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Dictionary of the History of Ideas Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas |
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Dictionary of the History of Ideas | ||
An analogy between art and play, ranging from
metaphor to literal identification, has been asserted,
for better
or worse, in an extraordinary variety of ways.
The most obvious of these
contrast art and play with
work, with the "serious,"
with activities carried out
under compulsion of some kind, whether moral,
cal, economic, psychological, or
genetic. Such anal-
ogies have been as
frequently rebutted by those who
insist that art is too serious for such an
equation as
they have been affirmed by those who have seen art
as only
hedonic or entertaining.
Between these extremes are those who find positive
merit in both aspects of
art, and we shall concentrate
our attention on such affirmative theories.
with these ideas about art and its cultural significance
are: (1) the surplus energy or leisure theory of culture,
seeing art and
play as products of superfluity after basic
needs have been met; (2)
education, imitation, and
vicarious experience theories, whereby art and
play are
valued for the way in which men can encounter harsh
harmlessly; (3) metaphysical theories equating
the two because of an
"as if" element in both, ulti-
mately extending to epistemology and science; (4)
child-in-the-man" theories emphasizing
naiveté and
unconscious processes as contrasted with
It is exceedingly rare in antiquity for play to be
associated with art at
all, and where it is, the connec-
tion is
usually found in a condescending attitude to-
wards both, or at least towards play where the function
of art is
conceived rather more loftily. For the most
part, however, play is thought
of as an activity of
animals and children, and, given the relatively unsenti-
mental attitude towards both in
antiquity, play is
reduced to a fairly low status. It is thought of as
purposive, noncognitive,
frivolous, time-wasting, and
hedonic. No doubt there were in antiquity, as
at all
times, those who found the highest value of art in
relaxation, entertainment, and the like, and
if they equated art with play
it was more likely to
damn the former than to praise the latter. Despite
unpromising beginnings, however, there is early evi-
dence of some redeeming qualities and among these
be traced the origins of ideas immensely fruitful
in the development of
later theories of play and art.
The leading notions are found in the connection of
play with imitation and education, and by
way of these
the affinity with art may be seen ultimately to draw
closer. Scattered references may be found in
Homer (e.g., Iliad XV, 363) as well as in other authors
of antiquity (cf.
Pauly-Wissowa, article "Spiel") in
which the
propaedeutic value of childhood games is
with clay, sand, and stone pre-figuring sculpture and
architecture, but their importance should not be exag-
gerated. It would be necessary at first to cast the net
rather widely to find the connections among ideas
whose interrelatedness as seen in later perspective was
scarcely apparent in earlier times, and so run the risk
of appearing to impute to our seminal thinkers a degree
of coherence on the present topic of which they were
innocent. On the other hand, the problem of play as
it is concerned with culture generally, with psycho-
logical theories of man and beast, or even with more
obviously related topics such as the drama or the agon
as "play," are all beyond the scope of this article; for
many of these broader issues the reader is referred to
the works of Groos and Huizinga, among others. Like-
wise the connection between sympathetic magic or
religious ritual (especially in the sublimated forms of
symbolic sacrifice) and imitation cannot be explored
here even though there are obvious points of contact
between these and certain aspects of play.
In all of these something is represented or acted out
or made to stand for
something else in a manner that
deliberately falls short of the literal or
actual enact-
ment of the something else. To
this extent, at least,
direct utilitarian or cognitive purposes are not
(even if they are never far from the surface) and there-
with a key aspect of play as such is
manifest. Against
this view it is frequently argued that the
mind is incapable of distinguishing
symbol from thing
symbolized, and so what appears to be indirect,
vicarious, etc., to more sophisticated minds has
been misapprehended. The
point is valid but comple-
ments rather than
weakens the argument advanced
here. It is rare for the most sophisticated
(or even the
most prosaic) of minds wholly to lose the ability to
immersed in the world of fantasy and imagination,
or to abandon
"reality" for the nonce, however easily
it might be
recovered at need. Even where primitive
languages treat
"play" as childish, frivolous, and so
forth, and do
not adequately distinguish what we
should think of as play or symbolic
activities from
"real" ones, people's actual conduct
will display their
grasp of the distinction.
Methodologically it will always be a problem to
isolate play as it is
manifested in art from the many
other factors with which play is
associated, e.g., human
nature and psychology, the "leisure
theory of culture,"
childish (or childlike) things, imitation,
vicarious ex-
perience, education,
epistemology, anticipations of
knowledge or of "serious
things," creativity, meta-
physics. For example, the references to play in Plato
display many
of the entanglements of the related
themes considered above. Play is
harmless enough in
very young children, but all too soon it takes on the
aspect of
an irrationality (and therewith unreality) that
it becomes the task of
education to remedy. Play only
becomes tolerable when it is channeled in
directions. To take another example, play as vicarious
experience is significant both in Plato and Aristotle.
The emphasis in
Plato lies rather in the joint subordi-
nation of art and play to education (itself in the service
of ethics
and metaphysics); hence, as will become
apparent in many other writers, it
is very difficult to
separate play in art from its manifestations under
aspects. In Aristotle, the emphasis, to be discussed in
detail below, is on catharsis, in which the
emotions aroused and discharged
by the action of the
drama are serious but harmless—two features
almost universally are included in the concept of play
and art.
Only in recent years (say, since Karl Groos
and, most notably, Huizinga)
has a conscious attempt
been made to analyze the concept of play so as to
its specific features. Until this century the innumerable
discussions of the subject, of which only a few impor-
tant examples can be given here, appear in contexts
displaying the leading interests of their authors; art and
play have
frequently been only incidental to those
interests, however.
Plato's standard position is clear enough: play is
intimately connected with
imitation: boys play at being
soldiers (Republic V,
466E ff.), and more generally,
children play at being their elders, the
bard imitates
in his narrative the speech and action of heroes and,
much less acceptably, the actor does this directly; the
poet imitates the
Muse who inspires him. Since the
force of imitation is construed in Plato's
psychology as making the imitator resemble what is
imitated, the truth of the model is all-important. At
Republic 425A "... children in their earliest
play are
[to be] imbued with the spirit of law and order through
music" (mousike here refers to the arts
and not necessarily only to music); at 536E children
are to
be introduced to their studies by play and not
by compulsion.
From these observations follows much of the criti-
cism of poetry and the arts for which Plato is notorious;
but we
shall be concerned here only with those aspects
of the criticism that bear
on play and art. Certainly
a man will not want to imitate anything unworthy
him (Republic III, 395A ff.), "except
for the sake of
play (paidia)" (396E).
