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After petitioner had received treatment in a mental hospital, a psychiatrist advised the court that he was able to stand trial, but that he was suffering from a mental disease and that further treatment would be advisable. Petitioner was then brought to trial in the District of Columbia on two charges of passing worthless checks. On advice of counsel, he sought to withdraw an earlier plea of not guilty and to plead guilty to both charges; but the judge refused to permit him to do so. Although petitioner maintained that he was mentally responsible when the offenses were committed and presented no evidence to support an acquittal by reason of insanity, the trial judge concluded that he was not guilty on the ground that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, and ordered him committed to a mental hospital under D.C. Code 24-301 (d), which provides that, "If any person . . . is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of [the] commission [of the offense], the court shall order such person to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill." In this habeas corpus proceeding, held: The trial court erred in ordering petitioner committed, because 24-301 (d) applies only to a defendant who by his own act has relied on a defense that he was insane when the offense was committed and who is acquitted on that ground. Pp. 706-720.
109 U.S. App. D.C. 404, 288 F.2d 388, reversed.
Richard Arens argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Rufus King.
Assistant Attorney General Marshall argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Richard J. Medalie, Harold H. Greene and David Rubin. [369 U.S. 705, 706]
Briefs urging reversal were filed by Francis M. Shea and Lawrence Speiser for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding instituted in the District Court by the petitioner, presently confined in Saint Elizabeths Hospital for the insane pursuant to a commitment under D.C. Code 24-301 (d), to test the legality of his detention. The District Court, holding that petitioner had been unlawfully committed, directed his release from custody unless civil commitment proceedings (D.C. Code 21-310) were begun within 10 days of the court's order. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed by a divided vote. 109 U.S. App. D.C. 404, 288 F.2d 388. Since the petition for certiorari raised important questions regarding the procedure for confining the criminally insane in the District of Columbia and suggested possible constitutional infirmities in 24-301 (d) as applied in the circumstances of this case, we granted the writ. 366 U.S. 958 .
Two informations filed in the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia on November 6. 1959, charged petitioner with having violated D.C. Code 22-1410 by drawing and negotiating checks in the amount of $50 each with knowledge that he did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment. On the same day, petitioner appeared in Municipal Court to answer these charges and a plea of not guilty was recorded. He was thereupon committed under D.C. Code 24-301 (a) to the District of Columbia General Hospital for a mental examination to determine his competence to stand trial. 1 On December 4, 1959, the Assistant Chief Psychiatrist of [369 U.S. 705, 707] the Hospital reported that petitioner's mental condition was such that he was then "of unsound mind, unable to adequately understand the charges and incapable of assisting counsel in his own defense." The case was continued while petitioner was given treatment at the General Hospital.
On December 28, 1959, the Assistant Chief Psychiatrist sent a letter to the court advising that petitioner had "shown some improvement and at this time appears able to understand the charges against him, and to assist counsel in his own defense." This communication also noted that it was the psychiatrist's opinion that petitioner "was suffering from a mental disease, i. e., a manic depressive psychosis, at the time of the crime charged," such that the crime "would be a product of this mental disease." As for petitioner's current condition, the psychiatrist added that petitioner "appears to be in an early stage of recovery from manic depressive psychosis," but that it was "possible that he may have further lapses of judgment in the near future." He stated that it "would be advisable for him to have a period of further treatment in a psychiatric hospital."
Petitioner was brought to trial the following day in the Municipal Court before a judge without a jury. The record before us contains no transcript of the proceedings, 2 but it is undisputed that petitioner, represented by counsel, sought at that time to withdraw the earlier plea of not guilty and to plead guilty to both informations. The trial judge refused to allow the change of plea, apparently on the basis of the Hospital's report that petitioner's commission of the alleged offenses was the product of mental illness. [369 U.S. 705, 708]
At the trial one of the prosecution's witnesses, a physician representing the General Hospital's Psychiatric Division, testified, over petitioner's objection, that petitioner's crimes had been committed as a result of mental illness. Although petitioner never claimed that he had not been mentally responsible when the offenses were committed and presented no evidence to support an acquittal by reason of insanity, the trial judge concluded that petitioner was "not guilty on the ground that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense." 3 The court then ordered that petitioner be committed to Saint Elizabeths Hospital as prescribed by D.C. Code 24-301 (d), which reads:
Petitioner maintains, however, that his confinement is illegal for a variety of other reasons, among which is the assertion that the "mandatory commitment" provision, as applied to an accused who protests that he is presently sane and that the crime he committed was not the product of mental illness, deprives one so situated of liberty without due process of law. 5 We find it unnecessary to consider [369 U.S. 705, 710] this and other constitutional claims concerning the fairness of the Municipal Court proceeding, since we read 24-301 (d) as applicable only to a defendant acquitted on the ground of insanity who has affirmatively relied upon a defense of insanity, and not to one, like the petitioner, who has maintained that he was mentally responsible when the alleged offense was committed. 6
The decisions of this Court have repeatedly warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction which confines itself to the bare words of a statute, e. g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 -462; Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 409 , for "literalness may strangle meaning," Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 . Heeding that principle we conclude that to construe 24-301 (d) as applying only to criminal defendants who have interposed a defense of insanity is more consistent with the general pattern of laws governing the confinement of the mentally ill in the District of Columbia, and with the congressional policy that impelled the enactment of this mandatory commitment provision, than would be a literal reading of the section. That construction finds further support in the rule [369 U.S. 705, 711] that a statute should be interpreted, if fairly possible, in such a way as to free it from not insubstantial constitutional doubts. E. g., United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 ; International Assn. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 . Such doubts might arise in this case were the Government's construction of 24-301 (d) to be accepted.
To construe 24-301 (d) as requiring a court, without further proceedings, automatically to commit a defendant who, as in the present case, has competently and advisedly not tendered a defense of insanity to the crime charged and has not been found incompetent at the time of commitment is out of harmony with the awareness that Congress has otherwise shown for safeguarding those suspected of mental incapacity against improvident confinement.
Thus, a civil commitment must commence with the filing of a verified petition and supporting affidavits. D.C. Code 21-310. This is followed by a preliminary examination by the staff of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, a hearing before the Commission on Mental Health, and then another hearing in the District Court, which must be before a jury if the person being committed demands one. D.C. Code 21-311. At both of these hearings representation by counsel or by a guardian ad litem is necessary. Dooling v. Overholser, 100 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 243 F.2d 825, construing D.C. Code 21-308, 21-311. The burden of proof is on the party seeking commitment, and it is only if the trier of fact is "satisfied that the alleged insane person is insane," that he may be committed "for the best interest of the public and of the insane person." D.C. Code 21-315. 7 [369 U.S. 705, 712]
Likewise, Congress has afforded protection from improvident commitment to an accused in a criminal case who appears to the trial court "from the court's own observations, or from prima facie evidence submitted to the court . . . [to be] of unsound mind or . . . mentally incompetent so as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense." D.C. Code 24-301 (a). In such circumstances preliminary commitment for a "reasonable period" is authorized in order to permit observation and examination. If the medical report shows that the accused is of unsound mind, the court may "commit by order the accused to a hospital for the mentally ill unless the accused or the Government objects." (Emphasis added.) In case of objection, there must be a judicial determination with respect to the accused's mental health, and it is only "if the court shall find the accused to be then of unsound mind or mentally incompetent to stand trial" that an order for continued commitment is permissible. Hence if the accused denies that he is mentally ill, he is entitled to a judicial determination of his present mental state despite the hospital board's certification that he is of unsound mind. And it should be noted that the burden rests with the party seeking commitment to prove that the accused is "then of unsound mind." D.C. Code 24-301 (a).
Considering the present case against this background, we should be slow in our reading of 24-301 (d) to attribute to Congress a purpose to compel commitment of [369 U.S. 705, 713] an accused who never throughout the criminal proceedings suggests that he is, or ever was, mentally irresponsible. 8 This is the more so when there is kept in mind the contrast between the nature of an acquittal by reason of insanity and the finding of insanity required in other kinds of commitment proceedings. In the District of Columbia, as in all federal courts, an accused "is entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon all the evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of committing crime." Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484 . See, e. g., Isaac v. United States, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 34, 284 F.2d 168. Compare Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 . Consequently, the trial judge or jury must reach a judgment or verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity even if the evidence as to mental responsibility at the time the offense was committed raises no more than a reasonable doubt of sanity. If 24-301 (d) were taken to apply to petitioner's situation, there would be an anomalous disparity between what [369 U.S. 705, 714] 24-301 (d) commands and what 24-301 (a) forbids. On the one hand, 24-301 (d) would compel posttrial commitment upon the suggestion of the Government and over the objection of the accused merely on evidence introduced by the Government that raises a reasonable doubt of the accused's sanity as of the time at which the offense was committed. On the other hand, 24-301 (a) would prohibit pretrial commitment upon the suggestion of the Government and over the objection of the accused, although the record contained an affirmative medical finding of present insanity, unless the Government is able to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused is presently of unsound mind.
