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Realme recently launched Realme X50 Pro smartphone, and the device offers the best features in its price range. After using this device, many users face common issues and problems in Realme X50 Pro smartphone.
But don't worry today. I will be giving you a proven solution for all the bugs and issues.
As you know, Android is an open-source operating system so that anyone can modify it according to their need. The smartphone manufacturers are using their own Custom operating systems. There is a very high chance of bugs and issues.
You can see on any device they are still suffering from bugs and problems. Today in this article, I have shown you in detail how you can fix those problems. So, let's get straight into our guide.
Page Contents
- 1 Realme X50 Pro Common Issues and Problems 2024
- 2 About Realme X50 Pro 5G
- 3 Tips & Tricks
- 3.1 Heating Problem on your Realme X50 Pro
- 3.2 Poor Battery Life on your Realme X50 Pro
- 3.3 A Laggy or Sluggish User interface on your Realme X50 Pro
- 3.4 Realme X50 Pro Phone unexpectedly shutting down
- 3.5 Realme X50 Pro Screen frozen or stuck
- 3.6 Apps Opening slow on the Realme X50 Pro
- 3.7 Apps and Games Crashes Suddenly or Unexpectedly on the Realme X50 Pro
- 3.8 Bluetooth not connecting on the Realme X50 Pro
- 3.9 Display cracked and touch not working on Realme X50 Pro
- 3.10 Wifi Connection problem or low range of wifi on Realme X50 Pro
- 3.11 Cellular network issue or Mobile Data Problem on the Realme X50 Pro
- 3.12 Apps not downloading from the Play Store on Realme X50 Pro
- 4 Conclusion
Realme X50 Pro Common Issues and Problems 2024
In this article, I have discussed various issues with the Realme X50 Pro. All the solution explained below is tested and working. Please stick to this article till the end. It will be very beneficial for you.
I will highly suggest you read the complete article to avoid confusion. And make sure to understand every method before applying it to your Realme X50 Pro device.
About Realme X50 Pro 5G
Let's have a quick look at the key specifications of Realme X50 Pro 5G.
- This phone comes with a 6.44 inches Full HD plus display, which is protected by Corning Gorilla Glass 5.
- Realme X50 Pro 5G has a Snapdragon 865 chipset. It's an Octa-core CPU.
- We are getting Realme UI 1.0 on top of Android 10 (Q).
- It has 12 GB of RAM and 256 GB Internal Storage.
- Talking about the Camera, we get a Quad Rear-facing camera of 64 MP + 12 MP + 8 MP + 2 MP and a Dual 32 MP + 8 MP Selfie Camera.
- Realme X50 Pro 5G comes with a Non-removable 4200 mAh battery, which also supports Fast Battery Charging.
Tips & Tricks
Below I have shared various common problems and their solutions. These problems are most common on almost every smartphone out there. But you don't have to worry if you are facing any problem with your Realme X50 Pro smartphone, then I am sure today in this guide you will definitely get your solution.
So, let's quickly get into the first problem.
Heating Problem on your Realme X50 Pro
Suppose you are facing Heating problems on your Realme X50 Pro smartphone. This issue is common and can be solved with some tweaks.
How to fix the heating issue on the Realme X50 Pro?
- After the phone is fully charged, unplug the phone. This often causes overheating problems.
- Make sure to use a thin back cover. Using a thick back cover may lead to improper ventilation of your phone and can cause heating problems.
- Don't play games while charging your phone, and don't use your phone too much while charging.
- Always be sure to use the original charger when you are charging the Realme X50 Pro smartphone.
- The biggest reason for phone overheating is gaming for long hours. This is a common issue in almost every smartphone.
- Do not install Unsupported Apps and Games on your phone. This often causes overheating problems.
- Always keep your phone updated and regularly update all your apps.
- Never let your phone storage become full. Because of this, your phone may become slow and cause heating issues.
- Sometimes because of the high temperature of your home environment, even heating problems can happen.
- Always download your app from Google Play Store. Sometimes the apps downloaded from the internet can cause heating problems.
- If your battery is too old and not in healthy condition, that is also the main reason for the Realme X50 Pro smartphone's overheating.
Also, Unlock Bootloader on Realme X50 Pro
The above steps will make sure that your phone temperature doesn't rise. However, if you are still facing this issue, then straightaway go to the service center and get it resolved.
Poor Battery Life on your Realme X50 Pro
If your Realme X50 Pro battery is draining fastly, then you can follow the below steps. By following the below steps, you can identify the cause of the issue on your smartphone.
How to fix poor battery life on the Realme X50 Pro device?
- Always Turn off GPS whenever GPS is not needed.
- If you have installed apps like phone cleaner, then make sure to uninstall it. These apps run in the background and eat up your phone battery.
- Never download apps other than the play store. These apps may contain malware that runs on your phone background and lead to battery draining issues.
- Always try to use your phone in general settings. Do not use your Realme X50 Pro device in custom settings, which can be the reason for poor battery life.
- If you face a high drop in your phone's battery percentage, try to replace your battery.
- Using Realme X50 Pro in high screen brightness settings may reduce your battery fast.
- If you play more games, this should also be the reason that your battery runs out quickly.
- Check if you are facing battery problems after installing any apps on your phone.
- If you have installed an app that claims that it will boost your phone battery backup, uninstall it.
- Keeping your phone in power-saving mode for long hours also causes the battery to run out quickly.
- If the battery problem continues after following the above steps, try the factory reset on your Realme X50 Pro.
Related – How to Install TWRP on Realme X50 Pro (TWRP File May Or May Not Be available as per the development)
After following the above steps, I am sure that you will not face it again. In case you are still facing any issues, then contact your smartphone customer support and follow the instructions.
A Laggy or Sluggish User interface on your Realme X50 Pro
Do you feel a laggy and sluggish user interface while using your phone? If yes, then here is the complete solution for your device. Please read all the steps carefully before applying them to your phone.