This last reservation finds an echo
in Laws (II,
667DE) where play is associated both with
art and pleasure. Play is here
defined as harmless
pleasure doing neither good nor harm. But doubts
at once raised by the Athenian whether the perform-
with imitations and representations of real things, could
ever harmlessly misrepresent those things (cf. 658E,
659E). Thus the argument returns to the standard
position in which Plato's references to art and play are
subordinated to education and moral training within
the metaphysical framework of his system.
Repeatedly, whenever the question of play, amuse-
ment, entertainment, pleasure, etc., is raised, whether
connection with art or not, Plato allows that these
involve a certain charm
if their pursuit is appropriate
to the age and mental development of the
players. But
judgment is not so easily disarmed and older and wiser
heads keep knowledgeable watch, since nothing that
is not true can be
beautiful, good, or even harmless.
Plato's views on art have been much attacked and,
taken superficially, they
may appear disappointing.
The overtones of censorship, regimentation, and
dent self-righteousness have
alienated many commen-
tators. But it is
always a mistake to read Plato as though
he were describing a feasible
reconstruction of the
world; he repeatedly distinguishes the ideally
from the actually attainable, and in so doing is playing
game of his own—a political game realized with
consummate art
within metaphysical rules asserted to
be self-evidently true for the sake
of the game. Seen
in this light he has been called ludimagister (Rahner
[1967], p. 12); Plato himself refers (Letter VI, 323D),
if genuine, to "the
jesting that is kin to earnest," and
his own use of myth will
bear comparison with Socratic
irony as a playful device of art. The Republic, in par-
ticular, is the model of all subsequent positive Utopias—
the negative ones are grimmer and lack the imaginative
exploitation of
possibilities, even the wishful thinking,
that characterize the Republic and its successors—
shared, as we shall see, by play and art.
Much that is at most implied in Plato is made explicit
by Aristotle. There
is a shift in the underlying meta-
presuppositions and these yield a theory that
is at once richer, more
accessible and comfortable, and
more "realistic."
The main points of departure lie in two develop-
ments of Platonic positions by Aristotle: imitation and
ultimate objectives of human existence. Imitation
is broadened so that its
validity is not constrained
within the limits of the
"real"; and one key concept
introduced by Aristotle
to vindicate man's existence
is "leisure" (schole).
We are told in the Poetics that art imitates not only
what is (as in Plato), but what "ought to be" and
"might be." The latter two liberate the Platonic
from its offensive literalness and dogmatism. What
ought to be represents the morally ideal and only
concerns us here; but what might be refers
directly to our theme.
Imagination is not bound by
the actual, but is free to range over the
possible and
the plausible. The latter is given even more significance
than the former, because the mind may grant credence
to something factually
impossible, but accepted as
plausible for the sake of some argument the
value of
which does not rest on factual truth. Here (Poetics, Ch.
26) Aristotle relies, as Plato does (Theaetetus 191B,
Republic IX, 588C ff.) on the ability of the mind to
juxtapose images disparately drawn from experience
in order to construct
monsters and other imaginary
beings and situations, sometimes for some
further purpose (if only to frighten children), but not
necessarily so. Aristotle draws attention to the power
of creating
metaphors as a sign of genius, "the one
thing that cannot be
This position does not differ significantly from the
Kantian notion of the
free play of the imagination, and
it also anticipates a further element of
great impor-
tance in later thought. This is
the balance between
factual (or logical) and aesthetic truth. The former
"objective" and serious; the latter
"subjective" and
playful. Yet if the latter is to be
redeemed of frivolity
and childishness some connection with factual
must be maintained. In Aristotle the connection is
stronger than Coleridge's "willing suspen-
sion of disbelief." It was Aristotle who
first drew atten-
tion to the confusion
between the two, as illustrated
by the yokel in the audience who rushes on
stage to
prevent one character from killing another. This in-
volves the inability to follow out all the
of a situation allowed ex hypothesi; or to follow a set
of self-imposed rules or conventions not sanctioned by
external reality:
yet these are features of play at every
The interrelation of art and play in drama is illus-
trated by two senses of vicarious experience: (1) what
can I
learn from what has happened to another, and
(2) what can be learned from
the imaginable alterna-
tives to any given
situation. Both senses rely on the
assumption that art is justified by its
indirect service
to knowledge and individual resource in facing future
situations; and as such may be seen as a development
of the propaedeutic
justification for children's play and
the adult agon. The manner of art, i.e., the depiction
of universals, further
enhances its usefulness for these
ends. By stripping away the fortuitous
and accidental
circumstances in which individual occurrences arise,
"poetry is more universal than history" because it
crystallize the essence of a situation. We are thus
exposed to all
the advantages of the widest conceivable
range of experience without
exposure to dangers that
between Greek and Roman sports and plays supports
this view: Greek games were never bloody, nor was
bloodshed ever directly shown in the Greek theater.
The doctrine of catharsis may be viewed in the same
context as applicable to
the emotions aroused by ideal
situations. Pity edifies though terror
crushes, and the
two together perform the function of
play—serious but
harmless. Pity or compassion is the emotion by
we empathize with the tragic hero, seeing ourselves
in him. We
use him as surrogate for what we dare not
do ourselves. He carries out in a
postulated reality all
our secret desires, our blasphemies, our
quests. Our elation is intensified by his temporary
successes: almost we could wish to follow him, but our
fascination is no
less morbid and we as much desire
his failure. His daring is a reproach to
our mediocrity,
and so the inevitability of his doom reflects our con-
sciousness of human limitations as much
as the jealousy
of the gods.
The play element lies in a series of "as if" proposi-
tions pursued with logical rigor to
an inevitable con-
clusion: let there be a
hero nobler by birth and breed-
ing than any
member of the audience; let him be wiser,
stronger, shrewder, prideful as
befits these qualities, but
still recognizably human; let him challenge the
of the gods; and let the gods prove the power of their
sanctions. We are content with the thought that if the
hero, preeminently
possessed of all human virtues,
cannot succeed, then how much less can we
of ourselves. We are thus reconciled to the governance
of the
cosmos and of our lowly role in its economy.
Aristotle seems to be the originator of, or at least
the first to write
about, leisure as the basis of culture.
The discussion in Politics II is long, but a few major
points should be presented.
