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Snowden's Constitution vs Obama's Constitution
from the constitutional-analysis dept
Edward Snowden is not a constitutional lawyer. But his public statement explaining his decision to blow the whistle on what he and Congress both know to be only the "tip of the iceberg" of state snooping secrets expresses a belief in the meaning of the Constitution: in a democracy, the people – not his defense contractor employers or the government that hires them - should ultimately determine whether mass surveillance interfering with everyone's privacy is reasonable.
Some have tried to minimize the import of the snooping exposed by Snowden on the grounds that the government is just storing the information it gathers, and has not yet searched it. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Seizure – the taking of private information – is what the government has now been forced to admit in its decision to prosecute Snowden for telling the truth about their secret seizures. Whether or not the state ever chooses to "search" the seized information, the universal, non-consensual seizure itself of what used to be called "pen register" data grossly invades individual privacy and vastly empowers government, all in violation of the Constitution if "unreasonable."
The Supreme Court reads the Fourth Amendment's "unreasonable" test to mean not "objectively reasonable," United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). This would mean "reasonable" as viewed by ordinary citizens - like Snowden. The Fourth Amendment is a unique exception to the Constitution's general choice of representative democracy ("a Republican Form of Government," Art. IV, §4) over direct democracy. The term "reasonable" appears nowhere in the Constitution except in the Fourth Amendment, although it is a concept well-known to law. For example, legal negligence is a breach of what a jury determines a "reasonable man" would do in the same circumstances. A similar standard has been imported into Fourth Amendment determinations. The Supreme Court long ago said that "probable cause for a search exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer's knowledge provide a reasonably trustworthy basis for a man of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal offense has been committed or is about to take place." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). So what the public deems reasonable is what the Constitution means by reasonable. Though public opinion is always relevant to interpretations of the Constitution, this is the only context where the Constitution directly assigns to the people the power to determine what the Constitution means.
By definition, the people cannot deem to be "reasonable" what they do not know about. Snowden uniquely did know. So like a digital era Paul Revere he decided to share his knowledge with his fellow citizens to test his hypothesis that they would not consider dragnet surveillance of their private electronic communications any more reasonable than he did, and like him, as citizens, they might choose to act upon that knowledge.
A strong case can be made that Snowden is right. Hence there is no need for him, or his supporters, to concede that he has broken any law. According to the Supreme Court, "it remains a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (quoting Katz v. U.S.)
The scope and duration of the seizures revealed by Snowden make them inherently non-judicial in nature, as discussed below. Any exception to the Fourth Amendment's "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" in the absence of showing individualized probable cause – or even reasonable suspicion – that a crime is being or will imminently be committed places it well outside the judicial process. This imposes a heavy burden on the state to prove that its search was otherwise "reasonable," and not a breach of the Fourth Amendment's "bulwark against police practices that prevail in totalitarian regimes." (id. Stevens, J. dissenting).
According to the Snowden revelations the Obama administration has violated this rule. A valid warrant could not have been issued under this rule when no reasonable person could possibly believe, no matter how much irrational fear the state and its propagandists are able to drum up, that universal crime by the general public, or by Verizon subscribers in particular, has been committed or is about to take place.
The state's burden of proving reasonableness is more difficult to carry in that the Constitution was designed to prohibit in every conceivable way known to its framers just the kind of authoritarian intrusion by central government on autonomous self-governing citizens that the Bush and Obama administrations' power-grabbing, privacy-invading nationwide snooping on innocent citizens represents. At least three constitutional protections against tyranny in addition to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement should also invalidate such encroachments.
In his Federalist #47, James Madison explained the separation of powers principle: "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." The dual sovereignty of the federal system was intended to further divide those separated powers between what is truly of national concern and what is of only local concern. "By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power. "Bond v. United States,131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (Kennedy, J., for unanimous Court ).
