text:
Critiquing the Critique of British COIN
by M.L.R. Smith
Abstract: In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals itself to be highly elusive. Rarely has a facility for counterinsurgency or small war ever been claimed by the British armed forces themselves. Invariably, it has been a tradition ascribed to them by others. Most notably, the tradition of British COIN expertise has been a narrative generated by commentators in the United States who were keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning. While a later series of scholars came to question this narrative, arguing that the British conduct of small wars was often based on more coercive assumptions, ultimately, what this reveals is that it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small-wars.
It's hard not to have sympathy: the picture of a desolate British soldier, head in hands, despairing at the futility of it all on the front cover of Frank Ledwidge's excoriation of British military conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, Losing Small Wars. Ledwidge's book documents a litany of shortcomings and institutional failures afflicting the British armed forces in recent years that have contributed to malfunction and under performance on the ground. More than that, the book is one of the key works that have created a narrative that now stretches back the best part of a decade which proclaims that an Army with a venerated reputation for waging small wars and counterinsurgency has now gone off the rails through complacency, ineptitude, cost-cutting, and laurel sitting. Here's the product description of the book on Amazon, which well summarizes the argument:
Partly on the strength of their apparent success in "small wars" such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world-beating. Yet under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with militia violence and fear, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand province resulted in numerous casualties and a burgeoning opium trade.[1]
But it gets worse. Not only were the armed forces woefully underprepared for their encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan, but when placed under the analytical microscope, the British Army's vaunted capacity for handling small wars disappears. What was supposed to be a record of effective counterinsurgency campaigning actually reveals a legacy of failure and lack of achievement. More terrible still, even the occasional victories or partial successes were not the result of any real skill or finesse, but more often the product of the unsubtle employment of brute force that encompassed massacres and atrocities, and even, depending on whom you read, genocide.
It is not the intention of this short piece to maintain that there have been no shortcomings in recent British military operations. Serious deficiencies there have been and it is right that these are exposed. Nor is the intention to question the findings of the new historiography that suggest British counterinsurgency campaigning has been more coercive and brutal than has sometimes been appreciated. What this study does argue is that the "where did it all go wrong?" school of thought, which asserts a once esteemed tradition of small war fighting now lies in ruins, is itself a myth that deserves to be questioned. It is a myth because it conflates a number of different, and not necessarily related, analytical interpretations into single storyline that is neither accurate nor coherent.
The argument seeks to separate out some of these interpretations. When viewed in broad historical terms, the British military experience shows itself to be one full of problems, irony and paradox. It also shows, though, that what ultimately governs whether Britain has prevailed in its small wars and counterinsurgencies depends on political will. Where strong political will has been invested in a cause the British stayed and fought: they made mistakes, they learnt, they adapted, and mostly they were successful. Success here is defined in the only terms that matter, whether the actions of the British armed forces assisted in the attainment of political goals as determined by higher decision centers, that is, elected policymakers. Where political will was lacking, a decision was almost always made to withdraw quickly, or sometimes not even to contest the political space. Thus, running parallel to a record of prevailing in the small wars where it chose to fight, Britain has an equally honored tradition of cutting and running in wars where it didn't.
Intellectually, then, it becomes difficult to sustain a narrative of a once proud "world beating" institution falling apart on instances where, though failures of leadership, doctrine and equipment there may well have been, the political will to stay the course was lacking, or in some cases, completely absent. The pronouncement of failure and a venerable tradition gone to seed can only be deduced from situations where military capability clearly failed to deliver despite strong political backing. With this consideration in mind, it is certainly possible to document disappointments arising from faltering political will – the 1956 Suez debacle for instance, and indeed quite possibly the loss of control of Basra between 2006 and 2008 – but equally it is difficult to pinpoint any generic failure where the British forces stood and fought with political support behind them. In fact, when the "where did it all go wrong" argument is itself subject to scrutiny, we find that the allegation of a once "world class" military reputation evaporating in a miasma of over-stretch and ineptitude is extrapolated from a single, and of itself somewhat questionable case, that of Basra.
Tradition, What Tradition?
Ledwidge and others allude to Britain's "apparent success" in "small wars," for which also read counterinsurgency. Therefore, to be clear in the first instance, what is meant by these terms? Small wars can be taken to mean military encounters where there is a large element of discretion in whether to be involved or not. That is to say, they are conflicts that reside below survival level threats that a country like the United Kingdom confronted in World War II, where the choice of not fighting (i.e. surrendering) possess far-reaching consequences. Decisions whether to invest causes with extensive time and effort that exist beneath this threshold, and which in all probability lie externally beyond national borders, are likely to be wars of choice rather than necessity. These can be said to constitute so-called small wars. Counterinsurgency campaigns are therefore likely to represent a particular form of "small war" that involves an attempt to confound an armed challenge to established authority.
Arising from its empire history where British forces found themselves frequently engaged in expeditions to conquer, occupy, or pacify foreign lands, a "tradition" of assumed expertise has grown up around Britain's ability to wage small wars either for territorial gain or against attempted insurrections against colonial authority. We might note, however, the passive voice construction in the description of Ledwidge's book, which claims "the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world-beating." The question is perceived by whom? Once this the question is addressed, it becomes evident that rarely has this been a self-generated perception on the part of the British armed forces themselves, either at the time of, or even after, the campaigns that allegedly gave them such a revered name in this aspect of warfare. It is a reputation that has been largely ascribed to them by others.
Those who have extolled, or intimated, a British way in counterinsurgency or small wars have been diverse. They span ex-colonial civil servants, former soldiers, journalists, American academics and serving U.S. Army officers. A self-inculcated tradition of counterinsurgency campaign cannot, though, be found in any contemporaneous British Army doctrine or documents. If anything the later twentieth century British Army consciously overlooked any putative tradition of counterinsurgency expertise in favor of a focus on war planning for mass battle on the Central European Front. This in itself indicates an element of obfuscation in the "where did it all go wrong?" thesis that conflates a talent for small wars attributed to the British by analysts with the subtle, but erroneous, implication that this also coincided with the self-perception of the British armed forces themselves. There is scant evidence for this belief, and the little evidence that does exist is problematic.
So, who and what accounts for the ascription of a British proficiency for small wars? Undeniably, the Malaya Emergency informed much subsequent commentary, framing early perceptions of a British flair for such encounters. The work of Sir Robert Thompson, a former officer in the Malaya Civil Service, whose Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experience from Malaya and Vietnam (1966), provided the stimulus that intimated a British way in counterinsurgency. This was not so much because Thompson articulated a British approach, but because his five-step framework for orientating a counterinsurgency plan unambiguously drew on the Malaya experience, the success of which appeared to stand in positive contrast to the contemporaneous flailing American effort in South Vietnam with its seemingly misplaced emphasis on search and destroy missions. Following Thompson's work, there were remarkably few direct allusions to a distinct British practice of COIN, the one exception perhaps being former Army officer Julian Paget's Counterinsurgency Campaigning (1967).
Going into the early 1970s with a spirit of post-imperial decline beginning to root itself in the British national psyche, a different, and more depressing, set of challenges arose that denuded any residual sense of achievement in successfully waging small wars. 1971 saw the publication Brigadier Frank Kitson's Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Peacekeeping and Law Enforcement, which chimed with the darker times, as the national gloom descended over the United Kingdom with rising levels of industrial unrest, economic despondency, social and moral decay, and crucially, the onset of the calamitous Northern Ireland crisis. Both in Low Intensity Conflict, and his later ruminations on the conflicts in Kenya, Malaya, and Cyprus, in Bunch of Five, Kitson makes no claims to discern a specifically British take on countering insurgency.
Interestingly, in September 1970 Kitson went onto command 39 Infantry Brigade in Belfast, a period during which Northern Ireland began its descent into chaos. Despite the fearsome reputation that Kitson possessed in Irish republican circles as a result of his experiences fighting in some of Britain's more notable later twentieth colonial wars, there is little to suggest that Kitson, or indeed any other British Army commander in Northern Ireland then or since, implemented a systematic COIN plan based on any set of enduring British techniques developed in previous campaigns.
Here we can discern something of an irony in the current notion of a British COIN tradition being thrown away. During the years of the Northern Ireland tumult, which Ledwidge and others cite as a major source of Britain's small wars heritage, the Army's role was from the mid-1970s mainly devoted to supporting the police. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the British Army's main focus remained on the planning for major battle against Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. In fact, the years of the Northern Ireland troubles represents a curious lacuna in British military thinking, for it is clear that far from elaborating, let alone celebrating, some ingrained capability to deal with such conflicts, the British Army's was – along with the rest of British defense thinking at the time – intent on ignoring the conflict as best it could. During this period the only work to appear that even hinted at some generalized British approach to small wars was former Army officer, Colonel Michael Dewar's 1984 publication, Brush Fire Wars that comprised a broad account of Britain's experience of "minor wars" since 1945.
Born in the USA: The Invention of a Tradition
In sum, from the 1950s through to the end of the century there was no enunciation in official United Kingdom publications, either by the Army or any other government agency, or from any other British military commentator, of a pre-existing facility for waging small wars. At most, there were intimations of an underlying set of values that might have governed conduct in Britain's minor wars, but no more. Surprisingly, perhaps, it was only after 1990 that a systematic line of thought developed that sought to explicitly identify a British approach. More paradoxically still, this evolving understanding was created not by British observers, but by a set of American writers. In effect, the attribution of a venerable British tradition of small war capability was made in the USA.
We can date the evolution of an interest in, if not admiration for, British counterinsurgency practice to the re-publication to Thomas Mockaitis' British Counterinsurgency, 1919-1960 (1990) that produced the first properly academic analysis of Britain's colonial campaigns. Although he did not propose that the British had developed a war-winning formula, Mockaitis did suggest that the British had, during a long period of tough encounters, evolved a set of practices that accentuated the principles of minimum force and discriminate violence. It was John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (2002) that further elaborated this argument by extolling the virtues of the British Army as a learning institution that was readily able to adapt its military methodology in Malaya to suit the needs of the situation.
