text:
Human beings are psychologically incapable of simultaneously holding two contradictory propositions in mind at once and having an attitude of assent or belief towards both of them. That is, we can't believe an outright contradiction. Nor do we have much voluntary control over which claims we believe. We can't, through the force of our will, start believing something new or stop believing something that we previously assented to. Try it. Get yourself to actually believe that Barack Obama is not the president of the United States, 2 + 2 = 5, or that Matthew McConaghey is not the sexiest man alive. Ok, just kidding on the last one.
"But people believe contradictory, irrational things all the time!" will be the objection. Here's what's really going on. An occurrent belief is one that is in conscious awareness now. In many cases, we have an occurrent belief that contradicts with some other claim that we believe or believed, but it is not occurrent. There are all sorts of things buried in my mind that I am not currently thinking about that could conflict with something that I am thinking about, but I just haven't made the connection and seen the problem. In other cases, a pair of beliefs we have are only implicitly contradictory. The two claims are not an outright contradiction, but were we to supply some other beliefs and draw out some of the logical implications of them, a genuine contradiction would emerge. But again, if I haven't thought it all out, I won't have an occurrent contradictory belief pair.
There are other sources of cognitive tension. Some groups of propositions are probabilistically contradictory--one asserts what another declares to be exceedingly improbable. If I won the lottery three days in a row, it would strike me as exceedingly improbable that the lottery was really a fair, million to one game.
Now some relevant points from neuroscience and philosophy of mind. The current picture of the world that occupies consciousness from moment to moment is a construction where what I am seeing, hearing, feeling, or thinking now is threaded together with my memories of the recent and not so recent past. What I am sensing now with the keyboard under my fingers is not the same as what I was feeling 10 minutes ago, but consciousness builds a continuous narrative that bridges those sensations and makes causal and psychological sense of the transitions. There was an entity, the I, who was in the kitchen then, and after that, I walked up the stairs and sat down at the computer. A world of continuous, causally regular objects that is also inhabited by the continuous subject is constructed (unbeknownst to me) out of the meaningless raw feels of thought and sensation.
This fleeting, perpetually forward rolling window of consciousness is discontent, as we have seen, with a picture of the world and the self that doesn't make sense. It abhors contradictions in the story of the world and the self that it creates. Concerning the world, this disposition manifests as a set of expectations that events and objects are regular, predictable, and sensible. The aversion to contradiction creates a forbidden conclusion about the self. It is profoundly disturbing for us to think of our selves as irrational. Seeing contradictions in the words and actions of others comes easy--consider how starkly some conflict between two claims from your husband or girlfriend leapt out at you the last time you were in an argument. Now consider how it felt when she accused you of first saying X was true and then contradicting yourself 5 minutes later by saying not-X. When you heard those two claims put together, your mind scrambled for an account that would diminish the seeming conflict. You quickly found an explanation whereby saying both of those things makes perfect sense. See? It is profoundly difficult, if not impossible to acknowledge about oneself that your own beliefs are at deep logical odds with each other. "I am irrational," is the forbidden conclusion that we cannot face, even when it is plainly obvious.
Experimentally, the refusal to accept it displays itself in revisions, confabulations, memory editing, and misrepresentations. In one study, subjects were asked to pick the most attractive person from a stack of pictures. Then the subject's choice was swapped for another picture without their knowledge. The researchers then asked the subjects why they picked that picture instead of the others. Without missing a step, and without even knowing they did so, subjects promptly confabulated a justification for why the new picture was of their most attractive original pick. The fact they cannot accept: I made a mistake--the picture I picked is not the most attractive one in the stack. Goethals, G. R., & Reckman, R. F. (1973). The Perception of Consistency in Attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9(6), 491-501.
In another study, high school students were tested to determine their attitude about a topic. Then a confederate in the study discussed the topic with them and subtley affected an attitude change in them. The subjects were assessed again and it was found that as a result of the confederate, they had a different view about the topic. But when asked to recall their view from before, they recounted their original position to make it consistent with their new one. Unknowingly, they made recall errors that rendered the new views as the one that they had believed all along. The perception of consistency in attitudes, George R. Goethals and Richard F. Reckman
In a now famous study by Nisbett and Wilson, shoppers were asked to evaluate various clothing items for quality. Multiple trials and randomization revealed that no matter what the arrangement of the articles of clothing, the subjects had a bias for the right hand items. When they were asked to justify their choice, however, they would construct an explanation on the basis of various features of the item. That is, subjects tended to pick the right item no matter which one was put there, and then they would make up a story about why it was the best one. Nisbett, R.E. and Wilson, T.D. "Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes".Psychological Review, Vol 84 pp 231-259.
Other studies show that when people have a strong conviction that a claim is true, they will heavily filter the evidence to make it fit. They will accept evidence that appears to confirm their view readily and with little scrutiny, but they will subject disconfirming evidence to high levels of criticism and analysis. So when they encounter contrary evidence to what they believe, it tends to actually reinforce their view and polarize them further into it. Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1979, Vol. 37, No. 11, 2098-2109
Ziva Kunda, a psychologist from Princeton, describes two impulses that are at odds in us. We have a motivation to be accurate--to form correct views about the world. But we also possess substantial motivation to arrive at particular favored conclusions. She says, "There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions." The Case for Motivated Reasoning, Psychological Bulletin 1990, Vol. 108, No. 3, 480-498.
What's the relevance of all of this to religious beliefs? Nowhere in our lives is the powerful conflict between a set of desires or psychological needs on one side and the goal of having an accurate, coherent, justified description of the world on the other more evident than it is about God. We want God to exist. We want the religious doctrine of our childhood to be the correct picture of reality. From the numbers, it is nearly impossible for us to shake off the transcendental temptation. But we can't accept about ourselves that this belief is the product of some invisible forces in our nature, or that it is driven more by desire than by reason. So we go through logical gymnastics and contortions of reason to fabricate "seemingly reasonable justifications." If we find ourselves believing it, we can't help but construct a back story that render that belief a reasonable one. If we didn't, we'd have to face the forbidden conclusion. (Thanks to Randy Mayes for the idea and the title.)
Saturday, April 4, 2009
The Forbidden Conclusion
36 comments:
- Teleprompter said...
Another excellent writing.
- April 4, 2009 at 11:05 PM
- Matt McCormick said...
Thanks dude. I've been thinking about this one for a while. MM
- April 4, 2009 at 11:14 PM
- M. Tully said...
I had often wondered why abandoning theism was so easy for me and not others (I knew I was missing something but for the life of me I couldn't point to it). The studies you cite and your relating them to religious associations really help to make that clear. I was raised in a religious tradition, but I was also raised in a tradition that valued truth and honesty.
In fact, it was only when a conflict between the two arose, did I ever begin to question either (It was a short journey once begun).
I agree with Teleprompter, I think this one is excellent and I think it deserves its own chapter.
"How much do you value truth (or honesty or reality or ...)?" - April 5, 2009 at 12:10 AM
- Luke said...
Great stuff. Thanks for the citations. Citations citations citations!
- April 5, 2009 at 1:04 AM
- Ketan said...
Instinctively, I had an idea why people still do stick to their belief, but by giving those examples, you really made things so clear. The results of the experiments you cited almost seem like impossible--humans can't be that dishonest with themselves (!), except that they've to be true, otherwise I'd have to draw the forbidden conclusio ;) Really nice article. Thanks, again!
- April 5, 2009 at 8:32 AM
- Bryan Goodrich said...
I really enjoyed the selection of articles. It provides a nice gateway into some of these human foibles of which we tend to remain unaware.
Now, I know this is my mathematics background, but one thing I rarely see brought up is the fact humans tend to be linear thinkers. Stochastic processes, nonlinear dynamics and vague values are not intuitive to humans, at least not without a whole lot of training. What gets me is that we rarely see these in our common way of perceiving things.
Take the idea of inconsistent beliefs. Logically we could easily throw out the excluded middle, and work with any number of many-valued logics (e.g., some forms of trivalent logics are used in quantum mechanics or fuzzy logic to capture "vague" meanings). The question is, do humans actually think binary or something else? I would find it rather hard to believe we actually operate like a binary computer processing "yes" and "no" of some sort. We can have inconsistent beliefs because we weigh beliefs differently (significance or risk, say), our justifications vary and as research shows, can be rather ad hoc and completely insufficient to the actual reality of the situation.
Do you know, in any research on the philosophy of mind, epistemology and neuroscience, of research or theories about how we formulate beliefs, ideas and reasoning that operate upon a more robust and dynamic framework from, say, classical logic? I'm aware of these kinds of approaches in other sciences, but the brain isn't my forte. I thought I would ask. - April 7, 2009 at 12:27 AM
- Richard T said...
Clearly, you never had an Edinburgh grandmother who could reconcile any number of contradictory beliefs by the use of the magic word nevertheless. She was thus able to manipulate your behaviour according to her wishes.
- April 7, 2009 at 2:38 AM
- Matt McCormick said...
Bryan, recent research on this question has focused on connectionist networks as models for human neural tissue. Paul Churchland and others have some really interesting work about what a belief is when it forms across the distributed weighted nodes of a parallel processing network.
Good question.
MM - April 7, 2009 at 7:38 AM
- Bryan Goodrich said...
Thanks, I have heard of Churchland and some of the work in that area. Do you happen to know what a network model of the brain would signify a belief to be (ontologically)? Or at least an idea in that direction? Then, and only then, would we really be able to compare that entity with one that we claim may be inconsistent, and how the mind handles it. - April 7, 2009 at 10:34 AM
- Matt McCormick said...