How to Fix Lag on the Realme X50 Pro Android device?
- If you are using any antivirus app on your phone or using any junk cleaning app, then uninstall it.
- Make sure your internal phone storage has sufficient space left. If your phone space is running out, then free some space, and your Realme X50 Pro phone will be back to normal.
- Connect your phone to a PC/ Laptop and scan it with Quick Heal or any trusted antivirus. This will remove the virus from your phone.
- Sometimes due to slow internet, you may encounter laggy and sluggish experiences.
- If the problem continues after following the above steps, then try Factory Reset your phone. Go to Settings → System → Reset Options → Select "Erase all data (factory reset)". There is a high probability that after Factory reset, your phone will run must faster than before.
- The apps which are of no use, uninstall it.
- Sometimes using a custom theme on your phone may lead to the slow performance of your phone.
- If you have recently installed a third-party launcher on your Realme X50 Pro, it can be the reason for this problem. You may uninstall it and revert to the default theme.
- Try to perform a basic reboot of your device and check whether the problem is fixed or not.
- Check if your phone is on the latest android version. If not, then update your phone to the latest OS available.
- Update all your apps whenever updates are available.
I have discussed all possible solutions that can easily fix lag problems on Realme X50 Pro.
Realme X50 Pro Phone unexpectedly shutting down
This issue is very common among android smartphones. In this issue, your phone suddenly powers off. If you face the same problem with your Realme X50 Pro smartphone, consider the below steps.
How to fix sudden shut down in Realme X50 Pro?
- First, check whether your Realme X50 Pro battery is working fine or not. To do that, Go to the phone dialer and type *#*#4636#*#* and dial. Now you can see that "Battery information."
- If your phone's temperature is rising high, this may also be the reason for your phone's sudden shutdown. Due to the phone's heat, it may also damage your device components.
- Don't use bulky back covers; this may cause heating problems due to improper ventilation.
- Make sure to check your phone Internal Storage has left some space. If not, then this can be the reason for unexpectedly powering off.
- After applying the above steps, do a Factory reset on Realme X50 Pro if the problem continues. This will definitely solve your problems.
Related – How to Root Realme X50 Pro
After following the steps will surely fix the sudden shutdown issue on Realme X50 Pro. But you still encounter this issue, then go to your phone service center and get it resolved.
Realme X50 Pro Screen frozen or stuck
You may face this issue while playing games, performing a task, or while making calls. This issue is mainly caused because of low RAM on your android phone. Follow the below steps to fix this issue.
How to fix screen froze or stuck on Realme X50 Pro?
- Firstly, Check for Android updates on your smartphone. If an update is available now, then update it immediately.
- If there are any apps on your phone that you do not use, then uninstall or Force stop them.
- Restart your Realme X50 Pro in safe mode and Wait to see if the problem goes away. If not, then Restart your phone normally and remove the app that caused the problem.
- You can face screen stuck issues on particular apps like Instagram. This is not the problem with the app. Either your phone has low memory or less storage left on your phone.
- If you face this issue while using an App, Go to Apps → See All Apps → Select the app. You are facing problems and clear its cache.
- The last steps are to Factory Reset your Realme X50 Pro smartphone. This could solve all your problems.
Also, How to Install Custom ROM on Realme X50 Pro (Custom ROM Download File May Or May Not Be available as per the development)
The main cause of this issue is the RAM. I hope after following the above instructions you can fix this problem.
Apps Opening slow on the Realme X50 Pro
You must have seen many times that whenever you open an app, it opens up very slowly. You will find this problem on all phones. If this issue is coming in your phone, too, then follow some simple steps given below.
How to Fix Apps open slowly on Realme X50 Pro?
- First of all, check that your phone's Internal Storage has enough space. If not, then Delete some trash files and check.
- Many times this problem arises because of the improper RAM management on your Phone. In that case, you can use RAM Booster App. This will help you with the overall performance of your device.
- Check if you have installed any Mod Apps or Games on your device. If you have installed it, then uninstall it right away from the Realme X50 Pro device.
- If the problem is coming in all the apps, you have to restart your phone and check it. With this, there is more chance of success.
- You can use the Lite version of apps. This may decrease more RAM Usage on your Phone.
- If this problem still arises, then you should Factory Reset your Phone.
Related – How to Install Stock ROM on Realme X50 Pro
If you still encounter this issue, then contact your service provider.
Apps and Games Crashes Suddenly or Unexpectedly on the Realme X50 Pro
Whenever you open an app or game, and it suddenly closes, this is a common issue and can be fixed by following the steps given below to solve this problem.
How to fix sudden app crashes on Realme X50 Pro?
- First, go to Settings → Apps and search for the app, which is causing a problem. Select the app and clear the data.
- Check if your phone Internal Storage has at least 1 GB of storage left.
- Uninstall the app and then again Install the app. This will fix the app crashing issue.
- Make sure to update the app to the latest version.
- If you have enabled Power Saving Mode or Safe Mode, then make sure to Disable it.
- Lastly, scan your device using an Antivirus app.
Also, How to Unlock Bootloader on Realme X50 Pro
The above steps must fix this problem. If you are still facing the issue, then leave a comment mentioning your issue.
Bluetooth not connecting on the Realme X50 Pro
Is your Bluetooth being disconnected when you turn on Bluetooth and connect with other devices? If yes, follow the steps given below.
How to fix the Bluetooth connection issue on Realme X50 Pro?
- Make sure you are not running your device under safe mode.
- This problem can occur because of the OTA Updates. So, check if there is any update available.
- If you have made any changes to Bluetooth settings, then make sure to restore to default settings.
- Check if your device is discoverable to other phones.
- Turn Off your phone Bluetooth for a few minutes and then again turn it ON.
- Remove all previously paired devices from Realme X50 Pro and check if the problem is fixed.