The timely appearance of Nagl's thesis struck a resounding chord in American military circles in a period that witnessed the slide of post-invasion Iraq into sectarian strife and a Sunni/al-Qaeda sponsored uprising against the Coalition occupation. As the U.S. armed forces debated how to transition from a main invasion force into an effective occupying power capable of dealing with the complicated conditions of civil insurrection, another American commentator, Montgomery McFate rose to prominence. McFate also drew inspiration from the British experience but unlike Nagl who focused on British Army practices during the Malaya Emergency, McFate was impressed by the Army's ability to acquire "cultural knowledge" of its enemy during the Northern Ireland Troubles.[2] This hard won knowledge, gained over many years of trial and error, she felt held important lessons for the U.S. military in attempting to operate in complex local environments such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To recapitulate, the attribution to the British armed forces of a special prowess in counterinsurgency was essentially one generated in the United States. Each observer emphasized an element of practice that they thought either distinguished a particularly British attitude towards small-scale military entanglements (Mockaitis and the principle of minimum force), or contained crucial lessons that could be adapted as best practice by the U.S. military (Nagl and the desirability of a flexible learning institution), and be useful in order to gain a sophisticated understanding of the challenges, subtleties and potential opportunities, in the specific theater in which U.S. forces were compelled to operate, especially those characterized by complex tribal interactions (McFate and the importance of acquiring cultural knowledge).
It was the construction of this American derived narrative about British counterinsurgency capabilities that led to further paradoxes. It was, ironically, only after the invention of this tradition that some sections of the British establishment consciously bought into this plotline. As the difficulties of pacifying post-invasion Iraq revealed themselves in mounting inter-communal violence and attacks on Coalition forces, the more turbulent American controlled sectors of the country seemed to stand in contrast to the quieter areas to the south under British tutelage. The perception grew that the harder, more kinetic American operations were creating more problems than they were solving, stirring up anti-Coalition hostility and generating further local resistance. In comparison, the southlands around Basra were characterized by a lower key British presence, where the Army patrolled in soft hats, and talked to the locals rather than engaged in frequent shoot-ups.
An Iraqi Aberration
Until the invasion of Iraq, it was uncommon for any official articulation of a distinctive British approach to COIN to be aired. One exception which came close to doing so was a House of Commons report in 2005 that took evidence from a number of serving and former soldiers, academics and other commentators who strongly intimated that Britain possessed an inherited knowledge of "post-conflict operations." Explicit references were made to prior experience in places like Malaya and Northern Ireland as providing insights and lessons from which others (i.e. the Americans) might usefully follow.[3] Undoubtedly, this view did gain adherents within sections of the Army after 2005.
The most notable convert to this line of thought in the British Army was the Chief of the General Staff, Mike Jackson, who drew distinctions between how British forces conducted themselves around Basra and the harder edged actions of the U.S. military. In one broadside he asserted in 2004 that "We must be able to fight with the Americans. That does not mean that we must be able to fight as the Americans."[4] In 2009 after leaving the Army, he stated in the Journal of Strategic Studies, that the British military experience was one that had extensive roots counterinsurgency that extended from its colonial policing encounters. "There is a sense," he added, "of a real historical thread in this type of operation for the British Armed Forces."[5]
For the most part, though, formal British Army pronouncements rarely venerated a British take on counterinsurgency. Most statements emanating from British military personnel were couched in modest terms, and if they ever came close to acknowledging a British approach, it was usually implied rather than overtly declared as is clear even in the notable House of Commons Defence Committee Report of 2005. Thus, the most celebrated public criticism of the U.S.'s supposedly heavy handed tactics in Iraq, Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster's 2005 article in Military Review entitled "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," makes no mention of any presumed British penchant for counterinsurgency operations. Instead, Aylwin-Foster notes only John Nagl's point in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, which distinguished the American Army's facility for high end war fighting arising from its institutional experience and historical origins that emphasized "the eradication of threats to national survival" which contrasted, supposedly, with "the British Army's history as an instrument of limited war to achieve limited goals at limited cost."[6]
As a result of these kinds of commentaries the relative tranquility of Iraq's south began to be explained in terms of the differing military cultures and traditions of the British and American armed forces. It was in this evolving context that established British approaches to counterinsurgency came to be raised as one explanatory factor that accounted for this apparent difference in operational styles and outcomes.[7] At this point a tone of self-congratulation did begin to creep into official British rhetoric. One Ministry of Defence report argued that the Army's "positive start in Iraq" was attributable in part to the "counter-insurgency experience from Northern Ireland and Balkans."[8]
We know, of course, that such a view heavily downplayed the fact that the Americans were compelled to operate in the Sunni badlands of the north in contrast to the anti-Saddmite Shi'a south. The British controlled areas were initially far less hostile to Coalition forces after the ousting of the old regime. Yet, and here we encounter a further irony, it was at this time in 2005 and 2006 that the British themselves were indeed running into serious difficulties in the south, with Basra degenerating into anarchy at the hands of Iranian backed Shi'a militia groups.
The widely reported publication of Aylwin-Foster's critique represented the height of a seemingly self-invoked, though again it should be emphasized, always implicit, sense of British superiority in matters of counterinsurgency. Feathers were ruffled with one U.S. officer, Col. Kevin Benson of the U.S. Army's School of Advanced initially accusing Aylwin-Foster of being "an insufferable British snob."[9] Paradoxically, again, at some level Aylwin-Foster's remarks were probably accurate in the context of the time, which witnessed degrees of U.S. excess, notably around Fallujah. In hindsight, moreover, few could disagree with his observations the Coalition had "failed to capitalise on initial success" and that Iraq was in "the grip a vicious and tenacious insurgency," or that there was need to "be better prepared for Irregular Warfare and post conflict stabilisation and reconstruction operations."[10]
A careful reading of Aylwin-Foster's commentary shows that it was delivered in respectful tones that paid fulsome tribute to American capabilities. It did not "slam" U.S. tactics, nor offer a "blistering critique"[11] which was the tone of much of headlines. Such inflammatory headlines coverage did, undoubtedly, create the impression that Aylwin-Foster was venting an overbearing sense of superior British counterinsurgency wisdom, but it is difficult to sustain this if one pays close attention to Aylwin-Foster's argument. Even Col. Benson modified his position, acknowledging that "sometimes good articles do make you angry. We should publish articles like this. We are in a war and we must always be thinking of how we can improve the way we operate."[12] In the end, Aylwin-Foster's thoughts were an important prelude to the re-focusing of U.S. military efforts, which succeeded in realigning forces that enabled the stabilization of the country after 2007.
Banging on About Basra: The Decline of the Tradition that Never Was
Even though Aylwin-Foster's article did not make invidious comparisons between the performance of the U.S. and British forces, there was no disguising that in the following two years the British controlled South was faltering around Basra. It was on this background that another false narrative was spun around the myth of British counterinsurgency, namely, the decline of a tradition. The relative quiescence of the south of Iraq was represented within some British defense circles as an exemplar of British competence in counterinsurgency, while other commentators also began to read the British Army's preference for unobtrusive patrolling in berets and their apparent willingness to work with local leaders through the lens of an ostensibly British facility for counterinsurgency. What was ultimately going on, however, was that one questionable narrative was coming to be replaced by another.
A more skeptical analysis of the rhetoric and reality of British operations in the South of Iraq begged the question as to whether the Army was indeed practicing a counterinsurgency approach at all. The fact that British were patrolling in Basra without hard hats and governing – at first – with the consent of the local population, attested to the fact that in the aftermath of the invasion, Southern Iraq was not in a state of insurrection. The unobtrusive approach adopted by the British may therefore have been entirely appropriate at this stage. Why, it may be asked, was any heritage of counterinsurgency invoked when there was no insurgency to counter? It seems more accurate to claim that British forces were engaged in an occupying/peacekeeping effort, and it is this that failed rather than any counterinsurgency campaign.
Furthermore, given the decision to drawdown and pull out of Southern Iraq arose from the political unpopularity of the war among the British electorate, it can be argued that Britain never even attempted a concerted counterinsurgency program in the South. A political decision had been taken to leave. Without the political will, there can be no such thing as a coherent counterinsurgency campaign. Therefore, can Basra be said to represent a failure of a British approach to COIN? Most certainly operational shortcomings were revealed, as was the vaunted (but always inaccurate idea) about the Army's capacity for rapid institutional learning, but categorical statements that an entire reputation – a reputation that the British Army itself never officially embraced – was jeopardized are wrong.
The Challenge of the New Historiography
The fact that the Ministry of Defence formally sought to identify a British capacity for "minimum force" practices by citing the examples of Northern Ireland (which was actually a bruising encounter characterized by a vicious undercover intelligence war) and the even more curious case of the Balkans (where nothing resembling a counterinsurgency campaign in any comparable sense ever took place) illustrated the tenuous grasp of even official viewpoints on a supposedly ingrained tradition. In the face of such self-regarding rhetoric and the declining hold on Basra it was understandable that commentators also began to identify the erosion, or even collapse, of that same tradition out of which grew the "where did it all go wrong" school.[13]
In the wake of the seeming failure of established British military virtues in small war came an even more potent threat to an assumed tradition of counterinsurgency expertise. This arose in form of a new historiography of the later British imperial era that demonstrated, often decisively, that the examples from which the canon of inherited counterinsurgency wisdom was drawn, particularly the legacy of colonial withdrawal, were far removed from any minimum force practices.
Although the slew of books and articles questioning the assumption of hearts and minds and minimum force grew rapidly in the late 2000s, the debate was not new. A decade beforehand Karl Hack had exposed the highly coercive methods employed by the British in "screwing down" the Communists in Malaya in his revisionist account of the Emergency.[14] Later in 2002 John Newsinger, coming from a Marxist historical perspective, developed a broader critique of a brutally suppressive tradition of British counterinsurgency.[15] From the late 2000s the work of archival historians such as Huw Bennett did much to reveal how British approaches colonial insurrections were often fiercely aggressive in orientation. Bennett's work on the Mau Mau war in Kenya in the 1950s, for instance, presented sufficient evidence to suggest that extensive atrocities were committed by British forces.[16]
