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1. Under 2 (b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13 (b), petitioner was justified in selling gasoline in interstate commerce to four comparatively large "jobber" customers in Detroit at 1 1/2 cents per gallon less than it sold like gasoline to many comparatively small service station customers in the same area, if the lower price to the "jobbers" was made to retain each of them as a customer and in good faith to meet a lawful and equally low price of a competitor - even though the effect of such price discrimination was to injure, destroy or prevent competition. Pp. 233-251.
3. The Federal Trade Commission instituted proceedings to challenge the right of petitioner, under 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13, to sell gasoline in interstate commerce to four comparatively large "jobber" customers in Detroit at 1 1/2 cents per gallon less than it sold like gasoline to many comparatively small service station customers in the same area. Petitioner presented evidence tending to prove that its lower price to each "jobber" was made in order to retain that "jobber" as a customer and in good faith to meet an equally low price of one or more competitors. The Commission held as a matter of law that such evidence was not material, and it made no finding of fact on this question. It found that the effect of such price discriminations was to injure, destroy and prevent competition; and it ordered petitioner to cease and desist from making such a price differential. Held: The Commission should have made a [340 U.S. 231, 233] finding as to whether or not petitioner's price reduction was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor within the meaning of 2 (b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. 13 (b). Pp. 233-251.
173 F.2d 210, reversed.
The Federal Trade Commission ordered petitioner to cease and desist from selling gasoline to four comparatively large "jobber" customers in Detroit at a lower price than it sold like gasoline to many comparatively smaller service station customers in the same area. 43 F. T. C. 56. The Court of Appeals ordered enforcement of the order with a slight modification. 173 F.2d 210. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U.S. 865 . Reversed and remanded, p. 251.
Howard Ellis argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Weymouth Kirkland, Hammond E. Chaffetz, W. H. Van Oosterhout, Arthur J. Abbott, Thomas E. Sunderland and Gordon E. Tappan.
By special leave of Court, William Simon argued the cause and filed a brief for the Empire State Petroleum Association, Inc. et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal.
James W. Cassedy argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was W. T. Kelley.
By special leave of Court, Cyrus Austin argued the cause and filed a brief for the Retail Gasoline Dealers Association of Michigan, Inc. et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance.
Raoul Berger filed a brief for the Citrin-Kolb Oil Company, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case the Federal Trade Commission challenged the right of the Standard Oil Company, under the Robinson-Patman [340 U.S. 231, 234] Act, 1 to sell gasoline to four comparatively large "jobber" customers in Detroit at a less price per gallon than it sold like gasoline to many comparatively small service station customers in the same area. The company's defenses were that (1) the sales involved were not in interstate commerce and (2) its lower price to the jobbers was justified because made to retain them as customers and in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. 2 The Commission, with one member dissenting, ordered the company to cease and desist from making such a price differential. 43 F. T. C. 56. The Court of Appeals slightly modified the order and required its enforcement as modified. 173 F.2d 210. We granted certiorari on petition of the company because the case presents an important issue under the Robinson-Patman Act which has not been settled by this Court. 338 U.S. 865 . The case was argued at our October Term, 1949, and reargued at this term. 339 U.S. 975 .
For the reasons hereinafter stated, we agree with the court below that the sales were made in interstate commerce but we agree with petitioner that, under the Act, the lower price to the jobbers was justified if it was made to retain each of them as a customer and in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.
Since the effective date of the Robinson-Patman Act, June 19, 1936, petitioner has sold its Red Crown gasoline to its "jobber" customers at its tank-car prices. Those prices have been 1 1/2 per gallon less than its tank-wagon prices to service station customers for identical gasoline in the same area. In practice, the service stations have resold the gasoline at the prevailing retail service station prices. 3 Each of petitioner's so-called "jobber" customers has been free to resell its gasoline at retail or wholesale. Each, at some time, has resold some of it at retail. One now resells it only at retail. The others now resell it largely at wholesale. As to resale prices, two of the "jobbers" have resold their gasoline only at the prevailing wholesale or retail rates. The other two, however, have reflected, in varying degrees, petitioner's reductions in the cost of the gasoline to them by reducing their resale prices of that gasoline below the prevailing rates. The effect of these reductions has thus reached competing retail service stations in part through retail stations operated by the "jobbers" and in part through retail stations which purchased gasoline from the "jobbers" at less than the prevailing tank-wagon prices. The Commission found that such reduced resale prices "have resulted in injuring, destroying, and preventing competition between said favored dealers and retail dealers in respondent's [petitioner's] gasoline and other major brands of gasoline . . . ." 41 F. T. C. 263, 283. The distinctive [340 U.S. 231, 236] characteristics of these "jobbers" are that each (1) maintains sufficient bulk storage to take delivery of gasoline in tank-car quantities (of 8,000 to 12,000 gallons) rather than in tank-wagon quantities (of 700 to 800 gallons) as is customary for service stations; (2) owns and operates tank wagons and other facilities for delivery of gasoline to service stations; (3) has an established business sufficient to insure purchases of from one to two million gallons a year; and (4) has adequate credit responsibility. 4 While the cost of petitioner's sales and deliveries of gasoline to each of these four "jobbers" is no doubt less, per gallon, than the cost of its sales and deliveries of like gasoline to its service station customers in the same area, there is no finding that such difference accounts for the entire reduction in price made by petitioner to these "jobbers," and we proceed on the assumption that it does not entirely account for that difference.
Petitioner placed its reliance upon evidence offered to show that its lower price to each jobber was made in order to retain that jobber as a customer and in good faith to meet an equally low price offered by one or more competitors. The Commission, however, treated such evidence as not relevant.
Facts determining this were found by the Commission as follows: Petitioner is an Indiana corporation, whose principal office is in Chicago. Its gasoline is obtained from fields in Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming. Its refining plant is at Whiting, Indiana. It distributes its products in 14 middle western states, including Michigan. The gasoline sold by it in the Detroit, Michigan, area, and involved in this case, is carried for petitioner by tankers on the Great Lakes from Indiana to petitioner's marine terminal at River Rouge, Michigan. Enough gasoline is accumulated there during each navigation season so that a winter's supply is available from the terminal. The gasoline remains for varying periods at the terminal or in nearby bulk storage stations, and while there it is under the ownership of petitioner and en route from petitioner's refinery in Indiana to its market in Michigan. "Although the gasoline was not brought to River Rouge pursuant to orders already taken, the demands of the Michigan territory were fairly constant, and the petitioner's customers' demands could be accurately estimated, so the flow of the stream of commerce kept surging from Whiting to Detroit." 173 F.2d at 213-214. Gasoline delivered to customers in Detroit, upon individual orders for it, is taken from the gasoline at the terminal in interstate commerce en route for delivery in that area. Such sales are well within the jurisdictional requirements of the Act. Any other conclusion would fall short of the recognized [340 U.S. 231, 238] purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act to reach the operations of large interstate businesses in competition with small local concerns. Such temporary storage of the gasoline as occurs within the Detroit area does not deprive the gasoline of its interstate character. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 . Compare Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570 , with Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U.S. 257, 268 . 6
There is no doubt that under the Clayton Act, before its amendment by the Robinson-Patman Act, this evidence would have been material and, if accepted, would have [340 U.S. 231, 240] established a complete defense to the charge of unlawful discrimination. At that time the material provisions of 2 were as follows:
The defense in subsection (b), now before us, is limited to a price reduction made to meet in good faith an equally low price of a competitor. It thus eliminates certain difficulties which arose under the original Clayton Act. For example, it omits reference to discriminations in price "in [340 U.S. 231, 242] the same or different communities . . ." and it thus restricts the proviso to price differential occurring in actual competition. It also excludes reductions which undercut the "lower price" of a competitor. None of these changes, however, cut into the actual core of the defense. That still consists of the provision that wherever a lawful lower price of a competitor threatens to deprive a seller of a customer, the seller, to retain that customer, may in good faith meet that lower price. Actual competition, at least in this elemental form, is thus preserved.
