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Navigating the Legal Labyrinth with Georgia Slip & Fall Accident Law Firm - Kenneth S. Nugent, P.C.
Georgia Slip & Fall Accident Law Firm - Kenneth S. Nugent, P.C.
When life throws a curveball, like a slip-and-fall accident, it's good to know that there's a champion in your corner. Welcome to Kenneth S. Nugent, P.C., a renowned {Georgia Slip & Fall Lawyer|Georgia Slip & Fall Attorney|Georgia Slip & Fall Law Firm|Georgia Slip & Fall Lawyers|Georgia Slip & Fall Attorneys|Georgia Slip & Fall Law Firms}, where your personal injury rights are our top priority. Why entrust your case to us? Let's navigate this together.
Why Kenneth S. Nugent, P.C.? - A Respected Authority in Georgia
Georgia, known for its Southern charm and historical landmarks, unfortunately, is not exempt from the hazards of slip and fall accidents. It's in these challenging circumstances that the stellar reputation of Kenneth S. Nugent, P.C., shines through. With extensive experience handling complex personal injury cases, we pride ourselves on being the voice for victims. We don't just talk the talk - we walk the walk.
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What sets Kenneth S. Nugent, P.C. apart from other law firms? With a legacy that spans decades, we have amassed substantial experience in Georgia's legal landscape. Our team of lawyers boasts diverse backgrounds, each contributing to a pool of comprehensive knowledge and skill. This well-rounded expertise ensures that every case we handle gets a custom-tailored legal strategy.
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Georgia Slip & Fall Law - Know Your Rights
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Are you ready to take the first step towards justice? Contact Kenneth S. Nugent, P.C., the trusted Georgia Slip & Fall Accident Law Firm. We're here to listen, advise, and guide you through your legal journey.


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Working with computers can cause workers a number of problems. These include stress, visual discomfort, as well as aches and pains in the hands, wrists, arms or shoulders.
The ACTU has Guidelines on Screen Based Work [pdf]. The guidelines, although developed some years ago, provide information on a range of issues associated with screen based work, including the ergonomics of the work station, electro-magnetic radiation and so on.
Computer Workstation Dimensions
(Based on the Australian Standard AS 3590 - 1990 Screen based workstations, part 2 workstation furniture)
Height of work surface
- If fixed - 680mm to 720mm above floor level
- If adjustable - 580mm - 730mm above floor level
Area of work surface
- Width - 1500mm minimum
- Depth - 900mm minimum
- Bench thickness over leg span - 25mm maximum
Volume of leg space
- Width - 800mm minimum
- Depth - 550mm minimum
- Height - 580mm minimum
Viewing distance to work
- 350mm - minimum
- 750mm - maximum
- Height of display - 30mm - 40mm below eye level
- Surface of seat to floor - 380mm - 510mm
- Seat pan depth - 330mm - 430mm
- Footrest area - 300mm x 375mm
Chairs and Posture Checklist for Keyboard Workers
It is important to ensure that the chairs are well adjusted chairs - this improves body position and circulation, reduces muscular effort and decreases pressure on the worker's back. Chairs should swivel, have five wheels for stability, have breathable fabric on the seat, a rounded front edge and have adjustable height and backrest for lumbar support.
Work surface height
The height of the work surface and/or the chair should be such that the work surface is approximately at finger length below the height of the elbow when seated.
The seat tilt should be adjusted so that the worker is comfortable when using the keyboard. Usually this will be close to horizontal but tilted slightly forwards. If this places an uncomfortable strain on the leg muscles or if the feet do not reach the floor then a footrest should be used. The backrest should supports the lower back when the worker is sitting upright.
Keyboard placement
The keyboard should be in a position that allows the forearms to be close to the horizontal and the wrists to be straight. That is, with the hand in line with the forearm. If this causes the elbows to be held far out from the side of the body then the work surface height should be re-checked.
Screen placement
The eye to screen distance should be set at the distance that permits the worker to most easily focus on the screen. Usually this will be within an arm's length. The height of the monitor should be such that the top of the screen is below eye level and the bottom of the screen can be read without a marked inclination of the head. Usually this means that the centre of the screen will need to be near shoulder height.
Desk-top layout
All controls and task materials should be placed within a comfortable reach of both hands so that there is no unnecessary twisting of any part of the body.
Document holder
The document holder should be placed close to the monitor screen in the position that causes the least twisting or inclination of the head.
Posture and environment
Workers should change posture at frequent intervals to minimise fatigue and avoid awkward postures at the extremes of the joint range, especially the wrists. It is best to take frequent short rest breaks rather than infrequent longer ones ( see the ACTU Policy). Sharp increases in work rate are to be avoided - changes should be gradual enough to ensure that the workload does not result in excessive fatigue. After prolonged absences from work the overall duration of periods of keyboard work should be increased gradually if conditions permit.
Lighting for VDUs
VDUs should be placed to the side of the light source/s, not directly underneath. If possible, desks should be sited between rows of lights. If the lighting is fluorescent strip lighting, the sides of the desks should be parallel with the lights. Screens should not be placed near windows but if this is unavoidable neither the screen nor the operator should face the window.
If the VDU is well away from windows, there are no other sources of bright light and prolonged desk-work is the norm, a low level of service light of 300 lux should be used. If there are strongly contrasting light levels, then a moderate level of lighting of 400 - 500 lux may be desirable but high quality anti-glare screens may be necessary.
Glare and reflection
It is important to detect the presence of glare and reflection. To determine whether there is glare from overhead lights the seated worker should hold an object such as a book above the eyes at eyebrow level and establish whether the screen image becomes clearer in the absence of overhead glare. To detect whether there are reflections from the desk surface the worker should hold the book above the surface and assess the change in reflected glare from the screen.
A number of ways are available to eliminate or reduce the influence of these reflections:
- Tilting the screen so that the reflections are directed below eye level.
- Purchasing a screen with matt or light diffusing surfaces.
- A negative contrast screen (dark characters on light background) will reduce the influence of these reflections.
Note: Covering the screen with a light diffusing surface or anti-glare screen is no longer recommended.
If the worker experiences eye discomfort when using a bright screen the following adjustments should be made:
- Turning the screen brightness down to a comfortable level.
- Looking away into the distance in order to rest the eyes for a short while every ten minutes or so.
- Changing the text and background colours. Recommended are black characters on white or yellow background, or yellow on black, white on black, white on blue and green on white. Avoid red and green and yellow on white.
Using a mouse
A well designed mouse should not cause undue pressure on the wrist and forearm muscles. A large bulky mouse may keep the wrist continuously bent at an uncomfortable angle. Pressure can be reduced by releasing the mouse at frequent intervals, by selecting a slim-line, low-profile mouse and by using the mouse at a comfortable distance from the body.
See also the following Australian Standards:
- AS/NZS 4443: 1997 Office panel systems - Workstations
- AS/NZS 4442: 1997 Office desks
Keyboard equipment and radiation
VDUs emit radiation, particularly visible light which allows the characters on the screen to be seen. Weak electromagnetic fields and very low levels of other radiation, not visible to the human eye, can be detected by sensitive instruments. Similar emissions are produced by television receivers.
However, the levels of most radiations and electromagnetic fields emitted from VDUs are much less than those from natural sources, such as the sun - and are well below levels considered to be harmful by responsible expert bodies such as th International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA).
The weak electromagnetic fields produced by television receivers and VDUs extend in all directions, but their intensity decreases very quickly with distance from the source. A workplace should be organised to ensure that VDU operators are no closer to any other VDUs than they are to their own.
Flat screen displays, such as liquid-crystal displays used in some laptop/notebook computers, produce even smaller amounts of radiation than those which use television type tubes.
Note: concerns have been raised that radiation from VDUs is a cause of cancer, however research to date has failed to establish a causal link.
Keyboard and telephone operations
Lightweight adjustable headsets with a volume control should be provided for staff on continuous keyboard/telephone operation. For continuous, traffic dependent telephone operations a manual call facility should also be provided.
More resources
- Comcare has produced a publication: Eye health in the workplace - a guide for PCBUs and workers which has information on visually critical and visually demanding work.
- Office wise: A Guide To Health And Safety In Offices. This is a WorkSafe publication picked up in all jurisdictions which provides information on a range of office issues. It is also available (free) from WorkSafe (1800 136 089).
- From the Trade Union Congress supported Hazards Magazine, resources on Computer Workstations including links to international on-line checklists and research tools.