Paul Churchland and the connectionists are arguing, reasonably I think, that what we call a belief is actually a set of activation potentials distributed across a neural network that behaves like a connectionist system. The term "belief" I've been arguing for a while, just needs to be jettisoned. It maps as well onto the empirical information we have about the human nervous system as "demon" maps onto modern germ theory of disease. That is, "belief" as we use it just doesn't seem to be a natural kind that lines up neatly with anything that we find in the world.
Back to your question: If we adopt a parallel, distributed processing model to describe minds, as we should, and if we think of beliefs as sets of activation potentials across a neural network, then it's a lot easier to reconcile what we know empirical about the brain and people's verbal and physical behavior. And seeing a mind as built up with these activation potentials (that morph and develop over time) fits nicely with some of the multi value or fuzzy logic points you were making earlier. Brain functions don't map cleanly onto Aristotelian logic, as you suggested. Our language and our folk psychology are still behind the curve on all this, however.
I'll get flak for this, but the eliminative materialist program in philosophy of mind is the right direction. There really aren't any such things as beliefs, minds, consciousness, will, etc. Or at least when the dust settles from what neuroscience is doing right now, what those terms will end up meaning will be radically different than what common sense tells us, just like what happened with "heat," "phlogiston," "demons," "caloric," and so on.
All of this has incredibly interesting implications for religious belief of course.
MM - April 7, 2009 at 10:45 AM
- Ketan said...
Hi, Matt!
I'm very tempted to point out that what you referred to as "ACTIVATION potential" is very likely to be "ACTION potential". Action term is a characteristic very fundamental to excitable tissues--nervous and muscle tissue. It means a propagated disturbance in the potential difference across and along a cell membrane. Well of course, the exact terminology doesn't make much difference as long as the basic idea gets conveyed. TC. - April 7, 2009 at 1:00 PM
- Ketan said...
Matt, I don't disagree at all with what you've openly speculated to be the nature of what we call beliefs, will, emotions, etc. I'm no expert in psychology/neurology, but what we call the "mind", is not a structure, but a complex FUNCTION of the human brain. In light of the above fact, no wonder, the mind would come to be understood more as a mesh of complex neural networks bathed in chemicals (neurotransmitters and ions) rather than an abstract incomprehensible entity. But where I disagree is that these findings will have implications ONLY on religious beliefs. To think of it, I'd long back drawn the very same (nihilistic--lack of free will, beliefs being nothing but play of chemicals all point to just one thing--lack of extrinsic purpose to life) conclusions that
you are waiting for neurologists to announce some day.
I'd concede that that realization was one of the factors in my considering nonexisuence of God. But that made me more of a deist rather than an out and out atheist. Embracing Atheism is more about the courage to accept what one is convinced to be the truth rather than being convinced of the truth (which of course has been the subject of numerous of your posts, and more so the previous one). I'm only trying to say that "such" facts will not just affect those who are religous, but also those who're totally irreligious. Believe me, for me it was much more difficult to accept the possibilities of lack of purpose to life and genuine free will rather than that of a supreme manager and a creator of life. TC. - April 7, 2009 at 1:32 PM
- Matt McCormick said...
TC, I'll assume that you're not merely tempted to point out the mistake, but you're actually pointing it out. And you're right. It's "action" not "activation." That was composed in haste.
There's a pattern of people misunderstanding a simple point here. If I claim that a study, or argument, or experiment has an implication for religious beliefs, that clearly does not imply that it ONLY has an implication for religious beliefs. I did not say the latter. Look, if I say that winning the lottery is a way to get rich, it isn't an objection to come back with, "But you can get rich through Internet marketing too!" The two claims are obviously compatible.
Having taught logic for decades, you won't find me using the term "only" lightly or carelessly unless it's a typo. And in the case in question I didn't use it at all.
MM - April 7, 2009 at 1:43 PM
- Ketan said...
I'll be honest on two counts here--I was pretty sure of the action potential thing. Just didn't want to sound snobbish.
The second thing is harder to be honest about--I thought your comment about "religious implications" had an element of sadistic pleasure, as in the pleasure one gets on knowing they were right and their rival, wrong, but totally forgetting in the process, how much pain the truth could have caused to the one learning the truth de novo. "Sadistic" may not be the most appropriate adjective here, and excuse me for an inability to think of a better one. My reluctance to put this suspicion in perspective should be obvious--I'd be assuming too much about your nature as a person from a mere statement, and accusing someone of deriving a sadistic pleasure is something very serious, and hence wanted to avoid it. But realized because of your pointing out, that in the process, I inadvertantly ended up charging you with something as much, if not more grave (at least to a logician)--of using "only" loosely. I think I made the mistake of reading too much into the concluding lines about religious implications, when possibly you were stating things in a matter-of-factly manner, without any emotion. Sorry, if you felt hurt, and even otherwise for assuming that statements in personal matters like purpose of life and liberty (free will) cannot be made dispassionately. TC. - April 7, 2009 at 2:38 PM
- Ketan said...
Once again, two things more. My name is not "TC" :) . It's a mere acronym I use for "take care". You can all me "Ketan".
Second, I'm no longer a deist. I turned an atheist, the moment I realized that the complexity of the Universe was no reason for an intelligent creator to have created it.
One last thing, which you may not answer if you find it too personal--why don't you include anything remotely emotional/personal in your blog? It is after all a blog! I for one would be very curious about your intellectual journey from whatever you were to begin with to this rigorous rationalist (being atheist being one of the many consequences of it). Again, I've taken a liberty of dwelling on something personal to you, which I hope doesn't backfire (upset you). TC. - April 7, 2009 at 2:51 PM
- Teleprompter said...
Wow! I have really learned a lot from all of these comments. Philosophy of mind intrigues me.
I agree with Ketan that I have had many restless moments considering a few of the implications under discussion here.
This issue is probably the most difficult thing I am facing as a relatively new (within the last year) deconvert from Christianity.
What is meaning? What is purpose? What is motivation? What is responsibility?
Perhaps these are the wrong questions. Perhaps I have insufficient information. Nevertheless, I eagerly look forward to trying to answer these questions (or any others which may arise) more explicitly. - April 7, 2009 at 9:58 PM
- Bryan Goodrich said...
Yeah, that sounds about what I recall seeing. I have to disagree with part of your conclusion, however. Eliminative reductions don't seem to make much sense if the manifest entity has an efficacious nature.
(e.g., a rainbow is often exampled as a valid elimination because a rainbow has no substantial existence beyond the reduced--what I'll call structure--substratum which qualifies the term. On the other hand, people like Searle, which I agree with on this manner, do argue that things like consciousness or intentionality have emergent properties qualified by the very reductions that make the term precise, analogously to how we do not eliminate tables or water for the fact their properties that make them what they are exist entirely in terms of the reduction or reduced structure.)
Your conclusion is that the term "belief" doesn't match what our reductive scientific investigations indicate it to be. That simply means our concept is inaccurate, needs refinement and we need a new theory about beliefs. An elimination, as you espoused here, sounds like we're throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The real difference is a difference in description, level of analysis and what I think can be described analogous to structures.
I think any meaningful reductionist programme should make clear when and why something should be eliminated, but most meaningful reductions--especially in the sciences--are not eliminative. I would call them symmetrical. Symmetric, in this sense, because the scientific analysis qualifies the emergent descriptions and properties we talk about at a wholly higher level of description.
(e.g., we talk about pistons in car engines, and solidity of tables and objects, qua engines and objects, while qualifying those meanings based on the science of their reduced structures and physics, which may depend upon our understanding of unobservables as described by, say, quantum mechanics.)
The simple reason I caution against eliminative reductions is that it is the same bias we see when people say that "the natural sciences are more pure than the social sciences" when, point in fact, you will never study economics in terms of physics, chemistry or biology, even though certain facets of behavior are strongly correlated and described by such physical factors. The social sciences are no less "pure" than the natural sciences, it is just a different kind of "critter" to deal with, just as in mathematics we deal with "abstract critters" from the kind, say, biology deals with. It is a difference in content, but not some different ontological kind. There's also a good cartoon that jokes how mathematics is the only real pure science, far removed from even physics!
I wont run on the tangent, but there is no fear of introducing any mystical "mind" or social factors which "transcend" reality in any meaningful way. It is simply the way we deal with those objects as those objects and not their component parts--just as the examples parenthesized above. I'll simply add that in that regard this is where I reference a lot about structures, as I have already, because the model of the reduced "level" and the higher "level" do share properties and we can analyze and inform each of the structures by what we discover about one or the other. That would be made possible by some kind of homomorphism between the two structures. Of course, it requires a more precise definition of structure in this ontological sense, what is meant by levels and how to construct and justify said morphisms. However, those are all things needing to be qualified that go far beyond the scope of this comment. - April 7, 2009 at 10:06 PM
- M. Tully said...
I'll reiterate that I don't know squat about philosophy, but you'll really get flak for asserting that human action is about brain states?
Fascinating. You and Eric got me reading Quine, and the the most striking thing I'm getting from it is, why is this this guy arguing so hard for what the evidence dictates (then I remind myself he was writing decades ago)?
I guess I have hard time understanding why people view neuroscience so differently from chemistry or physics. Given it is a younger specialty, but with that comes the advantage of being able to build on an already existing well developed framework.
Originally I felt surprised that I hadn't come across Quine as a philosopher of science. The more I have read, I no longer feel surprised. He wasn't a philosopher of science, he was scientist of philosophy.
So now it's decades later, with confirming data building up day after day, and you're still trying to justify it.
O.K., I officially rescind my previous conviction that the philosophers' purpose is only to come to up with the right questions to ask. After those of us in the data collection world find the answers to the questions, philosophers then must explain it to humanity. Upon reviewing the data, that latter function demonstrates itself to be much more difficult.
Thank goodness you guys are there (my end is much more fun). - April 7, 2009 at 11:00 PM
- Luke said...