The revelations of coercive, sometimes ferocious, crackdowns on insurrectionary elements was sufficient for those like Newsinger and others to pronounce that the vaunted record of British military aptitude for counterinsurgency was misplaced, and more a product of political failure. Others like Douglas Porch similarly argued that the British Army "did not have a particularly exemplary record at COIN or at any warfare, for that matter, at the time of Malaya" and the evidence of "brutal COIN tactics" was sufficient in itself to discount any claimed successes. Further, to the extent that British forces demonstrated any aptitude for Nagl's institutional learning, it was in Porch's words a preference for learning "kinetic methods," disguised under the cloak of hearts and minds, which were "every bit as repressive – even dirty as the French."[17]
Ironically, though, such historical revisionism does not objectively undermine any assumed British capability for fighting small wars, but merely re-frames it in more contingent ways. Strategic success, it should be recalled, is the attainment of political goals. The fact that the British campaigns were often extremely violent does not, ipso facto, mean that they failed: it simply means that such victories were just more violent and coercive than subsequent commentary previously thought. This is the point: historical revelations of coercive, and sometimes excessive practices, merely contradicted the ostensible narrative of minimum force that had been built up by (often non-British) commentators.
To reiterate, this was a narrative to which the British Army had no institutional commitment. As this study has elucidated, over the years only a few military figures, along with the occasional House of Commons or Ministry of Defence report, ever referenced a presumed British tradition of counterinsurgency achievements based on hearts and minds/minimum force, and that they did so was largely the result of a lack of historical understanding about how the Army regarded its own contemporaneous performance. Arguably, such ignorance arose from the poor institutional memory about the legacy of colonial warfare within British Army itself, which throughout the years of the Cold War was heavily focused on major land battle in Central Europe.
A Tradition Not of Minimum Force but of Political Will
In broader historical perspective, when British "COIN" experience is examined, what is demonstrable is that, ultimately, what has determined the success or failure in any theater is political will. It is the political investment in the cause that has governed whether the British state has had the wherewithal to stay the course that, traditionally, has always provided the space and time for the learning/adaptation process to occur in the contingent environment. It is this factor that holds the key to understanding the British military experience in so-called small wars: that is to say, Britain does not have any tradition in counterinsurgency, which is, as this study has indicated, is at best a loose idea. What Britain does have, though, is an extended tradition of committing itself long-term to a series of external, and occasionally internal, engagements.
The capacity to enact long-term commitments can be discerned across the spectrum of the British experience: initial mistakes, lead – eventually – to learning and adaptation, and invariably success in terms of the attainment of designated political goals (which is, to reiterate, the only objective measurement of success). We can see this in numerous examples from the Boer War onwards; Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Oman, and Northern Ireland.
One sees this process at work in Afghanistan. The initial British deployment to Helmand was certainly under-resourced and poorly thought through. British forces, though under pressure, did not buckle and retained their presence arising from the broader commitment of the British government to resolving the Afghan problem.[18] It was the long-term investment in the problem that enabled considerable improvements in operational effectiveness to be gained. In other words, British forces learnt and adapted.
The capacity to change, stay the course, and achieve results, has little to do with an imagined sense of proficiency in "small wars." It has everything do with the strategic calculations of elected decision makers about where the balance of the national interest resides. If that calculation is that it is worth the cost to stay and fight, the British have usually succeeded either in whole or in part in attaining their political objectives. Conversely, where the calculation has gone the other way, an entirely different set of imperatives has come into play, which brings us to the next crucial aspect of Britain's engagement with so-called insurgencies.
A Fine Tradition of Running Away
Where political will has been lacking because calculations of the national interest have been deemed to lie elsewhere, decisions have invariably been made to minimize losses and quit. Hence, in addition to a reputation for "COIN," there is an equally venerable British tradition of cut-and-run withdrawals. Examples are numerous. There is the case of the Palestine in the 1940s, a UN mandated territory, where Britain had no intention of staying following the agreement of a UN plan to partition the country. Aden is another example. The British evacuated the territory in 1967 because of a political decision to withdraw forces East of Suez as a result of financial stringency at home, which meant that, unlike Malaya, there was little strategic interest in stabilizing the country before leaving.
One of the most interesting cases was the participation in the multinational effort in the Lebanon in the 1980s. While the British have usually not been shy to send forces on peacekeeping missions, particularly in support of American initiatives, in this instance the British sent only a token force of 90 troops into Beirut. This was, somewhat unusually, dwarfed by the commitment of thousands of American, French and even Italian forces. Subsequently, after a few months, the British government unilaterally withdrew the force. The political assumption was that persisting with a presence in a rapidly deteriorating security situation was likely to be costly. Arguably, it proved an accurate calculation when in 1983 the U.S. Marines and French military headquarters in the city were attacked by Hezbollah backed suicide bombers resulting in the deaths of hundreds of troops.
It is in the context of the parallel British tradition of cutting-and-running that the supposed failures of British counterinsurgency in Basra should be seen. So here is the point: few serious analysts proclaim the failure of British COIN based on prudential withdrawals in places like Palestine, Aden or Beirut. There is no suggestion that just because the British failed to pacify Afghanistan in the nineteenth century or decided to quit India in 1947 that it failed in small wars or counterinsurgency. What the British external and colonial military engagement demonstrates is the deeply contingent character of war that involves constant assessments of the willingness to invest troops, money and material for a particular cause. Thus, alongside a legacy of often hard won and hardnosed success for British forces there is an equally fine tradition of running away. This is not a symptom of cowardice, weakness or failure, just political calculation – and arguably quite astute calculations at that – for if there is any wisdom contained in the British experience of contending with small wars, perhaps knowing when not to fight is just as important as committing to stay over the long term.
If one surveys the history of so-called British counterinsurgency encounters over the longer view, what is revealed is an extended and varied legacy of external entanglements (or in the case of Northern Ireland, an internal entanglement) ranging from colonial intervention, colonial withdrawal, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The outcome of each of these encounters has ultimately been based on the degree of political commitment to the cause. The legacy is one which – from the Boer War, to Malaya, from Kenya to Kuwait, to Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Kosovo, to Helmand, reveals a remarkable degree of operational success, but most importantly where the British authorities were fully committed, the attainment of political goals was almost always achieved. Arguably, perhaps with single exception in recent times of the Suez intervention in 1956, all the other examples of assumed failure were based on political decisions to withdraw from entanglements where there was no political commitment to stay.
Finally, then, we return to the key question, which is why so many commentators end up drumming on the cases of Basra and the initial commitment to Helmand, to build up a disproportionate argument about British operational failure within a presumed tradition of expertise in counterinsurgency? As has been demonstrated, if one looks closely at the evolution of this supposed tradition, it reveals itself as highly elusive. Rarely has a facility for counterinsurgency ever been claimed by the British armed forces themselves. Invariably, it has been a tradition ascribed to them by others. Ostensibly, it has been a narrative generated by commentators in the United States who were keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning. Such practices were deemed to constitute lessons from which the U.S. armed forces themselves could learn. A later series of scholars came to question a number of these lessons, suggesting instead, that British success was often based on more hard-head assumptions rather than on clichéd ideas of hearts and minds.
Seemingly, it is always attractive for commentators to filter their analysis through the lens of contemporary events, like the military commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and via popular tropes, like the assumption that Britain has an established tradition of counterinsurgency, to project arguments that assert the decline of a once esteemed reputation. Such plotlines are not historically grounded but are narratives that possess a certain broad though inevitably simplistic appeal for audiences that may not have the time or willingness to examine the British Army's experience of military engagement in so-called small wars in all its historical complexity.
A longer term perspective, in fact, is likely to reveal that the examples of Helmand and Basra are exceptional, even aberrations, in relation to the vast majority of instances of British military interventions over the past 150 years, not least because in Iraq and Afghanistan Britain has functioned as a junior partner to the United States (though a significant partner in a broader coalition of nations) in an extensive nation building capacity. It is, in other words, a consequence of the over-stretch of resources in potentially unlimited commitments that weaknesses of early twenty first century British military capacities have revealed themselves, rather than any failure of a non-existent tradition of counterinsurgency.
[1]. http://www.amazon.co.uk/Losing-Small-Wars-Military-Afghanistan/dp/0300166710
[2]. Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, "An Organizational Solution for DOD's Cultural Knowledge Needs', Military Review (July-August), p.18.
[3]. House of Commons Defence Committee, Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-Conflict Operations, Sixth Report of Session 2004-05, Vol. 1 (London: The Stationary Office, 2005), pp. 27-35.
[4]. Richard Norton-Taylor, "General Hits Out at US Tactics," Guardian, April 21, 2004.
[5]. Mike Jackson, "British Counter-insurgency," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), p. 347.
[6]. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," Military Review (November-December 2005), p. 8.
[7]. House of Commons Defence Committee, Iraq, p. 4.
[8]. Ministry of Defence, Stability Operations in Iraq (Op Telic 2-5): An Analysis from A Land Perspective (London: MOD, 2005), p. 14. Available at
http://download.cabledrum.net/wikileaks_archive/file/uk-stbility-operations-in-iraq-2006.pdf (accessed 11 July 2006).
[9]. Qoted in Matthew Davis, "UK Officer Slams US Iraq Tactics," BBC News, January 11, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4603136.stm (accessed June 21, 2012).
[10]. Aylwin-Foster, Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," p. 4.
[11]. Richard Norton-Taylor and Jamie Wilson, 'US army in Iraq institutionally racist, claims British officer', Guardian, January 12, 2006.
[12]. Quoted in Davis, "UK Officer Slams US Iraq Tactics."
[13]. David Betz and Anthony Cormack, "Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy," Orbis (Spring 2009), p. 321.
[14]. Karl Hack, "'Iron Claws on Malaya': The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1999), p. 102.
[15]. John Newsinger, British Counter-insurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland (London: Palgrave, 2002).
[16]. Huw Bennett, "Soldiers in the Court Room: The British Army's Part in the Kenya Emergency Under the Legal Spotlight," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 39, No. 5 (2011), pp. 717-730.
[17]. Douglas Porch, "The Dangerous Myth and Dubious Promise of COIN," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2011), p. 249.
[18]. See Theo Farrell, "A Good War Gone Wrong?" RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 5 (October-November 2011), pp. 60-64.