- From the UK's Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
- Working with Display Screen Equipment (DSE) [pdf] - a 16 page booklet
- Display screen equipment workstation checklist - A display screen equipment assessment checklist to help in the assessment of the risks to workers from visual display units and to comply with (UK) legal requirements
- more resources from the HSE can be downloaded from this page.
- From the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) an eTool that illustrates simple, inexpensive principles that will help workers and employers create a safe and comfortable computer workstation.
- From British Columbia (Canada), a useful publication How to Make Your Computer Workstation Fit You [pdf] which provides advice on adjusting the workstation, a checklist and also some exercises.
What about laptop/notebook computers?
Laptops, notebooks and iPads are increasingly being used to work away from 'permanent' workstations. Where possible and practicable it is advisable that all of the principles applying to computer workstations be applied when working with these types of computers. It is particularly important to avoid awkward body postures and ensure that frequent short breaks are taken to minimise the onset of fatigue.
For more information check out the following:
- Ergonomics, Mobile Devices and the Workplace of the Future - a page by ErgonomicsPlus - but with some useful information.
- From Comcare: Virtual Office Tablets and laptops
- Laptop use [pdf] from the Queensland government
Last amended February 2019

subset: commoncrawl


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Last week, before the OKC game, I was asked whether the Lakers' bigger problems were on offense or on defense. To me, this answer was, and remains, clear. It's the defense.
The Lakers' have fundamental problems on D, mostly related to denying dribble penetration and how they don't always help the helper. Any team can make the first rotation just fine, but the difference between a solid defense and an elite one is the ability to make the second and third rotation on any given possession. Right now, the Lakers don't make those late possession rotations very well and they're paying for it.
But those are the big picture issues. On an individual level, this defense is failing countless times over the course of the game. And while no one is immune, there are players whose bad habits are sticking out like a sore thumb. And while it may be difficult for some people to hear, one of the chief culprits is Kobe Bryant.
Mr. Bean may be playing his heart out on offense (we'll get to this later) but he's not showing that same commitment to the defensive side of the ball. There are multiple possessions each game in which he makes fundamental mistakes and it's costing the Lakers. Again, he's not alone. But as a leader of the team, he needs to be doing better.
One of Kobe's chief mistakes is that he gets caught watching the ball too often:
On this play, Kobe is playing on the weak side and his man (Gordon Hayward) is in the corner. Kobe is intently watching the ball on the strong side wing while peeking at the action in the paint to see if the ball is going to be whipped into one of the Jazz big men off their interior screen action. While all that's happening, Hayward cut back door. Kobe, never once looking at his man, only reacted to the pass and fouled a mid-air Hayward who was trying to make the catch.
At the lowest levels of organized basketball, players are asked to see the ball and their man. Kobe loses his man at the very start of this possession and never found him again until committing the foul.
Kobe also has a nasty habit of watching the ball and going for steals that aren't that likely, and compromising the rest of the defense in the process:
On this play Kobe is guarding DeMarre Carroll, who starts on the strong side but then drifts to the weak side as the Jazz run a sideline P&R. Once Carroll clears the side, Kobe again is mostly watching the ball and cheating towards Enes Kanter who is setting up for a mid-range jumper. The ball never goes to Kanter, however, and instead is skipped to Carroll spotting up on the wing. Kobe tries to steal the pass, fails, and then doesn't recover to Carroll quick enough to deny penetration. Meeks, hoping to try and play two players, cheats off the strong side corner (a cardinal sin in basketball) to help on Carroll. Like Kobe, Meeks is unsuccessful in slowing Carroll but also gives up the pass to the corner. Hayward makes the Lakers pay by hitting the wide open three.
Kobe's mistakes here aren't so drastic but he made several on that single play. Going for the steal was likely the worst offense since it put him in a position where he couldn't contain the penetration of his man. Scouting tells you that Carroll isn't a three point shooter so denying his drive is the number one goal of defending him. Once Kobe let Carroll get by him, the greater integrity of the defense was compromised and that was that.
On this last possession, Kobe simply plays a lazy brand of defense that hurt the Lakers on two separate occasions:
This play starts with Kobe on the left baseline guarding Randy Foye. The Jazz run a screen action to free Foye coming across the lane. When Ron's man comes to screen Kobe, you see him not want to fight through the pick and calls out a late switch to Ron. This leads to Foye getting a wide open jumper that Ron barely contested due to the timing of the switch. To make matters worse, after switching onto Marvin Williams, Kobe didn't box out and allowed Williams to sneak underneath Howard to tip in the missed shot. Two lazy plays on one possession for Kobe, there.
While I'm singling out Kobe here, he's not the only one playing this way. On one of the first plays of the game, Ron got beat on an alley oop to Marvin Williams where he was watching the ball similar to Kobe in the first clip. I could have put up multiple clips of Jamison losing his man on screens and getting beat off the dribble, not only from the Jazz game but from every game this season. If the Lakers' defensive problems were a one man issue, that would be simple enough. They're not and that complicates matters a great deal.
What further complicates things is that Kobe is a major culprit. His off ball defense stands out as particularly poor this year. He's gambling for steals, losing sight of his man, and roaming in ways that make the team's defense structurally unsound. In essence, Kobe is making the easy choice way too often rather than making the harder play that is more taxing physically.
In a way, this is easy to understand. Kobe is playing heavy minutes (44 hard ones against the Jazz) and is carrying a tremendous burden on offense. The energy he's expending on that side of the ball is massive and to think that won't affect him in other areas would be a silly conclusion, especially for a 17 year veteran. That said, he's clearly coasting on defense in order to conserve energy on offense and that simply won't do. Not only does it hurt the team in countless tangible ways, it sets a bad example for how the team needs to play on that end of the floor.
Dwight Howard was brought in to help solve some of the Lakers' defensive woes. And, he too can be better than he has been. But he can't make up for everyone's mistakes. Jamison and Duhon are turnstiles on D. Ron is getting beat more this season than in year's past. And Kobe, as shown, isn't holding up his end of the bargain. As a leader and a yearly member of the all-defensive team, he needs to be better.


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Turkey in radical revision of Islamic texts
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He longed for the day when a woman might travel long distances alone.
-- Professor Mehmet Gormez
Turkey in radical revision of Islamic texts
By Robert Piggott
Religious affairs correspondent, BBC News
26 February 2008
Turkey is preparing to publish a document that represents a revolutionary reinterpretation of Islam - and a controversial and radical modernisation of the religion.
The country's powerful Department of Religious Affairs has commissioned a team of theologians at Ankara University to carry out a fundamental revision of the Hadith, the second most sacred text in Islam after the Koran.
The Hadith is a collection of thousands of sayings reputed to come from the Prophet Muhammad.
As such, it is the principal guide for Muslims in interpreting the Koran and the source of the vast majority of Islamic law, or Sharia.
But the Turkish state has come to see the Hadith as having an often negative influence on a society it is in a hurry to modernise, and believes it responsible for obscuring the original values of Islam.
It says that a significant number of the sayings were never uttered by Muhammad, and even some that were need now to be reinterpreted.
Commentators say the very theology of Islam is being reinterpreted in order to effect a radical renewal of the religion.
Its supporters say the spirit of logic and reason inherent in Islam at its foundation 1,400 years ago are being rediscovered. Some believe it could represent the beginning of a reformation in the religion.
Turkish officials have been reticent about the revision of the Hadith until now, aware of the controversy it is likely to cause among traditionalist Muslims, but they have spoken to the BBC about the project, and their ambitious aims for it.
The forensic examination of the Hadiths has taken place in Ankara University's School of Theology.
An adviser to the project, Felix Koerner, says some of the sayings - also known individually as "hadiths" - can be shown to have been invented hundreds of years after the Prophet Muhammad died, to serve the purposes of contemporary society.
"Unfortunately you can even justify through alleged hadiths, the Muslim - or pseudo-Muslim - practice of female genital mutilation," he says.
"You can find messages which say 'that is what the Prophet ordered us to do'. But you can show historically how they came into being, as influences from other cultures, that were then projected onto Islamic tradition."
The argument is that Islamic tradition has been gradually hijacked by various - often conservative - cultures, seeking to use the religion for various forms of social control.
Leaders of the Hadith project say successive generations have embellished the text, attributing their political aims to the Prophet Muhammad himself.
Turkey is intent on sweeping away that "cultural baggage" and returning to a form of Islam it claims accords with its original values and those of the Prophet.
But this is where the revolutionary nature of the work becomes apparent. Even some sayings accepted as being genuinely spoken by Muhammad have been altered and reinterpreted.
Prof Mehmet Gormez, a senior official in the Department of Religious Affairs and an expert on the Hadith, gives a telling example.
