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Welcome to another edition of the "Rear Guard" Security Podcast. In this episode we're going to be discussing the problem with cyberwar.
Cyberwar was originally known as "information warfare" and burst on the InfoSec scene in 1994 when Winn Schwartau published a book entitled "Information Warfare." It was a fun book and it read like a cheap novel - partly because it was, pretty much, a cheap novel. There was a lot of exciting stuff in there about HERF guns, Van Eyck monitoring, bringing down aircraft, cyberterrorism, and so on. It struck a chord in the computer security community because the Soviet Union had just collapsed and there was a sense of "realignment of mission" in the intelligence community. There were beltway bandits looking for how to spend the "peace dividend." Meanwhile, the computer security community was just beginning to wake up to the fact that we were building critical infrastructure that was vulnerable to certain attacks that could potentially lead to loss of life or tremendously expensive damage.
The concept of cyberwar originally started off from a perspective of terrorist activities or a state attacking another state using electronic means in accordance with Winn's book. And since that time we really didn't see very much of it actually happening. One of the reasons that the topic of cyberwar is confusing is that there are multiple different concepts that get conflated underneath the umbrella of cyberwar, specifically cybercrime, cyberterror, cyberespionage, and cyberwar. When you talk to someone about cyberwar and you say, "thus and such really isn't a problem," they'll say, "Well, what about the attacks that were launched against Estonia in late 2007 which basically brought the government down? That was cyberwar." No, actually, it really wasn't. It was later proven that the Russian Republic was not behind those attacks, it was a disgruntled individual who had a large botnet.
It is an interesting problem when something that appear to be "cyberwar" is later revealed to be a single disgruntled individual. Whether or not an individual can declare war on a country meaningfully is a really interesting question, but we're not going to try to address that here. For the purposes of today's discussion, when we're talking about warfare, we're talking about warfare in the classical sense, which is two nation states engaging in some kind of combat operations against each other. There's a possible fourth axis here and I don't really know what to call it. My friend Paul Robertson likes to refer to it as "economic spoiling operations" - in which one nation might deliberately damage another's economy through electronic or other means simply as a way of dragging them back a little bit to clear a niche for them to move ahead. That sort of spoiling operation also doesn't fall under the rubric of cyberwarfare because really we're talking about in a warfare context, we're talking about military operations, which, as Von Clausewitz would say, are politics by other means. It's the extension of state versus state political activity moved into cyberspace.
Mao, when he wrote his famous treatise on guerrilla warfare, got this correct. He said that "guerrilla warfare is not useful in the absence of a political agenda." I'm reminded of back in the late 1980s when you had organizations, the terrorist organizations like the Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigades, which I don't think you can really say were going to seriously affect the political lives of any of the people on the receiving end of their attentions. They were just sort of random crazies who were out there attached to an ideology causing trouble. That's another aspect of this fourth axis that we're not going to talk about much today and that looks something like this: What if some crazy individual who has deep knowledge of computers decides for whatever individual reason that he is going to declare war personally on a superpower and prosecute that war? Kind of a cyberKaczynski, if you will, or a cyberUnabomber. We don't really have a whole lot to say about that. Crazies like that probably exist, whoever was mailing Anthrax around in 2001 was technically knowledgeable. We have a history of individuals like that but, again, we don't call that "warfare" because it's not in the context of a political process where one state is attempting to achieve its goals through military activity.
So there are three completely different topics that we're going to kind of touch on and then we'll talk a little bit about cyberwar. One is crime, another is terror, then espionage. Then we'll look at warfare.
The cybercriminal is a different animal from the cyberspy or cyberterrorist. The agenda of a cybercriminal is not aligned with any particular politics other than money. And as a result of the fact that they're profit-driven, they're simply trying to make a quick buck or quick 100 bucks or whatever the number is, they are not ideological. They are also extremely diffuse. Every cybercriminal who is out there is going to adopt whatever technique he comes up with at whatever particular time that's going to be most effective and most likely to make him some money. So by definition, cybercriminals don't represent a practical force. What they're almost more like viruses in a biological model - they're mutating rapidly and each one of them is doing their own different thing and you'll get different strains of cybercriminals that are out there attempting different strains of scams. We develop responses to those on a per strain basis and they're not coordinating amongst each other. One of the greatest strengths of the guerrilla groups that Mao ran during the war and during the Chinese Revolution was that he was able to achieve a level of diffuse activity that was centrally coordinated. You had these independent-seeming actors that were all pushing in the same direction. With cybercriminals we don't have anything like that type of asymmetric warfare. We simply have diffuse activity that is diffuse and is going to remain diffuse. So the threat of cybercriminals is the electronic smash-and-grab. They're going to come in, they're going to grab their money, they're going to go on and they're going to do something else.
Because of the evolutionary properties of cybercrime and the way that it works, I don't think that we're ever going to eradicate it, just like we're probably never going to eradicate regular human on human crime. Because as we close down one avenue for crime another one will almost by definition have to take its place because the criminals are going to go and scratch their heads and come up with a new point of attack. They rapidly shift to where the money is.
The cyberterrorist has a completely different agenda from the cybercriminal. They are ideological but they're attempt is not to gain direct benefit from their actions; their object is to cost the target. Consqeuently, the cyberterrorist's agenda is completely non-aligned with the cybercriminal's. They're trying to adjust the ideology of the target by costing them so much that the target will do anything in order to make them stop or will give in to their demands to make them go somewhere else. That is slightly different from the psychotic, crazed terrorist who is not really ideological and we can't really do anything about those guys except give them anti-psychotic drugs and therapy when we catch them. The cyberterrorist agenda is going to be maximum damage attacks and they want to produce as much fear as possible. That is why we call them "terror"ists. This is one of the reasons why historically, a few security practitioners have been somewhat derisive of the notion of cyberterror.
Back in the early 1990s, when the book "Information Warfare" came out people were talking about cyberterror scenarios in which ATM networks were going to crash and people weren't going to be able to get cash - the U.S. economy was going to crater and we would all be eating dog food in a week. Those kinds of claims are just simply not true. You can see when there is a railroad strike that the country doesn't completely collapse or you can see that when the Blackberry network goes off the air for 24 hours, people don't immediately lose their minds. We've shown that basic attacks against even important pieces of our electronic infrastructure generally result in a period in which people hunker down patiently and wait things out.
There is reason to doubt whether cyberterror is going to be effective, unless cyberterror is able to cause real world damage. That is a place where many of us security practitioners are deeply concerned and I agree with them: if somebody is able to get into a system control for a dam and cause flooding that can result in physical damage, death and fear - economic damage as well. That is something that is not at all to be taken lightly. Nothing that I say in my remarks against cyberwarfare should in any way be construed as being dismissive of the threat of cyberterror.
The fascinating thing about cyberterror is the cyberterror paradox: there is huge room for potential growth in cyberterror but it just simply hasn't happened yet. Whenever I am sitting at a conference in a hotel bar with a bunch of info sect practitioners and we are sitting around scratching our heads. We go, "If I were a cyberterrorist, I would do this, this and this." We come up with all these horrifying scenarios that really scare us. The interesting question then is:; why have the enemies of certain societies not done that kind of thing? I don't know - it's a really interesting question. It's possible that terrorists and terrorist organizations simply do not have the electronic warfare skills or do not think in the terms necessary to engage practical covert operations.
If you really want to scare yourself about the cyberterror threat you can concoct really frightening scenarios in which a dedicated attacker was willing to devote things on a five year to ten year horizon, to put agents in place to cause long-term damage at a specified time. That is very different from the way the terrorists have historically operated. They are going for ideological smash and grabs. It is quite possible that the reason they have been reluctant to attempt long-term covert operations is because their own security is not that good. The U.S. national security establishment has done a fairly good job of representing al-Qaeda as a highly technical terrorist organization. But the fact is, it is widely known that Osama bin Laden used to coordinate his operations using a satellite phone that was being monitored by the National Security Agency. When Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was captured his laptop had operational information unencrypted on the hard drive. These are not the actions of sophisticated cyberterrorists. These are the actions of terrorists who are certainly a threat but they are not this threat in information space yet.
So one of the interesting questions in the future for cyberterror is going to be: will some IT sophisticate eventually cross over the line and join a terrorist force. If that happens, things will be extremely interesting.
Another of the paradoxes of cyberterror is the fact that the most technologically sophisticated ones are the ones that are the easiest to attack if you are a cyberterrorist. Obviously, I'm referring here to the United States or other countries in the first world. But they are also the ones that generally have strong enough, robust enough infrastructure that they are going to be more likely to successfully whether those kinds of attacks. If there was a large cyberattack focused on crushing the United States' electronic backbone there are literally thousands of experienced network administrators all over the U.S. who would be able to step in and start trying to fight this problem. We have the depth and the technical sophistication to be able to try to address it.
