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As relevant here, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Statute) requires federal agencies and their employees' unions to "meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement," 5 U. S. C. §7114(a)(4); and creates the Federal Labor Relations Authority, giving it broad adjudicatory, policymaking, and rulemaking powers to implement the Statute, §§7104, 7105. The Authority initially held that §7114(a)(4)'s good-faith-bargaining requirement does not extend to union-initiated proposals during the term of the basic contract. The D. C. Circuit disagreed, and in response, the Authority reversed its position. In this suit, a federal employees' union proposed including in its basic contract with a subagency of the Department of the Interior (Agency) a provision obligating the Agency to negotiate, at the union's request, about midterm matters not in the original contract. Relying on the Fourth Circuit's view that union-initiated midterm bargaining is inconsistent with the Statute, the Agency refused to accept, or bargain about, the proposed clause. However, the Authority ordered the Agency to bargain. The Fourth Circuit set aside that order, holding that the Statute prohibits such a provision.
Held: The Statute delegates to the Authority the legal power to determine whether parties must engage in midterm bargaining or bargaining about midterm bargaining. Pp. 5-15.
(a) The Statute itself does not resolve the midterm bargaining question. Section 7114(a)(4)'s language is sufficiently ambiguous or open on the point as to require judicial deference to reasonable interpretation or elaboration by the agency charged with the Statute's execution. Such ambiguity is inconsistent both with the Fourth Circuit's absolute reading that the Statute prohibits midterm bargaining and with the D. C. Circuit's similarly absolute, but opposite, reading. It is perfectly consistent, however, with the conclusion that Congress delegated to the Authority the power to determine whether, when, where, and what sort of midterm bargaining is required. This conclusion is supported by the Statute's delegation of rulemaking, adjudicatory, and policymaking powers to the Authority and by precedent recognizing the similarity of the Authority's public-sector and the National Labor Relations Board's private-sector roles, see Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 97 . Pp. 5-13.
(b) For similar reasons, the Statute also grants the Authority leeway in answering the question whether an agency must bargain endterm about including in the basic labor contract a midterm bargaining clause. The Authority's judgment that the parties must bargain over such a provision was occasioned by the D. C. Circuit's holding that the Statute imposes a duty to bargain midterm. Since the Statute does not resolve the question of midterm bargaining, nor the related question of bargaining about midterm bargaining, the Authority should have the opportunity to consider these questions aware that the Statute permits, but does not compel, the conclusions it reached. Pp. 13-15.
132 F. 3d 157, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., joined, and in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to Part I.
97-1184 v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al .
97-1243 v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[March 3, 1999]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute requires federal agencies and the unions that represent their employees to "meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement." 5 U. S. C. §7114(a)(4). We here consider whether that duty to bargain extends to a clause proposed by a union that would bind the parties to bargain midterm--that is, while the basic comprehensive labor contract is in effect--about subjects not included in that basic contract. We reverse a lower court holding that the statutory duty to bargain does not encompass midterm bargaining (or bargaining about midterm bargaining). We conclude that the Statute delegates to the Federal Labor Relations Authority the legal power to determine whether the parties must engage in midterm bargaining (or bargaining about that matter). We remand these cases so that the Authority may exercise that power.
Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Statute or FSLMRS) in 1978. See 5 U. S. C. §7101 et seq . Declaring that "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest," §7101(a), the Statute grants federal agency employees the right to organize, provides for collective bargaining, and defines various unfair labor practices. See §§7114(a)(1), 7116. It creates the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which it makes responsible for implementing the Statute through the exercise of broad adjudicatory, policymaking, and rulemaking powers. §§7104, 7105. And it establishes within the Authority a Federal Service Impasses Panel, to which it grants the power to resolve negotiation impasses through compulsory arbitration, §7119, hence without the strikes that the law forbids to federal employees, §7116(b)(7).
Of particular relevance here, the Statute requires a federal agency employer to "meet" with the employees' collective-bargaining representative and to "negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement." §7114(a)(4). The Courts of Appeals disagree about whether, or the extent to which, this good-faith-bargaining requirement extends to midterm bargaining. Suppose, for example, that the federal agency and the union negotiate a basic 5-year contract. In the third year a matter arises that the contract does not address. If the union seeks negotiations about the matter, does the Statute require the agency to bargain then and there, or can the agency wait for basic contract renewal negotiations? Does it matter whether the basic contract itself contains a "zipper clause" expressly forbidding such bargaining? Does it matter whether the basic contract itself contains a clause expressly permitting midterm bargaining? Can the parties insist upon bargaining endterm (that is, during the negotiations over adopting or renewing a basic labor contract) about whether to include one or the other such clauses in the basic contract itself?
In 1985 the Authority began to answer some of these questions. It considered a union's effort to force midterm negotiations about a matter the basic labor contract did not address, and it held that the Statute did not require the agency to bargain. Internal Revenue Service , 17 F. L. R. A. 731 (1985) ( IRS I ) .
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however, set aside the Authority's ruling. The court held that in light of the intent and purpose of the Statute, it must be read to require midterm bargaining, inasmuch as it did not create any distinction between bargaining at the end of a labor contract's term and bargaining during that term. National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA , 810 F. 2d 295 (1987) (NTEU) . On remand the Authority reversed its earlier position. Internal Revenue Service , 29 F. L. R. A. 162, 166 (1987) ( IRS II ). Accepting the D. C. Circuit's analysis, the Authority held:
"[T]he duty to bargain in good faith imposed by the Statute requires an agency to bargain during the term of a collective bargaining agreement on negotiable union-initiated proposals concerning matters which are not addressed in the [basic] agreement and were not clearly and unmistakably waived by the union during negotiation of the agreement." Id ., at 167.
The Fourth Circuit has taken a different view of the matter. It has held that "union-initiated midterm bargaining is not required by the statute and would undermine the congressional policies underlying the statute." Social Security Administration v. FLRA , 956 F. 2d 1280, 1281 (1992) ( SSA ). Nor, in its view, may the basic labor contract itself impose a midterm bargaining duty upon the parties. Department of Energy v. FLRA , 106 F. 3d 1158, 1163 (1997) (holding unlawful a midterm bargaining clause that the Federal Service Impasses Panel had imposed upon the parties' basic labor contract).
In the present suit, the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1309 (Union), representing employees of the United States Geological Survey, a subagency of the Department of the Interior (Agency), proposed including in the basic labor contract a midterm bargaining provision that said,
"The Union may request and the Employer will be obliged to negotiate [midterm] on any negotiable matters not covered by the provisions of this [basic] agreement." Department of Interior , 52 F. L. R. A. 475, 476 (1996).
The Agency, relying on the Fourth Circuit's view that the Statute prohibits such a provision, refused to accept, or to bargain about, the proposed clause. The Authority, reiterating its own (and the D. C. Circuit's) contrary view, held that the Agency's refusal to bargain amounted to an unfair labor practice. Id ., at 479-481. The Statute itself, said the Authority, imposes an obligation to engage in midterm bargaining--an obligation that the proposed clause only reiterates. Id ., at 479-480. And even if such an obligation did not exist under the Statute, the Authority added, a proposal to create a contractual obligation to bargain midterm is a fit subject for endterm negotiation. Id ., at 480-481. Consequently, the Authority ordered the Agency to bargain over the proposed clause.
The Fourth Circuit set aside the Authority's order. 132 F. 3d 157 (1997). The court reiterated its own view that the Statute itself does not impose any midterm bargaining duty. Id ., at 161-162. That being so, it concluded, the parties should not be required to bargain endterm about including a clause that would require bargaining midterm. The court reasoned that once bargaining over such a clause began, the employer would have no choice but to accept the clause. Were the employer not to do so (by bargaining to impasse over the proposed clause), the Federal Service Impasses Panel would then inevitably insert the clause over the employer's objection, as the Impasses Panel (like the D. C. Circuit) believes that a midterm bargaining clause would merely reiterate the duty to bargain midterm that the Statute itself imposes. Ibid .
