text:
No. CIV–12–1000–HE.
Charles E. Geister, III, Derek B. Ensminger, Hartzog Conger Cason & Neville, Oklahoma City, OK, Eric S. Baxter, Lori H. Windham, Stuart K. Duncan, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs. Michelle R. Bennett, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Charles E. Geister, III, Derek B. Ensminger, Hartzog Conger Cason & Neville, Oklahoma City, OK, Eric S. Baxter, Lori H. Windham, Stuart K. Duncan, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs. Michelle R. Bennett, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
JOE HEATON, District Judge.
Plaintiffs, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel, Inc., David Green, Barbara Green, Steve Green, Mart Green and Darsee Lett sued Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), and other government officials and agencies challenging regulations issued under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Publ. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) ("Affordable Care Act" or "ACA"). Specifically, plaintiffs object to the preventive care coverage regulations or mandate which they allege forces them to "provide health insurance coverage for abortion-inducing drugs and devices, as well as related education and counseling." Complaint, ¶ 8. Plaintiffs contend the mandate violates their statutory and constitutional rights and seek both declaratory and injunctive relief. Presently at issue is plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in which they ask the court to prohibit defendants from enforcing the mandate against them. A hearing on the motion was held on November 1, 2012.
This lawsuit is one of many challenging various aspects of the Affordable Care Act. While the legislation is controversial, as another judge has stated in similar circumstances, "this Court's personal views on the necessity, prudence, or effectiveness of the Affordable Care Act are of no moment whatsoever. The only issues concerning the ACA presently before this Court are those raised by the parties: namely, whether [the preventive services coverage provision] passes muster under the Constitution of the United States, and whether it violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq." Mead v. Holder, 766 F.Supp.2d 16, 19 (D.D.C.2011), aff'd on other grounds, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, ––– U.S. –––– (2012).
The ACA, signed into law on March 23, 2010, effected a variety of changes to the healthcare system. The Act includes a preventive services provision which provides:
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for ... (4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and screenings ... as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a). The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to develop recommendations for the HSRS guidelines. The IOM published a report which proposed, among other things, that insurance plans cover "[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity." Included among the FDA-approved contraceptive methods are diaphragms, oral contraceptive pills, emergency contraceptives such as Plan B and ulipristal, commonly known as the morning-after pill and the week-after pill, respectively, and intrauterine devices.
The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) is an agency within HHS.
See http:// www. hrsa. gov/ womens guidelines/.
See www. fda. gov/ forconsumers/ byaudience/ forwomen/ ucm 118465. htm. Free Publications/ UCM 282014. pdf (last updated Aug. 2012).
On August 1, 2011, HRSA adopted IOM's recommendations in full, see76 Fed.Reg. 46621; 45 C.F.R. § 147.130, and, on February 15, 2012, HHS, the Department of Labor and the Department of Treasury published rules finalizing the HRSA guidelines. Unless grandfathered or otherwise exempt, employers' group health plans must provide coverage conforming with the guidelines for plan years beginning on or after August 1, 2012. 75 Fed.Reg. 41726, 41729.
Grandfathered health plans are not subject to the preventive services provision of the ACA. 75 Fed.Reg. 34538–01 (June 17, 2010). Some religious employers also are exempt from providing plans that cover contraceptive services. To qualify as a "religious employer" an employer must satisfy the following criteria:
A grandfathered plan is one that was in existence on March 23, 2010, and which has not undergone any of a defined set of changes. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–1251T; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251; 45 C.F.R. § 147.140. The government estimates that by 2013, a majority of group health plans will lose their grandfathered status.
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization; (2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization; (3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization; (4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B); 76 Fed.Reg. 46621–01, 46623. A temporary enforcement safe-harbor provision applies to other non-profit organizations that do not qualify for any other exemption and "do not provide some or all of the contraceptive coverage otherwise required, consistent with any applicable State law, because of the religious beliefs of the organization." 77 Fed.Reg. 16501, 16502 (March 21, 2012); 77 Fed.Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012). Finally, an employer with fewer than 50 employees is not required to provide any health insurance plan. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A).
The government is in the process of finalizing amendments to the preventive services coverage regulations to accommodate the religious objections of non-exempt, non-grandfathered religious organizations to providing coverage for contraceptive services. See 77 Fed.Reg. at 8728.
The individual plaintiffs (collectively the "Greens"), are members of a family that owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc., privately held, for-profit corporations. Hobby Lobby operates 514 arts and crafts stores in 41 states with 13,240 full-time employees. Mardel is a bookstore and educational supply company that specializes in Christian materials. It has 35 stores in 7 states with 372 employees. Both Hobby Lobby and Mardel are operated through a management trust which owns all the voting stock in the corporations. Each member of the Green family is a trustee of the trust.
It is not altogether clear from the parties' submissions whether Hobby Lobby and Mardel are wholly owned by the Green plaintiffs or just wholly controlled by them, with some portion of the non-voting, equity ownership of the companies held by others. See Complaint, ¶ 38. The complaint alleges only voting control. The distinction does not affect the disposition of the pending motion.
Although Hobby Lobby and Mardel are for-profit, secular corporations, the Green family operates them according to their Christian faith. "As part of their religious obligations" the Green family provides health insurance coverage to Hobby Lobby's and Mardel's employees through a self-insured plan. Complaint, ¶ 52. However, "[t]he Green family's religious beliefs prohibit them from deliberately providing insurance coverage for prescription drugs or devices inconsistent with their faith, in particular abortion-causing drugs and devices. Hobby Lobby's insurance policies have long explicitly excluded—consistent with their religious beliefs—contraceptive devices that might cause abortions and pregnancy-termination drugs like RU–486." Id. at ¶¶ 53–54. The government does not dispute the sincerity of the Greens' beliefs.
Hobby Lobby and Mardel, as secular, for-profit companies, do not satisfy the ACA's definition of a "religious employer" and are ineligible for the protection of the safe-harbor provision. Their health plans also are not grandfathered under the Act. The mandate takes effect as to the corporations' employee health plan on January 1, 2013, as that is the date upon which the plan year begins. Plaintiffs assert that they "face an unconscionable choice: either violate the law, or violate their faith." Id. at ¶ 133. If Hobby Lobby fails to provide the mandated coverage, plaintiffs contend the corporation will incur penalties of about $1.3 million a day. Mardel also will be fined if it does not comply with the mandate. Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from enforcing the mandate against them, arguing that the mandate violates their right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and their statutory rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1.
Legal Standard
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and should "not be issued unless the movant's right to relief is 'clear and unequivocal.' " Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir.2001)). To obtain a preliminary injunction the moving party must establish that:
(1) [the movant] will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury ... outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; (3) the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood [of success] on the merits.
Id. (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cruce, 972 F.2d 1195, 1198 (10th Cir.1992)). Plaintiffs, as the movants, have the burden of demonstrating that each factor tips in their favor. Id. at 1188–89.
The Tenth Circuit has applied a relaxed "probability of success" requirement when the moving party has "established that the three 'harm' factors tip decidedly in its favor." Id. at 1189. The movant in such cases "need only show questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs urge application of the " 'less rigorous fair-ground-for-litigation standard.' " Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189 (quoting Sweeney v. Bane, 996 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.1993)).
The relaxed standard does not apply if the injunction "is one that alters the status quo and therefore is disfavored." Northern Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 697 F.3d 1259, 1266 (10th Cir.2012). Defendants argue that plaintiffs are not seeking to maintain the status quo because, prior to the enactment of the mandate, Hobby Lobby provided coverage for emergency contraceptives that could cause an abortion. The court is not persuaded that the coverage was due to anything other than a mistake. Upon discovery of the coverage, Hobby Lobby immediately excluded the two drugs, Plan B and Ella, from its prescription drug policy. Defendants do not dispute that the company's policies have otherwise long excluded abortion-inducing drugs. Here plaintiffs are not seeking a disfavored injunction, but rather ask the court to preserve the status quo.
The court agrees with plaintiffs that the questions presented here are "serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful." However, an additional limitation on the applicability of the "less rigorous fair-ground-for-litigation standard" exists. The Tenth Circuit has concluded the " 'liberal definition of the 'probability of success' requirement' " does not apply " 'where a preliminary injunction seeks to stay governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme.' " Nova Health Systems v. Edmondson, 460 F.3d 1295, 1298 n. 6 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189). Here, plaintiffs challenge a regulatory requirement imposed pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme. As a result, the more liberal "fair ground for litigation" standard does not apply.