Of course the posttrial commitment of 24-301 (d) presupposes a determination that the accused has committed the criminal act with which he is charged, whereas pretrial commitment antedates any such finding of guilt. But the fact that the accused has pleaded guilty or that, overcoming some defense other than insanity, the Government has established that he committed a criminal act constitutes only strong evidence that his continued liberty could imperil "the preservation of public peace." It no more rationally justifies his indeterminate commitment to a mental institution on a bare reasonable doubt as to past sanity than would any other cogent proof of possible jeopardy to "the rights of persons and of property" in any civil commitment. Compare note 7, supra.
Moreover, the literal construction urged here by the Government is quite out of keeping with the congressional policy that underlies the elaborate procedural precautions included in the civil commitment provisions. It seems to have been Congress' intention to insure that only those who need treatment and may be dangerous are confined; committing a criminal defendant who denies the existence of any mental abnormality merely on the [369 U.S. 705, 715] basis of a reasonable doubt as to his condition at some earlier time is surely at odds with this policy.
The criminal defendant who chooses to claim that he was mentally irresponsible when his offense was committed is in quite a different position. It is true that he may avoid the ordinary criminal penalty merely by submitting enough evidence of an abnormal mental condition to raise a reasonable doubt of his responsibility at the time of committing the offense. Congress might have thought, however, that having successfully claimed insanity to avoid punishment, the accused should then bear the burden of proving that he is no longer subject to the same mental abnormality which produced his criminal acts. Alternatively, Congress might have considered it appropriate to provide compulsory commitment for those who successfully invoke an insanity defense in order to discourage false pleas of insanity. We need go no further here than to say that such differentiating considerations are pertinent to ascertaining the intended reach of this statutory provision.
The enactment of 24-301 (d) in 1955 was the direct result of the change in the standard of criminal responsibility in the District of Columbia wrought by Durham v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862. That decision provoked a congressional re-examination of the laws governing commitment of the criminally insane. "Apprehension that Durham would result in a flood of acquittals by reason of insanity and fear that these defendants would be immediately set loose led to agitation for remedial legislation." Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 Yale L. J. 905, 941 (1961). A Committee on Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense was established [369 U.S. 705, 716] by the Council on Law Enforcement in the District of Columbia to inquire into "the substantive and procedural law of the District of Columbia bearing on mental disorder as a defense in a criminal prosecution." S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955); H. R. Rep. No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955). Among its recommendations was a mandatory commitment provision, subsequently enacted as 24-301 (d). The Committee noted that while under the then existing discretionary commitment statute 9 it had been customary for the court and the appropriate executive official to order the confinement of all those who had been found not guilty solely by reason of insanity, more assurance should be given the public that those so acquitted would not be allowed to be at large until their recovery from past mental illness had been definitely established:
Nor is it necessary to read 24-301 (d) as an assurance that an accused who requires medical treatment will be [369 U.S. 705, 718] hospitalized rather than be confined to jail. Simultaneously with the mandatory commitment provision, Congress enacted the present 24-302, which permits transfers of mentally ill convicts from penal institutions to hospitals. Consequently, if an accused who pleads guilty is found to be in need of psychiatric assistance, he may be transferred to a hospital following sentence.
Finally, it is not necessary to accept the Government's literal reading of 24-301 (d) in order to effectuate Congress' basic concern, in passing this legislation, of reassuring the public. Section 24-301 (a) provides a procedure for confining an accused who, though found competent to stand trial, is nonetheless committable as a person of unsound mind. That section permits the trial judge to act "prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the expiration of any period of probation," if he has reason to believe that the accused "is of unsound mind or is mentally incompetent so as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him." (Emphasis added.) The statute provides for a preliminary examination by a hospital staff, and then "if the court shall find the accused to be then of unsound mind or mentally incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the accused confined to a hospital for the mentally ill." 11 (Emphasis added.) [369 U.S. 705, 719] This inquiry, therefore, is not limited to the accused's competence to stand trial; the judge may consider, as well, whether the accused is presently committable as a person of unsound mind. 12 Since this inquiry may be undertaken at any time "prior to the imposition of sentence," it appears to be as available after the jury returns a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as before trial.
In light of the foregoing considerations we conclude that it was not Congress' purpose to make commitment compulsory when, as here, an accused disclaims reliance on a defense of mental irresponsibility. This does not mean, of course, that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court. As provided in Rule 11, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., and Rule 9, D.C. Munic. Ct. Crim. Rules, the trial judge may refuse to accept such a plea and enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the accused. We decide in this case only that if this is done and the defendant, despite his own assertions of sanity, is found not guilty by reason of insanity, [369 U.S. 705, 720] 24-301 (d) does not apply. If commitment is then considered warranted, it must be accomplished either by resorting to 24-301 (a) or by recourse to the civil commitment provisions in Title 21 of the D.C. Code.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
[ Footnote 2 ] Despite the absence of a trial record, the District Court made findings of fact respecting the proceedings at petitioner's trial, some of which are contested by the parties. We rely only upon those facts that were here admitted.
[ Footnote 3 ] Petitioner did not appeal from this judgment.
[ Footnote 4 ] Similar statutes are found in 12 States, the Virgin Islands, and in England. Compare Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) 39-8-4; Ga. Code Ann., 1953, 27-1503; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann., 1949, 62-1532; Maine Pub. L., 1961, c. 310; Mass. Ann. Laws, 1957, c. 123, 101 (murder or manslaughter); Mich. Stat. Ann., 1954, 28.933 (3) (murder); Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) 631.19; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann., 1943, 29-2203; Nev. Rev. Stat., 1955, 175.445; N. Y. Sess. Laws 1960, c. 550, 1-3; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin 1953) 2945.39; Wis. Stat., 1958, 957.11; V. I. Code Ann., 1957, Tit. 5, 3637. The English procedure is found in Trial of Lunatics Act, 46 & 47 Vict., c. 38, s. 2 (1883).
Statutes under which commitment is mandatory if the trial judge or jury finds that the accused is presently insane are, of course, clearly distinguishable. The focus of the inquiry on which commitment turns is the accused's mental health as of the time of commitment, and the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is merely evidence bearing on that issue. Consequently, the effect of the compulsory aspect of such a commitment provision is by no means comparable to that involved in the present case. Similarly, any discretionary commitment statute presumably leaves the trial judge or jury free to find the accused presently sane and thus entitled to full liberty.
[ Footnote 5 ] In essence the claim is that 24-301 (d) compels the indeterminate commitment of such a person without any inquiry as to his present sanity, and solely on evidence sufficient to warrant a reasonable doubt as to his mental responsibility as of the time he committed the offense charged. The claim is said to be buttressed when 24-301 (d) is taken in conjunction with the rigorous release-from-confinement [369 U.S. 705, 710] provisions of 24-301 (e) and 24-301 (g) as construed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Overholser v. Leach, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 289, 257 F.2d 667; Ragsdale v. Overholser, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 281 F.2d 943.
[ Footnote 6 ] The defense of insanity need not, of course, be asserted by means of a formal plea. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 11, which governs proceedings in the District Courts, permits the entry of certain enumerated pleas, not including "not guilty by reason of insanity," a plea which is authorized in some jurisdictions. D.C. Munic. Ct. Crim. Rule 9 is identical to Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 11. Consequently, a defense of insanity in a criminal proceeding in the District of Columbia may be established under a general plea of not guilty. We read 24-301 (d) as making commitment mandatory whenever the defendant successfully relies, in any affirmative way, on a claim that he was insane at the time of commission of the crime of which he is accused.
[ Footnote 7 ] A police officer may arrest and detain any person who appears to be of unsound mind on the belief that if such person is "permitted to remain at large or to go unrestrained in the District of Columbia [369 U.S. 705, 712] the rights of persons and of property will be jeopardized or the preservation of public peace imperiled and the commission of crime rendered probable." D.C. Code 21-326. However, within 48 hours of such apprehension, the petition that is otherwise required for an involuntary commitment must be filed, and the procedural machinery which follows the filing of such a petition must be set in motion. D.C. Code 21-311, par. 3.
[ Footnote 8 ] In eight of the 13 other American jurisdictions where statutes providing for mandatory commitment, following an acquittal by reason of insanity, are in effect, see note 4, supra, the provisions of the statutes indicate that they are to apply only if an insanity defense is interposed by the accused: Colorado ("in a trial involving the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity"); Georgia ("in all criminal trials . . . wherein an accused shall contend that he was insane"); Nebraska (accused "may plead that he is not guilty by reason of insanity or mental derangement"); Nevada ("where on a trial a defense of insanity is interposed by the defendant"); New York ("when the defense is insanity of the defendant"); Ohio ("when a defendant pleads `not guilty by reason of insanity'"); Wisconsin ("no plea that the defendant . . . was insane . . . shall be received unless it is interposed at the time of arraignment"); Virgin Islands ("if the defense is the mental illness of the defendant"). We have not been referred to any case in the remaining American jurisdictions or in England where a mandatory commitment of this nature, following a proceeding in which the defendant did not interpose a defense of insanity, was sustained.
[ Footnote 9 ] The statute then in effect provided:
[ Footnote 10 ] We have been told of four such cases in the District of Columbia, two arising in the Municipal Court and two in the District Court: District of Columbia v. Trembley, D.C. 28343-60; United States v. Taylor, U.S. 4774-59; United States v. Kloman, Crim. No. 383-58; United States v. Strickland, Crim. No. 374-59.