"There are some messages that ban women from travelling for three days or more without their husband's permission and they are genuine.
"But this isn't a religious ban. It came about because in the Prophet's time it simply wasn't safe for a woman to travel alone like that. But as time has passed, people have made permanent what was only supposed to be a temporary ban for safety reasons."
The project justifies such bold interference in the 1,400-year-old content of the Hadith by rigorous academic research.
Prof Gormez points out that in another speech, the Prophet said "he longed for the day when a woman might travel long distances alone".
So, he argues, it is clear what the Prophet's goal was.
Original spirit
Yet, until now, the ban has remained in the text, and helps to restrict the free movement of some Muslim women to this day.
As part of its aggressive programme of renewal, Turkey has given theological training to 450 women, and appointed them as senior imams called "vaizes".
They have been given the task of explaining the original spirit of Islam to remote communities in Turkey's vast interior.
One of the women, Hulya Koc, looked out over a sea of headscarves at a town meeting in central Turkey and told the women of the equality, justice and human rights guaranteed by an accurate interpretation of the Koran - one guided and confirmed by the revised Hadith.
She says that, at the moment, Islam is being widely used to justify the violent suppression of women.
"There are honour killings," she explains.
"We hear that some women are being killed when they marry the wrong person or run away with someone they love.
"There's also violence against women within families, including sexual harassment by uncles and others. This does not exist in Islam... we have to explain that to them."
'New Islam'
According to Fadi Hakura, an expert on Turkey from Chatham House in London, Turkey is doing nothing less than recreating Islam - changing it from a religion whose rules must be obeyed, to one designed to serve the needs of people in a modern secular democracy.
He says that to achieve it, the state is fashioning a new Islam.
"This is kind of akin to the Christian Reformation," he says.
"Not exactly the same, but if you think, it's changing the theological foundations of [the] religion. "
Fadi Hakura believes that until now secularist Turkey has been intent on creating a new politics for Islam.
Now, he says, "they are trying to fashion a new Islam."
Significantly, the "Ankara School" of theologians working on the new Hadith have been using Western critical techniques and philosophy.
They have also taken an even bolder step - rejecting a long-established rule of Muslim scholars that later (and often more conservative) texts override earlier ones.
"You have to see them as a whole," says Fadi Hakura.
"You can't say, for example, that the verses of violence override the verses of peace. This is used a lot in the Middle East, this kind of ideology.
"I cannot impress enough how fundamental [this change] is."
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The animal residents at Disney's Animal Kingdom theme park at Walt Disney World have been treating us to such a steady stream of precious newborn animals lately that it's almost too much cuteness to handle. Just last month, some lucky guests on board the Kilimanjaro Safaris ride witnessed the birth of a baby zebra. This week, we got our first look at the newest animal addition to Disney's Animal Kingdom, a Masai giraffe calf.
Scott Terrell, director of animal and science operations for Walt Disney Parks & Resorts, announced the arrival of the male calf in a Disney Parks Blog post on June 21. The strapping boy is nearly 6 feet tall, weighs 183 pounds, and is absolutely adorable. Just look at his big, beautiful eyes and sweet face.
The calf, who has yet to be named, has been spending time backstage bonding with his mom, Lily, who has a beautiful coat just like her son's. The unique markings on the calf's coat include heart shapes and a butterfly marking over his right shoulder.
"The different size and color markings on giraffes camouflage them on the savanna and distinguish the different subspecies," Terrell explains in the blog post. "Masai giraffes, seen on Kilimanjaro Safaris, typically have a lacy-edged spot pattern that resembles oak leaves."
Caring For The Animals You See At Disney's Theme Park
With just approximately 35,000 Masai giraffes remaining in the wild after a 40% population decline in the past 30 years, the birth of this gorgeous calf is yet another success story to come out of the Association of Zoos and Aquariums' Species Survival Plan programs, which help ensure the responsible breeding of endangered and threatened species.
Last month's baby zebra, as well as a giraffe and an endangered white rhino born last fall, are just some of the recent arrivals bred through the program that can now be spotted by guests aboard the Kilimanjaro Safaris ride as they roam with their herds.
In addition to the Kilimanjaro Safaris attraction at Disney's Animal Kingdom, Walt Disney World guests can also spot creatures like giraffes and zebras at Disney's Animal Kingdom Lodge, a nearby resort where animals can even be seen from guest room balconies.
To learn more about the painstaking efforts that go into caring for animals like the giraffes and white rhinos at Disney's Animal Kingdom, check out the National Geographic docu-series, "The Magic of Disney's Animal Kingdom." The eight-part series, narrated by Josh Gad, streams on Disney+. It takes viewers behind the scenes to tell stories about the care, conservation and Walt Disney Imagineering involved in giving a home to more than 5,000 animals and 300 species at Disney's Animal Kingdom Theme Park, Disney's Animal Kingdom Lodge and The Seas with Nemo & Friends at Epcot.
More Updates Headed To Disney's Animal Kingdom
Just a day after the announcement of a new arrival at Disney's Animal Kingdom, Disney shared more news about exciting updates coming to the theme park as part of Walt Disney World's 50th-anniversary celebration.
A new daytime show, "Disney KiteTails," will debut on Oct. 1, 2021. The show, which will run several times daily at the Discovery River Amphitheater, will feature performers flying wind catchers and kites depicting Disney animals like Simba, Zazu, Baloo and King Louie. Each night, the park's towering icon, the Tree of Life, will be transformed into a "Beacon of Magic," lit up with sparkling projections and lighting effects.
Did you know you could spot so many animals at Walt Disney World? Let us know if you've been to Disney's Animal Kingdom!
This story originally appeared on Simplemost. Checkout Simplemost for additional stories.


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After a brief look at at the preview of this new book by Suzuko Koseki,
one of my favorite Japanese fabric designers, I was so inspired
that I immediately had a surge to make a potholder!
I had this great feedsack fabric that I've wanted to put
into use. Because the pattern on the fabric is so big and
is kitchen-themed, a potholder was definitely a great choice!
Such a beautiful print, isn't it? My plan was to attach
a bunch of appliques on it, but as I realized soon that
it might be better if I didn't add too many things so that
the center of attention is unquestionably the Apple Pie ;)
I added "1" on the right top corner to add a little fanciness,
so I named this potholder "No.1 Apple Pie." Hmmm..
I haven't had it for a while... yum yum...
This is the back side. I'm glad I chose this waffle fabric.
It seems to be working fine with the crazy binding.
I also made three fabric baskets over the weekend.
This one is my fave. I picked fabrics that I love.
This one is so Japanese. I can imagine being invited to
a little tea party by someone in Japan and seeing this basket
on a coffee table filled with candies and tea bags.
This is such a happy one. Looking at it makes me want to
sing a happy song or something.
All the fabric basket as well as the No.1 Apple Pie
Potholder have been listed in my shop;) When you make
a purchase, let me know you came from this blog so that
I'll add a little gift for you ;)
On a side note, I went to a farmer's market in Campbell, CA
yesterday and picked up Sun Golden Cherry Tomato seedling.
We've never been good at taking care of plants, but
I'm so excited for it to grow and to see cherry
tomatoes one day. If you have any suggestions as to
what we can do to help tomatoes grow better,
I'd really really appreciate it if you shared the
info with me ;)
Hope you all have a great week!
Thanks for stopping by and reading!


text:
Any reader familiar with this blog will know I side with Pigliucci in my belief that uploading consciousness into a machine is both undesirable and (even if it were desirable) impossible.
My main point: Consciousness is embodied, embedded, and enactive - and most importantly it is an emergent property of a complex biological system.
Chalmers vs Pigliucci on the Philosophy of Mind-Uploading (1): Chalmers's Optimism
By John Danaher
Philosophical Disquisitions
Posted: Sept 17, 2014
The brain is the engine of reason and the seat of the soul. It is the substrate in which our minds reside. The problem is that this substrate is prone to decay. Eventually, our brains will cease to function and along with them so too will our minds. This will result in our deaths. Little wonder then that the prospect of transferring (or uploading) our minds to a more robust, technologically advanced, substrate has proved so attractive to futurists and transhumanists.
But is it really feasible? This is a question I've looked at many times before, but the recent book Intelligence Unbound: The Future of Uploaded and Machine Minds offers perhaps the most detailed, sophisticated and thoughtful treatment of the topic. It is a collection of essays, from a diverse array of authors, probing the key issues from several different perspectives. I highly recommend it.
