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Friday, 17 May 2013
Primarily speaking...Color My Heart Dare #43
7 comments:
Oh I love it!ReplyDelete
Haha, Caroline, I love all your little puns! This card is so cute and love the effects that you used on the cardstock in the water, like the sanding and popping up with foam tape. Great card!ReplyDelete
The water on this one is amazing--I love how you detailed it! The little bird on the lifesaver is FABULOUS! So cute and the hemp is PERFECT! Love it! :)ReplyDelete
I think we are all in love with how you did that water. This card just makes me smile. The whole thing...it just makes me smile! I think that's the hightest compliment because, really, isn't that the whole point of hand-made cards???ReplyDelete
Great sailing card--love what you did with the water--paper layered and distressed. The greeting is perfect for your thank you card to a friend. Thanks for the inspiration!ReplyDelete
:) Marie
This is fantastic, Caroline! I love the layers of waves!ReplyDelete
Love the colour combo, the visual the waves and background makes and the inside. Thanks for continuing to inspire your little sis.ReplyDelete
xox, Muggie


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Back in December, Disney had announced their plans to acquire 21st Century Fox for $52.4 billion USD. But recently, Comcast (who owns NBCUniversal) announced their offer to buy Fox for $65 billion in all-cash.
Now, Disney has increased their offer to acquire Fox for $71.3 billion USD.
The deal will include
- Twentieth Century Fox
- Fox Searchlight Pictures
- Fox 2000 Pictures
- FX Productions
- Fox21
- FX Networks
- Fox Sports Regional Networks
- Fox Network Group International
- Star India
- Tata Sky
Disney would also gain Fox's 30% stake in Hulu, to now make it 60%. Hulu is a conglomerate and is also owned by Comcast (30%) and WarnerMedia (10%), formerly known as Time Warner.
Once the deal is complete, Fox's remaining assets would be spun-off into something called New Fox, which is composed of Fox News, Fox Business Network, FS1, FS2 and Big Ten Network.
Shareholders of 21st Century Fox would receive $38 in either Disney cash or stock per Fox share.
Disney's offer for Fox is 50% cash and 50% stock and would assume Fox's debt of $13.7 billion.
"The acquisition of 21st Century Fox will bring significant financial value to the shareholders of both companies, and after six months of integration planning we're even more enthusiastic and confident in the strategic fit of the assets and the talent at Fox," said Robert A. Iger, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Walt Disney Company. "At a time of dynamic change in the entertainment industry, the combination of Disney's and Fox's unparalleled collection of businesses and franchises will allow us to create more appealing high-quality content, expand our direct-to-consumer offerings and international presence, and deliver more personalized and compelling entertainment experiences to meet growing consumer demand around the world."
The Disney-Fox transaction is subject to approval by Disney and 21st Century Fox's shareholders, which were set to have meetings on July 10th but now scheduled for a later date.
Source: Disney

subset: commoncrawl


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Cruising With a Little One
Guest Blog By: Kristen Genung
We recently took our first cruise with Ava Jane when she was 7 months old. Most cruise lines allow 6 months and older, but there are some lines that are adults only. On more exotic itineraries and long crossings they prefer children to be at least 1 year old. We felt like we had taken enough cruises in the past (90+ for Danny) to feel comfortable taking Ava to a different country even though medical care might not be as good as at home. We also were lucky to bring the grandparents so it wouldn't' completely kill our nightlife and sightseeing fun!
We were asked many questions so we decided to make this into a Q&A for people. Email Danny (email@example.com) if you have any questions about cruising with young children and we will answer them in the next installment of "Cruising With a Little One."
Can I take a baby on a cruise?
Do I have to pay for my baby to cruise?
Yes, and not usually at a discounted rate. There are some "kids sail free" promotions or discounted 3rd or 4th passenger rates available, but it depends on the ship capacity and time of year.
Is there babysitting on the ship?
Babysitting varies on different cruise lines. Often there is minimum age of 1 year, and only available at certain times. For Princess Cruises, the kids club starts at age 3 where they can play most of the day and are fully supervised. It's never safe to leave a child in the room alone.
Where will my baby sleep on the ship?
Cruise ships have Pack n Plays which are small portable cribs, available on request ahead of time depending on availability. We bring out own if we are leaving from Los Angeles or San Diego. Babies can sleep in your bed, on a pullout sofa if available in your room, sleeping bag that you could bring if your child is too big for a crib but isn't ready for a real bed. Ava goes in the Pack N Play and we've done great with that so far. If you can afford connecting cabins with a family member or friend, that's a great option that offers more space. Some lines have room dividing curtains, and Princess has a separate closet area where a crib can fit.
How can I bathe my baby on a cruise?
Unless you book a mini suite or suite, you will most likely not have a bathtub. Cruise bathrooms are narrow, so you can either take him/her in the shower with you or bring a portable bath or bin to put on the shower floor. I bring my own portable bath and soap/shower gel as well.
How do I feed my baby on a cruise ship?
Some cruise lines will mash or puree foods for you on request, but I would check beforehand. You can bring your own jar or packet baby food to the eating areas, and we did a combination of both and it worked well for us. You will need your own food/snacks when going on excursions, and having extra back ups helps and is provides a comfort to your baby. Cruise ships provide high chairs as well.
We brought our own formula on board, and there is a mini fridge in the cruise cabin. If you need certain milk, I would check with your travel agent beforehand. You can also ask room service if you need anything kept at a colder temperature or frozen.
We also brought our own items for washing including bottles, sippy cups, spoons, bibs and other infant essentials.
Is there a safe place for my baby to play onboard?
Yes with exceptions. Under the age of 3 on Princess they are not able to attend the kids club. We ran into this issue with Ava since she is so young, so when there isn't an unused lounge or bit of hallway space, we spent a lot of time cruising the walking deck in the stroller and Ergo baby carrier, people watching in the public lounges, and lots of different toys and books from home.
Can my baby use the cruise ship pool?
No. Children must be out of diapers in order to use cruise pools. I would bring a swim diaper for excursions.
Should I bring a stroller or car seat?
We bring our stroller, baby carrier, and car seat. The smaller the better, but we use our jogger for everything, so storing it has to be considered. Car seat is also not always used, but I bring it just in case and for excursions.
Can I bring my baby on a shore excursion?
There are age minimums on most excursions, so check before you go. We either trade off with the grandparents, or just walk around in port.
Can I do laundry onboard?
We do laundry every other day at home, so I make sure to bring my own detergent and dryer sheets for the self service laundry machines. There is a fee if you use the cruise laundry service, and they don't use gentle detergent. You can also hand wash in the sink, and there is a dryer line in the shower. We brought extra blankets and items we wash frequently and we probably used 100 cruise ship towels!
Do I need to bring diapers and wipes with me?
Yes and bring extra! We used a lot of wipes to sanitize the room and for everything else as most parents do. I allotted for 10 diapers a day.
Bonus Pictures of Ava Jane's First Cruise!


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«Русская Реклама». ТВ-онлайн.
Dogs Who Look Like Their Owners. Get Your Pet Website!
http://www.petwebdesigner.com We build your pet website! Pet owners who look just like their pets make the funniest videos! Dogs and Puppies included here. Don't forget to enter our contest if you know a pet that looks like their owner: http://www.Petwebdesigner.com/contest Video # 2 in the series is here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uspGYzJkb-Y


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Market research firm MarketsandMarkets expects the global fragrance ingredients market will grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.6% from 2014 to reach $17.10 billion by 2019. Latin America is projected to be the fastest-growing market between 2014 and 2019.
According to the report, "Fragrance Ingredients Market by Type (Essential Oils and Aroma Chemicals), by Application (Cosmetics & Toiletries, and Soaps & Detergents) & by Geography - Global Trends & Forecasts to 2019," the global market for fragrance ingredients was valued at $12,383.25 million in 2013. Europe dominated the market in 2013, which was followed by North America.
The report said growth of the fragrance ingredients market is primarily driven by the change in the consumer preferences, increase in demand for natural fragrances, increase in demand from the developing nations, and significant technological advancements. However, factors such as research and development, proving expensive and compliance with quality and regulatory standards are restraining the growth of the market, the report said.


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Playing Valcamonica Multitouch Application Developed with Open Exhibits
In Sankt Pölten, Austria, just west of Vienna, at St. Pölten University of Applied Sciences, a Digital Media Technologies class developed a multitouch application that explores pre-historic rock art in northern Italy. The app, Playing Valcamonica, was developed using Ideum's … Continue reading
Thinking Outside the Screen
Of all the projects, two stood out for me. The first is Big Screams, a participatory game for mobile devices created by Canadian artist-programmer Elie Zananiri. Continue reading
London to New Mexico: Multitouch for the British Museum
Leaving London Olympic madness behind, I have landed in New Mexico for a month-long fellowship with Open Exhibits. It has been a long road from the multitouch seminar held at The British Museum in October 2011. That event brought an Ideum … Continue reading
Fall 2012 Conference Round-up
This fall brings three exciting conferences of interest to the Open Exhibits community, and lead Open Exhibits organization Ideum will be participating in each. The first is ASTC 2012, the Association of Science-Technology Centers conference in Columbus, Ohio on October … Continue reading
100 Years Exhibition Now Open at the Indian Pueblo Cultural Center
This weekend we had the pleasure of attending the opening of 100 Years of State & Federal Policy: The Impact on Pueblo Nations at the Indian Pueblo Cultural Center (IPCC). The exhibit has two media-based interactive exhibits and while these … Continue reading