That is fairly important because if you are talking about a cyberterror attack, the asymmetricality of the problem goes in both directions. If the defending force is extremely technically sophisticated and the attacking force is extremely technically sophisticated, you have a numbers effect in that quantity does have a quality all of its own. In cyberspace, our ability to react and defend is actually pretty good. But the high tech countries are the ones that are probably the easiest to hurt with non-technical, high-impact attacks such as flying airplanes into buildings. That is one of the reasons that I suspect that cyberterror has not been a particularly big problem to date. It simply that the terrorists that are out there have established methods that produce some predictable results and do not require them to establish a high tech strike force.
Another player in this space, which I haven't talked about yet, is the cyberspy - I'd like to discuss them briefly and then we can put cyberspies away. Cyberspies have an agenda that in a lot of cases, once again, opposed to the cybercriminal and cyberterrorists. Most importantly, the cyberspy's agenda is deeply opposed to the cyberwarrior's. The agenda of a cyberspy is to surreptitiously gather information from the target. You are trying to collect intelligence. The standard tools for espionage are penetration, covert operations and suborning and managing trusted agents in critical positions. So, the typical cyberspy operation against a U.S. government agency would really not be likely to encompass Internet-based attacks as much as they would be likely to consist of getting an employee on the inside who is willing to sell backup tapes for money.
If you look at the history of espionage, this has happened over and over again: Aldrich James, the Walker spy family, Robert Hanssen at the FBI. The KGB and the GRU during the cold war were extremely effective at these kinds of suborning operations for collecting intelligence. I always have to question the level of understanding of people who talk about cyberespionage as if it's a particularly big threat. Espionage is a huge threat, but the fact that you've added computers into the espionage environment doesn't make things much more complicated for a professional intelligence operative. All it does is give you another place for information to be compromised, and another mechanism for storing and transmitting it, and these are problems that people in the espionage field have understood for a long time.
One of the important things about a spy, however - and we saw this in the second World War surrounding the English and Polish compromises of the German Naval Enigma ciphers - is that, when you've collected intelligence, you have to be extremely careful about how that intelligence is used operationally so that you don't give away the fact that you have it. There's the famous story of Churchill allowing a convoy to run into where a wolf pack of German submarines was known to be in operation, and to take casualties, because the conclusion was that it was more important to have the Germans not suspect that their codes had been broken than to save a couple of ships full of people. That's a very hard choice to make, but those kinds of hard choices crop up all of the time in the intelligence environment.
Imagine for a second, if you will, that you were involved in cyberespionage operations against a country like the United States. You would be placing people in key locations. You would have agents possibly working the backup tapes or working in the operations centers of certain government agencies or, more likely, working at outsourcing companies that have deep access inside of federal agencies, and so forth. You would have all of your agents in place. The last thing that you would ever want to do would be to disrupt the network of your targets. The reasons you wouldn't want to disrupt the network is because that's where your intelligence is coming from. Thus, the mission of a cyberwarrior - where you might actually crash the target's networks - is going to blind the cyberspies; they're in opposition. Similarly, throughout the history of espionage, we have seen that there is a constant opposition between the soldiers and the spies, because the soldiers want to use the intelligence for battlefield purposes, tactically, whereas espionage is a strategic activity.
That tactical versus strategic divide is the single biggest thing that puts the spies in opposition to the warriors. You can very easily envision a situation down in the cyber war room of some country, where when the cyber war kicks off, the head of espionage throws up his hands in disgust and says: "Great! You've just blinded me. I can't get you any more intelligence about what's going on with the enemy because butthead over here just crashed all of their routers as part of his cyberattack."
The agenda of the cyberwarrior is to be prepared to attack or degrade or penetrate enemy command and control systems as an adjunct to physical military operations. Whenever the discussion turns to cyberwar people also use the term "asymmetrical warfare." The idea of asymmetrical warfare is that you have capability to do damage that is all out of proportion to their size or cost. In the case of ground warriors, it's the classic commando raid when someone is able to get two guys into a supply dump and destroy some critical supply chain at an important moment. The premise of asymmetrical warfare is to have a tipping effect that causes systemic failure. "For want of a nail the horse was lost; for want of a horse the knight was lost, and blah, blah, blah; for want of a nail the entire kingdom fell." That is the notion behind asymmetrical operations, and it's an excellent theory. Asymmetrical operations have worked extremely well since Sun Tzu's time (~400 BC) - give or take.
In cyberspace, the asymmetricality of the situation is something that I think we need to question. Is cyberwar disproportionally effective? Is it disproportionally cost-effective? Does it work at all? There are five huge buried paradoxes in the notion of cyberwar that I've identified, and I'll run through them and then we're done. In order, they are:
Imagine that we are
members of some small country's elite cyberattack force, and we're invited to
the war room as part of kick-off operations for the big attack against some military
target. The room is full of all of these generals and top brass and they're all
strutting around, and H-hour is coming up in 24 hours. And you have to raise
your hand and say, "Sir?"
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or whoever is running the show turns to you and says, "Yes."
And you say, "The attack is on Wednesday, and today is Tuesday."
And the Chair looks at you and says, "Yeah? What does that mean?"
"Well, today is Microsoft patch Tuesday, and they just issued a major patch that disarmed us, Sir."
At that point they grab you and they haul you out and you get a single bullet in the forehead.
It's a serious problem. I'm being a little bit silly about it, but if your premise is that you are going to have all of these electronic back doors into your enemy's command and control network so that you can crash it, or into their stock exchange so that you can crash it: it is a moving target that you're preparing to launch your attack against. It's one thing to say, "Here is Pearl Harbor. Its defenses are static. We understand the geographic location of where it is and we have an estimate of the kind of forces that we need to take it out." It's another thing if you're in an electronic warfare environment where your target can completely transform itself with a single router upgrade or by changing a rule on the firewall. More to the point, the second that they think that they're under attack, they might unplug the network and effectively disappear from being in harm's way. Pearl Harbor can't do that. The "digital Pearl Harbor" has completely different properties from the real one.
This is a big problem, and it's one of the reasons why I don't think that real warriors would ever be happy with a weapons system where there is no manual override operation. What would happen if all of our soldier's guns were electronically controlled and somebody was able to push a bad patch out to them and cause them all to cease to function? I think that's a ridiculous premise, and the reason I think it's a ridiculous premise is because I know lots of people who've served in the Army, myself included, and the idea that we would actually carry a weapon that could be remote disabled is just silly.
The disarmament affect and the potential for disarming a cyberwarrior without them being able to do anything about it is very real. In fact, if you want to think about cyberwar as a combined problem with intelligence, think of it this way. What happens if the enemy has a spy inside your cyberwar operations center? You have all of these viruses, penetrators, pieces of malcode in place. You've got all these capabilities to be able to launch an attack and the enemy is completely prepared so that the moment you launch your attack, they can hit one big red button which downloads correct software that blocks your attack and might even make it look as if it has worked. But in fact, it has not. I know that is a ridiculous premise. But it is no more ridiculous then the premise that someone is going to electronically wipe out a country before they launch an attack.
The next problem with cyberwar is the cost factor. This is a bit of an obscure argument but I am going to have to try to make it anyway. In order to be able to attack a network electronically from a distance, I submit to you, that you have to have what equates to the ability to remotely manage it.
If I am going to be able to sit in a war room someplace on the other side of the planet and reboot your computer reliably, I am a remote system administrator for your computer. I need administrative access. I need connectivity and I need tools to support my administrative efforts. If we're talking about cyberwar to be able to launch an effective attack against an enemy, we're basically saying that we are trying to be able to have a remote system administration capability against that enemy; which we have no part of being able to maintain. We have to reestablish that remote system administration capability at any time, at the drop of a hat; if we decide we are going to go to war. More likely, we have to keep it in place all the time, maintain it undetected, and keep it reliable without being able to test it.
Any of you who have ever done system or network administration (my professional background actually was as a network administrator) know how difficult it is to manage a heterogeneous network of hundreds of thousands of machines. This is why products like Unicenter, PatchLink and Configuresoft exist. These are expensive, complex, powerful tools that allow and organization to effectively manage its own computers. Imagine for a second that you were the head of the cyberwar force for some non-existent small country that is being tasked with simultaneously being able to knock out pieces of the U.S. Department of Defense, some big pieces of whatever is left of Wall Street, EarthLink plus a dozen other important sites. In order to do that, you are essentially being asked to remotely manage (through their firewalls!) a huge range of different systems, including different operating systems at different patch levels with different software configurations; all of which are being managed in unknowing opposition to your efforts. Do you see where I am going with this? This is the equivalent of asking somebody to build a combat version of Unicenter that actually works.