[ Footnote 11 ] D.C. Code 24-301 (a) provides:
[ Footnote 12 ] Compare 18 U.S.C. 4244, considered in Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 , which relates only to "mental incompetency after arrest and before trial." By the terms of 18 U.S.C. 4246, commitment is to last only "until the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law."
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting.
Eighty-seven years ago, Chief Justice Waite in speaking of the function of this Court said: "Our province is to decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be . . . . If the law is wrong, it ought to be changed; but the power for that is not with us." Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178 (1875). This holding followed as long as line of cases as it preceded. Today the Court seems to me to do what this long-established rule of statutory interpretation forbids. With sophisticated frankness it admits that the District's statute 1 "[b]y its plain terms . . . directs confinement in a mental hospital of any criminal defendant . . . who is `acquitted solely on the ground' that his offense was committed while he was mentally irresponsible, and forecloses the trial judge from exercising any discretion in this regard." Despite these "plain terms" the Court writes into the statute an exception, i. e., it applies "only to criminal defendants who have interposed a defense of insanity . . . ." It does [369 U.S. 705, 721] this despite the fact that the petitioner here apparently made no such contention in the trial court. Indeed, though he had counsel at the time of his trial in Municipal Court on two charges of passing bad checks, he made no attempt to appeal from the refusal of the court to accept his guilty plea and its finding that he was "not guilty on the ground that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense." After being committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital for treatment for some six months, he filed this habeas corpus application. Today's action may have the effect of setting him free though he makes no claim that he was sane at the time of trial or is so at this time. In fact, the last doctor's report in the record shows him to be suffering from a manic depressive psychosis from which though he "appears to be in an early stage of recovery" it is "possible that he may have further lapses . . . ." It further states that it "would be advisable for him to have a period of further treatment in a psychiatric hospital." The order today risks bringing that to an end.
The case therefore presents the complex and challenging problem of criminal incompetency with which the people of the District of Columbia have for years been plagued. The Congress in 1955 adopted the present statute to meet what it called the "serious and dangerous imbalance . . . in favor of the accused and against the public" which was created in part by the rule in Durham v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954). S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955). The statute, in my view, is not only designed to protect the public from the criminally incompetent but at the same time has the humanitarian purpose of affording hospitalization for those in need of treatment. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to this community. Moreover, [369 U.S. 705, 722] it has its counterpart in varying degrees in 36 of our States and in the federal system as well, many of which will be affected by this decision. In my view the Court undermines the purposes of these statutes; places a premium on pleas of guilty by defendants who were insane when they acted, made either pro se or through their attorneys; and thereby forces the conviction of innocent persons. And all of this is done in the face of the admitted "plain terms" of the mandate of Congress under the guise that the Court's holding "is more consistent with the general pattern of laws governing the confinement of the mentally ill in the District of Columbia." I believe, however, that the Congress in adopting 24-301 (d) said what it meant and that it meant what it said. I regret that the Court has seen fit to repeal the "plain terms" of this statute and write its own policy into the District's law. Especially do I deplore its suggestion of doubt as to its constitutionality. In the light of the cases this is chimerical. Finding myself with reference to the opinion like Mrs. Gummidge, "a lone, lorn creetur' and every think [about it] goes contrairy with me," I respectfully dissent.
It is well to point out first what is not involved here. First, this is not a civil commitment case, although this Court attempts to force one upon the parties. In providing the safeguards of D.C. Code 21-310 as to the ordinary civil commitment of persons claimed to be insane the Congress clearly acted in protection of those who were not charged with criminal offenses or who had never exhibited any criminal proclivities. In protecting the public from the criminally incompetent it could with reason act with less caution. See Overholser v. Leach, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 289, 291, 257 F.2d 667, 669, and Kenstrip v. Cranor, 39 Wash. 2d 403, 405, 235 P.2d 467, 468. In criminal cases the person could be held in custody in any [369 U.S. 705, 723] event and humanitarian principles require his hospitalization where needed. Nor are the procedures for release involved here. Petitioner has not sought his release under the statute. The procedure, however, is simple and effective, i. e., a doctor's certificate recommending release filed with the court is sufficient. If the doctor refuses such certificate, the inmate may seek to prove his sanity on habeas corpus. Here, however, no claim of sanity has been made.
Nor does this case involve commitment under D.C. Code 24-301 (a). The first provision of that section largely has to do with cases before trial. The accused is entitled to a speedy trial. He may be acquitted. Hence his commitment to a hospital would delay the effectuation of these rights. The Congress, therefore, provided safeguards, i. e., he might object to such a commitment and the consequent delay of his trial. But here - under 24-301 (d) - the accused has already had his trial.
Finally, the fallacy in the Court's position is clearly apparent when in an attempt to justify its holding on practical grounds it says that an accused who pleads guilty and is sentenced may thereafter be transferred from the prison to a hospital and the assurances of hospitalization provided by 24-301 (d) thus afforded. The short of this is that if the accused pleads guilty and is sentenced he then may suffer in addition to his conviction the same fate as petitioner suffers here. With due deference, this is a most cruel position. The accused, though innocent of the crime because of insanity, pleads guilty in hopes of a short jail sentence. He then has the stigma of criminal conviction permanently on his record. During or after sentence he is transferred to the hospital where he may be released at the end of his sentence but if found not cured at that time may still be subject to further custody and treatment. D.C. Code, 24-302; 18 U.S.C. 4247. [369 U.S. 705, 724]
It has long been generally acknowledged that justice does not permit punishing persons with certain mental disorders for committing acts offending against the public peace and order. But insane offenders are no less a menace to society for being held irresponsible, and reluctance to impose blame on such individuals does not require their release. The community has an interest in protecting the public from antisocial acts whether committed by sane or by insane persons. We have long recognized that persons who because of mental illness are dangerous to themselves or to others may be restrained against their will in the interest of public safety and to seek their rehabilitation, even if they have done nothing proscribed by the criminal law. The insane who have committed acts otherwise criminal are a still greater object of concern, as they have demonstrated their risk to society. In an attempt to deal with these problems, Congress has enacted 24-301 (d), which requires the court to order a person who has been acquitted of a criminal offense solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill.
Commitment to an institution of persons acquitted of crime because of insanity is no novelty. At common law, before 1800, the trial judge had power to order detention in prison of an acquitted defendant he considered dangerous because of insanity. 2 Hadfield, acquitted of [369 U.S. 705, 725] attempted regicide in 1800 as insane, was remanded to an English prison because his future confinement was "absolutely necessary for the safety of society," 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1354. Parliament responded by providing for automatic commitment to a mental institution rather than prison in felony cases in which the accused was acquitted on grounds of insanity, 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 94, and mandatory commitment has been the rule in misdemeanor cases as well in England since 1883. 46 & 47 Vict., c. 38. An accused acquitted on insanity grounds in Massachusetts was remanded to the sheriff for continued custody as early as 1810, Commonwealth v. Meriam, 7 Mass. 168, and in the District of Columbia, the judge being convinced that "it would be extremely dangerous to permit him to be at large," in 1835, United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,577. The District of Columbia Code of 1901, 31 Stat. 1189, 1340, authorized the trial judge, in his discretion and without further hearing, to forward the defendant's name to an administrator, who, in his discretion, again without hearing, might order commitment. Most defendants acquitted on insanity grounds were committed under this rule. 3 At the present time statutes provide for mandatory commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity in 12 States and the Virgin Islands as well as in England and the District of Columbia. 4 Six States permit [369 U.S. 705, 726] commitment in the discretion of the trial judge. 5 Eighteen more provide for mandatory or discretionary commitment if the trial judge finds that the defendant's insanity continues 6 or that his discharge would be dangerous to the public peace. 7 In 10 States and in Puerto [369 U.S. 705, 727] Rico, mandatory commitment follows a like finding by the trial jury 8 or by a second jury. 9 In three States standards for civil commitment must be met. 10 Only Tennessee makes no provision for such cases. 11 Many of these laws providing for commitment of acquitted defendants are by no means new, see the tabulation in Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law, 394-399 (1925), and with very few exceptions such laws have been upheld by state courts against constitutional attacks. 12 The [369 U.S. 705, 728] Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute contains a provision for mandatory commitment. ALI Model Penal Code, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 4.08. See also comments on this section in id., Tentative Draft No. 4, p. 199. In practice, it has been said despite the varying provisions in the several jurisdictions that acquitted defendants are "nearly always" committed. Note, 68 Yale L. J. 293.
The Court does not deny that petitioner was tried for an offense and acquitted solely on the ground of insanity at the time of its commission. It argues, however, that the procedure of 24-301 (d), as applied to a criminal defendant who has not pleaded insanity, is inconsistent with the whole scheme of procedural safeguards provided for commitment of other individuals to mental hospitals in the District of Columbia and therefore could not have been intended by Congress. But the procedure of 24-301 (d) applies only to defendants found not guilty solely on the ground of insanity. That is, unlike defendants committed before or during the trial, see State ex rel. Smilack v. Bushong, 159 Ohio St. 259, 111 N. E. 2d 918, all persons committed under 24-301 (d) either have been found after trial to have committed the act itself, or, as here, have conceded that they committed it. It is this [369 U.S. 705, 729] adjudication, or this admission, that serves to explain and, in Congress' opinion, to justify different treatment for such individuals. Overholser v. Leach, 103 U.S. App. D.C. 289, 257 F.2d 667. Whether we would have drawn this distinction is not the question; it suffices that the distinction was drawn and is not so untenable that we can say Congress could not reasonably have drawn it. And, insofar as 24-301 (a) applies also to those who have been tried and found guilty, it is no more inconsistent with mandatory commitment where the defendant has not pleaded insanity than where he has done so. In either case Congress wanted commitment if the judge found the accused insane or if the jury entertained a reasonable doubt.