Within its pages you will find a pair of essays debating the philosophical aspects of mind-uploading (you'll find others too, but I want to zone-in on this pair because one is a direct response to the other). The first of those essays comes from David Chalmers and is broadly optimistic about the prospect of mind-uploading. The second of them comes from Massimo Pigliucci and is much less enthusiastic. In this two-part series of posts, I want to examine the debate between Chalmers and Pigliucci. I start by looking at Chalmers's contribution.
1. Methods of Mind-Uploading and the Issues for Debate
Chalmers starts his essay by considering the different possible methods of mind-uploading. This is useful because it helps to clarify — to some extent — exactly what we are debating. He identifies three different methods (note: in a previous post I looked at work from Seth Bamford suggesting that there were more methods of uploading, but we can ignore those other possibilities for now):
Whether these forms of uploading are actually technologically feasible is anyone's guess. They are certainly not completely implausible. I can certainly imagine a model of the brain being built from a highly detailed scan and analysis. It might take a huge amount of computational power and technical resources, but it seems within the realm of technological possibility. The deeper question is whether our minds would really survive the process. This is where the philosophical debate kicks-in.
- Destructive Uploading: As the name suggests, this is a method of mind-uploading that involves the destruction of the original (biological) mind. An example would be uploading via serial sectioning. The brain is frozen and its structure is analyzed layer by layer. From this analysis, one builds up a detailed map of the connections between neurons (and other glial cells if necessary). This information is then used to build a functional computational model of the brain.
- Gradual Uploading: This is a method of mind-uploading in which the original copy is gradually replaced by functionally equivalent components. One example of this would be nanotransfer. Nanotechnology devices could be inserted into the brain and attached to individual neurons (and other relevant cells if necessary). They could then learn how those cells work and use this information to simulate the behaviour of the neuron. This would lead to the construction of a functional analogue of the original neuron. Once the construction is complete, the original neuron can be destroyed and the functional analogue can take its place. This process can be repeated for every neuron, until a complete copy of the original brain is constructed.
- Nondestructive Uploading: This is a method of mind-uploading in which the original copy is retained. Some form of nanotechnology brain-scanning would be needed for this. This would build up a dynamical map of current brain function — without disrupting or destroying it — and use that dynamical map to construct a functional analogue.
There are, in fact, two philosophical issues to debate:
The two issues are connected. Consciousness is valuable to us. Indeed, it is arguably the most valuable thing of all: it is what allows us to enjoy our interactions with the world, and it is what confers moral status upon us. If consciousness was not preserved by the mind-uploading process, it is difficult to see why we would care. So consciousness is a necessary condition for a valuable form of mind-uploading. That does not, however, make it a sufficient condition. After all, two beings can be conscious without sharing any important connection (you are conscious, and I am conscious, but your consciousness is not valuable to me in the same way that it is valuable to you). What we really want to preserve through uploading is our individual consciousnesses. That is to say: the stream of conscious experiences that constitutes our identity. But would this be preserved?
- The Consciousness Issue: Would the uploaded mind be conscious? Would it experience the world in a roughly similar manner to how we now experience the world?
- The Identity/Survival Issue: Assuming it is conscious, would it be our consciousness (our identity) that survives the uploading process? Would our identities be preserved?
These two issues form the heart of the Chalmers-Pigliucci debate.
2. Would consciousness survive the uploading process?
So let's start by looking at Chalmers's take on the consciousness issue. Chalmers is famously one of the new-Mysterians, a group of philosophers who doubt our ability to have a fully scientific theory of consciousness. Indeed, he coined the term "The Hard Problem" of consciousness to describe the difficulty we have in accounting for the first-personal quality of conscious experience. Given his scepticism, one might have thought he'd have his doubts about the possibility of creating a conscious upload. But he actually thinks we have reason to be optimistic.
He notes that there are two leading contemporary views about the nature of consciousness (setting non-naturalist theories to the side). The first — which he calls the biological view — holds that consciousness is only instantiated in a particular kind of biological system: no nonbiological system is likely to be conscious. The second — which he (and everyone else) calls the functionalist view — holds that consciousness is instantiated in any system with the right causal structure and causal roles. The important thing is that the functionalist view allows for consciousness to be substrate independent, whereas the biological view does not. Substrate independence is necessary if an upload is going to be conscious.
So which of these views is correct? Chalmers favours the functionalist view and he has a somewhat elaborate argument for this. The argument starts with a thought experiment. The thought experiment comes in two stages. The first stage asks us to imagine a "perfect upload of a brain inside a computer" (p. 105), by which is meant a model of the brain in which every relevant component of a biological brain has a functional analogue within the computer. This computer-brain is also hooked up to the external world through the same kinds of sensory input-output channels. The result is a computer model that is a functional isomorph of a real brain. Would we doubt that such a system was conscious if the real brain was conscious?
Maybe. That brings us to the second stage of the thought experiment. Now, we are asked to imagine the construction of a functional isomorph through gradual uploading:
Here we upload different components of the brain one by one, over time. This might involve gradual replacement of entire brain areas with computational circuits, or it might involve uploading neurons one at a time. The components might be replaced with silicon circuits in their original location…It might take place over months or years or over hours.If a gradual uploading process is executed correctly, each new component will perfectly emulate the component it replaces, and will interact with both biological and nonbiological components around it in just the same way that the previous component did. So the system will behave in exactly the same way that it would have without the uploading.(Intelligence Unbound pp. 105-106)Critical to this exercise in imagination is the fact that the process results in a functional isomorph and that you can make the process exceptionally gradual, both in terms of the time taken and the size of the units being replaced.
With the building blocks in place, we now ask ourselves the critical question: if we were undergoing this process of gradual replacement, what would happen to our conscious experience? There are three possibilities. Either it would suddenly stop, or it would gradually fade out, or it would be retained. The first two possibilities are consistent with the biological view of consciousness; the last is not. It is only consistent with the functional view. Chalmers's argument is that the last possibility is the most plausible.
In other words, he defends the following argument:
(1) If the parts of our brain are gradually replaced by functional isomorphic component parts, our conscious experience will either: (a) be suddenly lost; (b) gradually fadeout; or © be retained throughout.Chalmers adds some detail to the conclusion, which we'll talk about in a minute. The crucial thing for now is to focus on the key premise, number (2). What reason do we have for thinking that retention is the only plausible option?
(2) Sudden loss and gradual fadeout are not plausible; retention is.
(3) Therefore, our conscious experience is likely to be retained throughout the process of gradual replacement.
(4) Retention of conscious experience is only compatible with the functionalist view.
(5) Therefore, the functionalist view is like to be correct; and preservation of consciousness via mind-uploading is plausible.
With regard to sudden loss, Chalmers makes a simple argument. If we were to suppose, say, that the replacement of the 50,000th neuron led to the sudden loss of consciousness, we could break down the transition point into ever more gradual steps. So instead of replacing the 50,000th neuron in one go, we could divide the neuron itself into ten sub-components and replace them gradually and individually. Are we to suppose that consciousness would suddenly be lost in this process? If so, then break down those sub-components into other sub-components and start replacing them gradually. The point is that eventually we will reach some limit (e.g. when we are replacing the neuron molecule by molecule) where it is implausible to suppose that there will be a sudden loss of consciousness (unless you believe that one molecule makes a difference to consciousness: a belief that is refuted by reality since we lose brain cells all the time without thereby losing consciousness). This casts the whole notion of sudden loss into doubt.
With regard to gradual fadeout, the argument is more subtle. Remember it is critical to Chalmers' thought experiment that the upload is functionally isomorphic to the original brain: for every brain state that used to be associated with conscious experience there will be a functionally equivalent state in the uploaded version. If we accept gradual fadeout, we would have to suppose that despite this equivalence, there is a gradual loss of certain conscious experiences (e.g. the ability to experience black and white, or certain high-pitched sounds etc.) despite the presence of functionally equivalent states. Chalmers' argues that this is implausible because it asks us to imagine a system that is deeply out of touch with its own conscious experiences. I find this slightly unsatisfactory insofar as it may presuppose the functionalist view that Chalmers is trying to defend.
But, in any event, Chalmers suggests that the process of partial uploading will convince people that retention of consciousness is likely. Once we have friends and family who have had parts of their brains replaced, and who seem to retain conscious experience (or, at least, all outward signs of having conscious experience), we are likely to accept that consciousness is preserved. After all, I don't doubt that people with cochlear or retinal implants have some sort of aural or visual experiences. Why should I doubt it if other parts of the brain are replaced by functional equivalents?
Chalmers concludes with the suggestion that all of this points to the likelihood of consciousness being an organizational invariant. What he means by this is that systems with the exact same patterns of causal organization are likely to have the same states of consciousness, no matter what those systems are made of.