It is a ridiculous idea and that is one of the reasons I'm ridiculing it. So enough about the difficulty factor. I can't even imagine the budget requirements for building such a piece of attack software. If you stack that up against the budget requirements of having agents in place at each of the targets in a more classical covert operation sense, it makes a lot more sense to go for agents in place. Agents in place would be far more reliable and cost-effective if you've got time to do a run up on your target and get people in place. That, by the way, is a very important part that I forgot to mention, as part of the cost factor of this hypothetical cyberwar. It is not the case that you could simply turn to your cyberwar guys and say, "OK, we want to attack Fredonia tomorrow. Prepare." It would have to be laid in for a long time in advance. The kinds of electronic penetrations we are talking about involve considerable reconnaissance and development of custom tools and software. You'd need to study the target's administrative practices and match them with remote management capabilities; it would take months of covert operations to prepare for an actual attack before it would be possible. Some networks change every couple of months, so you'd be preparing an attack against a Pearl Harbor that was rapidly scooting around the map.
Doesn't that also seem a little ridiculous? I think it would be a lot smarter and a lot more likely that an attacker would send agents on the ground with GPS receivers to determine where the smart bombs should land when the war opens. Instead of trying to electronically trying to disable them, knock them out directly with a missile strike or a commando team. Tactical missile or bombardments take their targets offline and keep them offline. That is, by the way, why real war fighters tend to like attacking stuff by using high explosive.
Before an attack is launched it has to have some kind of useful military objective. If we are talking warfare, you need to advance your combat position: you need to take ground from the enemy or hold ground that the enemy is trying to take. Sometimes, you need to destroy critical resources of the enem - and keep them destroyed. If you look at the history of warfare, the way to accomplish virtually any military objective that is worth accomplishing involves having soldiers with feet on the ground. We've seen repeatedly in the 20th century that simply disrupting the enemy does not work. Bombing Vietnam did not work. The Germans tried it against the British in WWII. It did not work. We tried it against the Germans in WWII and it did not work. The Gulf War accomplished nothing until the ground war phase began. It takes getting boots on the ground, holding territory, guys with guns and bayonets in people's faces in order to accomplish a military objective. In order to make a cyberattack worthwhile as a force multiplier, it has to coordinate with some kind of an overall military objective that is achievable. That means that you have to have tactical superiority for some kind of follow through.
Let me try putting it in kind of a silly way. Suppose that we had some small country someplace. It has a reasonable sized economy and it has a fairly small army. They decide that they are going to conquer the United States. It is very difficult because with a population the size of the United States', even if you are electronically able to crash the U.S. infrastructure to the point where the U.S. was punch-drunk and incapable of responding: what are they going to do to actually prosecute the effectiveness of that cyberattack? Let's say we've got the U.S. electronically supine at our feet and we take our entire population of the country leading the attack and it is still smaller than the population of Los Angeles. We give all of our people guns and we send them to LA: the LA gangs kill them in about five minutes.
In order to be able to claim that cyberwar is an effective source multiplier in a military operation, you have to have a legitimate effective military operation for it to force multiply - otherwise, you are just being annoying. When we crash the U.S. infrastructure, then we wait for the U.S. Marine Corps to arrive. Because, unfortunately, it doesn't make any sense to get into a cyberwar against somebody unless you are able to withstand the inevitable retaliation - real military retaliation - that is going to come.
Usually when I make fun of this aspect of cyberwar, somebody comes along and says, "Well, but, what about a false flag operation. What if some small country makes it look like another small country launched this attack and then a superpower gets angry and lashes out against the wrong target. Ha ha." That sounds like something from an entertaining science fiction novel but let's address it anyway. The problem with that scenario is that before anybody is going to launch a cyberattack - even under a false flag - it has to be aligned with their particular political agenda. At the point where an entity the size of even the small country is carrying out some kind of an operation that is aligned with their political agenda it is not very difficult for the victim to look around and go, "Well, in whose advantage was this? We were attacked. Our electronic infrastructure was knocked over. It cost us billions of dollars from our economy. Boy, are we pissed. Who are we going to look at? Who did this?" There are probably five or six countries on the short list of who might have caused it. Then you simply start talking to them. Then you can investigate directionally based on that knowledge. Unless, again, somebody just randomly decides they are going to go crazy and try to provoke a new world war with a cyberattack, I don't think this is something political leaders are particularly likely to do. That scenario just simply doesn't hold water.
Because of the fact that packets don't hold ground and that cyberwar, if it has any weight at all, is only going to happen in the context of being a force multiplier, cyberwar only makes sense to the side that is likely to win anyhow. I'm going to say that again. It only makes sense to launch cyberattacks if you have the U.S. Marine Corps backing you up. Because unless you think you are going to win, launching a cyberattack simply means you are going to get clobbered harder when the other guy gets back at you. If we are talking about a conflict where the force structure is so evenly balanced that that little tiny extra kick is going to make a difference, I suppose cyberwar might be significant - but most military commanders in that situation would probably rather focus on having real forces instead of virtual force multipliers. Yes, it is the case that nations have been known to go to war in situations where the force structures are evenly balanced. But if you look at the 20th century, it didn't happen very often.
I don't think that there are a lot of political leaders in the world who are going to sit there and go, "Well, you know, we could probably take on the U.S. We could probably take them out. If we could knock their electronic infrastructure off the air for 48 hours, I think we could kick their butts." No one is going to do that. It is just stupid. But yet the cyberwar proponents talk as if that is a practical option.
To those of you who don't remember Mike Tyson: Mike Tyson was a world champion heavyweight boxer (1989) for a number of years. His hallmark as a heavyweight boxer was that he was extremely brutal. This is a guy; after all, that hits people in the head for a living. In one fairly famous incident when he was losing a match to Evander Holyfield, he attempted to bite his opponent's ear off and partially succeeded. He is not a nice man.
The point of the Blind Mike Tyson Effect is to ask yourself what happens if you were locked in a room with Mike Tyson. Of course, the first thing that comes to mind is you don't want to piss him off. What you really don't want to do is flip the lights off and whisper, "I'm gonna kick your ass, bitch."
A lot of the time when I have talked to proponents of cyberwar, what they say is cyberwar could be used to degrade the enemy's command of control prior to launching some kind of attack. That is the usual scenario. Let me be frank with you: some of these scenarios I've heard are just laughable from the standpoint of military practicality. I was at a conference about a year and a half ago. One guy was saying, "Well, if the Chinese wanted to take Taiwan, they could launch a cyberattack against the U.S. and other first world countries to knock their command and control systems off the air so that they couldn't respond effectively. Then the Chinese would have taken Taiwan before anybody would be able to do anything about it."
To which my usual response is, "Yeah, kind of like the way Saddam Hussein was able to take Kuwait before anybody was able to do anything about it."
The problem with that whole scenario of blinding your enemy is that the targets of these cyberattacks are first world superpowers. Many of them are extremely well-armed. The U.S. Navy keeps a carrier task force group down in the China Sea. It is not particularly publicized but the whole reason for that force is in case the Chinese did decide they were going to do something naughty regarding Taiwan. They have this nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; nuclear armed as well, with all of its escorts and its fighter wing. A carrier task force group, even if it's been electronically degraded, is a big bad Mike Tyson, indeed.
Nobody is foreseeing starting a nuclear war with China - but that's the point. If you have a capability like that sitting in your backyard, only a madman would blind or interfere with them. It's just like blinding Mike Tyson when you're locked in a closet with him: because what is going to happen is that they will only find very small scraps of you when the lights come back on. Anyone who was stupid enough to try to electronically blind a significant military force as part of local operations is going to have to take into account what happens when the rest of the strategic arsenal gets involved. Real military planners (not the armchair cyberwar pundits) understand that.
It's far more plausible that if China wanted to take Taiwan at this point, they would do it in the context of some kind of diplomatic initiative. They might wait until all of the superpowers that might object were busy with their own economic problems or foolish adventures in other parts of the world, or when their force structures were completely tapped out from dealing with (for example) insurgencies in the Middle East. Those are legitimate strategic approaches to how you might take Taiwan. But the idea of saying that someone was going to electronically blind their target before they launched a significant attack at somebody else or directly at that target is really silly - it's like the stupid ninjas in the bad movies of the 1980s, who always scream "aiiieee!" before they attack. Of course, if you launched your attack as part of a massive combined forces operation, then you need forces to combine with: you have to be able to take on the Blind Mike Tyson.