A truly human nature can
be fulfilled only on the assumption that an
can be created within which the individual can actu-
alize all his potentialities. But an
individual who is
obliged to satisfy his needs by his own resources
would be forced to function at a very limited level
of activity,
living from hand to mouth with no respite
from those activities needed
merely to sustain life. The
division of labor serves the dual function of
the individual to confine his activities to what he can
best, and of furnishing leisure for some individuals
in a society to think
of matters that transcend the
exigencies of the moment. There will be many
in which such thought accrues to the benefit of the
society; only
some of these, of course, will bear directly
on play and art.
There is a typology of human nature in Aristotle,
not unlike the class
structure of the Republic: some
people will be
content with practical and productive
activities, and for these the value of art and play lies
largely in recreation and entertainment, the restoration
of energies
exhausted in labor, or the dissipation of
excess energy when no purposive
activity is needed,
as in the interval between seeding and harvesting
or for simple variety or change of pace, or to keep
and mental capacities sharpened. But other
individuals have superior needs:
theoretical and
mythopoetic; and these point to the stationing of some
men in Aristotle's hierarchy of being above common
men and below the gods,
though following his advice
"to be as divine as they can
be" (Nicomachean Ethics
X. vii). For
these the object of all lower activities is
to provide the leisure needed
for contemplation and
those modes of creation appropriate to such men:
part of and operating upon nature. The relationship
in Aristotle
between activities instrumental for some
higher ends and those
intrinsically good in themselves
is not always clear—nor,
perhaps, can it be, in view
of his well-known antipathy to infinite
regress. At the
end of the line, as concerns human activity, are found
such notions as happiness and leisure. The latter he
mostly (e.g., Ethics X. vii) speaks of as instrumental,
further happiness-inducing activities distin-
guished by their not being engaged in under the duress
of need
(and thus sharing a key aspect of play); indeed,
leisure comes close to
being an end itself and a goal
of human existence, which in its moments of
enjoys the highest felicity. Aristotle quotes with ap-
proval (Ethics X. vi)
"The maxim of Anacharsis, 'Play
so that you may be
One searches the literature of later antiquity in vain
for the development
of these ideas. It is not merely
that the epigoni of the post-Aristotelian
schools lacked
originality, rather the topic seems to lapse into
There are, to be sure, scattered references to children's
play, to gaiety of spirit and the like, e.g., in Lucian,
Horace, Pliny,
Plutarch, and even in Cicero; and the
history of aesthetics continued to be
served, but the
connection between them is broken. Play as such is
neglected but passes into the fierce competition
of the agon to make a Roman holiday. The magic child
of many pagan
traditions is absorbed, especially by
Augustine, into Christianity, and
combines great sim-
plicity and wisdom as
before (cf. Boas, 1966), but there
is no connection with art.
Perhaps too much joy had escaped the life of reason
in the sequence of Greek
collapse, stern Ciceronian
injunctions to duty, Roman decline, and
asceticism. Even Roman comedy displays little of the
lightness of touch that might suggest that a practical
connection continued
even though the theory might
that might distract the Christian from the grim search
for salvation: Chrysostom, for example, in the Sixth
Homily of his Commentary on Matthew, tells us "It
is not God who gives us the chance to play, but the
devil" (PG 57, 70D). These strictures of course had
a target, for while the dominant theories to govern
human nature had changed, that nature no doubt
remained the same.
A contribution to our theme is to be found, therefore,
only by default, for
the same antipathy to play is also
directed against art. The latter was
only to be re-
deemed by the subordination of
its subject matter to
doctrinally sound topics expressed in a rigid
perfection taken to be the microcosm of the universe.
Not until
we reach Aquinas do we find a revival of
the generous Aristotelian view: in
his commentary on
the Nicomachean Ethics Saint
Thomas favorably
explicates the concept of eutrapelia, a lightness of spirit
midway between boorishness and
frivolity (cf. Rahner
[1967], p. 99). The emphasis here, as in the Summa
theologica (II-II, q. 168 a. 2), is however
on play as
relaxation from labor and tension, without reference
For a long time there seems to have been little
patience with play as a
feature of imagination, crea-
tivity, and
art, whether we search among British
empiricists or continental
rationalists, or among think-
ers not so easily
labeled. For one thing all these shared
in common a view that is in essence
hostile to the
innocence of art (or simply hostile to innocence) and
so we find three aspects, variously emphasized, all of
which illustrate the
decline of interest in play. The
first is rarely explicit, since it treats
some forms of art
as scarcely worthy of notice: the sort of art that
be associated with play is taken as childish, vulgar
primarily time-killing entertainment, and
thus not a fit subject for
intellectual inquiry (Schleier-
The second and third views involve even loftier
pretensions in which art is
justified predominantly with
reference to cognition and morality. The
position of
Leibniz usefully exemplifies the second view: such
validity as art possesses lies in its anticipation of posi-
tive knowledge. Aesthetic vision yields petites percep-
tions as the first of four grades of perceiving reality
the world. As the mind advances toward fully ra-
tional knowledge the lower grades are superseded.
Mendelssohn pointed out in criticism of this
view that art is thus assumed
to have no intrinsic value
of its own; and that therefore as positive
increases, the significance of art will decline. The third
aspect is found more frequently where the concept of
taste and its
educability comes to the fore, e.g., in
Hume, Burke, Vico, Lessing, and Herder, among
others. Here
taste becomes a function of sophistication
and wide experience, and so
cannot be assimilated to
the play theory. Where formal perfection is a
objective of art (e.g., in the theory and practice of
Dryden or
Pope) this further militates against an
analogy with play. For that formal
perfection is not
infrequently seen as the aesthetic counterpart of a
wholly rational world (conceived not only scientifically,
but as part of a
theodicy) such that art is not an explo-
ration beyond what is currently known, so much as
a confirmation of
the philosophically demonstrable.
Such views may be mathematically static (as in
Leibniz) or historically
dynamic (as in Vico). One could
quote indefinitely, but Vico may speak for
The studies of metaphysics and poetry are in natural oppo-
sition one to the other; for the
former purges the mind of
childish prejudice and the latter
immerses and drowns it
in the same: the former offers resistance to
the judgment
of the senses, while the latter makes this its chief
the former strives that the learned may know the truth
things stripped of all passion: the latter that the vulgar
act only by means of intense excitement of the senses,
without which stimulant they assuredly would not act at
(Scienza Nuova I, iii, 26; in Croce, Aesthetic, pp. 221-22).
A whole family of related views subordinates the
culture role of play:
historically oriented figures like
Vico, Herder, Hegel, Croce, to name only
a few, all
treat art as something to be superseded—a
imagination and play will be left behind for if ontogeny
recapitulates phylogeny, they belong to infancy:
"Whoever turns
to writing poetry in an age of reflec-
is returning to childhood and putting his mind
in fetters"
(Vico: letter to De Angelis of Dec. 25, 1725).