I agree with the Court that the present 24-301 (d) was the response of Congress to the decision in Durham v. United States, supra. That decision substituted for the McNaghten rule the simple question whether the "unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." 94 U.S. App. D.C., at 240-241, 214 F.2d, at 874-875. In amending the then 24-301 (d), Congress sought "to protect the public against the immediate unconditional release of accused persons who have been found not responsible for a crime solely by reason of insanity. . . ." H. R. Rep. No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 13 (1955); S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3; 101 Cong. Rec. 9258, 12229. This danger of improvident release, so crucial in the eyes of the Congress, has in fact inhibited the adoption of the Durham rule by other courts in jurisdictions where no mandatory commitment statute is available. Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (C. A. 9th Cir.); United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C. M. A. 314, 329, 17 C. M. R. 314, 329; United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, [369 U.S. 705, 730] 776-777, dissenting opinion; Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond, 41 A. B. A. J. 793, 879 (1955).
This is not to say, however, that the sole purpose of 24-301 (d) is commitment as a protection to the public. The policy of the law also includes assurance of rehabilitation for those so committed. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 312, 281 F.2d 943, 947. The common law permitted an acquitted incompetent to be confined in the District of Columbia even before 1901. United States v. Lawrence, supra. The desire of the Congress to satisfy its interest in the rehabilitation of an incompetent defendant brought on the original statute authorizing commitment to a mental institution. The 1955 amendment, here under attack, was designed only to strengthen the safeguards to the public safety in the light of the intervening Durham rule. There can be no question that the interest of a free society is better served by commitment to hospitals than by imprisonment of the criminally incompetent. While, as the Court points out, transfer after confinement permits treatment during sentence, it is not mandatory, and it may be interrupted before completion and the patient set free. Almost every newspaper reports depredations of the criminally insane who unfortunately for themselves and the safety of others have been released on the public. It was the purpose of the statute to prevent this occurrence whether or not the accused pleads not guilty because of insanity. A defendant's plea neither proves nor affects his guilt or his sanity. To make the commitment procedure effective only on the defendant's option limits the statute's protection of the public, forces an unfortunate choice on attorneys appointed to represent defendants, convicts those who are innocent by reason of insanity and deprives them of the treatment afforded by a humanitarian public policy. See Ragsdale v. Overholser, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 281 F.2d 943. [369 U.S. 705, 731] The Court says that this can all be done through another trial under civil commitment procedures, but this is but to disagree with the policy of Congress rather than the Court of Appeals which has upheld the statute. As mentioned, supra, the civil procedures are entirely insufficient where criminal acts are involved. The criterion of 24-301 (d) - merely whether there is a reasonable doubt that the accused was capable in law of committing the offense - is a far cry from the test of civil commitment, where it must be proven to the satisfaction of the court that the accused is actually insane. The requirement that the petitioner here go free unless civil commitment proceedings be filed and he be adjudged insane creates a serious risk that petitioner will again be turned loose on an unsuspecting public to carry on his check-writing proclivities and perhaps much worse. His is but one example that will inevitably follow in the wake of this decision today.
The Court disclaims the intention of granting petitioner an absolute right to plead guilty. Such a right would be contra to our concept of the fair administration of justice as exemplified in Rule 9 of the Criminal Rules of the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia, which was lifted verbatim from Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 13 It provides explicitly [369 U.S. 705, 732] that "[t]he Court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty." And it further prohibits the acceptance of a guilty plea without the court's "first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge." The opinion today acknowledges that the trial judge need not accept the plea of guilty when, as here, he has in his hands a certificate from competent doctors that the petitioner was and remains insane and in need of treatment. The Court emphasizes again and again that the petitioner never at any time during his trial on the check charges suggested that "he is, or ever was, mentally irresponsible." Of course he did not; he preferred to go to jail for a short period. But the right of a court to refuse a plea of guilty is based on the principle that in a free society it is as important that the court make certain that the innocent go free as it is that the guilty be punished. This the court did here and decided that a just disposition of the case would not permit the entry of the plea of guilty. That the evidence of insanity was sufficient is not questioned. As this Court has often held, the judge "is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct . . . ." Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 82 (1942). In the words of the late and revered Learned Hand, "he is charged to see that the law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he cannot discharge by remaining inert." United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925. And here in the District of Columbia its court of last resort, the Court of Appeals, has held that the trial judge is required to set aside jury findings of sanity where the record shows a reasonable doubt. Isaac v. United States, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 34, 284 F.2d 168. This is only further indication of his duty to seek a just disposition of every case, which justified, if it did not require, the rejection of the guilty plea here. [369 U.S. 705, 733]
It was also unquestionably proper for the prosecutor to introduce testimony of insanity. His function, this Court said in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 , is to act as "the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty . . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."
The Court denies none of this. Yet, although it stresses that the purpose of 24-301 (d) was to protect the public from the release of dangerous persons acquitted as insane, and although it concedes that a defendant may be acquitted as insane without pleading insanity, the Court requires a finding of present insanity in order to commit in such a case. To me neither the words nor the policy of the law supports this; I cannot believe Congress thought only people who claim to be crazy are dangerous enough to be confined without further findings.
The Court did not reach the constitutional issue. Its failure so to do is, I believe, a "disingenuous evasion," to borrow a phrase from Mr. Justice Cardozo in Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933). The Court should not, as I have said, rewrite a statute merely to escape upholding it against easily parried constitutional objections. I would uphold the statute. I shall not go into details, however, since the Court does not deal with the issue. In short, petitioner has no constitutional right to choose jail confinement instead of hospitalization. It is said that automatic hospitalization without a finding of present insanity renders the statute invalid but, as I see it, Congress may reasonably prefer the safety of compulsory hospitalization subject to the release procedures [369 U.S. 705, 734] offered by the statute and through habeas corpus. It is said that these release procedures are too strict, placing the burden on the petitioner. But it appears reasonable once a jury or a judge has found a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of a man who has admittedly passed bad checks to require a doctor's certificate to authorize release, and failing such to require proof of the doctor's error in refusing to issue it. There is no reason to believe that the doctors or, for that matter, the judge would be improperly motivated. Release is by no means illusory. In the past six years over 25% of those committed have been released. It must be remembered that here the constitutionality of 24-301 (d) is at issue, not the wisdom of its enactment. That is for Congress. So long as its choice meets due process standards it cannot be overturned. The problem which faced Congress was the reconciliation of the opportunity for release of the accused through a judicial hearing with the vital public interest, deference to the views of institutional authorities and a decent regard for the hospitalization and cure of the accused. The balance struck by Congress, in my view, meets the essential requirements of due process.
In any event, petitioner does not claim that he is now sane. He has made no effort to secure his release on the ground of being cured. Surely he should be required to make such an effort before asking the Court to strike down the statute on that ground. Moreover, if the burden is too heavy, rather than opening the hospital doors to all persons committed under the statute, it would be more fitting to rewrite the release procedures by shifting the burden to the hospital authorities to prove the necessity for further hospitalization. The Court has not hesitated to use a similar device in another area. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 . I would also think the Court would prefer to do this rather than create a loophole for those who seek to plead guilty. In so doing, the [369 U.S. 705, 735] Court would not force the badge of criminal conviction on innocent persons but would afford them the benefit of treatment, safeguarded by entirely fair and reasonable release procedures, and at the same time afford the public protection from those unfortunates among us that know not what they do. The Court has chosen not to reverse the burden of proof; perhaps the Congress will consider doing so.
I dissent.
[ Footnote 1 ] 24-301 (d), District of Columbia Code.
[ Footnote 2 ] Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part (2d ed. 1961), 456; Note, Releasing Criminal Defendants Acquitted and Committed Because of Insanity: The Need for Balanced Administration, 68 Yale L. J. 293 (1958); Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 307, 328. It has been said that in most cases, nevertheless, the defendant was released. Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law (1925), 392-393.
[ Footnote 3 ] See Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 Yale L. J. 905, 941 (1961); S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1955).
[ Footnote 4 ] Colo. Rev. Stat., 1957 Supp., 39-8-4; D.C. Code, 1961, 24-301; Ga. Code Ann., 1953, 27-1503; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann., 1949, 62-1532; Me. Laws 1961, c. 310; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., 1957, c. 123, 101 (murder and manslaughter only; in other cases, c. 278, 13, the trial judge may commit if satisfied the defendant is insane); Mich. Stat. Ann., 1954, 28.933 (3) (murder only; in other felony cases, 1961 Supp., 28.967, the trial judge shall commit if, after hearing, he determines continuing insanity); Minn. Stat. Ann., 1961 [369 U.S. 705, 726] Supp., 631.19; Neb. Rev. Stat., 1956, 29-2203; Nev. Rev. Stat., 1961, 175.445; N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc., 454, as amended by Laws 1960, c. 550; Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1954, 2945.39; V. I. Code Ann., 1957, Tit. 5, 3637; Wis. Stat. Ann., 1958, 957.11 ("rehearing" of present sanity and danger on request, see 51.11).