Also, How to Install TWRP Recovery on Realme X50 Pro (TWRP File May Or May Not Be available as per the development)
This will make sure your Bluetooth connection is stable and working fine.
Display cracked and touch not working on Realme X50 Pro
If your phone display is cracked and you want to access the data, follow the below steps.
How to access data if the phone touch is not working on Realme X50 Pro?
- You can connect your Realme X50 Pro to your PC/Laptop using a USB cable. By doing this, you can easily access all your data.
- If you have stored your data on a micro SD card, then take it out and insert it again. Check if this fixes the issue.
- The problem could be the failure of the screen sensor. Check it and take the required action.
- If you want to use any apps on your phone, then you can use an OTG Cable. Connect wireless Keyboard and Mouse. This way, you can access your phone like a PC.
- You can try the above steps if your touch functionality is not working.
I hope you find the above steps useful and working for you. If not, then make sure to drop a comment below describing your issue.
Wifi Connection problem or low range of wifi on Realme X50 Pro
If you face slow internet speed using wifi, you can follow the below steps to solve this problem.
How to Fix wifi Connection problem on Realme X50 Pro?
- Sometimes due to bad weather conditions may be the reason. You may face this issue very often during rainy or unpleasant weather.
- Check your modem if there is an issue, or you can reset its settings.
- You can try turning the wifi Router on and off a few times.
- Make sure you are not outside the wifi Router Range. This is the common reason for low range wifi.
- Turn On Airplane Mode on Realme X50 Pro for 2-3 minutes and then turn it Off. Now check whether the problem is fixed or not.
- Lastly, check whether you have used the entire bandwidth limit of your plan.
Also, How to Root Realme X50 Pro
Once you follow the above steps and still face the problems, try connecting to different Wifi connections. If the problem appears the same with the different wifi, take your phone to the service center and fix it.
Cellular network issue or Mobile Data Problem on the Realme X50 Pro
Many times we face cellular network issues on almost every smartphone. If you see fluctuations on your phone network or not getting a proper signal, you must try the below steps.
How to fix the Cellular network and Mobile Data network in Realme X50 Pro?
- Take out SIM Card from your Realme X50 Pro device and then insert the SIM again.
- If the problem continues, Turn On Airplane Mode, and after a few seconds, Turn it Off again.
- You can try resetting your Network Settings.
- This problem may often occur due to obstacles in between your phone and the mobile tower.
- Restart your Phone and check if the problem is fixed.
- Check if you are facing a network issue because of an app that you have recently installed.
Related – How to Install Custom ROM on Realme X50 Pro (Custom ROM Download File May Or May Not Be available as per the development)
This issue is very common. I hope you can get this fixed by following the above steps. If you are still facing network drop on Realme X50 Pro, please leave a comment. I will guide you further.
Apps not downloading from the Play Store on Realme X50 Pro
This is a common problem, and it may be caused by a new update on the play store. You follow the below steps and fix this problem.
How to Fix Apps not downloading from the play store on Realme X50 Pro?
- You can Restart your Realme X50 Pro smartphone and check if the issue is fixed.
- Next, Clear the local search history of the play store.
- Try Clear app data of google play store. This will surely fix this problem.
Also, How to Unroot Realme X50 Pro
That should surely fix this issue. And anytime if you face this issue, follow the above steps, and I am 100% sure you will be able to fix this issue.
This article covers all the problems and solutions you face on the Realme X50 Pro smartphone. I have tried my best to get those possible issues that Realme X50 Pro users face on their smartphones.
If you are still facing any problems that are not listed above, then make sure to leave a comment, and I will try my best to fix the issue.
See you in the next guide 🙂 Cheers


text:
It will be warm day in Love Land when you surprise your lady with this ravishing array of orange, light orange and dark orange roses in a sparkling flared vase. Twenty-four fabulous, flaming roses in all - she'll definitely feel the heat.
This dazzling bouquet includes orange roses, light orange roses and dark orange roses accented with salal.

subset: commoncrawl


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Each bracket is designed and fabricated to order, tailored to the exact specs and angles of your boat and tower for a perfect fit and finish. Our brackets are fabricated from a carbon fiber composite, strong enough to handle years of exposure to the elements. Each bracket has a neoprene lining, not only to protect the finish of your tower, but also ensures you bracket is solid and secure, free from slipping and able to adapt to the constant expansion and contraction of your tower from temperature change and vibration. The brackets include a threaded socket for our flag poles, an extra slot for a 3/8" skier down flag and pole, and stainless steel hardware. All brackets have a matte black finish.
MB Sports Tower Side Mount Brackets


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2 Samuel 7
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2 Samuel 7
God's Covenant with David
1Now when the king dwelt in his house, and the Lord had given him rest from all his enemies round about, 2the king said to Nathan the prophet, "See now, I dwell in a house of cedar, but the ark of God dwells in a tent." 3And Nathan said to the king, "Go, do all that is in your heart; for the Lord is with you."
4But that same night the word of the Lord came to Nathan, 5"Go and tell my servant David, 'Thus says the Lord: Would you build me a house to dwell in? 6I have not dwelt in a house since the day I brought up the people of Israel from Egypt to this day, but I have been moving about in a tent for my dwelling. 7In all places where I have moved with all the people of Israel, did I speak a word with any of the judgesa of Israel, whom I commanded to shepherd my people Israel, saying, "Why have you not built me a house of cedar?" ' 8Now therefore thus you shall say to my servant David, 'Thus says the Lord of hosts, I took you from the pasture, from following the sheep, that you should be prince over my people Israel; 9and I have been with you wherever you went, and have cut off all your enemies from before you; and I will make for you a great name, like the name of the great ones of the earth. 10And I will appoint a place for my people Israel, and will plant them, that they may dwell in their own place, and be disturbed no more; and violent men shall afflict them no more, as formerly, 11from the time that I appointed judges over my people Israel; and I will give you rest from all your enemies. Moreover the Lord declares to you that the Lord will make you a house. 12When your days are fulfilled and you lie down with your fathers, I will raise up your offspring after you, who shall come forth from your body, and I will establish his kingdom. 13He shall build a house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever. 14I will be his father, and he shall be my son. When he commits iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, with the stripes of the sons of men; 15but I will not takeb my steadfast love from him, as I took it from Saul, whom I put away from before you. 16And your house and your kingdom shall be made sure for ever before me; your throne shall be established for ever.' " 17In accordance with all these words, and in accordance with all this vision, Nathan spoke to David.