The question as to separation of powers is: which branch of the state, if any, can be trusted to accurately discern and express the judgment of the people as to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a permanent and universal regime of search and seizure of private communications? Since the subject restrained by the Fourth Amendment is the state acting in its executive capacity, the contours of the restraint on executive powers cannot be left to the subjective determination of the executive branch itself. Allowing the executive branch to decide the reasonableness of its own actions would defeat the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Hence the views of Obama, his prosecutors, military, and spies are all irrelevant to this determination. They stand accused of violating the rule of reasonableness which, not them, but the people must decide.
The judicial power under Article III of the Constitution extends only to the application of law in individual cases. Like stories, cases have a beginning, a middle and an end. The state does not have the power to initiate and courts do not have the power to hear a never-ending case against the whole population of the United States, or even against the subset of all the customers of Verizon. Only a police state with its secret tribunals takes such an adversarial posture against its own people. Where the government diffusely suspects and secretly snoops on the whole people, in a democracy, it is the government itself that proves itself illegitimate, unrepresentative, unreasonable, and in violation of its oath to support the Constitution.
The power to make rules that affect everyone into the indefinite future is inherently a legislative and not a judicial power. An unelected "court" that violates the separation of powers by exercising legislative powers in order to make new rules empowering the executive in secret collaboration between the two separate branches is the very definition of tyranny, in Madison's terms. Having a judge authorize an act does not turn that authorization into a "judicial process" as required by Katz. No judge or magistrate, let alone one judge of a multi-judge tribunal, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly acting in secret even from her own secret FISA court, can exercise Article III judicial authority, let alone collaborate with Article II executive power, to decree a universal and unending search or seizure of private communications. Any such unlimited "search and seizure" of persons who are not even suspects takes place inherently "outside the judicial process" of cases. As stated in Acevedo and Katz quoted above, it is therefore presumed "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
A legislature authentically representative of the people might determine that such a generalized search is a reasonable and necessary exception to this per se rule under some "specifically established and well-delineated" circumstance "that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,'" Katz (Harlan, J, at 361). That has obviously not been done. Few in Congress were even aware of the scope of the snooping being conducted by the Obama administration and its strained interpretations of law. Nor were they aware of the advisory opinions from a nominal court in fact acting as a secret unelected legislature acting in secret complicity with the executive branch to circumvent constitutional norms and usurp its legislative power.
Legislators were in any event proscribed from sharing with their constituents any knowledge they did acquire. Hence they could not represent any views of their constituents about the reasonability of secret spying which their constituents did not even know about.
With respect to federalism, the general police power to define and enforce criminal law resides with the states, not the federal government. Most of what the federal government now targets as part of its domestic "war on terrorism," which it invokes to justify universal snooping, in fact constitutes the local common law crimes traditionally described as "riot" or "mayhem." The federal government has no generalized power to enforce state criminal law or make its own. There is no general power given the federal government in the Constitution to "fight terror," which is a tactic. The government therefore has an initial burden to prove that its invasion of the privacy of every target of its dragnet surveillance program was "necessary and proper" to enforce some specific federal power that is enumerated in the Constitution.
This proof has been alleged but, if it exists at all, it remains hidden under a blanket assertion of state secrecy. What the people can see before their own eyes is the most expensive security state in the history of the world incompetent to prevent, except for those attempts resulting primarily from the state's own entrapments, several atrocious domestic crimes having varying degrees of international provenance. If spying actually did prevent other attempted crimes, as alleged, then where are the attempt indictments and prosecutions to prove it?
Since the "war" against terrorism is not a war in any traditional meaning of the term, but rather law enforcement by military means, and the NSA is a military spy agency, the Third Amendment command that, "No solider shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house" may be dusted off for application in the information age to this extreme case of state intrusion into private homes.
This is a time of peace in North America both because Congress has not declared war in any traditional notion of the term, and because the framer's original concept of war did not include overseas imperial adventures. The Third Amendment bespeaks war within the United States.