[ Footnote 5 ] Ark. Stat. Ann., 1961 Supp., 59-242 ("shall be committed . . . upon probable cause"); Conn. Gen. Stat., 1961 Supp., 54-37; Del. Code Ann., 1960 Supp., Tit. 11, 4702 (on motion of Attorney General); N. M. Stat. Ann., 1953, 41-13-3; Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., 1930, Tit. 19, 1351; S. C. Code, 1952, 32-927 (on acquittal or "question" of insanity at time of act).
[ Footnote 6 ] Mandatory: Ala. Code, 1958 recompilation, Tit. 15, 429; Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann., 1961 Supp., 9-1704a (or if recurrence "highly probable"); Utah Code Ann., 1953, 77-24-15; as well as Michigan in felony cases other than murder, see note 4, supra. In Hawaii, Rev. Laws, 1960 Supp., 258-38, the burden is on the defendant to show recovery. In California, insanity is tried after it has been determined whether defendant committed the act. On a verdict of acquittal because of insanity, the defendant is committed "unless it shall appear to the court" that he has recovered, in which case he is held until determined sane by civil procedures. Cal. Penal Code, 1956, 1026.
Discretionary: Ky. Crim. Code, 1960, 268 (after hearing); W. Va. Code Ann., 1961, 6198 (on report of two appointed experts); as well as Massachusetts in cases other than murder, see note 4, supra.
[ Footnote 7 ] Mandatory: Alaska Comp. Laws Ann., 1949, 66-13-78; Ore. Rev. Stat., 1961, 136.730.
Discretionary: Fla. Stat., 1961, 919.11 (must confine or remand to friends' care); Iowa Code Ann., 1950, 785.18; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., 1961 Supp., 607:3; N.C. Gen. Stat., 1958, 122-84 (after hearing, shall commit if found dangerous because of mental condition, and if "his confinement for care, treatment, and security demands it"); N. D. Century Code, 1960, 12-05-03; R. I. Gen. Laws, 1956, 26-4-7 (Governor may commit on judge's certification); S. D. Code, 1960 Supp., 34.3672; Vt. Stat. Ann., 1958, Tit. 13, 4805; Va. Code, 1960 replacement, 19.1-239.
[ Footnote 8 ] Ill. Rev. Stat., 1961, c. 38, 592 (not entirely and permanently recovered); Md. Code Ann., 1957, Art. 59, 8 (still insane); Miss. Code Ann., 1956 recompilation, 2575 (still insane and dangerous); Mo. Stat. Ann., Vernon 1961 Supp., 546.510 (not entirely and permanently recovered); N. J. Stat. Ann., 1953, 2A:163-3 (still insane); Okla. Stat. Ann., 1958, c. 22, 1161 (dangerous to discharge); Vernon's Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., 1961 Supp., Art. 932b, 1 (still insane); Wash. Rev. Code, 1951, 10.76.040 (still insane or danger of recurrence).
[ Footnote 9 ] Idaho Code, 1948, 19-2320 (still insane); Mont. Rev. Code Ann., 1947, 94-7420 (same); Puerto Rico Laws Ann., 1956, Tit. 34, 823 (same). In all three jurisdictions the trial judge has discretion whether or not to call the second jury.
[ Footnote 10 ] In Arizona, Rules of Crim. Proc., 1956, Rule 288, and in Wyoming, Stat., 1957, 7-242, a civil commitment petition is required to be filed. In Louisiana, Rev. Stat., 1950, 28:59, the acquitted defendant may be committed by the trial court "in the manner provided" for civil commitment in 28:53. Presumably this requires compliance with the substantive standards as well as the procedures of civil commitment.
[ Footnote 11 ] Apparently in Tennessee there is likewise no common-law power to confine the acquitted insane. See Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348, 373 (dictum). But there appears to be no obstacle to instituting civil proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann., 1961 Supp., 33-502, and 1955 ed., 33-512.
[ Footnote 12 ] In re Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769; Bailey v. State, 210 Ga. 52, 77 S. E. 2d 511; In re Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492; In re Beebe, 92 Kan. 1026, 142 P. 269; Hodison v. Rogers, 137 Kan. 950, 22 P.2d 491; State v. Burris, 169 La. 520, 125 So. 580; People v. Dubina, 304 Mich. 363, 8 N. W. 2d 99; People ex rel. Peabody v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N. Y. Supp. 322; In re Brown, 39 [369 U.S. 705, 728] Wash. 160, 81 P. 522; State v. Saffron, 146 Wash. 202, 262 P. 970; see also Gleason v. West Boylston, 136 Mass. 489; Yankulov v. Bushong, 80 Ohio App. 497, 77 N. E. 2d 88. Similar procedures were struck down in Brown v. Urquhart, 139 F. 846 (C. C. W. D. Wash.); In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S. E. 789; and Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1. Brown v. Urquhart required a hearing on present sanity as a matter of statutory construction and was overturned by the state court in In re Brown, supra. Boyett and Underwood relied in part on the abolition of habeas corpus, not present here, and the Michigan court has since allowed a commitment statute with more adequate release provisions to stand, People v. Dubina, supra.
[ Footnote 13 ] Rule 9 of the Criminal Rules of the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia reads:
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Citation: 369 U.S. 705
Docket No: No. 159
Argued: January 15, 1962
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This is What Happens When You Exceed Customer Expectations
For the third straight year, Rackspace has been placed in the Leaders quadrant of Gartner's Magic Quadrant for Public Cloud Infrastructure Professional and Managed Services.
Our trajectory remains strong: we moved materially to the right this year, based on our Completeness of Vision and with only a single vendor edging above us along the Ability to Execute axis. We believe our placement in Leader's quadrant validates our disruptive, integrated approach to managed public cloud and professional service.
By expanding the scope of the Magic Quadrant to include professional services, Gartner offers a snapshot of just how dynamic this market remains.The move reflects what we at Rackspace have been seeing for some time: as enterprise cloud adoption accelerates, more of these companies are seeking a partner who offers the kind of integrated, end-to-end experience that enables them to quickly and fully realize the promise of cloud.
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Our strength in this area is well-documented. For two decades, companies have sought out Rackspace for our ability to operate like no one else — at this point, operational excellence is simply embedded in our DNA. With an agile DevOps culture, Rackspace has helped literally thousands of companies move and operate successfully in the cloud, building up pattern recognition to solve even the most complex challenges. While every company's challenges are unique, chances are, we've seen it and solved it.
Since our founding in 1998, Rackspace has continuously evolved to meet the ever-changing needs of our customers. As a next generation cloud services provider, Rackspace goes beyond traditional managed services by delivering expert cloud guidance, customizable services and multi-cloud technologies. These new solutions represent a major shift in the IT as-a-service market.
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We are the only cloud services company to offer this comprehensive portfolio of managed services across infrastructure, data, security and applications, which we have expanded through key acquisitions including TriCore Solutions for enterprise resource planning and RelationEdge for customer relationship management expertise. Our growing suite of professional services rounds out this integrated approach.
[Read more: How to Get the IT Services You Need (Without Paying for the Ones You Don't]
Flexible, on-demand services
In addition to seeking end-to-end services from potential partners, enterprises have also made it clear they're no longer satisfied with bundled, one-size-fits-all contracts. They want to consume just the IT services they need, when they need them, with the flexibility to drop and add services as business needs change.
That's why we introduced Service Blocks, our next-generation cloud services delivery model. Each block represents a set of capabilities, and companies are free to use only those they need. Some cover broad needs such as those for reliability engineering, operational support or comprehensive assessment of a company's IT resources and needs. Others address more specific needs: for example, cost governance, serverless computing or adoption of Kubernetes.
This flexible approach is partly what attracted Synchronoss to work with Rackspace.
Synchronoss transforms telecom, communication and technology companies by creating digital customer journeys that reduce cost, improve consumer satisfaction and create new revenue.
After the explosive success of its content transfer service, however, the company found itself needing to process 300 terabytes highly personal subscriber data — every day. Its leaders turned to Rackspace to harness the power of AWS technology to provide a reliable, secure personal cloud solution at massive scale.
Expert guidance
Synchronoss CTO and Executive Vice President Pat Doran knew he needed to find a partner to help his team design, migrate and support a solution on AWS. But given the size of the data, the pool of potential partners was "very, very small," Doran said. The company chose Rackspace for our world-class support of the AWS platform, plus the ability to combine on- premises, public cloud and private cloud solutions.
Thanks to our Service Blocks model, Synchronoss was able to access the right tools and expertise at the right time, even as their AWS needs evolved, including Cloud Foundation, Tooling, Architect & Deploy and Complex Cloud Operations, which offers access to advanced technical resources, including solution architects, lead engineers, Kubernetes experts and DevOps experts.
While organizations like Synchronoss choose Rackspace for our guidance and technical expertise, they stay for another reason: Fanatical Experience. From first call through the entire customer lifecycle, Rackspace puts customer success at the center of everything we do.
Rackspace accelerates the value of cloud. We've done it for thousands of customers; now let us do it for you.
Gartner, Magic Quadrant for Public Cloud Infrastructure Professional and Managed Services, Worldwide, Craig Lowery, To Chee Eng, Scot MacLellan, Ross Winser, Brandon Medford, 26 February 2019.
Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publications, and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner's research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, express or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
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Please Keep Your Freedumb Away From My Freedom
I am just days away from a two week holiday to my hometown of Vancouver Canada, it is always nice to see the west coast of Canada in the spring, often during this time of year the trees will blossom, adding some incredible colors to the already beautiful scenery, and a sweet scent to the cool fresh air. I am also of course very much looking forward to seeing my family and friends, who are the reason for the trip.
After making some plans to visit friends, a discussion about me started amongst my various acquaintances back home, and eventually, some of this discussion came back to me though hearsay. Apparently not all of my friends think I am doing very well in life, and by their measurement, which is salary, I guess I am not, but I do not measure my life in salary, if I did I would have kept some of the high paying jobs I had in the past, or taken some that were offered to me along the way, but I did not, because instead of salary, I measure my life in how much free time I get to experience, free time I often spend with my son, or traveling, reading, and writing.
Inevitably during my trip back to Canada as I visit with the few friends that can find enough time off work to see me, they may give me advice, as they often have before, about how I should change my life to be more like theirs, forgetting that I had lived that way for too many years already, with the waking up to an alarm, rushing to work, wearing a shirt, tie and black socks, eating when I'm told to, and then rushing back home at the end of the day. Many just can't seem to understand that even though I hardly make any money at all by writing, programming, and selling shirts on the internet for a living, it is exactly the type of life I hope to live forever. To me what I have is something closer to true freedom, than the common illusion of it, which is humorously defined on the web today as freedumb.
As they suggest I dust off my work clothing, which I assume still exists somewhere in my closet, to get a "real job", and make some real money, I will likely just nod politely, and think to myself, "Please keep your freedumb away from my freedom."
Below are three videos, with a combined total of only seven minutes, they are all great clips, that I feel relate perfectly to normal corporate life and real freedom.


text:
The Four Foundations of Mindfulness Meditation
By Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche
Never Before Seen-Video:
Chogyam Trungpa
Nyinthun Talk
Barnet Vermont 1973
For the follower of the buddhadharma, the teachings of Buddhism, there is a need for great emphasis on the practice of meditation. One must see the straightforward logic that mind is the cause of confusion and that by transcending confusion one attains the enlightened state. This can only take place through the practice of meditation. The Buddha himself experienced this, by working on his own mind; and what he learned has been handed down to us.
Mindfulness is a basic approach to the spiritual journey that is common to all traditions of Buddhism. But before we begin to look closely at that approach, we should have some idea of what is meant by spirituality itself.
Some say that spirituality is a way of attaining a better kind of happiness, transcendental happiness. Others see it as a benevolent way to develop power over others. Still others say the point of spirituality is to acquire magical powers so we can change our bad world into a good world or purify the world through miracles. It seems that all of these points of view are irrelevant to the Buddhist approach. According to the buddhadharma, spirituality means relating with the working basis of ones existence, which is ones state of mind.
There is a problem with ones basic life, ones basic being. This problem is that we are involved in a continual struggle to survive, to maintain our position. We are continually trying to grasp onto some solid image of ourselves. And then we have to defend that particular fixed conception. So there is warfare, there is confusion, and there is passion and aggression; there are all kinds of conflicts. From the Buddhist point of view, the development of true spirituality is cutting through our basic fixation, that clinging, that stronghold of something-or-other, which is known as ego.
In order to do that we have to find out what ego is. What is this all about? Who are we? We have to look into our already existing state of mind. And we have to understand what practical step we can take to do that. We are not involved here in a metaphysical discussion about the purpose of life and the meaning of spirituality on an abstract level. We are looking at this question from the point of view of a working situation. We need to find some simple thing we can do in order to embark on the spiritual path.
People have difficulty beginning a spiritual practice because they put a lot of energy into looking for the best and easiest way to get into it. We might have to change our attitude and give up looking for the best or the easiest way. Actually, there is no choice. Whatever approach we take, we will have to deal with what we are already. We have to look at who we are. According to the Buddhist tradition, the working basis of the path and the energy involved in the path is the mindones own mind, which is working in us all the time.
Spirituality is based on mind. In Buddhism, mind is what distinguishes sentient beings from rocks or trees or bodies of water. That which possesses discriminating awareness, that which possesses a sense of dualitywhich grasps or rejects something externalthat is mind. Fundamentally, it is that which can associate with an otherwith any something that is perceived as different from the perceiver. That is the definition of mind. The traditional Tibetan phrase defining mind means precisely that: That which can think of the other, the projection, is mind.
So by mind we mean something very specific. It is not just something very vague and creepy inside our heads or hearts, something that just happens as part of the way the wind blows and the grass grows. Rather, it is something very concrete. It contains perceptionperception that is very uncomplicated, very basic, very precise. Mind develops its particular nature as that perception begins to linger on something other than oneself. Mind makes the fact of perceiving something else stand for the existence of oneself.
That is the mental trick that constitutes mind. In fact, it should be the opposite. Since the perception starts from oneself, the logic should be: I exist, therefore the other exists. But somehow the hypocrisy of mind is developed to such an extent that mind lingers on the other as a way of getting the feedback that it itself exists, which is a fundamentally erroneous belief. It is the fact that the existence of self is questionable that motivates the trick of duality.
This mind is our working basis for the practice of meditation and the development of awareness. But mind is something more than the process of confirming self by the dualistic lingering on the other. Mind also includes what are known as emotions, which are the highlights of mental states.
Mind cannot exist without emotions. Daydreaming and discursive thoughts are not enough. Those alone would be too boring. The dualistic trick would wear too thin. So we tend to create waves of emotion which go up and down: passion, aggression, ignorance, prideall kinds of emotions. In the beginning we create them deliberately, as a game of trying to prove to ourselves that we exist. But eventually the game becomes a hassle; it becomes more than a game and forces us to challenge ourselves more than we intended.
So we have created a world that is bittersweet. Things are amusing but, at the same time, not so amusing. Sometimes things seem terribly funny but, on the other hand, terribly sad. Life has the quality of a game of ours that has trapped us. The setup of mind has created the whole thing. We might complain about the government or the economy of the country or the prime rate of interest, but those factors are secondary. The original process at the root of the problems is the competitiveness of seeing oneself only as a reflection of the other. Problematic situations arise automatically as expressions of that. They are our own production, our own neat work. And that is what is called mind.
According to the Buddhist tradition, there are eight types of consciousness and fifty-two types of conceptions and all kinds of other aspects of mind, about which we do not have to go into detail. All these aspects are based largely on the primeval dualistic approach. There are the spiritual aspects and the psychological aspects and all sorts of other aspects. All are bound up in the realm of duality, which is ego.
As far as meditation practice is concerned, in meditation we work on this thing, rather than on trying to sort out the problem from the outside. We work on the projector rather than the projection. We turn inward, instead of trying to sort out external problems of A, B, and C. We work on the creator of duality rather than the creation. That is beginning at the beginning.
A gigantic world of mind exists to which we are almost totally unexposed. This whole world is made by mind. Minds made this up, put these things together. Every bolt and nut was put in by somebody-or-others mind. This whole world is minds world, the product of mind. This is needless to say; I am sure everybody knows this. But we might remind ourselves of it so that we realize that meditation is not an exclusive activity that involves forgetting this world and getting into something else. By meditating, we are dealing with the very mind that devised our eyeglasses and put the lenses in the rims.
So this is a living world, minds world. Realizing this, working with mind is no longer a remote or mysterious thing to do. It is no longer dealing with something that is hidden or somewhere else. Mind is right here. Mind is hanging out in the world. It is an open secret.
The method for beginning to relate directly with mind, which was taught by Lord Buddha and which has been in use for the past twenty-five hundred years, is the practice of mindfulness. There are four aspects to this practice, traditionally known as the Four Foundations of Mindfulness.
Mindfulness of Body
Mindfulness of body has to do with trying to remain human, rather than becoming an animal or fly or etheric being. It means just trying to remain a human being, an ordinary human being.
Mindfulness of body, the first foundation of mindfulness, is connected with the need for a sense of being, a sense of groundedness.
To begin with, there is some problem about what we understand by body. We sit on chairs or on the ground; we eat; we sleep; we wear clothes. But the body we relate with in going through these activities is questionable.
According to the tradition, the body we think we have is what is known as psychosomatic body. It is largely based on projections and concepts of body. This psychosomatic body contrasts with the enlightened persons sense of body, which might be called body-body. This sense of body is free from conceptualizations. It is just simple and straightforward. There is a direct relationship with the earth.
As for us, we do not actually have a relationship with the earth. We have some relationship with body, but it is very uncertain and erratic. We flicker back and forth between body and something elsefantasies, ideas. That seems to be our basic situation. Even though the psychosomatic body is constituted by projections of body, it can be quite solid in terms of those projections. We have expectations concerning the existence of this body, therefore we have to refuel it, entertain it, wash it. Through this psychosomatic body we are able to experience a sense of being.