David's Prayer
18Then King David went in and sat before the Lord, and said, "Who am I, O Lord God, and what is my house, that thou hast brought me thus far? 19And yet this was a small thing in thy eyes, O Lord God; thou hast spoken also of thy servant's house for a great while to come, and hast shown me future generations,c O Lord God! 20And what more can David say to thee? For thou knowest thy servant, O Lord God! 21Because of thy promise, and according to thy own heart, thou hast wrought all this greatness, to make thy servant know it. 22Therefore thou art great, O Lord God; for there is none like thee, and there is no God besides thee, according to all that we have heard with our ears. 23What otherd nation on earth is like thy people Israel, whom God went to redeem to be his people, making himself a name, and doing for theme great and terrible things, by driving outf before his people a nation and its gods?g 24And thou didst establish for thyself thy people Israel to be thy people for ever; and thou, O Lord, didst become their God. 25And now, O Lord God, confirm for ever the word which thou hast spoken concerning thy servant and concerning his house, and do as thou hast spoken; 26and thy name will be magnified for ever, saying, 'The Lord of hosts is God over Israel,' and the house of thy servant David will be established before thee. 27For thou, O Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, hast made this revelation to thy servant, saying, 'I will build you a house'; therefore thy servant has found courage to pray this prayer to thee. 28And now, O Lord God, thou art God, and thy words are true, and thou hast promised this good thing to thy servant; 29now therefore may it please thee to bless the house of thy servant, that it may continue for ever before thee; for thou, O Lord God, hast spoken, and with thy blessing shall the house of thy servant be blessed for ever."


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Showing Collections: 1 - 1 of 1
Collected Works of Will Inman
Identifier: SC-MS-136
Scope and Contents
Will Inman is a Wilmington-born poet who spent most of his time in Tuscon, Arizona. The Collected Works of Will Inman contains papers from 1945 to 2009 that provide context to Inman's life as a poet. These papers include Inman's literary work, such as poems, short stories, novel manuscripts, literary publications, and handwritten notes. In addition, this collection includes Inman's editorial work. From the early 1960s to the early 1980s, Inman edited and distributed "Kauri."...
1923 - 2009, undated
Found in:
Randall Library Special Collections


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The Clinton Administration's Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
May 1994
Executive Summary:
The Clinton Administration's Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
Last year, President Clinton ordered an inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. This policy review has resulted in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). The President signed this directive, following the completion of extensive consultations with Members of Congress. This paper summarizes the key elements of that directive.
As specified in the "Bottom-Up Review," the primary mission of the U.S. Armed Forces remains to be prepared to fight and win two simultaneous regional conflicts. In this context, peacekeeping can be one useful tool to help prevent and resolve such conflicts before they pose direct threats to our national security. Peacekeeping cap also serve U.S. interests by promoting democracy, regional security, and economic growth.
The policy directive (PDD) addresses six major issues of reform and improvement:
1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support—both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops.
-- To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations, with the most stringent applying to U.S. participation in missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.
2. Reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations, both the percentage our nation pays for each operation and the cost of the operations themselves.
-- To achieve this goal, the policy directive orders that we work to reduce our peacekeeping assessment percentage from the current 31.7% to 25% by January 1, 1996, and proposes a number of specific steps to reduce the cost of UN peace operations.
3. Defining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in UN peace operations.
-- The policy directive underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However1 as Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander when doing so serves American security interests, just as American leaders have done numerous times since the Revolutionary War, including in Operation Desert Storm.
-- The greater the anticipated U.S. military role, the less like it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
4. Reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations.
-- The policy recommends 11 steps to strengthen UN management of peace operations and directs U.S. support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information and command and control capabilities.
5. Improving the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations.
-- The policy directive creates a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the U.S. Government. Under this approach, the Department of Defense will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve U.S. combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not U.S. troops are involved. This approach will ensure that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant military component.
-- The State Department will retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, the State Department remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and ins tructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York.
6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive. the Congress and the American Public on peace operations.
-- The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President believes U.S. support for and participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term with the bipartisan support of Congress and the American people
Key Elements of the Clinton Administration's Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations
The Role of Peace Operations in U.S. Foreign Policy1
Serious threats to the security of the United States still exist in the post-Cold War era. New threats will emerge. The United States remains committed to meeting such threats.
When our interests dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and win wars1 unilaterally whenever necessary. To do so, we must create the required capabilities and maintain them ready to use. UN peace operations cannot substitute for this requirement.
Circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace. In such cases, the UN can be an important instrument for collective action. UN peace operations can also provide a force multiplier in our efforts to promote peace and stability.
During the Cold War, the United Nations could resort to multilateral peace operations only in the few cases when the interests of the Soviet Union and the West did not conflict. In the new strategic environment such operations can serve more often as a cost-effective tool to advance American as well as collective interests in maintaining peace in key regions and create global burden-sharing for peace.
Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which could spill across international borders) and the collapse of governmental authority in some states are among the current threats to peace. While many of these conflicts may not directly threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is significant. The UN has sought to play a constructive role in such situations by mediating disputes and obtaining agreement to cease-fires and political settlements. Where such agreements have been reached, the interposition of neutral forces under UN auspices has, in many cases, helped facilitate lasting peace.
