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WE LOST Explaining the Rise and Fallof the Center-Right Parties in Central Europe, 1996-2002
Table of Contents
T he purpose for conducting this study is very simple and reflects the experience of the International Republican Institute (IRI) in the region. From 1996 to 1998, pro-reform, pro-Western and generally center-right parties and coalitions won aseries of elections around Central and Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania,Macedonia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, center-right forces defeated post-Commu-nist and national populist parties and formed new governments. All of these promised toimplement long-delayed economic and political reforms and accelerate the dual processesof integration into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO). Most of them demonstrated solid progress toward these goals. By the next cycleof elections (2000 to 2002), however, six of the seven were out of power, and in severalcases (Romania, Poland and Lithuania) the center-right parties themselves were essen-tially destroyed.When IRI launched its Regional Program for Central and Eastern Europe in the summer of1999, our partners were often busy incumbents flying to center-right summits on govern-mental aircraft. Just a couple of years later we worked with them as with representatives ofthe opposition at best; at worst, some of our former partners fell into political oblivion.While there is no reason per se to lament failures of specific parties as something necessarilyfatal to the progress of the center-right project in the region, it is important for us to un-derstand the factors that led to these failures. Political scientists and journalists sometimesuse the term 'pendulum swing' to describe a massive and uniform pattern of incumbencychange across a region, as if this pendulum effect had the power of destiny and were not sup-ported by definable causes. Our approach, however, is based on the assumption that causeswere definable and can serve as lessons for other parties in similar situations.We are fully aware that from the point of view of democratic theory there is a strong argu-ment in favor of alternation of power and its healthy impact on democratic consolidation.6 why we lost
This alternation, however, is not a blessing as such.1 Rather, its import depends first onwhat kind of actors are involved, and second, on the nature of the learning process theygo through when they hand power over to their opponents. For moderate, center-rightparties (and for the left, as well), it is crucially important to analyze and reflect upon fail-ures, not only based on the 'selfish' interest of avoiding similar mistakes in future cyclesof incumbency, but also as a contribution to this learning process and thus to the betterfunctioning of democracy in their countries.For this reason, IRI has commissioned this series of country studies to analyze the reasonsfor the sometimes spectacular electoral setbacks suffered by center-right parties that fol-lowed their equally spectacular triumphs four years earlier. Funded though the support ofthe United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the ambitions of theproject, rather than to produce far-reaching scholarship, are to produce a political over-view that offers a space for reflection on the part of those who care about the fate of thecenter right in Central and Eastern Europe. This does not mean that authors lack scientificbackground and rigor; for all of them, the analysis of politics is their quotidian undertak-ing. Each of them comes from a milieu that is sympathetic to, or at least interested, incenter-right politics in the country about which he has written. With one recent exception,though, none of them is actively involved in party politics on the national level.Although IRI is pleased to have gathered these case studies together, it is important to notethat the opinions expressed are those of the individual authors, not necessarily those of theInternational Republican Institute or anyone else involved in the publication of this book.
1 Certainly, it would not be difficult to offer a plausible argument in favor of unchallenged perseverance in power (over more than one term) of strong, coherent parties endowed with a capacity to implement their programs and policies, assuming these contribute to an increase of wealth and the consolidation of democracy. Fore word 7
moderate ones. Further, there is a serious body of research available regarding these par-ties positing a widespread assumption that alternation in power of the moderate right andthe moderate left as we have known it in the US and Western Europe is the most desirablescenario for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.How, then, did the moderate right develop in the countries of interest in this study? Inprobably the most successful conceptual treatment of the moderate right in post-Com-munist Europe to date, Seán Hanley asserts that the group of moderate center-right partiesshould be clearly distinguished from other 'non-left' groupings, be they centrist liberals,national populists (such as the HZDS in Slovakia) or the radical nationalist right. (SeeHanley, Seán, "Getting the Right Right: Redefining the Centre-Right in Post-CommunistEurope," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20:3, pp. 9-27.)In general, according to this approach, "the center right in the region… is a product of the politics of late Communism, domestic reform, European integration and post-Cold War geopolitical realign- ment, which…powerfully reshaped historical influences and foreign models" (Han- ley, page 9). Elsewhere Hanley reiterates that center-right parties "must therefore be understood as essentially 'new' political forces, shaped by late Communism and the subsequent politics of post-communist transformation, rather than a simple throw- back to the authoritarian conservatisms and integral nationalisms of the past. At the same time, however, contrary to the assumptions of some writers, the liberal, neo- liberal, conservative and neo-conservative identities and ideologies adopted by such forces are more than hasty borrowings from the West or dictas from international financial institutions" (Hanley, page 15).Crucial for the development of the right in individual countries was a struggle for domi-nation of the right side of the political spectrum among various 'versions of the right,'namely among (market) liberals, (national) conservatives and European-oriented Chris-tian democrats in the mold of the German center-right umbrella parties. An example ofeach of these strains of thought was not present in each country, however, so the internalback-and-forth on the center right differed widely from place to place. More details aboutthe results of this struggle are to be found in the concluding chapter of this study.This struggle for dominance on the right also has systemic importance. Is it possible to speakof any special role the right-of-center parties played in development of party systems assuch? According to some, yes: "the development of competitive multi-party systems in East Central Europe has been driven by the contest between parties to define the post-Communist 'right.' The stabi- lization of the party system reflects directly the extent to which this contest has been resolved, and this has meant that the competition between a liberal free market right and Christian national right has been accorded a prominent role. Defining the left proved easier…" (Sitter, Nick, "Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party System Change in Europe, East and West". Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3:3, pp. 447).Similarly, Anna Vachudová admits that the question of whether healthy alternation in powerwas taking place hinged in part upon the character of the parties on the right in each country."It depended on whether moderate right-wing parties emerged that managed to appropriatethe traditional appeals of the right; and on whether they were coherent enough to govern, and8 why we lost
oppose, effectively." (Vachudová, Anna M., "Integration, Security and Immigration. The Euro-pean Agendas of Eastern Europe's Right Wing Parties." Paper presented at the Conference ofEuropeanists, The Council for European Studies, Chicago, 14-16 March 2002, page 1.)Regardless of the exact results of this endeavor to dominate the right, the ideologies of the rightin the region include a number of common elements: anti-Communism, conservatism (whichmay, and indeed often has, included nationalism and populism), economic liberalism (supportfor free markets) and in many cases a more-or-less influential element of traditional WesternEuropean Christian democracy. "The ideologies of Eastern and Central Europe's new center-right combine both historic discourses and newer ideas imported from Western contexts ordeveloped locally during the post-communist transformation" (Hanley, page 17).Thus, to summarize, "the 'centre-right' in the region should be broadly understood as a set of parties seek- ing broad electoral support for programmes fusing elements of liberalism (including neo-liberalism) and varieties of conservatism, which balance the demands of post- communist social transformation, modernization and Europeanization with older historical identities and ideologies" (Hanley, pages 22-23, italics added).This is actually a very solid attempt at defining the moderate right – the right with a chanceto rule and to contribute to consolidation of democracy (to contrast it, for example, withthe HZDS in Slovakia, which only had broad appeal and resulting governing potential, butwhose conduct in the mid- to late-1990s was irreconcilably at odds with any non-authori-tarian version of democratic consolidation). In short, the moderate right is moderate pre-cisely because it refrains from pursuing radical strategies and agendas aimed at restricted"sociologically distinct," determined, intransigent electorates with narrow interests. In-stead, moderate parties of the right seek to address broad groups of voters with programstouching the national interest and presenting 'nation-wide' visions.According to Sitter (page 435), there are three basic strategies of opposition in which par-ties in the region have been engaged. The first is general left-right competition between oramong major parties and blocks (usually post-opposition right versus post-Communist,reformed left) typified by catch-all appeals and an attempt to compete as government ver-sus opposition. Secondly, some parties have tried to mobilize pre-Communist identities(ethnicity, region) or narrower group interests. Characteristically, these parties have beenless successful than the previous group; at best they established a secondary dimension ofcompetition cutting across the main one. Finally, parties with radical appeals – most fre-quently radical-leftist, unreformed Communists, or the radical right – established them-selves on the flanks of the party system, with limited capacity to influence it in a moredecisive way. Needless to say, the main subjects of this study are the parties that make upthe group of largely moderate potential incumbents.
half of the 1990s. The second, equally obvious fact is that with the exception of Slovakia, eachfailed to defend its incumbency in the early years of the next decade. This group of countriesis far from homogenous. They differ as to whom the center right defeated, as well as withrespect to whom it consequently succumbed. The questions of how and why this happenedwill be touched upon in individual country chapters and in the concluding section.In the first respect, generally, center-right forces defeated either unreformed Communistsemploying nationalism and economic populism (Romania, Bulgaria) or a reformed andmore-or-less moderate, post-Communist left (Poland, Hungary, Macedonia and Lithu-ania). Only in the case of Slovakia was it something else – national populism with semi-authoritarian leanings, which was non-leftist, but certainly not moderate.In the second respect, four years later the parties in our analysis were mainly beaten bythe counterpart they had previously defeated. In Hungary and Macedonia, the parties onthe right lost to their traditional social-democratic rivals. In the case of Poland, it was aresurgent, moderate left, which in the meantime had gone through organizational con-solidation. In Lithuania, it was the post-Communist, moderate left in alliance with a newmoderate leftist party. The Romanian right was ousted from power by the formerly unre-constructed left, which during its period in opposition underwent further modernizationand moderation. Only in Bulgaria did the right lose to a completely new challenger – ananti-establishment party of benign, centrist populism.There are several caveats to be pointed out in case of Slovakia (which, clearly, has been in-cluded in this study as a contrasting case) which may account for its exceptionalism, i.e.the absence of consequent electoral defeat of the right. Without the intent to anticipate anexplanation provided later in the chapter on Slovakia, it is useful to mention that in Slovakiathe center right actually did not defeat the post-Communist left, but a national populist bloc.The proper left was the right's hesitant ally in this effort. Further, the task of 'constructing' aviable moderate right and the mission of fighting the authoritarianism of Vladimír Mečiar'sregime coincided before the 1998 elections, just as well as they coincided with the centerright's rule and its maintenance later. This, together with the intervening factor of pendingaccession to EU, may have decisively contributed to the fact that the right has not conse-quently yielded either to Mečiar's party (which completely lost coalition potential and wasnot able to rule alone) or the new, leftist-populist challenger, Smer.The fact that in six of our seven cases the center right failed (sometimes dramatically) todefend its governing position will be analyzed elsewhere. What remains to mention arethe direct and indirect ramifications of these defeats for the political scenes of the respec-tive countries in general and for the center right, in particular.There are several major trends that can be distinguished in Central and East Europeanpolitics since the crumbling of the right's dominance in the late 1990s. Not all of them area direct result of the center-right electoral failures in 2000-2002 – actually, they are ratherthe consequence of center right's conduct in power than electoral failures as such. On asystemic level, to be sure, in the early years of the new century we witnessed a reassertionof the left in positions of power. But there are other developments within politics in theregion that are more interesting than just a pendulum swing, the most important being theentrance of the new countries into the club of democracies, dramatic developments withintraditional parties, and the emergence of the new parties.10 why we lost
Since 2002, several recently independent countries rid themselves of authoritarian, na-tional-populist regimes and entered the club of consolidating democracies. In Croatia, theideologically mixed (centrist–leftist), anti-Tudjman opposition won elections in 2000 andformed a broad coalition. Its rule, however, proved to be a series of missed opportunities andscarce success. Given this, and the fact that post-Tudjman Croatian Democratic Community(HDZ) learned the lesson of moderation, the party was returned to power in the 2004 elec-tions. This offers the optimistic prospect of future alternation in power of two major moder-ate blocs. Serbia also did away with the regime of Slobodan Milošević, but the democratic,non-authoritarian elements of its new government remain deeply troubled by a divisionseparating parties on questions of the past, Serbian nationalism and attitudes towards theHague tribunal. Cutting across the entire political spectrum, this cleavage divides also the(potentially moderate) right. Prospect for moderation in Serbia are thus rather bleaker.Further, substantial changes and dramatic developments have occurred within the tradition-al parties as a result of widespread popular dissatisfaction with their policies and conduct.Electorates often have denied support to long-established parties (be they in governmentor in opposition). The most interesting are the cases in which popular disappointment didnot lead to a vote for the traditional opposition, but rather to support for new challengers– be they radical and extremist parties emerging from the margins of political system (theCommunists in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Self-Defense in Poland, or the GreaterRomania Party), or to completely new competitors (the League of Polish Families).Finally, new parties have emerged in the region by mobilizing their support differentlythan the traditional actors and campaigning on new issues. This was the case when sup-port denied to failing traditional parties went to newly emerging antiestablishment partiesof either largely centrist and 'benign' populism (National Movement Simeon II in Bulgar-ia) or to more ideologically colored, antiestablishment critics of the right (New Era in Lat-via, Res Publica in Estonia and the Alliance of the New Citizen in Slovakia) or left (Smerin Slovakia). These new claimants to power thrived on the establishment's incapability tofulfill their electoral promises and deliver effective policies. They based their campaignson issues of public ethics, competence and political conduct and style – with corruptionand neglect of public interest as a common denominator – rather than on policy issues.This strategy often struck a chord with frustrated electorates and was rewarded in the formof votes, seats and incumbency.These and other tendencies manifested themselves also within the center-right camp,members of which often suffered serious blows and splits. Some remained major opposi-tion forces (Hungary, Macedonia), but others did not. The Homeland Union in Lithuaniawent through a dramatic change, from being a dominant ruling force to near outsiderstatus, from which it has recovered notably during the last few years. Right-of-center co-alitions such as Solidarity Election Action in Poland and the Democratic Convention inRomania decomposed. Some, like the National Christian Democratic Peasant Party inRomania, fell into oblivion. The Polish right, stable in public opinion, but organizationallyshaky, has even reinvented itself once again.This leads us to the emergence of the new actors professing to be on the right – the new'antiestablishment right.' New Era, Res Publica, and the Alliance of the New Citizen moreor less explicitly declared their right-of-center orientation, while campaigning against the Fore word 11
political conduct of the traditional right. Their success and preponderance in governmentposed the problem of troublesome coexistence of the new and old center right in rulingcoalitions. Even though the popularity of antiestablishment parties decreases after sometime in power, this 'trouble' affecting Baltic and Slovak politics seems to have the potentialto play a role for some time to come and to defy a tendency toward inclusion of the new-comers in the establishment.Finally, there seems in some cases to be a trend among the center right toward a lukewarmattitude to European integration. It seems that only in the Baltic States and Slovenia is theright is proudly pro-European; elsewhere, the perspective on European integration as nowembodied in the EU is more differentiated. Even though there exist powerful hindrancesfor parties to express their reservations about the pace and form of European integrationopenly, some certainly do not hesitate to make use of these reservations for the sake of ideo-logical rejuvenation or reanimation – the Czech Civic Democratic Party, parties of the Pol-ish right and, to some extent, the Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia are illustra-tive cases. So, the crucial question regarding the future of the center right will have a muchto do with the question of whether center-right parties will adopt 'Euroskeptic' stances thatattempt to "shield the national culture from the process of European integration, and pre-serve cultural coherence in the face of rising immigration" (Vachudová, page 1).Given the fact that we are probably facing another swing of the pendulum, which mayreturn many center-right parties across Central and Eastern Europe to power, our analysismay help the these parties and their successors to address these emerging trends by learn-ing the lessons of their own shortcomings in the period when they were last in power andhad face equally complex and pressing dilemmas.
LITERATURE:Hanley, Seán (2004) "Getting the Right Right: Redefining the Centre-Right in Post-Com-munist Europe." Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20:3, pp. 9-27.Sitter, Nick (2002) "Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party System Change in Europe, Eastand West." Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3:3, pp. 425-451.Vachudová, Anna M (2002) "Integration, Security and Immigration. The European Agen-das of Eastern Europe's Right Wing Parties." Paper presented at the Conference of Europe-anists, The Council for European Studies, Chicago, 14-16 March 2002. Rise, Fall and Disintegration: The Bulgarian Center Right in Power and in Opposition (1997 – 2005)
CONTENTS: I. THE CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CENTER RIGHT II. THE TURNING POINT: THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTIONS IN JUNE 1996III. THE FAILURE OF THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT (1995-1996)IV. THE ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN POWER (1997-2001) V. THE REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT IN JUNE 2001VI. WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE (2001-2005)VII. WHAT HAS HAPPENNED (2001-2004)14 why we lost
T he 10th of November, 1989 is widely considered as the beginning of a new era in Bul- garian political life. On that date the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) forced the long-time Communist head of state, Todor Zhivkov, to resign.This sudden change, later called "a peaceful coup d'etat," opened a new chapter in Bulgarianhistory and was followed by an outburst of political activity. Taking advantage of the alteredpolitical climate, Bulgarian citizens quickly organized themselves into parties, civic move-ments, committees, discussion clubs and trade unions. On 7 December, less than a monthafter the ousting of Zhivkov from power, ten organizations met at the Institute of Sociologyof the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and created the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)coalition. After 45 years of totalitarian, Communist rule there was again organized politicalopposition in Bulgaria. Starting in 1989 as an amorphous anti-Communist coalition, theUnion was consolidated in 1997 into a single party with a Christian democratic ideology.The history of the Bulgarian center right in the last 15 years almost completely coincideswith the history of the UDF. It is full of numerous splits and personal conflicts, falls andtriumphs, unexpected turns and controversial politicians, achievements and failures, his-toric victories and everyday petty squabbling. Historical analyses of the center right, as wellas of the Bulgarian political and economic transition since 1989, are in their initial stages.There are no authorities to be challenged, no established "right" or "left" interpretations, noperiodization to be questioned. There is only a general agreement among political scientiststoday that the Bulgarian party system is not consolidated, and that the processes affecting itscentrist and center-right components are too dynamic to allow any prediction.Although the future is unclear, the recent past of the center right is now relatively clear.The protests in the winter of 1996-97 against the government of the Bulgarian Social-ist Party (BSP) opened the way for the radical reforms which the ex-Communists quitesuccessfully had blocked until then. And no one would argue against the evaluation thatunder the leadership of Prime Minister Ivan Kostov (1997-2001) the democratic forcesrealized their two major goals – creating the foundation of a free-market economy andpulling the country out of the Russian sphere of influence. However only twelve monthsbefore the reformers came to power, the Bulgarian center right was weak and dividedwhile the strong and united left seemed invincible.
hands of the Socialists. Although he was elected on the UDF ticket in January 1992, at theend of that year relations between him and the coalition broke down because of his harshcritique of the UDF government of Philip Dimitrov. By the end of 1993, the presidencyand the UDF turned into two separate and even competing centers of influence.At the end of 1995 (i.e. one year before the end of his five-year mandate), President Zhe-lev announced that he would run for another five-year term. In response, the coalitionPeople's Union (PU), which had split from the UDF, declared its support for his candidacy,whereas the UDF declared its intention to nominate its own candidate. The worst scenariofor the opposition thus materialized, culminating in the evil of running two democraticcandidates against the Socialist's one. And this took place at the moment when the BSPseemed ready and eager to concentrate all available power in its hands.All attempts at mediation within the democratic sector failed. President Zhelev refused towithdraw from the race, and the UDF refused to accept him as its candidate for a secondterm. In this deadlock, an agreement for a vote transfer between the first and the secondround of voting, according to which candidates of the right would compete in the firstround, while in the second the supporters of the defeated one would support the victor,seemed like a reasonable solution. It was clear that no one in a three-candidate race wouldbe able to win in the first round. There were three arguments against this solution. First,the experience from the 1995 local elections clearly indicated that a vote transfer wouldnot exceed 65%. Second, it was not difficult to foresee that an election campaign with twodemocratic candidates could lead to mutual attacks and bitter accusations, resulting inhostility and distrust between the opposition parties. Third, there was tremendous publicpressure in favor of one democratic candidate. Polls clearly indicated that should the dem-ocratic community field two candidates, a Socialist would be Bulgaria's next president,leaving the country entirely in the hands of the ex-Communists.
one) argued that primaries were inappropriate for European politics. All the nay-sayerswere right in one respect: unsuccessful primaries would expose the opposition to ridiculeand sow the seeds of its total collapse.Together with the parties and a Bulgarian non-governmental organization called the Cen-ter for Liberal Strategies, IRI formed a working group to discuss the details and preparethe text of a general agreement among all sides in the process. The group included inde-pendent experts, representatives of the presidency and all of the opposition political par-ties in the parliament. The final document was signed on 29 March by Ivan Kostov (UDF),Anastasia Moser (PU), Stefan Savov (PU) and the representative of the Movement forRights and Freedoms (MRF), Ahmed Dogan. Later the agreement was signed by the twocontenders, President Zhelev and the UDF candidate Petar Stoyanov. The first two clausesof the document stated that an accord had been reached to "nominate a joint candidatefor the presidential elections in Bulgaria through the process of primary elections" and"to support the nominee who wins the primaries and not to nominate or support othercandidates in the presidential elections."The first presidential primaries in Bulgaria took place on Saturday, 1 June 1996. The turn-out was 858,560, with voters facing a choice between President Zhelev and the youngerUDF candidate Stoyanov. There were no incidents during the process. On 4 June, it wasclear that Zhelev had lost by a two-to-one ratio to the younger contender. Stoyanov be-came the official joint candidate of all democratic parties in Bulgaria for the coming presi-dential elections in October. He went on to win the "real" elections with a record-breakingmargin of 20% in the second round against the candidate of the BSP. Six months later, anewly formed coalition called the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) won early parliamen-tary elections.The presidential primaries were a turning point in the course of the Bulgarian transitionto democracy and a market economy. Undoubtedly they remain as an excellent exampleof what the Bulgarian center-right parties could achieve through political dialogue andcooperation in spite of internal fights and conflicts. But while the center-right partieswere overcoming the crisis within their own ranks, the BSP government was dragging thewhole country into the worst economic crises since the liberation of Bulgaria from theOttoman Empire in 1878.
Stock breeding had great difficulties, too. All of this resulted in skyrocketing prices forfood in the country. The prices of milk and yoghurt increased five times; meat, cheese,sugar, rice, and flour-based products followed suit. Bread beat all records by increasingsevenfold. Fuel and heating also went up fivefold. Living standards fell by three fourths asthe attempt to go back to the "good old days" collapsed like a deck of cards, bringing thecountry down with it.The situation was not better for foreign investment. In 1996 Bulgaria ranked last among thepost-Communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe in foreign investments. The gov-ernment had deliberately created an investment-hostile climate. Foreign individuals werebanned from owning land and, what was worse, BSP leaders openly expressed their hostilitytowards selling "our precious soil to greedy foreigners." This bleak future reduced the num-ber of serious "green-field" investors who were so badly needed at that time. The Socialiststhought that in this way they could force investors to buy existing enterprises, but these wereinefficient and unattractive. There were changes in the investment legislation that specifical-ly precluded expatriate Bulgarians from investing in the country. The ex-Communist partyhad always disliked, for political reasons, Bulgarians who left the country and tried to harmthem economically. The immense bureaucracy the country inherited from Communismhad neither the expertise nor the incentive to develop a pro-investment policy. Several mul-tinational companies, among them the Rover Group, had to pull their production facilitiesout of the country. Negotiations with Russia's gas giant Gazprom for the construction of oilpipelines were stalled. This was an unpleasant surprise, since the government had believedthat the Russians would make some compromises in the name of the old political friendshipwith fellow ex-Communists. Bulgaria was rapidly deteriorating from a promising develop-ing market to a barren desert starved for foreign investment.Nothing, however, compared with the disastrous collapse of the banking system and itsconsequences. An enormous devaluation of the Bulgarian national currency (the lev) be-gan almost at the same time as a crisis in the banking system began to develop. Accordingto economic commentators, political analysts and leaders of the opposition, most of the"bad credit," streaming out of state banks went directly into the coffers of the Socialists andfinanced their election campaigns in 1994 and 1995.By the spring of 1996, it was clear the banking system was tottering. Also, the governmentfailed to isolate the biggest loss-makers in the economy from additional credit. The budget col-lapsed and had to be redrafted twice before the end of the year. No serious privatization dealwas agreed upon. Banks went down one after another, as the population engaged in severalmass runs on the lev, and the currency collapsed against the dollar by about nine tenths of itsvalue. Fifteen banks were ultimately put under special supervision. Millions of depositors andhundreds of enterprises lost the right to operate with their own assets. Bulgarians went throughthe bitter experience of hyperinflation, a phenomenon that was until then quite alien to the na-tion. The overwhelming majority of the population was unable to take any kind of precaution-ary measures, relying on a blind faith that sooner or later "the state will fix things." The panicand shock that followed were unprecedented in Bulgarian history.Following months of public apathy – and as a result of the profound shock of seeing stan-dards of living drop so dramatically – the nation took to the streets demanding electionsand rapid economic reform. On 3 January 1997, the first mass gathering took place in Sofia,18 why we lost
reminiscent in scale of the gatherings in neighboring Belgrade, and also of the 1990 Bulgar-ian "Velvet Revolution." Days of mass protests around the country followed. The protestsstarted from Sofia, but this time they spread all over the country. The arrogant behavior ofthe Socialists in January brought even more frustration. After the resignation of Prime Min-ister Videnov, the Socialist majority in parliament decided to elect a new BSP government.The discontent of the citizens exploded. Massive daily demonstrations paralyzed the capitaland all major cities. All the nation's major cities and villages, as well as major points androutes, were barricaded and manned by determined citizens. The demand was simple – nomore Socialist governments, and early elections as soon as possible.On 4 February in front of the Alexander Nevski Cathedral in Sofia at a huge rally of theopposition, the leader of the UDF and future prime minister, Ivan Kostov, announced thatBSP had agreed to call elections for April. For the next two months, a caretaker cabinet,headed by the UDF mayor of Sofia, Stefan Sofianski, was appointed by newly elected Presi-dent Stoyanov. These early elections confirmed the decisive change of mood in the nation.For the first time since 1989, an overwhelming majority of Bulgarians was prepared toadmit the necessity of the painful reforms necessary to make a clean break from theirCommunist past.
In the area of defense, Bulgaria emerged as one of NATO's most impressive participantsin the Partnership for Peace joint-forces exercises, working hand-in-hand with the UnitedStates Department of Defense on a top-to-bottom military reform program. Bulgaria alsowas active in the Euroatlantic Partnership Council. Very quickly Bulgaria became one ofthe great success stories of the world's emerging markets and a leading candidate for thenext round of NATO expansion.From its first day, the government actively pursued membership in Western institutions,including NATO and the European Union. The ADF maintained close contacts and anactive dialogue with NATO and EU officials on all relevant political, financial and militaryissues related to its future membership. In many ways, the Bulgarian government attempt-ed to cooperate as though it were already a full NATO member, as witnessed during theKosovo crisis. The government believed that active engagement to fulfill the membershipcriteria would encourage foreign investment and promote greater confidence in Bulgaria'spolitical and economic institutions.To sum up the essence of the ADF government, there is no doubt it was the most success-ful government since the start of transition in 1989. Bulgaria overcame the severe crisis itwas going through and, by introducing a currency board arrangement, achieved financialstabilization and low inflation throughout the ADF's term in office. In the context of thisstable macro-framework, the government conducted structural reform and privatization,as a result of which the private sector began to dominate the Bulgarian economy. Foreigninvestments grew to a record high in the year 2000. Bulgaria set clear priorities in for-eign policy, which were supported by the majority of the Bulgarian public. The desire andconsistent work for integration with the European Union and NATO achieved concreteresults and dispelled all doubt about "Bulgaria's path" for the next generation. The Kostovgovernment became the first in the post-Communist era to complete its term in office.It weathered several external economic storms and received international praise for theexample it set as a zone of stability in the volatile region of Southeastern Europe.Objectively speaking, the government's economic and political achievements seemed likemore than enough for reelection or, at worst, for a minimal loss. However, in the par-liamentary elections in June 2001 the ruling coalition was overwhelmed by the newlyformed National Movement Simeon II (NMSII). Its leader was the exiled successor to theBulgarian throne, Simeon Saxe-Coburgotski, who became the next prime minister. It wasno consolation that the old enemy BSP was in an even worse situation, finishing in thirdplace for the first time since 1989.
cause. Although the NMSII was immediately identified as a populist movement, makinguse of the disappointment in the traditional parties, there was no time to neutralize theeffect of the messages of Simeon, who announced his intentions to run only ten weeksbefore election day.NMSII is not considered a member of the Bulgarian center right. Moreover, NMSII rep-resentatives – probably, inter alia, under the influence of their leader – are not inclinedto identify themselves ideologically in left-right terms. The emphasis in their self-identi-fication is invariably on "pragmatism, expertise and positive attitude." They claim to be acentrist formation with an intense concern for social issues. The party joined the liberalfaction in the European Parliament. However, the purpose of this essay demands that wefocus not on the winner but on the loser – UDF.Four years after this political landslide, public debate on this subject may be summarizedas following: If one reason had to be singled out for UDF's disastrous results in the 17 June2001 elections, it would certainly be associated with their attempt to simultaneously solvetwo major problems, each one of which would normally require a party's entire politicalwill, devotion and human resources. In the period from 1997-2001, the UDF had to con-tinue its transformation from an anti-Communist coalition movement into a united party,while also governing the state.The difficulty of solving both problems at the same time stemmed from the UDF's insuf-ficient preparedness for taking over government in 1997. The Union was in the processof internal reformation, the end of which was envisioned to coincide with the end of thegovernment's term in office in 1999. But the fall of the BSP government upset the rhythmof Bulgarian political life; the opposition had to take responsibility for the country's gov-ernment irrespective of its internal state and available resources.Hence the reasons for the loss of confidence in the right (namely in the UDF) in powermay be divided into two groups. The first one includes all those associated with govern-ment, and the second, those associated with the state of the UDF as a party. Even thoughthis division is partly superficial, as the UDF was the ruling party, it is nevertheless mostexpedient for the sake of analysis of the election defeat of what was viewed as a quite suc-cessful government.