I'll hold off on the major criticisms until part two, since this is the part of the argument about which Pigliucci has the most to say. Nevertheless, I will make one comment. I'm inclined towards functionalism myself, but it seems to me that in crafting the thought experiment that supports his argument, Chalmers helps himself to a pretty colossal assumption. He assumes that we know (or can imagine) what it takes to create a "perfect" functional analogue of a conscious system like the brain. But, of course, we don't know really know what it takes. Any functional model is likely to simplify and abstract from the messy biological details. The problem is knowing which of those details is critical for ensuring functional equivalence. We can create functional models of the heart because all the critical elements of the heart are determinable from a third person perspective (i.e. we know what is necessary to make the blood pump from a third person perspective). That doesn't seem to be the case with consciousness. In fact, that's what Chalmers's Hard Problem is supposed to highlight.
3. Will our identities be preserved? Will we survive the process?
Let's assume Chalmers is right to be optimistic about consciousness. Does that mean he is right to be optimistic about identity/survival? Will the uploaded mind be the same as we are? Will it share our identity? Chalmers has more doubts about this, but again he sees some reason to be optimistic.
He starts by noting that there are three different philosophical approaches to personal identity. The first is biologism (or animalism), which holds that preservation of one's identity depends on the preservation of the biological organism that one is. The second is psychological continuity, which holds that preservation of one's identity depends on maintaining threads of overlapping psychological states (memories, beliefs, desires etc.). The third, slightly more unusual, is Robert Nozick's "closest continuer" theory, which holds that preservation of identity depends on the existence of a closely-related subsequent entity (where "closeness" is defined in various ways).
Chalmers then defends two different arguments. The first gives some reason to be pessimistic about survival, at least in the case of destructive and nondestructive forms of uploading. The second gives some reason to be optimistic, at least in the case of gradual uploading. The end result is a qualified optimism about gradual uploading.
Let's start with the pessimistic argument. Again, it involves a thought experiment. Imagine a man named Dave. Suppose that one day Dave undergoes a nondestructive uploading process. A copy of his brain is made and uploaded to a computer, but the biological brain continues to exist. There are, thus, two Daves: BioDave and DigiDave. It seems natural to suppose that BioDave is the original, and his identity is preserved in this original biological form; and it is equally natural to suppose that DigiDave is simply a branchline copy. In other words, it seems natural to suppose that BioDave and DigiDave have separate identities.
But now suppose we imagine the same scenario, only this time the original biological copy is destroyed. Do we have any reason to change our view about identity and survival? Surely not. The only difference this time round is that BioDave is destroyed. DigiDave is the same as he was in the original thought experiment. That suggests the following argument (numbering follows on from the previous argument diagram):
(9) In nondestructive uploading, DigiDave is not identical to Dave.This looks pretty sound to me. And as we shall see in part two, Pigliucci takes a similar view. Nevertheless, there are two possible ways to escape the conclusion. The first would be to deny premise (2) by adopting the closest continuer theory of personal identity. The idea then would be that in destructive (but not non-destructive) uploading DigiDave is the closest continuer and hence the vessel in which identity is preserved. I think this simply reveals how odd the closest continuer theory really is.
(10) If in nondestructive uploading, DigiDave is not identical to Dave, then in destructive uploading, DigiDave is not identical to Dave.
(11) In destructive uploading, DigiDave is not identical to Dave.
The other option would be to argue that this is a fission case. It is a scenario in which one original identity fissions into two subsequent identities. The concept of fissioning identities was originally discussed by Derek Parfit in the case of severing and transplanting of brain hemispheres. In the brain hemisphere case, some part of the original person lives on in two separate forms. Neither is strictly identical to the original, but they do stand in "relation R" to the original, and that relation might be what is critical to survival. It is more difficult to say that nondestructive uploading involves fissioning. But it might be the best bet for the optimist. The argument then would be that the original Dave survives in two separate forms (BioDave and DigiDave), each of which stands in relation R to him. But I'd have to say this is quite a stretch, given that BioDave isn't really some new entity. He's simply the original Dave with a new name. The new name is unlikely to make an ontological difference.
Let's now turn our attention to the optimistic argument. This one requires us to imagine a gradual uploading process. Fortunately, we've done this already so you know the drill: imagine that the subcomponents of the brain are replaced gradually (say 1% at a time), over a period of several years. It seems highly likely that each step in the replacement process preserves identity with the previous step, which in turn suggests that identity is preserved once the process is complete.
To state this is in more formal terms:
(14) For all n < 100, Daven+1 is identical to Daven.If you're not convinced by this 1%-at-a-time version of the argument, you can adjust it until it becomes more persuasive. In other words, setting aside certain extreme physical and temporal limits, you can make the process of gradual replacement as slow as you like. Surely there is some point at which the degree of change between the steps becomes so minimal that identity is clearly being preserved? If not, then how do you explain the fact that our identities are being preserved as our body cells replace themselves over time? Maybe you explain it by appealing to the biological nature of the replacement. But if we have functionally equivalent technological analogues it's difficult to see where the problem is.
(15) If for all n < 100, Daven+1 is identical to Daven, then Dave100 is identical to Dave.
(16) Therefore, Dave100 is identical to Dave.
Chalmers adds other versions of this argument. These involve speeding up the process of replacement. His intuition is that if identity is preserved over the course of a really gradual replacement, then it may well be preserved over a much shorter period of replacement too, for example one that takes a few hours or a few minutes. That said, there may be important differences when the process is sped up. It may be that too much change takes place too quickly and the new components fail to smoothly integrate with the old ones. The result is a break in the strands of continuity that are necessary for identity-preservation. I have to say I would certainly be less enthusiastic about a fast replacement. I would like the time to see whether my identity is being preserved following each replacement.
4. Conclusion
That brings us to the end of Chalmers' contribution to the debate. He says more in his essay, particularly about cryopreservation, and the possible legal and social implications of uploading. But there is no sense in addressing those topics here. Chalmers doesn't develop his thoughts at any great length and Pigliucci wisely ignores them in his reply. We'll be discussing Pigliucci's reply in part two.
~ John Danaher holds a PhD from University College Cork (Ireland) and is currently a lecturer in law at NUI Galway (Ireland). His research interests are eclectic, ranging broadly from philosophy of religion to legal theory, with particular interests in human enhancement and neuroethics.
John blogs at http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/.
You can follow him on twitter @JohnDanaher.
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Chalmers vs Pigliucci on the Philosophy of Mind-Uploading (2): Pigliucci's Pessimism
By John Danaher
Philosophical Disquisitions
Posted: Sept 20, 2014
This is the second and final part of my series about a recent exchange between David Chalmers and Massimo Pigliucci. The exchange took place in the pages of Intelligence Unbound, an edited collection of essays about mind-uploading and artificial intelligence. It concerned the philosophical plausibility of mind-uploading.
As we saw in part one, there were two issues up for debate:
The Consciousness Issue: Would an uploaded mind be conscious? Would it experience the world in a roughly similar manner to how we now experience the world?
The Identity/Survival Issue: Assuming it is conscious, would it be our consciousness (our identity) that survives the uploading process?David Chalmers was optimistic on both fronts. Adopting a functionalist theory of consciousness, he saw no reason to think that a functional isomorph of the human brain would not be conscious. Not unless we assume that biological material has some sort of magic consciousness-conferring property. And while he had his doubts about survival via destructive or non-destructive uploading, he thought that that a gradual replacement of the human brain, with functionally equivalent artificial components, could allow for our survival.
As we will see today, Pigliucci is much more pessimistic. He thinks it is unlikely that uploads would be conscious, and, even if they are, he thinks it is unlikely that we would survive the uploading process. He offers four reasons to doubt the prospect of conscious uploads, two based on criticisms of the computational theory of mind, and two based on criticisms of functionalism. He offers one main reason to doubt survival. I will suggest that some of his arguments have merit, some don't, and some fail to engage with the arguments put forward by Chalmers.
1. Pigliucci's Criticisms of the Computational Theory of Mind
Pigliucci assumes that the pro-uploading position depends on a computational theory of mind (and, more importantly, a computational theory of consciousness). According to this theory, consciousness is a property (perhaps an emergent property) of certain computational processes. Pigliucci believes that if he can undermine the computational theory of mind, then so too can he undermine any optimism we might have about conscious uploads.