We granted certiorari to consider the conflicting views of the Circuits.
We shall focus primarily upon the basic question that divided the Circuits: Does the Statute itself impose a duty to bargain during the term of an existing labor contract? The Fourth Circuit thought that the Statute did not impose a duty to bargain midterm and that the matter was sufficiently clear to warrant judicial rejection of the contrary view of the agency charged with the Statute's administration. SSA , supra , at 1284 (stating that " `Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,' " and quoting Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984)). We do not agree with the Fourth Circuit, for we find the Statute's language sufficiently ambiguous or open on the point as to require judicial deference to reasonable interpretation or elaboration by the agency charged with its execution. See Chevron , supra , at 842-845; Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA , 495 U. S. 641, 644-645 (1990).
The D. C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Authority all agree that the Statute itself does not expressly address union-initiated midterm bargaining. See NTEU , 810 F. 2d, at 298; SSA , supra , at 1284; Brief for Petitioner FLRA in No. 97-1243, p. 18. The Statute's relevant language simply says that federal agency employer and union representative "shall meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement." 5 U. S. C. §7114(a)(4). It defines the key term "collective bargaining agreement" as an "agreement entered into as a result of collective bargaining." §7103(a)(8). And it goes on to define "collective bargaining" as involving the meeting of employer and employee representatives "at reasonable times" to "consult" and to "bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the conditions of employment," incorporating "any collective bargaining agreement reached" as a result of these negotiations in "a written document." §7103(a)(12). This language, taken literally, may or may not include a duty to bargain collectively midterm.
The Agency, here represented by the Solicitor General, argues that in context, this language must exclude midterm bargaining. We shall explain why we do not agree with each of the Agency's basic arguments.
First, the Agency makes a variety of linguistic arguments. As an initial matter, it emphasizes the words "arriving at" in the Statute's general statement that the parties must bargain "for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement." This statement tends to exclude midterm bargaining, the Agency contends, because parties engage in midterm bargaining, not for the purpose of arriving at , but for the purpose of supplementing , their basic, comprehensive labor contract. In other words, the basic collective-bargaining agreement is the only appropriate destination at which negotiations might "arriv[e]." The Agency adds that "collective bargaining agreement" is a term of art, which only and always refers to basic labor contracts, not to midterm agreements.
Further, while the Agency acknowledges that there is a duty to bargain midterm in the private sector, see NLRB v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co. , 196 F. 2d 680 (CA2 1952), it argues that this private-sector duty is based upon language in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) that is different in significant respects from the language in the Statute here. The Agency explains that the NLRA defines private-sector collective bargaining to include (1) negotiation "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or [(2)] the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder." 29 U. S. C. §158(d) (emphasis added). The "or," under this view, indicates that private-sector employers have a comprehensive duty to "bargain collectively" whether or not such bargaining is part of "the negotiation of an agreement" leading to "written contract."
In our view, these linguistic arguments, while logical, make too much of too little. One can easily read "arriving at a collective bargaining agreement " as including an agreement reached at the conclusion of midterm bargaining, particularly because the Statute itself does no more than define the relevant term "collective bargaining agreement" in a circular way--as "an agreement entered into as a result of collective bargaining." 5 U. S. C. §7103(a)(8). Nor have we found any statute, judicial opinion, agency document, or treatise that says whether the words "collective bargaining agreement" are words of art that must necessarily exclude midterm agreements. Finally, the linguistic differences between the NLRA and the FSLMRS tell us little, particularly given the fact that the two labor statutes, like collective bargaining itself, are not otherwise identical in the two sectors. For all these reasons, we find in the relevant statutory language ambiguity, not certainty.
Second, the Agency--like the Fourth Circuit--contends that the Statute's policies demand a reading of the statutory language that would exclude midterm bargaining from its definition of "collective bargaining." The availability of midterm bargaining, the Agency argues, might lead unions to withhold certain subjects from ordinary endterm negotiations and then to raise them during the term, under more favorable bargaining conditions. A union might conclude, for example, that it is more likely to get what it wants by presenting a proposal during the term (when no other issues are on the table and a compromise is less likely) and then negotiating to impasse, thus leaving the matter for the Federal Service Impasses Panel to resolve. The Agency also points out that public-sector and private-sector bargaining differ in this respect. Private-sector unions enforce their views through strikes, and because they hesitate to strike midterm, they also have no particular incentive to bargain midterm. But public-sector unions enforce their views through compulsory arbitration, not strikes. Hence, the argument goes, public-sector unions have a unique incentive to bargain midterm on a piecemeal basis, thereby threatening to undermine the basic collective-bargaining process. See, e.g. , SSA , 956 F. 2d, at 1288-1289.
Other policy concerns, however, argue for a different reading of the Statute. Without midterm bargaining, for example, will it prove possible to find a collective solution to a workplace problem, say a health or safety hazard, that first appeared midterm? The Statute's emphasis upon collective bargaining as "contribut[ing] to the effective conduct of public business," 5 U. S. C. §7101(a)(1)(B), suggests that it would favor joint, not unilateral, solutions to such midterm problems.
The Authority would seem better suited than a court to make the workplace-related empirical judgments that would help properly balance these, and other, policy-related considerations. The Statute does not indicate that Congress itself decided to make these specific policy judgments. Hence the Agency's policy arguments illustrate the need for the Authority's elaboration or refinement of the basic statutory collective-bargaining obligation; they illustrate the appropriateness of judicial deference to considered Authority views on the matter; and, most importantly, they do not narrow the scope of a statutory provision the language of which is consistent with a variety of interpretations.
Third, the Agency argues that the Statute's history and prior administrative practice support its view that federal agencies have no duty to bargain midterm. The Statute grew out of an Executive Order that previously had governed federal-sector labor relations. See Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 CFR 861 (1966-1970 Comp.), as amended by Exec. Order Nos. 11616, 11636, and 11838, 3 CFR 605, 634, 957 (1971-1975 Comp.). In support, the Agency cites a case in which an Assistant Secretary of Labor, applying that Executive Order, dismissed an unfair labor practice complaint on the ground, among others, that a federal agency need not bargain over midterm union proposals. Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., Capital Exchange Region Headquarters , Case No. 22-6657(CA), 2 Rulings on Requests for Review of Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations 561-562 (1976) (not reviewed by the Federal Labor Relations Council, predecessor to the Authority); see IRS I , 17 F. L. R. A., at 736-737, n. 7 (finding, based upon this decision, that there was no obligation to bargain over midterm union proposals under the Executive Order). A single alternative ground, however--in a single, unreviewed decision from before the Statute was enacted--does not demonstrate the kind of historical practice that one might assume would be reflected in the Statute, particularly when at least one treatise suggested at the time that federal labor relations practice was to the contrary. See H. Robinson, Negotiability in the Federal Sector 10-11, and n. 9 (1981) (stating that under the Executive Order both unions and agencies had a continuing duty to bargain through the term of a basic labor contract).