Defendants argue that in Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), the Supreme court abrogated the more flexible standard for the preliminary injunction. The court does not have to reach that issue, due to its conclusion that, because plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the enforcement of an action taken, pursuant to a statutory scheme, they "must meet the traditional substantial likelihood of success' standard." Nova Health Systems, 460 F.3d at 1298 n. 6.
One court in this circuit has reached a contrary conclusion. In Newland v. Sebelius, ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, 2012 WL 3069154 (D.Colo.2012), a factually similar case, the court concluded the relaxed "likelihood of success" standard should be applied because the "government's creation of numerous exceptions to the preventive care coverage mandate has undermined its alleged public interest." Id. at ––––, 2012 WL 3069154, at *5. However, for purposes of determining the appropriate preliminary injunction standard, the question is not whether the public interest is strong or compelling, but rather whether it is in the public interest at all. And as to that question, the court is obliged to defer to the determination of Congress. As the Tenth Circuit observed in a somewhat similar context, applying the Heideman rule, "we presume that all governmental action pursuant to a statutory scheme is 'taken in the public interest.' " Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1115 n. 15 (10th Cir.2006) (more relaxed standard inapplicable to plaintiff's challenge to a Kansas statute requiring reporting of minors' voluntary sexual activity). In like manner, this court presumes the challenged government actions at issue here are taken in the public interest within the meaning of the Heideman standard, notwithstanding the existence of exceptions to the coverage requirement.
Two district courts in other circuits have issued preliminary injunctions in similar cases, employing different standards than those adopted by the Tenth Circuit. See Legatus v. Sebelius, –––F.Supp.2d ––––, 2012 WL 5359630 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) and Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, 2012 WL 5817323 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012).
And, as noted above, the presumption is made without regard to the court's owns views of whether the ACA or the particular regulatory requirements at issue are sound public policy.
Similarly unpersuasive is plaintiff's argument that the more flexible preliminary injunction standard applies here because they are not attacking the entire statutory scheme, just a small part of it. First, the Heideman exception, as articulated by the Tenth Circuit, does not require the challenge to be to an entire statutory scheme. Instead, it refers to attempts to "stay governmental action taken in the public interest" that is "pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme." Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1189 (internal quotations omitted). The mandate at issue here is both (1) an action in the public interest, as determined by Congress, and (2) one taken pursuant to the statute. That is all that is required. Moreover, none of the cases plaintiffs cite offer any explicit support for their view and at least some of them clearly involve challenges to less than a whole "scheme." For example, in Foulston, the challenge was not to the entire scheme (which imposed a reporting requirement on various professionals for instances of physical, mental or emotional abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child), but to a limited aspect of it (mandatory reporting of consensual sex between minors).
As plaintiffs are challenging a coverage requirement imposed as part of a regulatory or statutory scheme, the "fair ground for litigation standard" does not apply. To obtain injunctive relief, they must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, in addition to the standard's three other requirements. The requirement for showing a substantial likelihood of success on the merits is determinative of the present motion for the reasons which follow. First Amendment—Free Exercise of Religion
The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Plaintiffs maintain they exercise their religion by complying with their religious beliefs which prohibit them from providing coverage, or access to coverage, for abortion-causing drugs or devices or related education and counseling. The mandate forces them, plaintiff's argue, to violate their religious beliefs and substantially burdens their religious exercise.
The question of whether plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their constitutional claims requires a threshold determination of whether the particular plaintiffs have constitutional "free exercise" rights subject to being violated. As to the Greens, the answer to that is obviously yes. However, as to the corporations—Hobby Lobby and Mardel—the court concludes otherwise.
Corporations have constitutional rights in some circumstances, such as the right to free speech, but the rights of corporate persons and natural persons are not coextensive. Courts have not extended all constitutional rights to all corporations. Corporations do not possess a "right to exercise a privilege against self-incrimination." Application to Enforce Admin. Subpoenas Duces Tecum of the S.E.C. v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 416 n. 3 (10th Cir.1996), They have been denied "[c]ertain 'purely personal' guarantees ... because the 'historic function' of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–701, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944)). "Whether or not a particular guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision." Id.
The purpose of the free exercise clause is "to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority." Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (emphasis added). Churches and other religious organizations or religious corporations have been accorded protection under the free exercise clause, see Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012); Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531–32, 113 S.Ct. 2217, because believers "exercise their religion through religious organizations." Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (BRENNAN, J. concurring) (internal quotations omitted). However, Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not religious organizations. Plaintiffs have not cited, and the court has not found, any case concluding that secular, for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby and Mardel have a constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. See Anselmo v. Cnty. of Shasta, 873 F.Supp.2d 1247, 1264, 2012 WL 2090437, at *12 (E.D.Cal.2012) ("Although corporations and limited partnerships have broad rights, the court has been unable to find a single RLUIPA case protecting the religious exercise rights of a non-religious organization such as Seven Hills."). The court concludes plaintiffs Hobby Lobby and Mardel do not have constitutional free exercise rights as corporations and that they therefore cannot show a likelihood of success as to any constitutional claims they may assert. Plaintiffs' ability to show a likelihood of success therefore depends on evaluation of the claims of the individual plaintiffs—the Greens.
The court has considerable doubt whether the corporations would have standing to assert a claim on behalf of the Greens. See generally Grace, 451 F.3d at 670 (discussing prerequisites for associational standing as stated by the Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)). However, as the Greens are parties appearing and asserting their own rights, it is unnecessary to belabor the issue.
The question of whether the Greens can establish a free exercise constitutional violation by reason of restrictions or requirements imposed on general business corporations they own or control involves largely uncharted waters. However, the court concludes it is unnecessary, as to the constitutional claims, to resolve those questions here as the challenged statutory scheme and regulations are substantially likely to survive constitutional scrutiny in any event.
"While the First Amendment provides absolute protection to religious thoughts and beliefs, the free exercise clause does not prohibit Congress and local governments from validly regulating religious conduct." Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir.2006). "[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).' " Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). If a law is both neutral and generally applicable, it only has to be "rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest to survive a constitutional challenge." Grace, 451 F.3d at 649. A law that burdens a religious practice and is not neutral or generally applicable is subject to strict scrutiny. Id. "[U]nless it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest," the law violates the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
To analyze plaintiffs' free exercise claims the court must first determine the level of scrutiny to apply. Id. A law is neutral if its object is "something other than the infringement or restriction of religious practices." Id. at 649–50. Citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), plaintiffs argue that the mandate is not neutral because it exempts some religious employers from compliance while compelling others to provide coverage for preventive services. They contend it discriminates between religious objectors, exempting "only organizations whose 'purpose' is to inculcate religious values; who 'primarily' employ and serve co-religionists; and who qualify as churches or religious orders under the tax code." Plaintiffs' motion, p. 18,
Carving out an exemption for defined religious entities does not make a law nonneutral as to others. Plaintiffs do not allege that "the object of [the mandate] is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (emphasis added); see Grace, 451 F.3d at 649–50. They do not dispute that the mandate's purpose is secular in nature and intended to promote public health and gender equality. "[T]here is no evidence that the exception is in any way based on religious categorization or discrimination." Grace, 451 F.3d at 652 (quoting Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I–L, 135 F.3d 694, 701 (10th Cir.1998)); see Axson–Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir.2004) ("A rule that is discriminatorily motivated and applied is not a neutral rule of general applicability."); Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1232–33 (10th Cir.2009); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510, 825 N.Y.S.2d 653, 859 N.E.2d 459, 464 (2006). In fact, the religious employer exemption and the safe harbor provision suggest the opposite of what plaintiffs argue and must show to warrant strict scrutiny of the mandate. Using well established criteria to determine eligibility for an exemption based on religious belief, such as the nonsecular nature of the organization and its nonprofit status, the ACA, through its implementing rules and regulations, both recognizes and protects the exercise of religion. The fact that the exceptions do not extend as far as plaintiffs would like does not make the mandate nonneutral. O'Brien v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, ––––, 2012 WL 4481208, at *8 (E.D.Mo.2012) ("[T]he religious employer exemption does not compromise the neutrality of the regulations by favoring certain religious employers over others. Rather ... the religious employer exemption presents a strong argument in favor of neutrality...."). As the New York Court of Appeals explained in Serio, a case involving a free exercise challenge to a state law requiring employers providing coverage for prescription drugs to include coverage for contraceptives:
Plaintiffs also do not argue that the preventive care coverage regulations lack "facial neutrality." See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217.