Subsections 2 (a) and (b), as amended, are as follows:
In the Corn Products case, supra, after recognizing that the seller had allowed differentials in price in favor of certain customers, this Court examined the evidence presented by the seller to show that such differentials were [340 U.S. 231, 244] justified because made in good faith to meet equally low prices of a competitor. It then said:
In addition, there has been widespread understanding that, under the Robinson-Patman Act, it is a complete defense to a charge of price discrimination for the seller to show that its price differential has been made in good faith to meet a lawful and equally low price of a competitor. This understanding is reflected in actions and statements of members and counsel of the Federal Trade Commission. 12 Representatives of the Department of [340 U.S. 231, 247] Justice have testified to the effectiveness and value of the defense under the Robinson-Patman Act. 13 We see no reason to depart now from that interpretation. 14 [340 U.S. 231, 248]
The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition. In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act, [340 U.S. 231, 249] "Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent." Staley Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 135 F.2d 453, 455. We need not now reconcile, in its entirely, the economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Patman Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 15 It is enough to say that Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act either to abolish competition or so radically to curtail it that a seller would have no substantial right of self-defense against a price raid by a competitor. For example, if a large customer requests his seller to meet a temptingly lower price offered to him by one of his seller's competitors, the seller may well find it essential, as a matter of business survival, to meet that price rather than to lose the customer. It might be that this customer is the seller's only available market for the major portion of the seller's product, and that the loss of this customer would result in forcing a much higher unit cost and higher sales price upon the seller's other customers. [340 U.S. 231, 250] There is nothing to show a congressional purpose, in such a situation, to compel the seller to choose only between ruinously cutting its prices to all its customers to match the price offered to one, or refusing to meet the competition and then ruinously raising its prices to its remaining customers to cover increased unit costs. There is, on the other hand, plain language and established practice which permits a seller, through 2 (b), to retain a customer by realistically meeting in good faith the price offered to that customer, without necessarily changing the seller's price to its other customers.
In a case where a seller sustains the burden of proof placed upon it to establish its defense under 2 (b), we find no reason to destroy that defense indirectly, merely because it also appears that the beneficiaries of the seller's price reductions may derive a competitive advantage from them or may, in a natural course of events, reduce their own resale prices to their customers. It must have been obvious to Congress that any price reduction to any dealer may always affect competition at that dealer's level as well as at the dealer's resale level, whether or not the reduction to the dealer is discriminatory. Likewise, it must have been obvious to Congress that any price reductions initiated by a seller's competitor would, if not met by the seller, affect competition at the beneficiary's level or among the beneficiary's customers just as much as if those reductions had been met by the seller. The proviso in 2 (b), as interpreted by the Commission, would not be available when there was or might be an injury to competition at a resale level. So interpreted, the proviso would have such little, if any, applicability as to be practically meaningless. We may, therefore, conclude that Congress meant to permit the natural consequences to follow the seller's action in meeting in good faith a lawful and equally low price of its competitor.
In its argument here, the Commission suggests that there may be some situations in which it might recognize [340 U.S. 231, 251] the proviso in 2 (b) as a complete defense, even though the seller's differential in price did injure competition. In support of this, the Commission indicates that in each case it must weigh the potentially injurious effect of a seller's price reduction upon competition at all lower levels against its beneficial effect in permitting the seller to meet competition at its own level. In the absence of more explicit requirements and more specific standards of comparison than we have here, it is difficult to see how an injury to competition at a level below that of the seller can thus be balanced fairly against a justification for meeting the competition at the seller's level. We hesitate to accept 2 (b) as establishing such a dubious defense. On the other hand, the proviso is readily understandable as simply continuing in effect a defense which is equally absolute, but more limited in scope than that which existed under 2 of the original Clayton Act.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the Federal Trade Commission to make findings in conformity with this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] The company contended before the Commission that the price differential allowed by it to the jobbers made only due allowance for differences in the cost of sale and delivery of gasoline to them. It did not, however, pursue this defense in the court below and does not do so here.
[ Footnote 3 ] About 150 of these stations are owned or leased by the customers independently of petitioner. Their operators buy all of their gasoline from petitioner under short-term agreements. The other 208 stations are leased or subleased from petitioner for short terms.
[ Footnote 4 ] Not denying the established industry practice of recognizing such dealers as a distinctive group for operational convenience, the Commission held that petitioner's classification of these four dealers as "jobbers" was arbitrary because it made "no requirement that said jobbers should sell only at wholesale." 41 F. T. C. at 273. We use the term "jobber" in this opinion merely as one of convenience and identification, because the result here is the same whether these four dealers are wholesalers or retailers.
[ Footnote 5 ] Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, relates only to persons "engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce . . . where either or any of the purchases involved . . . are in commerce . . . ." 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. 13 (a). "Commerce" is defined in 1 of the Clayton Act as including "trade or commerce among the several States . . . ." 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C. 12.
[ Footnote 6 ] The Fair Labor Standards Act cases relied on by petitioner are not inconsistent with this result. They hold that, for the purposes of that statute, interstate commerce ceased on delivery to a local distributor. Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., 317 U.S. 572 ; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra. The sales involved here, on the other hand, are those of an interstate producer and refiner to a local distributor.
[ Footnote 7 ] The trial examiner concluded:
[ Footnote 8 ] "Now as to the contention that the discriminatory prices here complained of were made in good faith to meet a lower price of a competitor. While the Commission made no finding on this point, [340 U.S. 231, 240] it assumed its existence but held, contrary to the petitioner's contention, that this was not a defense.
[ Footnote 9 ] In contrast to that factual situation, the trial examiner for the Commission in the instant case has found the necessary facts to sustain the seller's defense (see note 7, supra), and yet the Commission refuses, as a matter of law, to give them consideration.
[ Footnote 10 ] In the Corn Products case, the same point of view was expressed by the Court of Appeals below: "We think the evidence is insufficient to sustain this affirmative defence." 144 F.2d 211, 217 (C. A. 7th Cir.). The Court of Appeals also indicated that, to sustain this defense, it must appear not only that the competitor's lower price was met in good faith but that such price was lawful.
[ Footnote 11 ] The Staley case was twice before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In 1943 the case was remanded by that court to the Commission for findings as to wherein the discriminations occurred and how they substantially lessened competition and promoted monopoly and also "for consideration of the defense [under 2 (b)] urged by the petitioners, and for findings in relation thereto." 135 F.2d 453, 456. In 1944, a majority of the court decided in favor of the seller. 144 F.2d 221. One judge held that the complaint [340 U.S. 231, 254] was insufficient under 2 (a) and that, therefore, he need not reach the seller's defense under 2 (b). He expressly stated, however, that he did not take issue with the basis for the conclusion that the seller's price was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. Id., at 227-231. His colleague held squarely that the seller's defense of meeting competition in good faith under 2 (b) had been established. Id., at 221-225. The third judge found against the seller both under 2 (a) and (b). Id., at 225-227. The important point for us is that the Court of Appeals, as well as this Court, unanimously recognized in that case the materiality of the seller's evidence in support of its defense under 2 (b), even though the "discriminations `have resulted, and do result, in substantial injury to competition among purchasers . . . .'" Id., at 222.
[ Footnote 12 ] In cease and desist orders, issued both before and after the order in the instant case, the Commission has inserted saving clauses which recognize the propriety of a seller making a price reduction in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, even though the seller's discrimination may have the effect of injuring competition at a lower level. See In re Ferro Enamel Corp., 42 F. T. C. 36; In re Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 31 F. T. C. 986; In re Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 28 F. T. C. 186.