The Agency also points to a Senate Report in support of its interpretation of the Statute. That Report speaks of the parties' "mutual duty to bargain" with respect to (1) "changes in established personnel policies proposed by management," and (2) "negotiable proposals initiated by either the agency or [the union] . . . in the context of negotiations leading to a basic collective bargaining agreement. " S. Rep. No. 95-969, p. 104 (1978) (emphasis added). This Report, however, concerns a bill that contains language similar to the language before us but was not enacted into law. According to the D. C. Circuit, at least, any distinction between basic and midterm bargaining that is indicated by this passage "did not survive the rejection by Congress of the Senate's restrictive view of the rights of labor and the importance of collective bargaining." NTEU , 810 F. 2d, at 298. In any event, the Report's list of possible occasions for collective bargaining does not purport to be an exclusive list; it does not say that the Statute was understood to exclude midterm bargaining; and any such implication is simply too distant to control our reading of the Statute.
Fourth, the Agency and the Fourth Circuit contend that the "management rights" provision of the Statute, 5 U. S. C. §7106, does authorize limited midterm bargaining in respect to certain matters (not here at issue), and that by negative implication it denies permission to bargain midterm in respect to any others. See, e.g. , SSA , supra , at 1284 ("The inclusion of a specific duty of midterm effects bargaining . . . suggests the inadvisability of reading a more general duty into the statute"). Our examination of that provision, however, finds little support for such a strong negative implication.
Subsection (a) of the management rights provision withdraws from collective bargaining certain subjects that it reserves exclusively for decision by management. It specifies, for example, that federal agency "management official[s]" will retain their authority to hire, fire, promote, and assign work, and also to determine the agency's "mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and internal security practices." §7106(a).
Subsection (b), however, permits a certain amount of collective bargaining in respect to the very subjects that subsection (a) withdrew. Subsection (b) states:
" Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any labor organization from negotiating--
"(1) at the election of the agency, on the numbers, types, and grades of employees or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of duty, or on the technology, methods, and means of performing work;
"(2) procedures which management officials . . . will observe in exercising any authority under this section; or
"(3) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any authority under this section by such management officials." §7106(b) (emphasis added).
The two subsections of the management rights provision, taken together, do not help the Agency. While the provision contemplates that bargaining over the impact and implementation of management changes may take place during the term of the basic labor contract, subsection (b) need not be read to actually impose a duty to bargain midterm. The italicized clause, "[n]othing in this section shall preclude," indicates only that the delegation of certain rights to management ( e.g. , promotions) shall not preclude negotiations about certain related matters ( e.g. , promotion procedures). By its terms, then, subsection (b) does nothing more than create an exception to subsection (a), preserving the duty to bargain with respect to certain matters otherwise committed to the discretion of management. Because §7106(b) chiefly addresses the subject matter of bargaining and not the timing, one could reasonably conclude that while that subsection contemplates midterm bargaining in the circumstances there specified, the duty to bargain midterm finds its source elsewhere in the Statute. Hence, the management rights provision seems to hurt, as much as to help, the Agency's basic argument.
The upshot of this analysis is that where the Agency and the Fourth Circuit find a clear statutory denial of any midterm bargaining obligation, we find ambiguity created by the Statute's use of general language that might, or might not, encompass various forms of midterm bargaining. That kind of statutory ambiguity is inconsistent both with the Fourth Circuit's absolute reading of the Statute and also with the D. C. Circuit's similarly absolute, but opposite, reading. Compare SSA , 956 F. 2d, at 1284, with NTEU , 810 F. 2d, at 301 (rejecting the Authority's position that there is no duty to bargain midterm on the ground that it is "contrary to the intent of the legislature and the guiding purpose of the statute"). Indeed, the D. C. Circuit's analysis implicitly concedes the need to make at least some midterm bargaining distinctions, when it assumes that the midterm bargaining obligation does not extend to matters that are covered by the basic contract. See id ., at 296.
The statutory ambiguity is perfectly consistent, however, with the conclusion that Congress delegated to the Authority the power to determine--within appropriate legal bounds, see, e.g. , 5 U. S. C. §706 (Administrative Procedure Act); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984) -- whether, when, where, and what sort of midterm bargaining is required. The Statute's delegation of rulemaking, adjudicatory, and policymaking powers to the Authority supports this conclusion. See 5 U. S. C. §7105(a)(1) ("Authority shall provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance"); §7105(a)(2)(E) (Authority "resolves issues relating to the duty to bargain in good faith"); §7117(c) (Authority resolves disputes about whether the duty to bargain in good faith extends to a particular matter); accord American Federation of Govt. Employees, Local 2986, AFL-CIO v. FLRA , 775 F. 2d 1022, 1027 (CA9 1985); American Federation of Govt. Employees, AFL-CIO, Council of Soc. Sec. Dist. Office Locals, San Francisco Region v. FLRA , 716 F. 2d 47, 50 (CADC 1983). This conclusion is also supported by precedent recognizing the similarity of the Authority's public-sector and the National Labor Relations Board's private-sector roles. As we have recognized, the Authority's function is "to develop specialized expertise in its field of labor relations and to use that expertise to give content to the principles and goals set forth in the Act," and it "is entitled to considerable deference when it exercises its `special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities' of federal labor relations." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA , 464 U. S. 89, 97 (1983) (quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. , 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963)).
We conclude that Congress "left" the matters of whether, when, and where midterm bargaining is required "to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities." Chevron , supra , at 865-866.
The specific question before us is whether an agency must bargain endterm about including in the basic labor contract a clause that would require certain forms of midterm bargaining. As is true of midterm bargaining itself, and for similar reasons, the Statute grants the Authority leeway (within ordinary legal limits) in answering that question as well.
The Authority says that it has determined, as a matter of its own judgment, that the parties must bargain over such a provision. Our reading of its relevant administrative determinations, however, leads us to conclude that its judgment on the matter was occasioned by the D. C. Circuit's holding that the Statute must be read to impose on agencies a duty to bargain midterm. See, e.g. , Merit Systems Protection Bd. Professional Assn. , 30 F. L. R. A. 852, 859-860 (1988) (midterm bargaining clause is negotiable because it "reiterates a right the Union has under the Statute"); 52 F. L. R. A., at 479 (in the instant suit, restating that same conclusion). The Authority did indicate below that even if it agreed with the Fourth Circuit's position that the Statute does not impose a duty to bargain midterm, the outcome in this litigation would be no different, as the Authority " `has previously upheld the negotiability of proposals despite the absence of a statutory right concerning the matter in question.' " Id ., at 480 (quoting Department of Energy , 51 F. L. R. A. 124, 127 (1995), enf. denied, Department of Energy v. FLRA , 106 F. 3d 1158 (CA4 1997)). This explanation, however, seems more an effort to respond to, and to distinguish, a contrary judicial authority, rather than an independently reasoned effort to develop complex labor policies. Regardless, the Authority's conclusion would seem linked to the D. C. Circuit's basic understanding about the statutory requirements.
In light of our determination that the Statute does not resolve the question of midterm bargaining, nor the related question of bargaining about midterm bargaining, we believe the Authority should have the opportunity to consider these questions aware that the Statute permits, but does not compel, the conclusions it reached.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
97-1184 v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al .
97-1243 v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit
[March 3, 1999]
Justice O'Connor , with whom The Chief Justice joins, and with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join as to Part I, dissenting.
The Court today ignores the plain meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (Federal Labor Statute or Statute) and erroneously concludes that when an agency responds to a judicial decision by abandoning its own interpretation of a statute and adopting that of the judicial forum this Court should defer to the agency's revised position, rather than evaluate whether the revised interpretation renders, in fact, the most plausible reading of the statute. I respectfully
The Federal Labor Statute plainly does not impose a general duty on agencies to bargain midterm. See Social Security Administration v. FLRA , 956 F. 2d 1280, 1281 (CA4 1992) (SSA) . Whether the language of a statute is plain or ambiguous is determined "by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997).