I grew up during the late part of the Cold War and spend a lot of time war gaming World War III-type scenarios and reading up and playing simulations based on the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. One of the givens in the M.A.D. doctrine was that if your enemy started rolling back their silo doors, you had to launch first. As a consequence of that, it was also a given during the Cold War that the last thing anyone would ever do is shoot down an opposition force's spy satellite. The U.S. has spy satellites over Russia. Russia has spy satellites up over the U.S. The Chinese have spy satellites up over the U.S. If, suddenly, the Soviet spy satellite goes dark, the Soviets are going to assume that the only reason it went dark is because we are rolling back our silo doors and they are going to launch first. That sounds like a farfetched scenario. The reason it sounds like a farfetched scenario is because it is. When the Chinese tested a satellite-killer missile a few years ago, we matched their test with one of our own - but nobody would ever dream of testing a satellite-killer on someone else's satellite. If either side launches an electronic attack against intelligence collection and blinds the enemy, you may as well run up a big flag saying, "We're about to attack you." That's one of the reasons why this whole scenario of knocking out somebody's electronic ability to react is really quite silly. You're left with nothing but a hellacious, blind, slugfest or a single-sided all-out strike.
If you take all this into account, what you'll realize is that cyberwar only makes sense in the case where you're going to win anyway. If you are already in a situation where you've got the ground forces to go in and successfully prosecute a war after you've launched your cyberattack, then it makes some sense to launch a cyberattack. If you have the naval forces to sink the carrier task force group and are not afraid of fighting the strategic war that's going to follow, yes, it makes sense launch an cyberattack prior launching your attack. But it only makes sense in the context where the political decision-makers and the military decision-makers at the highest level are confident of their ability to win the war to begin with. So that raises a really interesting question, which is, "Is the whole thing cost effective?" Which would you rather have, the U.S. Marines or a Cyberwar Department? Well, without the U.S. Marines a Cyberwar Department is pointless, and if you've got the U.S. Marines a Cyberwar Department becomes - well, it's kind of nice, I guess, but it's kind of like curb feelers on a Ferrari. The reason that I'm raising this is because I don't believe that our political leaders are not aware of this. It makes the situation such that the U.S. is not very likely to come under a cyberwar attack from anybody at this point in time, or for the near-term future.
We are quite possibly likely to use cyberwar against somebody else, and I would like to encourage people to think about that. I don't think in the future that full-on state-versus-state cyberwar is very likely to happen because it's pointless for superpowers to develop cyberattacks just to crush non-superpowers when they can crush them conventionally. When the cyberattacks against Estonia happened, initially people were claiming that the Russians were behind it, and that it was the first cyberwar that was happening. My response to that was the correct one, which was, "when Russia invades you it's a lot more obvious than a bunch of packets. There's just a whole hell of a lot of explosions and tanks and helicopters and Russians. Ask the people in Grozny." That probably wasn't a very nice thing to say, but it really is the truth. If Russia's going to invade you, they don't really need to crash your electronic infrastructure before they invade you; they're either going to win or they're not.
If the U.S. is going to invade you, we don't need to crash your electronic infrastructure. I think penetrating it, using it against you, understanding it completely, using your own infrastructure to monitor you-all of those things are completely legitimate intelligence objectives (in a military context "information operations"). From a military standpoint, crashing the target's network probably doesn't make a huge amount of sense. In the rare event that it does make sense, it's probably a lot more expedient to crash it with a thousand-pound bomb dropped on a GPS coordinate and then reconstruct it at the U.S. taxpayers' expense after we're done blowing it up.
The whole concept of cyberwar, at this time, as it's being sold, is ridiculous and pointless. The reason that I'm trying to raise this issue is not just to ridicule cyberwar proponents - it's because at a certain point, unless we are able to get the governments of the world to think rationally about this, we're going to move into an environment where civilian electronic infrastructure is on the table as if it were a military target. At what point is cyberwarfare turning into "state-sponsored cyberterrorism"? At what point is the automatic teller network - which is a civilian piece of infrastructure - going to be treated like a military target?
I know the twentieth century was marked as a period of total warfare in which horrendous attacks were launched against civilians during both of the two major world wars, but I am deeply concerned that we are preparing to carry out war crimes in cyberspace. If you accept my argument that this type of attack really doesn't have any military utility, but we spend all this money on building this cyberwarfare capability, we're going to crash enemy targets just because we can. At a certain point I think that you are attacking civilian targets indiscriminately, and that is a war crime. We need to think about that.
So just to wrap up here, no matter how you slice it, critical civilian infrastructure is going to continue to come under increasing levels of cyberattack. I am not at all saying that we should not be worried about coming under attack. We should be worried about coming under attack and we're going to continue to come under extremely high rates of attack for the foreseeable future. But because the types of attacks that we're coming under are not aligned, we're going to have really interesting problems. We should be thinking about how to defend against point attacks like cybercrime (first and foremost) and cyberterror as a distant second. I don't think we should be worrying about cyberwarfare attacks against us because if we're hardening our systems against cybercrime and cyberterror, we've probably done as much as we need to do to harden ourselves against cyberwarfare. Espionage remains as the critical problem that we're ignoring during our rush to worry about cyberwarfare and terrorism - penetrations launched on a ten year time-window are nearly impossible to prevent and we're doing very little in that area.
In a sense the cybercriminals are helping protect us against the terrorists because they're encouraging us to put firewalls in place: they are the ones who've caused us to have Microsoft patch Tuesdays, they are the ones who are constantly encouraging us in their oh-so-gentle way to keep all of our software as up-to-date and as flexible and as changing as possible. The cybercriminals are applying a pressure that is directly degrading the ability of a cyberwarrior to prosecute operations. Conversely, the cybercriminals are possibly increasing the avenues by which a cyberspy would be able to get in, thanks to the laissez-faire attitude many organizations are adopting toward malware and botnets. The flood of malware we're up against is a perfect hiding place for a small amount of critical espionage activity. Additionally, the research that's going on in producing malware is directly applicable for espionage purposes - and there is evidence that it has been used that way. I don't think any professional, self-respecting intelligence officer who had access to such wonderful tools as rootkits would avoid using them if he had them.
No matter how you slice it, we're going to have to be prepared to defend ourselves. I am not saying that we should just sit here and think, "Oh yeah, well, cyberwar is not going to happen. We don't need to worry about it." You can ask the government of Estonia about that. It wasn't cyberwar but it still hurt. Maybe it was just a cyberKaczynskiite, but the effect is the same. We need to be on our toes and we need to be prepared to defend our networks better - if only because of the simple fact that we are losing to a bunch of amateurs. Meanwhile, we don't need to worry nearly as much about cyberwars; the people who are selling the concept are blowing it all out of proportion.


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The gruesome violence that left eight dead in the Kashmir Valley on Sunday, during the Srinagar parliamentary election polling – that witnessed the lowest voter turnout in the last 29 years – has cast a grim shadow over the upcoming bypolls in the Anantnag constituency of South Kashmir.
But, more than that, if the Election Commission decides to call off the polls altogether, then it would be a colossal failure on part of both the state and central government to ensure peaceful polls. It also puts a blatant questions mark on the security forces of Jammu and Kashmir who, if you go by Sunday's violence, failed to anticipate the magnitude of the rage on the streets.
Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti's brother, Tassaduq Hussain, who is the ruling party (PDP) candidate from the Anantnag constituency, held a press conference in Srinagar on Monday, requesting the Elections Commission to postpone the polling as 'the atmosphere was not conducive for the polls.'
In doing so, Tassaduq indirectly questioned his sister Mehbooba's security grid, that failed to contain the violence in the first phase of the byelections – in the three districts of Srinagar, Budgam and Ganderball.
"You cannot force people to vote and you cannot force people not to vote," Tassaduq said, adding that democracy should not lead to killing of people.
Earlier, during his campaign trail, Tassaduq had told Firstpost that last year's unrest in the Valley, that witnessed the killing of close to hundred people, would definitely impact his candidacy.
If the Election Commission – which is currently deliberating and consulting stakeholders on the issue in the Valley – does decide to call off the polls, it would effectively be a huge victory for separatists in the Valley, who have been calling for a poll boycott.
Starting with the 1996 polls, no election has been called off due to violence in Kashmir – even during the peak of militancy. Sunday's election will go in history as one of the bloodiest democratic exercises in history, with an abysmally low voter turnout of 7.14 percent.
In the 1989 Lok Sabha election, when insurgency had just erupted in the state, the Srinagar parliamentary constituency witnessed just 5.18 percent participation. Those were some of the worst days for electoral democracy in Kashmir, as the summer capital witnessed no contest at all. No one filed the nomination papers other than National Conference's Mohammad Shafi Bhat, who won uncontested.
On Sunday, violence in many parts of the polling areas was uncontrollable. This unimagined, unanticipated violence left eight people dead and injured more than 100. Most of the deaths occurred in the Budgam district of Central Kashmir, an area that had largely remained peaceful during previous polls. This is being seen as one of the reasons why the security forces were unable to assess the situation correctly as the violence erupted in places which traditionally saw long queues of peaceful voters on election day.
Former chief minister and National Conference president Omar Abdullah said that he sees Tassaduq's statement as a direct "indictment of his sister's government."
"EC is well within its powers to postpone or countermand Anantnag election but if so @MehboobaMufti must reign & Governor should take charge," Omar said in one his tweets.