Perhaps, after all, the
theory of an analogy between
play and art did not lapse, but was merely
pursued to
the detriment of both! But, happily, more affirmative
positions are near.
In Kant the term "play" occurs so often in the
discussion of art that some commentators have been
led to exaggerate the
importance in his system of "the
free play of
imagination" or of ideas. Yet while no
well-articulated theory
can be attributed directly to
Kant, it remains true all the same that the
among play, art, and freedom to be found explicitly
in the
Critique of Judgment are the primary source
Schiller's position, and therewith of all subsequent
views on the question
before us—to the possible exclu-
sion of "surplus energy" theories.
The point of departure lies in the significance of
"freedom" in Kant's position. Cognitive judgments are
bound by the necessity of their conformity to the
i.e., by the forms of intuition and the categories. These
impose a logical structure on concepts and the relations
among them that in turn leads to the uniformity of
the knowledge possessed by all minds and thus justifies
the claim for the possibility of a science of the phe-
nomenal world. Ethical judgments, while not bound
by fact (which would make ethics merely empirical)
are bound by the nature of reason such that certain
"ideas of pure reason" are binding on all rational minds
so that, on Kant's view, a science of ethics is also
But aesthetic judgments are not bound in either of
these ways: they are not
referable back in any neces-
sary way to
concepts depending on experience, nor
are they such as to be uniform for
all rational minds.
They are necessarily subjective (Critique of Judgment—
hereafter CJ—Bernard
trans., §2, p. 39). Satisfaction in
the beautiful must not only be
distinguished from
cognition and morality, but also from sensory
(§3, 40) which exerts its own tyranny. In all these
we have an interest in the existence of the object that
rise to these judgments and feelings; but aesthetic
judgment is
disinterested and contemplative, i.e., it is
free of constraint whether
coerced by fact or logic or
pain and pleasure: "The cognitive
powers, which are
involved by this representation, are here in free
because no definite concept limits them to a definite
rule of
cognition" (§9, 52).
It should be noted that, at the same time that Kant
stresses the freedom
(and therewith the subjectivity)
of aesthetic judgment, he is not prepared
to abandon
altogether the notion of the uniformity of such judg-
ments (they ought
to be necessary and universal): "We
are conscious that this
subjective relation, suitable for
cognition in general, must be valid for
everyone, and
thus must be universally communicable, just as if it
were a definite cognition, resting always on that rela-
tion as its subjective condition" (ibid.). And
this leads
him to claim a "universal subjective
validity" that
restores the possibility of rational discourse on
In the "Analytic of the Sublime" (ibid.) Kant returns
to the question of play as it more specifically applies
to art. We find him
here furnishing support to those
who find the notion of art as play
profoundly offensive.
Indeed, as we noted earlier, art is often viewed as
only when it is intended to disparage both; but where
art is
assigned a nobler role, there is a tendency to
emphasize the rational
(cognitive and ethical) aspects
at the expense of play. Kant's position
reflects the
dialectical tension of these extremes. In §43 he
distinctions between art and nature, science, and
handicraft on the one hand, but warns (p. 147) against
"many modern educators" who "believe that the
way to produce a free art is to remove it from all
and thus to change it from work into mere
play." What redeems
art from this charge, as we see
from numerous other passages, is that the
ideas with
which imagination plays must have appeal to under-
standing and reason: so much for the
content of art;
as to its form, "e.g., in poetry there must be
an accu-
racy and wealth of language, and also
prosody and
measure." Kant's rationalism and formalism are
lightly to be cast aside, and thus we find him balancing
claims of freedom against those of the rule of reason
which may be thought
by those "modern educators"
(to say nothing of even
more modern artists) to con-
imagination within the framework either of drab
representationism or of
decaying forms:
[Poetry] plays with illusion (Schein), which it
produces at
pleasure, but without deceiving by it; for it declares
exercise to be mere play, which however can be purposively
used by the understanding
(§53, p. 171).
A final observation before we continue to trace the
later fate of these
influential ideas. In the Critique of
Pure Reason
(A141-42 = B180-81) we read that while
... the image is a product of the empirical faculty
reproductive imagination, the schema of
sensible concepts,
such as of figures in space, is a product and, as it
a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which,
in accordance with which, images themselves first
become possible.
This doctrine of schematism strongly suggests Kant's
philosophical motives
for retaining a rational founda-
tion for
art. It is that the mind can propose forms to
itself that in turn make
images of particulars possible;
but given the structure of the human mind
and its
uniformity, there are limitations as to the forms that
can be
entertained, and these have (or ought to have)
universal appeal,
constituting the basis for communi-
and meaningfulness. Yet he clearly confused
historically and culturally
determined forms (e.g., in
poetry and painting) for existentially
determined ones,
and so placed fortuitous restrictions on what might
properly constitute art as well as on the power of
imagination to propose
other forms (whether in art or
in science). We may therefore expect to find
in his
successors an attack on these restrictions, as well as
on the
necessary uniformity of human rationality. The
farthest-reaching attack,
however, will derive from
implications of his metaphysics that he could
have foreseen (e.g., the unknowability of the thing-
in-itself and the "as
if" aspects of our explanations of
The most important theory in the entire history of
this topic is found in
the aesthetic writings of Friedrich
Schiller. It is odd but worthy of note
that the signifi-
cance of his contribution
has been seriously underes-
timated both
by students of Schiller and of play theory.
His originality in the matter,
despite the obvious debts
to Kant and to Rousseau's educational theories,
to say
nothing of those of Lessing and Herder, lies in the
breadth of
the metaphysical claims he makes on behalf
of the aesthetic, and in his
modifications of the Kantian
The most important of these are: (1) in the absence
of access to the
"thing-in-itself," metaphysical pre-
suppositions are in principle
unverifiable—hence man
is free to construct explanatory schemes
of various
kinds to render his experience comprehensible to him-
self; (2) such schemes in the first place
reflect typologi-
cal differences of
temperament (Naive and Sentimental
Poetry—hereafter NS—176) in which particular
"modes of perception" (Empfindungsweisen) result in
diverse accounts of reality, each
compatible with facts
and logic though incompatible with each
such types are the "realist" and
the "idealist," each
of whom is persuaded by his
idiosyncratic perspective
that the other is wrong, but in view of (1)
above, both
are wrong; (3) thus, instead of the uniform human
presupposed by Kant as the foundation of "ob-
jective" knowledge, Schiller's postulation of
human natures accounts for the insolubility of meta-
physical, ethical, and political questions and for
dogmatic assertion by each type of the truth of its own
at the expense of the other; (4) a crucial aspect
of Schiller's account of
human nature follows from the
importance of form and content in Kant. These
seen by Schiller as distinctive features of human modes
experience in terms of impulses (Triebe). The form
impulse is seen as the tendency of the human mind
to structure experience
in particular ways and is con-
nected with
predominantly rationalist explanations of
the world (the idealist
position), while the material
impulse (Stofftrieb)
supposes its explanations to be
given along with concrete facts (the
realist position).