Electronic communications capacity has become an inherent feature of any modern dwelling house in the United States. Yet every electronic communication originated and sent from private homes is being seized by the military. Such permanent residence by Big Brother military spies within one's private stream of communications could be seen as an updated form of unconstitutional "quartering," the same kind of abuse of power by the military against citizens that the founders detested and prohibited, except in time of war
Aside from these constitutional restrictions on Congress from authorizing a universal spying program, and Congress's actual failure to assess and represent general public views about the reasonableness of mass spying, there is another factor that precludes Congress as it functions in the era of money in politics from representing the objective public view of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
What makes a modern Paul Revere like Edward Snowden necessary is that even Congress itself cannot be trusted to represent the will of the people, in these corrupt times, on virtually any subject on which money speaks. Polls consistently show confidence in Congress declining to around 10%, while about 80% of voters consider the government to be illegitimate in terms of the Declaration, i.e., lacking the "consent of the governed." Of likely voters, 69% think Congress will "break the rules" for their financial contributors. Other polls express the country's universal understanding (95%) that big money invests in politics for the large financial returns it earns by controlling government.
Such polls indicate a widespread understanding that Congress does not represent the people in any real sense. Its members and leadership are widely perceived as instead beholden to money. No politician wins office without some compromise of democratic legitimacy by dependence on plutocrats and special interest money, and certainly not a governing majority and its leadership without a lot of such money. Thus enactment of a law by Congress purporting to determine what the people think is reasonable is not necessarily a valid constitutional law that mirrors objective reasonableness.
Even aside from the lucrative government surveillance contracts that special interest money secures from Congress to subsidize "America's last growth industry," the plutocrats who buy enough politicians to dictate policy feel more secure when the people are stripped of their liberties. Without civil liberties, the people of the United States cannot sustain a democracy dependent upon that "consent of the governed" engraved on its foundation stone when laid in 1776. Without civil liberty, money can continue to rule by purchasing influence from its elected peddlers. In this corrupted system what the overwhelming majority of people may consider reasonable is now irrelevant to members of Congress, whether the subject is establishing effective weapon background checks or anything else opposed by the plutocrat class who pays them. See Martin Gilens, Affluence & Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (2012). Congress can thus not reliably represent the public's view of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, even if it had tried.
What do the American people consider reasonable concerning mass surveillance? A Washington Post poll (question #8) taken after the Boston Marathon bombing suggests that most Americans with an opinion would worry that government surveillance in the name of fighting terrorism would be unreasonable (i.e. "go too far"):
"Which worries you more: that the government (will not go far enough to investigate terrorism because of concerns about constitutional rights), or that it (will go too far in compromising constitutional rights in order to investigate terrorism)?
Will not go far enough: 41%
Will go too far: 48%
Neither (vol.): 5%
No opinion: 4%
A Pew poll taken after the Snowden revelations confirmed that a similar majority finds mass surveillance unreasonable. They answered "no" by 52-45% to the straightforward question: "Should the gov't be able to monitor everyone's email to prevent possible terrorism?" On the question of whether Snowden's NSA leak "serves the public interest" a majority with an opinion thinks it did, by 49-44%. If they "knew government had collected their data," 63% said they "would feel their personal privacy was violated." Of those respondents who agree with the Tea Party, 65% "Disapprove Gov't collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts."
A TIME poll has 54% thinking Snowden did a "good thing," in response to a neutrally phrased question: "Do you feel that the person who leaked the information about this secret program did a good thing in informing the American public or a bad thing?
A Washington Post/ABC Poll asked: "The NSA surveillance program was classified as secret, and was made public by a former government contractor named Edward Snowden. Do you support or oppose Snowden being charged with a crime for disclosing the NSA surveillance program?"
A majority having an opinion opposed prosecution 48-43%, with independents opposing even more. An overwhelming majority of 65% supported "having the U.S. Congress hold public hearings on the NSA surveillance program," suggesting the public dismisses the claimed need for secrecy as being more important than their own privacy interests.