The neutral purpose of the challenged portions of the [health care law]—to make contraceptive coverage broadly available to New York women—is not altered because the Legislature chose to exempt some religious institutions and not others. To hold that any religious exemption that is not all-inclusive renders a statute non-neutral would be to discourage the enactment of any such exemptions—and thus to restrict, rather than promote, freedom of religion.
Serio, 825 N.Y.S.2d 653, 859 N.E.2d at 464. "[T]he neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The [preventive services coverage regulations] [did not have] as their object the suppression of religion." Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542, 113 S.Ct. 2217.
The second requirement of the constitutional test is that "laws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability." Id. "The Free Exercise Clause protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment, and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation." Id. at 542–43, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs contend the mandate is not generally applicable because of the numerous exemptions, including those for grandfathered plans and religious employers. However, the mandate does not "pursue[ ] ... governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief." Id. at 545, 113 S.Ct. 2217. As the court noted in O'Brien, ––– F.Supp.2d at ––––, 2012 WL 4481208, at *8, "[t]he regulations in this case apply to all employers not falling under an exemption, regardless of those employers' personal religious inclinations." See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1134 (9th Cir.2009) ("Pharmacies and pharmacists who do not have a religious objection to Plan B must comply with the rules to the same extent—no more and no less—than pharmacies and pharmacists who may have a religious objection to Plan B. Therefore, the rules are generally applicable.").
As the court concludes the mandate is neutral and of general applicability, it is subject only to rational basis scrutiny under the First Amendment. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883–85, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Plaintiffs do not argue that there is no legitimate government interest for the mandate or that the regulations are not rationally related to protect that interest, and the court finds no basis on the present showing to conclude the law, under the rational basis test, is unconstitutional.
Applying these principles, the court concludes plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success as to their constitutional claims. The corporations lack free exercise rights subject to being violated and, as the challenged statutes/regulations are neutral and of general applicability as contemplated by the constitutional standard, plaintiffs are unlikely to successfully establish a constitutional violation in any event. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Plaintiffs' claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 present a closer question. RFRA applies standards which are more protective of religious exercise than the constitutional standard. It prohibits the federal government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion, unless the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1; Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). The Act "provides a statutory claim to individuals whose religious exercise is burdened by the federal government." United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1279 (10th Cir.2011). Congress passed RFRA to restore the compelling interest test that had been applied to laws substantially burdening religious exercise before the Supreme Court's decision in Smith.
RFRA provides that:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1.
As was the case with plaintiffs' constitutional claims, a threshold question here is whether all the plaintiffs are in a position to assert rights under RFRA. That depends on whether particular plaintiffs qualify as a "person" within the meaning of the statute. The Greens are unquestionably "persons" under the statute, entitled to assert its potential application to them. Less clear is the status of Hobby Lobby and Mardel.
RFRA does not include a specific definition of "person." Plaintiffs argue that Hobby Lobby and Mardel qualify as "persons" based on the general definition included in 1 U.S.C. § 1. That section provides: "In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise ... the words 'person' and 'whoever' includes corporations ... as well as individuals." As used in § 1, " '[c]ontext' ... means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of other related congressional Acts, and this is simply an instance of the word's ordinary meaning...." Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199, 113 S.Ct. 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 (1993). While context "has a narrow compass, the 'indication' contemplated by 1 U.S.C. § 1 has a broader one." Id. at 200, 113 S.Ct. 716. The qualification "unless the context indicates otherwise," is intended to assist the court "in the awkward case where Congress provides no particular definition, but the definition in 1 U.S.C. § 1 seems not to fit." Id. That is the situation here. General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors. Religious exercise is, by its nature, one of those "purely personal" matters referenced in Bellotti which is not the province of a general business corporation. As applied to 1 U.S.C. § 1 and the question of whether these corporations are "persons" within the meaning of RFRA, the context "indicates otherwise."
"Plaintiffs assert that "[i]t is settled law that corporations may exercise religion." Plaintiffs' reply, p. 8. However, the cases they cite, Gonzales and Lukumi involved religious organizations, not general business corporations. The same reasons behind the court's conclusion that secular, for-profit corporations do not have First Amendment rights under the Free Exercise Clause support a determination that they are not "persons" for purposes of the RFRA. This conclusion is buttressed by RFRA's reference to principles of standing: "Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under Article III of the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(c).
Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal is described in Gonzales as a religious sect. There is no indication it was incorporated. The church in Lukumi was a non-profit corporation, 508 U.S. at 525, 113 S.Ct. 2217, and nothing in Gonzales indicates the religious sect operated a secular, for profit business. Plaintiffs also cite Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir.2006) for the proposition that a commercial corporation's rights can include religious exercise. However, in resolving the issue of whether the plaintiff had standing to assert a violation of free exercise rights under the First Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit stated: "we easily conclude that Primera, as an incorporated religious organization, stated a section 1983 claim for the alleged violation of its ... free exercise rights." Id. at 1306.
Plaintiffs argue that "the Supreme Court has at least twice allowed commercial proprietors to assert religious exercise claims against regulations impacting their businesses," citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961). Plaintiffs' reply, p. 4. However, neither case appears to have involved a corporation and, in any event, it is clear that the religious beliefs that were allegedly being interfered with were those of the owners. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601, 81 S.Ct. 1144 ("[T]he only question for consideration is whether the statute interferes with the free exercise of appellants' religion.... Each of the appellants is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith."). Plaintiffs also rely on two Ninth Circuit cases, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.2009) and EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir.1988). Neither supports their argument. In Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1119, the Ninth Circuit stated "We decline to decide whether a for-profit corporation can assert its own rights under the Free Exercise Clause and instead examine the rights at issue as those of the corporate owners." Similarly, in Townley, 859 F.2d at 619–20, the court stated: ("Because Townley is merely the instrument through and by which Mr. and Mrs. Townley express their religious beliefs, it is unnecessary to address the abstract issue whether a for profit corporation has rights under the Free Exercise Clause independent of those of its shareholders and officers. Townley presents no rights of its own different from or greater than its owners' rights.").
In any event, the court concludes that plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success as to any claims asserted by Hobby Lobby and Mardel under RFRA. The question then becomes whether plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success as to the RFRA claims of the Greens.
"[A] plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim under RFRA by proving the following three elements: (1) a substantial burden imposed by the federal government on a (2) sincere (3) exercise of religion." Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir.2001). Once the plaintiff establishes these elements, "the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that 'application of the burden' to the claimant 'is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest' and 'is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.' " Id. at 961–62 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b)); Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 428–30, 126 S.Ct. 1211.
The term "religious exercise" is broadly defined to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2(4); see generally Smith, 494 U.S. at 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595 ("But the 'exercise of religion' often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation.").
The second and third elements of plaintiffs' prima facie case are not in dispute. No one questions that the Greens' beliefs are sincerely held or that the mandate burdens, at least indirectly, the Greens' "own exercise of [their] sincerely held religious beliefs." Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1314 (10th Cir.2010), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 469, 178 L.Ed.2d 298 (2010). The critical question is whether the mandate imposes a "substantial" burden on the Greens for purposes of the RFRA. Defendants contend that any burden the mandate imposes on the Greens is indirect, "result[ing]s from obligations that the preventive services coverage regulations impose on a legally separate, secular entity." Defendants' response, pp. 18–19. They argue that "[t]his type of attenuated burden is not cognizable under the RFRA." Id. at p. 19. Plaintiffs counter that defendants' "attenuation argument rewrites their faith. The government may not, they contend "re-draw the theological lines in religious belief systems." Plaintiffs' reply, p. 13. They contend the mandate substantially burdens their religious exercise "by forcing them to choose between following their convictions and paying enormous fines." Plaintiffs' motion, p. 9.
Plaintiffs assert that they "exercise religion by avoiding participation in abortion, an act forbidden by their faith. Plaintiffs' reply, p. 3.