A third principle, the play impulse (Spieltrieb) is ad-
vanced as
mediating between these two. (Two paren-
thetical observations: (a) these Triebe are not to
confused with the impulses or drives of more recent
though many commentators have mis-
praised Schiller for anticipating Freud, while
others have denounced him
for not being enough of
a Freudian; the impulses are rather
tendencies to think and act in
characteristic ways; (b)
it is typical of Schiller's dialectical method to
find a
third principle to mediate between and reconcile the
differences between polar opposites); (5) the divergen-
cies of perspective do not arise at the level of
or logic, but in disputed interpretations of facts them-
selves not in dispute.
From these divergencies from Kant, Schiller adum-
brates, but does not fully develop, a remarkable theory.
Schiller has often been called the poet of freedom; in
his Aesthetic Letters this is manifested by his search
for a means to liberate man from the coercion of
industrialized society,
and in NS from the compulsion
of genetic endowment, environment, and tempera-
ment. On the
Sublime seeks to overcome the ultimate
compulsion, that of a fixed
unalterable reality (whether
conceived of as Nature, Fate, or the laws of
The concepts of reality produced by the theologian,
historian, the scientist, or the metaphysician are
all simply an illusion
or appearance (Schein); they are
inventions, not
discoveries about the world. Nonethe-
they are all too frequently mistaken for ultimate
truths, and this in turn
leads to the dogmatism and
even fanaticism that appear justified by
ontological commitment to their truth.
Only the artist is free of illusions about his illusions;
in his creations
no claim to reality is made. Rather
he plays with
the appearances he constructs; what he
proposes is without ontological
commitment, it is a
game operating within self-imposed rules, as well
within the limiting conditions of fact and logic. It is
contemplative and detached as befits aesthetic crea-
tion; but it is also carried out for its own sake as befits
game. (Schiller also makes use of the role of play
as preparation for
"serious" activity, and of re-creation
following the
tensions of labor, but neither of these
is central.) The Kantian notions of
heuristic devices
are thus brought a stage further. The aesthetic
becomes the paradigm of all human perspectives on
the world.
Schiller sharply attacks the philosopher who
dogmatically insists on all
the details of an elaborate
system erected on metaphysical assumptions
origin and validity have never been investigated:
philosopher is a caricature compared with the
Schiller is well aware of the dangers of such a posi-
tion and is at pains to forestall criticisms of solipsism
aestheticism, to say nothing of self-indulgent
daydreaming and triviality.
By his insistence on the
Kantian foundations of objective knowledge, the
are, as it were, stipulated by all parties, so that the
notion of "objective," or at least
subjective" knowledge is
preserved—nothing is the
case simply because someone says so.
Nor is a retreat
into fantasy permissible, for this too belies the
Instead, much the way the hero in tragedy preserves
attitude permits moral superiority to the facts, not
empirical subordination to them. Nor will the charge
of triviality stand, for, as Schiller puts it, "Man is never
so serious as when he plays." A quite extraordinary
demand is being made here: at the metaphysical level
it is that we somehow resolve the problem how to
maintain our deepest and most serious beliefs strongly
enough to be able to act on them, while at the same
time recognizing that those beliefs have no final justifi-
cation. The latter part of this proposition is closest to
play, and such a prospect will seem melancholy to
some, but Schiller chooses to be exhilarated by it; we
are free to build tragedy or comedy indifferently on
the same data. There will be poignant exceptions, but
under ideal conditions man "is wholly man only when
he plays" (15th of the Aesthetic Letters). Then man
possesses the childlike quality of grace, aesthetic edu-
cation is complete, and in spontaneity and harmony
one plays the game of life.
Of those directly influenced by Schiller the most
notable are Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche. Schopen-
hauer, in
particular, after condemning metaphysical
explanations of the world as
illusory, finds almost the
only redemption in art, because we are aware
that we
are playing a game, and also because we are contem-
plating Platonic ideas, and the
illusion is harmless. But
perhaps the most consummate realization of
ideas is found in Hermann Hesse's Glasperlenspiel
(Magister Ludi): the
account of the Music Master is
closest of all.
A shallow reflection of Schiller's views is found in
Herbert Spencer, who
vaguely remembers reading
about the play theory in some German author
name escaped him. While what he has to say has little
bearing on
art, it is included in a simple version of
the "surplus
energy" theory:
We find that time and strength are not wholly absorbed
in providing
for immediate needs... Hence play of all
kinds—hence the
tendency to superfluous and useless ex-
ercise of faculties that have been quiescent
About the turn of this century there was a significant
revival of interest
in the topic of play, with some
bearing on art. Karl Groos' two books
chiefly rely on
the role of imitation, empathy, and education in the
learning and socialization process:
... play leads from what is easy to more difficult tasks,
since only
deliberate conquest can produce the feeling of
pleasure in
(1901, p. 8).
Lange, who follows Groos fairly closely, stresses the
structure of
self-imposed rules which call for the exer-
cise of imagination. He opposes the passivity of the
spectator to
the activity of the creator, and extends
his argument from play to art in
pointing to the inven-
tion of a context
developed in the course of creation
of a work of art.
Of the many commentaries on the surplus energy
and education theories a few
examples may be cited.
Dessoir (pp. 318ff.) treats the Kant-Schiller
favorably and with great penetration. Croce (p. 83),
followed by Collingwood, accepts the "freedom from
causality" argument of Schiller as "possible,"
but finds
the surplus energy argument, especially as found in
"outrageous." Guyau, on the other hand (p.
accepts the latter argument, but sees "art as too
involved with
life to be mere play." And Huizinga,
whose splendid book goes
much beyond our scope here,
treats Schiller quite harshly (p. 168), having
misunderstood his case.