text:
Date: Dec 8, 2012 6:18 PM Author: Sam Wormley Subject: Re: Action-Reaction: Energy that penetrates the Centrepoint transforms<br> into light. On 12/8/12 5:00 PM, jdawe wrote:
> Energy moves from an area...
We do not have a picture that energy comes in little blobs of a definite
> In physics, energy (Ancient Greek: ???????? energeia "activity,
operation"[1]) is an indirectly observed quantity that is often
understood as the ability of a physical system to do work on other
physical systems.[2][3] However, this must be understood as an overly
simplified definition, as the laws of thermodynamics demonstrate that
not all energy can perform work. Depending on the boundaries of the
physical system in question, energy as understood in the above
definition may sometimes be better described by concepts such as exergy,
emergy and thermodynamic free energy. Therefore, in the words of Richard
Feynman, "It is important to realize that in physics today, we have no
knowledge what energy is. We do not have a picture that energy comes in
little blobs of a definite amount."
Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy

subset: commoncrawl


text:
This is a traditional good luck meal that is served on St. Patrick's Day. This version of an old favorite makes quick work of a delicious meal. If you want to make it for a larger group just double your ingredients and use a 5 or 6 qt. slow cooker. This is perfect for a […]Continue reading
1 carcass (frame of turkey), wings, bones, skin and everything from your leftover cooked turkey 3 stalks celery complete with leaves 1 medium yellow onion 2 bay leaves 1/2 teaspoon basil 1/2 teaspoon marjoram 5 black peppercorns Remove all the good meat from the carcass, wrap well and set aside in the refrigerator. Then, break […]Continue reading
Do you want something festive to serve at the Holiday Party you're hosting? Or maybe you need an idea for something to bring to a Christmas Party Potluck. I have just the thing for you. It's a yummy non-alcoholic Christmas punch. It's hot and delicious and smells amazing. I love that everything is heated up […]Continue reading
This is such a simple recipe. There are only 4 ingredients (chicken, orange jam, barbecue sauce and soy sauce), and it cooks to perfection in the slow cooker. Serve over some cooked rice and dinner is done. If you're feeling fancy, steam up some broccoli or slice up some garden fresh cucumbers to go along […]Continue reading
I love waking up to the smell of breakfast cooking. Sadly, I'm the morning person around here so that doesn't happen very often… unless I whip up this easy breakfast dish the night before and stick it in the crockpot before going to bed. By the time I'm up and had my first cup of […]Continue reading
Thanks so much for your well wishes, good thoughts and prayers. Things are starting to look up and I'm read to rule out the flu. I think our daughter just has a bad cold and my shoulder is starting to feel better thanks to some rest yesterday. Today we start the week busier than ever. […]Continue reading
This recipe recipe is always a crowd-pleaser and very kid-friendly as well. I serve it with the delicious sauce over rice or noodles. Just add a side salad or steam up some broccoli and dinner is done. This is a recipe from my new Kindle cookbook – 35 Simple and Tasty Chicken Crockpot Recipes Instead of using […]Continue reading
Most casserole dishes are made in the oven in a piece of bakeware made for creating casseroles. But did you know you can also make casseroles in your crockpot? Here is a simple and delicious recipe that I have been using for years! Quick and delicious casseroles in your crockpot will not only cut down […]Continue reading
I love this dish because it's so simple and very tasty. If you're not a big fan of mushrooms, use any "Cream of…" type soup. One year I made this with some cream of broccoli soup and added a little chopped up broccoli to the mix as well and it turned out really good. This […]Continue reading
We love meatloaf around here. I use my mother-in-law's recipe but modified it to work in the crockpot for those days when we're busy running around. It's comfort food and there's always plenty left over for sandwiches the next day. I also like to crumble up leftover meatloaf and use it in spaghetti sauce. Here's […]Continue reading
I'll admit it… I love a nice bowl of homemade chowder. There's just something about the richness and creaminess that's hard to beat. The problem for me up until now has been that it takes some time to make and that I always feel guilty about all those calories. Well… consider the problem solved with […]Continue reading
Earlier this week I shared a recipe for a loaded backed potato soup that cooks in the slow cooker that's been a big hit this fall. Today I have another potato soup for you, but this one includes some sweet potatoes and apples. The combination makes for a great soup that fills you up and […]Continue reading
"I wonder if I could cook that in the slow cooker…" Have you asked yourself this before? Many of us with slow cookers have eyeballed them and wondered if we could cook our favorite recipe(s) in them. Often, you can. But before you just throw everything into the slow cooker and hope for the best, […]Continue reading
Just a quick tip for you this morning. If you're using meat in your crockpot dishes, take a few minutes in the morning and brown it in a pan. Yes, it takes a little extra time and you have a pan to clean after, but you'll be rewarded with lots of rich flavors. The nice […]Continue reading
Who doesn't love a nice baked potato with some sour cream, cheese and bacon? How about taking all those wonderful flavors and turning them into a quick and easy crockpot soup. I think peeling the potatoes was the hardest and most time consuming part of making this soup. Next time I'll put my husband to […]Continue reading


text:
If Attorney General Gregg Renkes (Empire, June 12) thinks the Ninth Circuit Court's decision was about the whole of the Pledge of Allegiance, as implied by your article, he is wrong.
The decision was limited only to the words "under God."
These words were placed in the Pledge by an act of Congress in 1954, in a Cold War reaction to what was seen as the threat of "atheistic" communism of the Soviet Union. The campaign initiated by the Roman Catholic Knights of Columbus culminated in President Dwight Eisenhower's saying when he signed it into law:
"From this day forward, the millions of our schoolchildren will daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural schoolhouse, the dedication of our nation and our people to the Almighty."
His words reflected the intent of Congress: To establish a religious exercise in the public schools of our nation.
The First Amendment to the Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ..." But Congress did make this law that put religious words into the mouths of our children, whether we wanted them there or not.
What is wrong with "under God" in the Pledge? About 10 percent of Americans do not "believe in God;" another 10 percent do not believe that "God" is in a position "over" any nation; and it gives the false impression there is unanimous agreement with this opinion about how our nation and a deity are related.
Kenneth H. Bonnell
Los Angeles
© 2018. All Rights Reserved. | Contact Us