Mindfulness of body brings this all-pervasive mind-imitating-body activity into the practice of meditation. The practice of meditation has to take into account that mind continually shapes itself into bodylike attitudes. Consequently, since the time of Buddha, sitting meditation has been recommended and practiced, and it has proved to be the best way of dealing with this situation. The basic technique that goes with sitting meditation is working with the breath. You identify with the breath, particularly with the out-breath. The inbreath is just a gap, a space. During the in-breath you just wait. So you breathe out and then you dissolve and then there is a gap. Breathe out . . . dissolve . . . gap. An openness, an expansion, can take place constantly that way.
Mindfulness plays a very important role in this technique. In this case, mindfulness means that when you sit and meditate, you actually do sit. You actually do sit as far as the psychosomatic body is concerned. You feel the ground, body, breath, temperature. You dont try specifically to watch and keep track of what is going on. You dont try to formalize the sitting situation and make it into some special activity that you are performing. You just sit.
And then you begin to feel that there is some sense of groundedness. This is not particularly a product of being deliberate, but it is more the force of the actual fact of being there. So you sit. And you sit. And you breathe. And you sit and you breathe. Sometimes you think, but still you are thinking sitting thoughts. The psychosomatic body is sitting, so your thoughts have a flat bottom. Mindfulness of body is connected with the earth. It is an openness that has a base, a foundation. A quality of expansive awareness develops through mindfulness of bodya sense of being settled and of therefore being able to afford to open out.
Going along with this mindfulness requires a great deal of trust. Probably the beginning meditator will not be able simply to rest there, but will feel the need for a change. I remember someone who had just finished a retreat telling me how she had sat and felt her body and felt grounded. But then she had thought immediately how she should be doing something else. And she went on to tell me how the right book had just jumped into her lap, and she had started to read. At that point one doesnt have a solid base anymore. Ones mind is beginning to grow little wings. Mindfulness of body has to do with trying to remain human, rather than becoming an animal or fly or etheric being. It means just trying to remain a human being, an ordinary human being.
The basic starting point for this is solidness, grounded-ness. When you sit, you actually sit. Even your floating thoughts begin to sit on their own bottoms. There are no particular problems. You have a sense of solidness and groundedness, and, at the same time, a sense of being.
Without this particular foundation of mindfulness, the rest of your meditation practice could be very airy-fairyvacillating back and forth, trying this and trying that. You could be constantly tiptoeing on the surface of the universe, not actually getting a foothold anywhere. You could become an eternal hitchhiker. So with this first technique you develop some basic solidness. In mindfulness of body, there is a sense of finding some home ground.
Mindfulness of Life
The instinct to live can be seen as containing awareness, meditation, mindfulness. It constantly tunes us in to what is happening. So the life force that keeps us alive itself becomes the practice of mindfulness.
The application of mindfulness has to be precise. If we cling to our practice, we create stagnation. Therefore, in our application of the techniques of mindfulness, we must be aware of the fundamental tendency to cling, to survive.
We come to this in the second foundation of mindfulness, which is mindfulness of life, or survival. Since we are dealing with the context of meditation, we encounter this tendency in the form of clinging to the meditative state. We experience the meditative state and it is momentarily tangible, but in that same moment it is also dissolving. Going along with this process means developing a sense of letting go of awareness as well as of contacting it. This basic technique of the second foundation of mindfulness could be described as touch-and-go. you are therepresent, mindfuland then you let go.
A common misunderstanding is that the meditative state of mind has to be captured and then nursed and cherished. That is definitely the wrong approach. If you try to domesticate your mind through meditationtry to possess it by holding onto the meditative statethe clear result will be regression on the path, with a loss of freshness and spontaneity. If you try to hold on without lapse all the time, then maintaining your awareness will begin to become a domestic hassle. It will become like painfully going through housework. There will be an underlying sense of resentment, and the practice of meditation will become confusing. You will begin to develop a love-hate relationship toward your practice, in which your concept of it seems good, but, at the same time, the demand this rigid concept makes on you is too painful.
So the technique of the mindfulness of life is based on touch-and-go. You focus your attention on the object of awareness, but then, in the same moment, you disown that awareness and go on. What is needed here is some sense of confidenceconfidence that you do not have to securely own your mind, but that you can tune into its process spontaneously.
Mindfulness of life relates to the clinging tendency not only in connection with the meditative state, but, even more importantly, in connection with the level of raw anxiety about survival that manifests in us constantly, second by second, minute by minute. You breathe for survival; you lead your life for survival. The feeling is constantly present that you are trying to protect yourself from death.
For the practical purposes of the second foundation, instead of regarding this survival mentality as something negative, instead of relating to it as ego-clinging as is done in the abstract philosophical overview of Buddhism, this particular practice switches logic around. In the second foundation, the survival struggle is regarded as a steppingstone in the practice of meditation. Whenever you have the sense of the survival instinct functioning, that can be transmuted into a sense of being, a sense of having already survived. Mindfulness becomes a basic acknowledgment of existing. This does not have the flavor of Thank God, I have survived. Instead, it is more objective, impartial: I am alive, I am here, so be it.
In this way, meditation becomes an actual part of life, rather than just a practice or exercise. It becomes inseparable from the instinct to live that accompanies all ones existence. That instinct to live can be seen as containing awareness, meditation, mindfulness. It constantly tunes us in to what is happening. So the life force that keeps us alive and that manifests itself continually in our stream of consciousness itself becomes the practice of mindfulness.
Such mindfulness brings clarity, skill, and intelligence. You are here; you are living; let it be that waythat is mindfulness. Your heart pulsates and you breathe. All kinds of things are happening in you at once. Let mindfulness work with that, let that be mindfulness, let every beat of your heart, every breath, be mindfulness itself. You do not have to breathe specially; your breath is an expression of mindfulness. If you approach meditation in this way, it becomes very personal and very direct.
But again it is necessary to say, once you have that experience of the presence of life, dont hang onto it. Just touch and go. Touch that presence of life being lived, then go. You do not have to ignore it. Go does not mean that we have to turn our backs on the experience and shut ourselves off from it; it means just being in it without further analysis and without further reinforcement.
Holding onto life, or trying to reassure oneself that it is so, has the sense of death rather than life. It is only because we have that sense of death that we want to make sure that we are alive. We would like to have an insurance policy. But if we feel that we are alive, that is good enough. We do not have to make sure that we actually do breathe, that we actually can be seen. We do not have to check to be sure we have a shadow. Just living is enough. If we dont stop to reassure ourselves, living becomes very clear-cut, very alive, and very precise.
Mindfulness of Effort
The sudden flash is a key to all Buddhist meditation, from the level of basic mindfulness to the highest levels of tantra. But it is not enough just to hope that a flash will come to us; there must be a background of discipline.
The next foundation of mindfulness is mindfulness of effort. The idea of effort is apparently problematical. Effort would seem to be at odds with the sense of being that arises from mindfulness of body. Also, pushing of any kind does not have an obvious place in the touch-and-go technique of the mindfulness of life.
In either case, deliberate, heavy-handed effort would seem to endanger the open precision of the process of mindfulness. Still we cannot expect proper mindfulness to develop without some kind of exertion on our part. Effort is necessary. But the Buddhist notion of right effort is quite different from conventional definitions of effort.
The traditional Buddhist analogy for right effort is the walk of an elephant or tortoise. The elephant moves along surely, unstoppably, with great dignity. Like the worm, it is not excitable, but unlike the worm, it has a panoramic view of the ground it is treading on. Though it is serious and slow, because of the elephants ability to survey the ground there is a sense of playfulness and intelligence in its movement.
In the case of meditation, trying to develop an inspiration that is based on wanting to forget ones pain and on trying to make ones practice thrive on a sense of continual accomplishment is quite immature. On the other hand, too much solemnity and dutifulness creates a lifeless and narrow outlook and a stale psychological environment. The style of right effort, as taught by the Buddha, is serious but not too serious. It takes advantage of the natural flow of instinct to bring the wandering mind constantly back to the mindfulness of breathing.
The crucial point in the bringing-back process is that it is not necessary to go through deliberate stages. It is not a question of forcing the mind back to some particular object, but of bringing it back down from the dream world into reality. We are breathing, we are sitting. That is what we are doing, and we should be doing it completely, fully, wholeheartedly.
There is a kind of technique, or trick, here that is extremely effective and useful, not only for sitting meditation, but also in daily life, or meditation-in-action. The way of coming back is through what we might call the abstract watcher. This watcher is just simple self-consciousness, without aim or goal.
When we encounter anything, the first flash that takes place is the bare sense of duality, of separateness. On that basis, we begin to evaluate, pick and choose, make decisions, execute our will. The abstract watcher is just the basic sense of separatenessthe plain cognition of being there before any of the rest develops.
Instead of condemning this self-consciousness as dualistic, we take advantage of this tendency in our psychological system and use it as the basis of the mindfulness of effort. The experience is just a sudden flash of the watchers being there. At that point we dont think, I must get back to the breath or I must try and get away from these thoughts. We dont have to entertain a deliberate and logical movement of mind that repeats to itself the purpose of sitting practice. There is just suddenly a general sense that something is happening here and now, and we are brought back. Abruptly, immediately, without a name, without the application of any kind of concept, we have a quick glimpse of changing the tone. That is the core of the mindfulness of effort practice.
One of the reasons that ordinary effort becomes so dreary and stagnant is that our intention always develops a verbalization. Any kind of sense of duty we might have is always verbalized, though the speed of conceptual mind is so great that we may not even notice the verbalization. Still, the contents of the verbalization are clearly felt. This verbalization pins the effort to a fixed frame of reference, which makes it extremely tiresome.