See also, the statement filed by Walter B. Wooden, Assistant Chief [340 U.S. 231, 247] Counsel, and by Hugh E. White, Examiner for the Commission, with the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1941:
[ Footnote 13 ] Herbert A. Bergson, then Assistant Attorney General, testifying for the Department, January 25, 1949, said: "The section [2 (b)] presently permits sellers to justify otherwise forbidden price discriminations on the ground that the lower prices to one set of buyers were made in good faith to meet the equally low prices of a competitor." Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 236, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 77. See also, report on S. 236 by Peyton Ford, The Assistant to the Attorney General, to the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Id., at 320. Mr. Bergson added the following in June, 1949: "While we recognize the competitive problem which arises when one purchaser obtains advantages denied to other purchasers, we do not believe the solution to this problem lies in denying to sellers the opportunity to make sales in good faith competition with other sellers." Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1008, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 12.
[ Footnote 14 ] Attention has been directed again to the legislative history of the proviso. This was considered in the Corn Products and Staley [340 U.S. 231, 248] cases. See especially, 324 U.S. at 752-753. We find that the legislative history, at best, is inconclusive. It indicates that it was the purpose of Congress to limit, but not to abolish, the essence of the defense recognized as absolute in 2 of the original Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, where a seller's reduction in price had been made "in good faith to meet competition . . . ." For example, the legislative history recognizes that the Robinson-Patman Act limits that defense to price differentials that do not undercut the competitor's price, and the amendments fail to protect differentials between prices in different communities where those prices are not actually competitive. There is also a suggestion in the debates, as well as in the remarks of this Court in the Staley case, supra, that a competitor's lower price, which may be met by a seller under the protection of 2 (b), must be a lawful price. And see, S. Res. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., directing the Federal Trade Commission to investigate and report to it on chain-store operators and F. T. C. Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
In the report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, which drafted the clause which became 2 (b), there appears the following explanation of it:
Somewhat changing this emphasis, there was a statement made by the managers on the part of the House of Representatives, accompanying the conference report, which said that the new clause was a "provision relating to the question of meeting competition, intended to operate only as a rule of evidence in a proceeding before the [340 U.S. 231, 249] Federal Trade Commission . . ." H. R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7. The Chairman of the House Conferees also received permission to print in the Record an explanation of the proviso. 80 Cong. Rec. 9418. This explanation emphasizes the same interpretation as that put on the proviso in the Staley case to the effect that the lower price which lawfully may be met by a seller must be a lawful price. That statement, however, neither justifies disregarding the proviso nor failing to make findings of fact where evidence is offered that the prices met by the seller are lawful prices and that the meeting of them is in good faith.
[ Footnote 15 ] It has been suggested that, in theory, the Robinson-Patman Act as a whole is inconsistent with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289, 1327-1350; Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 301; Learned & Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 Harv. Bus. Rev. 137; McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 273.
MR. JUSTICE REED, dissenting. *
The Federal Trade Commission investigated practices of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana in selling its gasoline in the Detroit area at different prices to competing local distributors, in alleged violation of the Robinson-Patman (anti-price discrimination) Act. Standard's defense is not a denial of that discriminatory practice but a complete justification, said to be allowed by the [340 U.S. 231, 252] Robinson-Patman Act, on the ground of trade necessity in order to meet an equally low price in Detroit of other gasoline refiners. On concluding that the practice violated federal prohibitions against discriminatory sale prices, the Commission entered a cease and desist order against Standard's sale system. The order was enforced by the Court of Appeals after a minor modification. 43 F. T. C. 56; 173 F.2d 210.
The need to allow sellers to meet competition in price from other sellers while protecting the competitors of the buyers against the buyers' advantages gained from the price discrimination was a major cause of the enactment of the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act. The Clayton Act of 1914 had failed to solve the problem. The impossibility of drafting fixed words of a statute so as to allow sufficient flexibility to meet the myriad situations of national commerce, we think led Congress in the Robinson-Patman Act to put authority in the Federal Trade Commission to determine when a seller's discriminatory sales price violated the prohibitions of the anti-monopoly statute, 2 (a), 49 Stat. 1526, and when it was justified by a competitor's legal price. 1 The disadvantage to business of this choice was that the seller could not be positive before the Commission acted as to precisely how far he might go in price discrimination to meet and beat his competition. The Commission acted on its interpretation of the Act. 2 Believing it important to support the purpose of Congress and the Commission's interpretation of the Act, with which we agree, we state our reasons. [340 U.S. 231, 253]
The Court first condemns the Commission's position that meeting in good faith a competitor's price merely rebuts the prima facie establishment of discrimination based on forbidden differences in sales price, so as to require an affirmative finding by the Commission that nevertheless there may be enjoinable injury under the Robinson-Patman Act to the favored buyer's competitors. The Court then decides that good faith in meeting competition was an absolute defense for price discrimination, saying:
The public policy of the United States fosters the free-enterprise system of unfettered competition among producers and distributors of goods as the accepted method to put those goods into the hands of all consumers at the least expense. 3 There are, however, statutory exceptions to such unlimited competition. 4 Nondiscriminatory [340 U.S. 231, 254] pricing tends to weaken competition in that a seller, while otherwise maintaining his prices, cannot meet his antagonist's price to get a single order or customer. But Congress obviously concluded that the greater advantage would accrue by fostering equal access to supplies by competing merchants or other purchasers in the course of business. 5
The first enactment to put limits on discriminatory selling prices was the Clayton Act in 1914, 38 Stat. 730, 2. Section 11 enabled the Commission to use its investigatory and regulatory authority to handle price discrimination. Section 2 provided for the maintenance of competition by protecting the ability of business rivals to obtain commodities on equal terms. The Robinson-Patman Act moved further toward this objective. In the margin appear the applicable words of the Clayton Act followed by those of the Robinson-Patman Act. Phrased summarily for this case, it may be said that the italicized words in the Clayton Act were the source of the difficulties in enforcement that Congress undertook to avoid by the italicized words of the Robinson-Patman Act. 6 [340 U.S. 231, 255]
It will be noted that unless the effect is given the Robinson-Patman amendment contended for by the Federal Trade Commission, there is little done to overcome the difficulties arising from the "meeting competition" clause of the Clayton Act. Formerly "discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good faith to meet competition" was allowed as a complete defense. Now it is "made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor." The Court says:
Legislative History. Upon the interpretation of the words and purpose of this last addition by the Robinson-Patman Act to curbs on discrimination in trade, the narrow statutory issues in this case turn. Though narrow, they are important if trade is to have the benefit of careful investigation before regulation, attainable under the Federal Trade Commission Act but so difficult when attempted by prosecutions in courts with the limitations of judicial procedure. As an aid to the interpretation of 2 (b), we set out applicable parts of its legislative history.