Matt, are you on reddit? If so, I want to friend you. If not, sign up real quick and I will friend you. :)
- April 10, 2009 at 11:33 AM
- Jon said...
Considering the first sentence your almost right. Those who have had their corpus callosum "Split-Brain" patients. cut tend to have P on one lobe while having a ~P on the other. A good one is "I'm Male" on the right hemi, and an "I'm female" on the other hemi - in some experiments.
Your right if we consider people in those cases to have become two people in one body after the operation. - April 15, 2009 at 11:53 AM
"Human beings are psychologically incapable of simultaneously holding two contradictory propositions in mind at once and having an attitude of assent or belief towards both of them"
I think this may be false...
"""Kripke invites us to imagine a French, monolingual boy, Pierre, who believes the following: "Londres est jolie." ("London is beautiful.") Pierre moves to London without realising that London = Londres. He then learns English the same way a child would learn the language, that is, not by translating words from French to English. Pierre learns the name "London" from the unattractive part of the city he lives in, so he comes to believe that London is not beautiful. If Kripke's account is correct Pierre now believes both that London is beautiful and that London is not beautiful. This cannot be explained by coreferring names having different semantic properties. According to Kripke, this shows that attributing additional semantic properties to names, will not explain what it is supposed to explain."""
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_Kripke - April 15, 2009 at 10:47 PM
- Ketan said...
Anonymous, the contradictions you cited could be explained by one simple reason--the boy, in the first place had no basis to believe "Londres est jolie". What mental effort did he put before drawing that conclusion? Had he tried to look up in the map where Londres and London were, he'd have been left with only one conclusion--London (=Londres) is NOT beautiful (as far as his experience would be concerned).
Extending this analogy to the question of existence or nonexistence of God, and its nature, looking up a map would be analogous to taking a detached view of one's conclusions. Meaning, trying to look at the Universe (more so the world around) as if from some faraway galaxy, rather than from "within the self". I just hope my last sentence makes sense, if not, the problem is with my explanatory power. When one is able to do this, duality of possible conclusions (about the SAME Universe) will become apparent, and one would supplant the other, for it would provide a comprehensive, and consistent account of the Universe.
*Universe=everything that verifiably lends itself to human perception.
Take care. - April 16, 2009 at 1:48 AM
ketan I don't think you understand the dilemma. Saul Kriptke struggled with providing a solution to Pierre having contradictory beliefs. Pierre has absolutely a basis for his contradictory beliefs i might add...
Gawd where's that bryan guy who understands logic here i am sure he can explain what's going on... - April 16, 2009 at 5:18 PM
- Matt McCormick said...
Anonymous, the alleged contradictory belief account you cite says that IF Kripke's account is correct, then Pierre believes a contradiction. The simple way to answer this is just to assert that Kripke's account of beliefs is not correct, and I wouldn't be alone in doing that, and then we don't have a problem. Furthermore, if the alleged contradictory belief story is misrepresenting Kripke's view, then it also won't work. It's also easy enough to say that Pierre has got one thing in mind when he is thinking that London is not beautiful, and that he has another in mind when he is thinking about the French sentence. My claim is that people cannot simultaneously belief something and believe that denial, as they grasp the claim and its denial, at the same time.
But I'm actually not especially wedded to the point. If it turns out that in some circumstances we have convincing empirical evidence that people do believe contradictions, then I'd just accept that. The point, of course, would be that they SHOULDN'T because doing so is irrational. Surely you don't think that's especially controversial. And the real point of the post, which you're not really addressing, isn't about whether or not people believe contradictions.
MM - April 16, 2009 at 7:41 PM
- Bryan Goodrich said...
The problem is not epistemological. Kripke is showing a semantic weakness in certain logics, especially when it comes to names and reference. One can have a referent explaining certain semantic properties one accepts, like "Clark Kent is a dork." On the other hand, he might have a certain referent explaining other semantic properties he accepts, like "Superman is not a dork." The problem is in trying to evaluate the semantics extensionally because it just so happens that "Clark Kent" is the same person as "Superman" and yet we do not have "x is a dork" and "x is not a dork" because the referents are different to the person and their beliefs.
I agree with Searle's speech acts approach to this, and we have to assess the reference to the person that is uttering it, or at the very least obtains said intentional stance. There are other logics, e.g., intensional logic, which deal with these kinds of issues since classical logics have no way to address them.
The point is that the contradiction comes as a semantical contradiction and not any sort of real (or ontological) contradiction, i.e., London is not, in fact, beautiful and not beautiful no more than the sun exists and the sun does not exist. The issue is whether or not the belief in said facts of the matter are taken to be semantically true or not.
I would say that the problem is simply resolved, say in the Clark Kent/Superman case, or any other intensional conflicting case, by showing that there does not exist a model which satisfies both statements at the same time, i.e., we do not have the intensional content or interpretation or model that makes semantically true--at the same time--both X and ¬X, even if independently the intensional content may be the same thing.
Can people hold (semantically) contradictory beliefs? Sure, because they're ignorant about certain intensional relations that would be weeded out with an adequately robust intensional logic that addresses those relations. One simple "trick" is to see if it is possible to interpret extensionally. In the case of Superman/Kent, we know that is not the case, because if we treated them both, as they really are, the same person, we do not keep the same intensional truth status since then Superman/Kent is both X and ¬X. If someone is ignorant of those relations, however, then they will have contradictory beliefs. As long as there is ignorance there is such a possibility.
I pose a more challenging question. How does reasoning under uncertainty provide a basis for saying, as MM does, that holding such contradictory beliefs come as irrational? Such a standard of assessment begs the question. At any given time it only comes up against a set of knowledge we already collectively agree upon and would assess the semantics based on that, but it is never complete, homogeneous in quality nor static. (Ir)rationality is, at best, a relative and fleeting concept.
It would be irrational, iff, someone accepts that "x is P" and "x is ¬P" while also understanding that A satisfies the first statement, B satisfies the second statement and "A=B". But we don't know the status of that last condition which is absolutely the condition which would make or break this status. Thus, we have propositional content P and we have models, M, which may satisfy those statements P. But they are always going to be interpreted based on certain conditions C. Thus, we cannot just look at if "M ╞ P" but need it to be "{M,C} ╞ P". There's heavier concepts I could introduce, but they get far more abstract than needed, and the notation required to make it easier is not exactly "nice" in ASCII or anything blogger would permit.
I recommend my truth blog linked above, since it is general enough to apply. - April 16, 2009 at 10:38 PM
"Anonymous, the alleged contradictory belief account you cite says that IF Kripke's account is correct, then Pierre believes a contradiction. The simple way to answer this is just to assert that Kripke's account of beliefs is not correct, and I wouldn't be alone in doing that"
Right, you wouldn't be alone. Just about every philosophy student who first encounters this puzzle makes the same claim. However this doesn't buy you much credibility as a philosophy professor.
There is a gang of philosophers who have pondered over Kripke's dilemma and they aren't beginning Phil students.
It is also self refuting and senseless to claim that a person cant have a belief that they know is false. This is nothing more than expressing the law of exclusive middle in a linguistic utterance other than its raw form.
A lecture from Philosophy of language course:
"""The well known puzzle is based on the assumption that our speaker is normal non omniscient, sincere, reflective and not conceptually confused. The two principles used are the Disquotational Principle (DP) and the Translation Principle (TP):
If a speaker of a language L assents to p and "p" is a sentence of L, then he believes that p.
If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language,
then any translation of it into another language also expresses a truth in that other language
Pierre, a Frenchman, heard in Paris about London's beuty. He therefore assents to the sentence:
(1) Londres est jolie.
Emigrated in England he learns English by exposure, takes up residence in London and, after observing the surroundings, he assents to:
(2) London is not pretty
He does not realize that the town where he lives is the town depicted in the nice pictures he saw in Paris; he has not updated his earlier belief expressed once as "Londres est jolie". Then, given that "Londres" and "London" (just as the old-fashioned "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus") have the same reference - or the same semantic value (the object referred to by the names which are rigid designators), it follows that Pierre believes that London is pretty and he believes that London is not pretty.
A similar puzzle may arise also with the homophonic case, when Pierre meets on two occasions Paderewski, once in a music hall and another time at a political conference. He does not realize that he met the same person and he assents to two different sentence:
Paderewski has musical talent
Paderewski has no musical talent
In both cases, we are compelled to admit that this supposed rational person holds contradictory beliefs, therefore this person is not as rational as supposed. Is it a real puzzle? If it is, either we have to reject the causal theory of reference, or we have to find an answer to the puzzle. Some answers could say that if the puzzle works, then it is worse for the causal theory of reference. A more precise answer could be that, as in the case of the reductio ad absurdum of Mill's theory via the traditional argument, we may have a reductio ad absurdum criticizing the validity of the disquotational principle. Beyond the difficulty of abandoning an apparent acceptable principle, it has been suggested (by Sosa) that even that principle may be dispensable in building up the puzzle. Before rejecting such a principle, or rejecting the causal theory of reference, it should be shown that other theories can solve the puzzle.
But it is not so clear that a descriptive theory of reference can do better. A Fregean could say that the contents of Pierre's beliefs (thoughts) are senses: the way in which London is presented to Pierre the first time fits with the way in which the concept "pretty" is given; the way in which London is presented to Pierre the second time does not fit. This could be correct. The problem is that we have no idea of what these "modes of presentations" are. We could try something like this: " Pierre believes that the town depicted in a nice picture he heard about in Paris is pretty" and "Pierre believes that the town he lives in is not pretty". Even given these expressions, we cannot avoid the fact that in both cases Pierre believes of London that it is pretty, and he believes of the same town that it is not pretty."""
http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/hp/penco/pub/kpuz.htm - April 18, 2009 at 12:21 AM
Nice well thought out response Bryan. However, Kripke's dilemma differs from previous semantic dilemmas in that the properties of the two beliefs are identical in extension and intension. whereas Superman = Clark kent are two beliefs that are not intensionally and extensionally the same. Quine showed this the case in his
solution to a previous semantic dilemma that I cant recall the name - it has to do with a spy and a guy he know's or something... - April 18, 2009 at 12:30 AM
- Bryan Goodrich said...