In contrast, the abstract effort we are talking about flashes in a fraction of a second, without any name or any idea with it. It is just a jerk, a sudden change of course which does not define its destination. The rest of the effort is just like an elephants walkgoing slowly, step by step, observing the situation around us.
You could call this abstract self-consciousness leap if you like, or jerk, or sudden reminder; or you could call it amazement. Sometimes it could also be also felt as panic, unconditioned panic, because of the change of coursesomething comes to us and changes our whole course. If we work with this sudden jerk, and do so with no effort in the effort, then effort becomes self-existing. It stands on its own two feet, so to speak, rather than needing another effort to trigger it off.
This kind of effort is extremely important. The sudden flash is a key to all Buddhist meditation, from the level of basic mindfulness to the highest levels of tantra. Such mindfulness of effort could definitely be considered the most important aspect of mindfulness practice. Mindfulness of body creates the general setting; it brings meditation into the psychosomatic setup of ones life. Mindfulness of life makes meditation practice personal and intimate. Mindfulness of effort makes meditation workable: it connects the foundations of mindfulness to the path, to the spiritual journey. It is like the wheel of a chariot, which makes the connection between the chariot and the road, or like the oar of a boat. Mindfulness of effort actualizes the practice; it makes it move, proceed.
But we have a problem here. Mindfulness of effort cannot be deliberately manufactured: on the other hand, it is not enough just to hope that a flash will come to us and we will be reminded. There must be a background of discipline which sets the tone of the sitting practice. Effort is important on this level also; it is the sense of not having the faintest indulgence toward any form of entertainment. We have to give something up. Unless we give up our reservations about taking the practice seriously, it is virtually impossible to have that kind of instantaneous effort dawn on us. So it is extremely important to have respect for the practice, a sense of appreciation, and a willingness to work hard.
Once we do have a sense of commitment to relating with things as they actually are, we have opened the way to the flash that reminds us: that, that, that. That what? does not apply any more. Just that, which triggers an entirely new state of consciousness and brings us back automatically to mindfulness of breathing or a general sense of being.
We work hard at not being diverted into entertainment. Still, in some sense, we can enjoy the very boring situation of the practice of sitting meditation. We can actually appreciate not having lavish resources of entertainment available. Because of having already included our boredom and ennui, we have nothing to run away from and we feel completely secure and grounded.
This basic sense of appreciation is another aspect of the background that makes it possible for the spontaneous flash of the reminder to occur more easily. This is said to be like falling in love. When we are in love with someone, because our whole attitude is open toward that person somehow or other we get a sudden flash of that person not as a name or as a concept of what the person looks like; those are afterthoughts. We get an abstract flash of our lover as that. A flash of that comes into our mind first. Then we might ponder on that flash, elaborate on it, enjoy our daydreams about it. But all this happens afterward. The flash is primal.
Mindfulness of Mind
Mind functions singly. Once. And once. One thing at a time. Things always happen one at a time, in a direct, simple movement of mind. Mindfulness of mind is to be there with that one-shot perception, constantly.
Often mindfulness is referred to as watchfulness. But that should not give the impression that mindfulness means watching something happening. Mindfulness means being watchful, rather than watching some thing. This implies a process of intelligent alertness, rather than the mechanical business of simply observing what happens.
Particularly the fourth foundationmindfulness of mindhas qualities of an aroused intelligence operating. The intelligence of the fourth foundation is a sense of light-handedness. If you open the windows and doors of a room the right amount, you can maintain the interior feeling of roomness and, at the same time, have freshness from outside. Mindfulness of mind brings that same kind of intelligent balance.
Without mind and its conflicts, we could not meditate or develop balance, or develop anything at all for that matter. Therefore, conflicts that arise from mind are regarded as a necessary part of the process of mindfulness. But at the same time, those conflicts have to be controlled enough so that we can come back to our mindfulness of breathing. A balance has to be maintained. There has to be a certain discipline so that we are neither totally lost in daydream nor missing the freshness and openness that come from not holding our attention too tightly. This balance is a state of wakefulness, mindfulness.
Mindfulness of mind means being with ones mind. When you sit and meditate, you are there: you are being with your body, with your sense of life or survival, with your sense of effort, and at the same time, you are being with your mind. You are being there. Mindfulness of mind suggests a sense of presence and a sense of accuracy in terms of being there. You are there, therefore you cant miss yourself. If you are not there, then you might miss yourself. But that also would be a doubletake: if you realize you are not there, that means you are there. That brings you back to where you areback to square one.
The whole process is very simple, actually. Unfortunately, explaining the simplicity takes a lot of vocabulary, a lot of grammar. However, it is a very simple matter. And that matter concerns you and your world. Nothing else. It does not particularly concern enlightenment, and it does not particularly concern metaphysical comprehension. In fact, this simple matter does not particularly concern the next minute, or the minute before this one. It only concerns the very small area where we are now.
Really we operate on a very small basis. We think we are great, broadly significant, and that we cover a whole large area. We see ourselves as having a history and a future, and here we are in our big-deal present. But if we look at ourselves clearly in this very moment, we see we are just grains of sandjust little people concerned only with this little dot which is called nowness.
We can only operate on one dot at a time, and mindfulness of mind approaches our experience in that way. We are there and we approach ourselves on the very simple basis of that. That does not particularly have many dimensions, many perspectives; it is just a simple thing. Relating directly to this little dot of nowness is the right understanding of austerity. And if we work on this basis, it is possible to begin to see the truth of the matter, so to speakto begin to see what nowness really means.
This experience is very revealing in that it is very personal. It is not personal in the sense of petty and mean. The idea is that this experience is your experience. You might be tempted to share it with somebody else, but then it becomes their experience, rather than what you wished for: your/their experience, jumbled together. You can never achieve that. People have different experiences of reality, which cannot be jumbled together. Invaders and dictators of all kinds have tried to make others have their experience, to make a big concoction of minds controlled by one person. But that is impossible. Everyone who has tried to make that kind of spiritual pizza has failed. So you have to accept that your experience is personal. The personal experience of nowness is very much there and very obviously there. You cannot even throw it away!
In sitting practice, or in the awareness practice of everyday life, for that matter, you are not trying to solve a wide array of problems. You are looking at one situation that is very limited. It is so limited that there is not even room to be claustrophobic. If it is not there, it is not there. You missed it. If it is there, it is there. That is the pinpoint of mindfulness of mind, that simplicity of total up-to-dateness, total directness. Mind functions singly. Once. And once. One thing at a time.
The practice of mindfulness of mind is to be there with that one-shot perception, constantly. You get a complete picture from which nothing is missing: that is happening, now that is happening, now that is happening. There is no escape. Even if you focus yourself on escaping, that is also a one-shot movement of which you could be mindful. You can be mindful of your escapeof your sexual fantasy or your aggression fantasy.
Things always happen one at a time, in a direct, simple movement of mind. Therefore, in the technique of mindfulness of mind, it is traditionally recommended that you be aware of each single-shot perception of mind as thinking: I am thinking I hear a sound. I am thinking I smell a scent. I am thinking I feel hot. I am thinking I feel cold. Each one of these is a total approach to experiencevery precise, very direct, one single movement of mind.
Things always happen in that direct way. That one-shot reality is all there is. Obviously we can make up an illusion. We can imagine that we are conquering the universe by multiplying ourselves into hundreds of aspects and personalities: the conquering and the conquered. But that is like the dream state of someone who is actually asleep. There is only the one shot; everything happens only once. There is just that. Therefore mindfulness of mind is applicable.
So meditation practice has to be approached in a very simple and very basic way. That seems to be the only way that it will apply to our experience of what we actually are. That way, we do not get into the illusion that we can function as a hundred people at once. When we lose the simplicity we begin to be concerned about ourselves: While Im doing this, such-and-such is going to happen. What shall I do? Thinking that more than that is happening, we get involved in hope and fear in relation to all kinds of things that are not actually happening.
Really it does not work that way. While we are doing that, we are doing that. If something else happens, we are doing something else. But two things cannot happen at once; it is impossible. It is easy to imagine that two things are happening at once, because our journey back and forth between the two may be very speedy. But even then we are doing only one thing at a time.
It is necessary to take that logic all the way and realize that even to apply bare attention to what we are doing is impossible. If we try, we have two personalities: one personality is the bare attention; the other personality is doing things. Real bare attention is being there all at once. We do not apply bare attention to what we are doing; we are not mindful of what we are doing. That is impossible. Mindfulness is the act as well as the experience, happening at the same time.
we could have a somewhat dualistic attitude at the beginning, before we
get into real mindfulness, that we are willing to be mindful, willing to
surrender, willing to discipline ourselves. But then we do the thing; we
just do it. It is like the famous Zen saying When I eat, I eat; when I
sleep, I sleep. You just do it, with absolutely no implication behind
what you are doing, not even of mindfulness.
These teachings are abridged from The Heart of the Buddha, published by Shambhala Publications. ©1991 by Diana J. Mukpo. Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche was founder of Shambhala International, a worldwide association of meditation centers; Naropa University in Boulder, Colorado, and the Shambhala Sun. The Four Foundations of Mindfulness Meditation appeared in the March 2001 issue of the Shambhala Sun.
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