The Clayton Act created a broad exception from control for prices made in good faith to meet competition. This raised problems of which Congress was aware. In reporting on a redrafted version of S. 3154, the Senate's companion bill to the House bill that became the Robinson-Patman Act, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, February 3, 1936, pointed out the weakness of 2 of the Clayton Act in permitting discrimination to meet competition, and suggested a harsh remedy, the elimination of its italicized proviso in note 6, supra, without the mollifying words of 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 7 In [340 U.S. 231, 257] March, the House Committee on the Judiciary made its report on the bill that became the Act. Section 2 (b) was then in substantially its present form. The report pointed out the draftsmen's purpose to strengthen the laws against price discrimination, directly or indirectly through brokerage or other allowances, services or absorptions of costs. 8 It commented that the subsection that became 2 (b) let a seller "meet the price actually previously [340 U.S. 231, 258] offered by a local competitor." 9 The language used in regard to competition in the bills and in the Act seems to have been based on a recommendation of the Federal Trade Commission. 10 The Commission had been [340 U.S. 231, 259] unable to restore the desired competition under the Clayton Act, and Congress evidently sought to open the way for effective action. 11
Events in the course of the proposed legislation in the Senate and House have pertinence. The Senate inserted the original ineffective language of the Clayton Act in its exact form in the Senate bill. In the same draft it adopted an amendment similar to the proviso ultimately enacted. 80 Cong. Rec. 6426, 6435. In the House, Representative Patman explained his view of the dangers in the original proviso. 12 It was taken out in Conference. 13 [340 U.S. 231, 260] The Chairman of the House managers, Mr. Utterback, before the Conference Report was agreed to by the House, received permission to print an explanation [340 U.S. 231, 261] of his understanding of the proviso. He explained that the proviso "does not set up the meeting of competition as an absolute bar to a charge of discrimination under the bill. It merely permits it to be shown in evidence. . . . It leaves it a question of fact to be determined in each case, whether the competition to be met was such as to justify the discrimination given, . . . ." The pertinent parts of the statement appear in the margin. 14
Statutory Interpretation. This resume of the origin and purpose of the original 2 of the Clayton Act and [340 U.S. 231, 262] the amendments of the Robinson-Patman Act gives a basis for determining the effect of this section in a hearing before the Commission where the charge, as here, that a seller during the same period of time has sold the same commodities to various purchasers at different prices, is admitted, and the defense, the elements of which are likewise admitted, is that the discrimination was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. Does meeting in good faith a competitor's price constitute a complete defense under the proviso to 2 (b)? Or does the fact of good faith reduction in price to a purchaser to meet a competitor's price merely rebut the prima facie establishment of discrimination, arising under the statute from proof of forbidden differences in price, 15 so as to require under 2 (a) affirmative finding by the Commission [340 U.S. 231, 263] that there may be injury to competition? Petitioner asserts that good faith meeting of a competitor's price is a complete defense. The Commission and the Court of Appeals take the opposite position, with which we concur.
This is our reason. The statutory development and the information before Congress concerning the need for strengthening the competitive price provision of the Clayton Act, make clear that the evil dealt with by the proviso of 2 (b) was the easy avoidance of the prohibition against price discrimination. The control of that evil was an important objective of the Robinson-Patman Act. The debates, the Commission's report and recommendation, and statutory changes show this. The Conference Report and the explanation by one of the managers, Mr. Utterback, are quite definitive upon the point. Because of experience under the Clayton Act, Congress refused to continue its competitive price proviso. Yet adoption of petitioner's position would permit a seller of nationally distributed goods to discriminate in favor of large chain retailers, for the seller could give to the large retailer a price lower than that charged to small retailers, and could then completely justify its discrimination by showing that the large retailer had first obtained the same low price from a local low-cost producer of competitive goods. This is the very type of competition that Congress sought to remedy. To permit this would not seem consonant with the other provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, strengthening regulatory powers of the Commission in "quantity" sales, special allowances and changing economic conditions.
The structure and wording of the Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act also conduce to our conclusion. In the original Clayton Act, 2 was not divided into subsections. In that statute, 2 stated the body of the substantive offense, and then listed, in a series of provisos, various circumstances under which discriminations [340 U.S. 231, 264] in price were permissible. Thus the statute provided that discriminations were not illegal if made on account of differences in the grade of the commodity sold, or differences in selling or transportation costs. Listed among these absolute justifications of the Clayton Act appeared the provision that "nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination in price . . . made in good faith to meet competition." The Robinson-Patman Act, however, made two changes in respect of the "meeting competition" provision, one as to its location, the other in the phrasing. Unlike the original statute, 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act is divided into two subsections. The first, 2 (a), retained the statement of substantive offense and the series of provisos treated by the Commission as affording full justifications for price discriminations; 2 (b) was created to deal with procedural problems in Federal Trade Commission proceedings, specifically to treat the question of burden of proof. In the process of this division, the "meeting competition" provision was separated from the other provisos, set off from the substantive provisions of 2 (a), and relegated to the position of a proviso to the procedural subsection, 2 (b). Unless it is believed that this change of position was fortuitous, it can be inferred that Congress meant to curtail the defense of meeting competition when it banished this proviso from the substantive division to the procedural. In the same way, the language changes made by 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act reflect an intent to diminish the effectiveness of the sweeping defense offered by the Clayton Act's "meeting of competition" proviso. The original provisos in the Clayton Act, and the provisos now appearing in 2 (a), are worded to make it clear that nothing shall prevent certain price practices, such as price "differentials [making] . . . due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture . . .," or "price changes . . . in response to changing [340 U.S. 231, 265] conditions affecting the market for . . . the goods concerned . . . ." But in contrast to these provisions, the proviso to 2 (b) does not provide that nothing "shall prevent" a certain price practice; it provides only that "nothing . . . shall prevent a seller rebutting [a] prima-facie case . . . by showing" a certain price practice - meeting a competitive price. The language thus shifts the focus of the proviso from a matter of substantive defense to a matter of proof. Consistent with each other, these modifications made by the Robinson-Patman Act are also consistent with the intent of Congress expressed in the legislative history.
The Court suggests that former Federal Trade Commission cases decided here have treated the "meeting competition" clause of the Robinson-Patman Act as being an absolute defense, not merely a rebuttal of the discrimination charge requiring further finding by the Commission. Reference is made to Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 324 U.S. 726 , and Federal Trade Comm'n v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 . In the Corn Products case, dealing with a basing point scheme for delivered prices, this Court merely said at p. 741:
That citation included these words at pp. 752-753:
There are arguments available to support the contrary position. No definite statement appears in the committee reports that "meeting competition" is henceforth to be only a rebuttal of a prima facie case and not a full justification for discrimination in price. The proviso of 2 (b) can be read as having the same substantive effect as the provisos of 2 (a). The earlier provisos are treated by the Commission as complete defenses. Perhaps there is an implication favorable to the petitioner's position in Representative Patman's omission to state the Federal Trade Commission interpretation on the floor. See n. 12, supra. [340 U.S. 231, 267]
The underlying congressional purpose to curtail methods of avoiding limitations on price discriminations, however, considered with the more specific matters discussed herein, satisfies us that we should adopt the conclusion of the Commission and the Court of Appeals. 17 We believe that good faith meeting of a competitor's price only rebuts the prima facie case of violation established by showing the price discrimination. Whether the proven price discrimination is of a character that violates 2 (a) then becomes a matter for the determination of the Commission on a showing that there may be injury to competition.
Conclusion. In view of the Court's ruling, we will not enlarge this dissent by discussing other problems raised by the case. We have said enough to show that we would affirm the decree below in principle, even though we should conclude some amendment might be required in the wording of the order.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACK join in this dissent.
[ Footnote * ] [Joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACK. See post, p. 267.]
[ Footnote 1 ] The difficulties of any other approach are illustrated by the attempt of Congress to clarify the Robinson-Patman Act. See President's veto message on S. 1008, 96 Cong. Rec. 8721, and conference reports, H. R. Rep. No. 1422, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., October 13, 1949, and 2d Sess., H. R. Rep. No. 1730, March 3, 1950.
[ Footnote 2 ] Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1008, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., June 8 and 14, 1949, p. 61.
[ Footnote 3 ] Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13 ; United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309 .
[ Footnote 4 ] E. g., Interstate Commerce Act, 5, 49 U.S.C. 5; Communications Act of 1934, 221, 47 U.S.C. 221; Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. And see Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1265.
[ Footnote 5 ] For a discussion of the merits of the legislation, see Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1289.
[ Footnote 6 ] Clayton Act:
[ Footnote 7 ] S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4:
[ Footnote 8 ] H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3:
[ Footnote 9 ] Id., p. 16:
[ Footnote 10 ] Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 96: "A simple solution for the uncertainties and difficulties of enforcement would be to prohibit unfair and unjust discrimination in price and leave it to the enforcement agency, subject to review by the courts, to apply that principle to particular cases and situations. The soundness of and extent to which the present provisos would constitute valid defenses would thus become a judicial and not a legislative matter.