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The career of renowned British cultural theorist Stuart Hall is difficult to categorize, its areas of study and influence extending from politics to sociology to the arts. So it's apt that veteran British docmaker John Akomfrah's "The Stuart Hall Project" should take something of a rag-and-bone approach to celebrating Hall's life and work, marrying his key philosophies to a cornucopia of historical archive footage and a selection of landmark compositions by Hall's favorite musician, Miles Davis. Results are handsome and heartfelt, though not especially complex in their engagement with the subject; festival programmers and public service broadcasters should respond warmly.
"When I ask somebody where they're from," Hall is quoted as saying near the start of the film, "I expect to be told an extremely long story." Auds unfamiliar with the man widely credited as one of Britain's first major nonwhite intellectuals may need a short one to begin with. Akomfrah is working in a less opaque mode than he was in 2010's avant-garde hybrid doc "The Nine Muses," but his work remains heavier on evocation than information: This "Project" jumps eagerly into Hall's cultural legacy and personal memories, but doesn't offers cursory definitions of such key concepts as British Cultural Studies or some of Hall's most important theories.
Akomfrah is less interested in academic specifics than in the social and environmental reflections of Hall's New Left ideas. Sourcing a remarkable selection of historical archive material covering events both momentous and mundane from the latter half of the 20th century, the film compiles a pictorial scrapbook of a world in rapid social flux, guided by vintage broadcasts of Hall advocating integration and equality. The film's specific historical reference points go no further than the immediate post-Thatcher era of the 1990s, though it might have been interesting to see Akomfrah apply Hall's still-pertinent teachings to the political upheavals of the new century.
Hall's personal journey is frequently woven into this tapestry, including remembrances of his working-class childhood in Jamaica, his own sense of immigrant displacement, and the vocal prejudice he experienced upon marrying a white woman.
It's a lot of material, fluidly edited by Nse Asuquo into a sustained narrative, though the rich illustration has the effect of turning Hall's philosophies into floating soundbites; frequent onscreen chapter headings along the lines of "Minimal Multicultural Selves" and "The Crisis and the Racial Lens," don't do much to illuminate proceedings. The film could hardly fail to sound great, given Akomfrah's decision to score most of it to classic Miles Davis recordings, from "Kind of Blue" to "Bitches' Brew," that Hall himself cites as an inspiration. Still, "My Funny Valentine" isn't the obvious soundtrack to footage of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.


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Mrs. Crawford
Welcome Back!
Welcome back 7/8C!
I hope you all enjoyed your first day back at school. I was glad to see all your smiling faces and am looking forward to having an awesome year with you!
Here are a few reminders about what was discussed today:
1. Grade 7/8 students will have access to his/her own locker this year. We are asking that students bring their own combination lock to the school AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Students will be asked to give a copy of the lock combination to the office and myself (the classroom teacher). Students will put all personal belongings and backpacks in his/her locker and take out only what is needed for the 100mins. of class time. They will be allowed to go to his/her locker for lunch and get the materials needed for the next 100 min. block after each recess.
2. Please remind your son/duaghter that I will be asking that each student keep his/her cell phone and ipod in his/her locker, unless they are being asked to use them for academic purposes.
3. I have sent home a copy of the Classroom Behaviour Expectations Contract that your son/daughter has written and discussed in class. PLEASE READ OVER WITH YOUR SON/DAUGHTER AND BOTH OF YOU NEED TO SIGN IT AND return it to ME as soon as possible.
4. A couple of things students are asked to bring to school are:
-a 1" binder for Language Arts
-pencil crayons
-CALCULATOR – essential for math curriculum
-RUNNING SHOES/CHANGE OF CLOTHES – different from the pair students wear outside (ESPECIALLY this year – the yard will be very muddy at times) – we will be participating in some kind of physical activity almost every day of the week, so a pair of indoor running shoes.
I am looking forward to an exciting year, filled with many new experiences and opportunities.


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Building an app with Combine pt. IIiOS
3 October 2019 | 11:15 | Cookpad Room
The workshop will last for 2 hours and starts at 10:15.
Building an app with Combine pt. IiOS
3 October 2019 | 10:15 | Cookpad Room
In this workshop, you'll learn how to build an app with the Combine framework which is released by Apple during WWDC 2019. Combine allows you to write functional reactive code by providing a declarative Swift API and can be compared to frameworks like RxSwift and ReactiveSwift (formally known as ReactiveCocoa).
The workshop will teach you the basics of Combine, when to use it and when to stick with composition.
After a short presentation which shows all principles of Combine, you will code yourself through a four steps example app which challenges you to complete and reach level 4.
The workshop will last for 2 hours.


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Dates: Tuesday 21st – Wednesday 22rd February 2017
Venue: SAMS (Scottish Marine Institute), Oban
Arts and humanities students and supervisors are invited to participate in this two day co-hosted (COST and SGSAH) inter- disciplinary event that will provide an opportunity to examine the interface between new minority language speakers, cultural entrepreneurship and research good practice in island and remote rural communities. The event seeks to build networks and share knowledge at all levels of research enquiry. With a focus on sharing examples of arts and humanities doctoral research and community policy case studies, participants will experience Scotland's west coast community of Oban and participate in a range of 'walking and talking' research activity as well as key presentations, site visits and round table discussions.
Key themes for the two day event include:
- Sharing good practice on minority language community research engagement and brokerage with particular emphasis on doctoral experiences;
- Inviting a better understanding of the minority language and culture issues facing communities, entrepreneurs, host communities and new minority language speakers and the research potential this offers;
- Drawing on multi-disciplinary and multi-lingual contexts to inform discussions regarding (i) the commodification of minority language and new speakers, (ii) the role of language and cultural enterprise in local and national policy, (iii) 'futureproofing' minority language cultures in 'fragile' and remote places;
- Realising the value of place/language as fluid/living cultural practice and enterprise with key community contributions including poet and writer Norrie Bissell, Isle of Luing, Scotland, and James Harrison representing CultureVannin, Isle of Man;
- Developing a pivoting perspective by which both research undertaken, challenges presented and new questions yet to emerge can be brought forth and offered for review and critique by both new and experienced researchers togethe
Event organisers:
Dr Kathryn A Burnett, University of the West of Scotland email@example.com
Professor Mike Danson, Heriot Watt University firstname.lastname@example.com
Professor Bernadette 0' Rourke, Chair of COST Action IS1306 New Speakers in a Multilingual Europe: Opportunities and Challenges: http://www.cost.eu/domains_actions/isch/Actions/IS1306 firstname.lastname@example.com
Mr Michael Rayner, University of the Highlands and Islands firstname.lastname@example.com
For expressions of interest please contact: Professor Mike Danson firstname.lastname@example.com or Dr Kathryn A Burnett firstname.lastname@example.com. Timetable for Event:
Please note participants must make own arrangements for travel and accommodation.
Programme for event:
Enterprising Culture: Entrepreneurship, Endorsement and Engagement of Minority Language in Europe's Remote Rural and Small Island Communities.
Day One: Tuesday 21st February 2017 SAMS @UHI (Scottish Marine Institute), by Oban
13:30 -14:00 Welcome and Networking Introduction Session: Dr Kathryn Burnett
14:00 -14:30 Thematic Focus 1: Past Research & Key Policy Issues
Researching new minority language, culture and entrepreneurship
Context Setting: Professor Mike Danson, Heriot Watt University on Gaelic
Context Setting: Mr James Harrison, CultureVannin, Isle of Man on Manx
14:30-15:00 Carousel/Brainstorming/ Rotating Review – led by doctoral students
15:00-15:15 Break
15:15-16:00 Sharing doctoral experience on research challenges, good practice andopportunities
Doctoral Researcher – Sara Brennan, Heriot Watt University
Doctoral Researcher – Emma Hill, Heriot Watt University
Doctoral Researcher – Fañch Bihan-Gallic, University of Aberdeen
16:00-16:15 Break
16:15-17:00 New Speakers: a learning context for research training and practice
Doctoral Researcher – Nicola Black, University of the West of Scotland
Doctoral Researcher – Ben Ó Ceallaigh, University of Edinburgh
17:00-17:15 Close and arrangements for Day 2: Community Field Site visit
Day Two: Wednesday 22nd February 2017 SAMS @UHI (Scottish Marine Institute), or alternative venue Oban
09:30-10:30 Meet 9:30 at Corran Halls – Networking Walking Session: Oban with Norman Bissell
10:30-11:00 New Speakers and Minority language: Argyll & Bute Gaelic focus talk: Duncan MacNeil, Furan, Gaelic Centre
11:00-11:30 Break
11:30-12:30 Talk: Norman Bissell, Poet, Writer, Educator and Director of the Scottish Centre for Geopoetics , Isle of Luing. Followed by Q & A
12:30-13:30 Lunch
13:30-14:30 Thematic Focus 2: New Research & Key Policy Questions
Context Setting: Professor Bernie O'Rourke Carousel Brainstorming/ Rotating Review led by doctoral students
14:30-15:00 Network focus event multiplier – Outputs capture – Future Research and Training Collaboration Possibilities
Facilitator: Dr Kathryn A Burnett
15:00-15:30 Close


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Welcome to Domicile 37
At Domicile 37, you will find over the top but simple-to-make crafts, A house full of treasured secondhand finds, and lots and lots of pattern!
Creating things since a young age and designing spaces since college, I now have the opportunity to take my design addiction to another level and share it with all of you. I am a mom to 3 crazy, spirited kids and I am married to a collegiate strength coach. I have a degree in Industrial Design and I minored in Interior Design. Throughout all my adulthood, every career choice I made pointed me to design. I now have the opportunity to share my eclectic sense of style with all of you and design and decorate things along the way.