The present circumstances require charting a course through the "treacherous terrain" at the intersection of the federal government's duty to avoid imposing burdens on the individual's practice of religion and the protection of competing interests. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1281. No Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit authority applying or discussing RFRA's "substantial burden" requirement does so in circumstances like those present here—where regulatory requirements applicable to a general business corporation are alleged to infringe on the religious exercise rights of the corporation's owners or officers. Similarly, the cases decided under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc–5, which applies essentially the same standard, do not provide specific guidance. However, certain principles emerge from the cases which guide the court's determination.
RLUIPA cases are instructive as "RLUIPA's legislative history reveals that 'substantial burden' is to be interpreted by reference to the Religious Freedom Act of 1993 ... and First Amendment jurisprudence." Grace, 451 F.3d at 661 (citing 146 Cong. Rec. 7774–01, 7776).
First, it is clear, as plaintiffs argue, that it is not the province of the court to tell the plaintiffs what their religious beliefs are, i.e. whether their beliefs about abortion should be understood to extend to how they run their corporations or the like, or to decide whether such beliefs are fundamental to their belief system or peripheral to it. RFRA makes clear it does not matter whether the particular exercise of religion at issue is or is not central to the individual's religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A); see Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1314 at n. 6. Nonetheless, even assuming, as appears to be the case with plaintiffs, that they object as a matter of religious faith to any act supporting or facilitating abortion, no matter how indirect, that does not end the issue. RFRA's provisions do not apply to any burden on religious exercise, but rather to a "substantial" burden on that exercise. As the Seventh Circuit observed in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir.2003):
Application of the substantial burden provision to a regulation inhibiting or constraining any religious exercise, including the use of property for religious purposes, would render meaningless the word "substantial," because the slightest obstacle to religious exercise incidental to the regulation of land use—however minor the burden it were to impose—could then constitute a burden sufficient to trigger RLUIPA's requirement that the regulation advance a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means.
342 F.3d 752, 761. Recognizing that the word "substantial" must have some meaning, the Civil Liberties court went on to conclude that
Civil Liberties was decided under RLUIPA but, as noted above, RLUIPA's standards for what constitutes a "substantial burden" are the same as RFRA's.
[I]n the context of RLUIPA's broad definition of religious exercise, a ... regulation that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise ... impracticable.
Id. (emphasis added). Civil Liberties thus concludes, in general, that a "substantial burden" on religious exercise is one that bears in some relatively direct manner on it.
The view of substantial burden adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Civil Liberties is not the only approach that has emerged. See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567–71 (5th Cir.2004) (discussing cases); Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 Fed.Appx. 729, 735–38 (6th Cir.2007) (unpublished) (discussing cases). However, the Tenth Circuit has cited Civil Liberties with approval in the context of determining what constitutes a "substantial burden," Grace, 451 F.3d at 661, suggesting that it shares the view that some level of "directness" must be present. The Tenth Circuit has, of course, also noted that a substantial burden may, in some circumstances, be based on compulsion that is indirect. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315;see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). Giving effect to both principles, the result appears to be that, while no bright line rule has been stated by the Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit (or perhaps could be, in this context), the degree to which the challenged government action operates directly and primarily on the individual's religious exercise is a significant factor to be evaluated in determining whether a "substantial burden" is present.
Evaluating the "directness" factor here, the court concludes the Greens are unlikely to be able to establish a "substantial burden" on them within the meaning of RFRA. The mandate in question applies only to Hobby Lobby and Mardel, not to its officers or owners. Further, the particular "burden of which plaintiffs complain is that funds, which plaintiffs will contribute to a group health plan, might, after a series of independent decisions by health care providers and patients covered by [Hobby Lobby's] plan, subsidize someone else's participation in an activity that is condemned by plaintiff's religion." O'Brien, ––– F.Supp.2d at ––––, 2012 WL 4481208, at *6. Such an indirect and attenuated relationship appears unlikely to establish the necessary "substantial burden."
Other cases decided by the Tenth Circuit under RFRA/RLUIPA are consistent with the view that some reasonably direct and personal connection between the religious exercise and the restraint in question must be present. In Abdulhaseeb, the restriction in question directly impacted the religious exercise of the plaintiff by denying him the diet that was necessary to his religious beliefs. In Wilgus, the defendant personally possessed the eagle feathers. In Kikumura, the prisoner was denied pastoral visits by a minister he claimed was particularly well suited to provide him with spiritual guidance.
Similarly, the principal Supreme Court case construing RFRA, Gonzales, also involved a close or personal connection between the religious exercise and the infringing government action. The religious sect in Gonzales was prohibited from engaging in communion. Its members were faced with the choice of foregoing a religious sacrament or violating the Controlled Substances Act.
Consideration of Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutional standard in this area also provides some support for the view that the necessary "substantial burden" is unlikely to be established here. Grace notes that the legislative history of RFRA and RLUIPA indicates that the term "substantial burden" should not be given a broader interpretation that the Supreme Court's articulation of the concept. Grace, 451 F.3d at 661.See O'Brien, ––– F.Supp.2d at ––––, 2012 WL 4481208 at *5 ("Courts frequently look to free exercise cases predating Employment Div. v. Smith to determine which burdens cross the threshold of substantiality"); Anselmo, 873 F.Supp.2d at 1258, 2012 WL 2090437, at *8 ("The Ninth Circuit has explained that the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence ... is instructive in defining a substantial burden under RLUIPA ....") (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir.2006)). As with the Tenth Circuit cases, the Supreme Court decisions have also involved situations where the restraint in question operated with some level of directness on the individual. For example, the plaintiff in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), was forced "to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand." 374 U.S. at 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790. The compulsory attendance law at issue in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), required the Amish plaintiffs to elect between "abandon[ing] belief and be[ing] assimilated into society at large, or be[ing] forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region." 406 U.S. at 218, 92 S.Ct. 1526. In Thomas, the employee's personal participation in activity to which he objected was involved.
Finally, the court notes the Supreme Court's approach in Lee. Although Lee was a free exercise case and focused principally on the nature and application of the compelling interest test, its discussion of the impact of commercial activity provides some guidance on the issue of what constitutes a "substantial burden." The Court noted that "every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs." Lee, 455 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 1051. The plain import is that there must be more than some burden on religious exercise. The burden must be substantial. The Court then went on to state that
[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees. Congress drew a line in § 1402(g), exempting the self-employed Amish but not all persons working for an Amish employer.455 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 1051. The Court's discussion reflected a concern with the impact of the employer's faith-based decisions on his employees. While that appears not to have been a matter critical in Lee, as Lee's employees were also Amish, it would be potentially significant here. Hobby Lobby and Mardel employ over 13,500 people and "welcome [ ] employees of all faiths or no faith." Complaint, ¶ 51. Many of those employees are likely to have different religious views. Moreover, the employees' rights being affected are of constitutional dimension—related to matters of procreation, marriage contraception, and abortion. While such considerations (and the discussion in Lee referenced above) go most directly to a determination of whether a compelling governmental interest is shown in a particular circumstance, rather than to what is here the determinative issue—what constitutes a "substantial burden"—they nonetheless suggest that term should be given meaningful application.
The matter of a constitutional right to abortion has been highly controversial since the right was discovered among the penumbras of the Due Process Clause some forty years ago. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Nonetheless, the right is now clearly established and necessarily shapes the nature of the rights and interests of plaintiffs' employees. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 L.Ed.2d 480(2007); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).
In sum, while the meaning and reach of the term "substantial burden" in this context is considerably less than crystal clear, it appears to impose a requirement that the burden on religious exercise be more direct and personal than has been shown here as to the Greens and their management of nationwide general business corporations.
Plaintiffs have not shown a "clear and unequivocal" right to injunctive relief in light of the standards applicable to their request. Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1188 (internal quotations omitted). The court is not unsympathetic to plaintiffs' circumstances and recognizes that the ACA's substantial expansion of employer obligations results in concerns and issues not previously confronted by companies or their owners. However, for the reasons previously stated, the court concludes plaintiffs have not made the necessary showing of a likelihood of success on the merits to warrant a preliminary injunction in the circumstances existing here.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a probability of success on their First Amendment claims. Hobby Lobby and Mardel, secular, for-profit corporations, do not have free exercise rights. The Greens do have such rights, but are unlikely to prevail as to their constitutional claims because the preventive care coverage regulations they challenge are neutral laws of general applicability which are rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.