.@MehboobaMufti Tassaduq's statement is an indictment of his sister @MehboobaMufti's government & its abject failure. How can the BJP not see this?
— Omar Abdullah (@abdullah_omar) April 10, 2017
As focus started to shift from Srinagar to Anantnag on Monday, tension surged across South Kashmir. Two middle schools, designated as polling stations, were burnt down on Sunday night in the Shopian and Pulwama districts. The house of an ex-Sarpanch was damaged and firing was heard in the Shopian area last night. The constituency is scheduled to go polls on Wednesday.
Tassaduq and Congress state chief Ghulam Ahmad Mir will contest for the Anantnag seat, vacated by Mehbooba after she became the chief minister. The constituency witnessed minimal political activity on the ground due to the tense situation.
Firstpost is now on WhatsApp. For the latest analysis, commentary and news updates, sign up for our WhatsApp services. Just go to Firstpost.com/Whatsapp and hit the Subscribe button.
Updated Date: Apr 10, 2017 18:42:57 IST

subset: commoncrawl


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text: I am thinking about putting together a proposal to present at the MLA on microblogging (don't want to limit it to just Twitter). If anyone is interested send me an email dave [at] outsidethetext [dot] com. In order to have enough time to complete the polished proposal for submission to the MLA by April 1st I would need an initial abstract and CV from those interested by March 18th.


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Jasper is an approx 6 year old Springer Spaniel looking for a home. He arrived as an unwanted pet from a home who were high drug users. When dropped off he had very dilated pupils and the vet suspected that he had been affected by the drugs. After 24 hours these had passed through his system and we were able to get to know the real Jasper and start treatment on him. He had very bad skin due to a heavy infestation of fleas and this had caused skin irritation, constant itching and scabs to form from his nibbling and scratching. He also had a heavy worm burden. Jasper had never seen the vet so had never had any treatment for any of these easy to fix health issues. He was very matted and had an absolutely filthy coat (also easily sorted with a good brush out and bath).
Jasper is a dog with very few issues. His biggest problem is pulling on the lead and that he doesn't like fireworks. He is fantastic with other dogs, loves his walks and has an excellent recall. He loves being groomed. He loves being fussed over and wants to be part of the family. He can live happily with other dogs (any resident dogs must be neutered) and also is fine with cats (but non reactive ones as I don't want to see him beaten up!). He likes to play fetch with his tennis ball, but has no possession issues (food or toys).
He can live with children, although older kids would be better as they can keep up with his energy levels out on walks. He loves to run and play when out, but at the same time makes an excellent house dog, who is fully house trained and is not destructive. He can be left for short periods of time on his own (no longer than four hours as is our policy) and does not fret that nobody is around. He would make a great dog for a fitness fanatic, he would make a good jogging companion and would easily keep up. He is basically a dog with no issues and is just adorable!
Jasper has been castrated, vaccinated and microchipped, plus flea and worm treated. He has no known long term health issues. He will need a fully enclosed garden to run around for bathroom breaks and an owner who is prepared to walk him every day. He rarely went out in his previous home and he wishes to make up for lost time!
A homecheck will be carried out and a minimum adoption fee of £150 applies.


text: I can't believe I'm even typing that but that was some cold breeze today! Also, if you're running a fever the wind and water will feel extra cold. That's right… sick again! Ugh. At least Avery didn't have strep. That means this isn't strep either, right? Right?! Read the rest of this entry »


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STUTTGART, GERMANY – Daimler AG has achieved a crucial breakthrough in battery technology. The Stuttgart-based automaker has succeeded in adapting lithium-ion technology to the demanding requirements of automotive applications.
Until now, the technology has been used primarily in consumer electronics. The new battery will be used in the series-production S 400 BlueHYBRID beginning next year.
The engineers' success resulted of the Daimler-developed integration of the lithium-ion battery into the vehicle's climate control system. This ensures that the battery works at optimal system temperatures of between 15 and 35°C, which in turn make it possible for the battery to provide long service life and maximum performance.
The main advantages offered by the newly developed lithium-ion battery are its very compact dimensions and its superior performance compared to conventional nickel-metal hydride batteries. The weight/power ratio of the entire battery is 1,900 watts per liter (W/L).
Lithium-ion batteries are ideally suited for use in hybrid vehicles to help reducing fuel consumption and thus also CO2 emissions. At the same time, the Daimler engineers are investigating to what degree this technology can be applied to other vehicle concepts, such as electric and fuel cell-powered cars.
The S 400 BlueHYBRID consumes 7.9 liters of gasoline per 100 km in the NEDC. This results in very low CO2 emissions of only 190 grams per kilometer. The maximum output is 220 kW/299 hp, and the corresponding maximum torque is 375 Nm. The S 400 BlueHYBRID accelerates from zero to 100 km/h in 7.3 seconds on its way to an electronically limited top speed of 250 km/h.
Even more potential is offered by the combination of clean BlueTec diesel technology with a hybrid module, a duo that is featured in the S 300 BlueTec HYBRID.


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Lean Manufacturing
Introduction to Lean
Lean Foundations
Lean Implementation
Lean Certification Programs
Lean Office
Lean Healthcare
Lean Government
Lean Six Sigma
Lean Leadership
Training Programs
Lean Implementation Programs
Value Stream Mapping provides a roadmap for your lean implementation plan. [click for workshop agenda]
Workplace Organization, one of the first steps you should implement in your operations, instructs you how to clean up and get things in order for Lean. [click for workshop agenda]
A3 Problem Solving unleashes employees on your organization's most challenging problems by giving them the 'know how' to properly understand a problem, diagnose the potential root causes, create an action plan, attack the causes, and measure results.
Kaizen Improvement is a method for identifying changes and implementing them. [click for workshop agenda]
Standardized Work allows you to share information about the best ways to do things so they will be done that way consistently [click for workshop agenda]
Quick Changeover (SMED) can reduce lead-time from weeks to days and lower work-in-process inventory and warehousing costs. [click for workshop agenda]
Total Productive Maintenance reduces equipment downtime and increases reliability. [click for workshop agenda]
Quality at the Source (Mistake Proof & Fail Safe) [click for workshop agenda]


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BEY-SAN-MAK & PRESMAC the production as a result of an extremely rigorous studies are performed. Orders, customer-focused project aimed at full satisfaction section of the image is transferred to contractual arrangements. All materials used in the manufacture of products that you order the official contracts, commercial conditions, technical specifications and delivery dates to occur later with bad surprises are recorded. In addition, government support of our customers, credit or debit for purchases and leasing companies will promote the necessary projects within the scope of our company is prepared free of charge.
- Expert facility set up by the project team for the design work, machinery and equipment to place concrete floor, electricity, water, compressed air system and so on. drawings of the project is to make the customer the infrastructure.
- Plant, Brick and paving stone mold with machine production models will begin upon the approval of the customer into technical drawings.
- The manufacturing process; welded fabrication, machining, painting and automation system consists of four basic parts.
- Production was completed and ready for dispatch briquette machine from the concrete flooring and free installation and tests are carried out by our experienced team of our customers sites, operator training and certificates are given to staff to work. Commissioning the plant after the warranty period starts.
All electric products, engines and parts worn are outside the 2 year warranty. BEY-SAN-MAK & PRESMAC overseas domestic intervenes Maximum 48 hours with 72, based on the route infrastructure the technical team can intervene in range of 120 hours. In addition, free technical support hotline 0800 371 00 04 reach us 24 hours a day.
Products are made according to CE norms. The best way to protect worker safety barriers for the safety of the employees is applied. Damping devices are used to minimize noise pollution. The entire system is under security with emergency stop button.
- 2-year mechanical parts warranty
- Full-time production
- Unlimited technical support
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- 7/24 accessibility
- DIN, ISO, CE, components used according to the norms of TSEK
- Easy use program selection
- Auto / Manual Stop option, waiting, and to continue from the point where you where
- At the end of training authorization certificate will be given
- Error correction via Internet option


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Cat Behaviour: January 2009 Archives
The Keesling family of New Castle, Indiana is alive today because of their heroic cat, Winnie, who meowed loudly and paced up and down the bed to wake her humans when she detected a deadly gas leak.
Read the report of the events of that night and about the reward given to Winnie for saving her family.
What I find interesting is that the cat, Winnie detected an odorless gas. According to the reports, Winnie detected it and then worked really hard to wake everyone up, even after the mom, Cathy repeatedly fainted as she made her way to the phone to call 911. I know cats noses are more sensitive than a human's sense of smell, but I really don't think Winnie was able to detect the gas.
What I think happened is Winnie detected changes in her human's behavior and breathing and got alarmed. One report even said that the 14 year old son had gone into the bathroom and passed out on the way back to his bedroom. His fall would have scared Winnie and she would have gone to wake up Cathy, the mom.
