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A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, who had information that respondent's mobile motor home was being used to exchange marihuana for sex, watched respondent approach a youth who accompanied respondent to the motor home, which was parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. The agent and other agents then kept the vehicle under surveillance, and stopped the youth after he left the vehicle. He told them that he had received marihuana in return for allowing respondent sexual contacts. At the agents' request, the youth returned to the motor home and knocked on the door; respondent stepped out. Without a warrant or consent, one agent then entered the motor home and observed marihuana. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional marihuana, and respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale. After his motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the motor home was denied, respondent was convicted in California Superior Court on a plea of nolo contendere. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search of the motor home was unreasonable and that the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment did not apply, because expectations of privacy in a motor home are more like those in a dwelling than in an automobile.
The warrantless search of respondent's motor home did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 390-395.
BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 395.
Louis R. Hanoian, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Steve White, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Michael D. Wellington and John W. Carney, Deputy Attorneys General.
Thomas F. Homann argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was A. Dale Manicom. *
[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Alan I. Horowitz, and Kathleen A. Felton; and for the State of Minnesota et al. by Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, and Thomas F. Catania, Jr., and Paul R. Kempainen, Special Assistant Attorneys General, Jim Smith, Attorney General of Florida, Tany S. Hong, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Michael A. Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General.
Frank O. Bell, Jr., and George L. Schraer filed a brief for the California State Public Defender as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether law enforcement agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless search, based on probable cause, of a fully mobile "motor home" located in a public place.
On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Robert Williams watched respondent, Charles Carney, approach [471 U.S. 386, 388] a youth in downtown San Diego. The youth accompanied Carney to a Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a nearby lot. Carney and the youth closed the window shades in the motor home, including one across the front window. Agent Williams had previously received uncorroborated information that the same motor home was used by another person who was exchanging marihuana for sex. Williams, with assistance from other agents, kept the motor home under surveillance for the entire one and one-quarter hours that Carney and the youth remained inside. When the youth left the motor home, the agents followed and stopped him. The youth told the agents that he had received marihuana in return for allowing Carney sexual contacts.
At the agents' request, the youth returned to the motor home and knocked on its door; Carney stepped out. The agents identified themselves as law enforcement officers. Without a warrant or consent, one agent entered the motor home and observed marihuana, plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a table. Agent Williams took Carney into custody and took possession of the motor home. A subsequent search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional marihuana in the cupboards and refrigerator.
Respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale. At a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the motor home. The Magistrate denied the motion, upholding the initial search as a justifiable search for other persons, and the subsequent search as a routine inventory search.
Respondent renewed his suppression motion in the Superior Court. The Superior Court also rejected the claim, holding that there was probable cause to arrest respondent, that the search of the motor home was authorized under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and that the motor home itself could be seized without a warrant as an instrumentality of the crime. Respondent [471 U.S. 386, 389] then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against him, and was placed on probation for three years.
Respondent appealed from the order placing him on probation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the vehicle exception applied to respondent's motor home. 117 Cal. App. 3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981).
The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807 (1983). The Supreme Court did not disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that the agents had probable cause to arrest respondent and to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime; however, the court held that the search was unreasonable because no warrant was obtained, rejecting the State's argument that the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement should apply. 1 That court reached its decision by concluding that the mobility of a vehicle "is no longer the prime justification for the automobile exception; rather, `the answer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile.'" Id., at 605, 668 P.2d, at 811. The California Supreme Court held that the expectations of privacy in a motor home are more like those in a dwelling than in an automobile because the primary function of motor homes is not to provide transportation but to "provide the occupant with living quarters." Id., at 606, 668 P.2d, at 812.
We granted certiorari, 465 U.S. 1098 (1984). We reverse. [471 U.S. 386, 390]
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." This fundamental right is preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer. There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule that a warrant must be secured before a search is undertaken; one is the so-called "automobile exception" at issue in this case. This exception to the warrant requirement was first set forth by the Court 60 years ago in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). There, the Court recognized that the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected; however, it held that the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests. The Court rested this exception on a long-recognized distinction between stationary structures and vehicles:
However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception. The reasons for the vehicle exception, we have said, are twofold. 428 U.S., at 367 . "Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." Ibid.
Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception. See, e. g., Cady v. Dombrowski, supra. In some cases, the configuration of the vehicle contributed to the lower expectations of privacy; for example, we held in Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, at 590, that, because the passenger compartment of a standard automobile is relatively open to plain view, there are lesser expectations of privacy. But even when enclosed "repository" areas have been involved, we have concluded that the lesser expectations of privacy warrant application of the exception. We have applied the exception in the context of a locked car trunk, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, a sealed package in a car trunk, Ross, supra, a closed compartment under the dashboard, Chambers [471 U.S. 386, 392] v. Maroney, supra, the interior of a vehicle's upholstery, Carroll, supra, or sealed packages inside a covered pickup truck, United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, at 440-441. As we explained in South Dakota v. Opperman, an inventory search case:
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes - temporary or otherwise - the two justifications for the vehicle exception [471 U.S. 386, 393] come into play. 2 First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving. Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. At least in these circumstances, the overriding societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable.
While it is true that respondent's vehicle possessed some, if not many of the attributes of a home, it is equally clear that the vehicle falls clearly within the scope of the exception laid down in Carroll and applied in succeeding cases. Like the automobile in Carroll, respondent's motor home was readily mobile. Absent the prompt search and seizure, it could readily have been moved beyond the reach of the police. Furthermore, the vehicle was licensed to "operate on public streets; [was] serviced in public places; . . . and [was] subject to extensive regulation and inspection." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 154 , n. 2 (1978) (POWELL, J., concurring). And the vehicle was so situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle.