That depends on what we mean by intension. Intensional content is provided -in the same language- while what we have in Kripke's example is two different languages. The assumption is that any model for a given sentence requires that the structure shares the same language for which the sentence is uttered (or is a wff).
The two statements are not extensionally the same because they come under two different languages. However, the difference is that there is a translation from one language (formal system) to another. Likewise, we can transfer (by, say, a homomorphism) the model of one language to another and maintain the truth of the sentence between languages.
The problem is you're assuming the disquotational property. While useful, I think it is utterly lacking. I bring that up in my truth blog.
Disquotation: "p" is true iff p
There is no scientifically sound basis for this rule that if one "assents that p" and "'p' is true in some language L", then one "believes that 'p'" Why?
The reason is that "assent" and "belief" are non-truth functional as well as not even scientifically founded, and yet we're making empirical claims with these logical statements. If we view it purely abstracted, though, there is no basis for some metalogical principle like that.
One error in it is that "p" may be constructed in L, but "q" is constructed in L*. While p=q intensionally (and we have two models M and M* which satisfy them in L and L*, respectively), there is no reason to suppose that one's assent to q and assent to ¬p should pose a problem. The reason is that the person never assents to p. Therefore, even on the same principle it does not apply, but we still haven't qualified what this "assent" relation or operation is.
Therefore, the confusion only arises in what one assents to. However, as I said, this is a language issue, not a logical issue. Assent in this case is immediately adjoined to the semantics because as the principle was even used it basically says "if one assents to p then there is a model for 'p'" where 'p' is comprised of the language the person understands that p. You cannot really separate assent to p and belief in "p" without the language for which p is described. Now, a person may understand more than one language, and can easily translate between L and L*, but if they do not, or only have a partial understanding, then that is the error. It is still semantical because the assent and semantics are intertwined. The issue is in the language and what one assents to in a language.
If we are to take anything important here, it is however you qualify assent, you need to make it language-contextualized otherwise you'll get a lot of nonsense, because you'll take the semantics and statements and "move them around" as if they were independent of the language when clearly they are not. - April 18, 2009 at 4:42 PM
I would say that what MM is trying to explain is that the mind has an intuitive sense of the law of non-contradiction (at the risk of putting words in his mouth). In order to know anything, we must be capable of sorting propositions in our current consciousness into their property category. The ability to discern between p and ~p then is fundamental to our minds ability to sort said propositions/information.
You might also note the "accidental nature" of Kripke's case, which can well be characterized by Alsten's critique of justified beliefs and cast light on by the series of papers which followed attempting to explain this (such as those by Goldman).
Instead, try to focus on the point that in order to sort information we must be able to sort between P & ~P, this is the only point that is required for the above assertions. - May 3, 2009 at 3:07 AM
Eeeep, by Alsten, I mean Gettier. =p.
- May 3, 2009 at 3:35 AM
- Bryan Goodrich said...
To presume our brains work with bivalence is a pretty big presumption. There is absolutely no reason I can see why we ought to (epistemic norm) semantically qualify our propositions with the law of non-contradiction. There is absolutely no reason I can see why our brains would (empirically) qualify our propositions with the law of non-contradiction.
It just does not make sense as an empirical fact, nor be logically necessary. Hell, we can reason with fuzzy logic just fine, much less with a trivalent logic.
Now, it might be true that we categorize classes of propositions so that the law of non-contradiction holds at the level of those generalizations or more general statements, but then those would be classes of propositions. By these classes I mean that they are higher-order objects than the propositions or the details of their content themselves. Think of the difference between atomic particles or chemical compounds to their aggregate as some sort of object we experience like a table or water. The properties of the aggregate are clearly not those of the lower-level substances.
The analog is that our propositions can work in much the same way. We can have a whole host of relations around our propositions that do not operate with bivalence, but we can class them together (make more compound statements or generate terms as composite of other terms and meanings) in ways such that our propositions emerge to be more "simple" and obtain the law of non-contradiction.
One way to recognize this is to consider that in just about any proposition, short of being an analytic tautology, every word in our speech act will have "deeper meaning" that we can break down. In that sort of reduction we are doing precisely what I was getting at in the analog.
Of course this doesn't mean there is a clear objective separation between these classes and some supposed "bottom level" of semantical content. The point is that our statements generally can be broken down to the point that what was said only obtains a bivalent truth condition when we remove the vagueness of the semantic content at the reduction by moving up in the propositional class. It would be precisely the class at which the semantical content has become bivalent by ignoring the variation in terms or vagaries that cause a separation from bivalence.
(Noting that fuzzy logic is the idea of capturing "vagueness" in terms. Though, we certainly do not need to go as far as a continuum of truth values, we might suppose at some "bottom level" all terms end up that vague or at least are presupposed to certain degrees in that kind of "hierarchy" we might imagine.)
So, to your point about accidental knowledge. I don't know if the Gettier problem fully applies here because the issue wasn't so much that someone "got it right on accident" and then we question whether he really knew what he claimed to know. The person can be considered justified in their belief, but what is lacking is the information that ties certain propositions or terms together with other information. If we find that to be 'accidental' then we would have to make almost every bit of knowledge fall under a Gettier problem, because it is so generic--so broad--a use that unless we had absolute knowledge, then we are always having gaps or missing information or missing relations between propositions and semantic content that we could be misinformed.
I would propose a more abstract model of what is going on like this:
x believes that P, where P obtains when the set {a, b, c, ..., p} is satisfied. In other words, x has a belief about P because x has some stance affirming a, b, c, ... and p. The degree of strength that he asserts these propositions varies. For instance, x might strongly believe that P while only weakly believing that p.
Also, x believes that ¬Q, where Q={a', b', c', ..., ¬q}.
What is not known to the person is that we have a translation rule φ:Q→P, by translating each element in Q one-one to each element in P. Of particular interest here is that "φ(q)=p". Thus, since x does not know or does not believe that φ, x does not know that he believes ¬p and p. We might also say that the strength of these assertions carries over. Thus, if we want to give an arbitrary quantification, we might say x believes that p with 0.2 confidence. Also, x believes that ¬q with 0.6 confidence. Thus, unknown to x, x believes that ¬p, by φ(¬q)=¬p, with 0.6 confidence.
This model can provide us with some semblance of how non-contradiction will fail because we're not dealing with bivalence. In fact, we're dealing with inductive reasoning and can use a number of logical frameworks for this (such as fuzzy, where we can group propositions with a characteristic function detailing their relative confidence in the set--though, I presumed the translation carries over the same confidence, it does not need to since it is in a new set, i.e., it went from 0.6 in Q to something else in P).
Also, it is not particularly a gettier problem because x's belief is justified to a degree of confidence--however we measure it. Furthermore, x's belief is not justified incorrectly. It is justified! The problem is lacking other relevant information, such as a translation rule for knowing that q in Q is equivalent to p in P (by an injective transformation from Q to P). x is justified for the belief that p and the belief that ¬q, but x is not believing one of those, but being mistaken about that belief. The mistake is in supposing there is no translation equating them or that they say approximately the same thing.
What we can argue is that x has a skewed view of reality by not understanding these relation between P and Q, and in talking about P and Q in general, as a higher-order class, we can talk about them with bivalence and get rid of all the vagaries of p and q. Thus, we might say that x believes that P and believes that Q, but Q, in all relevant points here, is equivalent to ¬P. We can make this generalization iff we know that all relevant model (interpretations) of P do not satisfy Q. In that respect, we can then solve the dilemma, i believe, and reintroduce bivalence. Of course, to make that move requires a lot of qualification, and recognizing the missing information that causes the mistake. Without it, we have nothing, and one is justified in their skewed view of reality. Thus, recognizing a mistake leads to correcting the skewness. - May 4, 2009 at 1:39 PM
- 逆円助 said...
- July 4, 2009 at 5:38 AM
- 精神年齢 said...
- July 6, 2009 at 6:50 AM
最近仕事ばかりで毎日退屈してます。そろそろ恋人欲しいです☆もう夏だし海とか行きたいな♪ email@example.com 連絡待ってるよ☆
- July 17, 2009 at 8:02 AM
- 家出 said...
- July 19, 2009 at 4:25 AM
- Deloceano said...
I like this piece.
this sentence:
There are other sources of cognitive tension. Some groups of propositions are probabilistically contradictory--one asserts what another declares to be exceedingly improbable. If I won the lottery three days in a row, it would strike me as exceedingly improbable that the lottery was really a fair, million to one game.
Reminds me of the first scene in the fantastic Tom Stoppard play, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead. After spinning ninety odd heads in a row, Guildenstern (or Rosencrantz?) is starting to have his faith in the laws of probability tested. His companion can't see a problem with it.
A play (and movie) worth seeing. - November 4, 2009 at 8:14 PM


text:
Product Details
- Instant Auto-Mix (pink).
- Dual Cure: 5 - 8 sec. Tack cure and build; Light cure 20 sec; Self-cure 120 sec.
- PMMA Resin chemically bonds to PMMA Dentures.
- No shrinkage or polymerization heat
- Excellent and accurate reproduction of detail.
- Grinds easily.
- Excellent Pattern Resin.