Every time I am sick or something unusual happens, Neo gets all freaked out and walks around meowing. That seems to be the kind of thing that cats do, they are really good at detecting differences in human behavior and are really good and knowing when people are in distress. So I think Winnie was looking out for her humans and did the right thing even if she wasn't able to detect the gas.
Does anyone have any stories of cats who can sense moods or distress in their humans? Please comment below.
Anyone that says that cats aren't complicated or incredibly intelligent probably doesn't know what they are talking about. I learned a valuable lesson from my cat and I'm going to pass it on to you.
If you're new here, please consider subscribing to my feed. If you love cats, you'll enjoy the posts we place online every day. Thanks for visiting!
My cat Maddy (pictured) loves to scratch her cardboard disk. For those of you who may not know what that is, I took a picture of Maddy sitting on her scratching disk. Some manufacturers call it a cardboard disk and others may call it a turbo scratching post. Either way, the premise is fairly simple. The toy consists of a replaceable cardboard disk and a ball that rotates around the perimeter of the toy. Some cats like playing with the ball more than they like scratching the post. Generally, Maddy doesn't play with the ball but she does scratch the cardboard several times a day.
About two weeks ago I scolded Maddy for scratching my great room chair. I really found this strange because Maddy rarely scratches the furniture. As a matter of fact, I have to really think hard to remember the last time she's done this. Anyhow, I didn't make to big of a deal of it. Unfortunately, it happened again within two days. At that point, I realized something wasn't right. I was even considering taking her to the vet. Then it hit me, I hadn't replaced the cardboard insert on her toy in months and it was worn out. You can tell it's worn out because the cardboard is all pushed down. The nice think about the circular cardboard disks is that they can be replaced and even flipped so that your cat can make use of both sides before you replace the insert. To me this is great value.
If your normally well behaved cat is scratching your furniture, he's probably doing it for a reason. More than likely, one of the choices that you have deemed acceptable for him to scratch are not working the way they used to. Remember that if you want to protect your furniture, you have to examine your cat's scratching choices frequently. I can't get mad at Maddy for scratching the furniture if I haven't provided the necessary scratching resources for her. While I have various scratching posts in the house, Maddy prefers the cardboard insert by far; I'm assuming it's because of the rough texture of the cardboard. I'll be keeping an eye on that cardboard insert a bit more carefully now.
So if your normally well mannered cat is scratching your favorite chair, examine his scratching post or other scratching choices and make sure they are still functioning for him. Generally, any scratching choice that is worn out won't provide the proper friction that your cat needs to maintain his claws. If your acceptable scratching choices are no longer working, your cat is naturally going to find choices that you may not like.
If you have a related story to share, I'd love to read your comments below.Click here for our past posts, our archives have hundreds of helpful cat information posts for cat lovers. Please subscribe to our RSS feed if you're a cat person that likes cat related information, cat care advice and news.
As a follow up to a previous post about recession proof cat toys, I found this article that gives some great advice for keeping kitty happy without spending money, and how to play with these make at home toys. No matter what your cat likes to do, he'll appreciate the quality time with you.
If you're new here, please consider subscribing to my feed. If you love cats, you'll enjoy the posts we place online every day. Thanks for visiting!
Whether your cat is an indoor cat or goes outside he will probably find that these long winter months can lead to a lot of ho-hum napping and, perhaps, some misbehaving.
Here are some tips to keep Suzy, and Zip, and Lucky happy:
First of all realize that cats (like all of us) pay most attention to something new in their environment. The best toy from yesterday will often be ignored today. They are on the prowl for the latest and greatest new object to attend to.
The trick, therefore, (this works well with kids, too) is to "rotate the stock." Keep a few toys out at all times (preferably in different areas of the house to keep them interesting--try putting a favorite toy in the bathtub) but switch them out every couple of days.
You know your cat better than anyone. When choosing toys (or making them-more on that later) don't try something your cat has never played with. If she doesn't like to chase things don't buy a mechanical mouse.
If she likes to play with your hanging clothes as you carrying them up the stairs then she will probably like "dangly toys."
We all know that cats have different types of play that assist them developmentally. This includes play fighting, hunting, and "flinging" where they pick up an object and throw it up into the air. You may want to try these activities with your cat and determine what they enjoy the most.
Many cats like rituals just like people (remember Mr. Rogers coming in, changing his sweater and shoes...) It may be jumping on its human's back every time he sits at the computer, pulling herself along the under side of a couch or chair, hanging upside down off a favorite step, or rolling on the sidewalk when his humans come home. We once had a very intelligent little female who loved this trick. If we left a glass of water on a table-and were too far away to grab it-she would wait until she got our attention and stare us in the eye as she casually knocked the glass over. These rituals are a great insight as to what cats like to do: pounce, climb, bat, wrestle, etc.
Purchasing toys is great but I think its fun to give your cat a variety of options by putting together home made toys.
• A great flinging toy: take the crinkly wrapper off a package (the heavier is often better), string your cat's favorite toys (the ring around the milk lid, a large button, a large rubber band, etc.) and then tie the string around the middle of the cellophane like a bowtie. With just the slightest touch it jumps and crinkles.Make certain it is all very secure to avoid any choking hazard.
• If your cat loves to climb into boxes or bags this is a great activity when the kids and the cat are bored. Take a nice sized box, pierce one side, hang any toys or objects he enjoys inside, turn it sideways. Cut 2" holes on the sides, hang (on the outside) small objects in the center of the holes. Add-or expose-the rippled, corrugated cardboard for an instant scratching station. This should give lots of hours of play and hiding time. Don't leave it out too long, though. Put it away for more fun in a few weeks.
• For the smart, energetic cat I would recommend a bouncy ball from a toy store. Warrant Eckstein in his book, How to Get Your Cat to Do What You Want, describes his consultation with Lily Tomlin's cat. The cat seemed to have no interest in anything Eckstein could offer. He found a ball in a toy store that bounced very high and in unpredictable arcs. The cat loved it-the unpredictability being something that most cats are wild about!
• You may not realize it, especially in a single cat environment, that your little guy enjoys wrestling. Place a work glove or a hand puppet on your hand and tickle his belly (with, of course, an appropriate growl and argh thrown in.) You may be surprised at his excited and energetic response. This can be a fun time for both of you and can become a ritual.
The key to keeping our furry friends entertained (and decrease unwanted behavior) is to keep things changing. If your cat shows no interest in your new efforts be flexible and try something else. Rotate toys frequently and pay attention to what they already enjoy.
Pat Gilbers, from TwoPennyCat - is a lifetime cat lover as well as being an entrepreneur, non profit specialist (visit PookaFundraising.com for information on raising money), and free lance writer. Please enjoy her new cat site, TwoPennyCat.com for wonderful photos, funny videos, interesting articles, and a unique collection of cat products.
Click here for our past posts, our archives have hundreds of helpful cat information posts for cat lovers. Please subscribe to our RSS feed if you're a cat person that likes cat related information, cat care advice and news.


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The wedding ceremony usually takes place on a selected venue which can be a church, a courthouse, or an outdoor venue. The location can be unconventional, for example a meadow or the seashore, or any outdoor location that inspires the groom and the bride. The wedding venue could also be a romantic and charming place, a location tested by history, or the fine sand of a lagoon. The price of an average wedding venue is $1244.
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Secretary of State Kris Kobach expects Democrats participating in their rare contested gubernatorial primary will propel statewide voter turnout to a 10-year high-water mark.
With five days remaining before the primary election, early votes have already exceeded the totals in 2010 and 2014, Kobach announced Thursday.
He predicted 468,500 Kansans will fill out a ballot, which would be 26 percent of the 1.8 million registered voters. Only 20.2 percent turned out four years ago, when Republican Gov. Sam Brownback was seeking re-election and his Democratic challenger, Paul Davis, was unopposed. In 2010, participation was 25.2 percent.
This year, the GOP gubernatorial field includes Kobach, Gov. Jeff Colyer, Insurance Commissioner Ken Selzer, former state Sen. Jim Barnett, entrepreneur Patrick Kucera, and teenagers Tyler Ruzich and Joseph Tutera Jr. Democratic candidates include state Sen. Laura Kelly, former agriculture secretary Josh Svaty, former Wichita Mayor Carl Brewer, physician Arden Andersen, and teenager Jack Bergeson.
"If you had an incumbent governor in the traditional sense, somebody who had won the office already, you wouldn't see people lining up in such large numbers in separate parties trying to run for the office," Kobach said.
The 2010 primary numbers were boosted by several competitive races, Kobach said, including open seats for governor, secretary of state, attorney general and congress. This year is different, he said, because Democrats haven't had a contested primary for governor in 20 years, and the six Democrats vying for the 3rd District congressional seat has Johnson County shattering records for early votes.