Respondent urges us to distinguish his vehicle from other vehicles within the exception because it was capable of functioning as a home. In our increasingly mobile society, many vehicles used for transportation can be and are being used not only for transportation but for shelter, i. e., as a "home" or "residence." To distinguish between respondent's motor home and an ordinary sedan for purposes of the vehicle exception would require that we apply the exception depending upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its appointments. Moreover, to fail to apply the exception to vehicles [471 U.S. 386, 394] such as a motor home ignores the fact that a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic and other illegal activity. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S., at 822 , we declined to distinguish between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers, noting that "the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction." We decline today to distinguish between "worthy" and "unworthy" vehicles which are either on the public roads and highways, or situated such that it is reasonable to conclude that the vehicle is not being used as a residence.
Our application of the vehicle exception has never turned on the other uses to which a vehicle might be put. The exception has historically turned on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle is being used for transportation. 3 These two requirements for application of the exception ensure that law enforcement officials are not unnecessarily hamstrung in their efforts to detect and prosecute criminal activity, and that the legitimate privacy interests of the public are protected. Applying the vehicle exception in these circumstances allows the essential purposes served by the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the exception will acknowledge legitimate privacy interests.
The question remains whether, apart from the lack of a warrant, this search was unreasonable. Under the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement, "[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize." Ross, supra, at 823. [471 U.S. 386, 395]
This search was not unreasonable; it was plainly one that the magistrate could authorize if presented with these facts. The DEA agents had fresh, direct, uncontradicted evidence that the respondent was distributing a controlled substance from the vehicle, apart from evidence of other possible offenses. The agents thus had abundant probable cause to enter and search the vehicle for evidence of a crime notwithstanding its possible use as a dwelling place.
The judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] With few exceptions, the courts have not hesitated to apply the vehicle exception to vehicles other than automobiles. See, e. g., United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530 (CA11) (airplane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983).
[ Footnote 3 ] We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a motor home that is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence. Among the factors that might be relevant in determining whether a warrant would be required in such a circumstance is its location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
The character of "the place to be searched" 1 plays an important role in Fourth Amendment analysis. In this case, police officers searched a Dodge/Midas Mini Motor Home. The California Supreme Court correctly characterized this vehicle as a "hybrid" which combines "the mobility attribute of an automobile . . . with most of the privacy characteristics of a house." 2
The hybrid character of the motor home places it at the crossroads between the privacy interests that generally forbid warrantless invasions of the home, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 -590 (1980), and the law enforcement interests that support the exception for warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 , 820 (1982). By choosing to follow the latter route, the Court errs in three respects: it has entered new [471 U.S. 386, 396] territory prematurely, it has accorded priority to an exception rather than to the general rule, and it has abandoned the limits on the exception imposed by prior cases.
In recent Terms, the Court has displayed little confidence in state and lower federal court decisions that purport to enforce the Fourth Amendment. Unless an order suppressing evidence is clearly correct, a petition for certiorari is likely to garner the four votes required for a grant of plenary review - as the one in this case did. Much of the Court's "burdensome" workload is a product of its own aggressiveness in this area. By promoting the Supreme Court of the United States as the High Magistrate for every warrantless search and seizure, this practice has burdened the argument docket with cases presenting fact-bound errors of minimal significance. 3 It has also encouraged state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari in even the most frivolous search and seizure cases. 4
The Court's lack of trust in lower judicial authority has resulted in another improvident exercise of discretionary [471 U.S. 386, 397] jurisdiction. 5 In what is at most only a modest extension of our Fourth Amendment precedents, the California Supreme Court held that police officers may not conduct a nonexigent search of a motor home without a warrant supported by probable cause. The State of California filed a petition for certiorari contending that the decision below conflicted with the authority of other jurisdictions. 6 Even a cursory examination of the cases alleged to be in conflict revealed that they did not consider the question presented here. 7 [471 U.S. 386, 398]
This is not a case "in which an American citizen has been deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute. Rather, . . . a state court has upheld a citizen's assertion of a right, finding the citizen to be protected under both federal and state law." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067 -1068 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). As an unusually perceptive study of this Court's docket stated with reference to California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), "this . . . situation . . . rarely presents a compelling reason for Court review in the absence of a fully percolated conflict." 8 The Court's decision to forge ahead [471 U.S. 386, 399] has established a rule for searching motor homes that is to be followed by the entire Nation. If the Court had merely allowed the decision below to stand, it would have only governed searches of those vehicles in a single State. The breadth of this Court's mandate counsels greater patience before we offer our binding judgment on the meaning of the Constitution.
Premature resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natural growth and refinement of alternative principles. Despite the age of the automobile exception and the countless cases in which it has been applied, we have no prior cases defining the contours of a reasonable search in the context of hybrids such as motor homes, house trailers, houseboats, or yachts. In this case, the Court can barely glimpse the diverse lifestyles associated with recreational vehicles and mobile living quarters. 9 The line or lines separating mobile homes from permanent structures might have been drawn in various ways, with consideration given to whether the home is moving or at rest, whether it rests on land or water, the form of the vehicle's attachment to its location, its potential speed of departure, its size and capacity to serve as a domicile, and its method of locomotion. Rational decisionmaking strongly counsels against divining the uses and abuses of these vehicles in the vacuum of the first case raising the question before us.