To put it more formally, Pigliucci thinks that the following argument will work against Chalmers:
Pigliucci provides two reasons for us to endorse premise (2). The first is a — somewhat bizarre — appeal to the work of Jerry Fodor. Fodor was one of the founders of the computational theory of mind. But Fodor has, in subsequent years, pushed back against the overreach he perceives among computationalists. As Pigliucci puts it:
- (1) A conscious upload is possible only if the computational theory of mind is correct.
- (2) The computational theory of mind is not correct (or, at least, it is highly unlikely to be correct).
- (3) Therefore, (probably) conscious uploads are not possible.
[Fodor distinguishes] between "modular" and "global" mental processes, and [argues] that [only] the former, but not the latter (which include consciousness), are computational in any strong sense of the term…If Fodor is right, then the CTM [computational theory of mind] cannot be a complete theory of mind, because there are a large number of mental processes that are not computational in nature.
(Intelligence Unbound, p. 123)
In saying this, Pigliucci explicitly references Fodor's book-length response to the work of Steven Pinker, called The Mind Doesn't Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. I can't say I'm huge fan of Fodor, but even if I were I would find Pigliucci's argument pretty unsatisfying. It is, after all, little more than a bare appeal to authority, neglecting to mention any of the detail of Fodor's critique. It also neglects to mention that Fodor's particular understanding of computation is disputed. Indeed, Pinker disputed it in his response to Fodor, which Pigliucci doesn't cite and which you can easily find online. Now, my point here is not to defend the computational theory, or to suggest that Pinker is correct in his criticisms of Fodor, it is just merely to suggest that appealing to the work of Fodor isn't going to be enough. Fodor may have done much to popularise the computational theory, but he doesn't have final authority on whether it is correct or not.
Let's move on then to Pigliucci's second reason to endorse premise (2). This one claims that the computational theory rests on a mistaken understanding of the Church-Turing thesis about universal computability. Citing the work of Jack Copeland — an expert on Turing, whose biography of Turing I recently read and recommend — Pigliucci notes that the thesis only establishes that logical computing machines (Turing Machines) "can do anything that can be described as a rule of thumb or purely mechanical ("algorithmic")". It does not establish that "whatever can be calculated by a machine (working on finite data in accordance with a finite program of instructions) is Turing-machine-computable". This is said to be a problem because proponents of the computational theory of mind have tended to assume that "Church-Turing has essentially established the CTM".
I may not be well-qualified to evaluate the significance of this point, but it seems pretty thin to me. I think it relies on an impoverished notion of computation. It assumes that computationalists, and by proxy proponents of mind-uploading, think that a mind could be implemented on a classic digital computer architecture. While some may believe that, it doesn't strike me as being essential to their claims. I think there is a broader notion of computation that could avoid his criticisms. To me, a computational theory is one that assumes mental processes (including, ultimately, conscious mental processes) could be implemented in some sort of mechanical architecture. The basis for the theory is the belief that mental states involve the representation of information (in either symbolic or analog forms) and that mental processes involve the manipulation and processing of the represented information. I see nothing in Pigliucci's comments about the Church-Turing thesis that upsets that model. Pigliucci actually did a pretty good podcast on broader definitions of computation with Gerard O'Brien. I recommend it if you want to learn more.
In summary, I think Pigliucci's criticisms of the computational theory are off-the-mark. Nevertheless, I concede that the broader sense of computation may in turn collapse into the broader theory of functionalism. This is where the debate is really joined.
2. Pigliucci's Criticisms of Functionalism
And I think Pigliucci is on firmer ground when he criticises functionalism. Admittedly, he doesn't distinguish between functionalism and computationalism, but I think it is possible to separate out his criticisms. Again, there are two criticisms with which to contend. To understand them, we need to go back to something I mentioned in part one. There, I noted how Chalmers seemed to help himself to a significant assumption when defending the possibility of a conscious upload. The assumption was that we could create of "functional isomorph" of the brain. In other words, an artificial model that replicated all the relevant functional attributes of the human brain. I questioned whether it was possible to do this. This is something that Pigliucci also questions.
We can put the criticism like this:
Pigliucci adduces two reasons for us to favour premise (9). The first has to do with the danger of conflating simulation with function. This hearkens back to his criticism of the computational theory, but can be interpreted as a critique of functionalism. The idea is that when we create functional analogues of real-world phenomena we may only be simulating them, not creating models that could take their place. The classic example here would be a computer model of rainfall or of photosynthesis. The computer models may be able to replicate those real-world processes (i.e. you might be able to put the elements of the models in a one-to-one relationship with the elements of the real-world phenomena), but they would still lack certain critical properties: they would not be wet or capable of converting sunlight into food. They would be mere simulations, not functional isomorphs. I agree with Pigliucci that the conflation of simulation with function is a real danger when it comes to creating functional isomorphs of the brain.
- (8) A conscious upload is possible only if we know how to create a functional isomorph of the brain.
- (9) But we do not know what it takes to create a functional isomorph of the brain.
- (10) Therefore, a conscious upload is not possible.
Pigliucci's second reason has to do with knowing the material constraints on consciousness. Here he draws on an analogy with life. We know that we are alive and that our being alive is the product of the complex chemical processes that take place in our body. The question is: could we create living beings from something other than this complex chemistry? Pigliucci notes that life on earth is carbon-based and that the only viable alternative is some kind of silicon-based life (because silicon is the only other element that would be capable of forming similarly complex molecule chains). So the material constraints on creating functional isomorphs of current living beings are striking: there are only two forms of chemistry that could do the trick. This, Pigliucci suggests, should provide some fuel for scepticism about creating isomorphs of the human brain:
[This] scenario requires "only" a convincing (empirical) demonstration that, say, silicon-made neurons can function just as well as carbon-based ones, which is, again, an exclusively empirical question. They might or might not, we do not know. What we do know is that not just any chemical will do, for the simple reason that neurons need to be able to do certain things (grow, produce synapses, release and respond to chemical signals) that cannot be done if we alter the brain's chemistry too radically.
(Intelligence Unbound, p 125)I don't quite buy the analogy with life. I think we could create wholly digital living beings (indeed, we may even have done so) though this depends on what counts as "life", which is a question Pigliucci tries to avoid. Still, I think the point here is well-taken. There is a lot going on in the human brain. There are a lot of moving parts, a lot of complex chemical mechanisms. We don't know exactly which elements of this complex machinery need to be replicated in our functional isomorph. If we replicate everything then we are just creating another biological brain. If we don't, then we risk missing something critical. Thus, there is a significant hurdle when it comes to knowing whether our upload will share the consciousness of its biological equivalent. It has been a while since I read it, but as I recall, John Bickle's work on the philosophy of neuroscience develops this point about biological constraints quite nicely.
This epistemic hurdle is heightened by the hard problem of consciousness. We are capable of creating functional isomorphs of some biological organs. For example, we can create functional isomorphs of the human heart, i.e. mechanical devices that replicate the functionality of the heart. But that's because everything we need to know about the functionality of the heart is externally accessible (i.e. accessible from the third-person perspective). Not everything about consciousness is accessible from that perspective.
3. Pigliucci on the Identity Question
After his lengthy discussion of the consciousness issue, Pigliucci has rather less to say about the identity issue. This isn't surprising. If you don't think an upload is likely to be conscious, then you are unlikely to think that it will preserve your identity. But Pigliucci is sceptical even if the consciousness issue is set to the side.
His argument focuses on the difference between destructive and non-destructive uploading. The former involves three steps: brain scan, mechanical reconstruction of the brain, and destruction of the original brain. The latter just involves the first two of those steps. Most people would agree that in the latter case your identity is not transferred to the upload. Instead, the upload is just a copy or clone of you. But if that's what they believe about the latter case, why wouldn't they believe it about the former too? As Pigliucci puts it:
If the only difference between the two cases is that in one the original is destroyed, then how on earth can we avoid the conclusion that when it comes to destructive uploading we just committed suicide (or murder, as the case may be)? After all, ex hypothesi there is no substantive differences between destructive and non-destructive uploading in terms of end results…I realize, of course, that to some philosophers this may seem far too simple a solution to what they regard as an intricate metaphysical problem. But sometimes even philosophers agree that problems need to be dis-solved, not solved [he then quotes from Wittgenstein].
(Intelligence Unbound, p. 128)Pigliucci may be pleased with this simple, common-sensical solution to the identity issue, but I am less impressed. This is for two reasons. First, Chalmers made the exact same argument in relation to non-destructive and destructive uploading — so Pigliucci isn't adding anything to the discussion here. Second, this criticism ignores the gradual uploading scenario. It was that scenario that Chalmers thought might allow for identity to be preserved. So I'd have to say Pigliucci has failed to engage the issue. If this were a formal debate, the points would go to Chalmers. That's not to say that Chalmers is right; it's just to say that we have been given no reason to suppose he is wrong.