Ethan Corson, executive director of the Kansas Democratic Party, said high turnout "is proof of what we've seen all over the state for over a year now."
"Our supporters," Corson said, "are energized and motivated and are seizing the opportunity to turn the page on eight years of failed Brownback-Colyer-Kobach policies."
Kobach's elections director, Bryan Caskey, said about 26,000 voters were affected by a recent federal court ruling that proof of citizenship requirements were unconstitutional. Applicants who were placed on a suspended list have returned to the voting rolls. However, Caskey said, a preliminary injunction in the case already had given them clearance to vote.
Kobach reminded voters they still need to show photo identification when they show up at polls.
"I'm very pleased that remains a requirement in Kansas," he said.
He also encouraged voters to take note of a limitation of voting screens in Kansas that only show six candidates. For races with seven candidates, such as the GOP's 2nd District congressional contest, voters will have to scroll to a second page. The order of names is random, Kobach said.


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As per GOI, there is no specific definition of "A Smart City". The definition or the guidelines to define a Smart City will change from city to city, state to state and country to country. More information regarding smart city as per GOI guidelines can be found out at their website
According to Wikipedia, A smart city uses information and communication technologies (ICT) to
a. Enhance quality, performance and interactivity of urban services
b. To reduce costs and resource consumption
c. To improve contact between citizens and government.
One example of interaction between services could be putting the drainage clearance by civic authorities on areas likely to receive heavy rainfall. Another example could be a commuter receiving alerts for possible traffic jam points depending on real time weather data. Even information, like, "is it likely to rain today in the CBD" can also be useful. Such examples enhance quality of urban services and make do things that are not possible right now.
The reduction in cost is tied to right allocation of resources and that can only be brought about with the availability of right data for making decisions. City smart street lighting is one good example of data from physical environment combining with a decision system to save money. Smart lights that turn on and off based on the need save you power compared to the ones that operate on timers and are left on between dusk and dawn.
To improve contact between Government and citizens, both the entities need to be looking at the same data. That means having open data platforms that can be accessed and analyzed by all stakeholders. A lot of promise of smart city is about getting right data from the environment, sharing it with the stakeholders and then creating intelligent systems to drive better decisions.
Citywide environment monitoring is one of the core infrastructure requirements of a smart city. Environment monitoring would include weather, air pollution, traffic data, water quality monitoring etc. that are under the sustainable environment category as per Government of India. We are going to discuss air quality monitoring in this paper. This paper looks at the current situation, explains air quality monitoring terms, the associated challenges and possible solutions.
The model so far has been relying on data from stations installed by Government agencies. Typical stations are high cost and thus there can be only be few of them in a city. The coverage is poor. Today our metros are spread across 40 km in length and breadth. Look at the map of Bangalore, Delhi, Mumbai or Hyderabad and see the vast area that we are qualifying as a "city". Now think of population densities of a typical Indian metro and you can do the math about huge populations living in the metros. If you install four stations from Yehalanka to Electronics city in Bangalore then people in Kormangala may not be getting the right data about their environment.
Someone who said, "I want to know the pollution right outside my window" summarized this very beautifully. Right now there is no easy way to do that in our cities. The typical digital signages put up by agencies that display information in a static manner are not much use for policymaking or preventive actions. Suppose you stand outside the Majestic Railway station in Bangalore and stare at a board displaying the NOX levels in PPM. How is that information useful?
Like, with every system, we need to start with the requirements. Why install these signages? The goals are:
1) Increase awareness about air pollution
2) Identify hotspots of pollution for preventive action
3) Identify events that trigger pollution
4) Archive pollution data for record keeping
5) Make this data available to researchers and citizens.
The first big problem we see with current deployment model is the identification of hotspots for preventive action. If the density of stations is low then the data is only representative of a particular location and using it as a proxy for other areas is a sure shot recipe for failure. If you have 10 stations in a metro that covers 1600 sq km then you have on an average just one station for 160 sq KM or millions of citizens! We are not solving "what is right outside my window" problem.
To do so we have to increase the density of the network. More stations means more data from immediate neighbourhood, the answer to "what is right outside my window" question. So how can we increase the density of the air quality stations? Budget is often a constraint and the only way forward is to bring the cost of stations down. However that has an inherent bias to bring down the quality of data. How can we achieve the right balance between price and performance? One possible solution is to create low cost stations with a do-it-yourself approach.
That DIY approach means you are supplying your own time so labor cost is not factored in. Since you are familiar with the intricacies of the system, you can identify and pick materials with a good price to reliability ratio. That means you can do the system at a fraction of the cost. That is the "expert who is ready to roll-his-sleeves approach". The downside is assumed familiarity with the system and know-how to interpret the data and fix glitches. To get more people on board, we can document the parts and process and release it to a wider audience in the hope that more people will follow suit. The success of this approach would depend on novices joining the project and ultimately turning into experts because of their innate curiosity. The movement has to become a social phenomenon to have the desired impact.
Then there are citizen science projects and crowd sourced projects, like "Air Quality Egg" that demand money but not expertise. They should have a better chance of success. The motto of such projects is "any data is better than no data". Such projects assume that citizens would deploy their sensors in large numbers and collaborate on data. The good part is that they really help create awareness and kickstart the debates. Everyone will sit up and take notice when you raise X $ on kickstarter for your air quality project. It indeed can have a galvanizing effect on your visitors when they see so many installations on your project dashboard.
That is the right bit about such projects. However there is a big issue that most of these projects tend to just ignore. For one, good air quality sensors are not available at dirt-cheap prices. Air quality may emerge as a lucrative market for manufacturers to take notice and with newer research we may get to a point where quality sensors will become available at throw away prices but that is not the case right now. How much of "a feature is required" or "what is good enough" are definitely debatable points but projects like Air Quality eggs pay scant regard to the quality of sensors or the process involved in getting the right data. This situation is very different from an expert striking a good balance between price and features. To cut down on cost, the stations typically use *cheap* sensors that are either low quality or would require extra work to make the data reliable.
One good example is citizen projects using the PPD42NJ (2) sensors (or derivatives) for measuring PM levels. The cheapest Good PM unit we have found is one from Dylos that retails for 200$. The PPD42NJ is about 20$ and you can get the cheaper Korean or Chinese knock-offs. However the cheap sensors come with a caveat. You have to calibrate each sensor individually. That means recording data from your sensor, comparing it against the readings from a more reliable (and expensive) instrument and the encoding that information for each station. That is not impossible and with the right knowledge that can be done.
However to get to that point, you have to plot graphs, compare the two graphs, do a curve fitting and find the equation for your sensor and then encoding that as a program that runs on your station. Typically that is beyond the capabilities of most citizens. Also, the time involved in doing the right thing would deviate from the "turn on and get data" motto of the project. What happens instead is that everyone just uses an equation that was published by someone the Internet (3) for his or her particular sensor and treats that as gospel for PM levels. Unscrupulous researchers of publish-more-useless-papers industry who just want to latch onto oh-air-quality-is-so-hot-now trend and continue the bad data collection methodologies do not help the situation. Most such papers have less data collection honesty than afternoon student lab experiments(4).
However if the whole premise of improving air quality is based on having the right data then we should worry about getting the right data. What is the way forward? Surely, we cannot have those 50,000$ Thomas Fischer stations (5) deployed at every nook and corner. The economics will not work. Do citizen projects serve no purpose? Surely their range and resolution may not be right but can they not provide broad indicators? How do we strike the right balance in this price vs. quality debate?
The right way is to create a hierarchy of data collection units. We can use the very fine instruments from Government and laboratories that act as as reference for data collection units. We pick the sensors that are quality sensors good enough for the task. Like for air quality we are fine with a 100 PPM or 250 ppm CO sensor but we pick an NDIR one instead of a cheap chemical sensor. (6)
Second, we mix the expertise and time investment as a substitute for price. We go back to the PM sensor example that can be made reliable with the right instruments and expertise. You cannot bring down the price without developing the expertise. That is even more critical in India because typically sensors are imported and a duty needs to be paid.
We need expertise to untangle the intricacies involved in sensor measurements, work with the right instruments and churn out the next level of stations to cover a city in a systematic manner. These units would be augumneted by citizen science projects. There should be a process behind deployment and professionals in charge of accessing the quality of data. We can partition the city into a number of grids at block levels and provide one instrument in each grid. The cost of such instruments would be 10x lower so we can expect 10x more coverage than current numbers. That means we can provide 10x quality data on same budget. Hopefully with cost coming down, more actors can be sponsors of such instruments, including schools, hospitals, corporates and NGO.
The Government can augment current offering with these instruments to improve coverage. This should make identifications of hotspots easier and provide granular data for decision-making that takes care of local problems. How can we create more awareness? We cannot just leave it to the government and civic authorities to spearhead the awareness campaigns. Air quality has a price in form of health concerns for the whole community. To start the right debates, the whole community has to chip in. That means taking on board citizens, schools, hospitals, corporates and NGO.