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Burnt by the Sun Have Played Their Last U.S. Show
Burnt by the Sun frontman Mike Olender is a true Jersey boy. On Oct. 2, the metallic hardcore band's last American show ever, he admitted that his first hardcore show was at the Jersey shore 20 years ago. Visions of Disorder was mentioned in his long last of bands included on that bill.
"Turn off the heat" someone shouted. The Cakeshop, a small basement located in Manhattan's swanky lower east side, was a sauna filled with a medley of big hardcore lovers' sweat. Being the band's only farewell show in the States, it was also a hometown show that included many of their close friend and family members. Bassist Teddy Patterson's father, wife and son were closest to the stage. Patterson's father -- whom Olender mentioned during their set was always supportive of Patterson -- kept bringing the band cups of cold water in between their songs.
"Don't f---ing stop," someone kept shouting. "Hey! We're old. Give us a f---ing break!" Olender said, as his bandmates were tuning their guitars. At 34 years old, Olender is the youngest one in the band.
The highlight of the show came when Aaron Nichols (ex-Kalibas, Defeatist) cannoned through a wall of photographers surrounding the stage. He went straight for a hug from behind to Patterson. A couple of people just thought he was a random crazy fan, because they tried to pull him away. Then he joined the rest of the pushing crowd. Impressively, Nichols kept his glasses on the whole time.
By the end of their set, people were covered in sweat that didn't come from their own bodies. Drummer Dave Witte jogged up the stairs to get some fresh New York air. Well, as fresh as it can be in the congested city, at least.
Brooklyn Vegan and 1,000 Knives set up the special one-time show that also included Torchbearer, Bloodhorse, Tombs and Black Anvil. The previous week, they put together a secret show with New Jersey hardcore vets Rorschach the Charleston at a small basement venue in Brooklyn.


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Egger, Ontario Power Generation land awards at biomass conference
Biomass Magazine and the International Biomass Conference & Expo, currently underway at the Minneapolis Convention Center, have announced this year's recipients of its annual industry awards, which were distributed during a ceremony prior to the April 21 general session.
The Excellence in Bioenergy award was granted to Christiane Egger, deputy manager of O.Ö. Energiesparverband, the energy agency of Upper Austria, and manager of Okoenergie-Cluster, a network of 170 companies active in renewable energy and efficiency. Egger is also vice president of FEDARENE, the European network of regional energy and environment agencies, and is an expert in building energy efficiency, biomass heating and dissemination and promotion of sustainable energy production and use.
Ontario Power Generation was named Groundbreaker of the Year. Its Atikokan Generating Station, the largest 100 percent biomass-fired power plant in North America, was designed to run on lignite coal. A $170 million conversion to wood pellets was completed last summer, and the facility now generates up to 200 MW of renewable power. OPG also successfully converted its Thunder Bay, Ontario, power station to advanced pellets, a facility that is now operated as a peaking station. On site to accept the award for OPG was Biomass Project Director Faron Rollins.


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Why is our training so effective?
After training 1,000's of traders and investors what they discovered, Bob and Mike realized that most trading education has it backwards.
This is how most trader education programs work:
- Learn our system
- Trade that market
- Make money (Hopefully)
This is our trader education program:
- Discover your goals
- Match the right market to you
- Give you the tools to trade that market
- Teach you how create a spiraling learning loop
Why does this method work so well?
Think of a medical student. One has a goal to be a famous surgeon, another wants to be a family practitioner. Each will take the same basic medical courses and specialize later.
They had a goal, received basic medical training and then specialized.
We modeled our 3 step training on that same principle:
1) Step 1: What are your goals with trading?
- Make a living trading
- Focus on your retirement account
- Hedge against a market collapse
- Learn more about the markets
- Or?
2) Step 2: Learn the basic anatomy of the markets
- What causes price movement
- What historical patterns repeat themselves
- What news events should you be aware of
- How to predict and measure future moves
- How to set up your chart
3) Step 3: Help you specialize
- What is the best market for you
- What type of trading do you prefer
- What trading setups/patterns are most comfortable for you
- How to create your personal trading feedback loop
- Give you personal coaching to create your trade plan
Bob Iaccino spent the last 22 years in the commodities, futures and Forex markets.
He is in high demand by various media outlets for his unparalleled understanding of market confidence, tone and trader outlook.
He has appeared on CNBC, CNBC Asia, Bloomberg Television and radio, CNN, CNN International, CNN Moneyline, Fox Business News, First Business (Canada), Phoenix TV (China) and several local television broadcasts throughout the country.
To date, Bob has done over 700 interviews on various economic, political and market-based topics.
He continues to appear in 10-15 live television interviews per month. Bob got his start in 1993 by joining Nikko Securities (Japan's third largest brokerage house at the time) as a phone clerk.
Bob left Nikko in 1997 to serve as Chief Market Strategist for Commerzbank Futures, the brokerage arm of Germany's 4th largest bank at that time.
Bob began distributing his research and insight into the markets to the bank's traders and clients as well as trading his own account.
Bob left Commerzbank in late 2002 to become Chief Market Strategist for a proprietary trading firm based in Chicago, who gave him the opportunity to run his own commodity pool.
This local firm had over 100 traders that relied on Bob's analysis to help them in their daily trading.
During this time, he also gave internal seminars on trading psychology and proper trader disciplines and mindsets.
Bob has also served as a Principal and member of the investment committee for a futures and Forex based Fund of Funds with $84 million in AUM, where his responsibilities included trader-style analysis and manager selection.
He was one half of a 2-person committee charged with discovering "start-up" managers. Bob also served as the Chief Market Strategist for TopstepTrader and Dean of TopstepTrader University's College of Trader development.
He used his extensive trading and analytical experience to give real world insight and direction to individual traders across the globe.
Bob currently serves as the Chief Market Strategist for Tethys Partners, a physical oil firm with transactions in excess of $2 Billion in 2014.
- 25 Year Market Veteran
- Teaching Traders Online and in Person for 10+ Years.
- Strategy and Development Consultant to Multiple Hedge Funds
- Former Options Maker on Multiple Exchanges
- Traded in Chicago, New York and Switzerland
- Current Head of Technology and Trading Systems Development for Path Trading Partners
I became fascinated with trading as a way to make a living about 12 years ago because of a company that promised me I could quit my job if I learned how to trade option spreads. $7,000 in tuition and 6 months later, I never made a dime. I found out later they were shut down by the SEC because their teachers only made money by teaching, not trading.
Fast forward another 12 years: I stumbled upon Bob and Mike's training program offered by a reputable Chicago trading firm, and took another chance. It was expensive, very challenging and took me close to a year to complete. (I was working full time)
These guys are the real deal, living in Chicago and making a living in the markets.
This training made such a profound impact on my life, I made it my mission to see if they were willing to make this training available to a broader audience by turning it into a less expensive monthly membership site. They said yes, with one condition. They are professional traders, both running and advising hedge funds, with Bob as a regular guest commentator on CNN, FOX BUSINESS NEWS, CNBC and other financial networks. They insisted there cannot be any hype in our marketing or training.
Unlike other companies, I can't promise you will retire rich or make Millions next year by joining us. What I can promise you is: Both your financial future and your understanding of the markets will be changed forever if you complete our training. I still get blown away when I draw their lines on my chart, whatever I am trading or investing in just seems to be attracted there. Not always, but with enough consistency that the markets are now a tool for my goals instead of a source of frustration!
Our training program is affordable, it works, it does takes time, and we would love to personally work with you!
Randy Balcom- Founder
Dynamic Price Action ™ is probably unlike anything you have experienced in your trading and investing education so far.
Because Bob and Mike were floor traders in Chicago, they were not looking at charts, just price and order flow on the board. When they had to move to computer screens because the floor was no longer profitable, both Bob and Mike spent 1,000's of hours trying to figure out how to measure order flow on a chart. In the pits, you would get a heads up when the big players were jumping into the market either buying or selling.
While there are many other floor traders that made a successful transition to chart trading, most rely on indicators because they cannot "hear the floor". Bob and Mike figured it out and will teach you how to hear order flow on a chart!
Our program consists of 21 full courses, each of them containing 4-7 video segments about 20-40 minutes long. The Guided Membership and the Professional Trader Membership feature weekly live and recorded webinars that show real life examples and applications of our lessons. Access to trading resources such as calculators and charts are also included in the Membership.
After you log in to Market Masters, you will be taken to a dashboard that provides you with your membership content.
Guided Members: You can access your currently unlocked videos through the "Training Videos" link under Content. More videos will become available over time. (Releases)
Professional Traders: Your videos can be accessed by clicking on the Professional Trader registered Course at the dashboard.
Our Professional Trader Program is also designed for traders who want to replace all or part of their income trading.
Trading Professionally with Other People's Money:
Now there is the ability for knowledgeable traders, no matter what your professional background or education is, to trade other people's money. We work with one firm in particular who helps experienced traders ramp up their income quickly. They are honest, ethical and well funded and will finance anyone who is a reliable and consistent trader.
In fact, even if you have your own money to trade, we have found the discipline required to trade for others will drastically improve your own profits.
How we help you get funded:
Trading professionally requires a trade plan that you created and use every day:
- What to trade?
- What time of day to trade?
- What signals do you use?
- What are your stop loss and profit targets?
- What days of the week to trade?
- When should you stay out of the market?
- What is your daily preparation?
- Want to put in your trade journal?
- How do you test new ideas?
- What kind of market conditions work best for you?
Answers to these questions among many others, need to be part of your trade plan.
Our Professional Trader Course
We designed a course that will teach you how to think like a professional trader, build your trade plan and give you all the tools you need to start making money consistently.
The course is laid out in different units. Each unit builds on the last one, so you will be required to finish each class and take a quiz before moving on to the next one.
Once your quiz has been successfully completed, you will be shown a certificate to download or print. There will be a code towards the bottom of the completion certificate. Please enter that code in the answer section at the bottom of the quiz page. This will allow you to move on to the next unit.
There are required timed quizzes between most units. Please make sure you are completely familiar with the content in that unit before taking the exam. (We strongly recommend watching the videos multiple times)
Plan on 30- 60 minutes to complete the quiz, they are hard!
Webinars and Coaching:
This is the most important part of our course. Each week we host a live coaching session for all of our traders. This is a forum where you can ask questions, get help with quizzes, get feedback on your trade plan, or what ever you need help with. We want to see you succeed and will spend what ever time is needed to get you there.
Personal one on one coaching is also available for a nominal fee.
The average trader will complete the course in 3- 6 months depending on your skill level and time available to study. This will include trading a demo account for 30 days to prove your ability to trade professionally.
Once you feel you are ready, we will introduce you to our funding partner(s) and you can start trading for them!