The GovernmentThe presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996-1997 refocused the attention of Bul-garian society on the abandoned reformist agenda. For the fulfillment of those tasks, theBulgarian political system could rely only on the ADF coalition, dominated by the "blueparty" – the UDF.In spite of the various policy successes of the UDF government, its rule saw rising un-employment that stabilized at 20%. In the context of the currency board arrangement,income policy was bound to observe strict fiscal discipline. Wages and salaries in the pub-licly-financed sphere rose steadily, but the low starting point from 1997 and their slowincrease did not satisfy the population. Although the living standard of the citizenry roseconsistently, the majority of citizens felt insecure, poor and pessimistic about the pros-pects for improvement. R i s e , Fa l l a n d D i s i n t e g r at i on … 21
The government was forced to launch severely delayed reforms in several spheres – publicadministration, health care, education, the armed forces, etc. While these reforms gradu-ally gathered momentum, they inevitably triggered acute social discontent, and there wasreluctance among the population to recognize their necessity. The introduction of newlegal frameworks for a number of traditional social and economic relations led to dra-matic social protests – for example after the introduction of compulsory electronic cashregisters for retailers. Reforms took their toll on particular social groups or professionalcommunities before their positive results could be felt. The ADF government's reformswere extensive and, more often than not, citizens felt some negative effects from the so-called "unpopular measures."It seems there was a definite pattern to the ruling center-right coalition's loss of popular-ity. A similar pattern was seen across Eastern Europe, in which almost all center-rightgovernments failed to win a second term in office. If the center right in the ex-Communistcountries follows its reformist program unswervingly, it must inevitably pursue unpopu-lar policies which often alienate voters. In most cases, they will turn to the renewed left,although the electorate might also support nationalist political groupings. Hence the logi-cal conclusion is that in the conditions of transition, center-right governments will "fallvictim to the success of their own policies" because, weighed down by their daily cares,people cannot see things in the long term and therefore can hardly appreciate reforms thatwill take time to yield tangible positive results.Although this explanation is quite popular among the politicians of the center right, itcontains only part of the truth. As numerous opinion polls showed, the Bulgarian publicby an overwhelming majority accepted the need for reforms and the fact that they hadbeen delayed. Bulgarians supported – or at least understood – the inevitability of reform,but they rejected the tactics and the agents of its implementation.The ADF government failed to do something very important, something that people ex-pected, but was not articulated clearly in the enthusiasm of the civil unrest during thewinter of 1996-1997. Perhaps ADF failed to recognize that the unprecedented intimacybetween the general public and the opposition created remarkable expectations. The in-volvement in civic protests and the intensity of the support provided by the protestorsexceeded the routine duties of the democratic citizen who occasionally goes to the ballotbox to cast his or her vote. This created excessive expectations with regard to the nature ofthe new government."We terminated the BSP's rule together, we will build a new Bulgaria together" was thecommitment written in the election manifesto of the ADF. Bulgarians expected a returnto the reformist agenda and a new policy that would break the nostalgia for Communismonce and for all. Bulgarians were longing for a new style, a new manner and a new wayof policy-making. They expected the closest possible relationship between governmentand the governed, and they expected openness, direct and frank dialogue between theauthorities and the public – mechanisms and practices which were entirely alien to theCommunist regime and which were also absent during the BSP government. After theextraordinary effort that went into bringing about early elections, the majority of Bulgar-ians expected that this would at long last be truly "their" government – transparent, com-municative and sincere.22 why we lost
But the ADF did not meet this expectation. In fact, it failed completely in this respect. Itstask was not only to conduct a concrete policy and to implement its program, but also tobuild and maintain a sense of solidarity between the government and the governed basedon a common belief in the necessity of the painful and long-overdue reforms. But solidar-ity, an important value of Christian democracy, was interpreted in the narrow partisansense as something applicable only to relations between the supporters and members ofUDF. In this context, the government itself started to look unjust, and the moral creden-tials of the power-holders came to be seen as questionable.Bulgarians did not want to hear about achievements because the moral profile of thepower-holders became more important than everything else. Thus a pragmatic debate oncompetence, means and ends in policy-making was displaced by a debate on morality andethics in politics. On this battlefield, the ADF could never win. It was not the painful re-forms and the severe financial discipline that caused the enormous decline of public trust,but the repulsive image of the party politicians and the UDF itself.
The PartyShortly before the early elections in April 1997, a momentous decision was taken at theUDF Ninth National Conference. Following years of debate, UDF leaders decided that theUnion should become a single party instead of remaining a loose alliance of more than adozen bodies, most of them with tiny memberships. The UDF's transformation from anamorphous, anti-Communist coalition into a party in 1997 was an undeniable success. Itwas the main guarantee of a successful, four-year term in office, especially after the bitterexperience of the early 1990s, when maintaining the integrity of the Union and its parlia-mentary group proved to be an impossible task. There was little nostalgia for the early daysof the "UDF movement" with their the lack of discipline, chaotic meetings of the NationalCoordinating Council, contradictory statements of leaders, tortuous decision-making andinability to enforce decisions once they were made. The UDF as a party was undoubtedlybuilt with the clear design of ending the organizational chaos of the early 1990s. From thisperspective, the project of building the UDF produced the desired results.On the other hand, any analysis of the election loss must note the "closing up" of the UDF,not only to the Bulgarian public at large, but also to its own supporters. Clientelism, en-capsulation, poor personnel policy, transformation into a sect-like party – these are themost frequent descriptions of the processes which evolved while the ADF was in power.It turned out that the new, orderly structure generated poor intra-party communication.Information flow between the UDF local clubs and the central leadership was difficult.Rank-and-file members were left with a sense of isolation from UDF policy-making whichled to their disillusionment. Many stopped delivering UDF messages to the public.Within the party, there was also a fusion of administrative and political power that causedits encapsulation, as most UDF local leaders were also members of parliament. The MPs,who held positions on both power levels, had to communicate within the limits of partystructures. The bulk of the information and communication about the problems of the re-spective constituencies passed through a specific partisan filter which selectively selectedout only the problems of UDF activists. And when UDF deputies visibly concentrated onsolving the problems of UDF members, it was very hard for external observers to accept R i s e , Fa l l a n d D i s i n t e g r at i on … 23
such practices. All Bulgarians had to question who the UDF's MPs really served – ordi-nary citizens or only UDF members.Paradoxically, the ADF's sweeping victory in the April 1997 parliamentary elections trig-gered negative tendencies within the party. The UDF parliamentary group was numerousenough to manage an absolute majority of seats in the chamber. This cleared the wayto a government completely dominated by the UDF and to mass appointments in pub-lic administration and local government. In early 1997, the economic resources understate management were formidable, since the BSP government had blocked the privatiza-tion process. The UDF came to power with the promise of accelerating privatization. Thepromise was kept, but the way this was done largely undermined public confidence in theparty. The image of the UDF among the Bulgarian public was irreparably marred.The UDF became too involved in the privatization process. It can be argued that politicallymotivated lending of public resources and political reallocation of property constituted areasonable alternative in an economic system that was defenseless against the encroach-ment of capital of unclear origins or outright "dirty money" from notorious "businessper-sons." But it is also quite understandable that the ultimate result of such an approach wasa host of accusations of clientelism and corruption against those in power.The UDF, however, did not allow or, more precisely, did not try to find a way of allowingbroader sections of the public to take part in the privatization process. The process, crucialfor the formation of new social relations, was thus reduced to an intra-party reallocation ofpublic property. Before the eyes of the Bulgarian public, and with the collaboration of UDFgovernment-appointed civil servants, the members of UDF local structures and the centralgoverning bodies took part in joint business ventures. This symbiosis of political and eco-nomic activity operated within the legal framework. But no one should be surprised that itfed a burning feeling of injustice and promoted the perception of large-scale corruption.The authentic political debate within the rank and file of the UDF was displaced by theissue of allocation and reallocation of economic resources, which naturally dominated thereform agenda. The value-oriented policy required by the Christian democratic identitydisappeared from the domestic political image of the UDF and was manifested only in thefield of foreign policy.Thus, before the 2001 elections, any basis for arguments and campaigning in terms of gov-ernment policy effectiveness, competence and achievements, was largely destroyed by thedirty image of "the blue party," as the UDF came to be known. The public refused to makeits choice by taking part in such a debate. The majority put its trust in something else which,albeit beyond the sphere of real politics, was promised them by the NMSII and its leader.There was no way to counter this phenomenon, since cleaning up the image of the UDF, builtduring the term in power, needed much more than several weeks of election campaigning. Itcould be argued that a four-year stint in opposition was what was needed for this task.
lic confidence back only by addressing the entire electorate. In designing its policy, theUnion should have opened up to independent experts and opinion-makers who caredabout UDF's problems and could suggest new ideas. The intellectual potential of the UDFelectorate was extremely high, but this potential was not used appropriately by the partyleadership. The time in opposition was invaluable for establishing permanent contactswith influential and active representatives of civil society in Bulgaria. The professionaland entrepreneurial communities undoubtedly understood the essence of the reforms andwere the natural civic allies of the "blue party." The UDF had to find a way of communicat-ing and developing long-standing mutual commitments with them.The UDF had to make an effort to develop its Christian democratic identity in order totake principled and consistent positions in the public debate, especially in opposition tothe government of NMSII and MRF. Thus its initiatives would not spring from ad hoccircumstances or the personal whims of one leader or another, but rather from clearlyarticulated principles. They would generate the value-oriented policy which was missingduring the ADF government. The UDF sought to clean up its image by using those valuesin real policies at the national and local levels.By democratizing the party, opening it up to all Bulgarian citizens, stressing Christiandemocratic values in UDF policies recruiting new people at the national and local levelsUDF could restore its public image. These processes redefined the character of the party.But this term in opposition could be UDF's last chance to become a genuine political partyand to provide categorical guarantees that its members and its leaders have learned thelessons of 2001.After twelve years of painful transition to democracy and market economy, the UDF hasbecome a symbol of change for the Bulgarians. Irrespective of the letdowns and mistakes,the Union remained the reformist force in Bulgaria. The UDF had to rely on this part of itsidentity, for which it was loved and hated and in the name of which the Bulgarian publicchose to follow it in 1997. It should have always supported and defended the achievementsof the "blue" government (1997-2001) and Prime Minister Ivan Kostov.The UDF had to recognize clearly that anti-Communism could no longer be the ideologi-cal pillar of the organization, even though many members and supporters were united bythis principle only. This does not mean that the first twelve years must be crossed out, orthat UDF policies were misdirected. Nor does this mean that anti-Communism shouldbe abandoned altogether. But the agenda of anti-Communism has been exhausted, andthe credit for this went precisely to UDF. In this sense, the UDF emerged as an anti-Com-munist formation whose policies were directed at eliminating its own raison d'etre. The re-forms which the UDF uncompromisingly backed and conducted put an end to the large-scale anti-Communist project in which all countries in transition were involved. Similarly,the ideas which the UDF declared at the beginning of transition, and which were met withfurious resistance at the time, have been embraced by all political formations in Bulgaria.This victory in the battle of ideas meant that the first decade of Bulgarian modernizationhad ended with the adoption of the reformist agenda by all.It is very probable that in the next stage, all the parties that rely mainly on anti-Commu-nist rhetoric, as well as those pining for a return to Communism, will be marginalized.The UDF's mission in opposition was to formulate the agenda of the "second-generation" R i s e , Fa l l a n d D i s i n t e g r at i on … 25
reforms of Bulgarian society. If the UDF were successful in presenting such a politicalvision to the Bulgarian public, it would also preserve the center-right project as a modern-izing and reformist government alternative. Thus the Bulgarian center right would be ableto restore its raison d'etre and would become a guarantor of reforms in Bulgaria, both pastand future.In the short run, all the temptations within the UDF to "help" the inexperienced NMSII inexchange for the reward of preserving certain positions in government should have beenignored. The party should have remained in opposition and exposed the lies of NMSII andits leader. It should have occasionally played the role of the constructive opposition, the al-ternative vision for the government that would defend the idea of Euroatlantic integration.The re-election of President Petar Stoyanov, the symbol the new beginning of 1997, shouldhave been considered a crucial first step in the recovery of UDF. The local elections in theautumn of 2003 were supposed to be the "dress-rehearsal" for the next parliamentary elec-tion. In the local elections, the Union was expected to restore its reputation and strengthby showing its new face to the public. Good results could have erased the negative eventsthat culminated in June 2001 and given the UDF the chance to reclaim the right to governthe country again in June 2005.
The obvious favorite in the presidential elections in November 2001 was incumbentPresident Stoyanov. His reelection seemed inevitable when the BSP nominated its leader,Georgi Purvanov, as its presidential candidate. Purvanov's popularity was falling fast afterthe defeat of the BSP in the parliamentary elections, and many observers considered thisnomination a dignified way for the BSP leader to step out of office. Stoyanov, in turn, de-cided to run as an independent candidate, believing that active campaigning for him bythe UDF leadership and members might do more harm than good. Stoyanov was a strongsupporter of the idea of collaboration between UDF and NMSII. Distancing himself fromUDF, the president demonstrated his sympathy for NMSII by officially asking for its sup-port. On the eve of the elections, this support was given by new Prime Minister SimeonSaxe-Coburgotski, who called upon NMSII voters to support Stoyanov.The actions of President Stoyanov were considered unacceptable by many traditional UDFvoters. That negative judgment was combined with a very confusing campaign burdenedby a very late start and personal blunders on behalf of the president. The result was a realshock: after the first round, Stoyanov came in second behind Parvanov and was unableto change anything during the two weeks preceding the second round. For the first timesince the beginning of the transition, a BSP candidate won the presidential race. The So-cialists received a boost from this win and for the first time since 1996, their party tookthe lead in the polls.The National Conference of UDF was characterized by a very depressing atmosphere.Only one year earlier, the president, prime minister and mayor of the capital city weremembers of UDF. By March 2002, all this was gone. Ekaterina Mihaylova was replacedas leader of UDF by ex-Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihaylova, who was considered afigure of compromise within the party. She supported the "hardliner" attitude towards thegovernment, but had excellent personal relations with representatives of the "collabora-tionist" wing. It was hoped her achievements in foreign policy could transfer her personalpopularity to the party itself.It became clear after the National Conference that radical changes in the UDF would haveto be postponed indefinitely. The top leadership of the party (i.e. the National ExecutiveCouncil, consisting of twelve members) was indeed renewed, but all governing bodiesbeneath it remained untouched. The desire to balance between the various internal groupsof the party and the unwillingness (or maybe the inability) to confront the government ona day-to-day basis gradually deprived the UDF of its identity as a viable opposition force.Rumors about a coalition with "the king" continued, and the critique against the "hardlin-ers" never stopped.The new leadership lapsed into passivity and inertia. One year after the election of Na-dezhda Mihaylova, there was a widespread feeling that UDF was fading away. Instead ofbecoming a stepping-stone for the success in the parliamentary elections, it was feared byparty activists that the local elections in the autumn of 2003 would be a debacle for theparty. Mihaylova, aware of these fears, made the courageous move to run against StefanSofianski for mayor of Sofia. During the campaign, she declared that she would eitherwin the race or resign as leader of UDF in the hope that her personal ultimatum wouldmobilize the "blue voters" of the capital. The results were disastrous both for UDF and itsleader. The Union received only 370,000 votes in comparison with 850,000 in 2001. This R i s e , Fa l l a n d D i s i n t e g r at i on … 27
represented a loss of almost 60% of the votes in the middle of its opposition term. Mihay-lova came in third after Stefan Sofianski and the BSP candidate. Between the first and thesecond round, UDF leaders suffered the humiliation of asking "blue voters" to supportSofianski, the leader of the new UFD party. Although the BSP candidate lost the race, thevictory of Sofianski was another indication that UDF was loosing even its hardcore votersin the capital.The dissatisfaction with the state of the Union was articulated openly by many local andnational leaders. The situation deteriorated rapidly when the leadership of UDF down-played the situation and Mihaylova refused to resign despite her earlier declarations. Thetensions within the party grew rapidly, and the two factions within the party became clear-er in the public eye. They differed in their assessment of the government of ADF, theirattitude towards the NMSII and their vision for the coalition policies of UDF.The "hardliners" within the UDF demanded an unconditional defense of the previous"blue government," relentless opposition activity against the NMSII-MRF government andrejection of any future coalition prospects with NMSII. They accused NMSII of turningback the reforms of the state administration, of rehabilitating the repressive institutions ofthe totalitarian past and of open collaboration with BSP. They insisted on coalitions onlywith organizations that are in strong opposition to the government and under no condi-tions with NMSII. The "collaborationists" were far more critical of the "blue government"–Mihaylova even apologized to the Bulgarian public for its mistakes. They were moretolerant towards the NMSII, planning future collaboration or even coalition with it. Itbecame obvious that UDF consisted of two entities that cherished different perceptionsof the past, the present and the future of the Union. These differences were too deep for apeaceful coexistence.After the failures of UDF there was tremendous public pressure on Ivan Kostov to returnto active politics. In the meantime, instead of making personal changes or trying to reach acompromise with the "hardliners," UDF leaders decided to call an extraordinary NationalConference to consolidate their power before the parliamentary elections in June 2005.Many local branches of the organization openly expressed their disagreement and theparliamentary group was divided, as well.In March 2004, UDF suffered the most painful split in its history. Numerous members ofthe party left, including Ivan Kostov, leader of UDF in 1995-2001 and prime minister in1997-2001; Ekaterina Mihaylova, leader of the majority in parliament in 1997-2001 andUDF chairwoman in 2001-2002; Yordan Sokolov, parliamentary speaker in 1997-2001;and the majority of ministers of the previous ADF government. The parliamentary groupwas split two-to-one in favor of the "hardliners." In May 2005, a new party was founded– Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB), and Ivan Kostov became its leader.Thus the Bulgarian center right entered the 2005 elections divided into three. UDF re-newed the Allied Democratic Forces coalition with its partners the Democratic Party(DP), the Georgyovden Movement (GM) and the Bulgarian Agricultural Popular Union-United (BAPU-U). The mayor of Sofia, Stefan Sofianski, succeeded in forming a coali-tion called the Bulgarian Popular Union (BPU) that included his own party, the Union ofFree Democrats (UFD), the Bulgarian Agricultural Popular Union (BAPU) and the small,nationalistic International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO). The third28 why we lost
part of the divided center right is the new party, DSB. The results of the June 2005 parlia-mentary elections – after which the BSP formed a new government along with NMSII andMRF – showed that the divided center right placed behind not only all three of these, butalso behind the radical nationalist ATAKA.As far as the long-term future is concerned, it may well be that the level of supportmanifested by UDF proponents in 1996 will be required again. The main adversarywill again be BSP, but this time the conflict will be waged against Socialist PresidentParvanov who is seeking reelection in 2006. The political context will be very different,however, with Bulgaria firmly on the way into NATO and the EU. However, the stakeswill be as high as they were ten years ago, namely, to avoid the prospect of a Bulgarianfuture dominated by BSP.
APPENDIX:List of Major Parties and Their Acronyms*Allied Democratic Forces – ADFBulgarian Agrarian Popular Union - BAPUBulgarian Communist Party - BCPBulgarian Socialist Party – BSPDemocrats for Stronger Bulgaria – DSBMovement for Rights and Freedoms- MRFNational Movement Simeon II - NMSIIPeople's Union - PUUnion of Democratic Forces - UDFUnion of Free Democrats - UFD
*Throughout this publication the native acronyms of party names are used. The only exception is thecase of Bulgaria where due to transcript from the Cyrillic, we opted for generally accepted Englishacronyms.
Notes:• Under the "BAPU" label, the table features various manifestations of the agrarian movement, which usually ran through the PU coalition in non-Socialist coalitions with other partners, namely UDF.
Presidents:Zhelyu Zhelev (January 1992 – December 1996)Petar Stoyanov (January 1997 – December 2000)Georgi Parvanov (January 2001 – today)
Governments: 1. Andrei Lukanov (February - November 1990) 2. Dimitar Popov (December 1990 - November 1991) 3. Philip Dimitrov (November 1991 – December 1992) 4. Luben Berov (December 1992 – October 1994) 5. Reneta Indjova (October 1994 – December 1995) 6. Zhan Videnov (January 1995 – February 1997) 7. Stefan Sofianski (February - April 1997) 8. Ivan Kostov (May 1997 – July 2001) 9. Simeon Saxe-Coburgotski (July 2001 – August 2005)10. Sergey Stanishev (August 2005 – today) Why Fidesz Lost: A Successful Government and Unsuccessful Party
CONTENTS: I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 1998 VICTORY OF RIGHT-OF-CENTER PARTIESII. MORE THAN A GOVERNMENT, LESS THAN A REGIME CHANGEIII. THE DOWNFALLIV. MORE THAN A CHANGE OF STRATEGY, LESS THAN AN IDEOLOGY32 why we lost
A fter the collapse of the political right in 1994, the post-Communist Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) and its coalition partner, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz), enjoyed a dominant political, economical and cultural position. Yet theywere unprepared for a quick and unprecedented reorganization of the right. One of thelessons of the disastrous defeat in 1994 for the right was that the left could only be chal-lenged by a politically united party. This was due to the mixed electoral system which,similar to the situation in Germany, helps bigger parties while placing smaller ones at adisadvantage.After 1994 parliamentary elections, the parties on the center right rapidly learned theirlesson and soon formed an alliance that began to achieve promising results as early asthe fall municipal elections of that year. The real question was whether the cooperationof a fragmented right could last through several elections and challenge the left. Anotherdilemma facing the alliance was the question of which party would lead the coalition. Aparty such as the Independent Smallholders' Party (FKgP), with its roots dating back topre-Communist times, did not seem to be appropriate for this role due to its class-basedcharacter, predominantly rural support and its chairman's populist political style. The pre-viously dominant Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) suffered a split in 1996, weaken-ing its political effectiveness. Similarly, the Christian-Democratic People's Party (KDNP)also suffered from internal tensions. Thus Fidesz (then the Alliance of Young Democrats),a small, yet united party with unyielding ideas, was left with the opportunity to assumethe role of unifier of the right.This liberal, regime-changing, anti-Communist party, which was formerly a youth organi-zation, gained 7% of the votes in the 1994 elections. It decided to abolish the age limit forits members and began to develop a more western character, similar to the right-of-cen-ter people's parties. Viktor Orbán, thirty-two at the time, was elected leader of the partyand declared the party's new identity to be liberal, center-right and civic. Spurning allradical movements, Fidesz liberalism reflected traditional, nineteenth-century, Hungar-ian national liberalism rather than the European mainstream ideology. Marking its new,center-right identity, the party adopted a new name as of April 1995: Fidesz – HungarianCivic Party.In 1996, Fidesz began uniting with other right-of-center parties in Hungary. This waswhen talks between Fidesz and MDF, the former governing party, began. An agreementwas reached after a year and a half. By 1997, Fidesz had integrated the remnants of the1990-1994 center-right coalition and was ready to challenge the ruling coalition. Politicalintegration found shape not only in contracts of cooperation but also on an ideologicallevel, as well. The backbone of the alliance's structure, Fidesz, released its electoral pro-gram in February 1998, forging an image for the center-right political partnership in lessthan a year's time. W h y F i d e s z L o s t : A S u c c e s s f u l G o v e r n m e n t… 33
identity after the regime change (See Csizmadia, Ervin, "The Interpretation of the 1998Elections," in Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds) Political Yearbook of Hungary 1999, Budapest:Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 1999). Their faith in a change ofregime was gone, but not their lust for political activity. Fidesz tried to reach these disillu-sioned voters and shift their allegiance to the political right. The slogan of Fidesz in 1998,"The Future's Choice," meant that the civil (or civic) idea was in fact a breakaway from thepolitical practice and values of the post-Communist elite.
1 Avar János: The Old Coon and the Young Tiger, Magyar Hírlap, 21 May 1998.36 why we lost
the government. Apart from the "coach and six," the prime minister often consulted withhis personal counselors, and similar to the role of Alistair Campbell in the United King-dom, the spin doctors' influence rivaled that of the ministers.2In 2000 a member of the "coach and six," László Kövér, took over the duties of party chair-man. The idea was to ease the burden on the prime minister in order to free him fromeveryday politics, giving him a role more similar to that of a president. This shows thesteadfast authority of the prime minister within the party and the parliamentary group.During four years of power, only twice did the fraction confront the prime minister. Boththese cases involved relatively minor issues, and both ended with the prime minister's vic-tory, marginalizing his opponents influence within the party. Broadly speaking, the primeminister had unanimous support among the party and the fraction.
2 During the four years in government, Orbán's main spin doctor was András Wermer.3 A relatively smaller crisis appeared between Fidesz and the MDF when the latter tried to form an alliance with parties outside the parliament to have its scope of action increased. Fidesz considered this to be a violation of the coalition agreement and convinced the MDF to halt all talks.38 why we lost
munist era.4 Extensive reforms could only have been carried out with the support of theopposition. But the opposition parties made it clear at the beginning of the term that theywould not take part in any institutional reforms.5 Due to these legal constraints, the gov-ernment decided to emphasize economic growth and improving living standards insteadof institutional reform.The Orbán cabinet divided the four-year term into two parts. A moderately restrictivefiscal policy replaced the initial policy of dynamic expenditures which stemmed from theeffort to fulfill electoral promises.6 Stagnating income growth and restrained national in-vestment plagued the first half of the government's term.An increase in incomes, controlled inflation (with limited use of regulated prices), growingnational investments and support for certain sectors of the economy (i.e. construction andtourism) characterized the second half of the term. The government attempted to balancethe unfavorable foreign economic situation by stimulating domestic demand. To do this thegovernment initiated the so-called Széchenyi Plan in 2001.7 The aim of the program wasto use the benefits of the robust and stable economic boom that began in 1997 to improveliving standards and dissipate regional inequalities. The program, aimed mainly at small- tomid-sized entrepreneurs and local authorities, was unique in the sense that not since theregime change had such an intense effort been put forth to boost the economy. As of 2000the emphasis was on a housing policy that reached broad sections of society.Similar to the New Deal in the United States in the 1930s, the Széchenyi Plan offered achance for Hungarian employment to move closer to the European standard, while tryingto reduce unemployment. As a result of broad national investments and support for in-vestments starting in the second half of the term, employment rose by 4% (approximately150,000 people),8 with unemployment falling by 2% as a consequence, the rate of eco-nomic growth rate was 4 – 5%, among the highest in the region even with sluggish growthin the European economy.It was widely expected that the government could achieve economic growth without cut-ting back on social policy. In order to live up to this expectation, a real increase in purchas-ing power had to be accomplished with the help of a radical decrease in inflation and a risein wages. While incomes were stagnant throughout the first half of the term, they beganto grow in 2000. The government ambitiously sought to double the real value of the mini-mum wage in two phases.9 While the purchasing power of wages per person and the realrate of retirement funds had reached the 1990 level, income per person still remained tenpercent lower than in 1990. Raising the minimum wage had a positive effect on the 27%
4 There is a total of 34 subjects of legislation that need a majority of two thirds of MPs to change a law, such as armed forces and their duties, local authorities and their basic rights, public and commercial TV and radio stations, etc.5 The proposal of Fidesz to subordinate the prosecutor to the government, similar to Western European practice, was turned down by the MSzP. A similar disagreement obstructed the reform of the electoral law and the attempt to reduce the number of MPs.6 About three quarters of the promises from the initial 40 points were carried out, mostly those implying direct financial help to voters.7 The project was named after one of the most famous Hungarian personalities of the 19th century, Count Széchenyi, who offered all his personal fortune and talent to help Hungary to flourish.8 Source: http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/pdf/memer104.pdf9 From the previous €100 to approximately €200 per month. W h y F i d e s z L o s t : A S u c c e s s f u l G o v e r n m e n t… 39
of employed workers in the country – a drastic change from the 75% decrease in the realvalue of the minimum wage during the previous government.10 The rise in employment,income and wages accompanied a considerable decrease of inflation.While the Széchenyi Plan was representative of the cabinet's economic policy, the familywas the focus of its social policy. The family unit was a major beneficiary of the govern-ment's redistributive policies and a tool to further the goal of building a stronger nationbuilt on community. In terms of practical policymaking, this meant broadening social-cohesion systems, tax benefits and the aforementioned home-building credit-program.Besides restoring social benefits cut by the Socialist government, the center-right cabinetpreferred to grant tax breaks in order to benefit middle-class families.These government policies constitute only a small part of four years of work, but they helpto demonstrate the difference between the Socialist cabinet's neo-liberal policy and theconcept of a deliberate increase in the role of the state.Attempting to pinpoint which groups of society the government's measures wereaimed at, we could highlight (1) the employed members of the active age group withexpertise or financial resources who live in families and (2) those wanting to be partof this group. While the first group is generally considered to be the "middle class," inthe civic in the rhetoric of Fidesz, the second was open to everyone willing to makethe effort needed.