text:
If you make it to the end, you will be rewarded with more photos. Or, I guess you could just scroll down…
Our baby girl was due August 13, 2011. (For the story of our gender reveal check out this post.) At our 12-week ultrasound, the technician said she thought the baby was measuring an August 17 due date.
"August 17?" I asked. "That's my birthday!"
The technician said she wouldn't want to be laboring on her birthday, and Tim and I joked that I would never have a birthday again. From then on, the day would be baby's day, not mine. My doctor decided to leave the due date as August 13 since it was only four days off from my original due date. And while I knew that a "due date" was just an estimate and that I could reasonably go any time two weeks before or two weeks after, I knew it was likely baby and I would have birthdays very close together.
Fast forward to July. My sister bought plane tickets to visit me for a week beginning August 14, the day after my due date. She just found out that she got a new job (yay!) and no longer had the flexibility to come whenever the baby arrived (boo!). I'll admit I was nervous. I thought there was a good chance I'd go into labor while she was here, and I wasn't sure I wanted another person around while I was laboring at home and waiting to go to the hospital. I also worried that the baby may be late and my sister would miss her all together. My sister assured me it would be okay. Even if there was no baby yet, we'd hang out, finish getting ready for her, and celebrate my birthday. As it turns out, I didn't need to worry.
On Tuesday, July 26, I jokingly told Tim I thought the next Wednesday, August 3, would be a good day to deliver. My work had already hired a temporary worker to assist while I was out on maternity leave. I was supposed to start training her Thursday and Friday, July 28 and 29. I figured that by the following Wednesday, I'd have most all my top priority projects wrapped up. My parents were "on call" to drive out from Illinois whenever they got word of baby's arrival. If she was born on August 3, my parents could come out the following week and still have a week here before my sister arrived on the 14th. I was born on a Wednesday, and August 3rd seemed like a nice day for a birthday. I had it all worked out in my mind.
Still, it was all said tongue in cheek. While at 37 weeks I knew I was technically "full term" and could go at any time, I still figured I'd be late. Even though both my sister and I were early, I had heard that most first-time moms don't deliver until after their due date. So, when I went into labor in the middle of the night, around 2 am on Thursday, July 28, I totally wasn't expecting it.
It's so weird. Wednesday we were eating dinner at IHOP and looking at lamps for the nursery at Lowe's, and then the next day we had a baby. She was here. No more planning. I didn't have my hospital bag packed. I didn't have my birth plan written out. I didn't have a glider or breast pump. I didn't have nursing bras or a diaper bag. Our house was a mess. I wasn't yet organized. The nursery wasn't complete. The dirty dishes were taking over the kitchen. We also had a maternity photo shoot planned for Sunday, July 31. I had been telling people for the last nine months that I was due in "mid August" and it wasn't even August yet. Then, I became a mom.
I woke in the middle of the night with an intense urge to pee. This wasn't an unusual occurrence. At 37 weeks pregnant I was regularly getting up in the night to use the bathroom – sometimes even twice in one night. Still, this sensation felt different – like, "wow, I must get to the bathroom now." As I sat up and started to exit the bed, I ran my hand across the mattress to make sure that I hadn't leaked or wet the bed.
When I walked toward the bedroom door, I felt a wetness in my panties. As I walked down the hall, I felt a trickle down my leg. Right before going to bed that night, I was reading about incontinence in What to Expect When Expecting. I even told Tim that a mutual friend of ours had recently confided in me her incontinence issues after giving birth. So, as I'm walking (very quickly at this point) down the hall, I'm thinking that I'm peeing my pants. Still half asleep, it was instinct to run to the toilet as quickly as possible. As I got to the doorway of the bathroom, I started to "leak" more and although I thought, "I should tighten my kegel muscles and try to stop it," I was already to the toilet. There was a gush, but it all happened so fast that I wasn't sure if it was my water breaking or just my bladder bursting with relief now that there was release. My panties were completely soaked.
I had heard that amniotic fluid smelled distinctive – sweet, not like the ammonia of urine. I smelled my panties, but to tell you the truth, I couldn't tell what it was. At that point I thought, well, I won't flush the toilet in case I need to come back and reference this liquid. I'll just wait and see if I start to have contractions. I knew that few women actually have their water break before contractions – in our birthing classes they told us this was more of a TV sit-com phenomenon than true life. But, when talking about it with my mom in the weeks prior, she said it happened that way for her both times.
So, I went back to the bedroom, changed my underwear and crawled back into bed. I don't even think Tim noticed I had gotten up. Then, almost immediately, I felt mild cramping in my lower abdomen, similar to period cramps. I knew I should relax, that I should try to go back to sleep because I could have a long day of laboring ahead of me. But of course, my mind was racing.
What? A July baby? What is today? July 28? Is July 28 even a Leo?
Our photo shoot! We were supposed to have maternity photos taken on Sunday.
And work! Oh, there's still so much to do. Our temp was supposed to come in and train today. And all those invoices on my desk – how will they know how to process them? Who will set up the new budget spreadsheets?
I didn't want to wake Tim. I wasn't sure what was going on and there was no reason for us both to be awake and anxious. After about half an hour of lying in bed, I decided to grab my netbook laptop and come downstairs. Plus, I had to pee again already.
I opened my laptop and Googled "water breaking vs. peeing." There were a few message boards that came up, but nothing that answered my question to my satisfaction. I then downloaded a contraction counter to my smartphone.
I wasn't really sure if I was having full-fledged contractions at this point, and they definitely weren't regular. I figured I'd go back upstairs and try to sleep again.
I may have dosed off briefly, but I couldn't sleep. I didn't even have my birth plan written out. After attending our Mindful Birthing class and doing lots of reading, I knew birth plans rarely went as planned. One of the midwives told me "they're more like goals." Still, I wanted to have something in writing that I could hand the nurse when we got to the hospital. I wanted something that said we wanted a low-intervention birth, that I intended to at least try for a natural, non-medicated birth with a midwife in the hospital's birthing suite. I didn't want to be tethered to a fetal heart monitor if it wasn't medically necessary; I wanted to be able to walk around. I wanted in writing that I wanted my husband to cut the umbilical cord and that I wanted to hold my baby and try to initiate breast feeding before she was taken out of room – that I wanted her with me skin-on-skin as long as possible.
At one point (it all seems like the middle of the night to me), I got back up and went downstairs to type this up. I basically summarized everything in the above short paragraph, but on that night, while beginning labor, I just couldn't concentrate enough to write it all out. Plus, the contractions were getting more and more painful. I realized that if the contractions were too painful to continue typing, it was probably time to wake up Tim.
By this time it was about 5:15am, around three hours after my water broke. I told Tim I thought I was in the early stages of labor, that I thought my water broke. He wasn't as surprised as I thought he might be. He was just very matter-of-fact about it "alright." We laid in bed together for a bit, but my contractions were getting more and more painful and it wasn't comfortable for me to lie down anymore.
Tim got up and started looking for someone to cover his shifts that day. He took the dog out for a walk. That period is now a haze for me. I remember throwing a bunch of stuff in my backpack. I didn't know how long I would be laboring at the hospital, so I packed things for both my time laboring and my hospital stay afterwards – my camera, my laptop, the yoga ball, a book to read, an outfit to change into, my journal, some snacks.
I was trying to follow the 4-1-1 rule we learned in our birthing class: don't go to the hospital until your contractions are four minutes apart, one minute long, for one hour. My contractions weren't a minute long, but they were closer than four minutes. What did that mean? I was so confused. I remember going down to the basement bathroom and laboring on the toilet. I felt better there, and I didn't feel anxious about leaking fluids when I was sitting on the toilet. I bounced on the yoga ball, I leaned against the banister and Tim pushed my hips together (a technique we had learned in class). I tried to envision each contraction as a wave coming in and out (I had read that somewhere), but I don't think I was very successful. I was loud. I moaned with each contraction and didn't care that it was fairly early in the morning and that we lived in a rowhouse with neighbors close on both sides. I figured they could hear me and hoped that they didn't call the police for some kind of domestic disturbance.
I remember Matt Lauer being in the background as I know the TODAY show was on the TV. By 8:00am I had Tim call my midwife practice. They weren't open yet, but there was an emergency line to call and leave a message. A few minutes later the on-duty midwife at the hospital called us back and Tim answered. I didn't feel much like talking to her, but she wanted to speak to me. I told her I thought my water broke around 2:15am and since my water broke, she told me to come on in.
Tim went and pulled the car up in front of the house. I was not looking forward to that car ride. At this point, I was in a severe amount of pain, and I was wailing pretty loudly. I leaned the chair back in the passenger's seat and braced my feet in front of me. The ride to the hospital didn't have to be a long one – we didn't live far from the hospital. However, it was morning rush hour. Then, Tim took a left when he should have gone straight.
"Where are you going?" I asked. "You should just go down Passyunk."
He wasn't thinking clearly, and we hadn't previously discussed the most direct route to the hospital. We also hadn't planned out the "drop off." When we got to the hospital, he went straight to the Emergency Room drop-off when he should have turned and let me off at the main entrance. I didn't want to wait for him to go around the block again, so I just had him pull over so I could get out and walk around the corner of the building. He went to park in the garage and said he'd meet me inside with all our stuff.
Having been to the hospital several times for classes and appointments, I knew there was often a line to get up to the reception desk where you had to sign in and get a pass to go inside. I walked directly to the font of the line and said, "I'm in labor and I need to go upstairs."
The expression on my face must have looked very serious, because she just waved me on. "Third floor," she said. I walked to the elevator and felt another contraction coming on. I was relieved there was no one else in the elevator. Then, right before the doors were about to close, a female doctor got into the elevator with me. I tried not to be too dramatic about my pain and purposefully didn't "let loose" like I'd been doing at home and in the car. She immediately came over to see if I was okay. I could tell she was worried. I knew where I was going (I'd been on the hospital tour), and although she tried to get me to go the wrong way on the floor, I started walking toward the registration desk. "Okay, you clearly know more than I do," she said. "Good luck."
When I got to the desk, they were expecting me. I've heard stories about women having to wait in the waiting room or wait in the triage room for a long time. I was taken into the triage room, right as Tim arrived. They wanted me to pee in a cup and I tried, but I just couldn't do it. The pain was all-encompassing.
I remember wearing a gown and laying in a hospital bed at one point. They checked me and said I was 5 cm and 100% effaced. "I guess it's a good thing we had you come in," the midwife told me. They asked if I wanted to deliver in the birthing suite. "That was the plan. I'd like to try if I can." (If you have an epidural, our hospital doesn't let you stay in the birthing suite, you have to be monitored in a standard hospital room).
A few contractions later, they checked me again. 7cm. Someone explained that most women increase a centimeter an hour, not a centimeter every 15 minutes. (Had it really been a half an hour?) Things were moving quickly.
Although I was told the birthing suite wasn't available, the next thing I knew I was being wheeled up the elevator and into the birthing suite.
All modesty went out the window. I've had other soon-to-be-mothers ask me what to wear while laboring. Well, I guess you could wear a nice tank top or some other "laboring outfit," but once in the birthing suite, I birthed completely naked. I think part of the reason was because when I first got into the room they asked me if I wanted to get into the bathtub. I had heard from friends that this relieved some pain, so I was really looking forward to getting into the water.
"If you feel like you need to push, let me know," the midwife said. "We can't let you have the baby in the water and if we do, I'll get in a lot of trouble," she said with a laugh.
I only lasted in the tub for a couple of contractions – sitting on my knees and leaning forward over the edge of the tub.
I remember the midwife trying to get me to trill my lips while I was mid-contraction, a way to relax and breathe. I couldn't do it, I just couldn't get my lips to work. After trying a few times I remember saying, "that one's not working – try something else."
Next, I moved into the shower. Standing, with the water flowing over my back and leaning with both arms on Tim's forearms, I felt better than I did in the tub. But we weren't in there long either. The next thing I know, we were back in the main birthing suite pushing. I started out in the bed on all fours, many pillows stacked up underneath me for support. The nurse left to get me some ice and a drink of what I think was seltzer and cranberry juice. Tim was next to me the whole time, but the midwife was the one in command.
We moved to a birthing chair – a weird wooden chair with no middle. I pushed through a few contractions there as well. The midwife asked me if we had a named picked out. "Adelaide," Tim and I both said. "Adelaide."
I believe we then moved back to the bed where I pushed on all fours again. I remember liking the bed better than the chair because at this point I was getting really tired and I could rest all of my body weight on the mattress. I can picture Tim there to my left with the drink and the ice saying supportive things.
"I can't do this. I can't do this," I repeated. "Yes you can," they all told me. "You ARE doing this."
"I don't feel good," I said, not knowing what else to say. The swearing I belted when I was laboring at home had subsided in the company of strangers.
"In what way don't you feel good?" my midwife wanted to know.
I could tell she was concerned that there might be something more than just the pains of a natural childbirth. "I'm just tired," I said. "I just want to meet her."
Although I'd heard it over and over that delivering laying on your back is counter-intuitive to how our bodies are built to birth babies, I found myself on my back. I guess I was technically sitting more than laying on my back. I was propped up by so many pillows that I was in an upright position. An intern held my left leg up near my chest. Tim held my right leg. I remember having a hard time keeping that left leg up while pushing through the contractions. They really had to hold my legs tightly to help give me some leverage.
I remember the midwife and nurse talking about all the hair they were seeing. "Oh she has a lot of hair. There's so much hair." They asked me to reach down and feel the top of her head. Yeah, it was pretty cool I guess, but at the moment, I wasn't having it. I didn't care about her hair and I wanted them to talk about something else.
I remember feeling as if the pushing took a really long time. However, in retrospect, Tim said it was only about 45 minutes or so. I just kept envisioning the moment I would meet her. "I just want to meet her. I just want to meet her," I repeated to myself.
Then, on the final push Tim said, "Oh wow. Oh Wow. Oh WOW" – each time a little louder as he saw her head, then shoulders, then whole body emerge.
The nurse immediately placed her on my chest. Things at this point were a bit of a blur. We arrived at the hospital around 9am and just after noon, she was born. I believe my first words were, "It is a girl isn't it?" still paranoid that the ultrasound had been wrong. The nurse lifted her back up to double check. "Yes, it's a girl."
She was beautiful and there was such a swell of emotion and relief.
Tim wanted to cut the umbilical cord and he did, but I wasn't really "present" for that moment. I think for our next child, I'd like to delay the cutting and then when we're ready, I want to make sure that I'm paying attention and present in the moment – the one down side of not having a doula or a written birth plan.
I held Adelaide for a bit and put her near my breast. After a while (my memory loses track of time here), they took her to be weighed, checked her vitals and footprinted her. Tim took photos as I rested in bed across the room. They handed her back to me and she nursed for the first time. Eventually they took her to get cleaned up and rolled in some lunch for me.
I was disappointed there was no photo shoot in the park, and I didn't get the chance to train my temp at work. I felt guilty for leaving several things up in the air when I went on an earlier-than-expected maternity leave. I imagine I would have felt differently had I been scheduled to be induced and knew what day I would give birth, or if I had reached my due date and was more prepared that she could come any day. In many ways, I know I was lucky to have avoided the anxiety of being overdue. And the hospital staff made sure to tell me that most women would've been envious of my quick labor.
When we got home from the hospital, I missed being pregnant (at least parts of it), and I felt as if I didn't get to properly say good-bye to that stage in the cycle. But, I had a new job. I was a mom, and I didn't have time to think twice about it. I was doing it and trying to digest it all. In the days ahead, I tried to survive the sleepless nights, to sleep when she slept (yeah right!) and to enjoy her bright eyes, many facial expressions and calming coos.
2 comments
Trackback link: http://nextlifechapter.com/birth-story/trackback/
I love that you shared your story. It will be such a nice thing to share with your daughter! My water also broke at around 2 a.m. (2:19. . .I remember). We have a lot in common it appears! 😉 Six years married, 3(ish) year old. . .I am going to read more.