Of course, we may not abdicate our responsibility to clarify the law in this filed. Some caution, however, is justified when every decision requires us to resolve a vexing "conflict . . . between the individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S., at 804 . "The certainty that is supposed to come from speedy resolution [471 U.S. 386, 400] may prove illusory if a premature decision raises more questions than it answers." 10 The only true rules governing search and seizure have been formulated and refined in the painstaking scrutiny of case-by-case adjudication. Consideration of this matter by the lower courts in a series of litigated cases would surely have facilitated a reasoned accommodation of the conflicting interests. To identify rules that will endure, we must rely on the state and lower federal courts to debate and evaluate the different approaches to difficult and unresolved questions of constitutional law. 11 Deliberation on the question over time winnows out the unnecessary [471 U.S. 386, 401] and discordant elements of doctrine and preserves "whatever is pure and sound and fine." 12
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." We have interpreted this language to provide law enforcement officers with a bright-line standard: "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979).
In United States v. Ross, the Court reaffirmed the primary importance of the general rule condemning warrantless searches, and emphasized that the exception permitting the search of automobiles without a warrant is a narrow one. 456 U.S., at 824 -825. We expressly endorsed "the general rule," stated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925), that "`[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used.'" 456 U.S., at 807 . Given this warning and the presumption of regularity that attaches to a warrant, 13 it is hardly unrealistic to expect experienced law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant when one can easily be secured.
The ascendancy of the warrant requirement in our system of justice must not be bullied aside by extravagant claims of necessity:
The motor home, however, was not parked in the middle of that intersection. Our prior cases teach us that inherent mobility is not a sufficient justification for the fashioning of an exception to the warrant requirement, especially in the face of heightened expectations of privacy in the location searched. Motor homes, by their common use and construction, afford their owners a substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within. When a motor home is parked in a location that is removed from the public highway, I believe that society is prepared to recognize that the expectations of privacy within it are not unlike the expectations one has in a fixed dwelling. As a general rule, such places may only be searched with a warrant based upon probable cause. Warrantless searches of motor homes are only reasonable when the motor home is traveling on the public streets or highways, or when exigent circumstances otherwise require an immediate search without the expenditure of time necessary to obtain a warrant. [471 U.S. 386, 403]
As we explained in Ross, the automobile exception is the product of a long history:
In this case, the motor home was parked in an off-the-street lot only a few blocks from the courthouse in downtown San Diego where dozens of magistrates were available to entertain a warrant application. 16 The officers clearly had the element of surprise with them, and with curtains covering the windshield, the motor home offered no indication of any imminent departure. The officers plainly had probable cause to arrest the respondent and search the motor home, and on this record, it is inexplicable why they eschewed the safe harbor of a warrant. 17
In the absence of any evidence of exigency in the circumstances of this case, the Court relies on the inherent mobility of the motor home to create a conclusive presumption of exigency. This Court, however, has squarely held that mobility of the place to be searched is not a sufficient justification for abandoning the warrant requirement. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court held that a warrantless search of a footlocker violated the Fourth Amendment even [471 U.S. 386, 405] though there was ample probable cause to believe it contained contraband. The Government had argued that the rationale of the automobile exception applied to movable containers in general, and that the warrant requirement should be limited to searches of homes and other "core" areas of privacy. See id., at 7. We categorically rejected the Government's argument, observing that there are greater privacy interests associated with containers than with automobiles, 18 and that there are less practical problems associated with the temporary detention of a container than with the detention of an automobile. See id., at 13, and n. 7.
We again endorsed that analysis in Ross:
Unlike a brick bungalow or a frame Victorian, a motor home seldom serves as a permanent lifetime abode. The motor home in this case, however, was designed to accommodate a breadth of ordinary everyday living. Photographs in the record indicate that its height, length, and beam provided substantial living space inside: stuffed chairs surround a table; cupboards provide room for storage of personal effects; bunk beds provide sleeping space; and a refrigerator provides ample space for food and beverages. 19 Moreover, curtains and large opaque walls inhibit viewing the activities inside from the exterior of the vehicle. The interior configuration of the motor home establishes that the vehicle's size, shape, and mode of construction should have indicated to the officers that it was a vehicle containing mobile living quarters.
The State contends that officers in the field will have an impossible task determining whether or not other vehicles contain mobile living quarters. It is not necessary for the Court to resolve every unanswered question in this area in a single case, but common English usage suggests that we already distinguish between a "motor home" which is "equipped as a self-contained traveling home," a "camper" which is only equipped for "casual travel and camping," and an automobile which is "designed for passenger transportation." 20 Surely the exteriors of these vehicles contain clues about their different functions which could alert officers in the field to the necessity of a warrant. 21 [471 U.S. 386, 407]
The California Vehicle Code also refutes the State's argument that the exclusion of "motor homes" from the automobile exception would be impossible to apply in practice. In its definitional section, the Code distinguishes campers and house cars from station wagons, and suggests that they are special categories of the more general terms - motor vehicles and passenger vehicles. 22 A "house car" is "a motor vehicle originally designed, or permanently altered, and equipped for human habitation, or to which a camper has been permanently attached." 23 Alcoholic beverages may not be opened or consumed in motor vehicles traveling on the highways, except in the "living quarters of a housecar or camper." 24 The same definitions might not necessarily apply in the context of the Fourth Amendment, but they do indicate that descriptive distinctions are humanly possible. They also reflect the California Legislature's judgment that "house cars" entertain different kinds of activities than the ordinary passenger vehicle.