Here, the language of the Federal Labor Statute, as well as the specific and broader contexts in which that language is used, demonstrates that the Statute is unambiguous. The Federal Labor Statute specifies a few instances where midterm bargaining is required, see 5 U. S. C. §7106(b), but it contains no provision that expressly or implicitly imposes a general duty on agencies to bargain during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. Rather, Congress defined the general duty to bargain to include only a duty to "meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement, " §7114(a)(4) (emphasis supplied), and obligated agencies to negotiate "with a sincere resolve to reach a collective bargaining agreement ," §7114(b)(1) (emphasis supplied); see also, §7114(b)(5) (requiring parties "to take such steps as are necessary to implement such agreement"). The term "arrive" is commonly understood to mean "to reach a destination" or "to gain or achieve an end." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 121 (1976). Thus, by its terms, the Federal Labor Statute requires an agency to "meet and negotiate in good faith" with unions only "for the purposes of" achieving an end: a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement. See also §7103(a)(8) (defining "collective bargaining agreement" as "an agreement" reached through collective bargaining); §7103(a)(12) (defining "collective bargaining," in part, as "to reach [an] agreement with respect to the conditions of employment").
The Court suggests that, because a midterm bargaining agreement is an end agreement of negotiation, the duty to bargain may encompass midterm agreements as well. See ante, at 7. As the word "midterm" suggests, however, such agreements are only a "midpoint" in the term of the underlying collective bargaining agreement. Because such agreements do not stand alone but relate back to the primary collective bargaining agreement, a midterm agreement is most appropriately regarded as a modification of, or a supplement to, the primary agreement reached pursuant to the Federal Labor Statute. See, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §158(d) (describing midterm bargaining agreements in private sector as "modification[s]" to the primary agreement). The Federal Labor Statute expresses no general duty on the part of agencies to negotiate modifications or supplements to an existing collective bargaining agreement. With respect to modifications and supplements, the Statute requires only that agencies bargain over a few specified topics. See 5 U. S. C. §7106(b).
Section 7106(b) obligates an agency to bargain midterm over specified agency initiatives, such as the creation of "procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising any authority" under the Federal Labor Statute. §7106(b)(2); see also §7106(b)(3) (providing for bargaining over "appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any authority under this section by such management officials"); American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 v. FLRA , 702 F. 2d 1183, 1186-1187 (CADC 1983). Because the Statute specifies a few, limited topics that are subject to midterm bargaining, it cannot be construed to require midterm bargaining generally. Such a construction, indeed, renders the specific and general obligations redundant. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc ., 503 U. S. 30, 36 (1992).
The Court reasons that §7106(b) does not define a limited duty to bargain midterm because it merely defines exceptions to §7106(a), which, in turn, defines managerial rights that are themselves exceptions to the duties outlined in the Statute. Moreover, because the section's introductory language "indicates only that the delegation of certain rights to management ... shall not preclude negotiations about certain related matters," see ante, at 11, the Court suggests that §7106(b) defines a permissive exception to an exception rather than an obligation. It thus follows from the structure and text of §7106(b) that "the duty to bargain midterm finds its source elsewhere in the Statute." Ante, at 12.
The Court's reliance on §7106(b)'s introductory language is misplaced because the subparts of §7106(b) indicate that this section defines an obligation, not a permissive exception. Specifically, although §7106(b)(1) provides that an agency at its election can initiate bargaining on working conditions, §§7106(b)(2) and (b)(3) are mandatory, requiring that agencies bargain midterm over the matters specified. At the very least, §§7106(b)(2) and (b)(3) demonstrate that Congress intended to impose only a limited duty on agencies to bargain midterm. Even assuming §7106(b) is permissive, there is no basis for the Court's conclusion that this section demonstrates that a generalized duty to bargain midterm emanates from another statutory source; indeed, there is no other provision of the Statute from which such a duty could emanate. See ante, at 12. Accordingly, it is plain from its language and structure that a general duty to engage in midterm bargaining is not prescribed by the Federal Labor Statute.
That the Federal Labor Statute contemplates a single end agreement, and not supplementary agreements or modifications, is also demonstrated by a comparison of it to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Statute's private-sector counterpart. The duty to bargain, as defined in the NLRA, includes "the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder ." 29 U. S. C. §158(d) (emphasis supplied). This broad definition of the duty, which clearly contemplates negotiation of midterm agreements, stands in stark contrast to the duty defined in the Federal Labor Statute, to "arriv[e] at a collective bargaining agreement." 5 U. S. C. §7114(a)(4). The NLRA also contains a proviso limiting this broad duty to negotiate when there is "in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry" and a party desires to "modify" that contract. 29 U. S. C. §158(d). For example, there is no duty to engage in midterm bargaining over matters already "contained in" the existing collective bargaining agreement. Ibid. As noted above, the Federal Labor Statute lacks any comparable language. Because, at the time it drafted the Statute, Congress knew that the NLRA defined a duty to bargain midterm, see NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co ., 196 F. 2d 680, 684 (CA2 1952), this omission indicates that Congress did not intend to include a similar duty in the Federal Labor Statute.
The Court concludes, nevertheless, that this omission is irrelevant because the Federal Labor Statute and the NLRA, as well as collective bargaining in the public and private sectors, are different. See ante, at 7; see also Fort Stewart Schools v. FLRA , 495 U. S. 641, 648 (1990) (observing that the Federal Labor Statute and the NLRA should not be read in pari materia ). To be sure, there are differences between the acts, but that fact does not render a comparison of them irrelevant. It is well established that "the interpretation of a doubtful statute may be influenced by language of other statutes which are not specifically related, but which apply to similar persons, things, or relationships." 2 B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §53.03, p. 233 (rev. 5th ed. 1992). Employing this principle, the Court has previously compared nonanalogous statutes to aid its interpretation of them. See Overstreet v. North Shore Corp. , 318 U. S. 125, 131-132 (1943) (using Federal Employers' Liability Act to aid interpretation of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 even though the two Acts were not strictly analogous). In light of these principles of construction, the NLRA may be used to aid our interpretation of the Federal Labor Statute. See also Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 92-93 , 96-97 (1983) (analogizing the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to the National Labor Relations Board).
A comparison of the two statutes explains why a duty to bargain midterm was included in the NLRA but omitted from the Federal Labor Statute. Under the Statute, but not the NLRA, the Government must subsidize union negotiators. See 5 U. S. C. §7131(a). Consequently, there is little incentive for union negotiators to streamline their bargaining positions or to avoid extended midterm bargaining. Given this incentive structure, it is difficult to imagine that Congress would obligate Government agencies to bargain midterm, for such an obligation would likely cause perpetual collective bargaining. Continuous bargaining, however, is contrary to the goal of the FLRA: to promote "effective and efficient" Government, not Government stymied by perpetual bargaining. §7101(b). Indeed, it was this realization that initially motivated the FLRA to reject the contention that the Federal Labor Statute contained a duty to bargain midterm. See Internal Revenue Service , 17 F. L. R. A. 731, 736-737 (1985) (observing that midterm bargaining would cause continuous bargaining on an issue-by-issue basis).
A duty to bargain midterm was also excluded from the Statute because, in the context of the no-strike regime of federal labor relations, it would leave the agency-employer at an unfair disadvantage. In the NLRA context, the union that wants to obtain a midterm modification or supplement from an employer who is dead set against it must pay the price of a strike that is costly to it and its members. In the context of the Federal Labor Statute, the union that wants to obtain a midterm modification or supplement need only bargain to an impasse and then hope that the Federal Service Impasses Panel will give it all (or at least some) of what it has requested. Demanding unreciprocated additional benefits is cost-free. Thus, a midterm bargaining requirement might motivate a union to "hold [a] matter off until the term agreement is done[,]... initiate the proposal as part of a single-issue negotiation," and, if an impasse results, force the agency to arbitrate. Ferris, Union-Initiated Mid-Term Bargaining: A Catalyst in Reshaping Conflict Patterns, 5 Negotiation J. 407, 411-412 (Oct. 1989). Again, it is obvious that this incentive structure does not promote "effective and efficient" government. §7101(b). Given the language and structure of the Federal Labor Statute, the context in which this language is used and the differences between the Statute and the NLRA, I would hold that the Federal Labor Statute plainly, and justifiably, does not impose a general duty to bargain midterm.