4. Conclusion
To sum up, Pigliucci is much more pessimistic than Chalmers. He thinks it unlikely that an upload would be conscious. This is because the computational theory of mind is flawed, and because we don't know what the material constraints on consciousness might be. He is also pessimistic about the prospect of identity being preserved through uploading, believing it is more likely to result in death or duplication.
I have suggested that Pigliucci may be right when it comes to consciousness: whatever the merits of the computational theory of mind, it is true that we don't know what it would take to build a functional isomorph of the human brain. But I have also suggested that he misses the point when it comes to identity.
~ John Danaher holds a PhD from University College Cork (Ireland) and is currently a lecturer in law at NUI Galway (Ireland). His research interests are eclectic, ranging broadly from philosophy of religion to legal theory, with particular interests in human enhancement and neuroethics.
John blogs at http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com/.
You can follow him on twitter @JohnDanaher.


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Oakland, California, United States, 10th Jan 2023 – Bliss Mushrooms is an Oakland-based luxury psychedelic company that produces ultra-high quality psilocybin products that are vegan, gluten-free, Non-GMO, and Fairtrade. The company is vertically integrated and operates in the relatively new psychedelic industry. In the latest record, the company has explored the potential benefits of microdosing psychedelics for mental health and well-being by carrying out research on famous celebrities and brands.
The Bliss mushrooms launched in Silicon Valley, a hub of innovation and technology. It has seen a trend of microdosing, where individuals consume small amounts of psychedelics, among entrepreneurs and employees in order to stimulate creativity and generate new ideas.Top of Form Similarly, Steve Jobs, the late founder of Apple, was a vocal advocate for the use of LSD by Bliss Mushrooms to boost creativity. Many entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, including tech billionaires Bill Gates and Elon musk have turned to microdosing psychedelics to enhance their creativity and productivity.
Furthermore, Kazumi is a 25-year-old social media influencer with a net worth of over $4 million, and she consumes Bliss Muhsrooms products to keep herself boosted. She has a large following on Instagram and Twitter and has been featured in Playboy and Maxim. Danii Banks is a 30-year-old digital influencer and plus-size model with nearly 8 million followers on Instagram. She has worked with various fashion and lifestyle brands, including Bliss Mushrooms, and is also popular on TikTok and YouTube for her lifestyle vlogs and lip-sync videos.
There is increasing evidence that both full doses and microdoses of psychedelic produced by Bliss Mushrooms may have mental health benefits. Previous studies have shown that psilocybin can relieve symptoms of depression and anxiety, and a recent study found that microdosing psilocybin may improve symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress. Bliss Mushrooms is trending amongst celebrities and influencer so the potential the company's psychedelics is all set make waves in the future.
About the company – Bliss Mushrooms
Bliss Mushrooms is a luxury psychedelic company based in Oakland, California. The company offers ultra-high quality psilocybin products that are vegan, gluten-free, non-GMO, and fair trade.
Their team is passionate about the potential of psychedelics to improve mental health and enhance overall well-being. As a vertically integrated company, it can oversee every step of the production process to ensure that our products meet the highest standards of purity and quality. They are committed to delivering safe, reliable, and consistent experiences to our customers.
In addition to our psilocybin products, Bliss Mushrooms also have a clothing division that partners with top fashion brands. Their fashion collaborations allow people to bring their unique perspective and values to the fashion industry.
For further information and updates about psychedelic product by Bliss Mushrooms, visit: Blissmushrooms.com
Media Contact
Organization: Bliss Mushrooms
Contact Person: Media Relations
Email: [email protected]
Website: https://blissmushrooms.com/
City: Oakland
State: California
Country: United States
Release Id: 2166
The post Bliss Mushrooms produces Microdosing Psychedelics to Boost Mental Health and Productivity appeared first on King Newswire.


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At the age of 85 she became seriously ill with her legs and feet badly swollen. She was rushed to hospital, where she was undressed and revealed to be male-bodied. The shock of being revealed brought on a heart attack and she died.
- Ivor Crews & Samkelo Kumalo. "After 65 Years the Secret of Christina the Nurse is Out … She's a Man!".. The Sunday Times, 27 July 1986. Reprinted in Ruth Morgan,, Charl Marais, Joy Rosemary Wellbeloved, and Robert Hamblin. Trans: Transgender Life Stories from South Africa. Johannesburg: Jacana, 2010: plate 5.


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I admit it, denizens. I am frazzled. Fried. Toast. Stick a fork in me; I'm done.
The absence of Cuters and sunshine have combined to give me a case of the blahs, and I really don't need to share them with you. My usual method of writing - to let my mind wander and my fingers follow along for the ride - will not yield anything worth reading, I fear.
So, for the new year, I leave you with words, mangled and otherwise. I promise to be back in 2011 with more serious rantings and ravings. For now, though think about the fact that....
You can be listless, but if you are full of energy does that mean you have list?
This came up in my first he's sick and I don't know what to do phone call to the pediatrician. In my frantic description I said that Big Cuter was listless. Sensing my over-concern, the doctor asked if he had had any list in the morning. It took me a minute, but I was able to laugh.... kinda sorta not really..... but the thought has never left me.
If you are feeling empathetic toward your fellow man, you are said to commiserate. By the same token, if you are alone with your sorrows do you miserate?
This morning, Little Cuter and I were emailing about the weather and missing each other and how we were feeding one another's angst and feeling vaguely guilty about it when she put a stop to the whole thing by saying that she didn't need any help, she could miserate with the best of them. I'm still laughing.
Re leaves itself open to many of these silly things. Can you juvenate by exercise and diet? The fact that you can re-juvenate yourself must imply the existence of a state of juvenation, don't you think? How can you go back to the original place again (the definition of the prefix re) if you were never there in the first place?
By the same token, when building a brand new house are you in the process of novatng? Again, if an old house can be re-novated it had be novate at some point, didn't it?
These are the kinds of things I think about when there's snow in them thar hills
the view from my front yard looking at the Pusch Ridge on December 30, 2010 at 4:30pm |


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Working together with providers and local and national governments, we believe we can help create a better health care system for our members.


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The Top 10 Greatest Film Lines Of The Modern Age
When you think of great films, quite often their greatness is established by one of three things – a great performance, a great scene, or, in this case, a great line. Dialogue makes or breaks a film, and some of the lines below truly made the films they appeared in; they're memorable, repeatable (although not always in esteemed company) and eminently classic – they're the greatest film lines of the last 30 years.
In the hundred or so years since film was invented and turned into a multi-billion dollar industry, plenty of ink has been spilled over lists and articles about just who has been the best – the best director, the best actor, the best musician – like humanity can't get enough out of figuring out the most superior of our own self-importance. The Hollywood awards season seems to last the entire year, with a multitude of industry-based awards shows dominating the blogosphere and newsprint each and every month, culminating in the very pinnacle of cinematic artistic achievement, The Academy Awards. Each year, golden gongs are handed out to those folks judged by others folks to be the best in their category at what they've done that year. Whether those awards are warranted or not isn't the point of this article; here, we're going to spotlight the very best of the best – the best Actors and Actresses, the best Directors, the best Films, even the best cinematic advances of the Modern Age. What do I mean by Modern Age, you ask. Simple. Hollywood's boom times of the 30's and 40's, at least prior to the War, are known today as the Golden Age, and the three decades after that could be termed the Bronze Age – with a shift into color film, multi-channel stereo and the re-invention of the Hollywood "blockbuster" away from biblical epics and sweeping melodramatic romance. The 80's, however, when you look at films produced at that time in a reflective mood, represents a shift both artistically and stylistically in the medium of film to such a degree that I think a new "age" of Hollywood could be coined: the Modern Age. An epoch of cinema between 1980 and 2010, 30 years of both massive successes, and epic fails. The Greatest of the Modern Age series attempts to distill the best of the Modern Age into a series of opinion-based lists, and we hope you enjoy (if not disagree with) our work.
When you think of great films, quite often their greatness is established by one of three things – a great performance, a great scene, or, in this case, a great line. Dialogue makes or breaks a film, and some of the lines below truly made the films they appeared in; they're memorable, repeatable (although not always in esteemed company) and eminently classic – they're the greatest film lines of the last 30 years. Feel free to leave your own choices in the comments section below.