In my opinion, searches of places that regularly accommodate a wide range of private human activity are fundamentally different from searches of automobiles which primarily serve a public transportation function. 25 Although it may not be a castle, a motor home is usually the functional equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and retirement home, or a hunting and fishing cabin. These places may be as Spartan [471 U.S. 386, 408] as a humble cottage when compared to the most majestic mansion, 456 U.S., at 822 ; ante, at 393, but the highest and most legitimate expectations of privacy associated with these temporary abodes should command the respect of this Court. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S., at 585 ; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 -715 (1984). 26 In my opinion, a warrantless search of living quarters in a motor home is "presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances." Ibid.
I respectfully dissent.
[ Footnote 1 ] The Fourth Amendment provides:
[ Footnote 2 ] 34 Cal. 3d 597, 606, 668 P.2d 807, 812 (1983).
[ Footnote 3 ] E. g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); Oklahoma v. Castleberry, ante, p. 146. Cf. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 12 -13 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN, J.).
[ Footnote 4 ] See, e. g., State v. Caponi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 302, 466 N. E. 2d 551 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985). The Court's inventiveness in the search and seizure area has also emboldened state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari from state court suppression orders that are explicitly based on independent state grounds. See, e. g., Jamison v. State, 455 So.2d 1112 (Fla. App. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985); Ex parte Gannaway, 448 So.2d 413 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985); State v. Burkholder, 12 Ohio St. 3d 205, 466 N. E. 2d 176, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); State v. Von Bulow, 475 A. 2d 995 (R. I.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).
[ Footnote 5 ] Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1029 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 72 -73 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring). See also Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Judicature 177, 182 (1982).
[ Footnote 6 ] Pet. for Cert. 15-17, 21, 24-25. The petition acknowledged that the decision below was consistent with dictum in two recent Ninth Circuit decisions. See United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1329 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982); United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 865 (1980).
[ Footnote 7 ] Only one case contained any reference to heightened expectations of privacy in mobile living quarters. United States v. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 101-102 (CA5 1979) (per curiam). Analogizing to automobile cases, the court upheld the warrantless search of an oceangoing ship while in transit. The court observed that the mobility "exception" required probable cause and exigency, and that "the increased measure of privacy that may be expected by those aboard a vessel mandates careful scrutiny both of probable cause for the search and the exigency of the circumstances excusing the failure to secure a warrant." Id., at 102.
In all of the other cases, defendants challenged warrantless searches for vehicles claiming either no probable cause or the absence of exigency under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 760 (CA10) ("camper"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 882 (1980); United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 423-425 (CA5) ("camper pick-up truck"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); United States v. Lovenguth, 514 F.2d 96, 97 (CA9 1975) ("pick up with . . . camper top"); United States v. Cusanelli, 472 F.2d 1204, 1206 (CA6) (per curiam) (two camper trucks), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); United States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582, 585-586 (CA10 1972) ("motor home"); United States v. Rodgers, 442 F.2d 902, 904 (CA5 1971) ("camper truck"); State v. Million, 120 [471 U.S. 386, 398] Ariz. 10, 15-16, 583 P.2d 897, 902-903 (1978) ("motor home"); State v. Sardo, 112 Ariz. 509, 513-514, 543 P.2d 1138, 1142 (1975) ("motor home"). Only Sardo involved a vehicle that was not in transit, but the motor home in that case was about to depart the premises.
Two State Supreme Courts have upheld the warrantless search of mobile homes in transit, notwithstanding a claim of heightened privacy interests. See State v. Mower, 407 A. 2d 729, 732 (Me. 1979); State v. Lepley, 343 N. W. 2d 41, 42-43 (Minn. 1984). Those cases - which were not cited in the petition for certiorari - are factually distinguishable from the search of the parked motor home here. In any case, some conflict among state courts on novel questions of the kind involved here is desirable as a means of exploring and refining alternative approaches to the problem.
[ Footnote 8 ] Estreicher & Sexton, New York University Supreme Court Project, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities (1984) (to be published in 59 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 677, 761 (1984)). The study elaborated:
[ Footnote 9 ] See generally 45 Trailer Life, No. 1 (1985); id., No. 2; 22 Motor Home, No. 1 (1985); id., No. 2; 1 RV Lifestyle Magazine, No. 3 (1985).
[ Footnote 10 ] Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?, 11 Hastings Const. L. Q. 375, 405 (1984).
[ Footnote 11 ] "Although one of the Court's roles is to ensure the uniformity of federal law, we do not think that the Court must act to eradicate disuniformity as soon as it appears. . . . Disagreement in the lower courts facilitates percolation - the independent evaluation of a legal issue by different courts. The process of percolation allows a period of exploratory consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule. The Supreme Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue, has the benefit of the experience of those lower courts. Irrespective of docket capacity, the Court should not be compelled to intervene to eradicate disuniformity when further percolation or experimentation is desirable.
[ Footnote 12 ] B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 179 (1921).
[ Footnote 13 ] United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 -914 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 -237 (1983).
[ Footnote 14 ] "As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on the Court's appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the perspective of history." 456 U.S., at 820 .
[ Footnote 15 ] In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), a plurality refused to apply the automobile exception to an automobile that was seized while parked in the driveway of the suspect's house, towed to a secure police compound, and later searched:
[ Footnote 16 ] See Suppression Hearing Tr. 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. In addition, a telephonic warrant was only 20 cents and the nearest phone booth away. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. 1526(b), 1528(b) (West 1982); People v. Morrongiello, 145 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 193 Cal. Rptr. 105, 109 (1983).
[ Footnote 17 ] This willingness to search first and later seek justification has properly been characterized as "a decision roughly comparable in prudence to determining whether an electrical wire is charged by grasping it." United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230, 1233 (CA5 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
[ Footnote 18 ] "The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to respondent's footlocker. Luggage contents are not open to public view, except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile." 433 U.S., at 13 .