[ Footnote 11 ] Id., p. 64: "If the discrimination is `on account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold', or makes `only due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportation', or is `made in good faith to meet competition', it is not unlawful, even though the effect `may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.' Discriminatory price concessions given to prevent the loss of a chain store's business to a competing manufacturer, to prevent it manufacturing its own goods, or to prevent it from discouraging in its stores the sale of a given manufacturer's goods, may be strongly urged by the manufacturer as `made in good faith to meet competition.'" See p. 90, id.,
Attention was called to this need. H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7: "Some of the difficulties of enforcement of this section as it stands are pointed out in the [Final Report] of the Federal Trade Commission above referred to, at pages 63 and following."
[ Footnote 12 ] 80 Cong. Rec. 8235:
[ Footnote 13 ] H. R. Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7:
[ Footnote 14 ] 80 Cong. Rec. 9418:
[ Footnote 15 ] See n. 6, supra.
[ Footnote 16 ] The Court's opinion in this case refers, p. 244, notes 10 and 11, to the opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Corn Products and Staley, 144 F.2d 211 and 221. But that court reversed its position in the opinion below, 173 F.2d 210, 216. It is fair to assume that reversal was because of our opinions in Corn Products and Staley.
[ Footnote 17 ] It is hardly necessary to note that the wisdom of the enactment is not for the Commission nor the courts in enforcing the Act. The Commission recently has advised Congress that while "on balance it would be preferable to make the good-faith meeting of competition a complete defense," it "does not strongly urge either view upon the Congress." Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1008, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., June 8 and 14, 1949, p. 61. Compare Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 311 . This statement confirmed the Commission's position taken in this case. There were other officials of the Commission who have taken the view adopted by the Court. [340 U.S. 231, 268]
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Citation: 340 U.S. 231
Docket No: No. 2287
Argued: October 09, 1950
Decided: January 08, 1951
Court: United States Supreme Court
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Automatic Time Tracking for WeChat…
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Vickyna Magenta
Vickyna Magenta
Look summer-ready in our Vickyna Magenta sandals! Available in different tones of pink, these comfy shoes are the perfect blend of cute and bold. They'll make any outfit pop!
Sandal in pink leather. 🙌🏻 Handcrafted in Argentina 🇦🇷
✿ 1/3 inch heel
✿ Mary Jane style
✿ Almond point shape
🙋🏻 If you can not find its size, we can tailor it (US 4-12, EUR 34-43). Tailoring time may take between 3 to 5 weeks. We work in full size.
* Please note that all pictures shown are for illustrative purposes; colors may differ depending on which device it is viewed on.
✿ Leather upper
✿ Leather insole
✿ Leather sole
Size Chart
Size Chart
✿ Flat and Heels
EU 35 (inner sole) 22,8 cm / 9 in
EU 36 (inner sole) 23,5 cm / 9 1/4 in
EU 37 (inner sole) 24,1 cm / 9 1/2 in
EU 38 (inner sole) 24,8 cm / 9 3/4 in
EU 39 (inner sole) 25,4 cm / 10 in
EU 40 (inner sole) 26 cm / 10 1/4 in
EU 41 (inner sole) 26,7 cm / 10 1/2 in
EU 42 (inner sole) 27,3 cm / 10 3/4 in
EU 43 (inner sole) 28 cm / 10 3/4 in
Shipping & Returns
Shipping & Returns
We ship from our studio in Buenos Aires, Argentina or San Diego, CA, USA.
📦 ✈ Free shipping to AU, CA, FR, US and UK on orders over $ 200.- dollars. (For the rest of the world shipping rates are calculated at checkout).
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Contact us within: 7 days of delivery.
Ship items back within: 20 days of delivery
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But please contact us if you have any problems with your order.
The following items can't be returned or exchanged
- Custom or personalized orders
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Conditions of return
Buyers are responsible for return shipping costs. If the item is not returned in its original condition, the buyer is responsible for any loss in value.
Care Instructions
Care Instructions
In order for your shoes to have a long and happy life, we recommend you:
✿ Suede shoes, before first wear we recommend to apply a waterproofing suede spray to protect from stains and water.
♡ To clean them: use a rub or brush the surface of the shoe with a thin cloth towel or a suede brush, use a suede rubber or pencil eraser to remove any obvious spots or scuffs, or apply suede cleaner and follow the instructions.
✿ Leather shoes, before first use: we recommend to apply neutral conditioning cream without color, to protect and nourish the leather
♡ To clean them: use a soft cleaning cloth that's made with microfibre material and horsehair shoe brushes make the most effective cleaning, you also can apply leather cleaner and follow the instructions.
✿ Metallic color leather, patent leather, foil suede calf and fabric, those materials are more delicate and need maintenance to keep it in optimum condition. Loose dirt may be removed with a soft damp, lint free cloth. We also recommend using a suitable fabric protector spray for fabric uppers. Eventually the metallic colors and patent loose its glossy finish with the use.
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✿ After each use, brush gently with a brush to remove dust and store them in their respective bag / box to avoid contact with the sun or moisture.
✿ Avoid contact with liquids and inclement weather.


text:
Company Provides High-Speed, Cost-Effective Alternative to Both Slower Consumer-Grade and More Expensive Business Solutions
PLEASANTON, Calif., Oct. 3, 2012 /PRNewswire/ — MegaPath, one of the leading providers of managed data, voice, security and hosted IT services in North America, today announced that the company has completed its aggressive nationwide Ethernet over Copper (EoC) network expansion, further solidifying its position as the largest EoC provider in the United States. The service is now available in the top 50 national markets.
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MegaPath operates one of the largest end-to-end communications networks in the country, providing both commercial and wholesale services. The company provides a full range of data, voice, security and hosted IT services for small, medium and enterprise businesses nationwide, as well as wholesale solutions to the carrier and service-provider markets through one of the largest end-to-end networks in the country. MegaPath helps businesses easily and securely communicate between their headquarters, employees and business partners to lower costs, increase security and enhance employee productivity. To learn more about MegaPath's managed IP data, voice, security and hosted IT services, please visit www.megapath.com.
Media Contact:
Tony Welz
Welz & Weisel Communications
SOURCE MegaPath
PR Archives: Latest, By Company, By Date


text:
In the foreword to the gorgeous new book Start Me Up!: New Branding for Businesses, from Gestalten, designer Anna Sinofzika mentions of the idea of a "curator-consumer." You're likely familiar with this type of shopper (heck, in some form or another you probably are one): A curator-consumer is someone who prefers Marvis toothpaste over Crest, Mast Brothers chocolate to Hershey's, and Mrs. Meyers to Dawn.
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Privacy Policy
Respecting your privacy
We respect your personal information, and this Privacy Policy explains how we handle it. The policy covers Welcome Home Mortgages.
This Policy also includes our credit reporting policy, that is, it covers additional information on how we manage your personal information collected in connection with a credit application, or a credit facility. We refer to this credit-related information below as credit information.
If you are in a country that is a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), the EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 ('GDPR') governs the way we collect, use, hold, process and disclose your personal information. Under the GDPR, we are a data controller. We make decisions on how and why your personal information is processed.
What personal information do we collect and hold?
General information
The types of information that we collect and hold about you could include:
- ID information such as your name, postal or email address, telephone numbers, and date of birth;
- other contact details such as social media handles;
- financial details such as your tax file number; and
- other information we think is necessary.
When the law authorises or requires us to collect information
We may collect information about you because we are required or authorised by law to collect it. There are laws which require us to collect personal information. For example, we require personal information to verify your identity under Australian Anti-Money Laundering law.