Shipping & Returns
Returns Policy
If you are not completely satisfied with your non-custom purchase, please contact us to return or exchange your item(s) within 30 days of the delivery date, with proof of purchase. Note that returns or exchanges are not accepted for custom orders, such as dental prosthetics, which are subject to the the terms of our warranty policy. Items must be in their original packaging, and if a medical product unopened. Upon return, your item will be inspected, and exchanges, credits or refunds will be issued for the purchase price. Any taxes charged will be refunded in accordance with applicable laws. Delivery fees are non-refundable with the exception of manufacturer defects or transit damage. ROE reserves the right to refuse returns or exchanges of items that are not in as-new condition due to damage or misuse by the client.
For all orders that are canceled prior to items shipping, no delivery fee will be charged, and the item will be credited in full. For special orders or custom orders such as dental prosthetics, all costs incurred by ROE for the return will be charged or the work completed up to the time of the cancellation will be charged prorated from the initial purchase price.
Our goal is to provide accuracy in all prices, delivery rates and other information. All prices printed and online are in U.S. dollars and are subject to any applicable taxes according to state and local laws. Availability, prices and delivery rates are subject to change. There may be errors in the prices, descriptions or images of certain merchandise, and we reserve the right to cancel orders if such errors, inaccuracies or omissions are discovered.
Information will be placed here.
Recently Viewed Products
You can stop autoplay, increase/decrease aniamtion speed and number of grid to show and products from store admin.$110.00Mr Hungry Bur

subset: commoncrawl


text:
The Sony A37 was announced today alongside the NEX-F3. Both cameras are entry-level shooters feature 16MP APS-C CMOS sensors and capture full HD video.
The A37 features Sony's trademark Translucent Mirror Technology to enable phase detection autofocus while maintaining live view on the A37's 3-inch tilt/swivel LCD screen. This fast live view autofocus is available in both photo and video modes – something no other DSLR manufacturer has achieved yet.
The A37 also features sensor-based image stabilization, up to 7 frames per second with 8.4MP stills and a sensitivity range of ISO 100-16,000. The camera also sports a 1440k dot resolution EVF with 100% coverage.
The Sony A37 should be available in June for $600 with an 18-55mm kit lens. Check availability at B&H Photo.
Alongside the Sony A37, the new 18-135mm zoom lens was introduced. It should be available in July for $500. It will also be sold as a kit with the current Sony Alpha SLT cameras beginning in August 2012. Check availability at B&H Photo.
More details and images below.
Sony Introduces Speedy ?37 Camera with Full-time Continuous AF Powered by Translucent Mirror Technology
New Model Features High-Quality 16.1MP APS-C Image Sensor, up to 7 fps Shooting, High- Resolution Electronic Viewfinder and more
SAN DIEGO, May 16, 2012 – Lightweight, easy to use and packed with a variety of useful features, the new Sony SLT-A37 camera is an ideal choice for consumers eager to explore the world of interchangeable lens DSLR photography.
The new ?37 camera is the latest to feature Sony's acclaimed Translucent Mirror Technology, which delivers a potent combination of fast shooting, non-stop phase detection autofocus and continuous live image preview during still and full HD video (60i/24p) shooting. This innovative technology also allows the new ?37 camera to grab split-second action with a burst of sharply focused images. Shots can be captured at up to seven frames per second in Tele-Zoom High Speed Shooting Mode, where the central portion of the sensor's image is magnified by approximately 1.4x.
The camera has a precision 3-cross 15-point AF system with tracking autofocus that keeps faces and fast-moving subjects in sharp focus. From action-packed sports to spontaneous family portraits, it will ensure that all the drama and beauty of that special moment is captured.
"Delivering lightning-fast shooting speeds and autofocus plus advanced full HD video capture, our innovative Translucent Mirror Technology continues to serve as the backbone of our A-mount line of cameras," said Mike Kahn, director of the Alpha business at Sony. "Featuring this unique technology plus a host of exciting new features and an attractive price tag, our new ?37 camera brings a whole new meaning to the term 'entry level DSLR'."
Framing and focusing is easy with the camera's high-resolution Tru-Finder™ electronic viewfinder. With a high 1440k dot resolution, excellent contrast and 100% field of view, it matches or exceeds the abilities of many optical viewfinders. Adjustments to exposure and other creative picture settings can be previewed in real time, either via the Tru-Finder™ EVF or the tilt-angle 6.7 cm (2.7″) Clear Photo™ LCD screen, making it easy to create shots with a customized, professional finish.
Additionally, the Sony ?37 camera helps inexperienced photographers create top-quality portraits with ease. The new Auto Portrait Framing mode identifies the subject's position in a composed image and follows the "rule of thirds" to trim the scene and create a beautifully framed portrait. The cropped photo is then boosted to full resolution using Sony's unique By Pixel Super Resolution technology, which uses pattern matching to maintain superb image detail, tones and textures in the photo. Both the original and cropped image files are saved for review.
By Pixel Super Resolution Technology is also used for the "Clear Image Zoom" feature, which digitally doubles the effective magnification of any lens attached to the camera. Ideal for travel and everyday shooting, it's a great way to boost maximum focal length without carrying extra hardware.
The 16.1 effective megapixel Exmor® APS HD CMOS sensor inside the ?37 camera captures finely detailed, low noise stills and Full HD video. It's teamed with the latest BIONZ® image processor that extends sensitivity to an ISO 100-16000 range, broadening options for low-light shooting without flash. Shared with all ? A-mount cameras, SteadyShot INSIDE™ stabilization cuts the effects of camera shake by up to 4.0 stops for clearer handheld images with any A-mount lens.
The new ?37 camera also features Superior Auto Mode, which intelligently recognizes a wide range of scenes and subjects and adjusts settings automatically.
New A-Mount 18-135mm Telephoto Zoom Lens and Accessories
A versatile match for the ?37 and other Sony A-mount camera bodies, the new SAL18135 18-135mm F3.5-5.6 telephoto zoom offers a generous 8x (approx.) zoom range in a compact, go-anywhere lens that's great for travel, street photography and everyday shooting. The lens features a SAM design that assures smooth, rapid, whisper-quiet autofocus operation and Direct Manual Focus for accurate fine-tuning of focus. This sharp telephoto zoom lens will also be offered as a kit lens with the ?37 and other Sony A-mount camera bodies.
Compatible accessories include the new PCK-LM11 semi-hard screen protector sheet, exclusively designed for a perfect fit with the LCD screen on the ?37 camera, as well as the HVL-F43AM flash, LCS-BP2 backpack and a variety of other exciting products that complete the Alpha ecosystem.
Pricing and Availability
The new ?37 digital camera will be available this June with an 18-55mm kit zoom lens (model SEL1855) for about $600. The new SAL18135 telephoto zoom lens will be available as a stand-alone product this July for about $500, and will be offered as a kit lens with Sony A-mount cameras beginning this August at the below approximate prices:
- ?37 camera kit with 18-135mm lens: $800
- ?57 camera kit with 18-135mm lens: $1,000
- ?65 camera kit with 18-135mm lens: $1,200
- ?77 camera kit with 18-135mm lens: $1,700
The camera kits, new lens and variety of accessories will be available at Sony retail stores (www.store.sony.com) and other authorized dealers nationwide.


text:
Butterfly Wing Scale Digital Image GalleryLemon Yellow Giant Orange Tip ButterflyMale lemon yellow giant orange tip butterflies feature strong serrations on the leading edge of their forewings, which may be important in male-male interactions and for defense. Indeed, life for the males of this tropical species is a contact sport. The butterflies can often be seen in small flocks swirling around each other or at mud holes in tight groups where jostling frequently occurs. Scientifically described as Anteos menippe, the lemon yellow giant orange tip butterfly is one of the largest and most robust species in the butterfly family Pieridae. Built for long flights, the brightly colored butterflies are occasionally observed migrating in large flocks in Central and South America. Although collected widely throughout the American tropical rainforests, the butterflies are most common in Peru and Brazil, especially in urban and suburban areas where cassia, their preferred host plants, are used as landscaping along residential streets. For sipping nectar, the butterflies prefer to visit red and purple flowers, such as hibiscus, lantana, bougainvillea, and passionflowers. The common name of the lemon yellow giant orange tip species is aptly descriptive of its more noticeable mode of appearance. The upper sides of its wings exhibit the beautiful coloration described in its name, as well as a pair of black false eyespots. However, the crafty species can exhibit another look when desired. If its wings are held upright with the undersides exposed, the butterfly looks like a green, veined leaf with a distinct midrib. The cryptic coloring acts as a safeguard against potential predators that may not be able to differentiate the camouflaged prey from surrounding foliage. Lemon yellow giant orange tip caterpillars also display cryptic coloration. The larvae primarily feed on the leaves of cassia plants but, unlike many butterfly larvae that defend themselves with sequestered phytochemicals, remain palatable despite high concentrations of alkaloids in the cassia leaves. Therefore, instead of exhibiting a warning coloration, the caterpillars, which co-evolved with cassia plants, developed a different mode of protection. The caterpillars exhibit different cryptic color morphs depending on the time of the year and the location of the eggs on the host plant. Contributing Authors Cynthia D. Kelly, Shannon H. Neaves, Laurence D. Zuckerman, and Michael W. Davidson - National High Magnetic Field Laboratory, 1800 East Paul Dirac Dr., The Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, 32310. BACK TO THE BUTTERFLY WING SCALE IMAGE GALLERY BACK TO THE DIGITAL IMAGE GALLERIES Questions or comments? Send us an email.© 1995-2022 by Michael W. Davidson and The Florida State University. All Rights Reserved. No images, graphics, software, scripts, or applets may be reproduced or used in any manner without permission from the copyright holders. Use of this website means you agree to all of the Legal Terms and Conditions set forth by the owners.