[ Footnote 19 ] Record, Ex. Nos. 102, 103.
[ Footnote 20 ] Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 118, 199, 775 (1983).
[ Footnote 21 ] In refusing to extend the California Supreme Court's decision in Carney beyond its context, the California Courts of Appeal have had no difficulty in distinguishing the motor home involved there from a Ford van, People v. Chestnut, 151 Cal. App. 3d 721, 726-727, 198 Cal. Rptr. 8, 11 (1983), and a cab-high camper shell on the back of a pickup truck, People v. Gordon, 156 Cal. App. 3d 74, 82, 202 Cal. Rptr. 566, 570 (1984). There is no reason to believe that trained officers could not make similar [471 U.S. 386, 407] distinctions between different vehicles, especially when state vehicle laws already require them to do so.
[ Footnote 22 ] Cal. Veh. Code Ann. 243, 362, 415, 465, 585 (West 1971 and Supp. 1985).
[ Footnote 23 ] 362 (West 1971).
[ Footnote 24 ] 23221, 23223, 23225, 23226, 23229 (West Supp. 1985).
[ Footnote 25 ] Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S., at 590 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.):
[ Footnote 26 ] "At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth Amendment principle. Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S., at 714 -715. [471 U.S. 386, 409]
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Citation: 471 U.S. 386
Docket No: No. 83-859
Argued: October 30, 1984
Decided: May 13, 1985
Court: United States Supreme Court
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Pakistan Air Force Making iPads
KAMRA, Pakistan (AP) — Inside a high-security air force complex that builds jet fighters and weapons systems, Pakistan's military is working on the latest addition to its sprawling commercial empire: a homegrown version of the iPad.
It's a venture that bundles together Pakistani engineering and Chinese hardware, and shines a light on the military's controversial foothold in the consumer market. Supporters say it will boost the economy as well as a troubled nation's self-esteem.
It all comes together at an air force base in Kamra in northern Pakistan, where avionics engineers — when they're not working on defense projects — assemble the PACPAD 1.
"The original is the iPad, the copy is the PACPAD," said Mohammad Imran, who stocks the product at his small computer and cell phone shop in a mall in Rawalpindi, a city not far from Kamra and the home of the Pakistani army.
The device runs on Android 2.3, an operating system made by Google and given away for free. At around $200, it's less than half the price of Apple or Samsung devices and cheaper than other low-end Chinese tablets on the market, with the bonus of a local, one-year guarantee.
The PAC in the name stands for the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, where it is made. The PAC also makes an e-reader and small laptop.
Such endeavors are still at the pilot stage and represent just a sliver of the military's business portfolio, which encompasses massive land holdings, flour and sugar mills, hotels, travel agents, even a brand of breakfast cereal.
The military is powerful, its businesses are rarely subject to civilian scrutiny, and it has staged three coups since Pakistan became a state in 1947. Many Pakistanis find its economic activities corrupting and say it should focus on entirely on defense.
"I just can't figure it out," said Jehan Ara, head of Pakistan's Software Houses Association, said of the PACPAD. "Even if they could sell a billion units, I can't see the point. The air force is supposed to be protecting the air space and borders of the country."
Supporters say the foray into information technology is a boost to national pride for a country vastly overshadowed by archrival India in the high-tech field. Tech websites in the country have shown curiosity or cautious enthusiasm, but say it's too early to predict how the device will perform. Skeptics claim it's a vanity project that will never see mass production.
Only a few hundred of each products has been made so far, though a new batch will be completed in the next three months.
"The defense industry is trying to justify its presence by doing more than just produce weapons," said Ayesha Siddiqa, author of Military Inc., a critical study of military businesses. "Some smart aleck must have thought we can make some money here."
PAC's website at http://www.cpmc.pk says the goal is "strengthening the national economy through commercialization" and lauds the collaboration with China — something that likely resonates among nationalists.
China is regarded as a firm ally by Pakistan's security establishment, whereas the U.S., despite pouring billions of dollars in aid into the country, is seen as fickle and increasingly as an enemy.
These perceptions have heightened as the U.S. intensifies drone attacks on militants based in the Pakistani borderlands. But the military is also a target of those militants. In 2007 the base at Kamra, home to 12,000 workers and their families, nine people died when a cyclist blew himself up at the entrance.
PAC officials suggested the program that produces the PACPAD was modeled in part on the Chinese military's entry into commercial industry, which lasted two decades until it was ordered to cut back lest it become corrupted and lose sight of its core mission.
The tablet and other devices are made in a low-slung facility, daubed in camouflage paint, near, a factory that produces J-17 Thunder fighter jets with Chinese help.
"It's about using spare capacity. There are 24 hours in a day, do we waste them or use them to make something?" said Sohail Kalim, PAC's sales director. "The profits go to the welfare of the people here. There are lots of auditors. They don't let us do any hanky-panky here."
PAC builds the PACPAD with a company called Innavtek in a Hong Kong-registered partnership that also builds high-tech parts for the warplanes.
But basic questions go unanswered. Maqsood Arshad, a retired air force officer who is one of the directors, couldn't say how much money had been invested, how many units the venture hoped to sell and what the profit from each sale was likely to be.
The market for low-cost Android tablets is expanding quickly around the world, with factories in China filling most of the demand. Last year, an Indian company produced the "Aakash" tablet, priced at $50, and sold largely to schoolchildren and students.
Arshad said a second-generation PACPAD would be launched in the next three months, able to connect to the Internet via cell phone networks and other improved features. He said the Kamra facility could produce up to 1,000 devices a day.