UN peace operations have served important U.S. national interests. In Cambodia, UN efforts led to an election protected by peacekeepers, the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees and the end of a destabilizing regional conflict. In El Salvador , the UN sponsored elections and is helping to end a long and bitter civil war. The UN's supervision of Namibia's transition to independence removed a potential source of conflict in strategic southern Africa and promoted democracy. The UN in Cyprus has prevented the outbreak of war between two NATO allies. Peacekeeping on the Golan Heights has helped preserve peace between Israel and Syria. In Former Yugoslavia, the UN has provided badly-needed humanitarian assistance and helped prevent the conflict from spreading to other parts of the region. UN-imposed sanctions against Iraq, coupled with the peacekeeping operation on the Kuwait border, are constraining Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors.
Need for Reform
While serving U.S. interests, UN peace operations continue require improvement and reform. Currently, each operation created and managed separately, and economies of scale are lost. Likewise, further organizational changes at UN Headquarters would improve efficiency and effectiveness. fully independent office of Inspector General should be established immediately. The U.S. assessment rate should reduced to 25 per cent.
Since it is in our interest at times to support UN peace operations, it is also in our interest to seek to strengthen UN peacekeeping capabilities and to make operations less expensive and peacekeeping management more accountable. Similarly, it is in our interest to identify clearly and quickly those peace operations we will support and those we will not. Our policy establishes clear guidelines for making such decisions.
Role in U.S. Foreign Policy
UN and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of a cause we support. Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.
While the President never relinquishes command of U.S. forces, the participation of U.S. military personnel in UN operations can, in particular circumstances, serve U.S. interests. First, U.S. military participation may, at times, be necessary to persuade others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests. Second, U.S. participation may be one way to exercise U.S. influence over an important UN mission, without unilaterally bearing the burden. Third, the U.S. may be called upon and choose to provide unique capabilities to important operations that other countries cannot.
In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for achieving U.S. objectives. If U.S. participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom Up Review), we would place our national interest uppermost. The U.S. will maintain the capability to act unilaterally or in coalitions when our most significant interests and those of our friends and allies are at stake. Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed 4n proper perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in UN operations. We will provide information about U.S. capabilities for data bases and planning purposes.
It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations. Instead, this policy, which builds upon work begun by previous administrations and is informed by the concerns of the Congress and our experience in recent peace operations, aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective. Congress must also be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping.
* * * *
I. Supporting the Right Peace Operations
i. Voting for Peace Operations
The U.S. will support well-defined peace operations, generally, as a tool to provide finite windows of opportunity to allow combatants to resolve their differences and failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves. Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified timeframe tied to intermediate or final objectives, an integrated political/military strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, and a firm budget estimate. The U.S. will continue to urge the UN Secretariat and Security Council members to engage in rigorous, standard evaluations of all proposed new peace operations.
The Administration will consider the factors below when deciding whether to vote for a proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a regionally-sponsored peace operation:
-- UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
-- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following:
-- International aggression, or;
-- Urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence;
-- Sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.
-- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
-- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations, a cease-fire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.
-- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
-- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.
-- The political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.
-- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.
These factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device. Decisions have been and will be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.
In addition, using the factors above, the U.S. will continue to scrutinize closely all existing peace operations when they come up for regular renewal by the Security Council to assess the value of continuing them. In appropriate cases, the U.S. will seek voluntary contributions by beneficiary nations or enhanced host nation support to reduce or cover, at least partially, the costs of certain UN operations. The U.S. will also consider voting against renewal of certain long-standing peace operations that are failing to meet established objectives in order to free military and financial resources for more pressing UN missions.
ii. Participating in UN and Other Peace Operations
The Administration will continue to apply even stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in a given peace operati6n. In addition to the factors listed above, we will consider the following factors:
-- Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable.
-- Personnel, funds and other resources are available;
-- U.S. participation is necessary for operation's success;
-- The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified;
-- Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled;
-- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.
Additional, even more rigorous factors will be applied when there is the possibility of significant U.S. participation in Chapter VII operations that are likely to involve combat:
-- There exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
-- There exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;
-- There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives.
Any recommendation to the President will be based on the cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.
II. The Role of Regional Organizations
In some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve regional organizations. The U.S. will continue to emphasize the UN as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the U.S. will support efforts to improve regional organizations' peacekeeping capabilities.
When regional organizations or groupings seek to conduct peacekeeping with UNSC endorsement, U.S. support will be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and meeting established UNSC criteria, including neutrality, consent of the conflicting parties, formal UNSC oversight and finite, renewal mandates.
With respect to the question of peacekeeping in the territory of the former Soviet Union, requests for "traditional" UN blue-helmeted operations will be considered on the same basis as other requests, using the factors previously outlined (e.g., a threat to international peace and security, clear objectives, etc.). U.S. support for these operations will, as with other such requests, be conditioned on adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and established UNSC criteria.
III. Reducing Costs
Although peacekeeping can be a good investment for the U.S., it would be better and more sustainable if it cost less. The Administration is committed to reducing the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs to 25% by January 1, 1996, down from the current rate of 31.7%. We will also inform the UN of Congress's likely refusal to fund U.S. peacekeeping assessments at a rate higher than 25% after Fiscal Year 1995.