This website is maintained by our


text:
In a complex and heart-wrenching case, a divided Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that the parental rights of a Native American father may be terminated if he has failed to establish a history of "continued custody" of his biological child.
The decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, however, is viewed as narrow and leaves intact the the 1978 federal law known as the Indian Child Welfare Act. The law was designed to stop the historically brutal and improper removal of Native American children from their families for adoption or foster care by white parents.
"I'm not personally happy with the decision, but I think it is very narrow, and very case- and individual-specific," says Kevin Leecy, tribal chairman of the Bois Forte Band of Chippewa. "It did not alter the protection given to tribes and their members."
But its immediate effect is a repudiation of efforts by Dusten Brown, a member of the Cherokee Nation, to wrest his biological daughter from her adoptive parents in South Carolina. Brown in late 2011 had won custody of his then-2-year-old daughter when lower courts ruled in favor of his argument that his rights under ICWA trumped state adoption law.
The adoptive parents, Matt and Melanie Capobianco, who arranged the private adoption with Brown's non-Native American former girlfriend, Christy Maldonado, appealed to the Supreme Court claiming ICWA is unconstitutional.
The court's decision, which steered clear of the law's constitutionality, was still a disappointment to Indian family advocates who say it undermines ICWA's efforts to keep Native American families, and culture, intact.
"This is a hard disappointment for me," says Mary Jo Brooks Hunter of the Child Advocacy Clinic at Hamline University's School of Law. "There is still a lack of awareness of the need to keep Native American heritage alive, and we are not in a good place in terms of the Supreme Court."
But others hailed the 5-4 decision as a boon to state courts seeking to hold accountable unmarried fathers, no matter their heritage, and asserted that the ruling poses no threat to ICWA's constitutionality.
"My basic view has been that ICWA is an excellent and important piece of legislation that applies and should apply primarily to circumstances where state agencies seek to remove children from their tribal families," says Joan Heifetz Hollinger of University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, a leading authority on adoption law.
Her argument, made in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the adoptive parents, hinges on Brown's failure to financially or emotionally support his pregnant ex-girlfriend during the time she was carrying the child.
"This is a case that dealt with a situation where a biological father, who knows about the pregnancy and a birth ... sits on the sidelines," Heifetz Hollinger says. "This is a message to mothers and fathers that simply using the biological trump card is not a way to establish or sustain a family relationship."
An analysis at SCOTUSblog says that the court had "two competing interpretations of the ICWA." The more expansive one, advocated by the biological father, argued that ICWA applies whenever a court is considering whether to terminate parental rights of a Native American parent. The competing interpretation, says Mike Gottlieb of SCOTUSblog, advanced by the adoptive parents, argues that ICWA's coverage is "limited to the kinds of cases that Congress most likely had in mind when it passed ICWA — namely, those in which social workers and other government officials are seeking to remove Native American children from an existing Native American family."
In his majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito wrote that during Maldonado's pregnancy, and for four months after that, Brown did not involve himself in the child's life, nor provide financial help. He never had legal custody of the child; Maldonado did, and she acted lawfully when she initiated adoption proceedings.
But when Brown saw paperwork of the pending adoption, he sought custody of the girl under the ICWA and was given it by a South Carolina family court.
The high court's ruling turns on the phrase "continuing custody" and the argument that a family that was never intact cannot be fractured.
Alito noted that even if Brown met the standard of a parent under ICWA, two sections of that act do not bar the termination of his parental rights. The ruling says at the time of the adoption, Brown had never had legal or biological custody of his child, or "continuing custody."
Thus a section noting "continued custody" of a child doesn't apply. However, the girl now lives with Brown.
Alito also wrote that only the adoptive parents sought to adopt the child — not Brown, nor members of his family or the Cherokee Nation. Alito says the biological father instead "argued that his parental rights should not be terminated in the first place."
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in a dissent, argued that the majority decision wrongly hangs on the meaning of "continued custody" of a child and may hurt other Native American parents in the future:
"Moreover, notwithstanding the majority's focus on the perceived shortcomings of the Birth Father, its reasoning necessarily extends to all Indian parents who have never had custody of their children, no matter how fully those parents have embraced the financial and emotional responsibilities of parenting."
She adds that this transforms a uniform federal standard for child custody involving Indian children and their biological parents into "an illogical piecemeal scheme."
Justice Antonin Scalia joined with Sotomayor in her dissent, but he added one final thought:
"It has been the constant practice of the common law to respect the entitlement of those who bring a child into the world to raise that child. We do not inquire whether leaving a child with his parents is 'in the best interests of the child.' It sometimes is not, he would be better off raised by someone else. But parents have their rights, no less than children do. This father wants to raise his daughter, and the statute amply protects his right to do so. There is no reason in law or policy to dilute that protection."
In April, NPR's Nina Totenberg wrote of the child, "Videos of her with her father, now married, seem to show a little girl equally happy. Her birth mother says that while she spent time with her child at the adoptive parents' home in South Carolina and listened to her child on the phone regularly, she now does not even know where her daughter lives. Neither do the adoptive parents. Dusten Brown says he has kept his daughter apart for the past 16 months to allow her to become used to her new home, away from the chaos and bitterness of the legal fight."
The case is expected to go back to court in South Carolina, where judges will have to factor in today's high court decision when they decide where the little girl — who spent two years with her adoptive parents, and the past year-plus with her biological father — will end up.
Copyright 2020 NPR. To see more, visit https://www.npr.org.


text:
Includes: Bed with wicker headboard, wicker 3-drawer chest, wicker framed standing mirror, skirted wingback and ottoman, sewing machine, assorted d'cor. Also includes contents of closet-vacuum, linens, etc. and contents of hall bath.
High bidder to remove the contents of the room on July 16, 2020, by appointment. Bring any tools, help, boxes, and packing materials that you will need to remove your items!
The winning bidder will be expected to remove the entire lot!
If bids extend on any lot, then ALL items will extend!
Winning bidders should plan to pick up their items on Thursday, July 16, 2020, beginning at 9:30 AM.
1. All items sell "AS IS, WHERE IS" with no warranty or guarantee. Bidders are encouraged to personally inspect all items prior to bidding. A Buyer's Premium of 13% will be added to the high bid, the total being the purchase price. SC sales tax (9%) will be added where applicable.
2. The credit/debit card in your profile will be charged at the conclusion of the auction. Please check your profile now and be sure that your information is current and up to date.
3. Beginning at 6pm Wednesday July 15th, 2020, lots will begin to close; when an individual lot receives a bid in the final few minutes ALL lots will have bidding extended.
4. Preview dates – by appointment. We welcome and encourage you to inspect all lots! Please note that we will be practicing social distancing at preview and will restrict the number of bidders allowed in the house at any one time. We appreciate your understanding and cooperation, and encourage you to take whatever precautions you deem appropriate.
5. Successful bidders MUST pick up their purchases at 1125 Ganton Way, Myrtle Beach, SC, Thursday July 16th, 2020 by scheduling an appointment. If you cannot pick up your purchases at these scheduled times, or make other arrangements, please do not bid! This is the only time available for pickup! Local pick up only! We are under time constraints to have this home empty, and thank you in advance for picking up your items on time! If you require shipping please have your shipper pick up during these scheduled times. You are responsible for removal and loading of your purchases, so bring whatever packing materials, tools, and labor you will need to move and load your items!
6. Use of Chris Pracht Auctioneers Realty & Auction online auction site is subject to the terms and conditions contained herein. Terms announced on individual auction pages will be in addition to the following terms and conditions. In using this site, you accept without limitation the terms and conditions of the online auction. Auctioneer reserves the right to edit the terms and conditions of this agreement, and it is the buyer's responsibility to review any changes prior to use of the site. In using this site, you agree in advance to accept such revisions/changes.
7. All property is sold in 'AS IS' and 'WHERE IS' condition. ALL SALES ARE FINAL! Bidder understands and agrees that no refunds, exchanges, adjustments, charge backs, etc. will be allowed. Property is available for inspection at specified times and it is the bidder's responsibility to determine condition. Bidder's failure to inspect any item or lot will not constitute grounds for any claim, refund, adjustment, charge back, etc.
8. All description information has been gathered from sources which we believe to with respect to condition, authenticity, provenance, source, condition, suitability for a particular purpose, etc. Auctioneer reserves the right to change, modify, delete any item or lot or description in the auction as may be necessary.
9. A Buyer's Premium will be added to the high bid of each item. The sum of the high bid amount plus the buyer's premium will be the sales price.
10. Sales tax, when applicable, will be added to the sales price at the appropriate rate. Dealers or other exempt parties must have proper documentation on file with Auctioneer prior to bidding.
11. A credit card is required to register. This is for verification only, and no charge will be made at registration. At the conclusion of the auction, the credit card on file may be charged, unless prior arrangements have been made. Please contact Chris Pracht Auctioneers Realty & Auction prior to bidding if you would like to make arrangements for alternative payment methods. In all instances, buyer must make full payment prior to removal of buyer's purchases. A receipt will be furnished to the buyer.
12. All purchased items must be removed by the buyer during the specified time. Any items that are not removed during the time allotted may, at Auctioneer's discretion, be discarded or resold with proceeds going to the Auctioneer. Chris Pracht Auctioneers Realty & Auction, LLC DOES NOT provide transportation or loading services. Any and all logistics of removal, including moving, packaging, loading, transportation, etc. are the sole responsibility of the buyer. Auctioneer is not and will not be held responsible for accidents or injuries that occur during the inspection or removal of items.