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Cover & Synopsis: LAGOON by Nnedi Okorafor
Amazon has posted the cover art and synopsis of the upcoming novel Lagoon by Nnedi Okorafor, coming April 2014.
Here's the synopsis (giant cover follows):
Three strangers, each isolated by his or her own problems: Adaora, the marine biologist. Anthony, the rapper famous throughout Africa. Agu, the troubled soldier. Wandering Bar Beach in Lagos, Nigeria's legendary mega-city, they're more alone than they've ever been before.
But when something like a meteorite plunges into the ocean and a tidal wave overcomes them, these three people will find themselves bound together in ways never imagined. Together with Ayodele, a visitor from beyond the stars, they must race through Lagos and against time itself in order to save the city, the world…and themselves.
'There was no time to flee. No time to turn. No time to shriek. And there was no pain. It was like being thrown into the stars.'
Book info as per Amazon US [Also available via Amazon UK]:
- Format: Paperback
- Publisher: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd; Unabridged edition (April 10, 2014)


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On Thursday, June 22nd, 2017, the 18th Dan Nwankwo lecture will be given by Quinn Capers, IV, MD, FAAC, the Associate Dean for Admissions at the Ohio State University College of Medicine. The celebrated annual lecture was established in memory of the late Dr. Daniel Chinedu Nwankwo, an obstetrician and gynecologist and beloved ANPA member, who died on Aug. 16, 1998. The annual lecture was established through a generous endowment by the Nwankwo family and his loving wife, Doris Nwankwo.
The topic of Dr. Capers' lecture will be "Unconscious Bias in Health Care and Medical School Admissions". Also, during the scientific program, on Friday, 23rd June, 2017, Dr, Capers, an interventional cardiologist at the Ohio State Wexner Medical Center, Columbus, OH, will deliver another lecture on "Percutaneous Transradial Artery Catheterization for Coronary Artery Disease"
Dr. Capers' career has expanded from an initial focus on clinical excellence as an interventional cardiologist to include transformative leadership in academic medicine.
Dr. Capers introduced the trans-radial artery technique of coronary stenting to The OSU cardiac catheterization laboratory and has led its transformation to a "radial first" lab. This has been associated with a sustained reduction in complications in all patient populations, especially elderly women and heart attack patients. He has personally performed over 4,000 coronary stent procedures, many in heart attack patients, and is an expert at performing these procedures through the radial artery in the patient's wrist. His physician peers have named him one of America's "Best Doctors" annually from 2009 to 2016, and his patient satisfaction scores placed in the 90th percentile nationally in 2013, 2014, and 2015.
Prior to 2007, The Ohio State University cardiology fellowship training program had never trained an African American physician. Dr. Capers served as the catalyst and leader of a dramatic turnaround resulting in recent fellowship classes at Ohio State that were 25% African American (compared to 4% of cardiology fellows nationwide). He is the senior author on a peer-reviewed publication describing Ohio State cardiology's efforts and currently serves as the co-chair of the American College of Cardiology's Cardiovascular Training Section Working Group on Recruitment Issues.
Named associate dean for admissions in the College of Medicine in 2009, Dr. Capers provides leadership to an admissions committee of 80 MD and PhD faculty members, 50 medical students, 60 faculty application screeners, and a full time staff, and he is recognized as a leader in medical school admissions nationally and locally. As a workshop facilitator for the AAMC, Capers has visited medical schools across the nation to train admissions committees in the holistic review of medical school applicants. Under his leadership, the admissions team at OSU has achieved the following: 1) the total number of applications has increased from ~ 4,000 to nearly 7,000 this year; 2) for the first time in the College's 101 year history, women outnumbered men in the entering classes of 2014, 2015, and 2016—a direct result of Dr. Capers' task force to study strategies to make OSU more attractive to women. Prior to this, the percentage of women in OSU's classes were never higher than 45%; 3) the number of applications from underrepresented minority (URM) students has tripled and the percentage in the entering class has gone from 14% to 26% in 2016, making OSU one of the most diverse majority medical schools in the country; and 4) the average Medical College Admissions Test score of the entering class reached a high point of the 94th percentile in 2012 and has remained steady. Dr. Capers has introduced innovations to reduce bias in the admissions process every year, the most notable being 2012-2013 when all admissions committee members took the Implicit Association Test to uncover hidden racial and gender biases. The year following this exercise, the admissions committee selected the most diverse class in The OSUCOM's history up to that point. He is the primary author on the first study to document the presence and extent of implicit racial bias in medical school admissions.
A Dayton, Ohio native, Dr. Capers graduated with honors from Howard University before obtaining his MD from The Ohio State University. He completed his residency in internal medicine and fellowships in vascular biology research, cardiovascular medicine, and interventional cardiology all at Emory University in Atlanta. Capers and his wife, Cheryl, are the proud parents of three children.
The 18th Dan Nwankwo lecturer has also given a TED talk describing his work on implicit racial bias.


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A very Happy Hello to you where ever you are popping in from..
I have a few things to pop up on here today to share with you!
The card sketch over at FEELING SKETCHY was so enjoyable to create with I did 2 cards! And they are both Christmas cards..
I came across this challenge via Lizzy Hills Blog and how she manages to do so many challenges each month is amazing.. and the challenge site is ONE LITTLE WORD and the word to use this time is fear.. That word means different things to different people, but I am sure we have all experienced it in some form in the cause of our lives.. that doctors appointment, that bill that comes unexpectedly and you wonder how you are gunna pay it, age, and the news we hear on tv, just a few things that spring to my mind.. I found this quote that I have used on my art journal pages that is very fitting to remember in life's storms...
Let your faith be bigger than your fear..
a closer look.. lots of texture.. reminds me of the moon!! hehe!
And the Mid month reveal for the 123 CHALLENGE BLOG has gone up so I can put my layout up and the criteria this month is..
The color is Khaki, the word is emphasise and the technique is hidden journalling.. and my layout ...
and just a little reminder of other challenges happening this month for your inspiration..
SKETCHY BOARDS which is on facebook..
Thanks for coming by, I hope your day is going marvellously well, and thanks so much for any comments too!