Facing Post-CommunismThe center-right government's primary goal was to bring the transition from Communismto its conclusion. The title of Fidesz's electoral campaign and manifesto, "The Future HasStarted" reflected this goal. This slogan reflected two themes: the beginning of a long-awaited and more prosperous future and the end of post-Communism. Fidesz thoughtthat the post-Communist and the civic virtues had conflicted with one another in the past,while the new policy of the center-right government was to expunge the post-Communistset of values and start anew. "The forces of the future have lined up," said Orbán to theparty congress preceding the elections on 16 February 2002.Fidesz faced several obstacles in this task. First of all, creating a new set of values with animplicit rejection of post-Communism would appear radical. As mentioned above, oneof the most remarkable characteristics of the 1998 elections was the intensity of politicalconflict. But parochial Hungarian voters, traditionally adverse to conflict, considered thisinappropriate behavior. Even many right-of-center voters did not understand that devel-oping a new set of values would involve a certain degree of conflict.The left attempted to portray the right, primarily Fidesz, as war-mongers. Consolidationof civic virtues and the continued attempts to replace the post-Communist political struc-
10 Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 2003: KSH 2004, p.96.40 why we lost
tures deepened political cleavages. Fidesz, the initiator of the conflicts, eventually paid forthis with a decline in its popularity.This was only one dimension of the opposition's criticisms of Fidesz "radicalism." These ac-cusations met with a favorable reception when the Fidesz-led government focused on thecompromises agreed upon around the fall of Communism and tried to cut the network ofconnections saved from the Communist era. At this point, Fidesz was no longer seen as asimple "troublemaker," but rather as an authoritarian party which endangered the citizenry'sright to privacy11. In this election year, the Fidesz government was characterized as a totali-tarian dictatorship threatening Hungarian democracy. Actual Fidesz policies were irrelevantto the left, since they felt that the rightist government had to be rejected on moral grounds.Fidesz's task (i.e. ousting the post-Communist set of values) automatically produced con-flicts which were not welcome by most voters. The left presented this attempt as an attackon democratic institutions and as an effort to build up a dictatorship. One of the mostimportant factors leading to the Orbán cabinet's defeat was succinctly summarized by theleftist publicist, András Bozóki, in 2002: "The government lost the elections for it wantedto reach two goals conflicting one another: "moral revolution" and "consolidation," bothof them with a "single blitz." It placed confrontation ahead of compromise which the vot-ers did not honor." (Bozóki, András, "Political Community or Cultural Community?," in:Sükösd-Vásárhelyi (eds) Hol a határ?, Budapest, 2002)
CorruptionAs mentioned, the abuses surrounding the Socialist government's privatization plansplayed a major rule in the center right's 1998 victory at the polls. Therefore it is not sur-prising that a 1996 survey revealed that citizens associated privatization with corruptionand the Socialists as the responsible perpetrators of these misappropriations.12 One ofFidesz's electoral promises was to re-evaluate the existing set of state-owned propertiesand to end misuse by selling some portion of them by the end of the term. This pledgemostly meant acknowledging the status quo in 1998 because by then 80% of state-ownedproperty had been privatized. The center-right government that took over in 1998 hencemissed the "big business" of the 1990s; it renounced privatization and retained the state-owned enterprises, considering them to be strategic assets.Center-right parties in power realized that it was the economic lobby that benefited fromprivatization by supporting the MSzP, making it a major player in Hungarian politics. Thegoverning parties believed that in order to successfully challenge their rivals they had tofind supporters in the business sector while creating a realm of influence that could be
11 This is well demonstrated by the following lines by the well-known Hungarian leftist publicist László Lengyel: "During the spring of elections [i.e. 2002], the voter had to face the fact that the moral watchfulness not only ob- served one's public life, but the private as well. Authorities intruded into his bed, into his children's room, checked what he ate, examined and rated whether or not he went to church and had extra-marital sexual life, read any liberal newspapers or watched any television programs he was not supposed to. It appeared that authorities had been spying on the voter through his children, his neighbors, his teachers, his doctors, his priests and that this awareness would not drop but instead increase should he vote another four years for the Orbán government." (Lengyel, page 121)12 http://www.mtapti.hu/mszt/19984/vasarhel.htm W h y F i d e s z L o s t : A S u c c e s s f u l G o v e r n m e n t… 41
relied upon if and when they lost power. Orders by the state were a part of the tools tobuild such a realm of influence, allowing companies close to the right to expand party-patronage to the state's enterprises. Apart from controlled "investments" by the state, Fi-desz made efforts to co-opt the right-of-center intelligentsia by creating or sponsoringnumerous foundations and non-profit companies, as well as trying to place its supportersin the directorates of existing social organizations. Both attempts were partially success-ful. Fidesz successfully increased its influence in state-owned banks and big companies,but there was no time to build up an entire economic network. Moreover, it was a bitterdisappointment for voters to see Fidesz participating in the same type of behavior that haddriven the Socialists out of power, especially since voters had expectations that the newgovernment (particularly Fidesz) would seek to correct the corruption of the past.The MSzP quickly discovered the effectiveness of this issue and focused on keeping asmany corruption cases on the docket as possible as elections approached. Attacks werealmost exclusively aimed at the prime minister and his closest advisors, suggesting that heabused his mandate for personal financial gain.13The opposition stressed the corruption scandals of the government rather than any policyfailures, and this tactic tainted every government decision with the suspicion of corrup-tion. It may be said that the right did not lose the fight against corruption but only thedebate about it (See Csizmadia, Ervin, "Parties and Corruption as Thematization in 2000,"in: Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds) Political Yearbook of Hungary 2000, Budapest: DemokráciaKutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2001).While one of the main points of the Fidesz manifesto in 1998 was about protecting na-tional assets, it constituted only a small component the 2002 electoral program. Fideszrealized in 1998 that regime change and democracy meant more than reforms carried outin certain institutions and believed that it should involve a reaffirmation of ethical andmoral standards. System change is not just a change in methods but the process of restor-ing justice. Cases of corruption between 1998 and 2002 weakened Fidesz's position andsuggested that new elite was growing rich behind the scenes of democratic institutions.
The Gate-KeepersThe influence of the media on Hungarian politics has grown in recent years. To understandthe position of the press in Hungary, it is necessary to analyze the distinctly Hungarian char-acteristics which set it apart from the press in other nations. As opposed to Western prac-tice, the Hungarian media work under strict party control. This is evident in the structureof ownership, as well as in the strong interrelationship between the media elite and partypoliticians. These two groups have never been separated in Hungary, and both print andelectronic media are subject to the rules of politics. This is also true for the public and thecommercial media, meaning that a given medium's political persuasion has a direct effect
13 The most unjustifiable of these attacks was one on the prime minister's father. According to the opposition, Orbán allegedly ordered a state company to present a sub-contract offer for his father's mines. Though the allegations were never proven to be true, the opposition's strategy was successful, and by the end of the term all surveys showed the highest corruption perception to be clearly attached to Fidesz amongst parliamentary parties. Source: http://www.gallup.hu/Gallup/monitor/kutatas/030915_korm.html42 why we lost
on the public's view of a given politician. According to a survey in 2000, 29% of journalistswould have voted for the MSzP, 24% for the SzDSz, and only 22% for the governing coalition(See Borókai, Gábor, "Government Communication – In an Unfriendly Environment," in:Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds) Political Yearbook of Hungary 2002, Budapest: Demokrácia Kuta-tások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2003). This means that leftist parties' support was morethan twice that of the right, representing an overrepresentation of the left in the media.According to the statistics14, the market share of the leftist media is much greater than thatof the right. This has a strong influence on coverage and the attitude towards the govern-ment, especially during elections. It is also true that the media was utterly subordinatedto party politics during the electoral campaign in 2002. This clearly favored parties whowere able to reach a greater proportion of the public through the "friendly" media, i.e. theMSzP. Much less media coverage was available for the right to convey its messages to thevoters. Though the right took control of the public media, public TV was less influential.Nonetheless, the Socialists and liberals accused the government, especially Fidesz, of mo-nopolizing public media in order to influence the opinion of the voters.
Unsuccessful StrategyFidesz had absorbed almost the entire moderate right by the 2002 elections. It had inte-grated almost all of the parliamentary group, as well as a great part of the voter base, of itsformer coalitional partners. MDF entered the elections on a joint list with Fidesz. After thejoint list was created, the "right" coincided with Fidesz, which embodied the only viableopposition to the post-Communist MSzP and its liberal satellite party, the SzDSz.In contrast to the 1998 elections, both parties prepared for the 2002 campaign careful-ly and well in advance. In another first, both sides used campaign techniques found inthe United States and Western Europe (See Mihályffy, Zsuzsanna, "From the Media tothe Neighborhood," Paper to be presented at the 7th Annual Kokkalis Graduate StudentWorkshop, 2005.) The stakes were high, and the campaign reached a level of intensityunmatched in Hungary's short history of democratic elections. Fidesz saw the election asa legitimization of a four-year fight against post-Communism. A victory would have justi-fied its policies and created the moral basis for further demolition of the remaining post-Communist structures. Both sides realized that the right's victory would have weakenedthe post-Communist party and possibly destroyed its ideological base. Another questionto be resolved was which government would lead the country into the EU. It was assumedthat the government which led Hungary into the EU would reap tangible political andfinancial benefits that could virtually carry them into victory for three to four terms in thefuture. It seemed that the 2002 elections would not only affect the upcoming four years,but would determine the balance of power for another decade or so.Fidesz followed its 1998 strategy by consciously avoiding the tools of a negative cam-paign. Fidesz used positive themes and avoided controversial and provocative ones. Themain message of the campaign was the success of the government. It featured an impres-
14 http://www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/a012.pdf W h y F i d e s z L o s t : A S u c c e s s f u l G o v e r n m e n t… 43
sive marketing campaign that highlighted the massive resources that were invested intothe state through the Széchenyi Plan15. MSzP campaign strategists immediately attackedthe prime minister, but Orbán kept his promise and stayed busy with governing insteadof campaigning. By not responding to the accusations, the core of the right's voters wasincensed and increased its activity, while the undecided voters felt that the silence of theprime minister betrayed his guilt. MSzP voters simply had their views reinforced.The success of the MSzP campaign, which began in 2001, was built on the simple conceptof creating a local network based on interpersonal connections that emphasized fieldworkby party activists. The MSzP ran a campaign which stressed an active presence in thestreets. It also utilized the media and direct-marketing tools to maximize mobilization.The MSzP's use of foreign techniques for the campaign greatly contributed to its success.
The DefeatFidesz, despite its misguided campaign strategy, was shoulder-to-shoulder with the So-cialists until the eve of the elections. The last opinion polls before the elections suggested
15 To emphasize this, Orbán declared that, contrary to the usual practice, the government would keep working even during the campaign. Orbán himself, upon whom the entire campaign was built, thus excluded himself from daily political battles and started his campaign only three weeks before the elections.44 why we lost
that Fidesz would have a comfortable victory, securing more than half of the parliamen-tary mandates and thus forming the government with its partner, the MDF. This mistakewas not only methodological, but also due to the mobilizing force of the MSzP's campaignstructure. While exit polls estimated a 68-70% turnout, relatively high for a Hungarianelection, it actually turned out to be 4-6% higher. It was exceptionally high in Budapestand the industrial towns, the strongholds of the MSzP.The directors of the Socialist campaign used the British model as a guide for the MSzP'smobilizing system (See Baja-Tóbiás-Szigetvári, "One Step Ahead of Our Rivals," in: Kur-tán-Sándor-Vass (eds) Political Yearbook of Hungary 2002, Budapest: Demokrácia KutatásokMagyar Központja Alapítvány Baja-Tóbiás-Szigetvári, 2003, pages 1294-1297). The systemmobilized large masses of politically inactive citizens over a period of a year and a half. Afurther issue was that in previous elections, turnout was lower than what was suggested bythe exit-poll data, thus hampering the ability of pollsters to predict the outcome.Fidesz lost the first round of elections by a couple of thousand votes, but it did not giveup the battle. The party changed its strategy in less than a day and during the short twoweeks between the two rounds, Fidesz carried out an effective campaign against the leftwhich resulted in a victory in the second round, although one that was not sufficient tochange the final outcome of the elections. This clearly illustrated what kind of a resultFidesz might have achieved had it not stuck so rigidly to a purely positive campaign.The new government formed a Socialist-liberal coalition under the leadership of PrimeMinister Péter Medgyessy.
with civic virtues and dedication to a highly active public life. More than ten thousandcivic circles were created country-wide within a few weeks. Their functions were coordi-nated by Fidesz in the beginning, but as time passed they gained more independence fromthe party (building a new center from public donations, etc.). The way they worked andtheir role were somewhat similar to the clubs of Forza Italia.While organization of the civic circles movement served to stabilize the status of Fideszand the right, the party was isolated from swing voters. Consequently, Fidesz had to re-define its politics. Upon evaluating the failure at the polls, it was clear that Fidesz was notsufficiently organized. The relative weakness of the party organization was also a conse-quence of a necessity to fill vacant civil-service posts after the victory in 1998.Attempting to capitalize on the lessons learned in its electoral loss, Fidesz – HungarianCivic Party decided to drastically redefine itself. At the biannual congress in May 2003the name was changed to Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union. The goal was to transform theparty into something akin to the modern European people's parties, especially in terms ofthe number of members, personnel and structure. This meant combining two traditionsof party evolution – that of the "Latin" and the German. Examples for the people's party-like structure were found in the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Chris-tian Social Union (CSU) and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), while membership wasbased upon the examples of "Latin" countries' center-right parties like the Forza Italia andthe French Union for a Popular Majority (UMP) (See Navracsics, Tibor, "The EuropeanPeople's Party's Birth," unpublished manuscript, 2005.).Fidesz was the first Hungarian party to introduce individual constituency organizationsthat paralleled the traditional township level organizations. A constituent president,named by the president of the Union upon the proposal of the local councils, leads theconstituency councils. He is personally responsible for the electoral preparation of Fideszin the given constituency, having authority over the local groups' presidents. This was adefinite shift from the previous administrative-unit-based organizational structure. Trans-formation brought along changes in functional areas, as well. Eight auxiliary organizations(farmers, villagers, those active in cultural, workers and employees, women, pensioners,local authorities, and ecologists) were formed after May 2003 for supporters who wantedto avoid professional politics but who wanted to become involved in one of these fields.The most remarkable change was the boom in membership and the development of new or-ganizations within Fidesz. The expansion to a union made the party accessible for many whowere previously unable to enter the system. As a result of this, massive entries in the secondpart of 2003 and the beginning of 2004 tripled the party's membership and improved nationalcoordination efforts. Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union thus became a real people's party, theonly one capable of challenging the MSzP's far-reaching and superbly organized system.
Change in CommunicationBesides building the party structure and addressing competitive disadvantages, Fidesz alsohad to develop a new image to improve the party's negative perception among voters. Theprimary aim was to increase its appeal with independent and leftist voters. The concept of aunion emphasized that Fidesz was more than a party and welcomed everyone as a member.46 why we lost
To illustrate this point, two inexperienced, but well-known former Olympic championscommonly assumed to be supporters of the left, Pál Schmitt and Zoltán Pokorni, werechosen to be vice presidents at the congress in May 2003. A number of well-known, butunpopular politicians were pushed into the background, while previously lesser knownones were given a chance. Orbán, returning to lead the party, guaranteed continuity inits general direction and carried out the sometimes contentious changes while relying onthe strength of his personal authority. His leadership, although a uniting force for right-ist voters, was still unacceptable for many other voters. To attract these voters, Orbánhimself had to change. In an effort to soften his rhetoric, emotional elements faded fromhis speeches, as did the value-centered messages sent out to rightist voters. They were re-placed by materialistic questions that interested the entire voting population like inflation,taxes, unemployment, etc.Almost a year after converting to a union, during his American-style annual speech addressingthe nation, Orbán spoke directly to the leftist voters and "absolved" those who did not stand upagainst the Communist dictatorship because of a desire to protect the welfare of their families.16Though Fidesz has emphasized that it was not against the average man but rather the Commu-nist elite, this message had been successfully obscured by the opponents' propaganda.
MobilizationFidesz concluded that one of the reasons for its 2002 defeat was a weak mobilization effort.Though the moderate campaign was a part of the strategy, leaders of Fidesz realized thatthe delay in party building seriously limited its mobilization efforts. The restructuring dis-cussed above stemmed from this realization. Elections to the European Parliament (EP)provided a good opportunity to test the new system.Fidesz also initiated an ambitious program, called the National Petition, which was mar-keted as a questionnaire that was targeted at the average Hungarian voter. The NationalPetition, initiated on 27 March 2004, included five demands for the government. Theseincluded that the price of medicine be reduced, subsidies for the farmers be increased,home-building support introduced by the civic government be restored, the process ofprivatization be halted and a cap on the annual increase in the price of gas and energy at5% be imposed. During the next month activists of the Union appeared in every majorcity and reached almost every village in an attempt to collect one million signatures. On15 May 2004, Orbán and Pokorni announced the achievement of this goal.Activities featuring direct democracy were complemented and supported by the tools ofparliamentary action. Fidesz put forth a motion in parliament, and at the beginning ofJune 2004 a bill was presented that dealt with the issues addressed in the National Petition.Although the governing majority refused to discuss the bill, the demands of the National
16 "Many are those in Hungary today who believe to have lived a safer and even better life in the previous regime. They feel uneasy and even anxious when they see some rejecting the Socialist era – including those, who, so to say, made certain compromises, although they just tried to make some sort of a living, tried to be happy and tried to provide a safe life for themselves and their loved ones. If we want to have the fears relating to the past evaporate from public life, it is up to us, the younger ones who have made the regime change to show the elder ones that we understand them and their lives." Viktor Orbán, Ocotober 2004. W h y F i d e s z L o s t : A S u c c e s s f u l G o v e r n m e n t… 47
Petition have been the fundamental principles for the Union's policies in the most recentbudget debate and in many parliamentary debates since.
OutlookAlthough it is too early to predict a winner for the general elections in 2006, Fidesz hasa solid lead on the governing parties. Falling living standards, pessimistic expectationsamong the population, internal crises within the MSzP and tension between the coalitionparties all bode well for Fidesz.The reasons behind this are due to the radical changes that took place within the partyin terms of communication and party organization, the same factors that contributedto its victory in the 2004 European Parliament elections. Currently, the party is mate-rially and "mentally" backed by a stable base of supporters. But its inability to breakthrough the bias of the media still handicaps Fidesz. The party still faces a passive anddissatisfied electorate that has been cultivated by a biased media. Resolving the conflictwith the MDF is a serious challenge, since failure to do so could waste some two to 4%of votes for the right in 2006. Avoiding this will require great flexibility and generosityfrom both parties. Nonetheless, the hopes and prospects of the right in the upcomingelections are high.
LITERATURE:Baja-Tóbiás-Szigetvári (2003) "One Step Ahead of Our Rivals," In: Kurtán-Sándor-Vass(eds) Political Yearbook of Hungary 2002, Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Köz-pontja Alapítvány.Borókai, Gábor (2003) "Government Communication – In an Unfriendly Environment."In: Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds) Political Yearbook of Hungary 2002, Budapest: DemokráciaKutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány.Bozóki, András (2002) "Political Community or Cultural Community?," In: Sükösd-Vásárhelyi (eds) Hol a határ?, Budapest.Csizmadia, Ervin (1999) "The Interpretation of the 1998 Elections." In: Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds) Political Yearbook of Hungary 1999, Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások MagyarKözpontja Alapítvány.Csizmadia, Ervin (2001) "Parties and Corruption as Tematization in 2000," In: Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds) Political Yearbook of Hungary 2000, Budapest: Demokrácia KutatásokMagyar Központja Alapítvány.Lánczi, András (2005) Utopia as Tradition. Budapest: Attraktor.Lengyel, László (2003) "Two thousand-two," In: Kurtán-Sándor-Vass (eds) PoliticalYearbook of Hungary 2003, Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Ala-pítvány.Mihályffy, Zsuzsanna (2005) "From the Media to the Neighborhood." Paper to be pre-sented at the 7th Annual Kokkalis Graduate Student Workshop.Navracsics, Tibor (2005) European People's Party's Birth. (unpublished manuscript) W h y F i d e s z L o s t : A S u c c e s s f u l G o v e r n m e n t… 49
APPENDIX:List of Major Parties and Their AcronymsAlliance of Free Democrats - SzDSzChristian Democratic People's Party - KDNPFidesz – Hungarian Civic Union - FiDeSz-MPSzHungarian Democratic Forum - MDFHungarian Socialist Party - MSzPIndependent Smallholders Party - FKgPParty of Hungarian Justice and Life - MIÉPWorkers' Party - MP
Notes:• A mixed election system is used in the country, thus the table shows the share of party list votes only.• MDF ran in 2002 on a joint list with Fidesz-MPSz.
Presidents:Mátyás Szűrös (23 October 1989 – 2 May 1990; provisional president)Árpád Göncz (2 May 1990 – 3 August 1990; provisional president)Árpád Göncz (3 August 1990 – 3 August 2000)Ferenc Mádl (4 August 2000 – 3 August 2005)László Sólyom (4 August 2005 – present)
Governments:1. József Antall (23 May 1990 – 12 December 1993)2. Péter Boross (21 December 1993 – 15 July 1994)3. Gyula Horn (15 July 1994 – 1 July 1998)4. Viktor Orbán (3 July 1998 – 27 May 2002)5. Péter Medgyessy (27 May 2002 – 28 September 2004)6. Ferenc Gyurcsány (28 September 2004 – present) The Failure ofthe Conservative Project in Lithuania
CONTENTS: I. INTRODUCTION II. PRE-HISTORY OF CONSERVATIVE RULE AND DRAMATIS PERSONAEIII. THE ANATOMY OF THE 1996 VICTORYIV. BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF CONSERVATIVE RULE 1996-2000 V. THE ROAD TO FAILURE: ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESSES TAKING PLACE DURING CONSERVATIVE RULEVI. AUTOPSY OF DEFEATVII. WHY WE LOST – AND WHAT IS NEXT FOR THE CONSERVATIVE PROJECT IN LITHUANIA52 why we lost
W hen the Lithuanian Conservatives swept into power in 1996, there were few signs to indicate the coming patch of economic, political and social instability they would face, the ascent of populism that would emerge and the ordeal theConservatives themselves would suffer at the hands of the electorate – all of this in thecourse of barely four years.The Conservative comeback, when it happened, elicited sighs of relief among liberal andright-of-center political commentators alike. "End of the Lithuanian Syndrome?" won-dered one. The "syndrome" referred to the return to power of the post-Communist partiesthroughout Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the trend that began with the1992 Lithuanian election.In 1996, a Conservative-led coalition secured control of 87 seats in the 137-seat Seimas(parliament) of Lithuania. The coalition, consisting of the Homeland Union (LithuanianConservatives, 70 seats), Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (16 seats), and the Unionof Lithuanian Political Prisoners and Exiles (1 seat), showed all the promise of becom-ing a new force that would redraw the Lithuanian political map in a way that MargaretThatcher's Tories had reshaped the British political climate in the previous decade. Cer-tainly, neither ambition, nor ability, nor political will and commitment were lacking whenGediminas Vagnorius formed his government after a landslide in October 1996.It took only four years, however, and following the 2000 parliamentary election the Lithu-anian Conservatives had to make do with barely nine seats, while their former coalitionpartners, the Christian Democratic party, split and demoralized, captured only two. Theresulting fractions of the Christian Democrats went on, alternately, either to be gobbledup by other parties, or to dwindle to a ghost-like presence, remaining merely a municipal-level force. The Union of Lithuanian Political Prisoners and Exiles, facing political extinc-tion, eventually merged with the Homeland Union.This chapter will tell the tale of the decline of what initially seemed to constitute a highlypromising beginning, a chance for Lithuania and a trend-setting reversal in the fortunesof center-right forces throughout Eastern Europe. Inevitably, given the subject, the presentpaper will give greater focus to the failures and negative aspects of conservative rule. I willtry, however, briefly to do justice to the positive aspects of the conservative coalition ruletowards the end of the chapter. 1
1 I am indebted to thoughtful analyses by Kęstutis Škiudas, Vladimiras Laučius and Dalius Stancikas, as well as to kind assistance by Jovita Pranevičiūtė. T h e F a i l u r e o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P r o j e c t… 53
Two facts are to be noted about this election, however. First, it is important to keep inmind that most of the LDDP electorate, despite its failure to vote, retained its ex-Com-munist sympathies (as well as, more importantly, its anti-Conservative animus). Secondly,one LDDP political figure to pass unscathed through the reversal of the ex-Communistpolitical fortunes was Algirdas Brazauskas, whose reputation remained (and continues tobe) unsinkable, despite widely reputed shady deals, frequent inefficiency and incompe-tence and a penchant for malapropisms and the simplistic. The latter, alongside with in-stinctive political cunning, the jargon-like speech patterns of a typical Soviet-era apparat-chik, unfeigned comprehension of simple people's concerns (though rarely the capabilityto address them) and (literally) towering earthy solidity combined to produce a father-likefigure that represented all that was good about the Soviet era.By contrast, the leader of the Conservatives, Vytautas Landsbergis, is frequently perceivedand portrayed as overly intellectual, just a puny "musician" with a goatee (he is, in fact, aprofessor of music), far removed from the people's concerns and interests. His principledinsistence on the moral dimension of politics was often caricatured as abstract idealismand emotional posturing, whereas a tough approach to relations with Russia (which in factyielded excellent results) was seen as dogmatic, hard-line, dangerous nationalism. Lands-bergis' use of history as point of reference for today's politics earned him admiration fromthose who had suffered from the Russian occupation and the Soviet regime, mostly elderlypeople, but it estranged the emerging younger generation of pragmatically-minded pro-fessionals to whom the Soviet era was a bygone age, better left alone and forgotten. Aloneamong the political figures of the 1990s, Landsbergis outgrew his direct political influenceto become a symbol of those ideals for which he stood: Lithuanian independence, restitu-tion of historical justice and morality in politics.His second-in-command, Gediminas Vagnorius, who headed the conservative coalitiongovernment from 1996-1999 represents, on the other hand, a very different profile. Thisinitially gray and unfamiliar political figure, "an economist with ideas," in 1993-1996 wenton to become the Conservative party's eminence grise, thus creating the phenomenon of"two-headed eagle" in the party: "idealistic" Landsbergis versus "pragmatic" Vagnorius.The latter years of the Vagnorius government, however, were marred by corruption al-legations and unsavory struggle for influence within the party. After his demise, he disap-peared into the woodwork. Two subsequent Conservative prime ministers were RolandasPaksas (1999) and Andrius Kubilius (1999-2000).Paksas, an erstwhile stunt-pilot with a proclivity for bursting into tears and a sulky teenager'scharm, has earned his place in history as the first-ever European president to be successfullyremoved by impeachment (in 2004, on the charges of corruption and betrayal of the na-tional interest). His brief stint as a Conservative prime minister was characterized by failureto address any relevant issues while maintaining high popularity ratings. Never more thanan opportunistic conservative, he went on to become a member of the Liberal Union and aliberal prime minister (2000-2001). Following resignation from the latter position, Paksasfounded the populist Liberal Democratic Party which was to become one of the main threatsto Lithuania's democratic constitutional order and its pro-Western commitments.Andrius Kubilius, a former physicist and one of the founding fathers of the ConservativeParty, distinguished himself through his resolute measures, firm grasp of domestic policy T h e F a i l u r e o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P r o j e c t… 55
and innovative as well as conceptual thinking. The ambitious program of internal reformson which he embarked, though cut short by the Conservative defeat in 2000 and left in-complete, laid the foundations of Lithuania's subsequent rapid economic growth. In manya political analyst's opinion, Kubilius was the best prime minister Lithuania has ever had,and he has emerged as the lone voice of reason and responsibility on the increasingly pop-ulist Lithuanian political scene. His ironic aloofness and intellectual superiority, however,earns him more the respect of the discerning than the affection of the masses. Currentlyhe is the chairman of the Conservative Party and, effectively, the leader of the opposition.
Christian Democratic Party 16 seats (11.7%); the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party 12seats (8.8%); the Social-Democratic Party 12 seats (8.8%); and the Center Union 12 seats(8.8%).