A lengthy literature from the utopian socialists to
the 1960's expands the
leisure theory to incorporate
art and play into the activities appropriate
to an in-
creasingly affluent society. The
education theories are
currently in the uncertain stewardship of the
of education and the learning psychologists; a stagger-
ing array of studies pursue the
related problems of
value-free finger-painting and learning by playing
a manner that has gone far to discredit the whole
The metaphysical and psychological theories remain
worthy of serious
consideration. As to the first there
has been a significant tendency to
extend creativity,
innovation, conventional (self-imposed) rule-making
obvious features of play and art beyond these to scien-
tific and even to cosmological explanations. Charles
Peirce, who acknowledges his debt to Friedrich Schiller
(p. 401),
develops (pp. 360f.) a notion of free aesthetic
Play"—culminating in "Muse-
ment" concerning "some wonder in
one of the Uni-
verses." Koestler
(1964, especially pp. 509ff.) displays
the interconnectedness of humor,
art, and science with
a wealth of illustration. But the most succinct
in recent literature on the subject is found in Kroeber
(1948, p. 357):
Generically, all the discoveries and innovations of pure
science and
fine art—those intellectual and aesthetic pur-
suits which are carried on without reference to
or utility—may be credited to functioning of the
play impulses.... They rest on the play impulse, which
connected with growth but is dissociated from preser-
vation, comfort, or utility, and which in science
and art
is translated into the realm of imagination, abstraction,
relations, and sensuous form.
Finally, there is another area, almost too vague to
document precisely, but
pervasive enough in recent
decades, in which certain childlike qualities
playfulness) are assimilated to some desirable features
art. While its origins may be traced back to Plato
at least, the
combination is modern, especially in its
emphasis on the unconscious nature
of creativity. If,
as Ellen Key argued in her famous book, this is The
Century of the Child (1909), much that is
relevant to
our theme will be displayed in what George Boas has
The Cult of Childhood (1966). Emphasis is laid
on the child's naiveté, spontaneity, and unconscious-
ness, and on the self-absorption of the child's
ties—these are
preferred to the calculation and pur-
posiveness of adult behavior. The child's vision is taken
to be
innocent, fresh, unencumbered by conceptual
fixity or subordination to
cognitive or moral criteria.
The artist (e.g., Rilke, Klee) is seen as
liberated from
the exigencies either of representationalism in content
or of set formal patterns. It would be a mistake to insist
that all aspects
of this shift in aesthetic objectives are
connected with nostalgia for
childlike simplicity and
still less with play. In part it must be
associated rather
will the metaphysical anarchy currently fashionable
and that dates from some of the post-Kantian develop-
ments we have traced. Among relevant contemporary
positions in aesthetics mention must be made at least
of Freudian
psychology and proponents of "aesthetic
An important paper of Freud's, "Creative Writers
Day-Dreaming," associates imagination, creativity,
and play, and
draws on a parallelism between the child
and the writer, each of whom
creates a world of his
own. This world is taken seriously, for the
of play is not the serious but the real. (Freud makes
further point that this play is not wholly uncon-
nected with the real, otherwise we have fantasy not
play.) From
this it follows that features of the real
world are rearranged by the child
in his play and by
the artist in his creation. The difference between
and day-dreaming is that the latter entails a degree
wish-fulfilment that moves in the direction of neuro-
sis or psychosis; but the differences appear to be of
degree not
kind: "... a piece of creative writing, like
a day-dream, is a
continuation of, and a substitute for,
what was once the play of
childhood." The elaboration
of these insights by the various
psychoanalytic schools,
particularly by Jung and Rank, is immensely
And it is but a step from these to a great variety of
perspectives advanced by existentialist and phenome-
nological writers on aesthetics who make a great
of the "child's vision."
This brings us close to the notion of "aesthetic sur-
face" (D. W. Prall, Aesthetic
Analysis, New York,
1929) and "sheer appearance" (S. Langer, Philosophy
in a New Key..., Cambridge, Mass., 1942).
the emphasis here is on the avoidance of conceptual
allowing the object to speak to imagination,
a playing with the possible
things the aesthetic object
might be, as in Dada for example. These
illustrate the
tendency in art and play for forms and structures to
explored and exploited more than the specific con-
tent of the artwork or game; much is made of the
paradoxical status
of "commitment" in the sense that
play and aesthetic
experience are contemplative, i.e.,
they do not require that what is
encountered be trans-
lated into action, yet
they furnish a rich stock of
paradigm situations in largely vicarious
experience that
is in fact deployed where knowledge and action are
called for. The "high seriousness" of play and
immersion is one of the ways in which many thinkers
tried to give expression to this phenomenon; and
it derives from the dual
capacity of art to be directly
an end-in-itself yet indirectly a means to
irrelevant or
seemingly opposed ends.
G. Boas, The Cult of Childhood (London, 1966).
Caillois, Man, Play and Games (New York, 1961). R.
Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford,
1938). B. Croce,
Aesthetic (London, 1922). M. Dessoir, Aesthetik und all-
Kunstwissenschaft in den Grundzügen (Stuttgart,
1906). J. Dewey, Art as Experience (New York, 1934).
Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art (New York,
S. Freud, "Creative Writers and
Day-Dreaming," in Standard
Vol. IX., trans. James Strachey (London, 1959). K.
Groos, The Play of Man, trans. E. L. Baldwin (New York,
1901). J. M. Guyau, The Problems of Contemporary Aes-
thetics (Los Angeles, 1947).
J. Huizinga, Homo Ludens, A
Study of the Play-Element
in Culture (Boston, 1950). Im-
manuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J.
H. Bernard
(London, 1892; New York, 1951). Arthur Koestler, The Act
of Creation (London and New York, 1964).
A. L. Kroeber,
Anthropology (New York, 1948). K. Lange, Das Wesen der
Kunst (Berlin, 1901). H. Noack,
"Das Spiel: über die Ver-
suche seiner Erklärung und die Aufgaben seiner Sinn-
deutung," Zeitschrift für Aesthetik,
27 (1933), 97-131.
Pauly-Wissowa, Reallexikon des klassischen Altertums,
cle "Spiel". C.
S. Peirce, Selected Writings, ed. P. P. Wiener
(New York, 1958). Hugo Rahner, Man at Play (New
1967). Friedrich Schiller, Naive and
Sentimental Poetry and
On the Sublime, trans. J. A. Elias (New York, 1966).
Sdun, "Zum Begriff des Spiels bei Kant und Schiller,"
57 (1966), 500-18. Herbert Spencer, Principles
of Psychology (London, 1870-72).
[See also Comic; Creativity in Art; Culture; Education;Empathy; Happiness and Pleasure; Primitivism; Utopia;
Wisdom of the Fool.]