text:
The suspects - one killed and one captured - are Muslims.
There are many important stories that will come out from this tragic crime. A spotlight once again shines on Islam's relationship to the suspected terrorists. But one story which must also be told is Islam's relationships to others involved - runners, volunteers, and first responders.
The Muslim community in Boston was quick to respond to the tragedy in their city. Imam Suhaib Webb, a prominent religious leader in Boston, led efforts by opening up his home to the runners. The Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center (ISBCC) volunteered the services of around 40 doctors from its congregation, and also hosted a vigil for the victims on Friday.
"Cling to the rugged rope of positivity. Knowing that nothing happens except God's grace blinds the murk of evil. Do not feel sorry for yourself. Face this with faith and contribute to the good sprouting from the dark soil. This is not a time for helplessness. It is a time to build," Imam Suhaib Webb advised Bostonians and the greater American Muslim community.
Unfortunately, this tragedy reminded everyone of the vicious face of tabloid journalism and the dangers of keyboard sleuths who sat on internet channels and churned out suspects, from the Saudi student, to the 'dark skinned' bag-men, to missing university students. While many media outlets were restrained, there were also commentators and pundits who spun a tale of Muslim guilt. The Yemeni Embassy in Washington, D.C. raised concerns about MSNBC's Chris Matthews' comments that 'indirectly branded the people of Yemen as terrorists.'
Out of the 176 victims at the finish line, the only one who was tackled to the ground and whose apartment was searched by the FBI was a Muslim, 20 year old Saudi Arabian student Abdurrahman Alharbi. Watching the marathon near the finish line when the two bombs exploded, Abdurrahman sustained injuries on his body and started running like other bystanders, only to be grabbed by suspicious members of the public.
The first explosion didn't seem to register with many people who thought it was a gas line exploding, said Firas Naji, a Muslim doctor who was volunteering in medical tent B. "We had no idea what it was," he told the Muslim Link. "The mood swiftly shifted from secure to panicky."
Like American Muslims across the nation, Dr. Naji "kept hoping it was not a Muslim." An internal medicine resident at the Cambridge Health Alliance and Boston resident, Dr. Naji loves to run and dreamt of volunteering at the marathon as a physician. Risking more explosions, he continued to treat less acutely injured after the blasts; many runners and spectators were emotionally traumatized and needed attention.
Interestingly, he received a call from worried family members in Syria while tending to the injured. "Two hundred people die there every day; we are very fortunate that we live our daily lives in safety," he reflected.
Dr. Nissrene Elmadhun, a general surgery resident at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, researcher at Brown University, and a member of the Islamic Society Boston Cultural Center, was in Rhode Island when she heard about the attack.
The pregnant doctor made a decision to come back to Boston to help.
"As surgical residents, we are trained to manage trauma patients, but its moments like these of human suffering in the face of such a cowardly attack and witnessing my colleagues come to the aid of others that one begins seeing things through one's faith," she said. "With the rush of victims coming in so brutally hurt, I couldn't help but think of their families and pray for them. Amidst all of the chaos, tragedy aside, it was a proud moment, not only an American moment, but a proud human moment ... people were making whatever sacrifices they could to help other people and do what they can for the betterment of human life," said Dr. Elmadhun.
In the days following the attack, several Muslims have been assaulted in New York, Boston, and other parts of the country. Dr. Firas Naji told the Muslim Link his friend was attacked, and soon reports appeared in local media of a Palestinian doctor who became a victim on an apparent hate crime motivated by Monday's bomb blasts.
Heba Abolaban said she and her friend, both in hijab, were walking with their children on Commercial Street when a man punched her left shoulder and began shouting at them, asking her to go back home and saying that she was responsible for the bombings.
Bangladeshi-American Abdullah Faruque, 30, was beaten at a Bronx restaurant hours after the Boston Marathon bombing. Three or four males followed him and called him a [expletive] Arab. They punched him on the head and body, dislocating his left shoulder.
On Wednesday morning, Salah Barhoun, 17, a Morrocan American spectator at the marathon and a high school runner found his picture plastered on the front page of the New York Post and social media as a suspect in the bombing. He says he went to the police the next day to clear his name after he found himself tagged in pictures online.
Barhoun's younger brother told ABC News that it made his mother "sick and upset" that her son had been connected to the tragedy. "My brother is not the bomber," the younger brother said.
Azeem Khan, 25, was running in the marathon for the American Liver Association. Training for the past 6 months, he was among the runners redirected at mile 24. Law enforcement authorities took away everything for investigation from all runners and spectators. After the explosion, he was taken to a safe house with other runners. "People were very united and offered me their cell phone as my battery was dead," he said. His keys, credit cards, IDS were returned on Wednesday.
Khan didn't sleep in the two days following the bombings. He told the Muslim Link he was struggling with emotional stress. "I saw grown adults crying [and] it reminded me of 9/11," said Khan, a Pakistani-American who grew up in New York and New Jersey.
Jalon Fowler is an African-American Muslimah who runs marathons; this was her third Boston Marathon and she ran for the Boys and Girls Club of Boston and the Ron Burton Training Village.
She told the Islamic Circle of North America that she trained for over six months running through rain, wind and snow." "I kept up with the training through busy times at work, sick kids and other life events. I remained committed because training for a marathon is simply something you put your heart and soul [into] and [you] believe that you get out of it what you put into it," said Fowler.
"Charity, helping others, and being the best emotional, spiritual and physical person [one can be] are major parts of being a Muslim. The marathon allowed me to strive towards these goals," she said. Keeping with her faith, she does not plan on giving up. "I will run the Boston Marathon until my body cannot take it anymore, God willing, for those that cannot," she said.
Imam Suhaib Webb was asked to represent the Muslim community at the interfaith event where President Obama was the keynote speaker on Thursday. However, the Governor's office replaced him with Nasser Weddady from the American Islamic Congress (AIC), a group unknown to most American Muslims. Unlike most mainstream Islamic organizations in America, AIC receives significant funding from the US State Department according to the Washington Post.
The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and many other Muslim organizations offered support, set-up funds, and issued statements in solidarity with the Boston community. One such fund can be accessed at http://links.masboston.org/?healthfund.
As the story of the Boston bombings is written, America must make sure not to focus on the Muslim names in the headlines, only to miss the many Muslim names scattered throughout its pages.


text:
Wrigley Field's pristine brick wall behind home plate is a throwback--a reminder that the Cubs' home park is the last holdout of professional stadiums awash in logos and billboards.
But that could change next year.
If they can get approval from the city's Landmarks Commission--and that might be a big "if" these days--Cubs executives will install a rotating 10-by-3-foot advertising sign just to the right of home plate.