When such a majority, or even a substantial minority, opposes government snooping in everyone's electronic communications, that should be a conclusive indication as to whether such a search and seizure is generally viewed as unreasonable. If reasonable people can differ on the question, then such a search and seizure cannot be held to be reasonable. "Reasonable" is what any reasonable person would accept. As one scholar recently observed, "the actual course that Internet surveillance law will take remains extremely difficult to predict." That is because such a public consensus of reasonableness has not been reliably and formally determined and expressed. It is important for the public to step in now to resolve this uncertainty by formulating and expressing informed views on reasonableness of dragnet surveillance. The "judicial" appraisal of reasonableness that has taken place outside of public view is only a single data-point for the public to consider in reaching its own independent assessment of reasonableness.
Those who would rely upon Smith v. Maryland (1979) for a rule that pen registers are inherently exempt from the Fourth Amendment, due to the court-determined lack of public "expectation" of privacy with regard to dialed telephone numbers, ignore the Court's important proviso in that case that swallows any such firm rule based primarily on word-play. The five-judge majority held that such attributed "expectations" would not govern, and "a normative inquiry would be proper … [f]or example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry," 442 U.S. 740-741, n. 5, which has essentially just happened, for all private digital communications purposes.
In other words, it is not what the public cynically "expects" from a tyrannical and intrusive government that secretly evades its constitutional obligations, but what the public "normatively" considers reasonable which must govern application of the Fourth Amendment. The people are thus entitled to "expect" what they think is reasonable conduct from their government even if such conduct is not in fact forthcoming from a government demonstrably not dependent upon their opinion, and the public knows it. Otherwise, as Justice Marshall wrote, reliance on public "expectations" in the sense of factual predictions of government behavior, "would allow the government to define the scope of Fourth Amendment protections."
Three Smith dissenters, Marshall and Brennan, expressly, and Stewart, implicitly, thought the "normative" exception should have governed the Smith case itself. Smith was a case where the pen register targeted the phone of a specific suspect of a specific crime against a known victim involving use of the telephone, the evidence of which crime was strong enough that the suspect was ultimately convicted. The Court's rationale was that Smith reasonably expected the telephone company to know the number he called, which knowledge – once shared with the police - provided evidence of his guilt.
Smith provides no support for the idea that the public would either expect or consider "normatively" reasonable the indiscriminate maintenance of pen registers for all the electronic communications of persons, the overwhelming portion of whom were not remotely suspected, let alone probably guilty, of any specific crime either involving or not involving such communications.
Justice Marshall also cogently attacked the word-play foundations of Smith by pointing out that because persons may release private information to a third party for one purpose "it does not follow that they expect this information to be made available to the public in general or the government in particular. Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all." Since the false dichotomy of expectations used by the majority is a logical fallacy and propaganda technique, the public would likely find far more reasonable the relativist view of privacy expressed by Justice Marshall that "[t]hose who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes" without a warrant.
Whether the contrary holding by the Smith majority was unreasonable is a question for the public to decide, and courts to merely discern, not dictate. For a Fourth Amendment determination of what is "unreasonable" the Supreme Court does not have the power to decree, but only mirror and reflect, the public's objective sense of reasonableness of government intrusions on their individual privacy.
The standard remedy against the state for making an unreasonable search or seizure is a damages claim against the officials involved where a jury would determine reasonableness. At the time of the Constitution this was the practice for protection of citizens from state intrusion. "An officer who searched or seized without a warrant did so at his own risk; he would be liable for trespass, including exemplary [i.e., punitive] damages, unless the jury found that his action was "reasonable." … [T]he Framers [of the Fourth Amendment] endeavored to preserve the jury's role in regulating searches and seizures." 500 U.S. 581-2 (Scalia. J., concurring).
A jury, properly selected and informed, can be fairly representative of, and a legitimate disinterested proxy for, informed public opinion. A civil jury is thereby institutionally capable of reflecting what society at large considers reasonable. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 48, requires a unanimous verdict of at least six jurors. Thus a fairly small minority of jurors representing a similar minority of the public can force either a compromise verdict by which alleged snooping is found unreasonable, or at least a mistrial if other jurors refuse to negotiate.