Plaintiffs also have failed to demonstrate a probability of success on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims. Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not "persons" for purposes of the RFRA and the Greens have not established that compliance with the preventive care coverage regulations would "substantially burden" their religious exercise, as the term "substantially burdened" is used in the statute. Therefore, plaintiffs have not met their prima facie burden under RFRA and have not demonstrated a probability of success as to their RFRA claims. Accordingly, the motion for preliminary injunction [Doc. # 6] is DENIED.
Because plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, it is unnecessary to determine whether the three other factors tip in their favor.


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text:
The Heart Of The Matter
Examining some of the real reasons behind the Rockets' 105-103 loss to Washington
HOUSTON - Watch a team shoot 46 three-pointers in a loss and it's a safe bet someone will utter the words, 'Live by the three, die by the three' within 60 seconds of the game's conclusion. It's one of those catchphrases that, for better or worse, has stood the test of time even though, like most of its longstanding brethren in the realm of bromides, the message it conveys may in fact be more inherently flawed that the offensive philosophy it is attempting to debunk.
The Houston Rockets did indeed launch 46 triples Saturday night. That much is true. They also eventually fell 105-103 to the Wizards after failing to protect a 17-point lead. That is a fact as well. But to link those two things together in such a way that directly blames the former for the latter is overly simplistic at best and downright disingenuous at worst, especially on a night when Houston hit more than 41 percent of its shots from beyond the arc.
The Rockets' offense is predicated on taking open shots - simple as that - and the vast majority of Houston's 46 threes were of the open variety. That's not unusual of course; with their dual ability to dissect defenses with dribble penetration and make opponents pay with their floor spacing, the Rockets frequently feast on a heaping helping of open three-point looks. There's a reason, after all, that Houston ranks second in the NBA (behind only New York) in three-point attempts per game. And when perusing those rankings you will rapidly notice the teams that take a lot of threes often do a heck of a lot more living than they do dying. To wit, seven of the clubs that rank in the league's top-10 in three-point attempts per game also reside among the ten most efficient offenses the NBA has to offer. The three-point shot is a weapon and smart teams know how to wield it.
All of which leads to yet another important factoid: Houston's offense is also built upon maximizing its use of the highest value shots in the game – corner threes and attempts at the rim. The Rockets rank No. 1 in the first category and No. 3 in the second, and that is a massive reason why this über young team has so rapidly become one of the most explosive offensive clubs in the league. During the first half of Saturday night's game, Houston put on a clinic in demonstrating the devastating power behind that philosophy. The Rockets' shot chart from the first two quarters was remarkable in its simplicity, with virtually everything coming either at the rim or from beyond the arc. The results were just as staggering: 13 made threes on 28 attempts as Houston took am 11-point lead to halftime. In the pick-your-poison puzzle the Rockets present to their opponents on a nightly basis, the Wizards had chosen to allow Houston to fire away from distance and the Rockets were only too happy to take full advantage of all those open looks.
In the second half, however, foreboding flaws increasingly began revealing themselves in the Rockets' style of play; foibles, it should be noted, that had little to do with an overreliance on the three-point shot. The zip and ball and body movement that are always the telltale signs of this team performing at maximum efficiency subsided significantly. Perhaps it was the result of being shorthanded for a third straight game. Maybe the players began feeling the effects of playing their third game in four nights. And Washington's vastly improved defense, boosted by its decision to start switching on screens, certainly had something to do with it as well. Whatever the case, the Rockets' offense transformed from powerful to pedestrian. The open looks dried up amid the kind of poor execution that often gives birth around these parts to those ill-favored buzzwords such as "sticky" and "stagnant."
Note, however, that Houston's effectiveness did not diminish because it leaned too heavily on the three-ball – the Rockets actually took 10 fewer threes in the second half than they did in the first. No, Houston's offense languished in large part because the trey was too often the only working weapon in its arsenal Saturday night. The lack of pace meant fewer easy buckets in transition. The stagnation in the half-court led to an increase in the number of turnovers and wasted possessions. Gone were the extra passes and strong off-ball cuts that opened up driving lanes for forays to the rim. As a result, the Rockets received 11 fewer free throw attempts and scored 12 fewer paint points than their season averages. Elite offenses crush opponents with a multipronged and diverse offensive attack. But in the second half, if Houston wasn't generating a good look from three, it frequently wasn't generating good looks at all.
Notice, too, that nothing up to this point has been said about the Rockets' defense. And one quick look at Washington's second half shooting percentages reveal a problem far more damaging than any that had to do with Houston's affinity for three-point shooting Saturday night. The Wizards hit a whopping 64 percent of their shots in the final two quarters, including a 68 percent mark in the third period that went a long way in reinforcing the notion that Washington had no intention of lying down and accepting its fate after falling so far behind in the first half. The undersized Rockets got bludgeoned in the paint for much of the evening. The Wizards also did well to knock down some of the shots that Houston would welcome them to take every time. Either way you slice it, however, the Rockets' inability to get stops burned them in both phases of the game since it also put a significant damper on their ability to score in transition in the second half.
So yes, there were very real reasons Houston dropped a tight, tough game to a much-improved Wizards squad Saturday night. Just know that those reasons had little to do with a clichéd bit of conventional wisdom that has long since worn out its welcome.
Yeah, we were sticky again tonight. We didn't have great movement and our spacing got a little bit funky. We chased the ball a little too much.
(relax after having a 17-point lead?)
We can't relax. We've got to keep playing. We had plenty of opportunities to win that game. They were making plays at the end of the game and we didn't.
They went inside a little bit more, Okafor got the ball a little bit more. But really it was we had turnovers and empty possessions where we didn't move the ball. We just got stagnant. We did not have a good second half.
(on play of Motiejunas and Beverley)
They played well. They played well last night, too.
On Rockets' forward Chandler Parsons:
"He made some shots early, we had some ball movement, but we made some shots. We're going to shoot threes and we shot an extraordinarily large amount of threes tonight. But we shoot a lot of threes as a team. We didn't get enough penetration, enough ball movement."
(on Jeremy Lin)
Jeremy wasn't feeling good before the game. He was a little bit under the weather so we tried to keep his minutes moderate so he could have energy.
I'm not sure what it is. It's a flu or cold or something … I should have played better. I could have helped the team out more than I did tonight. Now going to get back, get ready for the next one and move on.
We came in here, we wanted to get a win and we didn't, so everyone's going to be (disappointed), starting with me – obviously I didn't do pretty much anything tonight.
On what changed in the second half:
"I think in the beginning they were helping a lot off the corners so we were able to hit looks. Guys were just able to get a lot of open shots and threes. But in the second half, they did more switching so they weren't in rotation as much."
We got real stagnant in that third quarter with our offense. We slowed it down when we shouldn't have. We didn't get the easy transition buckets that were giving us success in the first half. They made adjustments on defense but I thought we could have done some things differently and we didn't get any stops down the stretch.
(when teams start switching on screens like that, is that the time to get to the rim?)
Definitely. We were hurting them with the three in the first half and I think they made adjustments and switched out and didn't allow us as much, so we've got to be aggressive and get to the hole. It all really starts with defense and not getting any stops.
(on all the three-point attempts)
I guess we were just open so we took the open shots. I don't know how many we hit but I don't remember us taking too many bad ones. We were just taking what the defense gave us.
On the Wizards' second half:
"They hit shots. We were going under on John (Wall) and he hit shots. (Bradley) Beal was hitting shots all night. There was nothing really that we were doing, we had a game plan and they were just making us pay by hitting shots. There was nothing they were doing that we hadn't seen before."
On tonight's performance:
"That game took a lot out of me so I can only imagine the stress on the players, but we pulled this one out tonight. I really don't know where to begin other than the stand point that we talked about the Houston Rockets approach before the game. After we watched Houston make their move right before the trade line this team decided they would spread you out and shoot from the perimeter. What we have done from a defensive standpoint made it even harder to adjust in the middle of a game. Ultimately we knew they would come in and make threes, that's a given. I told the team not to get discouraged and continue to give it all you got."
On the play drawn up at the end of the game:
"I went big with 21 seconds at the end of the game, and I said whoever has the smallest defender on them that's who I want the ball to go to. I'm a firm believer in going at mismatches, and the flow of the game. I felt Emeka Okafor played outstanding, and he was doing a great job when he got the ball down there. I coach by feel, I don't have a set play we will go to every time. Houston stayed small all game long and I just decided to go big and it worked out well."