On the other hand, the campaign of Paulauskas (who unsuccessfully ran for presidentagainst Adamkus) for the first time raised the specter of populism – the overwhelmingpreoccupation of Lithuanian politics ever since.The second critical event during the conservative rule was the Russian crisis of 1998-1999.The impact of the crisis on the Lithuanian economy and diminishing budget income, aswell as widespread allegations of corruption (upheld with some insistence by PresidentAdamkus), were leading towards a government crisis. Prime Minister Vagnorius soughtto draw the president's office into political confrontation, which resulted in a popularitybattle between the two politicians. This was won overwhelmingly by the president. Vagno-rius was forced to resign, and his ratings plummeted as rapidly as they had soared barely ayear before. This did not have any great direct effect on the popularity of the ConservativeParty; its ratings had already halved since the parliamentary election and were hoveringaround 8-9%.Adamkus' entourage was primarily responsible for promoting the candidacy of Paksas,then mayor of Vilnius, as a successor to the disgraced Vagnorius. Paksas, however, wasnever identified with the Conservative Party, despite the fact that he was hurriedly elect-ed the chairman of the party's governing board. Paksas enjoyed immense popularityratings (around 70%). Combined with the fact that he was promoted by the president,rather than rising from within the party ranks, this created an aura of an independentpolitical figure. From the start this aura sat rather uneasily with his commitments asthe Conservative prime minister. Things soon came to a sorry impasse when a conflicterupted between the parliamentary majority and Prime Minister Paksas over privatiza-tion of the Mažeikiai Oil Refinery. Paksas, heavily lobbied by the Russian state-ownedbidder Lukoil, resigned in a huff when he was leaned upon to decide in favor of theAmerican bidder, Williams International. He left the prime minister's office and theConservative Party in October 1999 without solving a single of the grave problems thatthe country was facing in the wake of Russian economic crisis. He had earned, however,a political martyr's fame, and his popularity ratings were higher than even those of thepresident. At Paksas' departure popular confidence in the Conservatives halved onceagain, dropping to approximately 4-5%, where it remained almost unchanged until theparliamentary election in 2000.In November 1999 the prime-ministership passed to Kubilius who embarked on a seriesof resolute and far-reaching reforms that drew Lithuania from the brink of economiccollapse and laid the foundations of Lithuania's future outstanding economic growth.Kubilius' reforms earned high praise both from President Adamkus and from the Euro-pean Commission. Towards the second half of the year 2000, the Lithuanian economywas showing signs of recovery. This, however, came too late. Kubilius' term in officewas soon ended with the crushing defeat of the Conservatives in the Seimas electionsin 2000.The alignment of the main political forces in the 2000 parliament was as follows: a broadsocial-democratic coalition, composed of the LDDP and the Social Democrats (eventuallythese would merge into the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party), won 49 seats (34.8% ofthe parliament); the Liberal Union 34 seats (24.1%); the New Union (Social Liberals) 29seats (20.6%); and the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) 9 seats (6.4%). 58 why we lost
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It would be hard to say now what kind of measures, short of a comprehensive re-educa-tion campaign, could have achieved such a turnaround in society's values. It would not beimprecise to claim, however, that the more thorough-going Conservative reforms werehindered by the social and political inertia which surpassed initial estimates. Both Sovietindoctrination and deeply-rooted political attitudes were proving to be more difficult toovercome than was originally maintained. Overall, the project of conservative politicaland social transformations fell onto very rocky ground on which to take root.The end result was that the section of the population which was not amenable to theConservative agenda remained virtually undiminished. It was largely passive in 1996, butturned up at the polls in one big protest vote against the Conservatives in 2000. By thenthis was also a society characterized by increasing mistrust for political parties and forthe democratic political process as a whole. It was likewise angered by the perception ofan ever wider chasm between political power-games in Vilnius, on the one hand, and theneglected, disenfranchised periphery, on the other.One of the key pieces in understanding the jigsaw-puzzle of this period is the Russian eco-nomic crisis of 1998-1999 and its effects on Lithuanian economy and politics. Insofar asRussia was Lithuania's main trading partner at the time, the collapse of its currency andeconomy could not fail to send deep reverberations through the Lithuanian economy, aswell. The Russian crisis followed upon a year of exceptionally high economic growth in Lith-uania (GDP grew by 8.5% in 1998), and the Vagnorius government ignored the early signsof disaster. The government budget was committed to extremely high spending based on anestimated 5.5% GDP growth, and this was not revised down until it was too late. As a result,the Lithuanian economy showed negative growth in 1999: down by 2.8% from the previousyear's GDP. Towards the end of 1999, the unemployment level rose by two percentage pointsto 11.4%. In November 1999, the government defaulted on its electoral promises to compen-sate ruble deposits. By then, however, it was too late to save the economy from crisis, but nottoo late to incur the rancor of those who were pinning their hopes on government hand-outsof cash in expectation of returning to their pre-1990 levels of affluence.Austerity measures and radical reforms adopted by the Kubilius government eased thecountry out of the economic crisis, and in 2000 the growth of the Lithuanian economyreturned to its pre-1998 level with GDP growth of 4.1%. In political terms, however, it wastoo little, too late.Another feature that needs to be factored into the complex field of Lithuanian politics isthe covert direct interference in it by the Russian state and by its energy-supplying subsid-iaries, Gazprom and Lukoil. Russian money is reported to have fuelled Paulauskas' failedpresidential campaign in 1997, as well as Paksas' successful one in 2002. Gazprom's exclu-sive franchise to Viktor Uspaskih elevated the former plumber into the ranks of Lithuania'srichest businessmen, and the ruthlessly populist Labor Party he created would capture thebiggest share of parliamentary seats in 2004. Lukoil money was almost undoubtedly be-hind the virulently anti-American campaign that in 1999 mobilized the extreme right andthe ex-Communist left alike behind their opposition to the sale of the Mažeikiai Oil Re-finery to Williams International – it was then that Paksas, future presidential impeachee,started having liaisons dangereux with "easy" Russian money. Several political fringe fig-ures noted for their past links to the KGB have, by some surprise coincidence, led the vo-60 why we lost
ciferous, even if ineffective opposition to Lithuania's integration into NATO (one of themnow is a European MP).Most of these concerns are, and for the time being will remain, unsubstantiated, letalone voiced in public, despite tacit confirmation from the security sources and theincreasingly worried tone of the annual Security Report issued by the Lithuanian StateSecurity Department. If, however, at least some of these reports prove to have beentrue, Lithuanian Conservatives will be proven to have played on a far from level politi-cal field at the time when Lithuania's political future and its integration with the Westwere being decided.Nor were the Conservatives helped by the development of Lithuania's political party struc-ture. The establishment of the New Union, or the Social Liberal Party, by Paulauskas, thecandidate narrowly defeated in the 1997 presidential election, and the increasingly suc-cessful performance of the New Union at the polls in 1999, raised the specter of populismonce again. The New Union's program offered, inter alia, to slow down Lithuania's integra-tion with NATO and the EU.As the New Union's unavoidable parliamentary victory was looming, President Adamkus'idea to avert the implied threat to Lithuania's Westward orientation was to harness theNew Union to a few parties with impeccable pro-Western and pro-democratic credentials:the Liberal Union, the Center Party and the Modern Christian Democrats, a revisionistgroup which splintered from the Christian Democratic Party. Thus in early 2000 a politi-cal neologism in the form of the slogan of "New Politics" was floated. The "New Politics"was also supposed to raise the standards of political life towards greater openness andmorality, and was expected to heal the growing rift between society and the political elite.Among the many parts of this political meccano, only one – the Liberal Union – hadanything resembling a consistent political ideology. When this new political derivativesecured the majority of parliamentary seats in 2000, it was Paksas, by then a liberal, whowas entrusted with the formation of the inherently unstable and short-lived governmentwhich was to disintegrate eight months later.The president's venture into political engineering had a twofold result. On the one hand,the two-party system that had seemed to be the axiom of Lithuanian parliamentary poli-tics until then was irreparably fractured. Political entities started further multiplying at thepopulist end of the spectrum with the foundation of the Liberal Democratic Party in 2002and the Labor Party in 2003.On the other hand, this uneasy marriage of the broadly left-wing, socially-minded NewUnion with a center-right Liberal Union committed to free market values spelt the begin-ning of the end for ideology-based grouping of political parties. Henceforth party ideolo-gies would recede into the background as the primary factor distinguishing parties fromone another, to be replaced by considerations of expediency and power-sharing arrange-ments. Nor was ideology any longer the selling point of political parties' programs. Onemay recall, by contrast, that in 1996 the Center Union was losing voters' support becauseits ideology was too indistinct. Likewise, the New Union founded in 1998 saw as its pri-mary task the creation of a credible party ideology (admittedly, this was not an easy taskfor a personality-based political force). By 2000 the political tide had turned in the oppo-site direction, and the role of ideology was on the ebb. T h e F a i l u r e o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P r o j e c t… 61
Admittedly, this placed clearly ideologically committed parties, such as the Conservatives,at a disadvantage. It would be simplistic, however, to blame this tectonic shift merely onthe results of President Adamkus' power-brokering effort.The political climate in Lithuania was, in addition, influenced by Western trends, andit is in this connection that one may discern two important and related developments.The first is the emergence of the phenomenon of the "new left" with Tony Blair's victoryin 1997 and Gerhard Schröder's in 1998 (and with Bill Clinton providing an importanttrans-Atlantic dimension). It indicated the swing of the Western political pendulum awayfrom the center-right orthodoxy of the early 1990s with which Lithuanian Conservativesmore or less directly associated themselves. Inevitably this made the Conservatives lookand feel like a fading, obsolete force – a fact that the hostile media did not fail to exploitpolemically.The "new left" was closely linked with the politics of the "third way" which set itself as analternative to both the traditional right and left ideologies. Blair's espousal of the free mar-ket along with the values of social state erased the conventional distinction between rightand left values, and confused many minds in Lithuania. This blurring of the political mapharmonized with another trend that reached Lithuania's shores at the time: the slogan of"non-ideological politics." The anti-ideological stance promoted the ideal of politics as acare-taking, non-controversial (and therefore, ultimately, non-political) technocratic ex-pertise. The dominant rhetoric became that of "solving problems" vs. "peddling ideology."The Conservatives, the only consistently ideological party in Lithuania, could not but feelthat the tide was turning against them.One continues to speak of the Conservative ideological commitment despite the fact that,from the point of view of its contents, this ideology was seldom more than a jumble of un-related and occasionally contradictory ideas. I shall relegate the discussion of its contentsto a later point in the text; for the purposes of the present discussion it will suffice to saythat it is still accurate to speak of the Conservatives as an ideologically committed partyinsofar as its political identity was characterized by a belief that conservative policies mustbe based on a shared body of doctrine.With regard to the question of what exactly that doctrine amounted to, opinions of-ten varied. The meaning of "conservatism" ranged from robustly patriotic sentimentswith an admixture of pro-Western orientation, on the one hand, to economic liber-alism and suspiciousness towards ideology in the Anglo-Saxon mold, on the other.("Conservatives emphasize that they are distinct from other ideologies in that theyhave no ideology," asserted Andrius Kubilius in 1997.) These differences concerningthe content of the conservative project indicate certain growth-related problems inconservative identity.In the immediate aftermath of the restoration of Lithuanian independence, the politicalfield was primarily defined through the attitude to the Soviet past: right-of-center Sąjūdisrepudiated it wholesale, while the ex-Communists sought some continuity with, and justi-fication for, Soviet Lithuania. This distinction, however, grew increasingly insignificant asLithuanian independence ceased to be a burning political issue and became an establishedfact. When the democratic, pluralist political mechanism and market economy becameentrenched, a new set of realities and problems came to life.62 why we lost
One may register a certain paradigm shift here. Previously, the political debate was largelydefined by such issues as a means for promoting independence and democracy in Lith-uania, restoring its statehood and integrating it with the West. Towards the end of the1990s, however, it was the ability to propose solutions to urgent social and economic is-sues, rather than to offer grand narratives, that defined a successful politician in the eyes ofthe public. Likewise, the focus of the concern shifted from foreign to domestic policy.Even when it came to integration with the West, most Sąjūdis politicians who were fromthe outset quite uncompromising in voicing their support for Lithuania's pro-Western ori-entation and democratic values were shown to have very scant knowledge of how Westernsocieties actually operate. In other words, it transpired that many a conservative politi-cian's vision of the West lacked foundation in reality. Public proclamations of the Westernideal at crucial points often failed to connect with the reality of pro-Western Lithuaniathat was being created.The Conservatives were slow to realize that the rousing slogans of the former politicalphase no longer represented the real concerns of the society. Instead, there were severalsymptomatic attempts to hoist on to the public a preoccupation with ideological concernsthat were entirely passé. Thus, for example, the ruling coalition sought to fan a politi-cal debate around the issue of whether it was legitimate to have sculptures representingSoviet-era ideological figures displayed in a privately-owned leisure park at Grūtas. Thepublic merely shrugged off the question as irrelevant.On the other hand, such newly-emerging issues as growing social and economic dispar-ity, as well as political alienation between the city and the country, and between the capi-tal and the provinces hardly received any attention. On the contrary, the Conservativesfrequently adopted a defensive position by insisting on their achievements, whereas anyattempts to point out new problems and challenges were interpreted as implicitly criticaland subversive.Thus an alternative emerged to the old-style politics in the politicians who had a firmergrasp of urgent social and economic issues and who could formulate pragmatic solutionsto them. This new paradigm of politicians was represented, for example, in the LiberalUnion: economically competent, ready to propose concrete solutions and youthful (therewere four candidates under 35 among the top eleven on the party's 2000 election list). Itperformed well against the Conservatives, who were perceived as dealing in generalities,committed to antiquated issues and senile (the association with the Union of the PoliticalPrisoners and Exiles did not greatly help the Conservative image, either).The second important aspect of the ideological paradigm shift is that towards the endof their parliamentary term the Conservatives eventually found themselves without anydistinctive political vision to offer. With their ambitious program of reforms derailedthrough internal (societal inertia), as well as external (Russian economic crisis) causes,and with their government confined to adopting unpopular austerity measures and fight-ing rearguard action, the Conservatives found themselves outmaneuvered on the ideo-logical plane. The most innovative idea at the time was one of the Sunrise and SunsetCommissions, created by Kubilius in order to establish strategic landmarks for businessdevelopment and public administration reform. Their activity, however, was drowned intechnicalities and did not have either the expected impact or any broader appeal. T h e F a i l u r e o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P r o j e c t… 63
By then the Conservatives had little to offer in positive terms apart from economic liberal-ism, and here they were outdone by the Liberals. The latter not only wielded much moreprecise economic analysis, but also were able to drive home the positive aspect of theirproposed liberal reforms: wider rights for local communities at the municipal level, pro-tection of small and medium businesses against foreign interests, etc. Moreover, the Liber-als were able to develop solutions for concrete problems consistent with their underlyingbelief in the free market and private initiative, while the Conservatives were still searchingfor a consistent ideological rationale behind their political practice.The ideological barrenness of the Conservative Party was one of the principal reasons whyits niche as the main party of the right was taken over by the Liberals during the 2000 elec-tions. The immediate reaction to this development among the Conservatives was either toadopt an ever more liberal economic stance (thus aiming to criticize the liberals from theright), or to descend into pragmatic realpolitik.It took the Conservative Party a few years to extricate itself from this ideological crisis.With the appearance of Dešinioji alternatyva (The Right-Wing Alternative) in 2003, how-ever, the Conservatives managed to reinvent themselves, once again finding an authenticpolitical voice and distinctive vision which have continued to dominate right-of-centerpolitical discourse. The author of this surprising comeback, Kubilius, replaced Landsber-gis as the paradigmatic politician of the new generation, whereas Landsbergis' uncom-promising global vision is now employed on the Conservative behalf at the EuropeanParliament.
image of the Conservatives as the "arrogant party" was rubbed in so deeply into the publicconsciousness that it has been impossible to get rid of it until now. This was not the casewhen the Conservatives had just arrived in power. In fact, at that point they constituted amarked contrast to the increasingly corrupt and stagnation-prone LDDP.Vagnorius' rise in the Conservative Party contained a promise of a new-style party man-agement. The party governing board he formed was built along the principles of unifiedand efficient political command. These principles, however, were abandoned with the sub-sequent reorganization of the party structure. As a result, power in the Conservative Partywas divided between the presidium that wielded most of the influence, and the councilthat was formed chiefly, though not exclusively, along the lines of regional representation.This reform of the party towards "democratization" through giving greater say to regionalorganizations has, in fact, undermined its efficiency, insofar as provincial organizationsare apt to come under control of regional "chiefs" who have been proving to be less-than-adequate players on the national political scene.Moreover, Vagnorius' period saw a rise and entrenchment of conformism and the politicsof "clan" within the Conservative Party. This practice did not entirely disappear with hisdemise, insofar as the figures who came to occupy the forefront of the party thereafter werenot his opponents, but rather those who had managed best to conform to Vagnorius' rule.Self-enclosed party structures, especially among its lower echelons and especially in theprovinces, have continued to prevent attracting new members to the Conservative Party.The local organizations have likewise had little use as the party's feelers whereby it couldinteract with society at the grass-roots level. The Conservative Party was also somewhatweakened by the formation of a splinter group (the soi-dissant "moderate Conservatives")around Vagnorius after the latter's resignation as prime minister. This has continued todrain some small proportion of the Conservative vote.A more serious blow was the dismantling of the Conservative-Christian democratic gov-erning coalition just before the 2000 election. The Christian Democrats pulled out of thecoalition hoping to dissociate themselves from the Conservatives, perceived as the "estab-lishment" party and held solely responsible for the previous government's mistakes. Thisstrategy clearly backfired for the Christian Democrats (they were pretty much wiped outin the election), but it also further damaged the Conservative reputation.Public relations were fairly effective and well-organized while the Conservative Party wasstill in opposition. It soon went downhill, however, with the ascent of the Conservativesinto power. During the Conservative government, numerous important and far-reachingreforms were carried out in the spheres of education, health care and public administra-tion. Foreign investment was attracted through successful privatization of state-ownedcompanies, and significant progress made towards the membership in the EuropeanUnion and NATO. Nevertheless, the only praise that these reforms and policies receivedwas from foreign experts; the press coverage was predominantly negative. Towards 2000public opinion firmly branded the Conservatives as the party guilty of "selling out" andimpoverishing Lithuania.In many cases this is attributable to the public officials' incompetence and perhaps un-willingness to engage in public relations. "Let our works speak for themselves" – suchhas frequently been the dominating attitude, and thus the public was left without means T h e F a i l u r e o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e P r o j e c t… 65
to understand the complex and occasionally painful structural reforms that were carriedout. On the other hand, conservative politicians have often had a love-hate relationshipwith the media. Media criticism is often taken as a declaration of hostilities, with furtherrelations severed in a torrent of accusations.Furthermore, the Conservative project was not helped by the public relations policy ad-opted by Vagnorius: a quiet deal was made with the principal media to eschew criticism ofVagnorius and his government. Moreover, the government's public relations efforts weredirected primarily at the increasing the popularity of Vagnorius and his government. Thusnot only were the Conservative Party and the conservative project as a whole left in theshade, this arrangement also worked against the Conservative parliamentary majority atwhose expense Vagnorius' popularity rose.On the other hand, the left-wing opposition was extremely efficient in playing the public-ity game. Its slogans, though often politically irresponsible and formulated without con-sideration of the common good (such as branding the privatization of Lithuanian Telecomas "a sell-out to the foreigners"), nevertheless captured popular and media attention. Thus,when it came to media battles, Conservatives inevitably lost, adding to their image as areckless group serving foreign (i.e., Western) interests at the people's expense. Most sig-nificant in this respect is the case of the Mažeikiai Oil Refinery privatization in 1999. TheConservatives understandably defended the Lithuanian energy market from the prospectof Russia's increased control. This was represented, by the left and the media alike, as un-pardonable squandering of the state assets and fawning to the United States, almost prob-ably with ulterior egoistic motives. The case of Mažeikiai came to haunt the Conservatives,especially since Williams International soon defaulted on the obligations it undertookwith the purchase, selling the refinery to the Russian-based Yukos.Nor were the Conservatives better equipped to deal with the opposition. The latter's attacksmay have been irresponsible and unconstructive, but the Conservatives did not manageto outgrow the rules of the game forced on them. Retaliation in kind, parliamentary give--and-take, shrill accusations: all of this contributed to undermining the confidence of theelectorate in the conservative project. Even more damagingly, it reinforced the sense of thefutility of the political process as a whole.Arrogance towards the populace at large outside the immediate circle of party supporters,especially in the provinces, also contributed to the deepening of political alienation. Thewhole political process was thereby perceived as corrupt and ultimately self-interested byever-widening circles of Lithuanian society. It is in this alienation and the anti-establish-ment resentment generated by it that one should search for the roots of radical populismwhich would come increasingly to dominate Lithuanian politics in the early 2000s.
Lithuania was not invited to start NATO entry negotiations with the first wave of CentralEuropean applicants. Moreover, Conservative political and public-relations efforts man-aged to turn European and Atlanticist integration into a part of the shared political agendawhich, by 2000, hardly any political force would dare to challenge openly. (It is importantto remember, for example, that there had been allusions to an attempt to withdraw Lithu-ania from the processes of EU and NATO integration in the electoral platform of Paulaus-kas, the populist contender for presidency in 1997.)In terms of domestic policies, Kubilius' stint as prime minister saved the state from de-fault in the aftermath of the recession induced by the Russian economic crisis. "Toughmeasures" and deep-going structural reforms started to yield positive results once therecession was over. Kubilius also put in place the prerequisites for subsequent rapid eco-nomic growth that was highly commended by the European Commission. The years of theConservative coalition government also saw the incipient widening of the middle class,whereas Vagnorius' public administration reforms brought about the emergence of a fairlyefficient and politically neutral civil service.
expectations, oriented towards concrete and immediate policy measures. This favoredboth the emergence of ever-newer, populist forces and the progressively more populistcharacter of the whole political field. Secondly, the Lithuanian political framework be-came increasingly unstable as a result. Both of these tendencies have been amply illus-trated by the parliamentary election in 2004, where all the major political parties exceptthe Conservatives and, to some extent, the Liberals, adopted populist rhetoric, whereasthe greatest share of the seats in the parliament was captured by the one-year-old, radi-cally populist Labor Party.
Now that waves of populism have become the norm in politics, while the Conservativesare increasingly seen as the only viable alternative by the informed minority, what are ourprospects for the future?In the near future one can only expect a gradual growth in either Conservative influenceor in the party's power base, insofar as recent studies suggest that there is no statisticalgroup or sociological niche available in Lithuanian society which could bring about asignificant enlargement of the conservative electorate. The main hurdles still facing theConservatives include inadequate public relations skills; petrified, self-enclosed partyorganization that is clearly out of step with the conservative electorate; and, with theexception of Kubilius, a deficit of the figures that would combine intellectual authorityand high visibility with popular appeal. On the current political playing field the Con-servative Party remains the only ideologically committed party and the only one thatstill generates ideas – such ideas, however, need not only to be generated, but also heard,and listened to.
APPENDIX:List of Major Parties and Their AcronymsHomeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) - TSLabor Party - DPLiberal and Center Union - LiCSLiberal Democratic Party - LDPLithuanian Social Democratic Party - LSDPNew Union (Social Liberals) - NSSąjūdis - KS
Notes:• A mixed election system is used in the country, thus the table shows the share of party list votes only.• The Social Democratic Coalition in 2000 was a coalition of LDDP and LSDP. In 2001 the parties merged creating the LSDP. In 2004 the party was the core of the "Working for Lithuania" coalition with NS.• The Liberal and Center Union is a merger of LCS and LLS.• LDP ran in 2004 as Coalition For Order and Justice.
Presidents:Algirdas Brazauskas (25 February1993 – 25 February 1998)Valdas Adamkus (26 February 1998 – 25 February 2003)Rolandas Paksas (26 February 2003 – 6 April 2004; removed after impeachment)Artûras Paulauskas (6 April 2004 – 12 July 2004; acting president)Valdas Adamkus (12 July 2004 – present)
Governments: 1. Kazimiera Prunskienė (March 1990 - January 1991) 2. Albertas Šimėnas (10-13 January 1991) 3. Gediminas Vagnorius (January 1991 - July 1992) 4. Aleksandras Abišala (July 1992 - November 1992) 5. Bronislovas Lubys (December 1992 - March 1993) 6. Adolfas Šleževičius (March 1993 - February 1996) 7. Laurynas Stankevičius (February 1996 - November 1996) 8. Gediminas Vagnorius (December 1996 - May 1999) 9. Rolandas Paksas (June 1999 - October 1999)10. Andrius Kubilius (November 1999 -November 2000)11. Rolandas Paksas (October 2000 - June 2001)12. Algirdas Brazauskas (July 2001-November 2004)13. Algirdas Brazauskas (November 2004 - today ) Why We Lost – The Macedonian Case
CONTENTS: I. INTRODUCTIONII. THE ATMOSPHERE OF CHANGEIII. VICTORY AND A TROUBLED RULINGIV. ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURESV. DEFEAT AND FRAGMENTATIONVI. PERSPECTIVES72 why we lost
H istorical events have hardly been favorable to the interests of the Macedonian nation and to the cause of an independent Macedonian state. Even now, as recent polls confirm, many Macedonians believe being part of the former Yugoslav fed-eration were the nation's best times. This belief, together with the troublesome fifteen yearsof post-Communist transition, is at the root of the people's lack of self-confidence, apathyand pessimism. These are exacerbated by the inefficiency of pluralistic governments and ageneral lack of capable political elites.The "Yugoslav connection" was so strong in the early 1990s that it worked against theelection success of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – DemocraticParty for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO – DPMNE, hereinafter VMRO), the newlyestablished reincarnation of the legendary, nineteenth-century VMRO. This time it wasled by young and charismatic Ljubco Georgievski. VMRO hoped Macedonians would feela national rebirth when the Yugoslav federation was falling apart and new independentstates were emerging. Any political analysis of the center-right political option in Mace-donia must address VMRO and the parties which came from VMRO-DPMNE. This istrue even though the party has rarely declared that it belongs to the center right. But it isgenerally agreed that VMRO represents this political option in Macedonia.After the first success in 1990, when the party won 38 of 120 seats in parliament, Presi-dent Kiro Gligorov refused to give the mandate to the candidate from VMRO-DPMNEto form a government. Instead an expert government was formed, with half of the min-isters close to the party. This government ruled Macedonia for seventeen months andintroduced all the laws that would give the Republic of Macedonia the marks of an inde-pendent state. The expert government was dismissed after the leftist parties, supportedby VMRO MPs, voted against it. But even while doing this, VMRO had no clear ideawhere this move would lead the party. This first major mistake was made in September1992 and initiated a long period in opposition that ended only after the victorious 1998parliamentary elections. VMRO's term lasted until the September 2002 parliamentaryelections.This analysis will give some perspective on the rise and fall of VMRO as a governing forceduring this period and as a major political party representing the center-right option inthe Republic of Macedonia.
The first major strike on democracy by SDSM was in the parliamentary and presidentialelections in 1994, which were marked by blatant fraud. The second major turbulence inthe country was the assassination attempt on President Gligorov, which seriously woundedhim and inflicted permanent injuries. The investigation of this case is still ongoing. Also,organized crime was getting stronger, which was famously acknowledged by then PrimeMinister Branko Crvenkovski who said that a "criminal octopus" existed in Macedonia,and that it would be defeated. Of course, this did not happen, and the people became moredisappointed by the lack of progress.During the 1994-1996 period, when the United Nations (UN) imposed sanctions againstYugoslavia, the SDSM government allowed trade transactions and oil sales into Yugosla-via contrary to UN sanctions. These transactions, of which the government was aware,exclusively benefited a select group of party functionaries. By most estimates, the valueof profits made by SDSM functionaries during this period ran into the hundreds of mil-lions of dollars. Besides oil, cigarette smuggling reached its peak during these years. Upuntil June 1998, public procurement transactions involving hundreds of millions of dol-lars were unregulated by law. This period was characterized by numerous scandals involv-ing public procurements because there was no accountability or transparency, and manySDSM ministers were implicated in scandals.Many also argue that the SDSM government and President Gligorov misled the nation,stating that the provisional name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" would beonly temporary. They completely failed in foreign policy with the "equidistance model"that tried to maintain similar relationships with all neighbors, even though some of themwere helping Macedonia survive the blockades while others were imposing blockades andsanctions. Meanwhile, EU and NATO integration progressed very slowly.Ninety percent of all public companies were privatized under the SDSM government.During this time, less than $50 million was received directly by the public treasury. Thevast majority of these companies was "sold" to SDSM insiders via a management buy-outscheme at ridiculous prices with a two-year grace period and a seven-year term of repay-ment, thus creating an oligarchy at the expense of the Macedonian state and the Mace-donian people. These actions were done to build a milieu of wealthy companies close toSDSM, to support its policies, cover its campaign expenses, satisfy the employment needsof SDSM members and supplement the benefits of the state administration.One of the biggest public scandals which shook Macedonia during the government ofSDSM was the TAT affair in 1997. TAT, a "savings and investment house" in Bitola, ad-vertised huge interest rates for depositors, promising to pay rates of 5-6% per month. Infact, it was nothing but a classic pyramid scheme in which ordinary citizens lost over $70million. In 1996, the director of TAT was proclaimed "manager of the year" by the govern-ment and the president, who himself awarded the prize. The TAT director was also chosento head the SDSM candidate list for the 1996 local elections in Bitola. Public praise washeaped on TAT and its director, creating much public interest and a rush to invest as aresult. Many "chosen" persons borrowed money from TAT at rates of 3% per annum, andpromptly re-invested it in TAT at the aforementioned rates, making profits by redeemingmoney just after a couple of months. Huge profits were thus made by public officials at theexpense of ordinary citizens who were simply deceived. Once the scheme collapsed, gov-74 why we lost
ernment officials seized TAT's documentation, and the subsequent investigation yieldedno results. Prime Minister Crvenkovski, in a famous speech to parliament in 1997 shortlyafter the TAT affair, recognized the failure of his war against organized crime.This atmosphere in 1997-1998 of favoring only one political and business structure, anenormous unemployment rate and a poorly performing economy provided a solid basefor the first victory of the opposition VMRO. The party had already started its restructur-ing and was slowly losing its label of being a populist party. Many well-known intellectualsjoined it, and an Intellectuals Council was re-established as an official party body. At thesame time, the influential general secretary of VMRO, Boris Zmejkovski, was trying toimpose his structure over the party but was removed and expelled, which also broughtMacedonian intellectuals back into the party. This move increased the public's acceptanceof the party.SDSM also failed to improve the ethnic relations between Macedonians and the ethnicAlbanian minority, or to give ethnic Albanians additional rights to pursue higher educa-tion in their mother tongue. The SDSM policy in this area was compromised by eventsin Gostivar, when the mayor of the city, Rufi Osmani, and the mayor of Tetovo, AlajdinDemiri, illegally flew the flag of the Republic of Albania next to the flag of the Republic ofMacedonia at the city hall. They were repeatedly asked to remove the flag and after failingto do so, the police removed it with force. Four people were killed in the riots that fol-lowed. Rufi Osmani and Alajdin Demiri were convicted and sentenced to twelve years inprison, a somewhat harsh term which was out of line with traditional sentences for suchcrimes. When VMRO later came to power, their sentences were revised, helping to bridgethe gap in ethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians.