The FLRA argues, in the alternative, that even if the Federal Labor Statute does not impose a general obligation to bargain midterm, agencies nevertheless must bargain over union-initiated proposals to include in term agreements midterm bargaining provisions. In other words, unions may propose that agency-employers agree to obligate themselves contractually to bargain midterm. In the private sector, the duty to bargain means only that the employer and the exclusive representative bargain over something in good faith. In the public sector, however, the duty to bargain over a proposal can have very different consequences: Unions may force an agency into binding arbitration by bargaining to impasse. §7119(c)(5)(B)(iii). Therefore, by imposing a duty to bargain over midterm bargaining clauses, the FLRA is, at the very least, taking the choice of whether to bargain midterm out of a reluctant federal employer's hands, and placing it into the hands of the Federal Service Impasses Panel, a result that seems inconsistent with the Federal Labor Statute's goals of promoting "effective and efficient Government." §7101(b).
There is, moreover, no statutory source for a duty to bargain over contractual requirements to bargain midterm. Section 7117(a)(1) directs an agency to bargain over "matters which are the subject of any rule or regulation only if the rule or regulation is not a Government-wide rule or regulation" but only "to the extent not inconsistent with any Federal law." The FLRA has interpreted this section to impose a duty on agencies to bargain over only proposals relating to conditions of employment. See Brief for Petitioner FLRA in No. 97-1243, p. 37. It is not apparent, however, how bargaining over a contractual requirement to bargain midterm is a "matte[r ] . . . affecting working conditions." See 5 U. S. C. §7103(a)(14) (defining "conditions of employment"). More important, because Congress, through the Federal Labor Statute, chose not to require agencies to bargain midterm, it is "inconsistent with . . . Federal law" for the FLRA to require bargaining over a contractual requirement to bargain midterm. As I read the Statute, Congress has clearly rejected such a requirement.
Even if I agreed with the Court that the Federal Labor Statute is ambiguous with respect to the duty to bargain midterm, I would not defer in this suit to the FLRA's interpretation of the Statute pursuant to Chevron . See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U. S. 837, 842-843 (1984).
We observed in Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala , 508 U. S. 402 (1993), that when an agency alters its interpretation of a statute, its revised interpretation may be entitled to less deference than a position consistently held. We explained:
"The Secretary is not estopped from changing a view she believes to have been grounded upon a mistaken legal interpretation. Indeed, an administrative agency is not disqualified from changing its mind; and when it does, the courts still sit in review of the administrative decision and should not approach the statutory construction issue de novo and without regard to the administrative understanding of the statutes. On the other hand, the consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due. As we have stated: `An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is "entitled to considerably less deference" than a consistently held agency view.' INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U. S. 421, 446 , n. 30 (1987). How much weight should be given to the agency's views in such a situation, and in particular where its shifts might have resulted from intervening and possibly erroneous judicial decisions and its current position from one of our own rulings, will depend on the facts of individual cases." Id., at 417 (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
See also INS v. Cardoza - Fonseca , 480 U. S. 421, 446-447 and n. 30 (1987) (rejecting agency interpretation of statute on ground that interpretation was not consistent with congressional intent, and agency's interpretation was not entitled to heightened deference because it had been inconsistent over time); Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm ., 454 U. S. 27, 37 (1981) (observing that the "thoroughness, validity, and consistency of an agency's reasoning are factors that bear upon the amount of deference to be given an agency's ruling," but ultimately deferring to inconsistent agency position); see also Watt v. Alaska , 451 U. S. 259, 272-273 (1981) (holding that agency's interpretation of amendment that was contemporaneous with amendment's passage was entitled to considerably more deference than agency's current, inconsistent interpretation).
Here, the FLRA changed its position on the precise matter that we have been asked to consider--whether agencies have a duty to bargain midterm under the Federal Labor Statute--and did so in response to a judicial decision. Initially, the FLRA determined that the Statute did not impose a duty to bargain midterm, see Internal Revenue Service , 17 F. L. R. A. 731 (1985), but it came to the opposite conclusion after the D. C. Circuit rejected this reading of the Statute, see National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA , 810 F. 2d 295 (1987) (holding the Statute required midterm bargaining); Internal Revenue Service , 29 F. L. R. A. 162, 166 (1987) (adopting D. C. Circuit's reading of the Statute). At the time it reversed course, the FLRA offered only a scant explanation for its sudden interpretive shift. It merely stated that it agreed with the D. C. Circuit's holdings and concluded, "based on the court's decision and in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge," that the IRS had impermissibly refused to bargain over a midterm proposal. Id., at 165-166, 168. The only apparent reason for the agency's shift in interpretation was the D. C. Circuit's decision. In this circumstance, the agency's interpretation of the Statute is entitled to less deference. See Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, supra, at 417. This lesser standard of deference seems particularly appropriate here because we have recognized some limits on the FLRA's interpretive powers. See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA , 464 U. S., at 108 . Accordingly, we should endeavor to find the most plausible construction of the Federal Labor Statute and examine the Secretary's current interpretation in light of this construction.
The FLRA currently interprets the Federal Labor Statute to impose a duty on federal agencies to negotiate midterm those union-initiated proposals that are not covered in the term agreement unless the union has clearly waived its right to bargain midterm. See Brief for Petitioner FLRA in No. 97-1243, pp. 18-20; see Department of Navy, Marine Corps Logistics Base v. FLRA, 962 F. 2d 48, 56 (CADC 1992) (outlining FLRA position). This is not, however, the most plausible construction of the Statute. For the reasons previously discussed, there is no language in the Statute expressing a general duty to bargain midterm. Moreover, to the extent that the FLRA has codified exceptions to a generalized duty to bargain midterm, those exceptions are defined out of whole cloth; there is nothing in the text of the Federal Labor Statute that suggests limits on a duty to bargain midterm. For these reasons, even if there were some ambiguity in the Federal Labor Statute, I would hold that the agency's interpretation of the Federal Labor Statute is inferior to the natural, and most plausible, reading of that Statute--that there is no general duty to bargain midterm. See Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S., at 417; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U. S., at 446 -447, and n. 30. I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the Fourth Circuit.
* Together with No. 97-1243, Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Department of the Interior et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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Citation: 526 U.S. 86
Docket No: No. 97-1184
Argued: November 09, 1998
Decided: March 03, 1999
Court: United States Supreme Court
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text: The Saint Croix river was formed relatively recently in geological terms. During the last ice age, a glacier blocked the south end of Lake Superior, forming glacial Lake Duluth. As the ice retreated, Lake Duluth broke though its banks to the south and started to drain. The water rushed to the south cutting first the Saint Croix valley, and later the Mississippi River valley south of Hastings. Once the glaciers melted and Lake Duluth was empty, a small rise of land divided the Saint Croix river near the present day town of Solon Springs, Wisconsin. At this point, water on the northeast side of the divide flowed though the Bois Brule River to the north into Lake Superior. Water on the south and west side of the divide flowed south on the Saint Croix River, then flowing into the Mississippi River at Prescott, Wisconsin. This divide is not a hill or a mountain, rather it is no more than a matter of a few inches in a swampy area at the north end of Upper Saint Croix Lake. This swampy area sits in the river valley carved by the glacial river flow. In contrast to the divide being only a few inches in elevation, the river valley is over 100 feet deep.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
MUSKEGON, Mich. — Aliyah Hughes has been busy building her beauty empire during the pandemic.