On the play of Bradley Beal:
"Bradley makes plays. He has done it for us before, and I have faith that he will continue to. Against Oklahoma City he hit that big shot and tonight he got a crucial rebound to help seal the deal. I will certainly not let him off the hook for missing a free throw, but he played well tonight."
On the game:
"Coach talked to us about it. We knew with James (Harden) basically handling the ball, him and Jeremy Lin, they do a good job of having four shooters out on the floor and one big. It was tough for us having to get in, and close out to their shooters. We just wanted to make it tough and make them make contested shots. In the second half, we kinda got into it defensively and they missed a couple and we executed on the other end."
On their success against teams with winning records:
"I think we got to play the same way. When we are on the road, we don't play the same way we need to when we are at home, playing as a team. We all know what it takes now, we all understand. To finish the season the way we want to, we need to do a better job. We owe Toronto because we didn't have the best game that we've had of our season. I had a terrible game leading my team, and other guys didn't step up. We know what we need to do to stop them."
On running a play for the final play:
"I know if I get the ball they are going to sink in like they do every game at the end of quarters. I'm basically the only one that will penetrate. We get them moving a little bit, they double the post, and we swing it to find the easiest outlet. We catch them off guard, they usually think I'm getting the ball or Brad is getting the ball, but we can go to the low post, and those guys can finish or they can make free throws. It makes it tough."
On Bradley Beal:
"I think he is playing big. He's finding his comfort zone, the way he wants to play. You see we ran a couple of plays for him in the pick and roll, he's also making plays and finding other guys. He's doing a great job of rebounding for us, and doing things on the defensive end. He's really maturing throughout every game he plays during his rookie season. It kinda helps when you have guys like Nene, me, Mek (Emeka), and other veterans on the team that are talking him through it. It's kinda easier when you have veterans making the game easier for you."
On his final rebound
"I thought Asik was going to box me out. I kinda disguised it like I wasn't gonna go in. Most bigs, they don't ever box out a guard. It was a long rebound and I just ended jumping up for it. I was in the right place at the right time I guess."
On what they changed in the second half:
"Our rotations. Sometimes we got sucked in way too much. We were giving them a lot of threes, we wanted them to take a lot of threes. That's what we wanted. We weren't going to give them easy layups, we liked our chances with them just hitting threes all game. We were able to stick it out, contest threes late."
On the final play:
"They went small, and Mek (Emeka) was so excited to get the ball on the pick. We went to the block and just spaced out and if they doubled he would kick it to the guy who was open. He was able to make a play and he got fouled."
On the Wizards:
"We're versatile. The five of us on the court, everybody can score, from every single position and we all have confidence in each other and know when we can exploit matchups. That just shows confidence."
On the final play of the game:
"This team is pretty unique where you legitimately have guys at every position who can put the ball in the bucket. So at the end of the game Coach (Wittman) drew up a play and said hey, 'whoever the mismatch is on is who we're going to'. It wasn't for me or Nene, it's whoever (Carlos) Delfino was guarding."
On Bradley Beal:
"It's only his first year. He's getting a lot of big-time pressure game experience. He's just growing from it."
On making adjustments to get the win:
"We went big and then just exploited them. We were able to figure it out on defense, and didn't really lose a step."
On the win:
"It was a team effort. We made some easy shots, got to the basket a little bit, so once you get to the basket and get a couple easy ones, the basket starts to look a little bigger."
On the Wizards' focus:
"We've got to worry about ourselves, and that's what I've taken pride in these last few games, just worrying about what we need to do and not really falling in to the trap of other teams. When we focus on ourselves we do a pretty good job."
On the Wizards' defense:
"That's what we try to do period. We try to let our defense take charge in the game. We know we're a good defensive time so when we sit down and buckle up, we're pretty good."
On Bradley Beal:
"He's legit. He's a player. When you're a player you make plays and do things to help your team win."


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A local business owner accused of reproducing and selling DVD copies of current box-office movies is facing felony charges.
This morning, investigators with the Orange County Sheriff's Office Economic Crimes Unit executed a search warrant at the C & M Gallery near S. Goldenrod Road and Sun Vista Way. Detectives recovered 1,120 DVDs, two computer towers, a flat-screen television and several movie menus.


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Get your gardening fix with our informative newsletter! It's the best way to find out about sales, new plants, and more.
Green Giant Arborvitae is a popular fast growing privacy hedge growing up to 3' a year. See articles for more information on growing, culture and care.
Trees & Shrubs
Thuja Green Giant
Evergreen Trees & Shrubs
Hedge Plants
Thuja Emerald - Fast Growing Hedge Plant Arborvitae
Hedge Plants -Selecting the Right Hedge Plant
Thuja Green Giant - Create Privacy-Hide Unsightly Views
Thuja Green Giant - Fastest Growing Hedge Plant


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Studying in Australia
If you intend to study in Australia, you will need to apply for the Student visa (subclass 500).
Student guardians can apply for the Student Guardian visa (subclass 590).
Family members of existing student visa holders will need to apply for a subclass 500 visa if they do not currently hold a student visa and want to join their family member in Australia.
For further information regarding Student visa requirements, lodging an application online and student visa evidentiary requirements, see:
For region specific information on Subsequent Dependants, see:
Processing Times
For visa and citizenship processing times, see:
What documents to provide
It is recommended that applicants provide complete and comprehensive evidence that supports their application at the time of lodgement. A list of evidentiary requirements will be provided as part of the online application process.
Use the Document Checklist Tool to find out what evidence you may need to submit with your application. Enter your country of passport and education provider to get an accurate Document Checklist.
If the Document Checklist indicates that you need to provide evidence of financial capacity, the country specific information detailed below may assist.
Country Specific Financial Guidance
You need to have enough money that is genuinely available to you to pay for your course fees, travel and living costs for you and your accompanying family members while you are in Australia.
It is useful to provide a summary with your application, outlining the funds that are available to you. You can complete this template and upload it as an attachment with your application.
If the Document Checklist Tool shows that you need to provide evidence of financial capacity, you must provide either:
- evidence of sufficient funds to cover your travel costs and 12 months of living and tuition fees for you and your accompanying family members and school costs for any school aged dependants, or
- evidence that your spouse or parents are willing to support you and they have an annual income of that meets the requirements, or
- an Acceptance Advice of Secondary Exchange Students form for secondary exchange students only, or
- a letter of support from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade or Department of Defence.
More information about the Student visa financial capacity requirements is available at http://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/Trav/Stud/More/Student-Visa-Living-Costs-and-Evidence-of-Funds.
Exchange Rate used to calculate financial capacity for a student visa
Generally, the exchange rate used to determine financial capacity is the rate applicable at the time of application.
However, if there has been a variation of more than 10% in the exchange rate between the time of application and the time of decision, the current exchange (as at 9am that day IMT) would be considered.
In such circumstances, the applicant will be afforded an opportunity to provide any additional evidence required.
Financial Records
Types of financial records which are acceptable for the purpose of assessing funds for student visa applications are:
- Specified Annual Income
- Loans from financial institutions
- Monetary deposits held with financial institutions
Evidence of Annual Income Option
For the purpose of the annual income option, evidence of income must be provided in the form of government documentation issued by the central government.
For Indian Nationals, the Income Tax Returns (ITR) issued by the Income Tax Department is considered as acceptable evidence for the annual income option.
Loans from Financial Institutions
A loan with an acceptable financial institution can be provided as evidence of funds. Evidence that the loan has been disbursed is the best way to satisfy DIBP that the applicant has genuine access to those funds. If the loan is not disbursed, we may have concerns about whether the applicant has genuine access to the funds.
For an education loan from an acceptable financial institution, the evidence could include a sanction/approval letter for the full loan and disbursement of the first year or first semester of tuition fees (as required by the education provider), as well as any funds intended to cover travel to Australia and the first 12 months of living expenses.
Loan letters from a financial institution should include details of any collateral security used for the approval of the loan.