The Administration remains concerned that the UN has not rectified management inefficiencies that result in excessive costs and, on occasion, fraud and abuse. As a matter of priority, the U.S. will continue to press for dramatic administrative and management improvements in the UN system. particular, the U.S. is working hard to ensure that new and on-going peace operations are cost-effective and properly managed. Towards this end, the U.S. is pursuing a number of finance and budget management refor ms, including:
-- immediate establishment of a permanent, fully independent office of Inspector General with oversight responsibility that includes peacekeeping;
-- unified budget for all peace operations, with a contingency fund, financed by a single annual peacekeeping assessment;
-- standing cadre of professional budget experts from member states, particularly top contributing countries, to assist the UN in developing credible budgets and financial plans;
-- enlargement of the revolving peacekeeping reserve fund to $500 million, using voluntary contributions;
-- Required status of forces/mission agreements that provide preferential host nation support to peacekeeping operations;
-- prohibit UN "borrowing" from peacekeeping funds to finance cash shortfalls in regular UN administrative operations;
-- revise the special peacekeeping scale of assessments to base it on a 3-year average of national income and rationalize Group C so that higher income countries pay their regular budget rate.
Moreover, the U.S. will use its voice and vote in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations to contain costs of UN peace operations once they are underway.
IV. Strengthening the UN
If peace operations are to be effective and efficient when the U.S. believes they are necessary, the UN must improve the way peace operations are managed. Our goal is not to create a global high command but to enable the UN to manage its existing load more effectively. At present each UN operation is created and managed separately by a still somewhat understaffed UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As a result, support to the field may suffer, economies of scale are lost, and work is duplicated. Moreover, the UN's command and control capabilities, particularly in complex operations, need substantial improvement. Structural changes at UN Headquarters, some of which are already underway, would make a positive difference.
A. The U.S. proposals include the reconfiguration and expansion of the staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to create:
-- Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and preparation for new and on-going operations;
-- Information and Research Division linked to field operations to obtain and provide current information, manage a 24 hour watch center, and monitor open source material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments;
-- Operations Division with a modern command, control and communications (C3) architecture based on commercial systems;
-- Logistics Division to manage both competitive commercial contracts (which should be re-bid regularly on the basis of price and performance) and a cost-effective logistics computer network to link the UN DPKO with logistics offices in participating member nations. This system would enable the UN to request price and availability data and to order materiel from participating states;
--Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going peace operations and disseminating information within host countries in order to reduce the risks to UN personnel and increase the potential for mission success;
-- Small Civilian Police Cell to manage police missions, plan for the establishment of police and judicial institutions, and develop standard procedures, doctrine and training.
B. To eliminate lengthy, potentially disastrous delays after a mission has been authorized, the UN should establish:
-- a rapidly deolovable headquarters team, a initial logistics support unit, and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new missions;
-- of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that nations could provide for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations;
-- trained civilian reserve corps to serve as a ready, external talent pool to assist in the administration, management, and execution of UN peace operations;
-- modest airlift capability available through pre-negotiated contracts with commercial firms or member states to support urgent deployments.
C. Finally, the UN should establish a professional Peace Operations Training Program for commanders and other military and civilian personnel.
D. Consistent with the specific proposals outlined above, the U.S. will actively support efforts in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly to redeploy resources within the UN to enable the effective augmentation of the UN DPKO along the lines outlined above. In addition, the U.S. is Prepared to undertake the following. primarily on a reimbursable basis:
-- detail appropriate numbers of civilian and military personnel to DPKO in New York in advisory or support roles;
-- share information, as appropriate, while ensuring full protection of sources and methods;
-- offer to design a command, control, and communications systems architecture for the Operations Division, using commercially available systems and software;
-- offer to assist DPKO to establish an improved, cost-effective logistics system to support UN peacekeeping operations;
-- offer to help design the database of military forces or capabilities and to notify DPKO, for inclusion in the database, of specific U.S. capabilities that could be made available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. U .S. notification in no way implies a commitment to provide those capabilities, if asked by the UN;
-- detail public affairs specialists to the UN;
-- offer to help create and establish a training program, participate in peacekeeping training efforts and offer the use of U.S. facilities for training purposes.
V. Command and Control of U.S. Forces
A. Our Policy: The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.
There is nothing new about this Administration's policy regarding the command and control of U.S. forces. U.S. military personnel have participated in UN peace operations since 1948. American forces have served under the operational control of foreign commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I, World War II, Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its inception. We have done so and will continue to do so when the President determines it serves U.S. national interests.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military personnel have begun serving in UN operations in greater numbers. President Bush sent a large U.S. field hospital unit to Croatia and observers to Cambodia, Kuwait and Western Sahara. President Clinton has deployed two U.S. infantry companies to Macedonia in a monitoring capacity and logisticians to the UN operation in Somalia.
B. Definition of Command: No President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces. Command constitutes the authority to issue orders covering every aspect of military operations and administration. The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field. The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate.
C. Definition of Operational Control: It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of command) to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, factors such as the mission, the size of the proposed U.S. force, the risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement will be carefully considered.
Operational control is a subset of command. It is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President, and assign tasks to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. Within the limits of operational control, a foreign UN commander cannot. change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.
D. Fundamental Elements of U.S. Command Always Apply: If it is to our advantage to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a UN commander, the fundamental elements of U.S. command still apply. U.S. commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher U.S. military authorities, as well as the UN commander. Commanders of U.S. military units participating in UN operations will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law, or are outside the mandate of the mission to which the U.S. agreed with the UN if they are unable to resolve the matter with the UN commander. The U.S. reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered.
There is no intention to use these conditions to subvert the operational chain of command. Unity of command remains a vital concern. Questions of legality, mission mandate, and prudence will continue to be worked out "on the ground" before the orders are issued. The U.S. will continue to work with the UN and other member states to streamline command and control procedures and maximize effective coordination on the ground.