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Since the early days of the Syrian uprising in 2011, President Bashar al-Assad's regime has made it a priority to keep state agencies running, allowing Assad to claim that the regime is the irreplaceable provider of essential services. Breaking the regime's monopoly on these public services and enabling the moderate opposition to become an alternative source of them would weaken the regime and prevent the radical jihadist Islamic State from emerging to fill power vacuums across the country.
How the Regime Tightened Its Grip
- Syrians depend heavily on the state for income, essential goods and services, and administrative documents. Once its survival was at stake, the regime intensified efforts to entwine itself with state institutions that provide these necessities.
- The once-sprawling bureaucratic functions of the Syrian state have been consolidated during the war into highly defensible urban power centers under the regime's control.
- To maintain its monopoly on the provision of essential services, the regime destroyed alternative structures that the opposition created in liberated areas.
- The rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State—which has brutally suppressed populations under its control—as the only other entity in Syria able to provide a degree of public administration has reinforced the regime's narrative that it is the sole real option Syrians have if they are to receive essential services.
What International Actors Can Do to Break Assad's Monopoly
Look past a military strategy. The opposition's Western and regional state backers—in particular Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—should move beyond simply providing military assistance to opposition factions and also support the restructuring of armed rebel factions and the political opposition into a more coherent and unified entity that can take on new roles within Syria.
Empower an alternate authority. In areas where the moderate opposition has taken over militarily, opposition groups must be encouraged to carry out the functions of the Syrian state, and they must be supported in those efforts.
Protect state institutions. The regime must be prevented from destroying these institutions—and the opposition's ability to run them—after military forces loyal to Assad withdraw from an area. To accomplish this, the United States and its Western allies should provide air protection from regime attacks after Assad-aligned forces retreat.
In late 2011, world leaders and regional analysts confidently predicted that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime would fall within weeks.1 But in mid-2015, it was still fighting, despite losing control of more than one-half of Syria's territory and struggling to maintain its grip on the remaining areas.
Evidently, military and economic assistance from Iran and Russia has been a critical factor that has helped the regime cling to power. But another key element of the regime's survival has been its ability to claim that the Syrian state, under Assad, has remained the irreplaceable provider of essential public services, even for Syrians living in the many areas that are outside the regime's control. The rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State as the only other entity with the capacity to deliver some basic services has helped the regime to highlight the moderate opposition's inability to do so, reinforcing the regime's claim that its survival is integral to the daily lives of Syrians.
A key element of the Assad regime's survival has been its ability to claim that the Syrian state has remained the irreplaceable provider of essential public services, even for Syrians living in the many areas that are outside the regime's control.
As the popular uprising morphed into armed conflict between 2011 and 2012, the Syrian regime made it a priority to keep state-owned agencies running, and in so doing it has kept Syrians dependent on its rule. Syrians relied heavily on the state before the uprising began and many of them had to do so even more during the conflict. The Syrian state was and remains the country's largest employer. State-owned public agencies are the primary providers of essentials like bread, subsidized fuel, healthcare, and education. Only state-run administrative services can provide Syrians with the documents allowing them to marry, register a property, or travel outside of Syria.
To ensure that Syrians continue to receive these much-needed services, once-sprawling state agencies have been consolidated into highly defensible, urban power centers under the control of forces loyal to Assad. Living in these regime-controlled areas has become a necessity for many Syrians.
Most importantly, the Syrian army ruthlessly targeted and destroyed nascent attempts by the regime's moderate political opposition—the groups seeking to topple the regime and keep the Syrian nation-state intact, whether as a secular democracy or a state in which Islam plays a greater role in politics—to establish its own viable alternative to the regime's provision of essential state functions. At the same time, regime forces largely left the radical jihadist Islamic State unmolested as it built and expanded its own systems of public service provision.
This created an apparent "us or the Islamic State" dichotomy, and in this balance of evils the Assad regime has become, for many, the option they feel compelled to support.
But is the Assad regime truly saving the Syrian state? A closer look at the regime's behavior—and its practice of destroying institutions when it loses control of an area, as occurred in Idlib, in northwestern Syria, in April 2015—suggests that the regime's support for the state is limited to the self-interested goal of holding on to the legitimacy and power that it desperately needs to survive.
As long as the regime is seen as the protector of the Syrian state, a political solution to the crisis will remain impossible. To achieve a breakthrough to this stalemate—and implement an effective strategy to curb the Islamic State—international actors who fear a collapse of the state must end the Assad regime's monopoly over public institutions and allow the moderate opposition to take over state functions in some of the areas under its control. Such action, on the part of both backers of the regime and its opponents, will enhance cooperation between the armed and political elements of the opposition, weaken the regime such that it may be obliged to make compromises in peace negotiations, and prevent the Islamic State from emerging to fill power vacuums across the country.
A State of Survival
The Assad regime and the Syrian state are two distinct but constantly interacting entities. When Hafez al-Assad, the former president of Syria and the father of the current president, captured power through a military coup in 1970, state institutions were already well established with a bureaucracy and infrastructure that could serve most of the country. During his three decades in power, the regime thoroughly infiltrated the state apparatus, particularly its highest ranks, through a network of cronyism and corruption and refashioned state institutions with symbols of the Assad ruling family, adorning government offices with photos of the president and erecting statues of him on public property.
Indeed, throughout more than forty years under the ruling Baath Party, the Assads have constantly blurred the lines between the regime (a collection of informal family, community, religious, and other networks that operate within and outside the institutional framework of the state) and the Syrian state (the apparatus that administers the country and provides services).
Government services underpin much of Syrian life. Administrative offices are the only structures that can issue essential documents and allow Syrians to register newborns and real estate property and access pensions. State-owned universities, schools, and hospitals serve irreplaceable functions for most citizens. Following a tremendous public sector enlargement during the 1970s, the state became the principal employer of Syrians—1.4 million were estimated to be on the government payroll in 2010.2
The regime intensified its efforts to meld itself with these state institutions when the uprising began in early 2011 and the regime saw that its survival was at stake. President Bashar al-Assad has rhetorically tied the regime's destiny to that of the country as a whole, regularly reiterating that his departure from power would cause the breakdown of Syria, while his perseverance through the conflict would allow the state and its institutions to survive, despite the loss of territories to the opposition. As he stated in an interview with the BBC in February 2015: "It wasn't about me to survive, it was about Syria."3
The regime has touted its efforts to keep state institutions running despite the war, frequently implying that the regime is the state. In November 2014, for instance, the minister of higher education praised the accomplishments of the public university system, which had enrolled 650,000 students and graduated more than 50,000 each year, despite the unfolding conflict.4 Two months later, as the western city of Homs confronted an acute gas shortage, the regime lauded the city for its efforts to ensure that state-owned hospitals, bakeries, water treatment plants, and other facilities continued to function.5
How the Regime Consolidated Its Assets
Since the war began, the regime has centralized many of its administrative functions, distributing critical services from the capital cities of Syria's governorates,6 where its affiliated forces are also deployed, rather than from outposts in the countryside, as it had done prior to the uprising. This has encouraged masses of displaced civilians to move to these areas—and reinforced the regime's overall narrative that its paramount task is not protecting itself but protecting the state. The regime has also kept much of the population of opposition-held areas dependent on these strongholds if they are to access services.
These state institutions are well protected by security forces affiliated with the regime. Syria's administrative offices are all located beside regime-held intelligence checkpoints. Government bureaucracy and public administration buildings—including the administrative heads of universities, hospitals, courts, and facilities for obtaining personal documents—are all within the vicinity of the regime's intelligence agencies, including military intelligence, state security, air force intelligence, and political security branches, and Syrians who visit them must pass under the attentive eye of regime security personnel.
Syrian cities with administrative offices have been steadily militarized through the deployment of army divisions and the establishment of military bases. An illuminating example is the regime-held center of Daraa, in southern Syria, where, in 2012, a major sports stadium was converted into a military base from which helicopter attacks could be launched. Similarly, a campsite used by the Baath youth organization (formally called the Baath Vanguards, Taleaa al-Baath) in Idlib was quickly transformed into a military base.
In addition to the regular military forces, locally recruited militias have been widely deployed.7 The regime has directly armed locals and organized them into local popular committees (lijan shabiya). While many people involved may be more motivated by a desire to protect their own neighborhoods than by a wish to affiliate themselves ideologically or politically with the regime, they inevitably contribute to the regime's security effort.
At the same time, the regime has effectively left opposition-held areas tethered to the state's institutions. For instance, people living on the outskirts of Daraa must visit the regime's outpost in the city center to collect official papers and state salaries.
This has already fostered an informal microeconomy, with people transporting salaries and documents from regime- to opposition-held areas in return for conspicuous bribes. Both the enterprising middleman and the government employee dispensing the service—in violation of state policy that the recipient must be present—receive a commission, providing them and their communities with new income and a degree of relative affluence.8
The high concentration of civilians in areas under Assad's control also works to the regime's advantage, as it can create a disincentive for the opposition to attack.
Many civilians have decided to leave their houses and move into relative safe havens under the regime's control. Even opponents of Assad have family members who have fled areas of active conflict for areas under the regime's control, both for safety reasons and to get access to the services that make regime-controlled areas relatively more livable than the rest of the country.9
The high concentration of civilians in areas under Assad's control also works to the regime's advantage, as it can create a disincentive for the opposition to attack.
The high concentration of civilians in areas under Assad's control also works to the regime's advantage, as it can create a disincentive for the opposition to attack. This was exemplified by a 2014 rebel shelling of the Mahatta neighborhood in Daraa.10 The neighborhood was under regime control, but many of the dozens killed in the attack had fled to Mahatta from opposition areas, meaning the attack was, in effect, an attack on the same families that had been providing support to the opposition—and the shelling had the effect of increasing popular support for the regime among staunch supporters of the opposition. This created tension among groups within the local opposition and, according to one opposition activist, made the groups reluctant to carry out further attacks on regime-controlled Daraa.11
Syrians' dependence on the state reaches beyond the country's borders. Until the regime changed its policy in May 2015, Syrian passport holders in neighboring Lebanon, Turkey, or even far away in Europe or the United States were required to mobilize a network inside regime-held cities in order to get their official documents. Some have paid up to $2,000 to renew their passports to be able to travel.12 This fee was not a newly declared, official administrative charge but a bribe distributed among the state employees authorized to produce official passports.
Indeed, it could be said that the regime is compelling support from many Syrians by holding the Syrian state hostage.
But as the conflict stretches on over time, the regime's stranglehold on the state is exhausting its institutional capacity to properly serve the population. Rather than exerting pressure on the regime to compromise, the war increases cronyism and corruption in government institutions, helping the regime to further infiltrate the civil service apparatus and tighten its grip on the Syrian state. The sale of official documents, for example, creates incentives among public servants to remain loyal to the state (to continue collecting bribes), all while encouraging them to issue documents in a selective manner (only to those who are able to pay).
The conflict has also reduced government budgets and forced sharp cuts in subsidies on strategic goods such as bread and diesel fuel, meaning that, even in regime-held areas, in the near future they risk becoming difficult to find, more expensive, and accessible only to those who are willing to bribe regime personnel in offices charged with distributing these goods.13 Millions of ordinary families still depend on those subsidies—a cornerstone of the social contract between Syrians and their state—and they are increasingly becoming involved in the regime's corrupt logic.
The regime's use of the state as a weapon has another destructive effect on the state itself. In Wadi Barada, on the outskirts of Damascus, the government continued to pay teachers' salaries and supply educational materials to local communities even after the area had fallen into rebel control. Yet it performed these state functions in a discriminatory manner, firing all teachers active in the opposition and arresting any students who had been active in the opposition as they were leaving Wadi Barada and other towns to take their secondary school exams. Using the state as a weapon in this manner deprives the state of its qualified employees, impairing its long-term functioning.14
The Case of Deir Ezzor
Beyond centralizing the organs of the state from the countryside into urban areas, the regime has also moved its institutions within cities, shifting them to neighborhoods that remain firmly under regime control. In Deir Ezzor, a town in eastern Syria populated by Arab tribes that has a history of opposition to Assad, the regime has succeeded in mobilizing residents to defend the portion of the city it holds—the portion of the city where state institutions have also been relocated and services are now provided.
Before the uprising, most state institutions were housed in the central neighborhood of Dawar al-Tamween, and the middle class lived primarily in the neighborhood of Howeika. Between June 2012 and early 2013, when these two neighborhoods fell under rebel control, the regime moved its administrative offices to the middle- and lower-middle-class neighborhood of Joura (see map). The demography of the city shifted as well, with many former residents of Howeika and affluent areas in surrounding towns streaming into the district.
At one point, the battle for control of Deir Ezzor threatened to push regime forces out of the city entirely. In what a Syrian army officer said was a sign of how important it was for the regime to maintain an administrative presence in Syria's east, in June 2012 Assad even sent the elite, Damascus-based Republican Guard to help defend the regime-held quarters of Deir Ezzor—this, when many observers had assumed that the regime would be willing to abandon the region wholesale.15 After fierce clashes with the opposition in late 2012, the regime fully established neighborhood services in Joura to provide for the entire city, and it has kept them secure through its security branches and major military complexes. By the end of 2013, with Joura protected, Assad's forces had regained their footing.
The advances of the so-called Islamic State in Deir Ezzor and the surrounding countryside in December 2014 did not discourage the regime from staunchly defending these areas. The highly protected Joura neighborhood is the regime's center of resistance against the group, offering citizens services despite the unfolding battle. Hundreds of thousands of people have moved to these areas from both within the city and the countryside, as well as from Islamic State–controlled Raqqa, in the north.16 The regime's counterinsurgency strategy went as far as organizing and training Sunni Arab tribes in Deir Ezzor to defend Joura and prevent Islamic State advances from the countryside into the neighborhood.17
By mobilizing locals on behalf of the state, the regime sheltered its strategic hub from attack. The regime has also praised locals in their efforts to defend the city. The minister of justice, originally from Deir Ezzor, visited the city in July 2014, and, in a speech, he lauded the sons of Deir Ezzor for their efforts in protecting the national interest.18
In addition, major tribal leaders from the region, along with important figures from the area, such as the local mufti and the heads of the university and local Red Crescent society, attended a conference in Damascus in August 2014 to condemn the Islamic State and proclaim their commitment to fighting it.19 Regardless of whether they personally oppose or support the regime, these leaders have a vested interest in defeating the Islamic State and buttressing the city and state services upon which they depend. For them, this is the only alternative to the Islamic State—a group whose spectacular brutality in suppressing the populations under its control is well known and widely feared, even by those who have been at war for four years.
Preventing Alternatives
What is widely known as the moderate Syrian opposition is actually an array of different political and military groups that operate with various degrees of independence from, cooperation with, and antagonism toward one another. Many claim an affiliation with the label of the Free Syrian Army, with perhaps the most defining characteristic of the moderate Syrian opposition being what it is not: neither the regime nor religious extremists bent on waging global holy war.
Even given the elusive definition, fractured nature, and associated weaknesses of the moderate Syrian opposition, it poses the most significant threat to Assad's rule, which may help explain why it is here that the regime has directed its most punishing military campaigns. The regime's intense pressure on the moderate opposition has played a significant role in keeping it divided and unable to implement a unified approach to local administration and service provision across the regions of the country it controls.
The regime's intense pressure on the moderate opposition has played a significant role in keeping it divided and unable to implement a unified approach to local administration and service provision across the regions of the country it controls.
Besides the moderate opposition, two groups in Syria have achieved differing degrees of semiautonomy: the Kurds—led by Syria's Democratic Union Party (PYD) and offshoots of Turkey's Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)—and the Islamic State. These two groups have been better organized and more powerful in the areas they hold than the more moderate rebel groups, and thus they have had some success in building parallel governance and service systems.
Yet both the Kurds and the Islamic State have a shaky foundation: the populations they govern still rely on many services provided by the state.
Destroying Aleppo's Experiment
Prior to the uprising, the most affluent neighborhoods in Aleppo—then and still Syria's most populous city—were found in its western sections. As protests morphed into armed conflict and rebel fighters closed in on the city, many of its wealthy residents left. By the end of 2012, opposition forces had secured control over eastern Aleppo, and, thanks to the support of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and foreign donors, this area flourished to such an extent that Aleppines were coming from the regime-controlled part of the city to buy food and supplies.
The opposition set up embryonic governance structures, establishing a council for the Aleppo Governorate (majlis mohafazat halab) and a city council (majlis madinat halab). These institutions effectively provided water, electricity, and trash removal services, while local groups organized new aid institutions to dispense food and medical supplies and conduct basic rebuilding projects.20 In spite of continued clashes between the regime and rebels, the eastern region under opposition control became viewed as a safe and desirable place to live, so much so that people from surrounding areas began to flock to it. A common refrain in comparing western and eastern Aleppo at the time was that, in the east, "There is life" (fee hayat). By early 2013, the population in the east had reached as many as 1.5 million people.21
The regime's subsequent bombing campaign, however, put a decisive end to these developments. In the latter half of 2013, the Syrian regime began raining "barrels of death" (baramel al-mawt)—oil drums filled with explosives and shrapnel that are typically dropped from helicopters—over eastern Aleppo. It is difficult to determine exactly what the attacks were targeting—civilians, infrastructure, or military positions—due to both the notorious inaccuracy of barrel bombing and the limited information available in a war context.
The effects, however, went well beyond the immediate toll of death and destruction: the attacks devastated efforts to reestablish a sense of normal life in eastern Aleppo, with an estimated 600,000 residents fleeing opposition sections of the city over the course of three months.22 The NGOs and foreign donors quickly shelved their rebuilding and development projects out of fear that their work and personnel would be harmed,23 while the bombing campaign also chased away many of the skilled bureaucrats who had been employed by the newly established opposition governorate and city council.24
In parallel, the regime closed the crossing from the west to the east; since then, going from one side of Aleppo to another has required leaving the city in order to circle part of it, getting on the road to Hama, and entering back through another entrance, passing through a combination of more than 40 government and opposition checkpoints.25
The local administrations set up by the opposition were thus hampered, and their ability to provide services and help meet people's daily needs destroyed. The barrel bombing severed the means by which Syrians in Aleppo could receive public services from an alternative political authority, one that could also facilitate reconstruction outside the aegis of the regime.26 The effects on eastern Aleppo are clear enough today: people who remain in the city say garbage sits piled on the streets and the smell of death permeates the air. Rebel forces continue to operate from the area, but the regime's tactics have effectively prevented the sections of Aleppo that are outside of its control from developing into viable alternatives to its authority.