Financial Institutions (FI) for Funds and Loans
The Department of Home Affairs monitors the financial sectors in India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan and accepts financial institutions which meet the regulatory requirements. The Regulations define the term 'financial institution' for the purposes of student visa applications as:
financial institution is a body corporate, that, as part of its normal activities takes money on deposit and makes advances of money;
a) under a regulatory regime:
i) governed by the central bank (or its equivalent) of the country in which the body corporate operates; and
ii) that the Minister is satisfied provides effective prudential assurance; and
b) in a way that the Minister is satisfied complies with effective prudential assurance requirements.
Where the Department has evidence that an officer at a financial institution has been complicit in issuing fraudulent documentation, we will provide this information to the central bank or its equivalent. While the matter is under formal investigation, we will not accept evidence of financial capacity from that financial institution.
For further country specific information follow the link below:
See: http://india.embassy.gov.au/ndli/vm_studyloans.html


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Luke Cage Comes to Netflix in Late September
Move over, Kimmy Schmidt. There's a new unbreakable person in town.
The Marvel Cinematic Universe has four shows in production. Daredevil and Jessica Jones have already had their debut seasons, and Daredevil's second season hits next Friday. Luke Cage will be the third show, followed by Iron Fist before they come together to form the Defenders, and now it looks like we've finally got a release date for the unbreakable man. During the New York City premiere for Daredevil season 2, they announced a September 30 date for Luke's solo series.
First appearing in Jessica Jones in late November, Luke Cage is a man who was forced into a lab experiment that gave him enhanced strength and unbreakable skin. Things have changed since he last returned to Harlem, and unfortunately, he's the one that has to sort it all out. He'll be played once again by Mike Colter, who some may remember as Jameson Locke from Halo 5: Guardians.
Excited for Luke Cage to get a show of his own? Let us know in the comments below.
Check Out More


text: The ANSEF Review Board - with the help of 40 referees - has finished a three month long review of a total of 184 submitted proposals. The Board has identified the 26 proposals with the highest scores as the recipients of the ANSEF 2013 awards. The list of the awardees may be found at:


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TCMDb Archive MaterialsView all archives (2)
DVDs from TCM Shop
Grand Hotel Guests at a posh Berlin hotel... MORE > $15.79 Regularly $19.98 Buy Now blu-ray
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According to a March 1932 New York Times article, author and playwright Vicki Baum based Menschen im Hotel both on a true story about a scandal at a hotel involving a stenographer and an industrial magnate, and on her own experiences working as a chambermaid at two well-known Berlin hotels. The first American stage version of Baum's Menschen im Hotel, entitled Grand Hotel, starred Eugenie Leontovich as Grusinskaya and Sigfried Rumann as Preysing. According to the Variety review of the film, M-G-M financed the stage production of Grand Hotel and in return acquired the film rights to the play for $35,000. Although Hollywood Reporter production charts and a New York Times news item credited Hans Kraly with preparing the script "with the assistance and supervision of Vicki Baum," his contribution to the final film has not been determined.
Hollywood Reporter pre-production news items announced Clark Gable, Jimmy Durante, George E. Stone and Buster Keaton as the male leads. According to modern sources, Keaton was slated to play "Otto Kringelein." Although Hollywood Reporter production charts list actors Otto Matieson, Kathryn Crawford and Ruth Selwyn in the cast, their appearance in the released film has not been confirmed. Hollywood Reporter pre-production news items also noted that Greta Garbo initially refused to play the part of the dancer. Modern sources list actors John Davidson (Hotel manager) and Sam McDaniel (Bartender) in the cast. A Hollywood Reporter pre-release news item notes that guests and visitors were barred from the set during the filming of John Barrymore's death scene. M-G-M publicity material indicates that Garbo rehearsed her romantic scenes under red floodlights to provide her with inspiration, and that two hundred pairs of woolen socks were worn out daily during the filming of the busy lobby scenes. The socks were worn on the outside of the actors' shoes to prevent noise.
Following the New York opening of Grand Hotel, New York Herald drama critic George Nathan called the film "dull to the point of complete ennervation," and accused Lionel Barrymore of "[looking upon] Hollywood as a mere golden sewer from which to fish up some easy, if aesthetically tainted, manna." Nathan also said that Garbo was "one of the drollest acting frauds ever press-agented into Hollywood histrionic eminence." Garbo's famous line, "I want to be alone," is spoken in the fourth reel of the film. For reasons unknown, the New York Times review neglected to include starring actor Lewis Stone's name in the cast list. Both the Motion Picture Herald and New York Times reviews allude to a "gruesome" scene in the picture, which both reviewers agreed should be cut before the film's release. The exact content of the scene in unknown.
Grand Hotel received the 1932 Academy Award for Best Picture. It was also voted as the best directed, best written and best acted picture of the year by the Hollywood Reporter poll of national film critics, and was voted best picture by both the Hollywood Reporter and Film Daily poll. According to an unidentified source in the AMPAS files, art director Cedric Gibbons was assisted by Edwin B. Willis and Alexander Toluboff. Modern sources indicate that the film was produced and distributed at a cost of $700,000, and was initially perceived as a John Gilbert vehicle. A biography of the Barrymore family notes that M-G-M production head Thalberg decided against Gilbert following the failure of his first three sound pictures. The Barrymore biography also notes that Wallace Beery, "protective of his lovable-brute image," initially rejected his "Preysing" assignment, but eventually accepted the role when Thalberg assured him that his character would be the only main character in the film with a German accent. In a filmography in the biographical film for Edgar G. Ulmer at the AMPAS Library, he is listed as production designer for this film and as the director of German and French versions. As no information has been located concerning any foreign-language versions of this film, it is possible that the versions in questioned were dubbed versions.
The file for the film in the MPAA/PCA Collection at the AMPAS Library contains an AMPP memo, dated November 27, 1931, in which Lamar Trotti, an AMPP official, wrote that the synopsis contained only one scene that offered "much occasion for worry." Trotti called the scene in which the dancer "flings herself into a bath, comes out stark naked and is seen from the Baron from behind curtains...wholly unnecessary." In January 1932, Jason S. Joy, another AMPP official, told Thalberg that there were two scenes that required "the most delicate handling" possible: the scene in which "The Baron" remains in "Grusinskaya's" room all night, and "the scene in Preysing's room when Flaemmchen visits him." Joy also objected to scenes involving "drinking, dancing women" and references to childbirth. When M-G-M submitted the film for reissue certification in 1936, the PCA suggested a number of eliminations, including "dialogue concerning reference to the mating practices of dogs"; "Grusinskaya" exiting a room dressed in white; references to "Flaemmchen's" figure; "Preysing" snoring; and the entire scene of "Preysing hitting Baron on the head and knocking him down and killing him."
Grand Hotel was spoofed in the 1934 Reliance film Transatlantic Merry-Go-Round (see below), in which Jack Benny impersonates John Barrymore and Nancy Carroll imitates Greta Garbo in a mock radio parody of the film. The film was also spoofed in a 1933 Vitaphone two-reel musical burlesque entitled Nothing Ever Happens, directed by Roy Mack. The title of that film was taken from the closing line of this film, spoken by Lewis Stone: "Grand Hotel, always the same. People come-people go, nothing ever happens." The delivery of Garbo's line, "I want to be alone," was spoofed in the 1932 M-G-M film Blondie of the Follies by Marion Davies, while Jimmy Durante imitated John Barrymore in the same film. A 1945 M-G-M remake of Grand Hotel, entitled Weekend at the Waldorf, was directed by Robert Z. Leonard and starred Ginger Rogers, Lana Turner, Walter Pidgeon, Van Johnson and Edward Arnold. A 1959 German version of Grand Hotel, entitled Menschen im Hotel, was directed by Gottfried Reinhardt and starred O. W. Fischer and Michele Morgan. On November 12, 1989, the Broadway musical Grand Hotel, opened at the Martin Beck Theater in New York. The musical, which was adapted and choreographed by Tommy Tune, starred Liliane Montevecchi and Karen Akers. Hotel Berlin, a 1945 Warner Bros. film, was based on Vicki Baum's novel of the same name and concerned characters in a hotel during the decline of Nazi Germany.


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More than three decades after her first UK concert with 10,000 Maniacs, and two years after her sold out Royal Albert Hall show marking the 20th anniversary of her solo debut Tigerlily, this will be a unique opportunity to see the celebrated singer play towns and cities chosen by Merchant herself and not usually included on her tours.