Measurement and signages are the first step to quantify the problem but to really solve the problem; we need to invite more actors to design solutions. We need to bring down the emission levels, cut on pollution, create watchdogs for industries, publish right data, involve more people and only a holistic approach can provide solutions. Like, you can have industrial watchdogs but if the measurements are not right then they can get away scot-free. You can have right measurements and yet the watchdog agency can look the other way if we don't have the right pressure groups to ensure compliance.
Fixing just one part is not the answer. To address the concerns we need to create pressure groups, have more discussions; create more literature and design solutions. Awareness about this topic has to be integrated in the social fabric and cultural practices. RTO should check for NOX/SOX pollution levels of vehicles, citizens should report increased CO levels in vicinity and hospitals should display PM2.5 levels outside their doors. That is about the awareness and data capture parts.
To go from data to action, we need to do the right analysis too. We need to
a. Make the data available in public domain
b. Provide right format for different stakeholders
Tomorrow, Government may install 500 stations in a city but if the data is not open and available for analysis then it defeats the purpose of having stations. Look at the "Digital India" initiative. GOI departments just dump their PDF, Excel and Word files and it would be a humoungus task to sift through data and make sense of it. Citizens and researchers should demand open data that can be consumed easily by machines. What do we mean by that?
We should not assume human intelligence to act on the data to make sense out of it. To illustrate, a table of numbers in excel or PDF is also *digital* data but it is not easy to parse and get data out without human intervention. A human understands that following is same data.
However a machine cannot reach that conclusion easily. Most of the *digital* data dumps assume humans looking at that data and making sense of it.
To achieve scales, we need systems where instead of humans; machines can analyze large chunks of data. However machines do not have cognitive skills and to achieve above goals, the involved parties need to agree beforehand on formats and conventions.
Machine level automation would require this trait as a central tenet of system design and not something bolted as an afterthought. A simple way to do that is to provide API for data that different programs can use to access information. We need systems that publish simple API. Something like, I give you latitude and longitude and return me a number that is trace of carbon monoxide from nearest station. More coverage and open systems is the only way to "know" more.
You have to create right data and then you have to publish it in the right way so more people can participate. The ultimate aim is that – Machines can consume data from other machines – Machines can generate different formats for different target audience.
Second part of this paper would look at what to measure, what is Air quality index (AQI), what gases are included in AQI and what impact they have on health.
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b.21 October 1917 d.December 1985
MA Cantab(1939) MB BChir(1942) MRCP(1948) FRACP(1970) FRCP(1973)
Peter Renshaw died at Dunedin, New Zealand. He had been educated at Repton and Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Since his father was a doctor, as were many members of his family going back over four generations in the Manchester area, it is not surprising that he elected to read medicine. He proceeded to the London Hospital for his clinical training. There, through his discerning interest in his mentor's methods of teaching, he developed a style of his own which not only held the interest of his students but also encouraged them to think for themselves.
During the war he served with the RAMC in West Africa and Europe. After demobilization he was appointed medical registrar to the Luton and Dunstable Hospital, becoming senior registrar there in 1949. Applications for senior medical posts in the United Kingdom were heavily over-subscribed at this time and, in 1951, with characteristic initiative, he applied for and was appointed senior registrar to Sir Horace Smirk in Dunedin. There he enjoyed such friendship and hospitality from Sir Horace's family and his other colleagues that he never seriously considered leaving New Zealand.
In 1956 he was appointed physician and lecturer in medicine to the University of Otago, and became the first medical member on the staff of the new Wakari Hospital in Dunedin on his appointment as medical superintendent, a position he held until his retirement. His ability to judge character enabled him to collect a team which established the high reputation of the new hospital. He recruited numerous medical graduates from overseas, many of whom were surprised to get a long distance telephone call long before they expected a reply to their application. By asking a few shrewd questions, which the candidates had not anticipated, he often obtained more candid information than would have been forthcoming from a formal interview. In addition to his administrative duties, he made time to continue the clinical work and teaching which he so much enjoyed. He was made a senior lecturer to Otago University in 1970 and elected FRACP in 1975. He became a foundation member of the New Zealand College of Community Medicine in 1980, and latterly was appointed deputy medical superintendent in chief to the Otago Hospital board. He visited England regularly, returning often to his old teaching hospital, where he used to hold ward rounds for the undergraduates.
Peter was a very much repected and loved member of the medical community in Dunedin. He was always deeply concerned with the health and welfare of his junior staff. He had a keen financial sense and regularly listened to the stock market reports on the BBC World Service. Many charities benefited from his well chosen investments, including the Otago Medical Research Foundation, the New Zealand Medical Education Trust, the Dunedin Diocesan Trust Board and the Crippled Children Society. He generously loaned his house in Wanaka and his beautiful yacht, Lenticula, to his friends, including many of his juniors. Only a few weeks before his death he endowed the Peter Renshaw Charitable Trust.
At University Peter's friends gained some insight into his character when he joined the Gliding Club, for this sport enabled him to develop his many skills. He pioneered gliding in the South Island and when the Otago Gliding Club was formed he became its first president and was appointed chief flying officer. Those of us who were privileged to see the superb photographs which he took from his glider readily understood his fascination with the sport.
Since some of his forbears had had heart attacks at a relatively early age, Peter was prepared for the massive cardiac infarction which he sustained when only 46. He philosophically gave up gliding for sailing and soon became an able helmsman.
Peter always remained young at heart. He had an impish sense of humour and loved entertaining children with his conjuring tricks. His disarming charm opened many doors that were closed to the less enterprising.
He was a staunch supporter of St Paul's Cathedral in Dunedin. The funeral service there was a final tribute to one of whom it can be said 'There went a beloved physician and a gallant one withal'.
JK Wagstaff
J Hannah
J Ledingham
[N.Z.med.Journal, 22 Jan 1986]
(Volume VIII, page 406)
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Labyrinths are so called because they are equipped with an auxiliary sponge-like breathing chamber just above the gills. This chamber, or labyrinth, lets the fishes breathe atmospheric air, therefore allowing them to survive in oxygen-deficient habitats and "crawl" out of the water in search of better environments.
This group of fishes is also collectively known as Anabantids, belonging to four different families. Here are some common-name members from each family:
Anabantidae: Climbing Perch, Bush Fish
Belontiidae: Blue Gourami, Pearl Gourami, Dwarf Gourami, Siamese Fighting Fish
Helostomatidae: Kissing Gourami
Osphronemidae: Chocolate Gourami, Giant Gourami
One of the easiest aquarium fish to take care of is the gourami. Active, colorful, and tolerant of most water conditions, gouramis are good inhabitants of a community aquarium. Many of them tend to be a bit timid, though, suffering infections when more aggressive breeds bully them around or nip at their elongated ventral fins. This is why the ideal habitat for them is a well-planted set-up with cave-like structures where they can find safe refuge when necessary.
Gouramis should be bought in pairs. While they may be hard to sex as juveniles, their color definitions become more pronounced as adults -- males are generally more colorful than the females. Dorsal and anal fins are also longer in the male.
The ideal water temperature for these African and Asian breeds is slightly warm – mid-70s to low 80s F. And depending on the adult size of the gourami, small to large community tanks with good foliage will be appropriate homes for them.
Siamese Fighting Fish
No discussion on anabantids is complete without touching on the Betta splendens or the Siamese fighter. Known and bred for their exotically colorful finnage, the male fighters are best kept in individual jars or in specially designed tanks with separate compartments. Their ability to breathe air allows them to survive in what may seem to be an unpleasant habitat, like a filter-less, non-aerated tank; but more importantly, this "solo" existence is actually for their own health and safety.
In a community, the highly aggressive Betta males seek each other and fight to death. Without another male to engage, a fighting fish moves slowly and becomes prey to tankmates who will tend to nip and tear its trailing fins. Harassed, the injured male will hide and most likely die of starvation. Females who don't have trailing fins, on the other hand, easily adapt to a community set-up.
Climbing Perch
Probably the best-known labyrinth fish is the Anabas testudineus, or Climbing Perch. It is said that it got its common name from a legend that portrayed them as fish that could climb trees. The truth is, these air-breathers can't climb trees, but can stay alive in an out-of-water (but damp) condition for as long as 48 hours. If a pond is drying up, a climbing perch will "crawl" using its gills and fins to find a more suitable home. It can also sink itself in mud to stay alive.
In an aquarium, the Anabas will thrive well in a community. They prefer warm water, though, as high as 80 degrees F. They are also predominantly territorial, therefore, adequate markers, like plants, and woody shelter will make them feel more comfortable.
See also: Feeding and Breeding Labyrinths
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