The Siege of Eastern Ghouta
Douma is another rebel-held city that had some temporary success in providing a credible administrative alternative. The suburb is just 10 kilometers (about 6 miles) from Damascus in the Eastern Ghouta region that forms the outskirts of the capital. Rather than relying on barrel bombing as in Aleppo, in the fall of 2013 Syrian regime forces surrounded Douma, cutting off access and launching attacks from the periphery, effectively enforcing a siege of the area.
Earlier in 2013, Douma leaders and civil servants who defected from the regime created a reasonably efficient local service council providing some services autonomously from the regime, including street cleaning, the regulation of real estate contracts, and the issuance of birth and death certificates. While their administration often employed Islamic phrases and symbols, it was moderate and its services were widely used by local residents.27 The suburb became an administrative center for opposition-held Eastern Ghouta. This was possible in large part because Douma had been the capital of the Rif Dimashq Governorate, giving it both the facilities and local civil servants necessary to perform such functions independently of Damascus.
Douma's drive to create a functioning administration was spurred by the fact that it has no open border with a neighboring country. This meant that local groups in the region were forced to negotiate with and rely on each other to achieve any progress. By contrast, in opposition areas in northern Syria along the Turkish border, opposition figures can simply cross into Turkey and seek out financial support to pursue their projects independently, creating a much more chaotic environment.
The siege of Douma, however, slowly drained the city's ability to develop as a thriving center where civilians could live without some of the services supplied by the regime. People from elsewhere were unable to enter Douma, and locals could not reach Damascus to collect salaries and official paperwork.28
In spite of this, the city of Douma has remained a nominal base of operations for both opposition fighters and civilian services. The local service council has been functioning since early 2013, while a military council led by Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), the strongest rebel faction in Eastern Ghouta, manages security affairs. Douma is limited, however, in both its military and administrative capabilities. Former civil servants perform some public services that had been provided by the government, but these do not extend beyond minimal tasks.29
The impact of the regime's siege and sporadic bombing campaigns has been to make survival—simply avoiding death and finding food and shelter—the primary concern of Doumanis. Douma is nearly unrecognizable after two years of siege. Jaysh al-Islam and allied rebel factions have maintained physical control over much of the area but, because of the siege, they have been unable to provide electricity, bread, medicine, education, communication, or even heating oil for the winter. This has severely eroded support among the local civilian population for the armed opposition, even if it has been the regime's siege that has cut off local access to services.30
By forcing Doumanis to focus on survival,31 the regime has rendered the more bureaucratic functions of the alternative state, like real estate documents and marriage licenses, irrelevant.
The result in Douma has been similar to that in eastern Aleppo—it has not been possible to establish a viable alternative to the Syrian state.
Controlled Autonomy in the Kurdish Areas
Part of the regime's strength in maintaining the functions of a state comes from the flexible approach it takes toward its rivals. While it has taken pains to destroy and deny the moderate opposition's efforts to provide services, with the Kurdish enclaves in Syria's northeast, it has been content to maintain only a strategic military and administrative foothold. This has freed up Assad's military forces to focus on fighting the opposition, while allowing the regime to continue to provide official documents and other administrative services, reminding residents that it is still an influential presence upon which they depend.
Syria's Kurds have long been marginalized by the Syrian regime; hundreds of thousands of Kurds were stripped of their citizenship and the regime forcefully repressed a Kurdish uprising in 2004. But a slow process of recognizing cultural rights that began in 2010 was quickened with the outbreak of the Syrian crisis the following year, with the regime reversing its citizenship policy.32 As the war has continued, the regime has made further conciliatory moves toward the Kurds.
In July 2012, the regime withdrew most of its forces from Kurdish-populated areas while maintaining several security and military bases and administrative offices. Since this withdrawal, the PYD, the dominant Kurdish party in Syria, has established independent, self-governing political units in the Kurdish-majority areas in the north of the country. The PYD has undeniably succeeded in becoming the dominant military and security force in the eastern Jazira region near the Iraqi border, as well as in the two Kurdish towns adjacent to greater Aleppo, Afrin and Kobane. The party has also succeeded in becoming the provider of basic needs—it subsidizes crops for farmers and provides water and electricity.
While the Jazira region is the heartland of the PYD, certain areas remain firmly under regime control. The capital of the easternmost province, Hasakah, is completely held by the regime. Though police disappeared from the streets of the second-largest town of Qamishli upon the regime's retreat, regime security forces have retained a presence in a local military complex.33 This security area also houses the major hospital for the city and surrounding towns and villages.
It is the regime that still issues important paperwork such as passports and school certificates in the Jazira region. It also manages flights from the still-functioning (and regime-controlled) airport in Qamishli. This duality in governance reminds locals that while the PYD may be ruling their area, the party is unable to provide some of the most crucial state functions that would give the Kurdish experiment in semiautonomy lasting legitimacy.
The strange combination of minimal regime military presence and continued administrative service provision reflects a stalemate between the PYD and the regime. Though it is presumably in the PYD's interest to get rid of the security forces and provide all services itself, a fight to displace the regime would cripple state institutions. These bureaucratic and administrative functions of the state are vital to Kurdish inhabitants in the region, on whose support the PYD depends. The Assad regime, perhaps cognizant of this fact, has allowed this odd arrangement to continue. This does not seem to be lost on local residents; a running joke in Qamishli is that the regime could withdraw from Qardaha (Assad's hometown, considered the heart of the regime's popular support) tomorrow, but even then it would not withdraw from Qamishli.
The Islamic State: Cultivating a Distasteful Alternative
There is one group the regime has comparatively left alone to build its own independent administration—the Islamic State. The Islamic State's expansion has benefited the regime by undermining other opposition groups, while also strengthening the idea that only the regime can save Syria and Syrians from this fanatic alternative.
The Islamic State emerged onto the international stage in 2013. It progressively made territorial gains—mostly at the expense of other opposition groups—without encountering regime resistance. Even the Islamic State's spectacular takeover of Raqqa, a governorate capital and an opposition stronghold, in early 2014 did not trigger a military response from the regime. As soon as the Islamic State seized the city from the armed opposition, it promoted Raqqa as a symbol of its power and a demonstration of its project to establish an Islamic caliphate (dawlat al-khelafeh). This confirmed many Syrians' worst fears that the group intended to establish its own tyrannical version of a state.
The Islamic State's expansion has benefited the regime by undermining other opposition groups, while also strengthening the idea that only the regime can save Syria and Syrians from this fanatic alternative.
And, unimpeded by the barrel bombs and sieges that decimated grassroots organizations in Aleppo and Eastern Ghouta, the organization quickly acted on its promises to provide an administrative alternative. Perhaps most significantly to locals early on, it established a court system and imposed laws. For example, morality police (hesba) began monitoring price controls to keep the costs of everything from foodstuffs to medical operations at reasonable levels. The group created a real sense of governmental rule for residents. By late 2014, Raqqa was known as the capital of the Islamic State; the moderate opposition never bestowed that label on any of the cities it controlled, nor was it able to create the same sense of a military and administrative stronghold.
But the Islamic State's alternative capital is one where executions are carried out in public and bodies are hung in the street. This unmatched barbarity has played directly into the regime's hands, by highlighting what an alternative to Assad would mean, both to Syrians and the international community.
While there is no definitive proof that the regime had a long-calculated plan to enable the Islamic State's expansion, several incidents suggest that Assad at least capitalized on the opportunity the Islamic State created. The regime never subjected Raqqa to the same level of air raids that devastated other rebel-held areas. Though Raqqa was first held by other groups, there was always an Islamist presence, and the regime has long been suspected of encouraging that presence to undermine the moderate political opposition. This was most clear, perhaps, early in the uprising, when the regime released from prison dozens of prominent Islamist fighters, who then quickly joined and became leaders in the most hard-line ranks of the armed opposition.34
The events in Raqqa also illustrate the importance of administrative centers to the regime's strategy of holding state institutions. After losing control of the city in the spring of 2013, the regime withdrew in the summer of 2014 from the nearby Tabqa air base and from the headquarters of the Syrian army's Seventeenth Division. Even though Tabqa had been an important base for launching air strikes in eastern Syria, once the provincial capital was lost and the regime was unable to impose administrative influence over the province, Assad's forces abandoned these facilities.
In contrast, the regime has been holding its ground and fighting desperately to keep the Deir Ezzor air base since 2011, even after the Islamic State gained control of all the territory around the city in 2014. Until February 2015, the regime's control of the city center allowed it to maintain administrative dominance, and it continued to pay the salaries of state employees in areas under Islamic State control. Since then, however, the Islamic State's siege of Deir Ezzor has prevented state employees outside Deir Ezzor from reaching regime-controlled areas to collect their pay.
In Raqqa, Assad's forces may well be allowing the U.S.-led international coalition against the Islamic State to do the regime's work. Similar to the way in which the regime's bombing campaigns weakened the efficacy of rebel rule, the coalition air strikes have caused military and economic strains that have limited the Islamic State's ability to govern. The regime has primed itself to move in, not only militarily but administratively, should the Islamic State be sufficiently weakened. Signs of this are already apparent on the ground. By the end of 2013, the pro-Assad paramilitary National Defense Forces had established a group outside Raqqa in Athria, a small city on the road to Homs, apparently waiting to conduct an offensive against Raqqa should the opportunity arise. In parallel, the regime has also created a kind of provincial administration-in-waiting, hosting Raqqa's most prominent tribal leaders in the capital. These preparations indicate how important it is to the regime not just to assert military control, should the Islamic State be routed from Raqqa, but also to reestablish administrative relevance.35
The Assad Regime Clings to Power
The Syrian state is the Assad regime's greatest resource. A monopoly over state institutions has given the regime the ability to claim that it is the only entity serving Syrian citizens and to deprive the moderate opposition of legitimacy. Despite four years of war, the regime's grip on the state has enabled it to force Syrians and the international community alike to deal with it as the country's legitimate political authority and to accept the idea that the Assad regime is actually the Syrian state. In other words, the continued access to state-administered services only in areas held by forces loyal to Assad has strengthened Syrians' perceptions that the state exists only where the regime is present. And the international community is fearful that a collapse of the Assad regime could entail the breakdown of the state altogether—and even worse, empower the Islamic State's expansion.
At the same time, Syria's political opposition today is a fractured mess located almost entirely outside the country and with almost no legitimacy on the ground in Syria, even in the few areas in which moderate armed opposition groups still operate. The international community and Syrians themselves are increasingly speaking as if the conflict has come down to a choice between two bad options—that as abhorrent as the Assad regime may be, a future Syria under it is still preferable to one in which the Islamic State and its radical jihadist ideology are ruling a functional caliphate in the heart of the Middle East.
Syria's political opposition today is a fractured mess located almost entirely outside the country and with almost no legitimacy on the ground in Syria.
But this is a skewed perspective of the situation. The Assad regime will not save the Syrian state. Since the conflict began, the regime has continued to protect public buildings or provide services only as far as this helped to maintain its legitimacy. As soon as the opposition has gained ground, seizing public buildings and attempting to serve in the same role, the regime has responded by bombing the very institutions it worked so hard to protect.
In eastern Aleppo, for example, the regime bombed schools and hospitals, in addition to agencies established by the opposition to administer and provide services to Syrians living outside the regime's control.36
More recently, after rebel forces captured the northern province of Idlib and its capital city in April–May 2015, regime forces used barrel bombing to destroy the national hospital and the governorate building as well as the Red Crescent office, preventing any alternative entity from being able to run these state institutions.37 A similar scenario could occur in Daraa, whose outskirts are in opposition control, with the regime only maintaining a hold on the center of the city.
In this way, the regime's loss of territory to the opposition will only tighten its monopoly over the state, further tie the population to its rule, and diminish the ability of state institutions to serve their intended functions.
In addition, as the regime falls short of resources, it will increasingly tie access to state services to loyalty to the regime, allowing only those who are involved in its corrupted network to benefit from service provision. This will eventually bind even more Syrian citizens to the regime, while leaving a large portion of the rest essentially stateless or under the control of the Islamic State.
An example of this trend was evident in May 2015, when the regime issued a new decree allowing Syrians living outside the country to renew their passports in foreign consular offices for $400, which will directly feed into the Damascus treasury. In addition to paying the costly fees, which many cannot afford, Syrians who want to obtain a new passport must undertake endless bureaucratic procedures, which can only be accelerated by bribing the consular staff.38
All in all, the regime is poised to increasingly manipulate access to state services, consigning Syrians to comply with its rule if they wish to receive education, health assistance, travel documents, or any other of the most fundamental services.
Saving the Syrian State
To prevent the Assad regime from tightening its grip even further, an alternate entity must be empowered to administer the Syrian state. In areas where the moderate opposition has taken over militarily, opposition groups must be encouraged to carry out those functions and supported in those efforts. At the same time, the regime must be prevented from destroying these institutions—and the opposition's ability to run them once military forces loyal to Assad withdraw from an area. These two steps must be pursued simultaneously.
The first requires that the opposition's Western and regional state backers (in particular Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) pursue a strategy that goes beyond simply providing military assistance to opposition factions and also supports the transition and restructuring of these armed factions and the political opposition into a more coherent and unified entity. Such an approach would include helping the political opposition to reestablish state institutions in territories outside the regime's control. This would help reinforce the political opposition ties' with the armed groups, which both have an interest in reinstating these services to reinvigorate their legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.
To prevent the Assad regime from tightening its grip even further, an alternate entity must be empowered to administer the Syrian state.
This can only happen, however, if the second step is taken and these areas are afforded some degree of protection from the ability of the regime's air forces to bomb them out of existence. To accomplish this, the United States and its Western allies should provide air protection from regime attacks in areas held by the opposition.
Taken together, such policies would establish much-needed coordination between Syria's armed and political opposition, enable the opposition to end the regime's monopoly on state service provision, and disassociate the regime from the state—allowing the state to be upheld even as the regime retracts and preventing the emergence of vacuums prone to exploitation by the Islamic State or other extremist groups.
All of this would help set the conditions for a political settlement to the conflict. A viable alternative to the Assad regime as a provider of basic services would weaken the regime's fundamental claim to legitimacy in the eyes of Syrians—both in areas it controls and areas controlled by the opposition—and the international community. From this weakened bargaining position, the regime would be far more willing to make concessions at the negotiating table that it has, to date, refused to make.
While many Syrians and interested foreign powers would like to see the end of the Assad regime, few—whether supporters of the regime or the opposition—want to see the erosion of the Syrian state. However, this is almost assured if the Assad regime's stranglehold on state institutions is allowed to continue.
1 See "Barak: Fall of Assad Would Be a 'Blessing' for ME," Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2011, www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Barak-Fall-of-Assad-would-be-a-blessing-for-ME.
2 Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010 Census, www.cbssyr.sy/yearbook/2011/Data-Chapter3/TAB-4-3-2011.htm.
3 Bashar al-Assad, interview by Jeremy Bowen, BBC News, February 10, 2015, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31327153.
4 Dr. Mohammad Mardini, minister of higher education, interview on "From the End" program on the official Syrian TV station, December 7, 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=9x6Suf4nLiE.
5 Talal al-Barazi, Homs governor, interview on "From the end" program, on the official Syrian TV station, January 18, 2015,
6 This comprises twelve cities in Syria's fourteen governorates, as well as the city of Qamishli in Hasakah Governorate in the country's northeast. The cities of Raqqa and Douma are administrative centers on paper, but because they are held by actors other than the Syrian government, they are not currently functioning as centers on the ground. Qamishli, though not a governorate capital on paper, is performing all of the functions of one.
7 The regime has both used existing forces and created new local forces to protect its institutions and monitor society. See "Syrians Are Organizing Themselves to Protect the State Institutions and Their Residential Neighborhoods," Syriasteps, September 8, 2013, www.syriasteps.com/index.php?d=110&id=109546.
8 Author interview with Saraqeb resident, Gaziantep, Turkey, May 2014.
9 Author interview with an employee of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Beirut, Lebanon, July 2014. In an interview with the BBC, Bashar al-Assad stated that "families of those [opposition] fighters, they came to the government in order to have refuge, not vice versa. You can go now and see where they live and who takes care of them. . . . Most of the areas where the rebels take over, the civilians flee and come to our areas. . . . The natural reaction of any person, of the people, of the families, of the population, is to flee from any area where they expect a conflict. . . . And they come to the government." See Bashar al-Assad, interview by Jeremy Bowen.
10 See "At Least 20 Killed in Syria by Mortar Fire at Election Rally in Support of Bashar al-Assad," Daily Mail Online, May 23, 2014, http://dailym.ai/1JJjuQs.
11 From an interview with a Daraa resident and activist (via Skype), October 2014.
12 Mohammed al-Khatieb, "For Syrians, Passports Are Solid Gold," Syria Deeply, November 11, 2013, www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2013/11/2583/syrians-passports-solid-gold.
13 Syria: Alienation and Violence: Impact of Syria Crisis Report 2014, Syrian Center for Policy Research, March 2015, http://scpr-syria.org/att/SCPR_Alienation_Violence_Report_2014_EN.pdf.
14 Author telephone interview with Wadi Barada resident and Free Syrian Army member, December 2014.
15 Author telephone interview with Syrian army officer, May 2014.
16 Author interview with Red Crescent staff, January 2015.
17 "Volunteers With the Syrian Army to Fight Against Daesh in Deir al-Zour Province," Almayadeen TV, December 24, 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8dXaBhNOTI.
18 Syrian Official TV, "The Minister of Justice Visited Deir az-Zour and Declared That Syria Continues to Confront Terrorism," July 18, 2014,
19 "Tribal Leaders of Deir az-Zour Assert Their Stance Against Terrorism in All of Its Forms," SANA, August 10, 2014,
20 Press conference by the opposition governor of Aleppo. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=makVa05xRDc.
21 Author interview with nongovernmental organization employee working in eastern Aleppo, Beirut, Lebanon, June 2014.
22 See "Potential Death Falling From the Sky," Violation Documentation Center in Syria, March 2014, www.vdc-sy.info/pdf/reports/1394885517-Arabic.pdf.
23 Author interview with a former director of an Aleppo-based nongovernmental organization supported by a Western donor, Gaziantep, Turkey, May 2014.
24 Author interview with former government and later local council employee in Aleppo, Gaziantep, Turkey, May 2014.
25 Author interview with former government employee (via Skype), August 2014.
26 Author phone interview with United Nations staff, August 2014.
27 Author interview with Red Crescent employee in Beirut, April 2014.
28 Author telephone interview with an employer in Damascus, October 2014.
29 Author interview with Douma resident (via Skype), April 2014.
30 Ibid.
31 One Doumani recently sold his entire house for $700 in order to buy food for his family. See "Home Is Sold for $700 to Buy Food," All4Syria.com, February 20, 2015, http://all4syria.info/Archive/194854.
32 "Damascus, the First Public Celebration of Nowruz," Al Jazeera Arabic, March 21, 2010,
33 Several Skype interviews in 2014 with Kurdish employees at Syrian state institutions, who confirmed that the Syrian government still regularly paid salaries for thousands of employees, though these had to be collected in either the city of Hasakah or Qamishli.
34 "President Bashar al-Assad of Syria Issued a Decree Granting a General Amnesty for All Crimes," Thawra, June 1, 2011 http://thawra.sy/_print_veiw.asp?FileName=28081056820110601020853.
35 Author phone interview with National Defense Forces fighter, April 2015.
36 On Aleppo see "Aleppo: At Least Nine Dead After Syrian Army Airstrike 'Targeted School,'" Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, April 19, 2015.
37 On Idlib see Al-Araby al-Jadid, "The Syrian Opposition Challenges Administration of Idlib," May 25, 2015, http://bit.ly/1IVdKC6.
38 See "Regime Increases Passport Renewal Fees for Syrians Abroad," Syrian Observer, April 23, 2015.