"Natalie Merchant is a rare breed: an artist who has never compromised, but instead evolved with integrity, thought, and meaning." Daily Telegraph
She will be joined by her longtime guitarist Erik Della Penna, who has been playing with her for 20 years, performing material from the past 35 years of Merchant's career. "I have always enjoyed performing in the UK but have rarely played outside of the major cities.
"An artist with a singular voice and vision. Time has only amplified the power of Merchant's music." Mojo
There's so much of Britain I've never seen; I expect this summer's tour will satisfy my desire to explore those historic and scenic regions while meeting up with my fans who live there."
nataliemerchant.com | Facebook | Twitter
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Part of SummerTyne Americana Festival 2018
SummerTyne is back for 2018! Celebrating the finest American roots music this feel-good festival brings together some legendary artists, a whole bunch of rising stars and the best of the next generation for a weekend long party. Friday 20 – Sunday 22 July 2018 Line-up â–¶ï¸...


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Sunday, June 10, 2012
Creative colourful Kuih Dumplings
Do you like these colourful kuih dumplings? They are actually Nonya Kuih Koci. I merely transformed them by wrapping with bamboo leaves instead of banana leaves. I used red bean paste for the filling. You can use your own favourite filling.
Ingredients: (makes 9)
(A)15 pcs bamboo leaves (or more) , soak with boiling water for 2-3 hours wash and wipe
~~ 9 hemp strings x 35 cm length each
25g rice flour
100g water
25g corn oil
(C) 150g glutinous rice flour
(D) 90g coconut milk
~~25g sugar
~~1/8 tsp salt
(E) 200g red bean paste , divide into 9 equal portions, roll into round
~~ green coloring (green tea powder); blue pea colouring and pink (strawberry emulco)
(F) 50g corn oil
1) Put ingredients (B) into a pot, cook over low heat, keep stirring till it forms a dough.
2) Combine glutinous rice flour with ingredients (D), mix well. Add in (1) and knead till the dough is smooth . Scale them into 9 equal portions (add in colouring).
3) Roll one portion of dough mixture to a round ball, flatten, wrap in filling and seal up opening properly.
4) Lightly oil your palms (ingredient F) and roll (3) into balls. Fold 1 piece of bamboo leaf into a cone, place the greased ball inside. Wrap and tighten with string. Repeat the same to the rest.
5) Steam over high heat for 15 minutes.
Posted by Veronica's Kitchen at 2:07 AM
Labels: kuih
8 comments:
So cute and colourful!ReplyDelete
Cass, 真得很好吃,QQ的皮。ReplyDelete
Wonderful kuih kochi aka dumplings...ReplyDelete
Hi茵茵, Thank you for your compliment and for reading my blog.ReplyDelete
Hi アンゼエリン, Thank you for reading my blog. Have a nice day.ReplyDelete
Hi Veronica, this is so cute and colorful. You're very creative.ReplyDelete
Have a nice week ahead.
Nice seen so colorful dumplings , so cute!ReplyDelete
Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)


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Most Popular in the Last...
Medicaid IT platforms
See the following -
CMS To Invest $5+ Billion a Year in Open Source and Cloud-based IT Infrastructure for Medicaid
After more than 40 years of relying on monolithic mainframe platforms to administer its services, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has embraced a new modular, open and agile approach to Medicaid health information technology for the Federal government and States. In many ways, this is the best of what open source advocates and technology innovators could have hoped for when it comes to open source policy from a government agency. According to Andrew Slavitt, Acting Administrator of CMS, the agency will spend more than $5 billion a year to fund this transformation.
Obama and Biden Blast EHR Vendors for Data Blocking
As they are winding their terms in office, President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden dropped a stink bomb on the health IT industry. Speaking at different events on Friday, January 9th, the President and Vice President both criticized proprietary electronic health record (EHR) vendors as the primary obstacle to the success of their administration's health care strategy. This is the highest level acknowledgement so far of the serious impact that "lock-in" EHR software vendors are having on America's medical infrastructure and the ability of physicians to provide medical care.


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The idea behind it is that some people don't have time to cook, or the inclination. For myself, it's a combination of not having the willpower to bother, and the fact that eating for one is difficult without having oodles of leftovers. Most grocery stores are designed around families, and it costs me a disproportionate amount of money for food that often goes to waste. Basically, I'd rather try this stuff than eat out all the time, because it's likely more healthy than fast food.
I made a video of me unboxing, making, and then trying the Soylent. The entire video is embedded below, or if you want links to each specific section, find them underneath the video.
Unboxing the Soylent
Preparing the Soylent
Consuming the Soylent
So overall it was a bit gritty and bland, not fantastic, but not terrible, either. Would be much, much better with something for flavour, like strawberries or banana. I'll have to invest in a food processor and give that a whirl. But it definitely has promise. I'll be eating the rest of that jug, as well as making more later. But as far as healthy calories for my dollar, it's hard to beat about $4 per meal for a single person living in an expensive city, and it'll definitely make for good emergency rations, too.
#FirstImpression, #Food


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Hello Lovelies!
when I mentioned that I'd simply be stopping by
on Mondays during the summer to say hello
while the new site is being developed
and because of my busy schedule
here at the new house?
Well, I haven't exactly JUST been stopping by to say hello,
since I love to chat ...
but this week, I simply must!
It's been one of THOSE weeks!
My illustration schedule has been crazy busy ...
as well as happenings here at the house.
I'd love to hear what you've been up to!
I hope it's all wonderful!


text:
Chase the Case S01E13 720p WEB h264-KOMPOST [eztv]
- Category TV
- Type HD
- Language English
- Total size 1.6 GB
- Uploaded By EZTVag
- Downloads 3
- Last checked 3 months ago
- Date uploaded 3 months ago
- Seeders 3
- Leechers 2
Your IP Address is Location is - Your ISP and Government can track your torrent activity! Hide your IP with a VPN!
EZTV - TV Shows: http://eztv.ag
Chase the Case S01E13 720p WEB h264-KOMPOST [eztv]
Five players begin the game with a case containing a secret amount of cash. Players answer questions to win visits to a soundproof vault where they can see inside their opponents' cases. In a fast-paced endgame, players attempt to steal each other's cases via tense challenges, but only the player who gets over the finish line first wins the contents of their case.
- Chase.the.Case.S01E13.720p.WEB.h264-KOMPOST[eztv].mkv (1.6 GB)
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Hideout 33BHDS
Keystone Hideout travel trailer 33BHDS highlights:
- Bunkhouse Suite
- Full and Half Bath
- Kitchen Island
- Master Suite
- Outdoor Kitchen
Don't let this extravagant and luxurious Hideout travel trailer pass you by! You won't believe the fantastic features that this unit provides, like a private bunkhouse suite that contains a set of double-size bunks and its very own half bathroom. The central living area is kept open and spacious because of two opposing slides which leave plenty of room for a sleeper sofa and booth dinette where you can cozy up as you watch a late-night movie on the 50" LED HDTV.
For any trip whether near or far you will want a Hideout travel trailer by Keystone RV. These models are lightweight which makes them easy to hook-up and tow. Just load up your belongings and head out for a weekend away in your own Hideout retreat. Inside you will find surround sound speakers, a Bluetooth DVD/CD/MP3 stereo, as well as a range with hi-output burner and a high-rise kitchen faucet. The drawers are easy to open and close with the ball bearing drawer guides, and with the 6 cubic foot refrigerator you can easily stock up on all of the food that you will need while you are away from home.Have a question about this floorplan?Contact Us
Sleeps 9 Slides 2 Length 37 ft 9 in Ext Width 8 ft Ext Height 11 ft 2 in Int Height 6 ft 9 in Interior Color Cedar, Timber Hitch Weight 1115 lbs Dry Weight 8310 lbs Cargo Weight 1590 lbs Fresh Water Capacity 43 gals Grey Water Capacity 69 gals Black Water Capacity 78 gals Tire Size 15 Furnace BTU 30000 btu Number Of Bunks 2 Available Beds Queen Refrigerator Size 6 cu ft Cooktop Burners 3 Number of Awnings 1 LP Tank Capacity 40 lbs. AC BTU 13500 btu Cargo Deck Size 0 ft TV Info LR 50" LED HDTV Awning Info Electric with LED Lights Axle Count 2 Shower Type Radius
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