text:
TVNewser: NBC News' chief medical editor says it's easy to get viewers worried about Ebola because we're all idiots. Well, she didn't say that exactly, but that's what she meant.
FishbowlDC: Politico's Mike Allen interviewed Akon and somehow didn't ask the 41-year-old musician why he thought naming his second album Konvicted was a good idea.
Lost Remote: One way to sell magazines? Have a man wear women's clothing and a woman wear men's clothing! Zany!


text:
Sunday night is jazz night at Welwyn Garden City's Campus West, where the latest Herts Jazz Club presentation sees the Clark Tracey Quintet centre stage.
Clark puts his normal role as club promoter to one side for the show, putting his latest line-up of young talent through their paces.
Famous names who have passed through the ranks in the past include Guy Barker, Alec Dankworth and Django Bates, and this band continues Clark's tradition of providing a national platform to the most gifted young musicians.
Clark started young himself, taking on drumming duties for groups led by his father, piano legend Stan, when he was just 17.
Joining him will be Chris Maddock, Henry Armburg Jenning, Reuben James and Daniel Casimir.
Tickets are only £5 for students and U21s, £13 at the door – visit www.hawthornetheatre.co.uk.


text:
Miles for Freedom to support Oasis House on October 1, 2016 has been cancelled. Please visit http://www.outdoorx.com to get more information on Wagner Subuaru Outdoor Experience Oct. 1-2 at Eastwood MetroPark. We will continue teach "Try Inline Skating" weather permitting.
Recent Posts
New Miles for Freedom Podcast Now Live
Miles for Freedom Podcast is now Live The Miles for Freedom podcast brings adventure, sport, and awareness to see people freed from slavery. In a world where 27 million people are trapped in human trafficking we want to bring a series of interviews that will inform, inspire, and influence you to move for freedom. … Continue reading New Miles for Freedom Podcast Now Live
Miles for Freedom October 3rd Logistics
Together we are making a difference one mile, one registration, one sponsorship and one volunteer at a time. The pictures below show you part of the first house we helped furnish for Oasis House in 2014. Help us maintain the house and reach our goal of $10,000 in 2015 by giving online at http://www.imathlete.com/donate/MilesforFreedomOasisHouse … Continue reading Miles for Freedom October 3rd Logistics
Miles for Freedom Dayton October 3, 2015
Packet Pick Up
Good Thursday May 28th morning Miles for Freedom. Full logistics will be posted Thursday night. I just wanted to let those of you traveling from Indianapolis, Michigan, Cleveland and GA that we will not have shirt pickup and check in on Friday. We only have check-in from 7:30-8:00 on Saturday. We will start as close … Continue reading Packet Pick Up


text:
SOS From Texas
SOS From TexasSnuggle into a soft, undyed organic cotton Night Shirt that is 100% made in the USA. When you purchase from SOS From Texas, you're supporting small-town American farmers. SOS grows all their own cotton on fields that have been certified organic by the Texas Department of Agriculture since 1992. The cotton is grown and spun into yarn in Texas and sewn and finished in North Carolina. Our SOS Night Shirts are simple, soft, comfortable and exceptionally environmentally clean. Once you try one, we think you'll be hooked. Their moto: "We Grow T-Shirts."
View as Grid List
6 Items
- Drawstring Easy Shorts$16.00
- Easy Shorts$16.00
- Long Night Shirt$26.00
- Mornings Night Shirt$20.00
- Undyed Night Shirt$18.00
- Unisex Sunwashed Tee$16.00
View as Grid List
6 Items


text:
Eileen Davidson Books Return to Days of Our LivesChristine Orlando at . Comments
Salem residents better prepare themselves, as TV Guide Magazine broke the news earlier today:
Eileen Davidson will return to Days of Our Lives for what one show rep promises to be "a powerful Kristen Dimera story arc."
When she left the series last summer, Davidson said she needed more personal time - but Days of Our Lives fans can now rejoice as she's said to begin filming in March and will end up back on our screens by summer.
"The writers have some great things cooking for Kristen and we can't wait for the fans to see what this will mean for Salem," teased Co-executive producer Greg Meng, adding that this will be "must-watch TV at its best!"
Kristen Dimera was last seen fleeing Salem after her wedding to Brady Black came to a screeching halt when a sex tape of her and Brady's brother Eric (a priest!) was shown during the ceremony!
Given how things have already heated up in Salem with Nick Fallon's return from the dead and EJ and Abby's salacious affair, once Kristen is thrown back into the mix, Days fans better hold on for one wild ride.
Days of Our Lives airs Monday through Friday on NBC.
C. Orlando is a TV Fanatic Staff Writer. Follow her on Twitter.


text:
Breaking: Lee to restore all HIV/AIDS funds
by Seth Hemmelgarn
Mayor Ed Lee will restore all of about $6 million in federal HIV/AIDS funds that the city expects to lose in the fiscal year beginning July 1.
Supervisor Scott Wiener confirmed the information to the Bay Area Reporter this morning (Thursday, May 17).
"The mayor really gets it," Wiener said. "He understands this city has a 30-year commitment to those impacted by this disease, and he has been just an incredible, incredible ally. I'm just really thrilled that he's doing this."
City officials and service providers have expressed grave concern about the impact that the cuts would have on people living with and at risk for HIV and AIDS. Reductions from the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Modernization Act will be about $4.6 million in fiscal year 2012-13, and cuts from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention will be around $3.1 million. The Ryan White decrease alone was expected to result in a 20 percent cut in funding to local nonprofits.[Upated: Lee spokesman Francis Tsang said in an email that the restoration is $6.6 million "because of a smaller reduction than expected" from the city's Ryan White Part B award.]
Wiener, who said he's been working "very closely" with Lee and his staff for about six months to restore federal funds for HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, also said, "My desire has always been the mayor would restore everything."
Lee is able to backfill the gap "because of improving revenue," said Wiener. The city's projected budget deficit for next year has declined from approximately $170 million to about $150 million.
"Tax revenue has been trending up," Wiener said. However, he said, "The wild card in all this" is state and federal government actions. He referred to California Governor Jerry Brown's announcement earlier this week that he wants to slash more than $8 billion from the state budget to help close a gap of almost $16 billion.
"We don't know what impact that is going to have on our budget, but our own budget has been improving," Wiener said.
Wiener also noted that a drop in federal HIV/AIDS funds approximately matching the $8 million that's expected for next year is also anticipated in fiscal year 2013-14.
He said Lee indicated to the community-based organizations that met with Lee and other city officials Thursday morning that over the coming months "we need to all work together to figure out what we need to do into the future."
For now, Wiener said, "I'm grateful that we have a mayor who gets it when it comes to HIV, and who just decided to resolve the issue out of the gate and not create chaos at the Board of Supervisors during the add-back process."
At a budget town hall in April with Wiener and Supervisor David Campos, who are both gay, Lee said that he and his administration "haven't made any decisions on the budget yet." But he did say his administration was looking at how to pay for the federal AIDS cuts with local dollars.
"It is up to us to find that money," sad Lee.
Wiener, Campos, and bisexual Supervisor Christina Olague have all been pushing for the restorations.
The mayor's decision came one day after Wiener, Campos, and Olague joined with HIV/AIDS service providers and clients at a news conference in front of City Hall in which they called on Lee to restore the cuts. The B.A.R. also editorialized in its Thursday issue for Lee to backfill the money.
Mike Smith, president of the city's HIV/AIDS Provider Network, said in a statement, "We are deeply grateful to the mayor for his bold decision to use city funds to replace federal HIV/AIDS program cuts that would have destabilized San Francisco's nationally recognized system of care and prevention. His leadership will help thousands of San Franciscan continue to access HIV/AIDS treatment services and will prevent the further spread of new infections."
Smith, who's also executive director of the AIDS Emergency Fund, added, "In this time of decreasing state and federal funding, his action today reaffirms our city's long-standing commitment to people with HIV/AIDS."
[Updated: Lee spokeswoman Christine Falvey said that the mayor "worked very closely with the impacted groups," city Health Director Barbara Garcia, and others to restore the funding. Since "early on" in the process, Falvey said, Lee "wanted to prioritize protecting these funds," despite the city budget gaps that remain.
She said Lee was concerned about "the devastating impacts not funding these programs would have on people living with HIV and AIDS."
Falvey also said, "There has been some good news" on city finances, "but there's still a pretty serious shortfall to overcome between now and June 1," when Lee is to submit his budget proposal to supervisors.
Lee's asked HIV/AIDS-related community-based organizations to start looking at the 2013-14 cuts within the next few months, she said. Using the same "collaborative approach that resulted in this funding restoration is something the mayor is interested in continuing," and the mayor wants to maintain "an open dialogue" with those involved, Falvey said.]