13. Auctioneer will not be responsible for errors or omissions caused by an interruption of internet or telephone service. Bidder acknowledges that the auction is being conducted electronically and hardware or software may malfunction without warning. Auctioneer, in his sole discretion, may void any sale, suspend bidding, or re-sell items that were affected by any malfunction. Decisions made by Auctioneer are final. Bidder is responsible for any bids place under his bidding number and password. When you place a bid, you have entered a binding contract between yourself and Chris Pracht Auctioneers Realty & Auction, LLC. Once you become the winning bidder, you are obligated to buy the item at the price indicated and in accordance with these terms and conditions. Placing a bid on this site, winning, and then not paying for the item is illegal and can result in prosecution. Auctioneer reserves the right to reject any bidder or bids at his sole discretion. If bidder at any time feels that his bidder number or password have been compromised due to lack of bidder's security, notify Auctioneer immediately.
14. Most items offered at auction are sold to the highest bidder, regardless of price. Occasionally, a fair and reasonable reserve or minimum price is necessary. In the event of a reserve, Auctioneer reserves the right to bid on the seller's behalf up to the reserve price.
15. During an online auction, extended bidding will be given to items that have bids placed on them within several minutes of the close of the item. This is to allow fair time for all bidders to respond to a change in the bidding before time expires. Additionally, items may have staggered ending times. All decisions of the auctioneer are final as to methods of bidding, disputes among bidders, acceptable bidding increments and other matters that may arise before, during, or after the auction.
16. Parties agree that any claim or controversy arising out of this contract shall be resolved by arbitration, which will be final and binding. The prevailing party will be entitled to collect from the other its costs associated with the arbitration, including attorney's fees. This contract will be governed in accordance with South Carolina law. Venue for any claim or controversy will be in Anderson County, South Carolina
United States


text:
Hard to Find Bulbs-Misc. V SeriesLamps ordered will generally be shipped the next business day by USPS Priority Mail or UPS, check here for Shipping Information. Large orders may qualify for a discount and may not qualify for next day shipment. If you do not know what lamp you require or for lamps not listed, email your request or call 336-882-2854. To order, please use our secure shopping cart or call 336-882-2852 or 800-692-3051. Click to go to our Home Page and View Cart.
Replacementlightbulbs.com Order Line: 800-692-3051 Hours: 8 AM to 4 PM EST Monday through Friday Sales: Address
changes, invoice copies, tracking and delivery confirmation numbers,
order status, product availability, payment options, shipping quotes,
returns, damage claims 336-882-2854 email@example.com International Orders:
Large international orders that require special shipping arrangements
and quotes If you have compliments, complaints, suggestions, or help with areas not listed above please contact: Ron MillerGeneral Manager firstname.lastname@example.com |


text:
U.S. negotiators are heading into a second day of what have been dubbed "serious and substantial" talks with North Korean officials. Yet amid all the discussion of how the U.S. will attempt to work with Kim Jong Un, there has been little (open) speculation as to whether Dear Leader Junior might crank up production of $100 and $50 bills. No, not North Korean 100- or 50-won banknotes, worth about as much as old tissues. I'm talking about fake greenbacks — or as the U.S. Secret Service has dubbed them, "superdollars."
These ultra-counterfeits are light-years beyond the weak facsimiles produced by most forgers, who use desktop printers. As an anticounterfeiting investigator with Europol once put it, "Superdollars are just U.S. dollars not made by the U.S. government." With few exceptions, only Federal Reserve banks equipped with the fanciest detection gear can identify these fakes.
Yet as unpatriotic as this may sound, perhaps America would be better off if Kim Jong Un were to try and enrich himself with DIY Benjamins. Let me explain, by way of a little background about superdollars.
(MORE: Can a Second Bailout Save Greece?)
The "super" moniker does not stem from any particular talent on the part of the North Koreans. It's a matter of equipment. The regime apparently possesses the same kind of intaglio printing press (or presses) used by the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing. A leading theory is that in 1989, just before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the machines made their way to North Korea from a clandestine facility in East Germany, where they were used to make fake passports and other secret documents. The high-tech paper is just about the same as what's used to make authentic dollars, and the North Koreans buy their ink from the same Swiss firm that supplies the U.S. government with ink for greenbacks.
Forging $100 bills obviously gels with the regime's febrile anti-Americanism and its aim to undercut U.S. global power, in this case by sowing doubts about our currency. State-level counterfeiting is a kind of slow-motion violence committed against an enemy, and it has been tried many times before. During the Revolutionary War, the British printed fake continentals to undermine the fragile colonial currency. Napoleon counterfeited Russian notes during the Napoleonic Wars, and during World War II the Germans forced a handful of artists and printing experts in Block 19 of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp to produce fake U.S. dollars and British pounds sterling. (Their story is the basis of 2007 film The Counterfeiters, which won an Oscar for Best Foreign Language Film.)
Superdollars can be viewed as an act of economic warfare, but Pyongyang's motive is probably more mundane: the regime is broke. The 2009 attempt to raise funds by devaluing its already pathetic currency revealed not only the country's fiscal desperation but also the abuse the Dear Leader was willing to inflict on his people. The won was devalued 100-fold, which meant 1,000 won suddenly had the purchasing power of 10 won. (Imagine waking up to learn that a slice of pizza costs $250.) Officials set a tight limit on how much old money could be exchanged for new, so whatever value existed within people's paltry savings evaporated overnight. Compared to devaluation, generating quick cash by counterfeiting another country's more stable currency looks downright humanitarian.
(MORE: TIME Interview with Warren Buffett)
The superdollar affair has a certain comic-book quality: copying the currency of evil capitalists so you can buy cognac and missiles. But Washington isn't laughing. At the end of December, Ireland's high court rejected a U.S. request to extradite former Workers Party president and IRA veteran Sean Garland for his alleged involvement with the superdollar plot. There is also the question of what exactly the North Koreans hope to procure with all this "money." According to the U.S. House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, superdollars may be part of the regime's effort to acquire materials for nuclear weapons.
Since the superdollars were first detected about a decade ago, the regime has been pocketing an estimated $15 million to $25 million a year from them. (Other estimates are much higher — up to several hundred million dollars' worth.) That sounds like a lot of money, but compared to the $1 trillion in cash circulating in the great ocean of commerce, a few hundred million is chump change. Although costly for small-business owners who unknowingly accept a bunch of forgeries, counterfeits probably won't bring about a crisis of faith in our paper money anytime soon.
Yet taking the long view, maybe a rash of new superdollars from the hermetic regime of Kim Jong Un would be beneficial. How so? Because counterfeits have a way of reminding people of what material money is and how it functions, and that could lead to a discussion of its pros and cons. Cash is, and always has been, such an uncontested part of everyday life that we rarely stop to consider its toll on society as the currency of crime, to say nothing of the heaping expense of printing, transporting, securing, inspecting, shredding, redesigning, reprinting, reinspecting and redistributing it ad nauseam, plus the broader costs of prosecuting and incarcerating the thousands, if not millions, of people who commit cash-related crimes. That's not to suggest we could get rid of paper money tomorrow; we still don't have a substitute that's equally convenient, universally accepted and adequately secure. But that day may be closer than you think. (Coins, however, we could — and should — do away with. As in, right now.)
(MORE: Google Takes Another Experimental Step Toward Delivering TV)
Superdollars and the untold billions of (electronic) dollars spent combating them could be the wake-up call that finally forces us to think more clearly about the costs of physical money. If killing all cash strikes you as too radical, consider for a moment what it would mean to get rid of high-denomination banknotes. Who would be most inconvenienced if Washington were to outlaw $100 and $50 bills tomorrow? Cartel bosses in Juárez, Mexico, jump to mind. So do human traffickers in China and Africa, aspiring terrorists in Afghanistan, wildlife poachers, arms dealers, tax evaders and everyday crooks who hold up mom-and-pop groceries. And, of course, North Korean government officials.
So then. At the risk of infuriating cash-hoarding militia members, anonymity-obsessed ACLUers, the U.S. Treasury, Russian mobsters, Laundromat owners and just about every person who has ever hid a purchase from a spouse or income from the government, I would say this to Kim Jong Un and his posse of counterfeiters: Bring it.
Wolman is a contributing editor at Wired and the author of The End of Money: Counterfeiters, Preachers, Techies, Dreamers—and the Coming Cashless Society, out this month from Da Capo Press. Follow him on Twitter: @davidwolman.
[Correction: This piece originally said the "won was devalued by 100 percent, which meant 1,000 won suddenly had the purchasing power of 10 won." It has been corrected to read, "The won was devalued 100-fold."]


text:
Scalia includes Visual Composer and is optimised for this best frontend and backend drag & drop page builder for WordPress. With Visual Composer you take full control over your WordPress site using powerful frontend / backend editor, which is really "what you see is what you get." Build any layout you can imagine with this simple drag and drop page builder plugin.
Term sheet convertible note colluding bootstrapping. Engine cross platform responsive design OAuth.


text:
Interactive RegistrationTM Help Desk
The Jockey Club Checkoff Program Frequently Asked Questions
- How to Identify a Thoroughbred
- Overview of Registration Process
- Fee Schedule
- Rule Book
- DNA Sampling
- Tips on Photos
- The Jockey Club Checkoff Program
- Microchip FAQ
- Thoroughbred Aftercare Alliance FAQ
- Thoroughbred Connect
- Transferred as Retired from Racing FAQ
- Tattoo Lookup General Information
- Tattoo FAQ
- Submit Tattoo Research Form
- The Jockey Club Identification App
- The Jockey Club Naming App
- Report of Mares Bred
- Digital Certificate FAQ
- Home
- Back to Help Desk
1. What is The Jockey Club's checkoff program? The Jockey Club's checkoff program provides an opportunity for owners and breeders to financially assist five charities by including additional funds (of an amount of their choice) with the foal registration fee. 2. What organizations are the beneficiaries of the checkoff program?