The nine-year-old launched LeeLee Kisses with help from her mom in August.
Together, they create organic makeup products at home.
"I like lip gloss," explained Hughes. "I sell lip gloss, bracelets, and some chapstick."
The business has taken off quickly for the third-grade entrepreneur, who now ships her products across the country.
"I have a lot of family here that supports, and my friends, and they tell everyone else, and then that worked," said Aliyah's mother Diamone. "When we first launched the website, I want to say that we had like 20 orders that first day. So she really did good for her first week."
She continued, "We just added two more states last weekend, so 15 states total now [that we ship to]. We're trying to get to 50 by the one-year anniversary of her business."
Aliyah is proud of what she's been able to accomplish, but still has some big goals for her beauty business.
"We're thinking about adding other things to her line," said Diamone. "We're still planning to see what else she would want to do... she's trying to become a millionaire within a few years."
To check out the makeup line, just head toLeeLeeKisses.com or visit the Facebook page for more information.
Janice Allen first reported this story for WXMI.


text:
Cohen, Ex-Trump Lawyer, To Testify Publicly Before Congress
WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump's former lawyer, Michael Cohen, will testify publicly before a House committee next month in a hearing that could serve as the opening salvo of a promised Democratic effort to scrutinize Trump, his conflicts of interest and his ties to Russia.
The House Oversight and Reform Committee announced Thursday that Cohen will appear before that panel Feb. 7, a little more than a month after the Democrats took the House majority.
The hearing marks the latest step in Cohen's transformation from a trusted legal adviser to the president to a public antagonist who has cooperated extensively against him. Although Democrats say the questioning will be limited to avoid interfering with open investigations, the hearing is still likely to pull back the curtain on key episodes involving Trump's personal life and business dealings, including hush-money payments to women and a proposed Moscow real estate deal, that federal prosecutors have been dissecting for months.
Cohen is a pivotal figure in investigations by special counsel Robert Mueller into potential coordination between Russia and the Trump campaign and by federal prosecutors in New York into campaign finance violations related to payments to buy the silence of a porn actress and a former Playboy Playmate who say they had sex with Trump. Federal prosecutors have said Trump directed those payments during the campaign.
Trump has denied having the extramarital affairs.
Cohen has pleaded guilty in both investigations and was sentenced last month to three years in prison. An adviser to Cohen, Lanny Davis, said shortly after he was sentenced that the former political fixer wanted to testify and "state publicly all he knows."
In a statement released on Thursday, Cohen said he had accepted the invitation "in furtherance of my commitment to cooperate and provide the American people with answers."
Cohen added: "I look forward to having the privilege of being afforded a platform with which to give a full and credible account of the events which have transpired."
Trump has denied wrongdoing and sought to minimize Cohen's statements by painting him as a liar. Asked by reporters in Texas on Thursday about Cohen's appearance, Trump said he's "not worried about it at all."
Cohen acknowledged in the Mueller investigation that he lied to Congress by saying negotiations over a Trump Tower in Moscow had ended in January 2016 when he actually pursued the project into that June, well into Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. In New York, he acknowledged his involvement in payments to porn actress Stormy Daniels and former Playboy model Karen McDougal.
The chairman of the oversight panel, Democratic Rep. Elijah Cummings of Maryland, said the committee is consulting with Mueller's office about the testimony. He told reporters on Thursday that "there will be limitations" on the topics covered in Cohen's testimony.
"We don't want to do anything to interfere with the Mueller investigation — absolutely nothing," Cummings said.
The panel's top Republican, Rep. Jim Jordan of Ohio, said Cohen's appearance shows that Cummings is using the "committee as a venue for political theater rather than legitimate oversight," noting how Cohen has admitted knowingly lying to Congress and is a witness in ongoing investigations.
"This makes clear that Chairman Cummings and the Democrats will do whatever it takes to attack this President," Jordan said in a statement.
A spokesman for Mueller declined to comment.
Cummings has signaled that his committee is more interested in investigating the president's involvement in the campaign violations to which Cohen pleaded guilty last year.
Cummings has sent document requests to the White House and the Trump Organization that seek to determine why Trump, who reimbursed Cohen for the hush-money payments, omitted that debt on his public financial disclosure form. Cummings is also requesting a raft of potentially revealing communications about the payments and other legal services Cohen provided for the president and his company.
The oversight hearing may not be Cohen's only appearance. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff, D-Calif., said he welcomes Cohen's testimony before the oversight panel, but "it will be necessary, however, for Mr. Cohen to answer questions pertaining to the Russia investigation, and we hope to schedule a closed session before our committee in the near future."
Cohen testified before the House intelligence panel in a closed-door hearing in 2017, before his role in the federal investigations was fully known and when Republicans controlled the committee. The GOP-led committee later ended its investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, saying there was no evidence of collusion or conspiracy between Trump's campaign and Russia.
Schiff wants to restart parts of that probe.
The Senate intelligence committee has also asked Cohen to return. He spoke to that panel in 2017.
"The request still stands, regardless of any public testimony Mr. Cohen may give on other issues," its chairman, Sen. Richard Burr, R-N.C., said in a statement.
Associated Press writers Catherine Lucey in McAllen, Texas, and Darlene Superville and Padmananda Rama in Washington contributed to this report.


text:
The mystery of how arsenic levels in beer sold in Germany could be higher than in the water or other ingredients used to brew the beer has been solved, scientists announced April 7 at the 245th National Meeting & Exposition of the American Chemical Society in New Orleans.
Mehmet Coelhan, Ph.D., and colleagues said the discovery could be of importance for breweries and other food processors elsewhere that use the same filtering technology implicated in the elevated arsenic levels in some German beers. Coelhan's team at the Technische Universität in Munich set out to solve that riddle after testing 140 samples of beers sold in Germany as part of a monitoring program. The monitoring checked levels of heavy metals like arsenic and lead, as well as natural toxins that can contaminate grain used in brewing beer, pesticides and other undesirable substances.
Coelhan explained that the World Health Organization uses 10 micrograms per liter of arsenic in drinking water as a limit. However, some beers contained higher arsenic levels. "When arsenic level in beer is higher than in the water used during brewing, this excess arsenic must come from other sources," Coelhan noted. "That was a mystery to us. As a consequence, we analyzed all materials, including the malt and the hops used during brewing for the presence of arsenic."
RELATED: Beer brewer wins Industrial Waste Water Treatment Plant of the Year Award
They concluded that the arsenic was released into the beer from a filtering material called kieselguhr, or diatomaceous earth, used to remove yeast, hops and other particles and give the beer a crystal clear appearance. Diatomaceous earth consists of fossilized remains of diatoms, a type of hard-shelled algae that lived millions of years ago. It finds wide use in filtering beer, wine and is an ingredient in other products.
"We concluded that kieselguhr may be a significant source of arsenic contamination in beer," Coelhan said. "This conclusion was supported by analysis of kieselguhr samples. These tests revealed that some kieselguhr samples release arsenic. The resulting arsenic levels were only slightly elevated, and it is not likely that people would get sick from drinking beers made with this filtration method because of the arsenic. The arsenic is still at low levels — the risk of alcohol poisoning is a far more realistic concern, as stated in previous studies on the topic."