text:
Saturday, September 29, 2012
Veggie Hawaiian Pizza | Onion Pizza Sauce Indian Style
Posted by Sangeetha Priya Rajarathinam at 12:03 AM No comments :
Labels: Baking n Biting , Pizza
Wednesday, September 26, 2012
Pavakkai Pulikulambu | Bitter Gourd Gravy with Tamarind and Homemade Powder
My MIL stays with us at least once in a year. When she comes here she prepares this puli kuzhambu powder in bulk and brings it.She likes my way of preparing this gravy (recipe follows)...Now for a long time i didn't go to motherland, since this podi is not in stock, I recently tried it by asking her over phone. So here comes two in one recipe the homemade Puli Kulambu Powder and Pavakkai Puli Kuzhambu recipe
Saturday, September 22, 2012
Chicken Nuggets with Homemade Avocado Dip
Most of my kids day out is with my hubby. Once in a blue moon :) I take them out to the nearest park. I got few park friends and few months back one of them asked for chicken nuggets (Sorry for the delay :). I am giving both the baked and shallow fried version with homemade avocado dip. Please choose your choice. To my perspective both are equally good.
Posted by Sangeetha Priya Rajarathinam at 2:52 AM 1 comment :
Labels: Non Veg
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
Gajar Ka Halwa | Low or Reduced Fat Carrot Halwa | Pressure Cooker Method
Happy that Vinayagar Chaturthi and my 100threcipe fall on the same day. May God shower you with good Health and Wealth. I want the recipe flexible to all, so I preferred Carrot Halwa. This is a never fail recipe and anyone can make halwa in jiffy since my method is going to be pressure cooker version. 100% I am dedicating to all my fellow readers...Since it is low in fat don't doubt the taste, definitely this is close to restaurant
Monday, September 17, 2012
Milk (Paal) Kozhukattai | Ellu Pooranam | Neivedhyam Recipes
I had tough time in 2007. Ganesh Chaturthi was nearing and I don't want to skip my regular Pooja/Prayer. Luckily my close friend was with me for Ganesh Chaturthi, so we started preparing bachelor kozhukattais. I just watched her and she prepared everything n called her her mom through phone for her doubts. The outcome was simply superb.
Friday, September 14, 2012
Sweet Pottukadalai n Uppu Pidi Kozhukattai | Ganesh Chaturthi Specials
Though I am not from the culture of making Kozhukattais for festival, Neighbors in Chennai not even taught making variety of patchanams also guided the way of praying with Mud Pillaiyar, Umbrella, Arugam poo malai etc. I really inspired, attained very pleasant mind and following every year. Let approach God with your own way and I wish your colorful dreams come true. I have given easy sweet and kara pidi kozhukattais here. Due to lengthy post I cut down the remaining actual neivedhyam recipes, will do in next post.
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
Soya Beans and Peanut Sundal | Soy bean Curry | Stir fry
I usually prepare White or Kala Chana for every chaturthi festival. Even Lord Vinayaka/Ganesh may expect different varieties right? This year for his birthday I planned to invite him with the traditional Neivedhyam/ Kozhukattai and Soya Bean sundal. I posted here in advance for you guys to do so. Advance Ganesh Chaturthi to ALL...
Dried Soya Beans - 1 & 1/2 Cups
Dried/Raw Peanut - 1/2 Cup
Monday, September 10, 2012
Whole Wheat Avocado Paratha
We all know that Avocado plays vital role in Anti-aging...Apart from that, this is one among the top fat burner. Studies show this fruit reduces Blood Pressure, Prevents Heart diseases, Stroke and Few Cancer...Though high in fat it is mono saturated and also rich in Fiber, Potassium, Folic Acid, Vitamin E and K etc...So whenever available in the market, try this paratha and keep your inner organs too clean and healthy. I grind few onions, tomato, green chili along with Avocado for making this Paratha, so yogurt raita is enough to accompany...
Friday, September 7, 2012
Arisiyum Paruppu Sadham | Dhal Lentil mixed Spicy Rice
There is no meaning in saying Kongu foods without this recipe. Whenever I taste Arisiyum paruppu sadam, it reminds my childhood days spent with cousins. We all gather on our very first day of vacation in Mom's hometown. When grandma asks what special to do, we all say arisiyum paruppu sadam with no second opinion. She makes fresh ghee from the butter collected on the same day, which apts well for this rice. aah the flavor still remains in my thought!!! We preferably have this rice for dinner with funny chats...the open
Tuesday, September 4, 2012
Pearl Millet Dosa | Kambu Dosai | Bajri Dosa Version I
Every day we are running with Sandwich, Cereals, Pan Cakes, Waffles, Egg Scrambles and Desserts so n so... How do we forget our traditional recipes? Try this easy and healthy Kambu/Bajri dosa which is purely made of Kambu/Bajri and no Rice or Urad dhal mixed in the batter. This is my mom's signature recipe and I have served this dosa with healthy Manathakkali chutney which I posted earlier(In the old picture below).
Whole Bajri/Kambu/Pearl Millet - 2 Cups
Subscribe to: Posts ( Atom )


text:
Personal Page at AllOver30: Rhonda
Age: 41
Height: 5'4" (163 cm)
City: Slany, Czech Republic
Occupation: Self-employed
Turn-Ons: Good looking man
Best/favourite sexual experience: I like doggy style because of how the cock feels inside, deep inside my vagina. My pussy gets so wet and usually I can cum from it.
All other pictures and movies of Rhonda are for members of All Over 30!
All Over 30 Copyright © 2007-2009, YoyoMoms.com


text:
Slip, slop, stab
Page Tools
Lenka Kripac and Charlie Garber freeze while waiting for their Snickers to digest.
So you think the beach is a fun place to go? Katrina Lobley changes her mind after seeing the film Lost Things.
Director: Martin Murphy
Stars Leon Ford, Charlie Garber, Lenka Kripac, Steve Le Marquand, Alex Vaughan
Rated M
Opens Thursday
The Australian horror flick Lost Things all started with a dare. "Writer Stephen Sewell and I were working on another project together and weren't getting anywhere raising money," says director Martin Murphy.
"I just said to [producer Ian Iveson] and Steve, 'If we don't shoot something before Christmas we're going to go nuts. We've got to start shooting something.'
"So Ian said to us, 'Can you turn a bright sunny Australian beach into a place of terror?'
"I'd been working on a low-budget horror film idea and I had written a story that was based in a forest. Ian was like, 'Yes, we can make a forest scary, but can you make a beach scary?' It was a challenge!
"Steve and I looked at each other and said, 'Yes.' So Steve went off and started writing the script and Ian and I started looking for a location that would have a variety of environments within a small physical area so that we could move around very quickly."
The place also had to have a bit of a sinister air about it. Enter Tuggerah Beach.
"There were about three locations that could have done it for us, that didn't have civic structures on the horizon line or anything like that. But we walked onto that location, and as soon as we came over the dunes we just knew that this is where you'd come to bury bodies, if you were that way inclined," says Murphy, suddenly dropping into his best Vincent Price impersonation. "As it turns out, that's what people did - 10 years before, two kids were murdered there."
They settled on the isolated spot to play out Sewell's story of four teenagers who head to the beach for an idyllic weekend of surfing and perhaps first-time sex, only to find themselves dealing with an ominous stranger, increasingly creepy moments and disturbing memories.
But first Murphy headed to Bronte Beach to rehearse his cast. The Tuggerah Beach shoot was to be squeezed into 11 days and he knew there'd be no time to talk things through on set.
"I was down on Bronte Beach for a week rehearsing these really violent scenes and I'd say to the cast, 'Just keep the screams down' ... 'Look, for the rape scene, just stand a bit apart and we get the idea'.
"A couple of times an actor would scream and I'd dance around a bit to let everyone know we're just playing.
"We didn't want to draw too much attention to ourselves because we didn't want the council to kick us off.
"I'd say, 'No theatre voices. Let's keep this soft. Just whisper. You're all going to whisper-shouting when you get stabbed. Whisper your scream' - because there were kids playing in the sand."
For Sewell, who's best known for his screenplay The Boys and whose play Three Furies will be performed as part of the Sydney Festival in January, his role went above and beyond the usual role of writer.
He went along on the Tuggerah Beach shoot and was kept busy refining the script to fit available resources. He's even credited with wrangling the resident crows, which add a spooky note to the film, by tempting them into shot with crumbled chocolate-chip biscuits.
Asked if it was difficult to turn a beach into a place of terror, he says, "It's Stephen Sewell you're talking to. I have no problem making any place on Earth scary. You can die anywhere, can't you? What's really scary is when you suddenly realise that the place that you're in is the place you might die."
Sewell says he's attracted to horror because of its "visceral" nature.
"I think every artist is essentially a child and as a child we experience the world as a place that's fascinating, frightening and at times horrifying," he says. "As children, we like to go to those places where we might get scared because we might learn something we shouldn't know there.
"I hope my fellow Australians can appreciate that some of their artists are entering deeper worlds of mystery and imagination and madness and terror. And at the other end of it, away from the political thing, I just hope that they get scared to death!"


text:
I constantly look out for ways to improve my themes. One thing about how special my themes is that I have incorporated a special font in the header title on some of my themes.
Take a look at the demo of our Mouse IT theme, for example. Look at the header title. It doesn't show one color code but it is the gradient blue.
How do we achieve this effect?
I use a CSS trick to create gradient text effect with a PNG image, no Javascript or Flash.
Can I change the blog title in the WordPress admin?
Definitely! In the WordPress admin, follow this process: Setting -> General. Then key in your blog title in the "Blog Title" field.
Is the title SEO friendly?
Yes. The title passed the W3C Validation so search engines can index it easily.
Is it compatible with major browsers?
Yes. This effect has been tested on IE6, IE7, Firefox, Opera and Safari.
A screenshot below shows the header of the Mouse IT theme.
Yes. You hardly see this in other free themes! Hope you enjoy this effect 😛
Themes that are currently using this effect:
– Mouse IT


text:
What does ZIF mean?
Definitions for ZIF
Here are all the possible meanings and translations of the word ZIF.
Webster Dictionary
the second month of the Jewish ecclesiastical year, corresponding to our May
Origin: [Heb. ziv.]
Suggested Resources
What does ZIF stand for? -- Explore the various meanings for the ZIF acronym on the Abbreviations.com website.
Anagrams for ZIF »
Chaldean Numerology
The numerical value of ZIF in Chaldean Numerology is: 7
Pythagorean Numerology
The numerical value of ZIF in Pythagorean Numerology is: 5
Images & Illustrations of ZIF
Find a translation for the ZIF definition in other languages:
Select another language:
Discuss these ZIF definitions with the community:
Word of the Day
Would you like us to send you a FREE new word definition delivered to your inbox daily?
Use the citation below to add this definition to your bibliography:
"ZIF." Definitions.net. STANDS4 LLC, 2018. Web. 21 Feb. 2018. <https://www.definitions.net/definition/ZIF>.