During a brief test, The tablet with its 7-inch screen appeared to run well and the screen responsiveness was sharp.
"It seems good, but operation-wise I have to look into it," said Mohammad Akmal, who had come to the store in Rawalpindi to check the product out. "Within a month or so, we will know."

subset: commoncrawl


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Guestpost: Business Models, Entrepreneurship, and Poverty Alleviation in Kenya
Blog: Business Model Alchimist
This guestpost tells the special story of how Sebastián Salinas Claro and Joshua Bicknel connected across the globe on the Business Model Hub. They joined efforts in their aim to defeat poverty by teaching entrepreneurship. The results are amazing.
By Sebastián Salinas Claro (with Douglas Cochrane and Joshua Bicknell):
My recent journey illustrates the power of social networks and how linkedin and the Business Model Hub brought me to Kenya – all the way from Chile. It was a fascinating experience that all started when I contacted Alex on Linkedin. I told him how I was teaching the Business Model Canvas to disadvantaged youth in the South of Chile with excellent results. He suggested that I post my story on Business Model Hub, which I did. That's where the journey starts.
In August Joshua Bicknel browsed the pages of the Business Model Hub and came across my post. He read about the exciting experience I went through introducing the Canvas in Chile. He decided to contact me, keen to hear more. After a few hours on Skype, I declared my intention to travel to Kenya to work with him on a pilot project. It was quite a commitment from me. Few Chileans travel to Kenya, and it was an even bigger leap considering we had never met. But I took the leap and joined his team in Nakuru, East Africas fastest growing City, in October 2011.
Since then we have been working with unemployed youth supporting them to imagine and design innovative new businesses that create employment and defeat poverty. I want to use this blogpost to discuss some of the insights from this experience, in particular the power of the Canvas as a great leveler. We worked with 4th year Commerce students from Egerton University and unemployed young men and women who never finished high school. Both grasped the Canvas equally fast and applied it to imagine impressive new businesses. In fact, on a number of occasions the non-university students actually impressed us more.
One such occasion was in a session with the Salgaa Sparks youth group. In Salgaa there is no rubbish collection. All waste is either dumped on the streets or burnt. It is a fast growing town and a popular nightspot for transit truckers, so the area is becoming increasingly dirty and unsanitary. Sparks came to us seeking help to develop a solution to this problem. Initially, they didn't imagine starting a business, instead believing the solution to be a volunteer community-cleaning programme. By using the Business Model Canvas we helped them discover a more interesting opportunity altogether.
Firstly, they mapped their idea on the canvas, imagining it as a profitable business, and came up with a rubbish collection scheme. Not a wholly radical idea. A similar schemes exist in other Kenyan settlements. However, they then began to question whether there was any value in the collected waste and soon realized that they could turn the organic materials into fertilizer and sell it to the farmers at $10 a bag. Then they came up with another profitable idea: to rent out their work carts on days when they were not collecting rubbish.
Using the canvas they envisioned, imagined, developed, and refined a very exciting business model with three potential revenue streams. A business that achieves two goals at a time. It cleans-up the environment and provides unskilled youth with jobs. They are currently applying to the Kenyan Youth Enterprise Fund and project that their business will break even in its second month!
Throughout their lives these youth have been excluded because of their social and economic background. By using the Canvas they have, with no formal business training and sometimes not even a high school diploma, produced a very attractive business proposal. This speaks volumes for the capacity of the Canvas as a tool for profound change, empowering communities to start businesses that tackle the current structures of inequality.
We are excited to expand this programme next year. We will take graduates to both Kenya and Chile to work with hundreds of unemployed youth to develop new businesses as we seek to build a global generation of young people with a commitment to defeating poverty through entrepreneurship and not aid. And everywhere we go we will pack the Canvas as the key tool in our arsenal!
Check out our website in www.balloonkenya.com and www.emprediem.com
Signed, Douglas Cochrane, Joshua Bicknell & Sebastian Salinas Claro
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Evangelicals and Israel: Stephen Spector
Oxford University Press (2009) 338 pages.
Reviewed for American Studies Today, Issue 19, September 2010
After decades of reluctance to address this deeply controversial issue, in recent years there has been a veritable avalanche of books critical of the Christian Zionist movement. Authors include Grace Halsell, Don Wagner, Timothy Weber, Victoria Clark, Dan Cohen-Sherbok, Naim Ateek, Gary Burge, as well as two books of my own. It is perhaps therefore not surprising to find a growing reaction among Jewish Zionists who have begun to come to the defence of their Christian allies.
Stephen Spector's work is representative of this genre of Jewish apologists, which includes Paul Merkley, David Brog, Shalom Goldman and Gerhard Falk. Their agenda appears to be to justify a strand within Christian Zionism that is neither popular nor representative of evangelicalism as a whole, but which nevertheless plays a strategic role within the Israel Lobby.
The book purports to be the story of American evangelical Christian Zionism. It is a good read, as one should expect for a Professor of English. It would be more accurate, however, to describe it as the story of political Christian Zionism as represented by organisations such as Eagles Wings, Bridges for Peace, Christian Friends of Israel, Christians United for Israel and the International Christian Embassy. These self appointed para-church organisations have publically disavowed both proselytism among Jews as well as apocalypticism, based on a reductionist interpretation of the Bible. They are primarily lobby organisations, advocating on behalf of a Zionism among churches and in Washington among politicians.
While critical of both evangelistic Christian Zionism (such as Jews for Jesus) as well as apocalyptic or dispensational Christian Zionism (such as Hal Lindsey and Tim LaHaye), Spector reserves his strongest criticisms for evangelicals who oppose Zionism on theological grounds.