E. Protection of U.S. Peacekeepers: The U.S. remains concerned that in some cases, captured UN peacekeepers and UN peace enforcers may not have adequate protection under international law. The U.S. believes that individuals captured while performing UN peacekeeping or UN peace enforcement activities, whether as members of a UN force or a U.S. force executing a UN Security Council mandate, should, as a matter of policy, be immediately released to UN officials; until released, at a minimum they should be accorded protections identical to those afforded prisoners of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention III (GPW). The U.S. will generally seek to incorporate appropriate language into UN Security Council resolutions that establish or extend peace operations in order to provide adequate legal protection to captured UN peacekeepers. In appropriate cases, the U.S. would seek assurances that U.S. forces assisting the UN are treated as experts on mission for the United Nations, and thus are entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities and are subject to immediate release when captured. Moreover, the Administration is actively involved in negotiating a draft international convention at the United Nations to provide a special international status for individuals serving in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under a UN mandate. Finally, the Administration will take appropriate steps to ensure that any U.S. military personnel captured while serving as part of a multinational peacekeeping force or peace enforcement effort are immediately released to UN authorities.
VI. Strengthening U.S. Support for Multilateral Peace Operations
Peace operations have changed since the end of the Cold War. They are no longer limited to the interposition of small numbers of passive, unarmed observers. Today, they also include more complex and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and humanitarian objectives.
The post-Cold War world has also witnessed the emergence of peace enforcement operations involving the threat or use of force. These missions have been considerably more challenging than traditional peacekeeping operations, yet the U.S. and the UN are only now beginning to change sufficiently the way they manage peace operations. The expansion of peacekeeping operations without a commensurate expansion of capabilities has contributed to noticeable setbacks. If the U.S. is to support the full range of peace operations effectively, when it is in our interests to do so, our government, not just the UN, must adapt.
It is no longer sufficient to view peace operations solely through a political prism. It is critical also to bring a clear military perspective to bear, particularly on those missions that are likely to involve the use of force or the participation of U.S. combat units. Thus, the Department of Defense should join the Department of State in assuming both policy and funding responsibility for appropriate peace operations. We call this policy "shared responsibility."
A. Shared Responsibility: DOD will assume new responsibilities for managing and funding those UN peace operations that are likely to involve combat and all operations in which U.S. combat units are participating. The military requirements of these operations demand DOD's leadership in coordinating U.S. oversight and management. Professional military judgment increases the prospects of success of such operations. Moreover, with policy management responsibility comes funding responsibility.
DOD will pay the UN assessment for those traditional UN peacekeeping missions (so called "Chapter VI" operations, because they operate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) in which U.S. combat units are participating, e.g. Macedonia. DOD will also pay the UN assessment for all UN peace enforcement missions (so called "Chapter VII" operations), e.g. Bosnia and Somalia. State will continue to manage and pay for traditional peacekeeping missions in which there are no U.S. combat units participating, e.g. Golan Heights, El Salvador, Cambodia.
When U.S. military personnel, goods or services are used for UN peace operations, DOD will receive direct and full reimbursement; reimbursement can only be waived in exceptional circumstances, and only by the President.
Our Shared Responsibility policy states: "Unless the President determines otherwise, at the request of one of the Principals:
-- The State Department will have lead responsibility 2 for the oversight and management of those traditional peacekeeping operations (Chapter VI) in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the existing State Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities account, and;
-- The Defense Department will have lead responsibility for the oversight and management of those Chapter VI operations in which there are U.S. combat units and for all peace enforcement (Chapter VII) peace operations. The Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations through the establishment of a new account within DOD established to pay UN assessments. Once such an account is established, DOD may receive direct reimbursement from the UN for contributions of goods, services, and troops to UN peace operations."
The Administration will submit legislation to Congress creating a new peacekeeping assessment account for DOD and implementing the shared responsibility concept. The legislation will stipulate that, in all cases, the agency with lead responsibility for a given operation will be responsible for assessments associated with that operation.
Since peace operations are neither wholly military nor wholly political in nature, consisting instead of military, political, humanitarian and developmental elements in varying degrees, no one agency alone can manage all facets of an operation effectively. Therefore, the designated lead agencies will engage in full and regular interagency consultation as they manage U.S. support for peace operations.
In all cases, State remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN Mission in New York. DOD is responsible for military assessments and activities. NSC facilitates interagency coordination.
B. Reimbursements from the UN: Under the shared responsibility policy, and the proposed accompanying legal authorities, DOD would receive and retain direct reimbursement for its contributions of troops, goods and services to the UN. An import ant advantage will be to limit any adverse impact on DOD Operations and Maintenance funds, which are essential to U.S. military readiness. As our draft legislation stipulates, the U.S. will seek full reimbursement from the UN for U.S. contributions of troops, good and services. The U.S. will first apply reimbursements against DOD incremental costs. Any remaining excess after the Services have been made whole would be credited to DOD's proposed peacekeeping account when it is a DOD-led operation or to State's CIPA account when it is a State-led operation. The President may choose to waive UN reimbursement only in exceptional circumstances.
C. U.S. Funding of UN Peace Operations: In the short term, the Administration will seek Congressional support for funding the USG's projected UN peacekeeping arrears. Over the long run, we view the shared responsibility approach outlined above as the best means of ensuring improved management and adequate funding of UN peace operations. Moreover, the Administration will make every effort to budget for known peacekeeping assessments and seek Congressional support to fund, in the annual appropriation, assessments for clearly anticipated contingencies.
D. U.S. Training: The Armed Services will include appropriate peacekeeping/emergency humanitarian assistance training in DOD training programs. Training U.S. forces to fight and decisively win wars will, however, continue to be the highest training priority.
VII. Congress and the American People
To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the American people must understand and accept the potential value of such operations as tools of U.S. interests. Congress and the American people must also be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations.
Traditionally, the Executive branch has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to UN peacekeeping. This lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become more numerous, complex and expensive. The Clinton Administration is committed to working with Congress to improve and regularize communication and consultation on these important issues. Specifically, the Administration will:
-- Regularize recently-initiated periodic consultations with bipartisan Congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S. forces, including possible deployments of U.S. military units in UN peace operations.
-- Continue recently-initiated monthly staff briefings on the UN's upcoming calendar, including current, new, and expanded peace operations.
