peace, of
which we are here speaking, are never to be directly, but indirectly for-
bidden; that is, by laying such foundations of dominion, that the result
may be, that the majority, I do not say are anxious to live wisely (for that
is impossible), but are guided by those passions whence the republic
has most advantage. (10:6:2)
And therefore the chief point to be studied
is, that the rich may be, if not thrifty, yet avaricious. (10:6:3) For there is no
doubt, that, if this passion of avarice, which is general and lasting, be
encouraged by the desire of glory, most people would set their chief
affection upon increasing their property without disgrace, in order to
acquire honours, while avoiding extreme infamy. (10:6:4) If then we exa-
mine the foundations of both kinds of aristocracy PAGE 382 which I have
explained in the last two chapters, we shall see, that this very result
follows from them. (10:6:5) For the number of rulers in both is so large,
that most of the rich have
access to government and to the offices of
the dominion open to them.
[10:7] (10:7:1) But if it be further ordained (as we said, 8:47), that patri-
cians who are insolvent be deposed from patrician rank, and that those
who have lost their property by misfortune be restored to their former
position, there is no doubt that all will try their best to keep their property.
(10:7:2) Moreover, they will never desire foreign costumes, nor disdain
their native ones, if it is by law appointed, that patricians and candidates
for office should be distinguished by a special robe, concerning which
see 8:25 & 8:47. (10:7:3) And besides these, other means may be de-
vised in every dominion agreeable to the nature of its situation and the
national genius, and herein it
is above all to be studied, that the sub-
jects may do their duty rather spontaneously than under pressure of the
[10:8] (10:8:1) For a dominion, that looks no farther than to lead men by
fear, will be rather free from vices, than possessed of virtue. (10:8:2) But
men are so to be led, that they may think that they are not led, but living
after their own mind, and according to their free decision; and so that
they are restrained only by love of liberty, desire to increase their pro-
perty, and hope of gaining the honours of the dominion. (10:8:3) But effi-
gies, triumphs, and other incitements to virtue, are signs rather of sla-
very than liberty. (10:8:4) For rewards of virtue are granted to slaves, not
freemen. (10:8:5) I admit, indeed, that men are very much stimulated by
these incitements; but, as in the first instance, they are awarded to
great men, so afterwards, with the growth of envy, they are granted to
cowards and men swollen with the extent of their wealth, to the great
indignation of all good men. (10:8:6) Secondly, those, who boast of their
ancestors' effigies and triumphs, think they are wronged, if they are not
preferred to others. (10:8:7) Lastly, not to mention other objections, it is
certain that equality, which once cast off the general liberty is lost, can
by no means be maintained, from the time that peculiar honours are by
public law decreed to any man renowned for his virtue.
[10:9] (10:9:1) After which premisses, let us now see whether dominions
of this kind can be destroyed by any cause to which blame attaches.
(10:9:2) But if any dominion can be everlasting, that will necessarily be so,
whose constitution being once rightly instituted remains unbroken.
(10:9:3) For the constitution is the soul of a dominion. (10:9:4) Therefore, if it
is preserved, so is the dominion. (10:9:5) But a constitution cannot remain
unconquered, unless it is defended alike by reason and common human
passion: otherwise, if it relies only on the help of reason, it is certainly
weak and easily overcome. (10:9:6) Now since the fundamental constitu-
tion of both kinds of aristocracy
has been shown to agree with reason
{ love }
and common human passion, we can therefore assert that these, if any
kinds of dominion, will be eternal, in other words, that they cannot be
destroyed by any cause to which blame attaches, but only by some
inevitable fate.
[10:10] (10:10:1) But it may still be objected to us, that, although the consti-
tution of dominion above set forth is defended by reason and common
human passion, yet for all that it may at some time be overpowered.