Dictionary of the History of Ideas | ||


text:
"What a slut- could she be any more desperate? She's just trying to get attention. And look what she's wearing!"
Statements like this are uttered by both men and women about women, but right now, I'm more concerned with focusing on women who talk about one another this way.
Our larger community has come to agree that a slut is someone, most often a woman, who enjoys sex more than she should, is overtly sexual, and who exercises her impetus to realize her sexual desire. Women criticize and judge other women who don't suppress their sexual drive and behavior. We are encouraged to disavow our authentic wishes to be sexual. In fact, we are praised if we are powerless (or at least ambivalent) in our sexuality, and this is incredibly destructive.
We have the messages of historical sexuality that still influences us- puritan sex, sex between one man and one woman for the purpose of procreation. And then there are the messages about sex in the media today. This is an incredibly difficult intersection to navigate.
Here's the short of it:
Female sexuality is considered acceptable if a woman is in a relationship; she is encouraged to please her partner (love sex), but she runs into trouble when she seeks sex outside of a relationship (lust sex). It's fine for her to have her needs, though not necessary, as long as they are the right kind of needs- the kind that make her partner feel affirmed. She is discouraged from expressing her needs in a way that might make her seem a) too sexually aggressive or b) too difficult for her partner to please. The message to women is this; cast off your sexual needs and learn how to negotiate the needs of others. Don't be too sexy, but please no, don't be frigid and closed off, either. Follow this advice and you will be a respectable woman.
…but do we want respect if we have to pay for it with our authenticity? And why do so many women experience the impulse to glance knowingly at one another when a member of their cohort walks by in clothes that express a part of her sexuality if we're all under this microscope? (What exactly is the knowledge being shared with those glances, anyway?)
Part of what's happening for women is fear, fear of expressing the parts of themselves that they have been told are shameful or "too much." That in itself can be tough to overcome. When someone has believed that a core aspect of herself is bad for a significant part of her life, even when she wants to access and express it, the insecurity of navigating and realizing this can be painful. Many women fear that they won't express themselves the "right way."
Some women resent one another for their ability to take the risk and express their sexuality in a way that feels healthy for them. This resentment is born of the fear I just described, anger that they, themselves, don't feel capable of taking this action, and hope that they can govern their sexuality the way they want to instead of they way they've been directed. This hope keeps their authentic sexuality from straying too far so that they are, in some way, always connected to it.
If we experiment with allowing ourselves to be curious about our sexual needs and desires, without pressuring ourselves to avoid nor move toward them, we can give ourselves space to get to know that part of ourselves. As we increase our self-knowledge, our capacity for connection in relationship will improve. The idea is to first share our desires with ourselves (because sometimes it's a secret), and then with those close to us. We become less isolated. We become stronger, and we begin to lose that urge to act like crabs in a bucket, keeping one another down. For some women, this will be a longer journey than for others. For all, powerful, safe, balanced, healthy, authentic sexual experiences will be worth it.
Love and Be Loved,

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Apply for
Contact DHS
Make online payments
Report abuse
Report fraud
Respond to an RFP
Take an alcohol use screening. Answer 12 questions and the screening will generate personalized results based on your age, gender and drinking patterns. Your answers are completely confidential and anonymous.
A chemical dependency assessment includes an interview with a counselor to review a person's chemical usage and its impact on their daily life and relationships. The assessment may also include:
Check the Getting help page to find out who to call to get an assessment.
Anyone can request an assessment for him or herself or for another person. Currently, all county or tribal agencies provide assessments, and many treatment programs do as well. Health plans that serve Medical Assistance and MinnesotaCare clients also must provide assessments. Call your health plan or county or tribal office for more information. Check the Getting help page to find out who to call to get an assessment. If you are a tribal member, you can also call your tribal office.
Anyone can request an assessment for him or herself or for another person. Under the state's Rule 25 (similar to a state law), all county or tribal agencies must provide an assessment when requested. Health plans that serve Medical Assistance and MinnesotaCare clients also must provide assessments. Call your health plan or county or tribal office for more information. Check this list for Rule 25 County Referral Numbers (PDF).
Addiction to alcohol or other drugs is a primary, chronic illness. Genetic, psychosocial and environmental factors influence how it develops and manifests itself. The disease is often progressive and can be fatal. It is characterized by continuous or periodic:
Alcohol or other drug addictions may begin with a personal choice to use these substances. However, research shows that for many a physiological dependence soon takes hold. Drug dependence produces significant and lasting changes in brain chemistry and function. These drug-induced changes in brain function may have behavioral consequences, including the defining characteristic of addiction: compulsion to use alcohol or other drugs despite adverse consequences.
Like diabetes or hypertension, addiction is a chronic medical illness that can be treated successfully.
Researchers use the term alcohol problems to refer to any type of condition caused by drinking that harms the drinker, jeopardizes the drinker's well-being or places others at risk. Alcohol problems can result from even moderate drinking, for example, driving under the influence (DUI), drinking during pregnancy or drinking when taking certain medicines. Alcohol problems range from occasional binge drinking to alcohol abuse or dependence (alcoholism).
Recovery is the ongoing process of overcoming active alcoholism or other drug addictions. The goal is to reduce or eliminate problems associated with chemical use. People in recovery make a commitment to sobriety and work to improve or maintain their physical, mental, emotional and spiritual well-being.
The first step in getting help is to have a chemical dependency assessment done by a professional.
If a county agency has denied you service or benefits, you have the right to appeal the decision (PDF).
Call Appeals Information before filing a written appeal at:
Call the Minnesota Department of Human Services Licensing Division at 651-431-6500.


text:
Trickbot is about as bad as they come in the world of malware. Originally a malware strain from the Windows ecosystem, security professionals have recently found samples of the code in the wild that prove that Trickbot has made the jump to the Linux world as well.
One of the things that makes this such a nasty little threat is the fact that it's best viewed as a muti-function toolkit.
It isn't just simple malware, which often has a limited bag of tricks and a very specific function. This is essentially the Swiss Army Knife of malware.
Another is the fact that just about any would-be hacker can get his or her hands on the code. Trickbot is often rented by hackers around the world who use it as a service to infiltrate whatever network they set their sights on and harvest whatever sort of data they're after.
Finally though, there's the fact that a Trickbot attack isn't 'just' a Trickbot attack. Once that malware strain has stolen whatever data the user wanted, it will often then be used to deploy a ransomware strain like Conti or Ryuk. It hits the target system with a devastating one-two punch, stealing yet more data and then encrypting files and locking down broad swaths of the victim's network.