So, although Spector interviewed over 70 Evangelical and Jewish Zionists in the course of his research, he relies on anecdotes and paraphrases to portray the views of those he deems 'liberal' or 'modernist' who regard biblical Zionism as an oxymoron. The chapter addressing criticisms of Christian Zionism is therefore one of the weakest and least convincing.
It is simply untrue to say that evangelicals who oppose Zionism "are closer to liberal mainline Protestants than to most conservative born-again Christians," Academics at the bastions of evangelicalism in the USA, such as Fuller and Wheaton, repudiate Christian Zionism just as much as their counterparts in Europe. John Stott, the 'father' of evangelicalism, is not alone in describing 'Christian Zionism' as 'biblical anathema'.
If evangelicalism is defined by the centrality of the gospel, the necessity of a personal faith in Jesus Christ, in the authority of the Scriptures and in the verbal proclamation of the gospel to all nations, it is actually Christian Zionists who, having reinterpreted the gospel and disavow proslytism, are closer in spirit to mainstream liberalism rather than conservative evangelicalism.
It is therefore not surprising that it is in assessment of the biblical and theological presuppositions of Christian Zionism that the book is probably at its weakest. While strong on dialogue with Jewish and Christian Zionists, there is little evidence that Spector understands the theological presuppositions and tenuous biblical basis for the various strands of Christian Zionism. He is reassured that none of those he interviewed tried to convert him and that evangelical Zionists can share the gospel in acts of kindness toward the Jews rather than through proselytism. This is not evidence of the orthodoxy of Christian Zionists, just the opposite.
While Old Testament Bible verses are occasionally quoted without context to demonstrate that Zionism is biblically rooted, it is the evangelical critics of Christian Zionism, according to Spector, who 'unfairly' quote 'the biblical prophets to attack the modern state of Israel'.
The fundamental question Christian Zionists avoid is whether the coming of Jesus Christ was the fulfilment or the postponement of the promises God made to Abraham? Which is central to the New Testament – Jesus or Israel? Ironically, Christian Zionists are portrayed as the new Zealots. Like their 1st Century forebears, they are trying to impose a Jewish kingdom by force, something Jesus repudiated. Spector cites, for example and without comment, Jack Hayford as promising, "if the Israelis need soldiers, he and his Pentecostal congregants will fight side by side with them." Portraying the modern state of Israel as God's chosen people on earth, the role of the Church is therefore reduce to providing dubious justification for Israel's colonization of Palestine.
While ostensibly a book about evangelicals, it soon becomes rather tiresome when, in any debate or disagreement posed, it is always Zionists who are given the last word. So, for example, in a dismissal of Walt and Mearsheimer's definitive work on the Israel Lobby, Spector defers to Alan Dershowitz suggesting the author's claims "are variations on old anti-Semitic themes of the kind found in the notorious czarist forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and in Nazi literature."
Conversely, Spector gives ample space to some of the worst examples of Islamaphobia. There is a deep paranoia regarding the motives of Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular. He refuses to see that Israel could be, in any way responsible, partly or otherwise, for the perpetuation of the Middle East conflict. They are always, in his words, "the victims of injustice, not the perpetrators."
Disappointingly, for a book with 82 pages of notes and indexes, there is no conclusion or summary chapter. It is as if the publisher has left it out by mistake or needed to reduce the word count. Whatever the reason, the book is weaker for it.
Instead, the last chapter is given to an assessment of the influences on George W Bush's Middle East policy. Here Spector tries to downplay the impact of the Israel Lobby. Without really explaining why, he would have us believe there is "broad and deep support" for Israel in America because "that position is politically sound and morally just, not because of political pressure or influence" from evangelicals. Ironically, he gives the last sentence in the book to Hal Lindsey.
If first impressions count, the eulogy on the back cover from Abraham Foxman, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, must surely be the kiss of death to any work claiming to be balanced or objective. One surprised Cambridge academic did ask me rhetorically, who on earth could have possibly vetted the book for Oxford University Press? One wonders. But then it is worth remembering that it was the Oxford University Press who published (and still publishes) the first Christian defence of Zionism, namely the Scofield Reference Bible.


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Shoot For The Moon
Story, art & colours by Alexandre Tefenkgi & Mauricet
To reach for the stars, to break the bonds of Earth, for some this is a lifelong dream, but rivalry and ambition can sometimes go hand in hand with such noble aspirations... In Volume One!
©2012 Alain Mauricet & Alexandre Tefenkgi
Valley Of Shadows
Buddy Chaplin hasn't got much going for him. His marriage has failed, he's stuck in a dead end job and his prospects are zero. Gloom hangs over Buddy like the dark clouds that hover over New Los Angeles. But life is about to take an unexpected twist for Buddy Chaplin in the valley of shadows.... In Volume One!
Art and Script : David Lloyd ; Plot : David Lloyd and David Jackson.
© 2012 David Lloyd & David Jackson
catalyst island
In a place far away, at a time long ago a catastrophe sets off a series of epic, mythological events...In Volume Two!
Script & Art : Henry Flint © 2012 Henry Flint
Return Of The Human
1000 years after humanity abandoned a poisoned Earth to build an empire across the stars, one man returns, and finds the Mother Planet is more than anyone suspected. But will it be enough to save his Galactic Civilisation from an attempt to exterminate mankind?
Here are ten sample pages of an epic sf story told in a revolutionary manner, using full-screen panels with varying captions... Enjoy! Then go to BUY for the full first two episodes in Volumes 1 and 3!
© 2013 Mark Wheatley & JC Vaughn.