text:
Fees and ProceduresA one-time administration fee of $25.00, plus a $50.00 annual membership fee must accompany each application. All accepted candidates will enjoy all the rights and privileges appertaining to their credential status which includes all conferences and functions of the E.A. and will be kept informed of such activities.
Credential applications can be filled online or downloaded from this website and mail to:
Evangelical Association
Dr. Rondo Thomasr
300 Water Street
Whitby Ontario, L1N 9B6
Tel: (416) 391-5000
Or an application may be picked up in person at the above address or we can send it by mail.
Phone (416) 391-5000
Fax: (416) 391-3969
- • Fill up form online or in print
- • Include required documents
- • Interview by Dr. Thomas and/or panel of interviewers
What Should I Expect If Approved?
After the council has approved your application for credentials and is satisfied as to your gifts and calling, the council will designate a day for the special occasion of bestowing the credential approved. This will be done in a divine service and in a decent and orderly fashion, and with due regard for the significance of the occasion, setting the candidate apart for the Gospel Ministry.
The question uppermost in considering an applicant for membership is not the number of college and seminary degrees he/she may have, but: "Is the applicant's daily life a convincing testimony as to his/her having been born again? Is there evidence of a genuine call to ministry and a God given ability to preach or carry out the Gospel work in such a way as to win souls to Christ?"
On the other hand, we place no premium on ignorance and urge all Christian workers to qualify themselves for God's work as fully as they possibly can. For this reason, Canada Christian College has extended itself to all who wish to prepare themselves for the work of the Lord.
The Ordination: Held twice a year.
First week of June and first week of December
You will be ordained/bestowed credentials accordingly or to which between the 2 ordinations date you are available. You have the privilege to invite your family, friends and church members to witness the work of God and be encourage by the continuance in building His kingdom.