One of the researchers who made the discovery had this to say about the new Linux threat:
"The malware acts as a covert backdoor persistence tool in UNIX environment used as a pivot for Windows exploitation as well as used as an unorthodox initial attack vector outside of email phishing. It allows the group to target and infect servers in UNIX environment (such as routers) and use it to pivot to corporate networks."
This is bad news indeed, especially given that many of the devices that make up the burgeoning Internet of Things run on a Linux operating system. Therefore, most don't have even rudimentary protection against hackers. Beware of this one. It is dangerous indeed.


text:
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text:
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Inlay: Genuine Moss Agate with Muonionalusta Meteorite and Gold LeafMaterial: CeramicFinish: Polished (outside)Fitting: Comfort fit (inside)Width: 8 mm wide
*Disclaimer: Moss Agate is a natural product. We crush the gemstones into smaller pieces to be able to fit them in the inlay. Moss Agate gemstones are all different shades in color. They are all green but some darker some lighter.
All the pores will be filled with CA (Cyanoacrylate) so the ring can stand daily wear. We tested our own rings and they can stand water. They are waterproof but we always advise to not wear the ring when showering or swimming. From veneer to polished ring can take up to several days.
If you order a Decazi ring it will be made by hand. We don't have rings in stock. This way we guarantee that every ring is made by your wishes. Make sure when you measure your fingers that the size is correct. If you have troubles with sizing please let us know we can help you. Resin: The resin we use are all created by us, keep in mind that a pattern will never be the same. If you have a custom order you can send us a message. We can create almost every colour combination.
We ship worldwide, and to keep the cost low we send the rings in special envelopes fully protected.Refund: Every order is handmade and unique, so for that, we don't accept refunds. But we will find a proper solution to make you a happy customer.
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While we are STILL waiting to hear what's going on with the Mike Napoli deal, the Boston Red Sox made the signing of Koji Uehara official on Tuesday.
Here's the release from the Red Sox:
BOSTON, MA—The Boston Red Sox today signed right-handed pitcher Koji Uehara to a one-year contract through the 2013 season. In 37 relief appearances for the Texas Rangers last season, Uehara had a career-low 1.75 ERA (7 ER), ranking fifth among American Leaguers with at least 30.0 innings. He also posted the third-highest strikeout-to-walk ratio (14.33) and the fourth-lowest WHIP (0.64) in modern Major League history (since 1900).
Uehara (pronounced EW-eh-hara), 37, recorded 43 strikeouts compared to three walks over 36.0 innings in 2012. His 14.33 strikeout-to-walk ratio trailed only Hall of Famer Dennis Eckersley (18.33 in 1989, 18.25 in 1990) among all-time single-season leaders.
He held right-handed batters to a .125 average (7-for-56) last season, the fourth-lowest mark among Major Leaguers with at least 50 batters faced. Among AL pitchers against right-handed hitters, he also ranked tied for second in opponent OPS (.369) and sixth in opponent slugging (.214).
Following a 10-year career in Japan, Uehara was signed as an international free agent by the Orioles in 2009 and made 12 starts that year. Since shifting to the bullpen in 2010, he leads all Major Leaguers with a 10.76 strikeout-to-walk ratio (183 K/17 BB) and has averaged 11.36 strikeouts per nine innings (145.0 IP), the third-highest mark among American Leaguers with at least 125.0 innings over that time.
Over the last three years, he has held right-handers to a .177 batting average (47-for-265), third in the AL during that time (minimum of 200 batters faced). He posted a 0.72 WHIP or lower in consecutive seasons (0.72 in 2011, 0.64 in 2012), becoming just the second big leaguer ever to accomplish the feat along with Eckersley in 1989 and 1990.
The Osaka, Japan native, who was traded to the Texas Rangers on July 31, 2011, is 5-9 with 14 saves, 35 holds, and a 2.89 ERA (68 ER/211.2 IP) while striking out 231 compared to 29 walks in 157 appearances over four Major League seasons with the Orioles (2009-11) and the Rangers (2011-12). Among Japanese-born pitchers in the Majors, his 0.92 career WHIP and 1.23 walks per nine innings are the lowest such rates ever, while his 9.82 strikeouts per nine innings is second all time to Takashi Saito (minimum of 200.0 IP).
He appeared in three postseason games for the Rangers in 2011 and tossed a scoreless frame for Texas in the 2012 American League Wild Card game.
In his 10 seasons (1999-2008) for the Yomiuri Giants in the Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) Central League, Uehara compiled a 112-62 record with 33 saves, a 3.01 ERA (518 ER/1,549.0 IP) and 1,376 strikeouts. He led the NPB in wins in 1999 and 2002, ERA in 1999 and 2004, and strikeouts in 1999 and 2003.
An eight-time NPB All-Star (1999-2005, 2007), he was named the Central League Rookie of the Year in 1999, along with winning the Sawamura Award as the NPB's top pitcher, the Golden Glove Award, and being named to the Top Nine Award as NPB's best all-around starting pitcher in both 1999 and 2002. He led the Giants to the Japan Series championship in 2000 and 2002.
He also participated in both the 2004 and 2008 Olympic Games for Team Japan, and helped lead his country to the gold medal at the inaugural World Baseball Classic in 2006.
Uehara will wear No. 19. With the signing, the Red Sox 40-man roster is now at 40.
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'Real Housewives of Beverly Hills' Star Erika Jayne and Husband Tom Girardi Divorcing After 21 Years
After 21 years of marriage, Erika Jayne is filing for divorce from her husband Tom Girardi.
The Real Housewives of Beverly Hills star has "filed for dissolution of marriage," according to new legal documents.
"After much consideration, I have decided to end my marriage to Tom Girardi," the reality star exclusively told E! News. "This is not a step taken lightly or easily. I have great love and respect for Tom and for our years and the lives we built together."
"It is my absolute wish to proceed through this process with respect and with the privacy that both Tom and I deserve," she added. "I request others give us that privacy as well."
The couple married in 1999 after meeting at a restaurant in West Hollywood where she was working as a cocktail waitress.
Their two-decade, unconventional romance faced a lot of skepticism thanks to their 33-year age difference, Girardi refusing to wear a ring, and no prenuptial agreement.
"I'm tired of having to justify my 20-year marriage. Go get a 20-year marriage, then come f--king talk to me," she said on the hit Bravo show.
Girardi has worked as a lawyer for decades. His most famous case served as the basis for the 2000 film Erin Brockovich.