Coelhan pointed out that beers produced in at least six other countries had higher arsenic amounts than German beers, according to a report published four years ago. He said that breweries, wineries and other food processors that use kieselguhr should be aware that the substance can release arsenic. Substitutes for kieselguhr are available, he noted, and simple measures like washing kieselguhr with water can remove the arsenic before use.


text:
This seminar examines the scholastic approach to the history of philosophy exemplified by Etienne Gilson against the background of its foundation in the thought of Aristotle as it was appropriated by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. It examines the role that philosophy or theology's history plays in the conceptual constructions of scholastic thinkers, and what they think is truly first and deepest in the history they so study.
Dr. Robert Sweetman
Tuesday 9:30am-12:30pm
(MA, PhD)


text:
Wise Care 365 is a PC performance enhancement* application, which consists of five key elements: PC Checkup, System Cleaner, System Tune-up, Privacy Protector and System Monitoring.
The PC Checkup element can check the whole running condition of your PC, grade its health status, and, if necessary, provide you with quick-fix solutions.
The System Cleaner element will help you scan and clean invalid registry entries, useless files, junk from browsers and redundant Windows components.
The System Tuneup element optimizes your system, network, defragment disk and registry; manage startup & services and context menu.
Privacy Protector will erase your browsing history, including viewed pictures, watched movies/videos, accessed files and visited pages. It can also prevent files or data from being recovered by specialised recovery software, and it can generate passwords for you.
System monitoring allows you to overview system processes and hardware information such as temperature and memory usage, etc.
As well as the above tools, Wise Care 365 also includes a restoring and scheduler function as well. Overall, Wise Care 365 has a simple and intuitive interface that both novice and expert will be able to use. That coupled with some a well rounded out tool-kit makes Wise Care 365 a useful applicaiton to have.
*Note, some features are only available in the registered version of Wise Care 365.


text:
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Simple to use, needing just a few minutes of your time each day.
Helps plan your work, so you serve your regular customers on time.
Tracks customer debts, so you get paid for all the work you do.
Generates invoices, emails them for you and lets your customers pay you online.
Calculates your VAT if required.
Records all your expenses, in categories you choose, helping you pay less tax.
Collects all your finances into a summary report for the year to help you with your accounts and tax.
Supports multiple users, so you can allocate work across members of your team or franchise.
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Works without an internet connection.


text: RAW Potassium contains 50% water-soluble potash derived from potassium sulfate. This is the highest concentration of natural water-soluble potassium available to the home gardener. During fruiting and flowering, large amounts of potassium are used by the plant in a matter of days, which can lead to potassium deficiencies. RAW Potassium is ideal for boosting potassium (K) levels, treating deficiencies and creating optimal recipe solutions. A 2 oz package of RAW Potassium makes up to 200 gallons, an 8 oz package makes up to 800 gallons and a 2 lb package makes up to 3200 gallons.


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M4W is a company formed by a young and dynamic team of professionals with a 100% technical and commercial training in the field of Industrial Engineering and it has a long proven experience in different sectors of activity related to the manufacturing and the industrial world in general.
The most important aspects of its human capital are the high technical ability, the broad experience in project management of sales and liquidation of industrial assets as well as a deep industry knowledge and skills when it comes to designing the sales force that best suits the needs of the project.
Machines4World Polígono La Serna - Centro de Negocios - Ciudad Agroalimentaria c/c, 31500 Tudela (Navarra), Spain Tel: 0034 948415757 / Fax: 0034 948415758 / Email: firstname.lastname@example.com |
Webpages design


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Your little one needs to keep their head warm but also has discerning tastes. That's what makes our reversible cap perfect. When you feel like a pattern, there's a pattern. When it's time for a simpler look, flip it inside out for a solid color. It's made from buttery-soft organic cotton, so you don't have to worry about baby's delicate scalp—wind, snow, rain, or shine, it will keep their crown safe at all times.
- 0-3 months
- 100% organic cotton
- G.O.T.S. certified
- non-toxic, eco-friendly dyes
- ethically made in India


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Simply Blessed Authentic Barn Wood Sign 3D Cut Out Letters
A beautiful way to show your commitment to someone! Makes a perfect gift
This sign is approx 7-8" x 15"
**IMPORTANT** Each Barn Wood sign is created from authentic, reclaimed wood. Letters are laser cut from wood and attached to create a 3 Dimensional effect. Due to the nature of this reclaimed wood, every sign is unique and special in it's own way. Your sign may not look exactly like shown. Whenever possible, the sign is key holed on the back for easy hanging on a nail or hook


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Architect of the Standard Model of Physics
Steven Weinberg (b. 1933) was born in New York to Jewish parents of Romanian and German heritage. He studied at the Bronx High School of Science, then did his undergraduate studies in physics at Cornell. After a brief stint at the Niels Bohr Institute in Denmark, he earned his PhD at Princeton in 1957. Weinberg first did research at Columbia University, then became a professor at UC Berkeley. While there, he started writing one of his most famous books, The Quantum Theory of Fields, as well as the popular textbook Gravitation and Cosmology. In 1966, Weinberg moved back east to teach at Harvard. The following year, as a visiting professor at MIT, he published his new model unifying electromagnetism and the nuclear forces. Part of this was proposing the existence of the Higgs boson (which was finally discovered in 2012). Weinberg's model built on the work of his former high school classmate and fellow Jewish physicist, Sheldon Glashow. The two shared the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physics for their work (together with Pakistani physicist Abdus Salam). Over the years, Weinberg did research on—and greatly furthered our understanding of—gravity and cosmology, quantum physics and string theory, pions, leptons, and supersymmetry. His work has expanded nearly every aspect of modern physics and is among the most renowned scientists in the world. Weinberg has testified before Congress as an expert witness, and has written many popular articles and science books, among them The First Three Minutes and To Explain the World: The Discovery of Modern Science. He has been awarded 11 honourary degrees together with a long list of awards including the National Medal of Science. Weinberg is also a staunch supporter of Israel and has refused to speak at universities that boycott the Jewish State. Today, as he nears his 87th birthday, he continues to write and teach physics at the University of Texas at Austin.
UPDATE: Sadly, Steven Weinberg passed away on July 23rd, 2021.
Words of the Week
Given the history of the attacks on Israel and the oppressiveness and aggressiveness of other countries in the Middle East and elsewhere, boycotting Israel indicates a moral blindness for which it is hard to find any explanation other than antisemitism.
– Steven Weinberg


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Just read the question about the Big Rewrites and I remembered a question that I've been wanting answered myself.
I have a horrible project passed down to me, written in old Java, using Struts 1.0, tables with inconsistent relationships, or no relationships at all and even tables without primary keys or fields meant to be primary keys but aren't unique at all. Somehow most of the app "just works". Most of the pages are reused (copy pasted code) and hard-coded. Everyone who's ever worked on the project has cursed it in one form or the other.
Now I had long considered to propose to upper management a total rewrite of this horrendous application. I'm slowly attempting to on personal time but I really feel that this deserves some dedicated resources to make it happen. Having read the articles on big rewrites I'm having second thoughts. And that's not good when I want to convince my superiors to support my rewrite. (I work in a fairly small company so the proposal has the possibility of being approved)
TL;DR When is a big rewrite the answer and what arguments can you use to support it?