-- Inform Congress as soon as possible of unanticipated votes in the UNSC on new or expanded peace operations.
-- Inform Congress of UN command and control arrangements when U.S. military units participate in UN operations.
-- Provide UN documents to appropriate committees on a timely basis.
-- Submit to Congress a comprehensive annual report on UN peace operations.
-- Support legislation along the lines of that introduced by Senators Mitchell, Nunn, Byrd and Warner to amend the War Powers Resolution to introduce a consultative mechanism and to eliminate the 60-day withdrawal provisions.
* * * *
Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives. The U.S. cannot be the world's policeman. Nor can we ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states-crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests. This policy is designed to impose discipline on both the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collective security.
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
1For simplicity, the term peace operations is used in this document to mean the entire spectrum of activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement aimed at defusing and resolving international conflicts.2 Lead responsibility refers to the coordination of interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an on-going peace operation. The lead agency will chair the interagency working group (IWG) established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions.


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On Monday, October 4, the Supreme Court declined to consider a petition filed by Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri. Al-Marri is perhaps the least well known of the three persons who have been held in the United States as enemy combatants.
The decision was unsurprising yet still disappointing. Al-Marri, who has been waiting for nearly three years, should not have to wait another day to get the justice that he was due all along.
As with dirty bomb suspect Jose Padilla, the Court basically is telling al-Marri to come back later. Last spring, in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, the Court ruled 5-4 that Padillas challenge to his detention should have been filed in South Carolina. Now, the Court is, in effect, sending the same message to al-Marri.
The Court should not have interposed this unnecessary delay. The legal issue is precisely the same, wherever the case is filed. And, as I will argue below, the outcome of Padilla and al-Marris challenges is clear from prior Court rulings.
Their incommunicado detentions, with no charges filed against them, and no initial access to attorneys, are as they always were plainly unconstitutional. Delaying these cases only extends unconstitutional and already lengthy detentions in military prisons.
Moreover, as I will explain, this is far from the only disturbing aspect of the al-Marri and Padilla cases. They also serve, as the public record reflects, to prove that the government is using the enemy combatant designation tactically not in a consistent way, based on the facts and the law.
Its bad enough that the government invented a label that, in its view, allows both Geneva Convention safeguards and U.S. Constitutional rights to be stripped away. The government has compounded this error by failing to use the label in any principled way.
The facts of al-Marris case
Before his arrest, al-Marri a Qatari national was attending graduate school at Bradley University in Illinois. Originally, the government held him on a material witness warrant. Then it charged him with making false statements. Less than a month before al-Marris trial, the government dropped its charges against him, and declared him an enemy combatant.
Few people know that the government sought to have al-Marris criminal case dismissed without prejudice that is, without losing the governments ability to choose later to re-indict him in a civilian criminal court. But that tactic failed.
After designating al-Marri an enemy combatant, the government held him incommunicado in a South Carolina military prison where [Yasir] Hamdi (due under an agreement he signed last September to be released no later than next September 30, but still in custody) and Padilla are also being held.
Al-Marris attorneys challenged his detention in Illinois. But the government argues that his habeas corpus petition should have been filed in South Carolina, where the government incarcerated him. As noted above, this is the same argument the government successfully made with respect to Jose Padilla as reflected in the Padilla v. Rumsfeld decision.
The Courts view on the Padilla and al-Marri cases is already clear
Although Padilla and al-Marris hearings in the Supreme Court on the merits of their cases have been delayed, it is quite clear what the Court will ultimately rule.
In the Rasul v. Bush case, the Court ruled, 6-3, that federal courts have the jurisdiction to consider challenges to the custody of foreigners; specifically, the noncitizen detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the right to file petitions for habeas corpus.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, pointed out the unique circumstances of the petitioners (2 Australians and 12 Kuwaitis):
They are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.
Because the courts of the United States have traditionally been open to nonresident aliens, the Court held that the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the executives potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.
The Rasul majority found that nothing in any of the Courts cases categorically excludes aliens detained in military custody outside the United States from the privilege of litigation in U.S. courts. Thus, it was no surprise that in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a majority of the justices found that due process demands that a citizen held on American soil as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker.
In a plurality opinion and a concurrence, the Court in Hamdi held that the administration could label Yaser Hamdi an enemy combatant, but that Hamdi has the Due Process right to challenge the governments claimed justification for his detention before an impartial adjudicator.
Justice OConnor explained that history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others. She elaborated:
It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nations commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad…. [D]ue process demands some system for a citizen detainee to refute his classification.
Together, the Rasul and Hamdi cases telegraph that when Padilla refiles his case in the proper court, he should receive the Due Process right to challenge before an unbiased arbitrator the governments rationale for his detention.
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society, Justice Stevens wrote in an impassioned dissent in Padilla. He compared unconstrained executive detention for the purpose of investigating and preventing subversive activity to the Star Chamber.
The executive detention of subversives, Justice Stevens wrote, may not be justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information…. For if this nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.
Although the government has made much of the distinction between citizens and noncitizens, the truth is that the U.S. Constitutions Bill of Rights speaks of persons not citizens. Thus, al-Marri has Due Process rights just as surely as Padilla does.
As soon as there is a ruling then either in South Carolina or, if the lower federal courts err, from the Supreme Court Padilla and al-Marris illegal detention must end. But as the days pass, their unconstitutional imprisonment continues. The Court should be ashamed not to have intervened, when it could have, to stop an ongoing constitutional violation of the most serious kind.
Short of being executed or tortured (options the current administration also seems to favor), being detained in a military prison with no end date, no charges filed, and no right to contact with the outside world, is perhaps the most Kafkaesque nightmare imaginable. But the Court has allowed that nightmare to continue, when it could have ended it.
Part 1 | Part 2
This article originally appeared as a FindLaws Writ legal commentary on October 11, 2004, and is reprinted with permission.