allied with the SDSM, took 14 seats, compared to eleven seats for PDSH. Prime MinisterGeorgievski said his government would continue to work toward membership in NATOand the European Union and strive for better relations with neighboring Balkan countries.He pledged to reform the economy by working to end corruption, reduce taxes, eliminateregulations on investments and attract foreign investment.PDSH's participation in the coalition proved to be a wise step during the 1999 Kosovocrisis. This was the first major challenge for the VMRO-led government, when more than360,000 refugees fled to Macedonia. In spite of a weak economy, insufficient foreign assis-tance and fears that the refugees would not return to Kosovo, the government successfullymanaged the refugee crisis. This operation allowed NATO troops to cross Macedonianterritory and to build logistic facilities for their intervention in Kosovo. VMRO-DPMNEthus was on the right track for building partnership with the Euroatlantic community,always pushing to promote Macedonia's Euroatlantic integration.In addition to the relaxation of the inter-ethnic relationship, the mayors of Tetovo andGostivar, Alajdin Demiri and Rufi Osmani, were released from prison and their sentenceswere revoked. On the third national TV and radio channel, a full day of programmingin Albanian and other minority languages was started for the first time. The rate of em-ployment of Albanians in public administration rose, especially in the police and securitystructures.But the Kosovo crisis generally had a negative influence on the approval ratings of the gov-ernment. The public thought that the government should not allow the Kosovo refugeesto enter the country, or that it should be more organized to prevent demographic changein the Macedonian population. This was accompanied by the lowest ratings for NATOand EU ever, as well as decrease in support for the country's Euroatlantic integration. Onthe other hand, many argued that the enormous number of foreign media covering theKosovo crisis and stationed in Macedonia misrepresented the efforts of the MacedonianGovernment, taking every opportunity to blame it for mistreating the Kosovo refugees.The VMRO government failed to win this media war or to use its humanitarian actions toits benefit. It was unable to use this event to improve its image and stature in the interna-tional community, even though it reacted in accordance with international humanitarianstandards.The NATO campaign lasted for 72 days, and stabilizing the situation took several months,with the Macedonian government arguing that it did not receive the financial help thatwas promised by the international community. One VMRO official, future President ofthe Republic of Macedonia Boris Trajkovski, made a name for himself during the Kosovocrisis as a deputy minister of foreign affairs. He was in charge of coordinating the activi-ties concerning refugees. His good international contacts and the famous statement thathe gave in a press conference addressing the international community demanding urgenthelp for Macedonia made him popular and launched an excellent political career.Later in the autumn of 1999, Trajkovski ran at the party convention and became the VMROcandidate for president. He won the national race with 592,118 votes, defeating SDSM'sTito Petkovski. International observers said that although the elections were marred bysome faults in the western part of the country, they were generally fair. However, due toallegations of fraud from SDSM, and a decision by the Supreme Court to repeat the vote76 why we lost
turned into a lifestyle magazine, telling stories about animal life, music or similar themes.The purchase of a local TV station, which broadcast in the Skopje area, did not work. Itnever functioned as an information station, and after a couple of years it was sold to a per-son who had no connection to the party. There was also a radio station that was supposedto spread a pro-VMRO message, but only managed to broadcast Macedonian patrioticsongs.The party was more and more under attack from the media, connecting it with the partyfirms which were supposed to make the finances of the party sustainable, but were buy-ing real estate, shops and factories. The constitutional court ruled against all of these partycompanies, and the firms had to be dismantled, and the party property sold. VMRO indeeddismissed the firms, but the real estate and other properties were transferred into the per-sonal property of the closest associates of Prime Minister Georgievski. Party officials neverexplained where the money for these transactions went. The intention of building a financialbase for a time of opposition was a critical mistake, and many close associates of Georgievskibecame wealthy real estate and business owners, obviously with help from the prime minis-ter himself. This mistake increased the negative perceptions of the government.In autumn 2000, municipal elections were held for the second time and partial re-runswere necessary. These were especially important elections, as they were the first to fol-low the highly-contested presidential elections of 1999, where VMRO and PDSH showedgood partnership. Both the election campaign and the elections themselves were marredby violent incidents, notably between sympathizers of the two ethnic Albanian parties. Inthe immediate wake of the elections, the SDSM announced plans to form a new parlia-mentary majority for a vote of no-confidence in the Georgievski government and to callfor early parliamentary elections.According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, these electionsfell short of international standards. Results in most of the municipalities were decided inthe second round of voting on 24 September, during which runoffs were held in 54 dis-tricts, while the first round of voting had to be repeated in 27 districts. Both the "For theGood of Everyone" coalition formed by the VMRO and DA and the opposition coalition"For Macedonia Together" (based on an alliance of SDSM, the Liberal Democratic Partyand other smaller formations) initially claimed victory. The two ethnic Albanian partiesran independently in most municipalities, although both concluded alliances with smallerparties in some districts. There was no central tabulation or announcement of results bythe State Election Commission, which led to confusion over the outcome. Final resultsindicated that the opposition coalition received the largest share of votes in the first round,while the governing parties won in most municipalities in the second round. Overall, theVMRO/DA coalition won around half of the mayoral positions, while the opposition wonmost big cities, including the capital, Skopje.In the municipalities with Albanian majorities, PDSH emerged as the clear winner. Theseelections were the most violent in the history of independent Macedonia. A member ofthe election committee in Kondovo, close to Skopje, was killed, and many people werewounded in Ohrid and Kocani.Serious disagreements between VMRO-DPMNE and DA emerged. The main conflictwas about the logistical support that VMRO was giving NATO during the Kosovo crisis,78 why we lost
and which was opposed by DA officials because of their links with Belgrade. Further-more, six VMRO members of parliament led by Finance Minister Boris Stojmenov leftthe party and formed their own parliamentary group and party, named VMRO-Make-donska.DA decided to step out of the government because of differences with VMRO on econom-ic policy, refusal by VMRO to back DA leader Tupurkovski for president of Macedonia,DA's discontentment about the handling of the privatization process and irregularities inthe 1999 and 2000 elections. A new government was elected without DA, and the LiberalParty and some DA members of parliament joined the VMRO-led coalition. In a slightvictory for VMRO, the party succeeded in keeping the majority in the government andhaving all of the mayors from DA join VMRO or at least proclaim their loyalty to thegovernment. The ruling coalition survived this crisis with a slim majority of 64 out of 120parliamentary seats.In January 2001, just before the crisis started, the Macedonian government was underthe threat of being implicated in a wire-tapping scandal, with the SDSM claiming thegovernment tapped about a hundred public and political figures, including 25 journalists.It claimed the illegal surveillance took place in the run-up to local elections in September2000 and in the following three months when the government was struggling to defend itsparliamentary majority. The scandal, named the "Macedonian Watergate" by the media,broke out on 17 January in a press conference when the SDSM leader Crvenkovski, pro-vided 150 pages of transcripts of allegedly monitored telephone conversations. The mediaalso speculated that DA leader Tupurkovski had leaked the transcripts to Crvenkovski.This scandal showed that how vulnerable and inexperienced the security structures led byVMRO were, having intruders linked with SDSM among their employees.By the end of 2000, the situation in southern Serbia (Preshevo, Bujanovac and Medvedje)got worse and there were clashes with Albanian insurgents there. When the first intel-ligence information about plans for similar actions arrived in the government, the reac-tion was insufficient. The Albanian partner in the governmental coalition, PDSH, did notsupport the Albanian insurgents which had been planning this attack on the Macedonianstate. But as developments worsened, and the so-called National Liberation Army (NLA)gained support among Macedonian Albanians, PDSH feared for its rating among its elec-torate and started to indirectly support the NLA; some PDSH members became com-manders and took part in the clashes.The situation went out of control with the occupation of the Macedonian village Tanu-shevci, to which the government was argued to have reacted hesitantly, leaving even thedeputy director of the state security blocked by the insurgents from entering this area forseveral hours. After the international community indirectly gave approval for action, thegovernment debated whether such action should be undertaken by the army or the minis-try of the interior. As events worsened and the Macedonian security forces suffered morecasualties, the dialog with the international community became hostile. The Macedoniangovernment was losing international support. Disagreements between the prime ministerand Interior Minister Ljube Boshkovski and between the government and NATO and EUleaders, as well as with the special envoys James Perdew and François Leotard, furthercomplicated the situation. Why We Lost – The Macedonian Case 79
The NLA issued several "communication notices" that proclaimed their actions as a "fightfor the liberation of Albanian territories." They later changed their argument and pro-claimed they were fighting for better rights of the Albanians in Macedonia. This was aturning point when the Macedonian government lost the support of the internationalcommunity. The unsuccessful siege of the Lipkovo region and the failure of the Arachi-novo action only increased the pressure from abroad for developing a dialog with insur-gents. On 13 May 2001, SDSM and its coalition partners entered the all-national coalitiongovernment. This was supposed to unite all the parties in Macedonia in order to endthe crisis and was done under strong international pressure that led to the signing of theOhrid Framework Agreement on 13 August 2001. It was negotiated among the main partyleaders in Macedonia and President Trajkovski.Meanwhile, as the coalition proved unable to stop what many called the ethnic cleans-ing of Macedonians in the Tetovo region, another mistake was made by Georgi Efremov,chairman of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Macedonia, who suggested that thebest way of ending hostilities between the Macedonian and Albanian communities was todivide the country into two parts. According this plan, Albanians would settle in the west-ern regions of Gostivar, Tetovo and Debar, which would then join Albania. In exchange,Albania would hand over to Macedonia the town of Pogradec and the surrounding areanear Prespa Lake, where a small Macedonian minority lives. The proposal enraged largesections of the political spectrum. There was a danger that the EU might decide to reviewthe validity of the Stabilization and Association Agreement that Macedonia signed in Lux-embourg on 9 April 2001. This proposal could also have undermined all the support thatMacedonia had received so far and endanger Macedonian Euroatlantic integration.Whether it was a test of public opinion, an outright provocation or a serious project, thisplan certainly shifted attention away from the fighting in the north. Prime Minister Geor-gievski did not refuse the plan, indirectly showing support for this unrealistic idea.In the Tetovo region, the Albanian insurgents undertook what many called the ethniccleansing of Macedonians, trying to merge a territory from Skopje into Tetovo along theborder with Kosovo. Regular troops were unable to defend the population, and manypeople fled to Skopje and other cities. Interior Minister Boskovski, by the order of theprime minister, formed and trained a unit called "Lions," composed mostly of unem-ployed young men and women, as well as other people with a criminal background. Thename of this unit was badly chosen, reminding the people of the symbol of the lion on theVMRO-DPMNE party flag. The media harshly criticized the activities of the unit, and theinternational community labeled them paramilitary troops. Yet, the "Lions" generally didnot take part in the biggest actions in the crisis, because they were formed too late. Theunnecessary publicity, parades and shows of strength created a bad picture and negativepublicity. The highlight of this was the action in village of Trebosh, long after the signingof the Ohrid Framework Agreement, when they were sent with cameras from state TVdirectly into an ambush, where three policemen from the unit were killed.During the last months of the conflict, Prime Minister Georgievski and Interior MinisterBoskovski openly lobbied for proclaiming martial law on the whole territory of Mace-donia and constantly argued with international mediators on this point. The two mostinfluential men on the political stage in Macedonia gave many statements accusing NATO80 why we lost
and its leaders of supporting the Albanian cause and pointed to the Alliance as the majorperpetrator of the war in Macedonia during the past year. One explanation for this rheto-ric was the pending parliamentary elections and a desire to gain the support of patrioticMacedonian voters and those greatly disappointed by the outcome of the 2001 crisis.All of these anti-Western politics were a step away from the original platform of VMROas a pro-Euroatlantic party, evidenced by its application for NATO membership in 1993and the signing of the Association and Stabilization Agreement with the EU in 2001.Prime Minister Georgievski's disputes with Western officials made him a politically un-stable leader. The first serious divide between him and his closest associates occurredwith the resignation of the vice president of the party, Dosta Dimovska, in January 2002.Also, the prime minister's relationship with former advisor (and now president) Tra-jkovski dramatically deteriorated, which was evidenced by the insults hurled at Tra-jkovski during his resignation speech in 2002, in which he apologized for supportinghis candidacy in 1999.
ernment protected the environment and preserved the cultural and historical heritage inthe country by excavating and renovating the ancient city of Ohrid, an important city inSlavic culture.Social issues were also addressed by the VMRO government. Thousands of apartments foryoung couples were built; the health sector was improved; the situation of the pensionersimproved and public servants received a salary increase. Generally, the VMRO govern-ment did a lot for the citizens of Macedonia and was on the right track, but corruptionconnected to the prime minister and his close associates, as well as the crisis of 2001,negatively affected the government.The fight against corruption was short-lived. When VMRO came to power, it started nu-merous investigations concerning the crimes of the SDSM government. This was a com-plete failure because the public prosecutors and courts dismissed most of the accusationsas unproven. This was to be expected, since the court system was built under anotherpolitical system. The only case in which the VMRO government accused one of its ownofficials was the case of the minister of defense, Ljuben Paunovski, which is still in thelabyrinth of the judicial system.The government did not succeed in publicizing the reforms or the prospects for goodeconomic growth they promised. It operated in a hostile media environment – one thatgot worse immediately after the parliamentary elections, when SDSM was able to useits resources to indirectly create media close to it. To improve its public relations tac-tics, there was an attempt by the government to start a network of NGOs linked withits party members that could promote the policies of the government, but this was notachieved during its term in office. No right-of-center or conservative think thank, insti-tute, center, or party foundation was founded to present and support party policy. Onlya humanitarian foundation was formed by the prime minister's wife, and it was man-aged by a closed circle of associates that lacked transparency, leaving it open to regularattacks by the media.The lack of professionalism and mistakes that many VMRO officials committed in thegovernment were mostly due to inexperienced personnel and difficulties in acquiringloyal administration personnel, councilors, intelligence and security service members orgood spokespersons to explain and promote government policies.During VMRO's term, the rate of unemployment decreased, but most of these new jobswere created through governmental firms and the state administration. They were mostlyfilled by party members and often overstaffed. Still, unemployment in Macedonia re-mained high, and this irritated people without any party affiliation and caused generallybad publicity.The corruption issue, besides the mishandling of the crisis in 2001, was one of the crucialreasons for failure of the government. The obvious attempt of Prime Minister Georgievskito create a counterbalance to the pro-Communist financial oligarchy failed because of theunsophisticated ways of buying firms and real estate and the privatization of the rest of thefirms in Macedonia, as well as the absence of any sense of responsibility toward the partyand the government's future. During its term, the SDSM oligarchy succeeded in privatiz-ing 90% of the firms in Macedonia, including the most profitable ones, and there was no82 why we lost
impact on its ratings or reputation. This was not the case with VMRO, which, thoughprivatizing much less under its rule, was quickly stigmatized as running the most corruptMacedonian government ever. It seems the old saying holds true that if two people do thesame thing, it is not in fact always the same.
The authority and charisma of Georgievski was never in question; he always kept every-thing under his control, but under his leadership the party never experienced solid in-ternal democracy and discussion without consequences for bearers of dissenting opin-ions. Georgievski had intentions of controlling the party through Gruevski. But obviouslyGruevski did not want to play that role. After the tragic death of President Trajkovski andthe presidential elections in 2004, the dispute between them surfaced, as they blamedeach other for losing the elections to their biggest political rival, former SDSM ChairmanCrvenkovski.After making this dispute public, Georgievski made an unsuccessful attempt to returnto the position of party leader, demanding a new party congress. This was very difficultbecause of a party statute that centralized the management of the party by giving theleadership full power to appoint local leaders. Facing this situation, Georgijevski and hisfollowers formed a new political party called the VMRO-People's Party. Most of VMRO'smembers of parliament joined it thanks to the changes in the election law supported bySDSM. Georgievski did not become the leader of the new party, instead leaving an actingpresident in power. Two other small factions also separated from VMRO. Former associ-ates of ex-leader Georgievski and his former vice president of the party, Dimovska, formeda political party named the Democratic Republican Union of Macedonia. Also MarjanGjorcev, former VMRO minister of agriculture, is attempting to gather the votes of villagepeople and the farmers, mostly in eastern Macedonia. This split is one of the biggest chal-lenges facing VMRO today.Thus, disunity and fragmentation haunts the future of the center right in Macedonia,seriously handicapping the chances for the right to win in the next parliamentaryelections.
VI. PerspectivesThe recent local election showed a strong discontent among Macedonian voters, especiallythose in urban areas where the population is not easily influenced or intimidated by threatsof losing their government job or their social benefits. It also showed that EU and NATOintegration are not crucial topics for winning elections, but rather that the improvementof the economy and creating jobs are key. Since there have been no improvements in thisarea, there is an open space for the center-right parties led by VMRO-DPMNE to win thenext parliamentary elections.Recent developments suggest a wide coalition among the so-called center-right par-ties which sprang from VMRO-DPMNE will be difficult to achieve. Personal disputesand inability of the leaders to overcome the past threatens their prospects for success.The pragmatic mind-set which is necessary for such reconciliation seems unrealisticto expect.VMRO-DPMNE had always been a movement geared towards an independent, stableand European Macedonia. It still has to confront the challenge of turning itself into amodern center-right political party. It is important to develop a new political platformwith a strong emphasis on the economic problems of Macedonia prior to the electionsin 2006. As the party is in a constant process of reform after the split, it is necessary to84 why we lost
improve and preserve the relations with representatives of the international communitywho can provide indirect support for moderate political structures which are free fromcorruption.VMRO-DPMNE has been trying to become a member of the European People's Partysince its founding, and additional efforts are needed to achieve the confidence and coop-eration of the center-right parties in Europe by improving internal party democracy andmaturity in political activities. A strong link with Republican and conservative circles inUSA is needed for gaining support for VMRO-DPMNE's policy.The obligations from the Framework Agreement are coming to an end, and the major-ity of the population is not interested in security and ethnic relations themes. A strongeconomy and employment policy should be built for the coming parliamentary elections.The ruling coalition in Macedonia has neither had good economic results nor improvedemployment levels.It is necessary for VMRO-DPMNE to gain think-tank and NGO assistance in supportingits campaign. The party's media presence should be pro-active and cooperative, avoidingunnecessary statements which could harm its rising popularity.Regarding the parties which came out of VMRO-DPMNE, especially the VMRO-People'sParty, it should concentrate on building partnerships with VMRO-DPMNE if it wouldlike to be part of a winning coalition in the future. If this can not be established, its mem-bers will slowly return back to the "mother" party. VMRO-DPMNE has to take a leadingrole in the opposition block because of the capacity of the party and its well developednetwork across Macedonia.Cooperation and partnership with the Albanian minority party PDSH should be a prior-ity, as there is no other political party which could present the center-right option to Alba-nians in Macedonia. This will not be easy, as PDSH and PPD are overshadowed by BDI'spopularity among ethnic Albanians to such a degree that the two parties did not evenrun in the second round of the spring 2005 local elections. This defensive strategy will beinsufficient and work against the prospects of much-needed, long-term cooperation withVMRO-DPMNE.
APPENDIX:List of Major Parties and Their AcronymsDemocratic Alternative – DADemocratic Party of Albanians – PDSHDemocratic Union for Integration – BDILiberal Democratic Party – LDPLiberal Party – LPParty for Democratic Prosperity - PPDSocial Democratic Union of Macedonia - SDSMVMRO-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity – VMRO - DPMNE Why We Lost – The Macedonian Case 85
Notes:• SDSM ran as the "Union for Macedonia" in 1994 and "Together for Macedonia" in 2002.• VMRO-DPMNE boycotted the second round of elections in 1994, ran as "Coalition for Change" in 1998 (with DA) and joined a coalition with LP in 2002.
Presidents:Kiro Gligorov (27 January 1991 – 19 November 1999)Boris Trajkovski (15 December 1999 – 26 February 2004)Branko Crvenkovski (28 May 2004 – today)
Governments: 1. Nikola Kljusev (March 1991 – July 1992) 2. Branko Crvenkovski I (August 1992 – November 1994) 3. Branko Crvenkovski II (November 1994 – February 1996) 4. Branko Crvenkovski III (February 1996 – November 1998) 5. Ljubco Georgievski I (November 1998 – December 1997) 6. Ljubco Georgievski II (December 1999 – November 2000) 7. Ljubco Georgievski III (November 2000 – May 2001) 8. Ljubco Georgievski IV (May – November 2001) 9. Ljubco Georgievski V (November 2001 – November 2002)10. Branko Crvenkovski IV (November 2002 – May 2004)11. Hari Kostov (June – November 2004)12. Vlado Buckovski (December 2004 - today) Victories, Defeats, Reconfigurations and Reinventions of the Polish Right
CONTENTS: I. CONTEXT OF UNIFICATION OF THE RIGHT PRIOR TO THE 1997 ELECTIONSII. THE RIGHT IN POWER… AND ON THE WAY OUT OF IT.III. RECONFIGURATION AGAIN. RECOVERY FOR SURE. ALSO REINVENTION?88 why we lost
P erhaps in no other country than Poland have the historical failures of the center right been so evident and so spectacular. It is a paradox that despite historically be- ing in the vanguard of the anti-Communist revolutions of the 1980s, with the deep-est historical traditions of resistance to Communism, and with a society highly religiousand conservative, Poland has to this very day (2005) failed to produce a genuinely center-right government in the Western sense of the term. "Center-right" means a governmentholding to a set of beliefs that include – but not exclusively – a firm belief in the benefitsof the free-market economy (liberalization, demonopolization and privatization), a lim-ited, but strong state in the areas of defense and crime and a robust foreign policy that isnot only pro-Western, but also resistant to the imperatives of Franco-German hegemonyin Europe, in essence broadly pro-US. Such a government also deeply understands thenature of the cultural conflict underway in Europe, and is supportive of traditional valuesand cultural sensibilities. According to this strict interpretation, Poland has yet to producesuch a government, and the failures to do so were especially evident in the 1997-2001 pe-riod, upon which this chapter focuses.To understand the hopes that were vested by many on the right in the 1997-2001 governmentof Jerzy Buzek, it is important to understand that none of the previous governments after 1989could have been called genuinely center-right. After the Round Table negotiations of 1989that led to the initial dismantling of Communism, Poland was for two years – until the firstfully-free elections of 1991 – ruled by governments which either had as some of their membersleading representatives of the Communist Party (the Mazowiecki government of 1989-1990),or which were more technocratic than center-right (the Bielecki government of 1991).The short-lived government of Jan Olszewski at the beginning of 1992 defined itself asright-of-center, but in terms of economic policy it was perhaps the most leftist since 1989.The government of Hanna Suchocka of 1992-1993 was perhaps the closest to a genuinecenter-right administration, but the ideology of many of its members could be fairly saidto be closer to Christian-democratic than center-right. Moreover, since it was a coalitiongovernment of at least five separate parties, the government found it difficult to articulatea consistent policy line in many areas.The increasingly public splits, divisions and arguments of the coalition members of theSuchocka government, combined with the effects of the economic shakeout and disloca-tion brought on by the rigors of the Balcerowicz economic reform plan of the early 1990s,were the main reasons which brought the former Communists back in to power from1993-1997. They were organized under the name the new Social Democracy of Poland(SdRP), under the umbrella of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) with their old allies, thePeasant Party (PSL). During those four years, there were no credible center-right partiesin parliament whatsoever, and few expected the right to recover in time to win the 1997parliamentary elections. However, the experience of those four years was also a surpriseto the post-Communists, who imagined in 1993 that they would remain securely in powerfor a longer period of time, reducing the 1989-1993 loss of power to a mere interregnumin their post-War hold over Poland. V i c t or i e s , D e f e at s , R e c on f i g u r at i on s … 89
The gradual collapse in public support for the post-Communist governments of 1993-1997 (Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak between 1993 and 1995, Jozef Oleksy 1995-1996and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz 1996-1997) was due to several factors. Chief among thesewas the slow realization among the electorate that the cumulative effects of their policieswere to restore, if not Communism (which would have been politically impossible), thenat least mechanisms of power which were starting to erode many of the achievements ofthe post-1989 democratic changes.The beginning of the end of post-Communist dominance can probably be traced to theso-called Oleksy spy scandal of 1995-1996, when the serving Prime Minister Józef Oleksywas accused by his minister of interior (at that time appointed by then-President LechWalesa) of being a KGB spy. The crisis led to Oleksy's resignation, and an investigationby the military procurator as well as by parliament, although in the end no charges wereformally laid. Precisely because of the lack of clarity, the Oleksy issue became a feature ofthe next election campaign, allowing the opposition to run on a platform that presentedthe SLD as traitors to Poland, and Solidarity as the symbol of the national interest. Thatwas bad news for the SLD, which had achieved its 1993 electoral successes because itwas able to set the electoral agenda around bread-and-butter issues rather than emotionalrhetoric.In this sense, the 1997 election that brought the right to power was determined not so muchby a short-term struggle between left and right, but a much more long-term debate be-tween two models of political cleavage. One political cleavage revolved around emotionalperceptions and values, while the other was more reflective of differences between economicinterests, such as the tussle between private and public sector employees, town and coun-try inhabitants, and the parts of the population which were more and less adaptive to thedemands of the market economy. As the Polish economy develops, and Poland moves closerto the West, the second cleavage will come increasingly to the fore, and Polish politics willresemble more and more the classic Western cleavage between left and right. But that will bea much longer process than many had expected. In the short term, Poles remain politicallyoriented according to their historical experience with Communism, regardless of whetherthey hold left-wing or right-wing economic views. The Oleksy Case merely strengthenedthe importance of that cleavage, and in the 1997 elections the main beneficiaries were thoseparties – such as the center right – which tapped into that division.
Two events in 1997 sealed support for AWS: one was the visit to Poland of Pope John PaulII in June. But the deciding factor was – coincidentally – an act of God, in the form of thesevere flooding that affected much of Poland in the summer of 1997. The incompetentreaction of much of the government, the sense of chaos, and some ill-judged remarksby the prime minister were enough to shatter the claims of the SLD to be "competent"administrators.The victory by Solidarity Election Action in the September 1997 elections by six percent-age points over the SLD showed a groundswell against the government that no-one hadseen coming. AWS obtained 201 parliamentary seats, the SLD 164, with 60 seats going tothe centrist Freedom Union (UW), 27 to the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), and 6 to the far-right ROP (Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland). The new government coalitionbetween the AWS and UW had a majority of 60 seats above all other parties combined,and 30 seats over an absolute majority of parliament. Although the SLD lost the election,it actually increased its share of the vote from 21% in 1993 to 27%. Failure to rememberthis crucial fact was one of the reasons for the over-confidence of the center right in thecoming four years.
as the coalition prime minister, members of the AWS parliamentary club met to review theagreement. Many were surprised by the degree of compromise that had been reached withthe UW, in particular the number of key ministries that had been ceded to the minorityFreedom Union. In the provinces, AWS activists stiffened their resistance to the appoint-ment of UW supporters as deputies to AWS vojvods (provincial governors), as laid out inthe agreement.The impression that the coalition was in chaos, and unable to agree on even the most obvi-ous reform requirements was made worse by the astonishing public-relations lapse of thegovernment giving its members huge pay bonuses for the last quarter of 1997, even afterit was revealed that the previous Cimoszewicz government had already paid the bonusesout for its own members. Not only did it look as though as the current ministers wereheading for the trough after only eight weeks in office, it was very untimely since votershad just been told that they needed to belt-tighten because of the profligacy of the previ-ous administration.
form, namely a "pro-family" tax policy. AWS had fallen into the trap of being unable toaccept a perfectly sensible reform because of a rhetorical campaign slogan about whichmost voters had forgotten.But that was not the end of tensions between AWS and UW over taxes. In November 1998,almost the entire AWS supported an amendment to the tax law for 1999, a position inclear contradiction to that of the government. The immediate reaction of Balcerowicz wasto threaten to resign and withdraw the UW from the government. The vote confirmed inhis own mind his worst suspicions about AWS: that it was an irresponsible political force,both in the political sense of being disloyal to its own prime minister, and in the policysense of pushing forward with populist economic proposals regardless of the damage theywould do to the economy.The crisis was instructive in several ways. First, it revealed yet again the weaknesses in therelationship between the government and its parliamentary supporters, especially withinAWS, and the opportunities those weaknesses provided for future problems. Many AWSmembers of parliament were semi-detached from the government, seeing their role notas supporting the government through thick and thin, but rather as lobbying the govern-ment for their pet policies regardless of the cabinet's position. Moreover, the confusedstructure within AWS, and the monumental number of responsibilities that Krzaklewskihad taken upon himself, resulted in a crisis of leadership within the AWS parliamentaryclub that rendered many of the AWS members of parliament uncontrollable. It was es-sentially a federation of competing cliques and parties which lacked a strong leadershipwilling to institute an effective mechanism to instill party discipline.
vented such squabbles developing into festering political sores. Buzek's own weaknessesof personality were often reflected in governmental policies, particularly towards lawbreaking by some of the more aggressive political players, such as Andrzej Lepper andhis populist Self Defense (Samoobrona) party. Polish politics have always been markedby a debate whether government should seek to establish social peace through negotiat-ing a consensus between competing pressure groups and interest factions, often sacrific-ing the letter of the law to do so, or whether they ought to seek to establish social orderthrough upholding the rule of law, even if to do so cuts across special interest groupsand means saying no to radical economic demands. Under a government led by AWS,where the unionist mind-set saw everything in terms of bargaining and compromise,there was real difficulty in initiating any semblance of firm control on social protesters.Failure to deal firmly with Lepper was one of the sources of the government's continuingfall in support and credibility.
decided that the only way to survive was to start making their mark in opposition to AWSministers, rather than supporting them.The conflict between powerful Minister of Interior Janusz Tomaszewski, a close associ-ate of Krzaklewski, and the young conservative head of the prime minister's chancellery,Wiesław Walendziak, was symbolic of the conflicts tearing AWS apart. Walendziak ac-cused Tomaszewski of too quickly "coming to terms" with the existing system of bureau-cracy and political patronage, rather than seeking to genuinely undertake reforms thatwould undercut many of the existing power relationships between government and do-mestically vested interest groups. In contrast, Tomaszewski felt that Walendziak was leak-ing information to the press about the suspicions of the public interest ombudsman thatTomaszewski had concealed his past links with the Communist secret police. Tomaszews-ki was finally removed from office in September 1999 when the suspicions were formallytabled against him, and the whole affair caused huge damage to the credibility of AWS andits leadership, as well as entrenching fault lines and conflicts among its various factions.Both Buzek and Krzaklewski faced a similar dilemma: to lead from the front, at the ex-pense of losing supporters on the margins, or to play the role of arbiters and co-ordinators,focusing on complicated tactics to satisfy all possible factions within party and govern-ment. For Buzek, the former choice would have meant sacking or reshuffling unpopularministers before they became targets for attack; and for Krzaklewski, that would havemeant moving forward quickly to forge a single party from AWS, instead of leaving itas loose coalition of bickering politicians. In an attempt to buy off short-term stability,both Buzek and Krzaklewski chose the easier options. The inefficiencies which that choiceproduced provoked a vicious circle of declining popularity and increasing dissent in theranks, which were becoming increasingly difficult to control.
that the post-Communist left would lose the 1997 elections, so few could have believedthat the massive defeat of 2001 – when the rump AWS party failed to pass the electoralthreshold after being trounced by the post-Communist SLD - could be overcome by theright just four years later. The process commenced in January 2001 with the departureof key figures from the UW and AWS to create the so-called Civic Platform (PO), es-sentially a liberal-conservative movement, headed by presidential candidate AndrzejOlechowski, Deputy Speaker of the Senate Donald Tusk and Parliamentary Speaker Ma-ciej Płażyński. Its leaders deliberately portrayed themselves as anti-establishment play-ers, tapping into the latent hostility of ordinary Poles towards a seemingly ossified andcorrupt establishment.In some ways, the message of the Platform echoed the themes of other political movementsthat spread across Europe in recent years, such as Forza Italia in Italy. There is of course nocomparison between this movement and the Platform in terms of policies, but the streakof anti-establishment populism was the same. In the case of the Platform, the policieswere a combination of free-market (flat tax and flexible labor markets) and conservativeideas. Significantly, the Platform played heavily on the theme of cleaning up Polish politicsand getting rid of the overbearing influence of corruption-prone parties in the media andeconomy. Their proposals of a first-past-the-post voting system, direct elections of townmayors, and reform of party finance were all specific ideas to achieve these goals.The process of decomposition was mirrored within AWS itself, when over the summerkey members of the movement left to form the more traditionally conservative Law andJustice (PiS) party. It was run by the Kaczynski brothers, one of whom, Lech, had beenappointed by Buzek as minister of justice. Kaczyński exposed himself politically by usinghis time as minister to support the creation of PiS, formally run by his brother Jarosław.PiS quickly outpaced the AWS movement in the pre-election polls, and attracted manyformer AWS MPs and supporters disgusted at the political and moral disaster that AWShad become.PO and PiS had several things in common. By publicly declaring themselves to be a quali-tative break with their old parent parties of AWS and UW, they were both claiming tointroduce a new model of political activity while focusing heavily on themes of compe-tence and anti-corruption. Also, both parties publicly turned their backs on the Solidaritytrade union, which had been the lynchpin of the AWS movement, and also at the heart ofanti-Communist activity throughout the 1990s. In the spring of 2001, the Solidarity tradeunion decided to formally withdraw from active party politics and to revert to its classictrade union role.In the last months of Buzek's rule, the parties which made up the ruling coalition struggledto come to terms with the defeat of Krzaklewski in the presidential elections, and the pros-pect of massive defeat in the upcoming September parliamentary elections. What origi-nally began as a struggle for the succession to Krzaklewski as the leader of AWS turnedinto a battle for the heart and soul of the entire center right, as it increasingly became clearthat AWS itself was disintegrating. As defeat became increasingly inevitable, so the con-stituent parties of AWS started looking for alternatives, attracted to the Civic Platform onthe one hand and the PiS movement on the other. It proved a wise choice, because in theelections, it was the PO and PiS that entered the new parliament, and not AWS. V i c t or i e s , D e f e at s , R e c on f i g u r at i on s … 97
AWS ultimately drew its political legitimacy from having been on the anti-Communistside during the pre-1989 period. Now, the electorate was telling the leadership of the rightthat it no longer regarded that as enough to win their vote. The beneficiaries of this col-lapse of faith were PO and PiS, who decided to seek support not through appealing to pastglories but by offering a clear policy alternative to the SLD, especially in economics, chal-lenging the SLD from the point of view of policy, not ideology. The baton on the centerand right of Polish politics was about to be picked up by politicians who, although notentirely blame-free for the debacles of the last four years, were at least seeking to redefinewhat anti-Communist politics should look like. That opportunity, of creating a non-Com-munist opposition which was both free-market and conservative, rather than statist andreactionary, was at the end of 2001 within the reach of Poland's right – and by 2005, it wasready to be grasped and carried towards victory.In the intervening years, both Civic Platform and Law and Justice have emerged as theunchallenged standard bearers of the Polish right, preparing to take power in the elec-tions of 2005. To reach this position they were helped by the total collapse of the SLD,which had stormed to power in 2001, through a series of highly public corruptionscandals involving the upper reaches of government. But the key to their success wastheir rejection of any affiliation with the compromised right-of-center governmentof Jerzy Buzek, and to define themselves against both the Communists and the failedright. The other pillar of their success was their transparent and strict application ofthe highest ethical standards to their membership and leaders, and intolerance of cor-ruption or nepotism in their own ranks. Finally both parties invested large amounts oftime and resources into defining their policies professionally and competently, even ifthose policies are anathema to the traditional electoral base of the "old right," such astrade unions. In Poland, the "new right" has discovered what the successful right-of-center parties in the United States under Ronald Reagan and in the United Kingdomunder Margaret Thatcher discovered. This is that an open and principled dialogue ondifficult policy issues delivered by credible politicians is the way to achieve politicalsuccess, even in Central Europe. How far that electoral success in 2005 will be trans-formed into a permanent dominance of the political scene in the future remains tobe seen.