What do we collect via your website activity?
If you're an internet customer of ours, we monitor your use of internet services to ensure we can verify you and can receive information from us, and to identify ways we can improve our services for you.
If you start but don't submit an on-line application, we can contact you using any of the contact details you've supplied to offer help completing it. The information in applications will be kept temporarily then destroyed if the application is not completed.
We also know that some customers like to engage with us through social media channels. We may collect information about you when you interact with us through these channels. However, for all confidential matters, we'll ensure we interact with you via a secure forum.
To improve our services and products, we sometimes collect de-identified information from web users. That information could include IP addresses or geographical information to ensure your use of our web applications is secure.
How do we collect your personal information?
How we collect and hold your information
Unless it's unreasonable or impracticable, we will try to collect personal information directly from you (referred to as 'solicited information'). For this reason, it's important that you help us to do this and keep your contact details up-to-date.
There are a number of ways in which we may seek information from you. We might collect your information when you fill out a form with us, when you've given us a call or used our website. We also find using electronic means, such as email or SMS, a convenient way to communicate with you and to verify your details.
However we'll never ask you for your security details in this way – if you are ever unsure, just contact us.
How we collect your information from other sources
Sometimes, we will collect information about you from other sources as the Privacy Act 1988 permits. We will do this only if it's reasonably necessary to do so, for example, where:
- we collect information from third parties about the loan or lease made available to you arising out of the services we provide you;
- we can't get hold of you and we rely on public information (for example, from public registers or social media) or made available by third parties) to update your contact details; or
- we exchange information with your legal or financial advisers or other representatives.
What if you don't want to provide us with your personal information?
If you don't provide your information to us, it may not be possible:
- for us to give you the credit assistance you seek from us;
- to assist in finding a loan or lease relevant to your circumstances;
- verify your identity or protect against fraud; or
- to let you know about other products or services that might be suitable for your financial needs.
How we collect and hold your credit information
We will collect your credit information in the course of you answering the enquiries we make of you relating to the credit assistance you seek from us. In addition to what we say above about collecting information from other sources, other main sources for collecting credit information are:
- your co-loan applicants or co-borrowers;
- your guarantors/proposed guarantors;
- your employer, accountant, real estate agent or other referees;
- your agents and other representatives like the person who referred your business to us, your solicitors, conveyancers and settlement agents;
- organisations that help us to process credit applications;
- organisations that check the security you are offering such as valuers;
- bodies that issue identification documents to help us check your identity; and
- our service providers involved in helping us to process any application you make for credit through us.
What do we do when we get information we didn't ask for?
Sometimes, people share information with us we haven't sought out (referred to as 'unsolicited information'). Where we receive unsolicited personal information about you, we will check whether that information is reasonably necessary for our functions or activities. If it is, we'll handle this information the same way we do with other information we seek from you. If not, we'll ensure we do the right thing and destroy or de-identify it.
When will we notify you that we have received your information?
When we receive personal information from you directly, we'll take reasonable steps to notify you how and why we collected your information, who we may disclose it to and outline how you can access it, seek correction of it or make a complaint.
Sometimes we collect your personal information from third parties. You may not be aware that we have done so. If we collect information that can be used to identify you, we will take reasonable steps to notify you of that collection.
How do we take care of your personal information?
We store information in different ways, including in paper and electronic form. The security of your personal information is important to us and we take reasonable steps to protect it from misuse, interference and loss, and from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure. Some of the ways we do this are:
- document storage security policies;
- security measures for access to our systems; and
- only giving access to personal information to a person who is verified to be able to receive that information
We may store personal information physically or electronically with third party data storage providers. Where we do this, we use contractual arrangements to ensure those providers take appropriate measures to protect that information and restrict the uses to which they can put that information.
What happens when we no longer need your information?
We'll only keep your information for as long as we require it for our purposes. We may be required to keep some of your information for certain periods of time under law. When we no longer require your information, we'll ensure that your information is destroyed or de-identified.
How we use your personal information
What are the main reasons we collect, hold and use your information?
Collecting your personal information allows us to provide you with the products and services you've asked for. This means we can use your information to:
- give you credit assistance;
- give you information about loan products or related services including help, guidance and advice;
- consider whether you are eligible for a loan or lease or any related service you requested including identifying or verifying you or your authority to act on behalf of a customer;
- assist you to prepare an application for a lease or a loan;
- administer services we provide, for example, to answer requests or deal with complaints; and
- administer payments we receive, or any payments we make, relating to your loan or lease.
Can we use your information for marketing our products and services?
We may use or disclose your personal information to let you know about other products or services we or a third party make available and that may be of interest to you.
We will always let you know that you can opt out from receiving marketing offers.
With your consent, we may disclose your personal information to third parties for the purpose of connecting you with other businesses or customers. You can ask us not to do this at any time. We won't sell your personal information to any organisation.
Yes, You Can Opt-Out
You can let us know at any time if you no longer wish to receive direct marketing offers from us. We will process your request as soon as practicable.
What are the other ways we use your information?
We've just told you some of the main reasons why we collect your information, so here's some more insight into the ways we use your personal information including:
- telling you about other products or services we make available and that may be of interest to you, unless you tell us not to;
- identifying opportunities to improve our service to you and improving our service to you;
- allowing us to run our business efficiently and perform general administrative tasks;
- preventing any fraud or crime or any suspected fraud or crime;
- as required by law, regulation or codes binding us; and
- any purpose to which you have consented.
What are the grounds which we will deal with your personal information under the GDPR?
Under the GDPR, we must have a legal ground in order to process your personal information. The legal grounds that we may rely on are:
- Performance of our contract with you;
- Compliance with a legal obligation;
- Where you have provided your consent; and
- For our legitimate interests: our main legitimate interests for processing your personal information are: fraud, security, due diligence, business operations and direct marketing.
How long do you keep your information?
We required to keep some of your information for certain periods of time under law, such as the Corporations Act, the Anti-Money Laundering & Counter-Terrorism Financing Act, and the Financial Transaction Reports Act for example.
We are required to keep your information for 7 years from the closure of accounts, or otherwise as required for our business operations or by applicable laws.
We may need to retain certain personal information after we cease providing you with products or services to enforce our terms, for fraud prevention, to identify, issue or resolve legal claims and/or for proper record keeping.
Who do we share your personal information with?
To make sure we can meet your specific needs and for the purposes described in 'How we use your personal information', we sometimes need to share your personal information with others. We may share your information with other organisations for any purposes for which we use your information.
Sharing Your Information
We may use and share your information with other organisations for any purpose described above.
Sharing with your representatives and referees
We may share your information with:
- your representative or any person acting on your behalf (for example, lawyers, settlement agents, accountants or real estate agents); and
- your referees, like your employer, to confirm details about you.
Sharing with third parties
We may share your information with third parties in relation to services we provide to you. Those third parties may include:
- the mortgage aggregator through whom we may submit loan or lease applications to lenders or lessors on the mortgage aggregator's panel;
- the Australian Credit Licence holder that authorises us to engage in credit activities;
- referrers that referred your business to us;
- valuers;
- lenders, lessors, lender's mortgage insurers and other loan or lease intermediaries;
- organisations, like fraud reporting agencies, that may identify, investigate and/or prevent fraud, suspected fraud, crimes, suspected crimes, or other misconduct;
- government or regulatory bodies (including ASIC and the Australian Taxation Office) as required or authorised by law. In some instances, these bodies may share the information with relevant foreign authorities;
- guarantors and prospective guarantors of your loan or lease;
- service providers, agents, contractors and advisers that assist us to conduct our business for purposes including, without limitation, storing or analysing information;
- any organisation that wishes to take an interest in our business or assets; and
- any third party to which you consent to us sharing your information.