Script by Phil Hester. Art by John McCrea. Colours by Matthew Wilson. Letters by Marshall Dillon
A spaceship has crashed upon a primitive planet. Amidst the wreckage lie the dead and the dying. The prisoner carried by the spaceship is missing and the crew are as worried about that as they are about being marooned on a strange world light years from their home planet... In Volume One!
©2012 John McCrea & Phil Hester
blue cat
Life for some unlucky teens can be tough - peer pressure, drugs, the break down of the family. The last thing Cindy Sparks needs is for her life to take a turn for the weird... In Volume Two!
Script: James Hudnall Art: Val Mayerik Letters: Tom Orzechowski
©2012 James Hudnall & Val Mayerik
Welcome to our first FREE SAMPLE, which features three opening chapters from Volume 1 and three opening chapters from Volume 2 of ACES WEEKLY.
As well as the creators featured in this Free Sample, Volumes 1 and 2 showcase the talents of JC Vaughn, Mark Wheatley, David Hitchcock, Lew Stringer, Carl Critchlow, Algesiras, Yishan Li, Kathryn Layno, Benjamin Dickson, Gavin Mitchell, David Leach, Mychailo Kazybrid, Bambos Georgiou, Esteban Hernandez & Rory Walker.


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Migrating to SQL? If you are going to migrate or rewrite your application to use SQL database you definitely need to read about our Mediator ISAM Server. You will learn how to migrate to SQL quickly without the need to rewrite the application and even without the need to know SQL! Migration of your Delphi, Clipper, Harbour or xHarbour application is really simple! Just keep on reading. >> more
Every company producing Delphi or xBase software (Delphi, Clipper, Harbour, xHarbour) may become an OTC partner. For our partners we offer attractive purchase terms and technical support. >> more
Now you can find out prices of all our software on-line. We have placed the price calculator in "Products/Prices" section. The calculator is available for registered users only. You can also download our entire price list in PDF format. >> more
Mediator allows for quick migration of Delphi or xBase (Clipper, xHarbour, Harbour) applications to SQL environment. Terminal allows to run Clipper or Harbour application in terminal mode with an application server.


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If you're around age 85 and reading this fact, you might be nodding, "Yep, I hear that." And indeed, the fact makes sense, given that the likelihood of hearing loss increases as we age, according to the National Institute on Aging.
But with the good news that U.S. residents aged 80-plus are expected to double over the coming years, also comes the silver lining that hearing technology continues to advance right along with them.
Today's Intrigue AI hearing aids are a perfect example of hearing innovation that can help you hear better and simplify your life through a ton of added features. So, hearing loss is no longer something we simply have accept as a "part of life" and move on with.
And why would you want to? When you stop to think about it, hearing is a huge part of experiencing and enjoying life to the fullest. Imagine your world without everyday sounds like birds chirping or leaves scattering in the wind. Or meaningful sounds like your grandchild's first words or that melodic album that always cheers you up when you need it. And of course, you can't put a price on the ability to hear and maintain conversations with the people around you.
The potential effects of untreated hearing loss run even deeper than you may think. Let's explore some of them.
Possible risks of untreated age-related hearing loss
Leaving your hearing loss untreated as you age can impact your:
- Vocabulary — Various sounds and letters may become more difficult to hear and understand as frequencies are lost.
- Voice — Hearing your own voice at a softer volume may cause you to speak more loudly to others—even shout—to compensate.
- Enjoyment of music and movies — The need to increase the volume on your TV or stereo may make it difficult to enjoy entertainment with others (who would prefer a normal volume), while putting everyone at risk for noise-induced hearing loss.
- Conversations in noise — Background noise in restaurants or group outings can become overwhelming, making it increasingly difficult to focus on speech and hold conversations.
- Work performance — Communicating and understanding may become challenging during mandatory meetings or calls, co-worker interactions, and important announcements.
- Relationships — Struggling to maintain important conversations with your spouse or to understand what is being said during social events can cause you to withdraw from your relationships.
- Cognitive health — With possible reasons including strain on the brain and diminished social engagement, untreated hearing loss has been linked to depression and dementia.
- Safety — Your ability to hear important alerts like fire alarms or tornado sirens may become impaired. And due to less awareness of your surroundings, your risk of falling may also increase.
Maintaining hearing health can make aging easier
So, even if you're unsure—or doubt—you're developing hearing loss, it's still a good idea to start monitoring your hearing health well before you reach the 85-year mark. Experts recommend getting your hearing evaluated by a licensed hearing care professional every three years once you're 50. To get started, call us today!
If it turns out you have hearing loss and hearing aids are recommended, remember, you're in great hands. Today's advanced hearing technology easily adapts to your life and can help you hear better anywhere, monitor your hearing and physical activities, control your hearing aids from your smartphone, and much more. Learn more about Intrigue AI hearing aids here.
Find out what noises you may be missing! Schedule an appointment today for a hearing consultation.


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Meet our Optometrist, Dr. Ivy Sun
Dr. Sun is an Optometrist providing complete eye care services for the surrounding communities.
As a licensed optometrist,& Certified Orthokeratologist Dr. Sun provides exams, diagnoses, and treatments of all disorders that affect the eye or vision. In addition to training in eye diseases and disorders, Dr. Sun is also trained in anatomy, biochemistry, and physiology. With this background, Dr. Sun is trained to recognize a range of health issues; such as glaucoma, macular degeneration, diabetes and hypertension.
Dr. Sun works hard to stay current on the latest advances in eye health and vision care and regularly attends continuing education seminars and advanced training courses. It is because of Dr. Sun's dedication to continuing education that our patients receive the most modern and progressive vision care available.