APPENDIX:List of Major Parties and Their AcronymsLabor Union - UPAlliance of the Democratic Left - SLDPolish Peasant Party - PSLSelf-Defense - SOFreedom Union - UWCivic Platform - POLaw and Justice - PiSLeague of Polish Families - LPR V i c t or i e s , D e f e at s , R e c on f i g u r at i on s … 99
Notes:• Before 2001, the SLD ran as an SLD coalition around the Social Democracy of Poland (SdRP); in 2001, after becoming the SLD party, it ran in a coalition with UP.• UW was created through a merger of the Liberal Democratic Congress and the Demo- cratic Union. The election results for UW in 1991 and 1993 represent the sum of both parties' individual results.• In 1997, AWS was a coalition comprised of ZChN, the Party of Christian Democracy (PChD), the Conservative People's Party (SKL) and the Solidarity Trade Union. In 2001, it ran as AWS of the Right (AWSP), a rump alliance based on ZChN.
Presidents:1. Wojciech Jaruzelski (31 December 1989 – 22 December 1990)2. Lech Wałęsa (22 December 1990 – 23 December 1995)3. Aleksander Kwaśniewski (23 December 1995 – today)
Governments: 1. Tadeusz Mazowiecki (24 August 1989 – 14 December 1990) 2. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (12 January 1991 – 5 December 1991) 3. Jan Olszewski (23 December 1991 – 5 April 1992) 4. Waldemar Pawlak I (5 June 1992 - 10 July 1992) 5. Hanna Suchocka (11 July 1992 – 25 October 1993) 6. Waldemar Pawlak II (26 October 1993 – 1 March 1995) 7. Józef Oleksy (4 March 1995 – 26 January 1996) 8. Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (5 February 1996 – 17 October 1997) 9. Jerzy Buzek (17 October 1997 – 19 October 2001)10. Leszek Miller (19 October 2001- 2 May 2004)11. Marek Belka (2 May 2004 – today) Have We Really Lost in Romania?
CONTENTS: I. BACKGROUND ON THE ROMANIAN RIGHT II. INTRODUCTION III. FALLING DOWN FROM THE HIGHEST PEAK IV. WRONG CAUSES FOR GOOD CONSEQUENCES V. TAMING BUREAUCRACY WITH STICK AND CARROT VI. GHOST HUNTERS: HOW TO ARREST A PHANTOMVII. WHEN IDEOLOGIES CLASH AND INSTITUTIONS QUARRELVIII. HAVE WE REALLY LOST?102 why we lost
I n the 1990 elections, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party (PNTCD) re-emerged on the right side of the Romanian political spectrum. They claimed this position on the basis of being successors to thedominant pre-World War II parties, the Liberals and National Peasant Party. Even thoughPNTCD was considered center-left before the war, after 1989 it defined itself as a Chris-tian-democratic force opposing the former Communist party transformed into the Na-tional Salvation Front (FSN).Having lost the 1990 democratic elections, PNL and PNTCD created the nucleus of thecenter-right pole of Romanian politics, toward which other smaller parties gravitated (forinstance traditional social democrats – the PSDR – and ecologists). However, the initiative ofcreating the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) comprising all of these came froman NGO Civic Alliance that in 1990 gathered prominent figures from among anti-Commu-nist dissidents and intellectuals. Other associations like those of former political prisoners ofthe Communist regime and of leaders of the 1989 revolution joined the CDR alliance.In the 1992 local elections, CDR had some major successes in Bucharest and other largecities, and it announced a possible victory in the fall general elections. But the Liberalsdecided to run by themselves in the general elections and left CDR, which shook thesolidarity of the center-right pole. University Professor in Geology and Rector of the Uni-versity of Bucharest Emil Constantinescu was elected president of CDR and candidate forthe presidency. The Liberals failed to enter the parliament in 1992, while CDR got a goodresult, but not enough to govern the country. In the 1996 elections, the Liberals re-joinedCDR, and solidarity on the right has been stronger ever since.Against a background of accusations of corruption addressed at the ruling DemocraticNational Salvation Front (FDSN) government, and with all significant media aligned withCDR during the 1996 parliamentary election campaign, the right-of-center coalition suc-ceeded in winning the elections. However, it could not govern the country alone and hadto invite a center-left coalition of traditional social democrats with the Democratic Party(PD) and Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) grouping to join thecoalition. Constantinescu was also elected president of Romania when he defeated post-Communist, would-be Social Democrat Ion Iliescu in the runoff election.There were so many parties in the government coalition that internal quarrelling couldnot be overcome throughout the whole period of the mandate. Difficult economic reformswere also undertaken, resulting in a population that was desperate and frustrated by thetime of the 2000 elections. People voted for the former-Communist Social DemocraticParty of Romania (PDSR) and the Greater Romania Party (PRM), which was comprised ofextremists combining nationalism and antiestablishment appeals including, for example, apromised to get rid of corruption even though this meant executing corrupt individuals inpublic places. The CDR split again as the Liberals wanted to avoid being held responsiblefor the difficulties of the government. PNTCD thus took all the blame, and even though itwas covered under a newly renamed coalition, CDR 2000, it became a marginal force.In 2004, the liberal PNL and pragmatic PD decided to form a new right-of-center co-alition around two prominent political figures: Theodor Stolojan (former independent H av e W e R e a l l y L o s t i n R o m a n i a ? 103
prime minister between 1991-1992) and Traian Băsescu (former minister of transporta-tion from 1990-1992 and 1996-2000, and mayor of Bucharest from 2000-2004). The Truthand Justice Alliance (DA) was created, but it was probably too late in coming to secure avisible success in the elections: the DA did not manage to get more votes than the incum-bent Social Democratic Party (PSD).The Alliance did succeed, however, in having its candidate, Basescu, elected as presidentof Romania. He defeated the PDS candidate, former Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, avery unpopular political figure, who had been accused of corruption and controllingmass media for his own benefit, but who was a very powerful party bureaucrat andexecutive. Năstase was defeated in the second round by a very close margin (51.5%to 49.5%). This gave an impetus to Băsescu, who, playing a very tough political game,precluded forming a PDS ruling coalition with the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR)and UDMR. He talked these parties into coming to support the DA candidate for primeminister partly by persuasion and partly by threat of new elections. Băsescu took ad-vantage of the constitutional right of the president to propose the prime minister. Hadparliament rejected his proposal three times, new elections would have been organized,and small parties like PUR and UDMR faced the danger of not gaining a sufficient per-centage to make it into parliament. Bluffing or not, Băsescu made a government of DA,PUR, and UDMR happen.
II. INTRODUCTIONFormer President of Romania Emil Constantinescu made a shocking statement just be-fore he completed his term in office: "I was defeated by former secret police people." Weare not going to dwell much on what was behind this clear-cut declaration – one that isquite unusual coming from the president of a country. But the statement itself reveals thefight of Romanian politicians with the Communist ghosts that has always accompaniedtheir struggle against poverty, underdevelopment, inflation and all other side effects ofeconomic reforms that have been initiated in Romania during the last fifteen years. Oc-cult powers are often comfortable excuses for justifying political failure, giving rise tothe conspiracy theories that have flourished throughout the difficult transition process.Were there no imagination to explain what happens behind visible events, there wouldbe no exciting stories to help cover abstract statistical figures about poor performance ingovernment.This is not to deny the fact that many former secret police and Communist activists havetried to gain new positions of influence within the new configuration of power after 1990.Several studies have evidenced how political power of former Communist decision-mak-ers was converted into economic and political privileges all around Eastern Europe. How-ever, assigning a decisive occult influence by such people spread along various institutionsand organizations, as if they had a secret code of action and a common objective to restorethe past regime, is mostly a social and political myth. Such myths, however, are useful ashistory is continuously written and re-written. They might divert people's attention fromthe day-to-day facts of life; they are good excuses for politicians who fail to understandtheir duties and they keep people aware of past mistakes.104 why we lost
Did the Romanian right really lose in 2000? And how and why? There are split opinionson this matter, which can be summarized as follows:• The "sacrifice" scenario: Some analysts say that losing power in 2000 was the expected outcome of a four-year period of harsh and painful economic reforms. People blame the politicians for short-term consequences, because when they vote they are usually blind to overarching raison d'etat or long-term benefits. Was the support of the Ro- manian authorities for the US forces' bombing of Belgrade (against public opinion) a step forward to gaining later NATO membership? Were the massive lay-offs in mining regions a first step toward a healthier economy that cut subsidies and closed the "black holes" of the economy?• The "incompetence" scenario: Other analysts say that the right-of-center coalition was not able to understand and manage all the processes of good governance in order to reach improved macro-economic performance. It could not control inflation, so- cial unrest, unemployment, bureaucracy, implementation of political decisions, etc. In this argument, macroeconomic figures are good symptoms of incompetence in governing matters, and center-right politicians were simply not able to deliver on what they promised.• The "high-expectations" scenario: Most analysts believe that during the 1996 electoral campaign, the CDR could not restrain itself from promising a flood of milk and honey if it were to win the election. People trusted these promises and formed very high ex- pectations at the beginning of the governing period (1997). As positive outcomes of re- form had not appeared at the mid-term and, on the contrary, people found themselves worse off than three years before, they dramatically lost faith in political leaders and therefore voted not only for the Social Democrats, but also for the extremist Greater Romania Party in the 2000 elections.• The "ex-Communist forces conspiracy:" There were numerous accounts that the Democratic Convention was not really able to gain the upper hand over the bureau- cracy and secret services, which maintained a fair amount of autonomy in their deci- sions and plotted along with the political opposition to undermine the government's authority. In January 1999, when a significant group of miners headed to Bucharest threatening the government with violent protest, law enforcement proved to be weak in trying to halt the march. Police forces easily retreated in the face of an organized group of miners, and the prime minister was forced to negotiate a truce with union leaders.• The divided-government coalition: For the first time since 1990, the government in- cluded more than one party. In fact there were so many political parties and civil society forces represented in the executive branch that any conceivable prime minister could not have mediated among the divergent political interests. Clashes among governing parties impeded necessary reforms. Also, as a result and attempt to solve these frictions three prime ministers were successively appointed (and dismissed) not without danger- ous fooling around with the constitution.But it would be completely wrong to think that only one of these explanations accountsfor the electoral failure in 2000. All five scenarios are plausible, since one can find morethan one example to back up each explanation. The five sets of explanations are not even H av e W e R e a l l y L o s t i n R o m a n i a ? 105
independent of each other. One thing leads to another, and this is how a critical mass of discontent turned into a huge desire for changing the government. It could be that the Democratic Convention really raised expectations beyond what any- one else could have accomplished in a four-year term, but it could equally have been a lack of expertise in government matters that actually widened the gap between the promises and what was delivered. It could be that some bureaucrats remained faithful to the former incumbents (the Social Democrats) and tried to block some political decisions because they were frustrated with poor governance. Ultimately, one should not ignore the fact that the right-of-center coalition made progress in some necessary but painful reforms that at the end of the day resulted in healthy economic growth, starting in 2000 and continuing in the following years under social democratic rule.
Chart 1: Evolution of Voter Intentions for Right and Left Political Blocks 1996 – 2004
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Likewise, governments, while naturally eroding their credibility when in power, have in-vented various ways to maintain people's trust in their capacity to fulfill promises.At least two transfers of power in Romania show that the winner benefited from the hightrust of the population soon after the elections. In Chart 1, one can observe CDR (center-right) in 1997 and the Social Democratic Party (center-left) in 2000 having scores in publicopinion polls after elections that were much higher than those they had received in the offi-cial ballot. However, even though many people believed that CDR had created high expecta-tions after the 1996 elections and this was the reason for such a dramatic failure1, it seemsthat the high expectations scenario is only partially true. In 2000, PSD tried to better controlvoter expectations, but was still invested with a high level of trust just after the elections. Itseems that the PSD did better in using its "parachute" than its right-of-center opponents,since the party succeeded in preserving its score in the 2004 elections (almost 37%).There are other differences that we should highlight not only between the two governingperiods (1997-2000 and 2001-2004), but also between the contexts in which CDR andPSD, respectively, won the elections.First, while CDR fought hard to take power in 1996, PSD took power almost as a naturalgift in 2000. CDR victory was announced (but not certain) only six months before the1996 elections. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, were favored in the polls morethan one year before the 2000 elections. Second, whereas the incumbent, right-of-centercoalition entered the 2000 elections profoundly divided (two candidates for president,two different political entities), the PSD stayed united, even though a fraction had splitin 1997 and tried to create an alternative.2 Finally, while CDR won the elections in 1996against a background of relative prosperity and stability, PSD addressed its messages in2000 to a frustrated, disappointed population plagued by poverty, low consumption andhigh inflation.In order to win the 1996 elections, CDR was almost forced to promise the impossible. ItsContract with Romania comprised a list of issues to be solved in only 200 days. These werevery important issues for various categories of Romanians: youth, pensioners, farmers,blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, etc. Close scrutiny of such promises would haveindicated to rational voters that God himself would have to be involved in the governmentin order to have everything solved in 200 days. But voters were so outraged by corruptionscandals involving high government officials reported by the media, that they rationalizedthe desire for change by saying, "if only half of these promises are fulfilled, we would stilllive much better than now," or "if these promises come true in 800 days instead of 200 thenwe would still doing well in two years." Experts still think that even this kind of "discountthinking" regarding the CDR's program was extremely optimistic.In 2000, PSD (at that time still PDSR) promised to restore authority and ease the pain result-ing from the reform process, which of course was not presented as such but mostly as a lack of
1 CDR's major component, the National Christian Democratic Peasant's Party (PNTCD), did not pass the thresh- old for parliamentary representation in 2000 and 2004.2 This was the Alliance for Romania (ApR) which, however, failed to pass the threshold for parliament, even though it won almost 10% in the 2000 local elections. ApR located itself within the social-liberal political current and tried to capitalize on popular discontent toward both right and left. H av e W e R e a l l y L o s t i n R o m a n i a ? 107
competence on the part of the center-right government, disregard for the poor majority andin-fighting among coalition members. Basically, the PSD promised only to heal the woundsand nothing more, but what followed the election exceeded the people's expectations.Still, there was one more difference in communicating with the public. While the CDRgovernment exposed the public to all crises, setbacks, and in-fighting, with the mediaenjoying each and every political scandal, PSD had developed a strategy to manage publicexposure by controlling the media from the very beginning. It was said that the media hadactually defeated the left in 1996 by criticizing the government and promoting the right-of-center coalition. After having lost the 1996 elections, left-wing political leaders admit-ted that they should have been friendlier with the media so as to build a more positivepublic image. Many expected the PSD not to repeat the same mistake during 2001-2004,and indeed it did not. But instead of developing a friendly relationship with newspapersand TV stations, the PSD preferred to control information flows by manipulating the me-dia's market constraints and opportunities3.Finally, the electoral basis for right-of-center parties was rather narrow and still is. Ur-ban, educated, young professionals from Western regions and Bucharest mostly vote forthe center right, as they hope to fulfill their entrepreneurial aspirations, while poor, oldpeople from rural area and the poorest regions of the country vote PSD and center left(considered the heirs of the Communist party), as they need more assistance from thegovernment. The majority of voters falls into the second category, due to the difficultiesof the transition process and the collapse of the Communist would-be welfare regime.However, the center-right coalition proceeded to undertake tough economic reforms inthe urban industrial sector (including privatization and closing-down of state enterprises)and thereby alienated a good share of its traditional voters. This means that the electoralbase of the CDR had gotten even narrower by 2000.
3 Most media outlets had accumulated debts to the state budget and expected the new government to forgive these debts. PSD had closed its eyes, suggesting favorable behavior toward government actions. Selling government or state company advertising to media was also an act of distributing privileges to the most obedient.108 why we lost
mania, that were not full NATO members at the time, but only partners. It is well knownthat after the collapse of the Soviet Union's security system, Romanians badly wanted tosee their country under the official protection of NATO, that is, to become a member statein the Alliance. The country's first attempt in this direction was made in 1997 in Madrid,when Romania was not invited to join NATO among other Central European countries,but was promised to be included in the next wave of enlargement, assuming that a set ofconditions were met. Romanians were still optimistic.However, bombing Belgrade was a rather controversial issue in public opinion. Romanianauthorities decided to support NATO logistically in 1999 in order to threaten the Miloševićregime, while public opinion was more against offering that kind of support. Around 40%of Bucharest voters believed the authorities took the wrong position in the conflict betweenNATO and Milošević, and only 35-37% considered the position correct. This outcome wasall the more significant, given that Bucharest was a stronghold of the Democratic Conven-tion (CURS survey 1999). A total of 85% of the respondents in the same survey wanted theattack on Belgrade to cease as soon as possible, and 64% thought that bombing Belgradewas just an act of NATO aggression towards another country. Throughout the rest of thecountry, the opposition was even stronger – 76% of adult Romanians opposed Romania'slogistical support of the NATO bombing of Belgrade (POB, May 1999).This opposition was derived from the feelings of Romanians that they should not contrib-ute to aggression against a neighbor. Moreover this particular neighboring country sharedthe same Orthodox religion, and bombing Belgrade had not stopped even on Easter. TheSocial Democrats, in the opposition at that time, opposed the bombing and the offer oflogistical support to NATO. Of course, they capitalized on popular discontent about thebombing of Belgrade and the government decision to support NATO. Three years later,Romania became a full member of NATO, under the Social Democratic-led government,and Social Democrats in power decided to send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. SocialDemocrats themselves wanted to be "the artisans" of NATO integration, although manyanalysts considered that had Romania decided not to support NATO in 1999, it would nothave become a full member in 2002.Another illustrative example is linked to the fate of mining regions. For several years after1990, the restructuring of mining enterprises was considered a hot potato for any govern-ment. In fact, one needed much courage to take on the issue. Subsidies granted to state-owned mines had become a serious burden to the budget, and the cost per unit of Roma-nian coal was said to exceed the price of imported coal. The only reason not to close downsome of the inefficient mines was concern for the miners themselves and their families.The critical mining region was Valea Jiului (in the Southwest of the country), becausemining was the dominant economic activity in the region and therefore the main sourceof income for households. Other auxiliary activities developed around mining enterprises,which meant that closing down the mines would lead to massive unemployment of thepopulation and to poverty. Mining unions had proven to be the strongest labor organiza-tions in the country after 1990, and the Petre Roman cabinet was actually dismissed bythe miners in 1991, when it attempted to start restructuring the mining area. Miners cameto Bucharest in a violent protest and forced the government to resign, with the support ofsome conservative figures of the ex-Communist party at that time. H av e W e R e a l l y L o s t i n R o m a n i a ? 109
The first center-right government in 1997 wanted to continue the process of restructur-ing the mining regions. It offered generous financial incentives for miners to leave theirjobs. As no alternative jobs could be found in the region, authorities hoped that ex-min-ers would leave the area and relocate in rural sites or set up businesses with the moneythey received as lay-off incentives. None of these had happened as planned. The solutionturned out to be unsustainable. Ex-miners spent all the money, remained unemployed andbecame increasingly discontented.The second attempt to restructure mining enterprises occurred at the end of 1998. This timeunions strongly reacted against the government plan to reduce subsidies and lay off otherminers. They organized a march to Bucharest in January 1999 led by the now famous MironCozma – the same individual who crushed the student protest in Bucharest in 1990 andforced the government to step down in 1991. The new march terrified public opinion andthe authorities. Police tried to stop the miners in a violent confrontation, but the miners'army won the first battle, compelling the prime minister to negotiate to have the minersreturn home. This was just a short-term truce, buying center-right politicians some time toarrest Cozma and indict him for undermining public authority. Discovering this, the minersstarted another march to Bucharest, but this time the protest was violently suppressed by thepolice, and Cozma was arrested and sentenced to eighteen years in prison.That was the moment at which the strong union of miners from Valea Jiului was actuallydismantled for good.4 From that moment on, the reform process has continued peace-fully, as sustainable solutions were sought for laid-off miners. This was beneficial to thePSD government which was back in power in 2001 and continued to take the necessarymeasures of cutting off subsidies for mining regions and providing alternatives for the re-dundant workforce. The ex-Communists would never have tried to suppress the potentialviolence (sometimes of a paramilitary nature) of the miners' union, but the center-rightgovernment was determined to prevent the union from undermining any reform attempt.As a consequence, it was not only the mining sector that underwent restructuring, butalso other state-owned industries, as well. Another bitter lesson that authorities learnedwas that police forces were not determined to confront the miners and that the politicalopposition wanted to gain electoral capital from miners' discontent.
4 Opinion polls conducted during this period showed that people from Bucharest were horrified by the possibility of miners coming to the capital (73% thought miners should be stopped in their march to Bucharest), but most people all around the country were rather sympathetic to the miners' protest.110 why we lost
process after 1990. It was always said that ex-Communist politicians, mostly groupedaround the Social Democratic Party, had experience in working with a powerful bureau-cracy inherited from the Communist regime. The bureaucracy basically incorporatedthe knowledge of how to govern. From this perspective, politicians had to rely on thisexpertise or perish.On the other hand, the bureaucracy in the army, secret services, ministries, local ad-ministration and justice system was in its nature conservative and resistant to change.The decision between shock therapy and slower reform after 1990 in Romania wasalmost made by the bureaucracy. Rapid changes would have led to technocrats los-ing all privileges and power. Democratic processes that occurred after 1990 gradu-ally removed discretionary power from the bureaucracy and empowered new socialand political categories. In order to see their strategies and programs implemented,politicians then had to compromise with technocrats. One of the major compromis-es concluded was leaving more opportunities for bureaucrats to control economicresources. This is mainly how corruption was generated in transition societies andspread to all administration levels. The apparent competence of the social democratsin government business was due to this armistice that enabled them to negotiate withthe bureaucracy. The technocrats had to obey political orders and implement gradualreforms, in exchange for protection in matters of corruption. Privatization of state-owned enterprises, public procurement and fiscal policies all included space for illicitbut profitable personal business for the bureaucrats. Obviously not all politicians wereinnocent in liberalizing informal practices that skimmed off the benefit of transitioneconomies. Sometimes they took their own share.When center-right parties came to power for the first time in 1997 determined to fightcorruption, they either discovered the occult mechanisms that resisted reforms or thebenefits of compromising with the bureaucracy. All in all, inexperienced liberal andChristian-democrat politicians realized the real force of the bureaucracy in Romania.There were several accounts of ministers in that period regarding how people in the ad-ministrative apparatus behaved very selectively, implementing decisions mostly accord-ing to their private interests. There was a sense of solidarity among second- or third-level public officials that started to function whenever group interests were threatenedby political decisions.Before having won the 1996 elections, the Democratic Convention promised to bring15,000 experts into the administrative machinery. This, however, was another numberthat had nothing to do with reality. In fact, the right did not expect to win the 1996 elec-tions and therefore was not prepared to govern the country. Even though they tried toreplace some of the heads of the bureaucracy, they did not have enough competent peopleto fill all positions, and soon became the victims of the powerful technocratic machinery.Most of the old public officials were retained in exchange for political loyalty. DemocraticConvention parties, overwhelmed by the responsibility of managing economic and ad-ministrative business, preferred to live with the illusion that at least they had recruitednew political activists from the bureaucratic level. Later on they understood that mostof the bureaucrats would have sold their "loyalty" to any other politicians, no matter theideology, in order to preserve their positions. H av e W e R e a l l y L o s t i n R o m a n i a ? 111
After harsh economic reforms that generated popular discontent, bureaucrats realizedthat the center-right parties were going to lose power in the next elections. As the PDSRwas already favored by the opinion polls in 1999, public officials that seemed to be loyalto the new politicians changed sides again and began to prepare themselves for a newgovernment to come.It is here that we should discuss the first government crisis that occurred at the end of1997 and split the governing coalition until the prime minister was replaced. The Demo-cratic Convention did not get enough votes in the 1996 elections to govern the countryalone and had to ally itself with the Democratic Union of Hungarians (UDMR) and theDemocratic Party.5 In December 1997, the Democratic Party, concerned about its owndecreasing popularity in the polls, decided to provoke a government crisis and asked forthe resignation of Christian Democrat Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea. The DP withdrewits ministers from the government and threatened to remove support for the coalitionin parliament. The crisis lasted about four months, the prime minister resigned and theDemocrats got back into the government.But the first crisis of the governing coalition unleashed all the tensions and fights amongthe partners that continued without abatement afterward. The divergent interests of theparties were disclosed. When the first Christian Democrat prime minister started to inves-tigate illegal businesses of former governments, some PD ministers (once in power) wereon the "black list." They wanted the searches stopped and finally demanded removal of thehead of the investigative unit.