Sharing outside of Australia
We may use overseas organisations to help conduct our business. As a result, we may need to share some of your information (including credit information) with such organisations outside Australia. The countries in which those organisations are located are:
We may store your information in cloud or other types of networked or electronic storage. As electronic or networked storage can be accessed from various countries via an internet connection, it's not always practicable to know in which country your information may be held. If your information is stored in this way, disclosures may occur in countries other than those listed.
Overseas organisations may be required to disclose information we share with them under a foreign law. In those instances, we will not be responsible for that disclosure.
Where we transfer your information from the EEA' to a recipient outside the EEA we will ensure that an adequate level of protection is in place to protect your personal information such as putting in place contractual protections to ensure the security of your information.
How do you access your personal information?
How you can generally access your information
We'll always give you access to your personal information unless there are certain legal reasons why we can't. You can ask us in writing to access your personal information that we hold. In some cases we may be able to deal with your request over the phone.
We will give you access to your information in the form you want it where it's reasonable and practical. We may charge you a small fee to cover our costs when giving you access, but we'll always check with you first.
We're not always required to give you access to your personal information. Some of the situations where we don't have to give you access include when:
- we believe there is a threat to life or public safety;
- there is an unreasonable impact on other individuals;
- the request is frivolous;
- the information wouldn't be ordinarily accessible because of legal proceedings;
- it would prejudice negotiations with you;
- it would be unlawful;
- it would jeopardise taking action against serious misconduct by you;
- it would be likely to harm the activities of an enforcement body (e.g. the police); or
- it would harm the confidentiality of our commercial information.
If we can't provide your information in the way you've requested, we will tell you why in writing. If you have concerns, you can complain. See 'Contact Us'.
How do you correct your personal information?
How we correct your information
Contact us if you think there is something wrong with the information we hold about you and we'll try to correct it if it's:
- inaccurate;
- out of date;
- incomplete;
- irrelevant; or
- misleading.
If you are worried that we have given incorrect information to others, you can ask us to tell them about the correction. We'll try and help where we can – if we can't, then we'll let you know in writing.
What additional things do we have to do to correct your credit information?
If you ask us to correct credit information, we will help you with this in the following way.
Helping you manage corrections
Whether we made the mistake or someone else made it, we are required to help you ask for the information to be corrected. So we can do this, we might need to talk to others. However, the most efficient way for you to make a correction request is to send it to the organisation which made the mistake.
Where we correct information
If we're able to correct the information, we'll let you know within five business days of deciding to do this. We'll also let the relevant third parties know as well as any others you tell us about. If there are any instances where we can't do this, then we'll let you know in writing.
Where we can't correct information
If we're unable to correct your information, we'll explain why in writing within five business days of making this decision. If you have any concerns, you can access our external dispute resolution scheme or make a complaint to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.
Time frame for correcting information
If we agree to correct your information, we'll do so within 30 days from when you asked us, or a longer period that's been agreed by you.
If we can't make corrections within a 30 day time frame or the agreed time frame, we must:
- let you know about the delay, the reasons for it and when we expect to resolve the matter;
- ask you to agree in writing to give us more time; and
- let you know you can complain to our external dispute resolution scheme or the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.
How do you make a complaint?
How do you generally make a complaint?
If you have a complaint about how we handle your personal information, we want to hear from you. You are always welcome to contact us.
You can contact us by using the details below
Welcome Home Mortgages
(02) 9771-4892
PO Box 82, Revesby North NSW 2212
We are committed to resolving your complaint and doing the right thing by our customers. Most complaints are resolved quickly, and you should hear from us within five business days.
Need more help?
If you still feel your issue hasn't been resolved to your satisfaction, then you can raise your concern with the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner:
- Online: www.oaic.gov.au/privacy
- Phone: 1300 363 992
- Email: firstname.lastname@example.com
- Fax: +61 2 9284 9666
- Mail: GPO Box 5218 Sydney NSW 2001 or GPO Box 2999 Canberra ACT 2601
If you are located in the EEA, you can contact the relevant data protection authority (for example in the place you reside or where you believe we breached your rights). For example, the Office of the UK Information Commissioner:
Office of the UK Information Commissioner
• Online: www.ico.gov.uk
• Phone: 0303 123 1113
• Live chat: https://ico.org.uk/global/contact-us/live-chat
What additional things do we have to do to manage your complaints about credit information?
If your complaint relates to how we handled your access and correction requests
You may take your complaint directly to our external dispute resolution scheme or the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. You are not required to let us try to fix it first.
For all other complaints relating to credit information
If you make a complaint about things (other than an access request or correction request) in relation to your credit information, we will let you know how we will deal with it within seven days.
Ask for more time if we can't fix things in 30 days
If we can't fix things within 30 days, we'll let you know why and how long we think it will take. We will also ask you for an extension of time to fix the matter. If you have any concerns, you may complain to our external dispute resolution scheme or the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.
Letting you know about our decision
We'll let you know about our decision within 30 days or any longer agreed time frame. If you have any concerns, you may complain to our external dispute resolution scheme or the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.
Your Rights under GDPR
If you reside in the EEA, you can also:
- object to the processing or your personal information or ask us to delete, or restrict or stop using your personal information. There may be circumstances where we are required to, or entitled to retain or continue using your information.
- withdraw your consent to our processing of your information. We may continue to process our information if we have another legitimate ground to do so.
- ask us to send an electronic copy of your personal information, including to another organisation.
You can contact us if you wish to exercise these rights. See 'Contact Us' for more information If we refuse any request you make in relation to these right, we will write to you to explain why and how you can make a complaint about our decision.
Contact Us
We care about your privacy. Please contact us if you have any questions or comments about our privacy policies and procedures. We welcome your feedback.
You can contact us by using the details below:
Welcome Home Mortgages
(02) 8051 3097
Gateway Tower
Level 36, 1 Macquarie Place
Sydney NSW 2000
What if you want to interact with us anonymously or use a pseudonym?
If you have general enquiry type questions, you can choose to do this anonymously or use a pseudonym. We might not always be able to interact with you this way, however, as we are often governed by regulations that require us to know who we're dealing with. In general, we won't be able to deal with you anonymously or where you are using a pseudonym when:
- it is impracticable; or
- we are required or authorised by law or a court/tribunal order to deal with you personally.
What do we do with government-related identifiers?
In certain circumstances we may be required to collect government-related identifiers such as your tax file number. We will not use or disclose this information unless we are authorised by law.
Changes to this Privacy Policy
This Policy may change. We will let you know of any changes to this Policy by posting a notification on our website, correspondence via post or email or you may contact us for a copy of the most up to date policy at any time.


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The situation is roughly this : you have a server and many clients (let's say 10k clients per server just to be concrete). Data is mostly sent server->client , not very much is client->server. Let's say 10k bytes per second per channel from server->client, and only 1k bytes per second from client->server. So the total data rate from the server is high (100 MB/s) but the data rate on any one channel is low. The server must send packets more than once per second for latency reasons; let's say 10 times per second, so packets are only 1k on average; server sends 100k packets/second. You don't want the compressor to add any delay by buffering up packets.
I'm going to assume that you're using something like TCP so you have gauranteed packet order and no loss, so that you can use previous packets from any given channel as encoder history on that channel. If you do have an error in a connection you have to reset the encoder.
This is a rather unusual situation for data compression, and the standard LZ77 solutions don't work great. I'm going to talk only about the server->client transmission for now; you might use a completely different algorithm for the other direction. Some properties of this situation :
1. You care more about encode time than decode time. CPU time on the server is one of the primary limiting factors. The client machine has almost no compression work to do, so decode time could be quite slow.
2. Per-call encode time is very important (not just per-byte time). Packets are small and you're doing lots of them (100k packets/sec), so you can't afford long startup/shutdown times for the encoder. This is mostly just an annoyance for coding, it means you have to be really careful about your function setup code and such.