text:
Thursday, January 05, 2006
Preditors and Editors Readers Poll
3 comments:
- John said...
A closer look at this site reveals that it is written and posted by just one very unsuccessful science fiction/fantasy author Dave Kuzminski AKA "The Butterfly".
Following Victoria Strauss's Sci Fi book promotion methods in her volunteer writers beware page or did she copy Dave's methods first? Both are self appointed writing scam "experts" without any independent over the shoulder type of fact checking or supervision. Some of their "scam reports" are nothing more than false rumors they started in writer discussion pages and blogs. Each are masters of intimidation and use pen names to post additional comments quickly to contradict and bury any opposing comments in their discussion boards, forums and blogs.
It has been proven that they both have knowingly posted false statements in their listings. Possibly to take vengeance on some publishers and agents that have rejected them personally or possibly for income through extortion or protection schemes as some companies have reported. Yet since they are accurate about 9 times out of 10, few writers ever become aware of their false statements, and most believe their propaganda.
Both appear to work full time obsessively to post information on the Internet to the writers community to support their vague accusations on their web site "reports" (while neither writer follows journalistic standards or convention for reporting the who, what, where, when and why facts). Working together they often begin topic threads to reinforce each others misinformation and work to publicize each of their Sci Fi novels. Both misrepresent themselves as scam busting heroes to the writers community, when in fact it is merely their platform to manipulate and deceive naïve writers with their own book sales and profiting schemes.
A fascinating piece of fiction you have here. For anyone who's interested in figuring out just how false the information above really is, I recommend carefully and thoroughly reading EVERYTHING posted on the Writer Beware website. Then, do a little fact checking of your own. There's quite probably sufficient information provided there to do a thorough investigation of your own.
Once you do, dear readers, I'm certain that only the most gullible of you will fall for the tripe written above.
No one's buying it, John.
Sorry. No, really, I am.
Mean people are punished by God even when the courts fail in thier duties.