(10:10:2) For there is no passion, that is not sometimes overpowered, by a
stronger contrary one; for we frequently see the fear of death over-
powered by the greed for another's property. (10:10:3) Men, who are run-
ning away in panic fear from the enemy, can be stopped by the fear of
nothing else, but throw themselves into rivers, or rush into fire, to es-
cape the enemy's steel. (10:10:4) In whatever degree, therefore, a common-
wealth is rightly ordered, and its laws well made; yet in the extreme diffi-
culties of a dominion, when all, as sometimes happens, are seized by a
sort of panic terror, all, without regard to the future or the laws, approve
only that which their actual fear suggests, all turn towards the man who
is renowned for his victories, and set him free from the laws, and (estab-
lishing thereby the worst of precedents), continue
him in command, and
entrust to his fidelity all affairs of state: and this was, in fact, the cause
of the destruction of the Roman dominion. (10:10:5) But to answer this
objection, I say, first, that in a rightly constituted republic such terror
does not arise but from a due cause. (10:10:6) And so such terror and con-
sequent confusion can be attributed to no cause avoidable by human
foresight. (10:10:7) In the next place, it is to be observed, that in a republic
such as PAGE 384 we have above described, it is impossible (8:9 & 8:25)
for this or that man so to distinguish himself by the report of his virtue,
as to turn towards himself the attention of all, but he must have many
rivals favoured by others. (10:10:8) And so, although from terror there arise
some confusion in the republic, yet no one will be able to elude the law
and declare the election of anyone to an illegal military command, with-
out its being immediately disputed by other candidates; and to settle the
dispute, it will, in the end, be necessary to have recourse to the constitu-
tion ordained once for all, and approved by all, and to order the affairs
of the dominion according to the existing laws. (10:10:9) I may therefore
absolutely assert, that as the aristocracy, which is in the hands of one
city only, so especially that which is in the hands of several, is everlast-
ing, or, in other words, can be dissolved or changed into another form
by no internal cause.
PASS, at length, to the third
and perfectly absolute
dominion, which we call democracy. (11:1:2) The difference between this
and aristocracy consists, we have said, chiefly in this, that in an aristoc-
racy it depends on the supreme council's will and free choice only, that
this or that man is made a patrician, so that no one has the right to vote
or fill public offices by inheritance, and
that no one can by right demand
this right, as is the case in the dominion, whereof we are now treating.
(11:1:3) For all, who are born of citizen parents, or on the soil of the
country, or who have deserved well of the republic, or have accom-
plished any other conditions upon which the law grants to a man right
of citizenship; they all, I say, have a right to demand for themselves the
right to vote in the supreme council and to fill public offices, nor can
they be refused it, but for crime or infamy.
[11:2] (11:2:1) If, then, it is by a law appointed, that the elder men only,
who have reached a certain year of their age, or the first-born only, as
soon as their age allows, or those who contribute to the republic a
certain sum of money, shall have the right of voting in the supreme
council and managing the business of the dominion; then, although on
this system the result might be, that the supreme council would be
composed of fewer citizens than that of the aristocracy of which we
treated above, yet, for all that, dominions of this kind should be called
democracies, because in them the citizens, who are destined to
manage affairs of state, are not chosen as the best by the supreme
council, but are destined to it by a law. (11:2:2) And although for this
reason dominions of this kind, that is, where not the best, but those who
happen by chance to be rich, or who are born PAGE 386 eldest, are
destined to govern, are thought inferior to an aristocracy; yet, if we
reflect on the practice or general condition of mankind, the result in both
cases will come to the same thing. (11:2:3) For patricians will always think
those the best, who are rich, or related to themselves
in blood, or allied
by friendship. (11:2:4) And, indeed, if such were the nature of patricians,
that they were free from all passion, and guided by mere zeal for the
public welfare
in choosing their patrician colleagues, no dominion could
be compared with aristocracy. (11:2:5) But experience itself teaches us
only too well, that things pass in quite a contrary manner, above all, in
oligarchies, where the will of the patricians, from the absence of rivals,
is most free from the law. (11:2:6) For there the patricians intentionally
keep away the best men from the council, and seek for themselves
such colleagues in it, as hang upon their words, so that in such a
dominion things are in a much more unhappy condition, because the
choice of patricians depends entirely upon the arbitrary will of a few,
which is free or unrestrained by any law. (11:2:7)
But I return to my subject.
[11:3] (11:3:1) From what has been said in the last section, it is manifest
that we can conceive of various kinds of democracy. (11:3:2) But my
intention is not to treat of every kind, but of that only, "wherein all,
without exception, who owe allegiance to the laws of the country only,
and are further independent and of respectable life, have the right of
voting in the supreme council and of filling the offices of the dominion."