text: RSS New property listed in Clayton, Cloverdale Posted on September 9, 2016 by Terry Mitterer Posted in Clayton, Cloverdale Real Estate I have listed a new property at 131 19525 73 AVE in Surrey. See details here 1 of ONLY 2 in wildly popular UPTOWN CLAYTON, this fabulous 'G' Plan is seldom available & highly sought after. At almost 2,000 SF with 4 bathrms, it's also the largest & has all the premium features that you could ask for: Open Concept Living, 9' ceilings, large windows for max light, Gourmet Kitchen with Maple Shaker cabs, Quartz counters, pantry, island & premium S/S appliances, tile & laminate floors, custom built fireplace feature wall, powder rm on main, spacious master with WI closet & ensuite, extra storage, Side x Side Double Garage with room for 2 more cars on front apron. Huge Media/Den/Bedrm/Flex Rm with full bath and access to your patio & fenced back yard. Great Amenities; Clubhouse with guest suite, exercise room, all purpose room & playground. Sophisticated, kid & pet friendly community, Walk everywhere; steps from great schools, shops, services, parks & transit. Quality construction & finishing, rain screen, sound proofing, deluxe trim & closet organizers. Balance of new home warranty.


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We were looking for something local to eat and happened to chance across Bebek Bengil in Google Maps. It actually took us more than 30 minutes to walk over but I thought it was worth it since it's touted as "The Original Crispy Duck Since 1990". Bebek Bengil Dirty Duck Diner is known for their crispy grilled duck.
This is a different dish from the popular bebek betutu in Bali. Bebek Betutu is a seasoned steamed or roasted duck that's popular in Bali. Bebek Bengil (which means dirty duck) serves crispy duck. You can even order 1 whole duck for IDR 300,000 if you book one day in advance. It's a pretty good deal at RM 94/duck if you want to go for it. The service by the uniform clad waitresses is pleasantly discreet and unobstructive.
Bebek Bengil (IDR 125,000)
I had this original dish, which is half a duck steamed in Indonesian spices which is then deep fried for a crispy finish. It's served with rice and Balinese vegetables and it cost RM 40. It's their flagship signature dish and it tasted alright. I'm not a huge fan of deep fried duck and I thought it was slightly too crispy but personal tastes aside, it was pretty good.
Thirsty Duck (IDR 44,000)
This is what my better half had – it's a concoction of pure orange, markisa (passionfruit in the local language) and melon sugar.
Ice Bebek Putih Jambul (IDR 39,000)
The drink I had was chosen at random from the duck-themed options. It turns out to be a shaved ice confection with lots of interesting goodies at the bottom – love the white squiggles and fresh fruit slices.
Bebek Pelalah (IDR 122,000)
My dear ordered this dish. It's one of the specialties and the Balinese recipe came from one Ibu Agung Raka Sueni. I have no idea who that is but the owners of Bebek Bengil thought it was noteworthy enough to highlight this in their menu. This is the grilled version of the duck (as opposed to my steamed and deep fried duck) with Balinese sauce and steamed rice. It's very spicy! I really like the sauce here.
I thought the ambience of Bebek Bengil is unique – the place is totally dark (as you can probably gather from the photos) with the exception of mood lighting from the pavilions where we were seated. There were not a lot of people due to the higher than usual prices. The meal came up to around RM 140 for the two of us and it's worth a visit for the atmosphere alone. The water features around the raised dining pavilions made it really romantic.
Bebek Bengil Dirty Duck Diner
Jalan Hanoman, Padang Tegal,
Ubud, Bali


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Positioned in between Anaheim and Santa Ana is Backyard Grove, CA, recognized for its inexperienced parks, annual strawberry competition, and naturally, nice eating places representing Orange County. And in case you're dwelling in Backyard Grove, then likelihood is you've gotten a favourite spot to go for lunch or dinner.
However in case you've simply moved to the realm or not too long ago rented an condominium in Backyard Grove, then you definitely is likely to be looking for just a few eating places so as to add to your go-to checklist. We're right here that will help you out with an inventory of 10 must-try Backyard Grove eating places. Discover out the place the locals go for a chew to eat.
#1: Azteca Restaurant
Delicacies: Mexican restaurant
Deal with: 12911 Principal St, Backyard Grove, CA 92840
Azteca Restaurant's Web site
Positioned alongside historic Principal Road, Azteca Restaurant is a superb place to seize a meal whether or not you're searching for tamales, tacos, chile verde, albondigas, or jumbo shrimp.
#2: The Penalty Field
Delicacies: Burger, scorching canine joint, and American restaurant
Deal with: 12900 Euclid St Ste 135, Backyard Grove, CA 92840
The Penalty Field's Web site
One other one of many must-visit Backyard Grove eating places you need to contemplate stopping by is The Penalty Field. You could find them serving burgers, scorching canine, and fries with a wide range of toppings in addition to shakes.
#3: Los Sanchez Restaurant
Delicacies: Mexican restaurant
Deal with: 11906 Backyard Grove Blvd, Backyard Grove, CA 92843
Los Sanchez Restaurant's Web site
When you're searching for a Mexican restaurant with dishes like pozole, huevos rancheros, barbacoa tacos, and sopes, you'll want to cease by Los Sanchez Restaurant.
#4: Aunt Yese's
Delicacies: Breakfast spot
Deal with: 12444 Brookhurst St, Backyard Grove, CA 92840
Aunt Yese's Web site
Aunt Yese's is a comfy homestyle breakfast spot serving classics like bacon and eggs, eggs benedict, home made chilaquiles, pancakes, omelettes, lunch sandwiches, and loads of vegan choices.
#5: Sabroso! Mexican Grill
Delicacies: Mexican restaurant
Deal with: 13129 Harbor Blvd, Backyard Grove, CA 92843
Sabroso! Mexican Grill's Web site
You could find Sabroso! Mexican Grill on the east aspect of Backyard Grove. There's a fantastic collection of gadgets like loaded nachos, shrimp cocktails, chamorro (slow-cooked beef in Guajillo sauce), tortas, California burritos, and agua fresca.
#6: Pho Lu
Delicacies: Vietnamese restaurant
Deal with: 10141 Westminster Ave Ste M, Backyard Grove, CA 92843
Pho Lu's Web site
When you've not too long ago moved to Backyard Grove and are looking for an genuine Vietnamese restaurant, you'll find that at Pho Lu. Assume pho, vermicelli, vermicelli soup, and damaged rice dishes, all along with your alternative of meat or vegetable.
#7: The Boiling Crab
Delicacies: Cajun and Creole restaurant
Deal with: 14241 Euclid St Ste C116, Backyard Grove, CA 92843
The Boiling Crab's Web site
The Boiling Crab is positioned in south Backyard Grove and has wonderful choices for these searching for an genuine crab boil with out leaving California. You may decide your catch, sauce, and spice degree or order fried shrimp or catfish baskets as an alternative.
#8: Lee's Sandwiches
Delicacies: Sandwich restaurant
Deal with: 13991 Brookhurst St, Backyard Grove, CA 92843
Lee's Sandwiches' Web site
Lee's Sandwiches is the right place to seize a chew in Backyard Grove whether or not you're within the temper for a pork roll, pate sandwich, veggie avocado croissant, or Hawaiian candy rolls.
#9: Vientiane Thai Laos Restaurant
Delicacies: Laotian restaurant
Deal with: 10262 Westminster Ave, Backyard Grove, CA 92843
Vientiane Thai Laos Restaurant's Web site
Vientiane Thai Laos Restaurant is a stellar spot to take a look at in Backyard Grove. An genuine Laotian restaurant, Vientiane Thai Laos Restaurant has dishes like fish desserts, cucumber salad, tom yum kai, Lao curry noodle soup, and stir fried frog.
#10: Mo Ran Gak
Delicacies: Korean BBQ restaurant
Deal with: 9651 Backyard Grove Blvd, Backyard Grove, CA 92844
Mo Ran Gak's Web site
Rounding out our checklist of Backyard Grove eating places is Mo Ran Gak, a Korean BBQ spot, additionally serving genuine meals like galbi, seafood tofu soup, and cabbage wraps with pork.