3. Memory use on the server is a bit limited. Say you allow 4 GB for encoder states; that's only 400k per client. (this is assuming that you're doing per-client encoder state, which is certainly not the only choice).
4. Cache misses are much worse than a normal compression encoder scenario. Say you have something like a 256k hash table to accelerate match finding. Normally when you're compressing you get that whole table into L2 so your hash lookups are in cache. In this scenario you're jumping from one state to another all the time, so you must assume that every memory lookup is a cache miss.
5. The standard LZ77 thing of not allowing matches at the beginning or end is rather more of a penalty. In general all those inefficiencies that you normally have on tiny buffers are more important than usual.
6. Because clients can be added at any time and connections can be reset, encoder init/reset time can't be very long. This is another reason aside from memory use that encoder state must be small.
7. The character of the data being sent doesn't really vary much from client to client. This is one way in which this scenario differs from a normal web server type of situation (in which case, different clients might be receiving vastly different types of data). The character of the data can change from packet to packet; there are sort of a few different modes of the data and the stream switches between then, but it's not like one client is usually receiving text and another one is receiving images. They're all generally receiving bit-packed 3d positions and the same type of thing.
And now some rambling about what encoder you might use that suits this scenario :
A. It's not clear that adaptive encoding is a win here. You have to do the comparison with CPU use held constant, if you just compare an encoder running adaptive vs the same encoder with a static model, that's not fair, because the static model can be so much faster you should use a more sophisticated encoder. The static model can also use vastly more memory. Maybe not a whole 4G, but a lot more than 400k.
B. LZ77 is not great here. The reason we love LZ77 is the fast, simple decoder. We don't really care about that here. An LZP or ROLZ variant would be better, that has a slightly slower and more memory-hungry decoder, but a simpler/faster encoder.
C. There are some semi-static options. Perhaps a static match dictionary with something like LZP, and then an adaptive simple context model per channel. That makes the per-channel adaptive part small in memory, but still allows some local adaptation for packets of different character. Another option would be a switching static-model scheme. Do something like train 4 different static models for different packet types, and send 2 bits to pick the model then encode the packet with that static model.
D. Static context mixing is kind of appealing. You can have static hash tables and a static mixing scheme, which eliminates a lot of the slowness of CM. Perhaps the order-0 model is adaptive per channel, and perhaps the secondary-statistics table is adaptive per channel. Hitting 100 MB/s might still be a challenge, but I think it's possible. One nice thing about CM here is that it can have the idea of packets of different character implicit in the model.
E. For static-dictionary LZ, the normal linear offset encoding doesn't really make a lot of sense. Sure, you could try to optimize a dictionary by laying out the data in it such that more common data is at lower offsets, but that seems like a nasty indirect way of getting at the solution. Off the top of my head, it seems like you could use something like an LZFG encoding. That is, make a Suffix Trie and then send match references as node or leaf indexes; leaves all have equal probability, nodes have a child count which is proportional to their probability (relative to siblings).
F. Surely the ideal solution is a blended static/dynamic coder. That is, you have some large trained static model (like a CM or PPM model, or a big static dictionary for LZ77) and then you also run a local adaptive model in a circular window for each channel. Then you compressing using a mix of the two models. There are various options on how to do this. For LZ77 you might send 0-64k offsets in the local adaptive window, and then 64k-4M offsets as indexes into the static dictionary. Or you could more explicitly code a selector bit to pick one of the two and then an offset. For CM it's most natural, you just mix the result of the static model and the local adaptive model.
G. What is not awesome is model preconditioning (and it's what most people do, because it's the only thing available with off-the-shelf compressors like zlib or whatever). Model precondition means taking an adaptive coder and initially loading its model (eg. an LZ dictionary) from some static data; then you encode packets adaptively. This might actually offer excellent compression, but it has bad channel startup time, and high memory use per channel, and it doesn't allow you to use more efficient algorithms that are possible with fully static models (such as different types of data structures that provide fast lookup but not fast update).
I believe if you're doing UDP or some other unreliable packet scheme, then static-model compression is the only way to go (rather than trying to track the different received and transmitted states to use for a dynamic model). Also if clients are very frequently joining and leaving or moving servers, then they will never build up much channel history, so static model is the way to go there as well. If streams vary vastly in size, like if they're usually less than 1k but occasionally you do large 1M+ transfers (like for content serving as opposed to updating game state) you would use a totally different scheme for the large transfers.
I'd like to do some tests. If you work on an MMO or similar game situation and can give me some real-world test data, please be in touch.


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In a previous post I looked at the evidence that there was a competitiveness crisis in the Eurozone as well as a debt crisis. I concluded that it is plausible that Germany is now too competitive (its real exchange rate is undervalued), and that other Eurozone countries may have to experience a period of stagnation to correct this.
If this is true, an obvious question is how this happened. One simple story is that the formation of the Euro reduced real interest rates in a number of countries, which provided a large stimulus to demand, and also helped generate housing bubbles in some countries. A related story is the rapid expansion in cross border lending by Eurozone banks documented by Hyun Song Shin. However here I want to focus on another question: how could this have been prevented?
Standard macro has a simple answer: fiscal policy. The Eurozone outside Germany should have been running a much more contractionary fiscal policy in the years after its formation. If countries had done this, then a by-product would have been lower levels of debt when the global recession hit, which might have reduced the extent of the current debt crisis. But the main point is that it would have diminished the current undervaluation of Germany within the Eurozone, and so reduced the pain that countries outside Germany may now have to go through on that account.
The really interesting question for me is why Eurozone countries did not pursue more contractionary fiscal policies. The evidence that inflation outside Germany was significantly higher than German inflation was clear enough. Here is consumer price inflation in Ireland, Spain and Germany, for example. We can see in 2009 the process of correction beginning, but as my earlier post showed, the correction process for the Eurozone as a whole has only just begun.
In one sense the answer to my question is obvious. Contractionary fiscal policy involves higher taxes or lower government spending, and governments do not like doing this. However two other factors may have made things worse in this case.
1) In the run-up to the formation of the Eurozone, critics of the whole project focused on the costs of losing an independent monetary policy. Studies showed that an active countercyclical fiscal policy could reduce this, but significant costs remained. (Some of my own work in this area is discussed on my webpage.) One response from those arguing the case for the Euro was to deny the problem. If you deny a problem, you do not prepare for it.
2) When the Euro was formed, the focus was on the problem of debt, rather than the problem of avoiding persistent differences in national inflation. This led to the Stability and Growth Pact, with its famous 3% deficit limit. As many have noted, debt to GDP ratios in Ireland and Spain were falling from 2000 to 2007, while debt to GDP in Germany was rising. So for governments in Ireland and Spain, there was no great pressure from outside to run a more contractionary policy. In these circumstances, what chance would economists have in persuading them otherwise? (Some did try: for example Lane, P. (1998), 'Irish fiscal policy under EMU', Irish Banking Review, Winter.)
Gross Debt to GDP (Source: OECD Economic Outlook) |
Why does all this matter? As everyone knows, the Eurozone is currently revamping how individual countries run their aggregate fiscal policy. With so much focus on the problem of debt rather than the problem of competitiveness, there is a danger of repeating the mistakes that were made when the Euro was formed, and ignoring the need for countercyclical fiscal policy.
One alternative is to in effect hardwire countercyclical fiscal policy by creating a fiscal union, where residents in countries that are growing too fast pay taxes to those growing too slowly. But as Kevin O'Rourke pointed out, proposals at the recent summit do not involve such a fiscal union, whatever they may be called in public. It is quite likely that such a union would be politically impossible at present. If that is the case, then using fiscal policy in a countercyclical way is essential if the Eurozone is to avoid recurring crises.