After terrorists take over the US Presidents plane, Air Force One, the President himself (Harrison Ford) is called upon to take it to the insurgents and deliver his own brand of US-style justice. Typically gung-ho and filled with as much machismo and bravado as any Chuck Norris film, the President and the man Bad Guy (Gary Oldman) face off in the cargo hold of the plane, before the President, gaining the upper hand, says the line which cemented Ford as the best Cinema American President ever, before the inevitable heroic save. It's the kind of line which audiences cheer for, and in this case, Ford delivers it perfectly.
Danny Trejo delivers one of the last decades great one-liners in his recent outing as the Mexican federale Machete, in Robert Rodriguez's film of the same name. Bedding all the women in the film during the course of the story, and single-handedly killing more folks than any John Woo movie even thought of, Trejo's Machete responds to a request to keep in touch with the above line, in perfect deadpan delivery. It's Rodriguez and Trejo at their very bitchin' best.
Before it became uncool to actually enjoy this James Cameron-directed behemoth, audiences across the world fell in love with the story of Jack Dawson (Leonardo DiCaprio) and his romance with Rose DeWitt Bukater (Kate Winslet), and also with the unrivaled joy of seeing a brand new SS Titanic steaming across the Atlantic. In one key scene, in which Jack and a fellow passenger scamper up to the massive vessel's bowrail and stand above the waves and ocean with the wind in their faces, Jack screams the famous line into the sky – and into almost every list of famous film lines in history. Cameron himself abused the line in his cringe-worthy Oscar acceptance speech as Titanic took out almost every award possible (not quite, but it felt like it) and the line has now become an oft parodied classic. But back before the billion-dollar grosses and the massive Oscar swag, when Titanic was actually cool, this was the iconic line featured in every promo clip and trailer.
Berated in a courtroom whilst giving evidence into the death of one of the men on his Cuban base, Colonel Jessup (Jack Nicholson) loses his temper against upstart Navy lawyer Lt Kaffee (Tom Cruise), and delivers one of cinemas most astonishing confessions. Jessup is incensed at the gall Kaffee has to even ask a lot of the questions he does during the trial, swinging from vitriolic pride in his country to virtually name-calling Kaffee as a coward for not protecting his country, until the moment at which Jessup screams a question: "Do you want the truth?", to which Kaffee replies "Yes I want the truth": before Jessup's incriminating, case-closing final admission is unleashed. Nicholson and Cruise owned this film, which also starred Demi Moore, Kevin Pollack and Kevin Bacon, although the film is mostly remembered for the Cruise/Nicholson courtroom showdown finale. The screen nearly melts as these two cinematic heavyweights go at it, going for the jugular in what is still a masterclass in tension and payoff. The most iconic courtroom line ever has been parodied ever since.
When Bruce Willis's psychologist character approaches young Cole Sear to discuss his personality issues, the young lad lets him in on a tiny little secret; Cole can see ghosts. This now over-parodied line created the perfect storm of dread thrill and creepy unease when M Night Shyamalan scared the crap out of Planet Earth with his debut masterpiece The Sixth Sense, a film which had a twist so astonishing it ensured a cult following. In the years since, young star Haley Joel Osment went from cute to pudgy and eventually to out-of-work, while Bruce Willis just kept going from strength to strength. This line, in one of the genuinely scariest films of the last 30 years, remains the most iconic.
In a film filled with awesome, quotable lines, Ghostbusters contains one of the single greatest deadpan deliveries of any film, anywhere, and by the master of deadpan himself, Bill Murray. When confronted with pencil-necked bureaucrat Walter Peck (William Atherton, who would also play a slimy television reporter in the first two Die Hard films, forever cementing his on-screen persona of a complete tool), the Ghostbusters are brought before the mayor of New York City, where the insults between the government agent and our heroes reaches fever pitch when Ray (Dan Akroyd) makes mention of the fact that Peck has no penis. In response to a previous statement, the Mayor asks the Ghostbusters if this is true – and Peter (Bill Murray) hurls one of the 80's great lines across the screen, to the howls of laughter from the audience.
Poor Stanley Goodspeed (Nicolas Cage) – he's stuck on Alcatraz Island with a bunch of dead Navy Seals and one former British SAS operative, John Mason (Sean Connery), who's spent the last thirty years incarcerated with no charge. With a rogue military commander threatening to explode a highly toxic missile over San Francisco, Stanley can't get his head around the fact that only he and Mason are left to stop the deadly attack, and after complaining vociferously about how he's just "doing his best", Mason responds with one of the best ball-grabbing one-liners in a Michael Bay film, ever.
A favorite amongst female audiences across the world, Inigo Montoya (Mandy Patinkin) is seeking revenge against the six-fingered man who killed his father – and whenever he meets one of the men in the dastardly Count Ruel's employ, he delivers the above missive to strike fear into their hearts.
Arnold Schwarzenegger was already an action superstar by the time he appeared in James Cameron's sequel to The Terminator, and along with the dazzling special effects came the need to give the Austrian Oak yet another one-liner – after all, the man had made a career of singularly groan-inducing lines ever since he uttered the immortal "I'll be back" in the original Terminator film. The above quote, spoken at first by teen actor Edward Furlong while trying to teach the cybernetic construct how to behave more like a human (so it could blend in more appropriately), is fired right back by Arnie's Terminator, and the sharp delivery, mixed with Arnie's word-mangling accent, created a 90's icon. "Hasta la vista" was almost as big as Bart Simpson's "Eat my shorts" from around the same era, and when you've nearly outdone The Simpsons, you know you've made it.
In the pantheon of quotable films, The Blues Brothers ranks right up there at the very top, alongside Casablanca and Ernest Goes To Camp. When their childhood home, an orphanage, is threatened with closure over unpaid taxes, the brothers (Dan Akroyd and John Belushi) take to the road to get the band back together and raise some cash. Due to the religious nature of their upbringing, under the influence of the Nuns running the orphanage, they figure that their mission is – as the title suggests – from God, and so they remain untouched and virtually unblemished for almost the entire duration of the movie.


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A bill to conserve endangered species — from the red-cockaded woodpecker to the snuffbox mussel — was passed by the U.S. House in a 231-to-190 vote on Tuesday.
The Recovering America's Wildlife Act would create an annual fund of more than $1.3 billion, given to states, territories, and tribal nations for wildlife conservation on the ground. While threatened species have been defined and protected under the Endangered Species Act since 1973, that law does not provide robust funding to proactively maintain their numbers.
The effort comes as scientists and international organizations sound the alarm about accelerating species decline.
"Too many people don't realize ... that roughly one-third of our wildlife is at increased risk of extinction," said lead House sponsor Debbie Dingell, a Democrat from Michigan, echoing a recent study about climate change.
In the United States, there are more than 1,600 endangered or threatened species, according to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, but state agencies have identified more than 7 times that number in need of conservation assistance in their wildlife action plans.
"The bottom line is, when we save wildlife we save for ourselves," said Collin O'Mara, CEO of the National Wildlife Federation, which supports the bill. He said species loss threatens everything from the insects that pollinate plants in the food chain, to sea life that helps to insulate coastlines from storm surge.
The bill would amend a 1937 law, the Pittman-Robertson Act, which was passed in response to dwindling game and waterfowl species. That law allows states to tax hunting supplies to pay for wildlife and habitat restoration, but that money is not enough to do the same for non-game species, according to the Pew Charitable Trusts.
The act would also invest more in conservation than the existing program for threatened non-game species, called the State Wildlife Grant Program, which awarded states a total of $56 million this year.
One major stumbling block remains: how to pay for this investment.
Supporters continue to hash out the details, while critics such as Rep. Bruce Westerman (R-AR) called the current draft "regrettably flawed" because it would create a new permanent spending program. He urged members to vote against it.
The bill would require that 15% of all conservation money go to restoring populations of federally-listed endangered species.
On Monday, the White House released a statement, saying it "strongly supports" the goals of the bill.
Companion legislation in the Senate has 16 GOP co-sponsors.
Copyright 2022 NPR. To see more, visit https://www.npr.org.


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Hola! Let's get in touch!
Have a question for Florian or like to request a recipe from Florina? Take a peek at the FAQs below, or reach out to us directly. We're excited to connect with you!
Is blogging your full time job?
Where do you find your pottery?
Yes, blogging is my full time job. People don't realize how much work goes into a blog post behind the scenes, it truly takes a great team to run a successful blog.Start your blog because you feel like you have something unique to share with the world
I find my pottery all over the world. I'm lucky to enough to have family members that love to travel and they are always on the lookout for unique dishes and props for me. I also do a lot of Etsy shopping and love Anthropologie's home collection.
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