The checkoff proceeds will be distributed to The Grayson-Jockey Club Research Foundation, The Jockey Club Safety Net Foundation, Thoroughbred Aftercare Alliance (TAA), Thoroughbred Charities of America (TCA) and the Thoroughbred Retirement Foundation (TRF). Grayson-Jockey Club Research Foundation traditionally is the nation's leading private, non-corporate source of equine research funding, having individually contributed more than $28.8 million to 45 universities since 1983 to underwrite 383 specific projects aimed at enhancing the health and safety of horses. The Jockey Club Safety Net Foundation is a charitable trust created to provide financial relief to needy members of the Thoroughbred industry and their families. Since 1985, the foundation has helped over 1,000 individuals and their immediate families with more than $16 million in support. TAA is an organization designed to serve as both the accrediting body for aftercare facilities that care for Thoroughbreds following the conclusion of their careers and a fundraising body to support these approved facilities. TCA is a 501© fund-raising organization that distributes grants to a variety of non-profit organizations designed to improve conditions for horses and people in the Thoroughbred industry. TRF is a 501© organization dedicated to finding retirement homes for Thoroughbreds once their racing careers are over.
3. How does the checkoff program work?Thoroughbred owners and breeders can select one of the designated amounts or an amount of their choice to the checkoff program on the Application for Foal Registration form or during the payment process on Interactive Registration™.
4. Will the checkoff proceeds be earmarked for specific programs administered by those organizations?Yes. Funds from The Jockey Club checkoff will be directed to The Grayson-Jockey Club's equine research funding, The Jockey Club Safety Net Foundation's funding toward financial relief and assistance to needy members of the Thoroughbred industry and their families, TAA's approved aftercare facilities, TCA's Thoroughbred re-training and adoption grantees and to TRF's prison programs.
5. Are checkoff payments tax deductible?Yes, checkoff contributions made in conjunction with foal registration qualify as charitable contributions for federal income tax purposes. Please be sure to complete the necessary contact information required to receive a receipt from the charity or charities in which you make a contribution.
6. Can I make a payment to benefit these organizations if I am not registering a foal?If you are not registering a foal but want to financially assist The Grayson-Jockey Club Research Foundation, The Jockey Club Safety Net Foundation, Thorougbred Aftercare Alliance, Thoroughbred Charities of America or the Thoroughbred Retirement Foundation, you should contact those organizations directly. For The Grayson-Jockey Club Research Foundation, please visit www.grayson-jockeyclub.org or call (859) 224-2850. For The Jockey Club Safety Net Foundation, please visit www.tjcfoundation.org or call (212) 371-5970. For TAA, please visit www.thoroughbredaftercare.org or call (859) 224-2756. For TCA, please visit www.tca.org or call (859) 276-4989. For TRF, please visit www.trfinc.org or call (518) 226-0028.
Note: To register a foal using Interactive Registration, click here. If you need a hardcopy Application for Foal Registration form, please contact The Jockey Club's Registry at (800) 444-8521 or (859) 224-2700.Is this enough information?
Yes, please return me to the last page I visited.
No, I'd like to fill out a feedback form and receive additional help.


text:
What is 1/453 as a decimal?
Converting 1/453 to a decimal is quite possibly one of the easiest calculations you can make. In this (very short) guide, we'll show you how to turn any fraction into a decimal in 3 seconds of less! Here we go!
Want to quickly learn or show students how to convert 1/453 to a decimal? Play this very quick and fun video now!
First things first, if you don't know what a numerator and a denominator are in a fraction, we need to recap that:
Here's the little secret you can use to instantly transform any fraction to a decimal: Simply divide the numerator by the denominator:
= 1/453
= 1 ÷ 453
= 0.0022075055187638
That's literally all there is to it! 1/453 as a decimal is 0.0022075055187638.
I wish I had more to tell you about converting a fraction into a decimal but it really is that simple and there's nothing more to say about it.
If you want to practice, grab yourself a pen and a pad and try to calculate some fractions to decimal format yourself. If you're really feeling lazy you can use our calculator below instead!
Why would you want to convert 1/453 to a decimal?
This is a great question. We have lots of calculations on this site about converting a fraction into a decimal but why would you want or need to do that in the first place?
Well, first of all it's just a good way to represent a fraction in a better way that allows you to do common arithmetic with them (like addition, subtration, division and multiplication).
In real life, we mostly deal with decimals (like currency, for example) and since our brains are taught from a young age to understand and compare decimals more often than they are fractions, it's easier to understand and compare fractions if they are converted to a decimal first!
Here's a little real life example of converting a fraction to a decimal when using quantities. Let's say you're cooking and you can usually see fractionally how much of an ingredient is left in a pack. However, electronic scales measure weight in decimals and not as a fraction of the ingredient left. This makes converting between fractions and decimals a useful skill in cooking.
Hopefully this tutorial has helped you to understand how to convert a fraction to a decimal number. You can now go forth and convert fractions to decimal as much as your little heart desires!
Cite, Link, or Reference This Page
If you found this content useful in your research, please do us a great favor and use the tool below to make sure you properly reference us wherever you use it. We really appreciate your support!
What is 1/453 as a decimal?
"What is 1/453 as a decimal?". VisualFractions.com. Accessed on July 25, 2024. http://visualfractions.com/calculator/fraction-as-decimal/what-is-1-453-as-a-decimal/.
"What is 1/453 as a decimal?". VisualFractions.com, http://visualfractions.com/calculator/fraction-as-decimal/what-is-1-453-as-a-decimal/. Accessed 25 July, 2024.
What is 1/453 as a decimal?. VisualFractions.com. Retrieved from http://visualfractions.com/calculator/fraction-as-decimal/what-is-1-453-as-a-decimal/.
Fraction to Decimal Calculator
Fraction as Decimal
Enter a numerator and denominator
Next Fraction to Decimal Calculation
Random Fraction to Decimal Problems
If you made it this far down the page then you must REALLY love converting fractions to decimals? Below are a bunch of randomly generated calculations for your decimal loving pleasure:


text:
Decorate your nails and bring the funky gorgeous looks to your hands with our Nail Art Vinyl Stencil – X Pattern. Just paste the stencil on your nails and apply the nails polish over it. Instantly you will get a unique nail art style for yourself. All Nail Art Vinyl Stencils are usable for one time only but highly recommended for all those modern fashion lovers and nail art enthusiasts.
How to apply?
- Apply nail polish on your nails and wait until completely dry. We recommend using fast dry top coat over nail polish or bare nails to create a flat surface which helps the product stick better. Make sure nail is dry and free of oily residues before applying product.
- Lightly push tape/stencils to the nail using a finger, especially paying attention to the areas near skin, cuticles, and the tips of long nails. You can always cut nail tape to size if they are too long and cut stencils to help them form better to the tip, sides and curvature of the nail. Try peeling stencils from different directions if you have trouble with smaller pieces not remaining on the backing paper. Find your direction and peel fast, holding stencil close the backing sheet. When small pieces remain within a stencil, flip and stick/peel the stencil to the back of the paper to remove all stuck pieces.
- Apply fresh or thinned, not thick or gloopy, nail polish across the tape/stencil. Shimmer and metallic nail polishes work better than cremes. We recommend applying nail polish with a sponge lightly pushing it to your nail, similar to ombre design, this prevents any polish bleeding under the stencil giving cleaner lines. Remove extra nail polish from your skin and cuticles by using a flat brush dipped in acetone or nail polish remover.
- Remove tape/stencils immediately after applying nail polish using your fingers, tweezers or nippers while the polish is still wet. For better results pull the tape following its edges and stencils following the pattern.
- Wait until your design has completely dried before applying top coat. Use fresh or thinned top coat, hold your brush parallel to your nail and try not to touch a nail with the brush, only the top coat drop should touch the nail to prevent smearing. If you want to leave stickers on your nails you should apply 1-2 thick layers of top coat to seal stickers completely to the nail.


text:
Here is the BEST Time to Start Hyssop Seeds in Wisconsin (2022 Guide)
Do you want to grow hyssop seeds in Wisconsin, but don't know when to start them?
Starting hyssop seeds is not as easy as it seems.
Here's why:
- Hyssop Seeds must be consistently watered, receive at least 8 hours of sunlight a day, & be kept at room temperature of at least 70 degrees Fahrenheit.
So if you don't consistently water them they won't germinate. If they aren't in a room that is at least 70 degrees Fahrenheit they won't sprout. And if it receives 8 hours of sunlight the plant itself won't grow.
- Because Wisconsin's growing season is not long enough, hyssop seeds cannot be sowed outside and should only be started indoors.
Because of this, I'm going to teach you the ideal time to start hyssop seeds indoors in Wisconsin:
- To Learn More About HOW to Grow Hyssop, Check Out This GUIDE!
When to Start Hyssop Seeds Indoors
Depending on the type of hyssop, it takes roughly 5 to 21 days to grow hyssop from seed indoors before you can transplant them into your garden. And it could take 14 to 21 days for your hyssop to bloom!
The approximate date of when you should start your hyssop seeds indoors can be found by:
- Finding the last average frost date HERE
- And then subtract 5 days from it
You can also find the average last frost date for most major cities in the below chart that I have created:
To help ensure the greatest success of your hyssop seeds germinating you should:
- Use a heat mat to ensure the gardening pot remains at 70 degrees Fahrenheit
- Use a grow light to control how much light your hyssop seeds receive
- Water your seeds with a spray bottle to ensure your seeds are not overwatered
It should also be noted that you will not want to introduce your hyssop plants into your garden until 2 weeks after your last frost or else your plant will potentially die or not bloom
If you want to learn WHEN to start ANY Flower Seed in Wisconsin, head over to HERE and just type in the flower you want to grow.