5 The Democratic Party was a faction of the former National Salvation Front (FSN), heir to the Communist party. They called themselves reformists within FSN and founded their own party in 1991 requesting more rapid reforms. Their voters were somehow more similar to those of the right-of-center parties, even though they were considered center-left. The Democratic Party upon its founding actually provided the first govern- ment team (from 1990 to 1991), before the miners, with the support of ex-Communist hardliners, brought them down. They had some experience in government business, but also maintained links with the Commu- nist-era bureaucracy.112 why we lost
tion and a great deal of trouble for the coalition. The very birth of the Democratic Conven-tion around the Civic Alliance, which was a prestigious anti-Communist non-governmen-tal organization established by famous intellectuals dissidents in the Communist regime,launched a program of moral principles that should govern post-Communist Romania.Purging public officials who collaborated with the Communist Party apparatus or formersecret police was considered a priority action, so as to remove the main obstacles of transi-tion to democracy and a market economy.The contradiction between the economic and moral reform revealed itself soon after theCDR took power. Harsh structural reform of the economy could not be delayed and badlyneeded the full support of the population and some sense of solidarity among all politicalforces. Otherwise there was a risk of failure. But maintaining solidarity and support washard to conceive as long as "moral issues" deeply divided the society.As we have seen, some moral issues – like the 1989 revolution, bureaucrats inherited fromthe Communist regime, property restitution and others – alienated one of the most im-portant coalition partners, the Democratic Party. Disclosing the names of secret policeinformers during the Communist years proved to be a sensitive issue even for the so-called historical political parties (such as the Liberals and Christian Democrats). Laterevents proved that important members of these two parties, who were former detaineesin Communist prisons after World War II, were obliged to compromise with the secretpolice apparatus by torture and force, and that some of them had had to inform on theirown dissident inmates. Obviously some of these senior members of the historical partiesresisted as much as they could passage of legislation to search the secret police archives todisclose the names of informers. Thus moral reform was transformed in fighting a ghost,because ghosts are everywhere: nobody can see them, but everybody can talk about them.Communist ghosts were even to be found in the house of the ghost hunters themselves.Since ordinary people had to face the hardships of the economic reforms, they became lessand less interested in calls for moral reform.The first governmental crisis was rooted in this discontent and divide within the govern-ing coalition. One of the Civic Alliance's prominent members, Valerian Stan, as head ofthe control body of prime minister's office, wanted to disclose corruption cases of gov-ernments after 1990. But most of the PD ministers in 1997 were members of the cabi-net between 1990 and 1991. Therefore, they asked for Stan's resignation, but also becamesuspicious about the intentions of the Christian Democratic prime minister. Were theirgovernment partners planning to indict them for corruption and force them to leave thecoalition? Later on, the prime minister denied that he asked his subordinate to investigatethe corruption cases of PD ministers. As no one else assumed political responsibility, itwas thought that occult forces were manipulating Stan to act to undermine the solidar-ity of the coalition. So this meant that Stan himself was part of the former secret policeconspiracy. Almost everyone forgot that the Stan was a prominent member of the CivicAlliance, who had not ceased to promote moral reform principles no matter who wasfound guilty. The fear of the former secret police and ex-Communist infiltration of thegovernment coalition soon turned into an obsession that paralyzed action and necessaryreform measures. When the first Christian Democratic premier was forced to resign torescue the coalition, the Civic Alliance, which had been the backbone of the Democratic H av e W e R e a l l y L o s t i n R o m a n i a ? 113
Convention, withdrew its support for the government in 1998 specifically for this reason– abandonment of moral principles by the center-right coalition.Another episode is illustrative of such ghost-hunting actions. The PD minister of foreignaffairs in 1997, Adrian Severin, who was considered second most senior in his own party,revealed in an interview that he had access to documents that proved that some famousjournalists and some prominent political figures in Romania were secret agents of foreignintelligence services. He also attacked his own boss, PD Chairman Petre Roman. Follow-ing the interview, the media demanded to see the list of spies or that the minister stepdown. After a while the minister resigned, but he never denied the existence of the list. Hewas soon expelled from his own party. Since no one could clarify what had actually hap-pened, several rumors immediately began to spread: the minister was intoxicated by theformer secret police as to make him look ridiculous, or the minister himself was part of aconspiracy to artificially create another public scandal.At the end of 2000, the law on disclosing the names of Communist secret police informerswas finally passed in parliament, although not the version that was supported by the ini-tiators, but a more moderate one. An institution was created to research the former secretpolice archive and disclose the names of informers. The first attempt to clear the parlia-ment of persons with a dubious past was made before the 2000 elections. Some prominentfigures of the historical parties (the Liberals and Christian Democrats) were disclosedas having reported to the secret police on colleagues and dissident friends. Contrary topublic expectation, the number of names disclosed from the PDSR (heirs to the Com-munists) and PRM (known as the party where all former Communists and secret policeofficers sought shelter) did not exceed the number of names coming from the center-rightcoalition. Even the president of the National Liberal Party, Mircea Ionescu-Quintus, wasunveiled as a former collaborator with the Communist secret police. The ghost huntingthus ended up with the ghosts among the hunters.
The Democrats were always concerned about their popularity in the polls, and the pollsshowed a constant drop. They were afraid that PDSR in the opposition would gain politi-cal capital and legitimize itself as the only authentic social democratic party in Romania.PDSR was not member of the Socialist International at that time because it was consid-ered hard-line Communist. But it made an effort to change this image and to become amodern social-democratic party, succeeding in 2001 when it merged with other smallersocial democratic groups to become the Social Democratic Party. Parallel to this process,at the end of the CDR-led government's term, PD became more and more anxious tomoderate economic reforms and provide social benefits for the poor so as to preserve itsown identity.Shock therapy in the economy was only partially successful, but it was at least something.In 2000, because some of the ineffective and/or parasitic industrial plants had been shutdown or privatized and subsidies had been eliminated, the economy started to recover.After three years of economic decline, the year 2000 was the first year of tenuous eco-nomic growth. A technocrat and former head of the national bank, Mugur Isarescu, wasappointed prime minister, which assured some sort of equilibrium in the coalition. Atthe end of 1999, Romania was invited to start negotiations on EU integration, which wasa major victory, but mostly a political one, since from many other perspectives Romaniawas not prepared for such a huge leap forward.The economic reforms would have gone even further, had the government coalition notbeen such a melting pot of ideologies and interests. The Christian Democrats and theCivic Alliance wanted to promote moral reform. The Liberals were concerned more witheconomic restructuring. The Democrats wished to preserve their identity and provide re-lief for those among the population in need. The Hungarians had their own ethnic agenda,which had nothing to do with economic issues. All parties pushed for their individualinterests, fears and concerns, while coordination was badly needed. Even worse, since allpartners shared governing responsibilities, ideology clashes were often transposed intoinstitutional quarrels.The partners also found themselves in several situations prisoners of an imperfect consti-tution. At the end of 1999, the coalition and the president discovered that it was impossi-ble to remove the premier without changing the whole cabinet and without going throughthe parliament at the mercy of the opposition. After long and embarrassing negotiationswith the prime minister at that time, Radu Vasile, they succeeded in forcing him to resign.The president himself realized on several occasions that he had no political support forhis actions. Once endorsed by the Democratic Convention to win the presidency, Con-stantinescu had thereafter no such political force on which to rely. The unofficial creed ofthe 2000 election year was "everyone for himself." Every party in the coalition attemptedto rescue the political capital it may have had left. PD had its own candidate for the presi-dency, so had the Liberals, the Hungarians and the Christian Democrats. President Con-stantinescu decided not to run for president again, which was a real loss, especially for theChristian Democrats. H av e W e R e a l l y L o s t i n R o m a n i a ? 115
APPENDIX:List of Major Parties and Their AcronymsAlliance for Romania - ApRDemocratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania – UDMRDemocratic Convention of Romania - CDRDemocratic National Salvation Front -FDSNDemocratic Party – PDGreater Romania Party - PRMNational Liberal Party – PNLNational Peasant Party Christian Democratic - PNTCDNational Salvation Front – FSNParty of Romanian National Unity - PUNRRomanian Party of Social Democracy – PDSRSocial Democratic Party - PSD116 why we lost
Notes:• The umbrella group FSN disintegrated into FSDN (Iliescu) and rump FSN in 1992, which later converted into the PD.• PDSR was formed after the 1993 merger of FDSN and another smaller social demo- cratic party.• PSD was formed after the 2001 merger of PDSR with some other smaller leftist parties.• DA was created by the union of PD and PNL in 2004.• ApR defected from PDSR in 1997 and later joined PNL.• In 1992, CDR was a coalition with PNTCD as its major component; in 1996 it included PNTCD, PNL and two small environmentalist parties.
Presidents:Ion Iliescu (December 1989 – June 1990)Ion Iliescu (June 1990 – October 1996)Emil Constantinescu (October 1996 – November 2000)Ion Iliescu (November 2000 – November 2004)Traian Băsescu (December 2004 – today)
Governments:1. Petre Roman I (December 1989 – June 1990)2. Petre Roman II (June 1990 – September 1991)3. Theodor Stolojan (October 1991 – September 1992) H av e W e R e a l l y L o s t i n R o m a n i a ? 117
CONTENTS: I. INTRODUCTION II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SLOVAK CENTER RIGHT AND FACTORS INFLUENCING IT III. CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES AS INITIATORS OF SYSTEMIC CHANGES AFTER 1989 IV. INITIAL CONFLICTS: DEFYING REFORMS AND CONTROVERSY OVER THE STATE MODEL FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA V. REORGANIZATION OF THE CENTER RIGHT IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST AUTHORITARIANISMVI. THE CENTER RIGHT HEADS THE REFORM BLOC AFTER THE PRINCIPAL CHANGE IN 1998VII. A CENTER-RIGHT GOVERNMENT OF REFORMS AFTER 2002VIII. CONCLUSION120 why we lost
I. Introduction
T he Slovak Republic, with its Czech neighbor, shares the distinction of being the youngest independent state in Europe. Since its creation in 2003, it has gone through two basic periods in development. The first was a period of deep "democracy deficit"which excluded the country from the process of the Euroatlantic integration (1993 - 1998).In this period, Slovakia was considered a deviant country and a "black hole in Central Eu-rope." The second was a period of radical socio-economic reforms and a strengthening ofdemocracy, during which the country returned to the path of integration (1998 - 2005).Since 2002, Slovakia has been considered a "Central European reform tiger."One of the key factors that has influenced development in Slovakia since 1993 is the con-figuration of political forces, particularly the positions of center-right parties within theparty system. Their strength resulted from support obtained in parliamentary elections,internal organizational cohesion and positions in the institutions of state. Other strengthsinclude their ability to form coalitions and alliances (among themselves, as well as withparties of different political and ideological orientation), their programmatic background,an efficient party structure, skillful political leaders and their relationships with non-partyactors. These strengths continue to play an important role in determining the direction ofthe country's development.
Since 1990, there have been several political parties in Slovakia that define themselvesas liberal, conservative or Christian-democratic. Some of them have disappeared, whileothers have united with parties of a similar ideology. Several parties exist today as inde-pendent formations:• The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), in existence since 1990, has established itself as a conservative, Christian political force.• The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) was founded in 2000 with a merger of the liberal Democratic Union (DÚ) with one of the factions of the Christian Democratic Movement.• The Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), founded in 1998, is comprised of three political parties representing the interests of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Slovakia – the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), the liberal-conservative movement "Co-existence," and the liberal Hungarian Civic Party (MOS).• The Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) was established in 2001 as a political party with a liberal orientation.• The Democratic Party (DS), a civic-right party, is the successor of the historical DS which was founded in 1944 during the anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising. In the years 1993-1994, some small political parties of similar orientation united with the DS, including the Conservative Democratic Party, the Party of Conservative Democrats, and the Civic Democratic Party in Slovakia.Since the first free elections after the fall of the Communist regime in 1990, center-rightpolitical formations in Slovakia have maintained strong positions in the system of execu-tive power longer than any other political force. They have greatly influenced the country'sdevelopment during the last 10 years. During the other six years, the country was gov-erned by national-populist parties with unclear ideological and programmatic profilesand an authoritarian style of government.In the years 1990-1992, center-right parties were members of the government that createdthe political and legislative basis for systemic changes in society, specifically the broad civ-ic, liberal-democratic movement Public Against Violence (VPN) which gradually trans-formed into the civic-right Civic Democratic Union (ODÚ), the conservative KDH andcivic-right DS. Between March and September 1994, center-right parties (the conservativeKDH and liberal DÚ), the post-Communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ) and theHungarian parties made up the provisional government.In the years 1998 – 2002, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), dominated by center-right parties (KDH, DÚ, and DS), was the strongest member of the broad democraticcoalition. It ruled together with the conservative SMK and two left-of-center parties – theSDĽ and the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). After the parliamentary elections in2002, a programmatically homogeneous government was created consisting of three con-servative parties (SDKÚ, KDH and SMK) and one liberal party (ANO).In Slovakia, in contrast to other Central and Eastern Europe countries, center-right partieshave not competed against the post-Communist left, but rather against other political forces.They have also been quite successful in their efforts. This fact can be adequately explained122 why we lost
only in the context of the peculiarities of Slovakia's social transformation after the fall of theCommunist regime. Therefore, a more detailed description and analysis is needed of thedevelopments that preceded the electoral victories of center-right parties in 1998 and 2002.
1 These solutions varied from unclear models of confederation and union under which two republics would oper- ate as states with absolute state sovereignty, to the entire separation and creation of two independent states. C e n t e r - R i g h t Pa rt i e s i n S l o va k i a … 123
forces to overcome their disunity in order to form pre-election alliances. The center-rightparties' share of the vote (16% of valid votes) was almost four times smaller than the centerright's share in 1990. The results of the parliamentary elections in 1992 were catastrophic forthe civic-right. Smaller civic parties also failed to use appropriate pre-election coalition strat-egies, running separately and failing to enter the parliament.2 As a result, a considerable seg-ment of the political right, almost 10% of votes, was denied representation in parliament.After the elections in 1992, a government of the HZDS was formed that ruled with the"silent" and later official support from the nationalist SNS. The inability of the victoriousparties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to resolve the question of Czechoslovakia'sstate model resulted in the division of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (ČSFR)and the creation of two separate, independent states. National-authoritarian and populistforces were strengthened in Slovakia as a consequence. They used their strong positionsnot only for enforcement of their preferred state model and building an independent Slo-vak state, but also for concentrating power. In the period 1993-1994, however, the au-thoritarian national-populist camp was weakened by the attrition processes. Groups ofmoderate politicians first left HZDS and later SNS to form the centrist Democratic Union,which declared itself a liberal party.After the ruling coalition of HZDS and SNS lost its majority in spring 1994, the conserva-tive KDH, liberal DU and post-Communist SDĽ, with the support of the Hungarian par-ties, voted the nationalists from power and formed an interim coalition government thatruled from March until September 1994. The broad left-right composition of the govern-ment indicated that the main dividing line in Slovakia's party system was not related to dif-ferences in policy or ideology, but rather to the manner in which parties executed power.The common ground of the KDH-DÚ-SDĽ coalition (with support from the Hungarianparties) was resistance to authoritarianism and faithfulness to the principles of democracyand the rule of law. This political division between democratic and authoritarian partiesgrew in the coming years and greatly influenced the country's future development.
2 These were the Civic Democratic Union (ODÚ, the rump VPN), the Democratic Party (DS) in coalition with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and, finally, the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS). C e n t e r - R i g h t Pa rt i e s i n S l o va k i a … 125
A government of three parties – the HZDS, SNS, and ZRS (Association of Workers of Slo-vakia) – was formed after the elections in 1994. In addition to the two national-populistparties, the newly founded, radical-leftist ZRS became a member of the ruling coalition.The binding force of this unusual coalition was an authoritarian approach to the executionof power that contradicted the values of liberal democracy. From the first day of its term ingovernment, the authoritarian coalition focused on concentration of power and on limit-ing opportunities for free and democratic political competition. The government stoppedall socio-economic reforms. The only reforms it supported were those that strengthenedits own power positions (i.e. the non-transparent privatization of state assets to the handsof entrepreneurs politically loyal to the government). In the years 1994-1998, the conser-vative, Christian-democratic and liberal formations (KDH, DÚ, MK, and DS) formed ananti-authoritarian alliance. Its primary aim was to preserve the democratic character ofthe state. On one hand, these parties solidified their ideological positions (their member-ship in international party organizations played a significant role in this process); on theother hand, they tried to cooperate with each other in order to create broader groupings,whose main aim was to defeat the dominant national-authoritarian force, the HZDS.After the government of Vladimír Mečiar thwarted a referendum on direct presidential elec-tion in July 1997, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) was created with five constituentmembers: three non-leftist formations (KDH, DÚ and DS), the leftist Social Democratic Partyof Slovakia (SDSS) and the ecologically oriented Green Party of Slovakia (SZS). The main mo-tive of this political alliance was to bring an end to the rule of the authoritarian forces.Before the parliamentary elections in 1998, the SDK had to change its organizational sta-tus and formally register as a separate party due to an amendment to election law ap-proved by the ruling coalition shortly before elections (this amendment in fact prohibitedelectoral coalitions). Actually, the SDK was an "electoral party" with a limited membership– i.e. the 150 people on its candidate list. The candidates on this list were representatives ofall five constituent ("mother") parties, the five ideological platforms within the SDK. Theparties which formed the SDK in 1997 did not formally participate in the 1998 elections(the party called "SDK" ran instead of them), but they did not cease to exist. The Hungar-ian parties – MKDH, Coexistence and MOS – preferred another organizational model.Under the pressure of the discriminatory new election law, they fused into a single party,the Party of the Hungarian Coalition.
3 The Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) was established in 1998 by some left-leaning politicians as a project criticizing the country's excessive polarization and the conflict-prone character of its politics. C e n t e r - R i g h t Pa rt i e s i n S l o va k i a … 127
ation of strong center-right entity (of the people's party type), the "mother" parties of SDK,especially KDH, attempted to preserve their own ideological identity and organizationalindependence. At the end of 2000, members of KDH who belonged to the conservativepart of the party left the parliamentary caucus of SDK. By this time, KDH had definitivelyseparated from the SDK and became an official, fifth member of the ruling coalition.Dzurinda succeeded, however, in persuading the majority of liberal representatives ofSDKÚ (members of the DÚ) and part of the Christian-democratic platform to support hisidea of establishing a new people's party. In 2000, a group of SDK representatives aroundDzurinda founded the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ), into which theDÚ eventually merged. The founders of the SDKÚ labeled their party an instrument forthe integration of center-right formations and a successor of the SDK in unifying theChristian, conservative and liberal forces. According to them, it was designed to be aunion of center-right political trends, ideas and personalities and a place for Catholic,Evangelical and other Christian democrats to meet with liberals, modern conservativesand other democratically thinking citizens. They argued that SDKÚ wanted to move be-yond the frontiers of ideological isolationism and to end the senseless division betweenconfessional and civic-right forces. The founders of the new party considered coalitions ofminor parties as a historical failure and a destabilizing element on the political scene.These ideas were only partially fulfilled. Due to differing opinions about how to cooperateamong center-right parties, a strong competition developed between SDKÚ and KDH.While KDH maintained a substantial portion of its original supporters, SDKÚ failed tocarry out the scenario of its own transformation into the dominant people's party whichwould succeed in filling the area on the center right and replace the existing parties. Itbecame a medium-sized and relatively strong party, but not a dominant political actor.Although conflicts accompanying the reshuffling of the center-right part of the spectruminfluenced the level of electoral support of particular parties, they did not have any essen-tial impact on the implementation of reforms. The SDKÚ, KDH and SMK all cooperatedto enact reform policies and effectively defended their policies against the efforts of leftistparties within the coalition (not to mention the national-populist parties). Understand-ably, many compromises within the "internal leftist opposition" of SDĽ and SOP were alsonecessary.In 1999-2001, significant shifts occurred in Slovakia's party system that influenced themakeup of the political landscape and, to a great degree, predetermined the results of the2002 parliamentary elections. In 1999, a split took place in the post-Communist SDĽ andas a result, the party's very popular vice chairman, Robert Fico, left the party. Fico foundedthe new opposition party Smer (meaning "direction" in Slovak), which eventually becamea dominant force on the left as the SDĽ practically disappeared. After the liberal DÚ unit-ed with SDKÚ in 2001, there was an opportunity for a new liberal party to emerge. TheAlliance of the New Citizen (ANO), created in 2001, took advantage of this opportunity.It was created by media entrepreneur Pavol Rusko, the co-owner of Markiza, the mostpopular Slovak private TV channel.Both new parties – Smer and ANO – tried to get support from voters disappointed withthe policies of the Dzurinda government. Smer's intent was to attract former SDĽ voters,while ANO attempted to address sectors of the center-right electorate. Both parties criti-128 why we lost
cized the broad, coalition government, but their rhetoric was different. While Smer re-jected the liberal socio-economic policy of the cabinet in principle and behaved as an anti-reform populist party, ANO criticized Dzurinda's government for the way it carried out itsreform policy (i.e. particularism and corruption), but did not reject the reforms, as such.Although opinion polls conducted in 2000 and 2001 indicated a significant decrease inelectoral support for the ruling center-right parties, these parties succeeded in keeping thebasic core of their voters. Shortly before elections, the support of the center-right partiesstrengthened as a result of their ability to effectively reach citizens with their message.
of policy topics, including those which the opposition used for its strong criticism of thegovernment, was a contributing factor to their election success.In the campaign, opposition Smer attacked the ruling parties, especially the SDKÚ, foralleged corruption, but while this rhetoric helped Fico keep his popularity among leftistvoters, it did not weaken the support of the center-right voters for the right. Although in1999–2002, during Dzurinda's first government, there was a number of political scandalsresulting from clientelism and corrupt practices, their impact was minimal, even thoughthe population considered (and still considers) corruption to be one of the most pressingproblems of public life. This is due to a variety of factors, including the fact that duringMečiar's government, corruption was much more blatant. In comparison with the Mečiarperiod, people considered corruption less widespread. Also, in 1999 and 2002, somesignificant anti-corruption measures were carried out, such as approval of laws limitingcorrupt behavior, introduction of compulsory tenders with international participationin privatization of the natural monopolies, adoption of anti-corruption government pro-grams founding of special anti-corruption units in state institutions. Finally, publicizedcorruption cases resulted in personnel changes in the government cabinet and other stateinstitutions. Center-right parties argued that they were more responsive than the Mečiargovernment to charges of corruption.Since October 2002, the center-right, conservative-liberal coalition SDKÚ-SMK-KDH-ANO government has been in charge in Slovakia. It has carried out an ambitious plan ofstructural reforms. The government added to past reforms (such as revision of the con-stitution, decentralization of public administration, bank sector reform and break-up ofnatural monopolies) by reforming tax policy, public finances, the social system, pensions,health care, the judiciary and the military. The government is also preparing for a reformof the education system.In last several years, the country and its population were confronted with massive reformsin a short period of time, and the positive effects on macroeconomic stability or the influxof foreign direct investments have not protected the center-right parties from a fall inpopularity from 2002 levels. This has been accompanied by the increasing popularity ofthe strongest opposition party, Smer, which rejects the reform policies of the cabinet andpromises to revise almost all reform measures should it come to power.In the upcoming 2006 elections, the center-right parties need to deal with the questionof how they can benefit from reform efforts that will not bear fruit until the currentcabinet has left power. One of the tactics is to intensify its efforts to communicate withpeople about reforms and their consequences. The efficacy of this effort can be mea-sured in shifts in public's assessment of the overall direction of society's development.At the end of 2004, polls indicated for the first time a balanced share between optimistsand pessimists, while a year before, the share of pessimists was almost two times higher.This provides the center-right parties with favorable conditions for addressing voters byusing a policy–focused argument.Although relatively frequent conflicts in relations among coalition partners has not causedthe weakening of the common efforts of center-right parties to implement reforms, theyhave had a negative impact on the positions of these parties among citizens. The problem-atic side of the ruling parties' activity is a trend to "instrumentalize" power, a trend that130 why we lost
seems to strengthen proportionally to the length of these parties' time in power. Since2003, there have been cases of what are viewed by some as authoritarian solutions to crisissituations within the ruling coalition or within particular parties, as well as several casesrelated to party financing. The SDKÚ has frequently been involved in these cases. Theelectorate of the center-right parties is much more sensitive to the values of democracyand the respect for democratic rules in political life than the electorate of other parties.Therefore, any possible violation of these values and principles by the center right can havea damaging effect on its position in the eyes of public.Another problem is the unclear stance of center-right parties regarding their possible co-operation with HZDS before and after the 2006 elections. Some representatives of SDKÚdo not rule out such cooperation, if SDKÚ would be forced to choose its coalition partnerfrom among the two major opposition parties – HZDS or Smer. The SDKÚ justifies pos-sible cooperation with HZDS by the necessity to preserve the pro-reform orientation ofa successor government and argues that the HZDS does not threaten to reverse socialand economic reforms after the elections. Cooperation of center-right parties with HZDS,however, has strong moral implications because of the undemocratic authoritarian policyof the party in the past. According to public opinion polls, the vast majority of SDKÚvoters oppose cooperation with HZDS. Many SDKÚ voters will only lend their support ifSDKÚ rules out cooperation with HZDS in advance.
VIII. ConclusionFrom the standpoint of effectively implementing party priorities and its overall impact onthe country's development, one should assess the performance of center-right parties inSlovakia as successful. This success is the result of concrete steps that were taken, as wellas skills which have been demonstrated, the most important being:• strong positions in defending democratic principles during a time when the character of political regime was being forged (1993–1998);• the ability to offer a real political and programmatic alternatives;• the ability to form wide coalition alliances regardless of dividing lines within the party system (for instance, cooperation with SMK representing the ethnic minority or with the leftist SDĽ);• launching reform measures that reacted to the most pressing problems of society;• delivery of real results from reform policies;• decisive and non-compromising tactics in political and programmatic competition with left-wing forces applied even when the left was a partner in the anti-Mečiar coali- tion;• strong positions in the NGO sector and the ability to use the expertise of independent organizations; and• the ability to use the question of integration into the EU and NATO for internal transformation purposes and to gather international support for their own domestic policies. C e n t e r - R i g h t Pa rt i e s i n S l o va k i a … 131
APPENDIX:List of Major Parties and Their AcronymsAlliance of the New Citizen – ANOAssociation of Workers of Slovakia- ZRSCommunist Party of Slovakia - KSSChristian Democratic Movement - KDHDemocratic Party – DSDemocratic Union – DÚParty of Civic Understanding - SOPParty of the Democratic Left - SDĽParty of the Hungarian Coalition - SMKPeople's Party - Movement for Democratic Slovakia – ĽS-HZDSPublic Against Violence - VPNSlovak Democratic Coalition – SDKSlovak Democratic and Christian Union - SDKÚSlovak National Party - SNSSocial Democratic Party of Slovakia - SDSSSmer – Social Democracy
Notes:• SDĽ was still the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) in 1990; but changed its name to SDĽ in 1991. It ran as the coalition "Common Choice" in 1994 with SDSS, the Greens and a small agriculturalist party.• The current KSS was re-established in 1992.• HZDS separated from VPN in 1991. Rump VPN ran in 1992 as the Civic Democratic Union (ODÚ).• SDK was an electoral party composed of KDH, DÚ, DS, SDSS and the Greens.• SMK ran as the coalition of Coexistence (ESWS) and the Hungarian Christian Demo- cratic Movement (MKDM) in 1990 and 1992; also the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS) joined them in the "Hungarian Coalition" in 1994. In 1998 the three parties merged.
Presidents:Michal Kováč (March 1993 – March 1998)Rudolf Schuster (June 1999 – June 2004)Ivan Gašparovič (June 2004 – today)
Governments:1. Milan Čič (December 1989 – June 1990)2. Vladimír Mečiar (June 1990 – April 1991)3. Ján Čarnogurský (April 1991 – June 1992)4. Vladimír Mečiar (June 1992 – March 1994)5. Jozef Moravčík (March 1994 – December 1994)6. Vladimír Mečiar (December 1994 – October 1998)7. Mikuláš Dzurinda (October 1998 – October 2002)8. Mikuláš Dzurinda (October 2002 – today) Explaining Center-Right Defeats
CONTENTS: I. INTRODUCTION: STABILITY AS A MATTER OF STRATEGYII. POLITICAL OUTCOMES LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AND VICTORIES OF THE CENTER RIGHTIII. COMPARATIVE DEFEATS: STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS VERSUS STRATEGIC SHORTCOMINGS134 why we lost
I. Introduction: Stability as a Matter of Strategy
E xplaining the center right's defeats in Central and Eastern Europe in the first several yeas of the 21st Century is inconceivable without assessing the way these parties came to exist and consolidated themselves in their respective countries. As withany political grouping, these parties had to struggle with political opponents to claim theirplace within each nation's party spectrum. In some cases, particularly in the early 1990s,they were also involved in mutual struggles to define the right side of these spectra. Howthey fared in these trials very much shaped the premises of their electoral victories andhad an impact on the way they behaved in office. This analysis of these factors includesinquiry into political outcomes that lead to the establishment and consolidation of partieson the center right. It also includes examination of the importance of party strategy, incontrast to other approaches which find social structures or historic legacies decisive.A notable body of recent research prefers restoring the focus to the question of strat-egy rather than assuming structural determination. According to Aleks Szczerbiak andSeán Hanley, historical and structural explanations of the emergence, strength and suc-cess of the right in the region provide many interesting insights. What probably mattersmost, however, is strategy. Thus, "the re-emergence of the center-right in post-communistCentral and Eastern Europe can be more fully understood only by considering a rangeof 'political' factors marginalized or reduced to structural variables in existing compara-tive analysis (See Szczerbiak, Aleks and Seán Hanley, "Introduction: Understanding thePolitics of the Right in Contemporary East-Central Europe," Journal of Communist Studiesand Transition Politics 20:3, pages 1-8.)
1 By "sociological determinism," we mean alignment between parties and voters and between parties and groups or classes within society, where the legitimacy of this relationship is based on representation of group interests by parties within the state vis-à-vis other groups. E x p l a i n i n g C e n t e r - R i g h t D e f e at s 135
"post-communist parties have been free to adopt a range of party strategies, some moresuccessful than others" (Sitter, page 426). "Hence the argument that the developmentof party systems is driven by party strategy, within parameters set by cleavages, institu-tions, voting patterns and party organization, and that conditions of post-communismplace far fewer constraints on party leadership than was the case in early TwentiethCentury Western Europe" (Sitter, page 429).