(11:3:3) I say expressly, "who owe allegiance to the laws of the country
only," to exclude foreigners, who are treated as being under another's
dominion. (11:3:4) I added, besides, "who are independent," except in so
far as they are under allegiance to the laws of the dominion, to exclude
women and slaves, who are under the authority of men and masters,
and also children and wards, as long as they are under the authority of
parents and guardians. (11:3:5) I said, lastly, "and of respectable life," to
exclude, above all, those that are infamous from crime, or some
disgraceful means of livelihood.
[11:4] (11:4:1) But, perhaps, someone will ask, whether women are under
men's authority by nature or institution? (11:4:2) For if it has been by mere
institution, then we had no reason compelling page 387 us to exclude Durant [10]175
women from government. (11:4:3) But if we consult experience itself, we
shall find that the origin of it is in their weakness. (11:4:4) For there has
never been a case of men and women reigning together, but wherever
on the earth men are found, there we see that men rule, and women
are ruled, and that on this plan, both sexes live in harmony. (11:4:5) But
on the other hand, the Amazons, who are reported to have held rule of
old, did not suffer men to stop in their country, but reared only their
female children, killing the males to whom they gave birth (Justin,
Histories, ii. 4.). (11:4:6) But if by nature women were equal to men, and
were equally distinguished by force of character and ability, in which
human power and therefore human right chiefly consist; surely among
nations so many and different some would be found, where both sexes
rule alike, and others, where men are ruled by women, and so brought
up, that they can make less use of their abilities. (11:4:7) And since this is
nowhere the case, one may assert with perfect propriety, that women
have not by nature equal right with men: but that they necessarily give
way to men, and that thus it cannot happen, that
both sexes should rule
alike, much less that men should be ruled by women. (11:4:8) But if we
further reflect upon human passions, how men, in fact, generally love
women merely from the passion of lust, and esteem their cleverness
and wisdom in proportion to the excellence of their beauty, and also
how very ill-disposed men are to suffer the women they love to show
any sort of favour to others, and other facts
of this kind, we shall easily
see that men and women cannot rule alike without great hurt to peace.
(11:4:9) But of this enough.
{ The Political
Treatise is unfinished.
Note 1 - PAGE 360 Bk.XIB:191105; Bk.XX:14480, 25832,33, 26772.
"This V. H. is Pieter de la Court (1618-85), an eminent publicist, who
wrote under the initials D. C. (De la Court), V. H. (Van den Hove, the
Dutch equivalent). He was a friend of John de Witt, and opposed to the
party of the Statholders." POLLOCK'S Life and Philosophy of
Spinoza, Book XII Page 338.
JBY Note 1 - PAGE 368
For the dogmas of the "simple and general religion" see TTP3:XIV[28]:186.
I conjecture what is meant is something like "Universal Religion" and "Holiday."
Spinoza seems to imply a modified "Theocracy." TTP3:Bk.XIA:139; Bk.XIB:17783.
civil theologyBk.XIA:15344.
Note 1
This promise is not kept by the author, no doubt owing to his not living
to finish the work.
Note 1 - PAGE 376
Livy, "Hist.," Bk. xxi. Chaps. VI. and following.
Note 2 - PAGE 376 Bk.XIB:157, 182.
A.D. 1672. William Henry, Prince of Orange, afterwards William III. of
England, was made Statholder by a popular insurrection, consequent
on the invasion of the French.
Note 1 - PAGE 379
Cic. ad Quint. Grat. iii. 8, 4. The better reading is "rumour," not "tumour."
"The good" in such a passage means the aristocratic party.
Note 1 - PAGE 380
Not by law, except before B.C. 287 and in the interval between the dic-
tatorship of Sulla and the consulship of Pompey and Crassus. But in the
golden age of the republic the senate in fact controlled the tribunes.
End of Part 3
A Political Treatise - Part 3
Revised: January 17, 2005
Part 1 - Preface - Table of Contents - Chapters I to V
Part 2 - Table of Contents - Chapters VI and VII
Part 3 - Table of Contents - Chapters VIII to XI