2 With few but important reservations, this scheme is adopted from Vachudová. E x p l a i n i n g C e n t e r - R i g h t D e f e at s 137
The battle fought on the right in the early 1990s in Hungary involved a Christian nationaloption (the MDF) and a liberal one (SzDSZ and Fidesz) and was won by the former. Laterdevelopments brought the shift of the Free Democrats towards the Socialists and Fidesz'sdrift towards nationalist conservativism. Hungarian conservativism thus actually devel-oped itself in opposition to the Westernizing and modernizing politics of social democratsand social liberals. This formula brought reward to the Young Democrats in the form ofelection victory, as well as domination of the right pole of Hungarian politics. Unlike theUDF, Fidesz tirelessly tried to swallow and otherwise subjugate smaller groupings on theright (KDNP, FKgP, MDF) and often succeeded in doing so.3While the current Hungarian competitive pattern is that of alternation of the left andright, doubts regarding the degree of its moderateness linger. In fact, this competition hasbecome very intense and takes place in an increasingly polarized environment. Fidesz, inparticular, has been the target of frequent accusations of using extremist appeals for thesake of mobilization, of political brinksmanship and of polarizing the polity.Also not infrequent are opinions that both major actors in Hungarian political competi-tion, the Socialists and Fidesz, have to a great extent rejected programmatic, policy-basedcompetition and instead slavishly followed the public mood, resorted to campaign popu-lism and plundered state resources while in government to keep their populist promises.Be these allegations substantiated or not, Tamás Lánczi in his chapter points out the roleof state paternalism (called the "new conception of the state") in the electoral victory ofFidesz in 1998, when the party juxtaposed its caring, family-oriented and patriotic pater-nalism to the 'cold' technocratic policies of the Socialists and Free Democrats. Fidesz alsoput its bet on inclusion, participation and mobilization of people. This has manifesteditself in its ceaseless encouragement to participate in the political process, as opposed tothe Socialist strategy of depoliticization of many spheres of public life. All in all, Fideszhas embarked upon quite a unique political style in the region, scoring many successes,but at the same time encountering harsh criticism and suffering demonization by its op-ponents. Also, by its deliberate choice, prospects for the right in Hungary are framed bythe assumption that competition is to remain antagonistic and election results close to tiedfor the foreseeable future.In Lithuania, the largely national-conservative version of the right, embodied by theHomeland Union, also came to dominate the right side of the spectrum in the early 1990s.Its stature and success rested on anti-Communism and its resolute pro-independencestances. Its achievement in the 1996 elections was based on the successful exploitation ofits predecessor's self-discreditation. The Conservatives promised to increase living stan-dards based on private initiative-induced economic growth, and this offer resonated afterfour years of social democratic rule. They also offered the hope of increasing the standardsof public morality and benefited from the sowing of populist promises to various popula-tion groups as well, as Mantas Adomenas notes in his chapter. Lithuanian Conservativesdid not face a serious challenge from other parties on the right until late in the 1990s,
3 MDF, a small national conservative party and remnant of a glorious past, is ailing in the shadow of Fidesz, but so far resists all attempts to be taken over by it or included under the Orbanite umbrella.138 why we lost
when as a result of their controversial years in power, they temporarily yielded their statusas the dominant party on the right to the Liberal Union.On the surface, the competitive pattern of Macedonia reminds one of alternation of mod-erate leftist and rightist blocks seen in some other countries in the region. This contest,however, in Macedonia takes place in an environment hardly favorable to programmaticcompetition. Moreover, it is troubled by ethnic problems. From the beginning, VMRO, ahistorical melding of nationalism and anti-Communism, dominated the right pole of theparty system, even though, as Andrej Lepavcov mentions, it did so mostly without explicitdeclarations of allegiance to a set of traditionally center-right principles. It may be thatVMRO's position on the right was determined by that of its main rival, the post-Commu-nist SDSM, and its social democratic orientation.VMRO owed its rise to power in 1998 to the resentment by voters of the Socialist colo-nization of the state and the exploitation of its resources, privatization-related corruptionand the alleged involvement of the ruling establishment in and benefiting from pyramidschemes that impoverished a large part of the population. The country also faced a broadeconomic crisis, even though not as acute as it was in the cases of Bulgaria or Romania. Asmany of these practices were not unknown for VMRO in power either, it seems that theyare the major driving force of the Macedonian power alternation, which suggests a seriouslack of programmatic competition.In Poland the conflict of the post-Communist versus post-Solidarity parties has domi-nated the scene. Within the post-Solidarity right, there was a Western liberal wing (UW)and a large and patchy Christian-national one. These two never actually fought the seriousbattle of the right; instead they were involved in a complicated series of cohabitations andcoalitions (See Bakke, Elisabeth and Nick Sitter, "Patterns of Stability. Party Competitionand Strategy in Central Europe since 1989,"Party Politics 11:1, pages 243-263.)Although unstable and disunited, the right in Poland managed to dominate the governmentand to introduce economic reforms until 1993. The 1993 election victory of the post-Com-munist left showed the limits of 'tinkering' and gave impetus to reformation of the rela-tionships of various right-of-center groups, in which an umbrella-like grouping of looselyorganized ties among parties on their right was chosen. This was embodied in the SolidarityElection Action (AWS), which turned out to be instrumental in the consolidation of elec-toral support for the right and eventually brought it to power after the 1997 elections.The right owed its victory exactly to this "creation of an appropriate political vehicle," asMarek Matraszek puts it, and to the good result of its potential ally UW, rather than toits predecessor's poor performance. In fact, SLD did not suffer a crushing defeat in 1997;it actually increased its share of votes. AWS was clever enough, however, to make use ofthe natural unpopularity of the incumbent government and of several incompetent stepstowards the end of its tenure to win by a small but extremely important margin of thevote. The 'political vehicle' chosen by the Polish right in 1997, however, would later play aprominent role in the explanation of AWS failures in power.Romania is an example of laborious construction of a viable, moderate center-right – anundertaking, which some argue is hardly finished even today. The two historic parties,PNL and PNTCD, declared their right-of-center orientation in 1990. In the form of anearly CDR, they faced various reincarnations of the Communist party (FSN, FDSN, E x p l a i n i n g C e n t e r - R i g h t D e f e at s 139
PDSR) in highly polarized contest troubled by their own disunity (namely PNL tended todrift away from the CDR) and by the necessity to cooperate with non-right actors, someof which originated from FSDN.The CDR's victory in 1996 has to be attributed to the enormous discreditation of the rul-ing PDSR in the eyes of voters, as they correctly came to blame the party for the acuteeconomic crisis and enormous corruption. This enabled a broad opposition alliance theoust post-Communists to a great extent by outbidding them in promises to improve thepressing social condition of the population and to put to an end to corruption. Anothersignificant factor was that in 1996 PNL and PNTCD managed to avoid conflicts betweenthemselves and thus formed a stable core for the opposition alliance.Slovakia is another example of a laboriously crafted, moderate right. The original right, beit civic (VPN, DS) or confessional (KDH), scored almost 50% of the vote in the first elec-tions, but soon had to yield to the national-populist opposition of HZDS. Mečiar's splinterfrom VPN thrived on criticizing the social impact of economic reforms and on the per-ceived failure of Slovak politicians to negotiate a satisfactory solution for the model of theCzech and Slovak relationship. The politics of the national populists in power inducedintense political conflict which framed the creation of the second wave of the moderateright in Slovakia.This "new right" was created from the remnants of the old formations of DS, KDH andpost-VPN groups, where a new element was an influx of defectors from the ruling parties,namely HZDS and SNS, which eventually created the DÚ. During 1996 and 1997, the anti-Mečiar opposition of largely non-Socialist provenience arrived at a platform of gradualcohesion based on political alliances, and later in 1998 on an electoral party, the SDK.Composed of rightist, as well as minor non-rightist elements, and overwhelmed by theprimary concern of overthrowing Mečiar, the SDK became the core of a broad oppositionalliance which managed to take power after the 1998 parliamentary elections.As Grigorij Mesežnikov puts it in his chapter, this victory was due to the coalition's cleverstrategy and impressive mobilization of society. The opposition took advantage of its rival'sweakest point – its "Euro-incompatibility." More and more, Slovakia's citizens began to re-ject the authoritarian excesses of the HZDS-led government as they realized more clearlythat these were the major obstacle for the country's admission to the European Unionand NATO. Regarding mobilization, the opposition focused tremendous effort on rally-ing anti-authoritarian feelings, correctly calculating that unprecedented mobilization ofdomestic and foreign help in this respect would bring them an enormous advantage. Eventhough formally the right ran independently in the form of the SDK, in fact the entire op-position block (with exception of the leftist SDĽ) participated in civic mobilization. Theright made sure it dominated the block, mainly in the process of government formation.To sum up, consolidation of the moderate Slovak right of the second generation coincidedwith resistance against a national-populist, authoritarian-leaning regime, as well as withthe period of the rule in a heterogeneous coalition of the left and right. Important conflictson the right (within the SDK) took place while the party was in charge of government: anongoing conflict culminated between proponents of a unification model around PM Dzur-inda, who campaigned for creating a large people's party, and proponents of a coalitionmodel, namely the KDH, which maintained that independent parties should be retained140 why we lost
and should form electoral coalitions as needed. The result of this clash was a withdrawal ofKDH from SDK and separation of the unification wing in the new SDKÚ. The most recent"offspring" of the Slovak center-right is ANO, a party which came into existence campaign-ing on an anti-establishment appeal, not sparing the ruling right and its political conductfrom criticism, as well as on professions of economic and lifestyle liberalism.Thus in the second half of the 1990s, all party systems involved in this study possessedan incipient or somewhat consolidated moderate right, either in the form of a large party(Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia) or as a more-or-less formalized loose structure or coali-tion-like arrangements of various parties (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia). Theseoptions on the right defined themselves in some cases in mutual struggles and in a contestwith the moderate left (Hungary, Lithuania, Poland), the dominant post-Communist left(Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia), or national-populists (Slovakia).As their rivals failed to deliver and discredited themselves, the right came to power in a se-ries of elections between 1996 and 1998. Although the center-right parties used their timein office for introducing various reform programs, ultimately, with the single exceptionof Slovakia, they failed to be reelected. Right-of-center politics went through a decline interms of organization, policy and often also of ideology. Rather than relying on explana-tions based on destiny, this chapter tries to summarize genuine reasons for this decline.
fragmented nature of the right. He rightly suggests that none of these can exhaustivelyexplain the phenomenon, and that a combination of these reasons would probably ac-count best.This is a typical treatment of the topic throughout this book and altogether, the mostquoted reasons for reverses of the center-right parties cited here can be grouped into thefollowing clusters:• The first one relates to governing. It incorporates painful reforms, their social impact and the resulting negative influence on the mood of electorates, as well as the reac- tion of those in government when reforms backfire on their popularity. It also includes questions of political and moral conduct of those in power, namely problems of ar- rogance, alienation from the people and corruption. Political organization for those in government, including coalition government, is also a part of this cluster.• The second cluster of reasons is linked to parties themselves. It takes account of their problems with internal party organization, ideological exhaustion and crisis and phe- nomena such as highly personalized conflicts and infighting.• A separate group of reasons related to both governments and parties, which may well be a result or a composite effect of the previous two groups, is their failure, or even un- willingness, to communicate with society, their poor public relations and misguided electoral campaigns.In reality this division may seem to be a bit artificial, as governing, party, and communica-tion-related reasons for the right's decline in office more often than not act in a complexinterplay. It is therefore difficult to give an account of, let us say, political incoherencewithout taking into account impaired party organization and ideological crises. We, how-ever, believe this breakdown is convenient for the sake of explanation.
Mistakes in GoverningIn the group of the governing-related factors, painful reforms have a dual impact on thefates of the governments that undertake them. They determine the moods of an electoratethat often feels pauperized and less secure in cases when governments did act responsi-bly, taking unpopular measures such as cutting subsidies and services and implementingprivatization. They also affect the ruling reformers. As they realize there is hardly anychance that positive consequences of reforms will manifest themselves before the forth-coming elections, they tend to hesitate to engage in selling reforms to public and defend-ing them from critics.The impact of reform policies hit the popularity of the ruling right in practically all thecountries under study, especially in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Poland, as the latter wentthrough a series of the four major structural reforms. Popularity setbacks were followedby communication paralysis, which resulted in a vicious circle.The Slovak example, however, shows that there is no inevitability in this respect. The Slo-vak government after 1998 certainly did introduce economic reforms that met with theresistance of the population. However, they never became sufficient reasons to vote thegovernment out of power. One of the reasons is that the economic reforms undertakenwere not that radical. Their reach and depth was checked by the leftist element in the coali-142 why we lost
tion. Also, importantly, rather than aiming at far-reaching economic overhaul, the coali-tion focused on improving the international standing of the country, in which it achievedremarkable success. It returned the country back to the EU and NATO integration paths,which gave a sense of dignity to the people that to a certain extent counterbalanced theunrest caused by structural reforms.Another reason for setbacks of the center right was the whole range of misgivings relatedto ethical conduct in politics or public morality in elected office. This was one of the mostdisappointing features of the center-right governments: arrogance, corruption and a pred-atory attitude toward the resources of the state resulted in (and were perceived by publicas) a nearly total failure of parties on the right to establish themselves as an alternative totheir predecessors. This failure was particularly conspicuous in Macedonia, Bulgaria andRomania, but it also played a role in the Polish, Lithuanian and Hungarian center right'sreversals, thus raising it almost to the status of a universal factor.Regarding arrogance, in practically all cases elected officials forgot how and why theyhad been elected to office, disappointing and alienating the electorate. Politicians wereseduced by power and emulated their post-Communist predecessors by seeking financialgain from their positions. The spoils of privatization – or re-privatization, in some cases– proved to be the downfall of many of the region's most promising center-right leaders.The right in Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Macedonia and Poland was not immune toallegations of privatization-related corruption – accusations that often proved substanti-ated. Their rule was certainly seen as corrupt by the general public.In case of Bulgaria, Svetoslav Malinov maintains that the ADF's failure was not only aboutpolicy-making, but also about moral conduct. The transparency and responsiveness ofgovernment were particularly acute problems in Bulgaria. He argues that ADF failed tounderstand that people rioted against the previous government not only out of social dis-content, but also because they deeply resented its immoral conduct in governing. Theyattached high expectations to ADF's rule as a true alternative also in this respect, and assoon as the government of the right started to be perceived as "the same as Socialists" onethical questions, punishment was not long in coming.The profound dissatisfaction of ordinary Bulgarians with the moral aspects of the right'srule also helps us to understand that in 2001, disillusioned Bulgarians did not turn back tothe Socialists. Instead, they invested their trust in a force that convincingly claimed to be dif-ferent from both former ruling forces exactly in the area of public morality – the NationalMovement Simeon II – and in an unprecedented way. The UDF-based coalition was oustedfrom power in 2001 by what was one of the most breathtaking breakthroughs of a new chal-lenger to power. The highly personalized, anti-establishment and non-ideological NationalMovement Simeon II won 47% of the popular vote just two months after its founding.Also in Lithuania, the failure of the Homeland Union to become a true moral alternativeto its predecessors harmed its chances in a dramatic way. The party fell from a dominantposition to near-outsider status with 8% of the vote. While in power, the Conservatives– in addition to demonstrating the "normal" corruption and neglect of public interest– contributed to the rise of populist politics which continue to hamstring Lithuanian po-litical life today by their incapacity to address and counteract what Adomėnas calls the"growing rift between society and the political elite." E x p l a i n i n g C e n t e r - R i g h t D e f e at s 143
Macedonia perfectly fits the group of countries where the conduct of politics accountedfor the demise of center-right rule rather than, or greatly in addition to, poor economicperformance. According to our author, the central "ingredient" of VMRO's failure waspoor public relations and an inability to counter accusations of corruption and miscon-duct in government. It is, however, necessary to say that this must have been a ratherdifficult task, as VMRO soon repeated all the missteps of its predecessors, including cor-ruption and exploitation of state resources. Moreover, the party also earned the stigma of(or amplified an already existing) nationalist radicalism. As the Albanian insurgency tookplace during its time in government, some of VMRO's leaders manifested a very harshattitude regarding treatment of the insurgents and the Albanian minority in general. Thiswent hand-in-hand with showing a certain disproval for implementation of some provi-sions of the Framework Agreement in Macedonia.The current state of the dominant party on the right, which in the meantime has split,shows that the Macedonian conservative movement is seriously torn between at least twofactions. One of them relies on moderation, while the other one is clearly basing its poli-tics on resistance to provisions of the Ohrid agreement and inciting feelings that the Slavicpopulation of the country is being endangered by the policies of current government.Another group of problems to be treated under the label of the governing-related causesis what could be termed political organization for those in government, including coalitiongovernment. This can be a problem for center-right parties in two basic ways: either theright itself prefers various loose arrangements of organization, cooperation and coordina-tion of forces ("party as a coalition") over a single party (which may not be possible toachieve for a number of reasons), or it goes through the troubles of coexistence in coali-tion with other parties.Typically, coalitions turned out to be a weak point of center-right rule. As the right is his-torically more prone to organizational fragmentation, inevitably the victories of the pro-reform coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe were based largely on coalition-buildingstrategies. During campaigns, personal and political differences were deemphasized topresent alternatives to the status quo. After elections, however, these differences quicklyreemerged. While it was essential to assemble broad coalitions of democrats to defeat au-tocrats, these amalgams proved ill-suited to governing. Successful reform and democraticinstitutionalization take more than a four-year term, and while more coherent formationsor single parties have a tougher chance of winning a breakthrough election, they are typi-cally able to govern more effectively.This was the case mainly in Romania and Poland, both of which illustrate a feature of "par-ties as coalitions" as a double-edged sword. While the Polish AWS and Romanian CDR werewell placed to win elections, they were poorly structured to govern. On the other hand, theUDF/ADF seemed to do a much better job of unifying and governing coherently, and themost diverse government under study (in Slovakia), which was a proper coalition includingone "party as a coalition" (SDK), arguably governed the best. This suggests that fragmenta-tion as such is not an insurmountable obstacle for successful government, but it can becomeso, if coupled with ideological differences and party and personal egotism.With only a little exaggeration, it can be said that the right in Slovakia not only rose to power,but practically defined itself through coalition-building – building an opposition coalition,144 why we lost
as well as organizing the right itself for electoral struggle in a coalition-like arrangement. Thedefinition of the right continued in consequent conflicts as to whether to convert this coali-tion into a large unified rightist party or to continue in coalition practice. These conflicts,however, never proved to be fatal for the perseverance of the right in power.The right in Slovakia had to be, and indeed under the shrewd leadership of Prime MinisterDzurinda, was extremely pragmatic in its relationships with coalition partners, namelythe leftist SDĽ and left-leaning, antiestablishment SOP. This contrasts with the Romaniancase, in which CDR had troubles handling its relationships with PD, or with the Lithu-anian one, where Christian Democrats decided to distance themselves openly from theirpartner in rule, the Homeland Union, in an attempt to save their electoral chances.The inescapable consequence and a frequent companion of impaired organization for gov-erning is political incoherence which manifests itself in both decision-making (in execu-tives, as well as legislatures) and policy implementation.Poland and its AWS represent a complex case in which organizational fragility, fragmen-tation and lack of political coherence interplayed with ideological insufficiency. In thecase of AWS, its strategy of putting together various rightist groups under one umbrella,which was so instrumental in accumulating votes, turned out to be a source of weaknesswhile in power.Factionalism troubled AWS in terms of organization, policy and ideology. Undisciplineddeputies, a weak prime minister and ineffective leadership were the three main factorsleading to the failure of AWS as an effective structure, as mentioned by Matraszek in hischapter. All three were inextricably related to fragmentation and a loose coordinationmechanism of the right-wing umbrella.The fragile and organizationally challenged AWS, a "disparate collection of parties andgrouplets," as Matraszek puts it, was not able to impose voting discipline on its MPs. Somemembers even had perfectly rational motivations to behave as if they were in oppositionto their own leadership. Thus the parliamentary caucus of this political mosaic soon be-came incapable and unwilling to effectively support the AWS government. By the sametoken, it had scant motivation to defend the government and its policies after its popular-ity declined due to the impact of structural reforms.The Romanian CDR was also deeply troubled by the paralyzing effect of disunity bothwithin the Convention itself and within the ruling coalition (the case of PD). For example,Sebastian Lăzăroiu points out the divisive potential of the "double agenda" of institutionaland economic reform and moral renewal. The right, or better said, some of its importantcomponents, was not able and did not want to give up the "decommunization" agenda,which estranged allies such as PD and often precluded them from granting support for theright's structural reforms. In the end, "decommunization" also produced highly embar-rassing episodes within the right itself. As anti-Communism is often a defining character-istic of the right, similar situations certainly represent a predicament for the incumbentcenter-right parties implementing reform programs.Another governance-related feature of the right's rule, on which the Romanian chapterdoes a very good job, is treatment of the established bureaucracies by the center-rightgovernments after their ascent to power. Lăzăroiu catchingly tackles the topic of how bu- E x p l a i n i n g C e n t e r - R i g h t D e f e at s 145
reaucracies reacted to the incumbency change and how the CDR in office failed either tobreak them and enforce adherence to political commands in policy implementation, or tocome to terms with them as the Socialists did. The result was a deceptive, largely disobedi-ent and corruption-prone bureaucracy, boycotting decisions of politicians and changingits loyalty as soon as another incumbency change started to loom on the horizon.
Weaknesses in PartiesAs far as party-related causes are concerned, the internal life of political parties, in particu-lar party organizations, stands out as extremely important one.The Bulgarian case is illustrative of the situation in which organizational consolidationof the center-right (i.e. turning a "party as a coalition" into a unified party organization)coincided with its period in government. This contributed to the fact that successful unifi-cation of the UDF into a single party organization was accompanied by counterproductiveclosure, encapsulation and insulation not only from society and voters, but often also fromparty members on the local level. This after some time resulted in a largely dysfunctionaland paralyzed party organization. Not only did the public see the party as a self-interestedsect, but even its own members doubted it had a broader purpose. Not surprisingly, afterthe 1999 municipal elections, UDF abandoned its flagship procedure – primary elections.Venerated in 1997, just a few years later the party rejected such primaries as a source ofdisunity and quarrels, and returned to traditional elite-controlled method of candidateselection for the 2001 general elections. The closed character of the party resulted in itspoor communication with society. This, accompanied by a ruthless infiltration of the statestructures by the party nominees, further contributed to its unpopularity.In Lithuania, the Homeland Union's coherence and efficiency in party management dwin-dled away precisely while the party was in office. Ill-managed organizational reform, accord-ing to Adomėnas, influenced the governing capacity of the party as well as the party's publicimage, as it did not prevent dominance of local chiefs and clan politics. The party organiza-tion lost its attraction to people and found itself trapped in the resulting recruitment crisis.Local party organizations to a great extent lost their capacity to interact with society.Ideological crisis may, but need not necessarily, go hand-in-hand with organizational cri-sis. Adomėnas depicts the transformation of the ideological space of Lithuanian politicsduring conservative rule, including the Conservatives' ideological exhaustion. Gradually,the party got to the stage that "towards the end of their parliamentary term" where they"eventually found themselves without any distinctive political vision to offer." Althoughit had always been a doctrinal party, the Homeland Union at a certain point underwentsuch a strong ideological dilution that it had nothing distinct to offer to voters on the rightand eventually lost its position as the main party of the right to the Liberal Union. Thistendency receded only gradually with the rise of a new leader.In general, center-right parties run the risk of ideological dilution and exhaustion whenoverwhelmed by governing and suffer from a drain of personnel from the party to thestructures of government. There can be "too many" right-of-center messages competingin the case of "parties as coalitions," or there can be an absence of message as parties di-lute their identity in the pragmatism often required by governing. The latter danger was146 why we lost
prevented in Hungary by Orbán, who chose instead to keep the party and the nation con-stantly busy by offering them a vision of a complex overhaul both in terms of organizationand ideology (see Lánczi's chapter for an informative account of this topic). This strategyproved successful, but backfired in many other respects.Looking for factors within party internal life other than party organizations proper leadsus to factional disunity and personal infighting. In Lithuania, strong personality-relatedfactors played a role in both Conservative successes and failures. The movement sufferedfrom factionalism and personal intrigue. This contributed greatly to an overall politicalincoherence which included, for example, the inability to defy new challengers on theright, namely President Adamkus and the Liberal Union, and a lack of capacity to solvethe problems in the policy area. In Romania, for example, three "political" center-rightprime ministers and two caretaker ones held power over the course of one four-year term– not because of policy differences, but because of personality conflicts and factional andpersonal jockeying for power.
elections. They feared that touching controversial and unpopular topics would not boosttheir popularity and would rather bring more harm than profit and would give ample am-munition to the opposition. Ruling politicians often developed a tendency to treat eachcriticism as malicious attack motivated by shadowy interests. When each contact becamea malicious attack in their eyes, one often-reached conclusion was that all communicationwas useless. Or the reason could have been tinged with arrogance when a preponderancein power prevented parties feeling obliged to explain their actions to people – all the morein cases where they had something to hide, such as a case of corruption or a neglect of thepublic interest.The Bulgarian, Romanian and Macedonian cases are especially illustrative of an intimaterelationship between the communication and political conduct of those in power. Thereis always a much smaller chance that the press will praise a government's achievements,if the ruling parties are generally perceived as corrupt and self-serving. Also, for govern-ments it is extremely difficult to defend their actions and justify their motivations whenmembers of parliament and parties backing the cabinet and interacting with people onthe grassroots level are seen as selfish and predatory political entrepreneurs. It is impos-sible to appeal to people's reason and patience in judging government performance, whenthose who appeal are seen as extracting profit from their elected office. The Bulgarian caseprovides an example of how news related to the misconduct of the ruling right wiped outcompletely other policy-related topics. The Lithuanian case describes various "popularitywars" between governments and the caucuses backing them in parliament that damagedthe right's image.A typical malaise affecting the pro-reform right (for example, in Poland and Lithuania)was that the state of their public relations (often in spite of abundant resources) embodiedtheir inability to sell their achievements and to resist the fact that that negative aspectsof their rule dominated the press. According to Lánczi's account, Fidesz in Hungary hadacute problems with its image (whatever the reasons were) which were not tackled prop-erly by the party. It failed to avoid the impression of being a radical force polarizing societyand the fear related to these concerns mobilized many people to vote against Fidesz. InPoland and Lithuania, the ruling right was utterly unable to defend its reforms againstnegative coverage which dominated the press.Frequently, the right had to face a historically and culturally determined dominance ofthe left in media – both public and private. Such a situation may trigger the temptationto control public media to counteract this "natural advantage" of the rival, as was thecase in Hungary or Macedonia. On the contrary, in the Polish case Matraszek states theright's "failure to control the media, at least in the sense of ensuring fair and balancedreporting" became a major problem, as it missed the chance to influence the composi-tion of the public media supervisory bodies, leaving them staffed by the nominees oftheir predecessors.To conclude this section, it is necessary to note that there are always many reasons forproblems of incumbents in communicating their actions to the public. In the post-Com-munist region, apart from inexperience with political public relations, there were two ad-ditional ones – contempt of power holders for the ideas of responsiveness and account-ability and their rational effort to conceal their corrupt practices.148 why we lost
Elaboration of the contrasting case of the Slovak right offers an opportunity to use all thethree groups of reasons for the right's reversals in one analysis. The experience in Slovakiaunequivocally poses the question why the right, despite carrying out economic reformsand suffering from many of the same vices discussed in this study, was not ousted frompower in the elections in 2002.One reason which has been mentioned already was that Slovak economic reforms werenot excessively radical, yet they worked. Another reason was the positive impact of therestoration of the feelings of many Slovaks regarding the country's international stature.Yet another reason pertains to the disunited nature of opposition, when Mečiar's HZDSlost any coalition potential, its potential ally SNS did not make it to parliament due to aninternal split and the new, ambitious, populist challenger Smer turned out to suffer fromunpredictable levels of support. Its actual election result was half of its pre-election pollresults.The right (KDH and SDKÚ) ran separately, but both of its components obtained solidresults, which, in case of the SDKÚ, was quite a surprise to many. SDKÚ took advantageof the pending EU accession, appealing successfully as the most reliable guarantor of itssuccessful completion. This appeal probably worked with a great part of potential center-right voters who were otherwise estranged by SDKÚ's performance in power, namely whatthey saw as unprincipled pragmatism and allegations of corruption. As with the SOP in1998, the right pragmatically included a new actor again in 2002: the right-of-center, anti-establishment party ANO, which liked to present itself as pro-market liberal. In the end,the rightist character of the coalition was strengthened as its leftist components SDĽ andSOP failed to enter parliament and SMK, the reliable partner of the pro-reform right, wasincluded.Today, the right faces its own disunity caused mainly by differing reactions to the prag-matism of Prime Minister Dzurinda and his SDKÚ, which in their effort to keep unpopu-lar government in power have resorted to actions and alliances enraging their coalitionpartners, such as various deals with independent deputies in parliament or alleged tacitcooperation with Mečiar's HZDS.Thus the real challenge for Slovak right will be the 2006 elections in which it certainlywill not be a favorite. It will face several options as to how to defend its incumbency. Oneof them will be an attempt to reconfigure the political conflict in Slovakia into a formof "Smer versus the rest." This would assume a highly controversial alliance with and le-gitimization of the HZDS by its direct membership in the coalition or accepting its tacitsupport in parliament (perhaps in the form of an "opposition agreement") for the sake ofgetting the party on the anti-Smer side of the conflict. Both SDKÚ and HZDS are usingthis idea to exert gentle pressure on their partners, but it is still improbable that it will hap-pen. Thus, the right's probable fate in the next election is to be at the mercy of a kingmakerwhich will be either HZDS or radical parties such as KSS and SNS.What remains to be seen is whether the Slovak right will be able to use its renowned com-munication skills to avoid this scenario. It seems that resources for this are quite limited,even though there are some signals in polls that the population is starting to perceive andacknowledge that complex reforms done after 2002 are bearing fruit. But even thoughthere is a chance of improving the economic performance record of the right, the political E x p l a i n i n g C e n t e r - R i g h t D e f e at s 149
LITERATURE:Bakke, Elisabeth and Nick Sitter (2005) "Patterns of Stability. Party Competition andStrategy in Central Europe since 1989," Party Politics 11:1, pp. 243-263.Hanley, Seán (2004) "Getting the Right Right: Redefining the Centre-Right in Post-Com-munist Europe." Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 20:3, pp. 9-27.Sitter, Nick (2002) "Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party System Change in Europe, Eastand West." Perspectives on European Politics and Society 3:3, pp. 425-451.Szczerbiak, Aleks and Seán Hanley (2004) "Introduction: Understanding the Politics ofthe Right in Contemporary East-Central Europe," Journal of Communist Studies and Tran-sition Politics 20:3, pp.1-8.Vachudová, Anna M (2002) "Integration, Security and Immigration. The European Agen-das of Eastern Europe's Right Wing Parties." Paper presented at the Conference of Europe-anists, The Council for European Studies, Chicago, 14-16 March 2002.150 why we lost
Notes on Authors
Grigorij Mesežnikov is President of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO) in Bratislava,Slovakia. Previously, he served at Comenius University in Bratislava and at the PoliticalScience Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. He is a founding member of the In-stitute for Public Affairs (IVO), which he joined full-time in June 1997. He has co-editedand co-authored a number of books, including the Slovakia: Global Report, an annual,comprehensive analysis of country's development in all relevant sectors of society, andFreedom House's Nations in Transit.Jan Erik Surotchak is Resident Director for Europe at the International Republican Insti-tute, based in Bratislava, Slovakia. Prior to re-joining IRI in 2003, he served in Bratislavafor two as director of a Freedom House NGO voter-mobilization support program and forfive years as director of the Foundation for a Civil Society's Democracy Network publicpolicy project. Surotchak opened IRI's office in Slovakia in 1994. He holds a Master of Artsin Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.Peter Učeň studied political science in Bratislava, Budapest and Florence. He specializesin theory of parties and party systems, democratization and populism. He works in thearea of democracy promotion and building democratic institutions, and is Assistant Pro-gram Officer for the International Republican Institute's Regional Program for Centraland Eastern Europe in Bratislava, Slovakia.