The problem with the civil justice solution contemplated by the Constitution's Seventh Amendment however is that courts have invented official immunities to protect government officials from juries. E.g. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). This tends to remove the question of Fourth Amendment reasonableness from the jury where the Constitution originally placed it, and delegate that decision right back to those very officials who cannot be trusted to guard the chicken-coop, and to the judges who invent defenses subversive of the Constitution in order to exempt those officials from their constitutional responsibility. Even aside from judge-made official immunities, new judge-made "standing to sue" rules prevent victims of unconstitutional secret surveillance from seeking any remedy in court without prior individualized evidence. E.g. ACLU v. NSA. Judge-made state-secret and sovereign immunity doctrines, in catch-22 fashion, block plaintiffs from getting that evidence.
The Justices on the Supreme Court appointed through an increasingly corrupt and unrepresentative political process (three justices of the Smith majority were Nixon appointees) cannot be trusted to reflect the public's objective view of what may be a reasonable sacrifice of privacy in exchange for achieving some proportionate benefit toward achieving legitimate law enforcement goals. As observed by one of the last great Supreme Court Justices, appointed just prior to the institutionalization of Nixonian corruption, in Fourth Amendment cases the "Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's fight against crime." (Stevens, J.). The government's proportionality analysis between loss of liberty and security is difficult to take seriously when, as one comedian observes, falling furniture accidents cause more harm than the terrorism offered to justify its new erosion of liberties.
If any branch of the state were conceded the formal power to decide Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the current environment of the independence from the will of the people by all three separate branches of the state, and their corrupt dependence on the will of money, it would inevitably use that power to cancel the people's civil liberties, as it has already done in secret. The remaining public forum where the public may yet formulate and express its judgment about the reasonableness of mass surveillance purporting to target terror is a criminal jury trial.
Bradley Manning was denied his constitutional right to such a trial because of the paradoxical notion that the US Military, which is uniformly sworn "to support this Constitution" as required by Article VI (cl. 3) thereof, can operate as a Constitution-free zone in its treatment of soldiers like Manning under the false pretense that their actual sworn duty is to do anything the military determines necessary or proper for promoting "security" against shadowy "enemies."
The Supreme Court has held that "the constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the armed forces … itself does not empower Congress to deprive people of trials under Bill of Rights safeguards, and we are not willing to hold that power to circumvent those safeguards should be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause." So far this broad principle has been applied only to honorably discharged soldiers, Toth v Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21-22 (1955), as well as, fortunately for Snowden, any civilian, even if tried abroad, Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), including the military's own civilian employees, like Snowden. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
It remains for a soldier like Manning to expose the military's betrayal of its universal oath to support the Constitution by winning application of the Bill of Rights to at least those cases, like his, involving other than uniquely military crimes like desertion, see Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 20 How. 65 (1857), or cases not driven by the exigencies of the actual battlefield. The battlefield exception supposedly justifies the betrayal, but in fact excuses only skipping the Fifth Amendment indictment of a soldier who is "in actual service in time of War or public danger" not a Sixth Amendment trial.
Snowden, if he chooses to return to the United States to face trial or is forced to do so – notwithstanding that he has a compelling claim to political refugee status– will present a difficult target for the money-stream media to demonize, although they are trying. Unlike the case of Manning, the government must provide Snowden a public trial fully compliant with the Bill of Rights. On the evidence of his well-articulated public statements, Snowden would seem to have the makings of a good witness and, on a level playing field, a capable match for tyrants, both in and outside the courtroom.
In any Sixth Amendment criminal trial of Snowden, a profoundly important – even defining - issue will be weighed in the balance. If Snowden did catch the state massively violating its Fourth Amendment obligations in the view of even a significant minority of the public, then the interests in maintaining the secrecy of those police-state surveillance methods cannot constitutionally receive any legal support whatsoever from a justice system operating under the Constitution.
A number even smaller than the majority that polls show generally favor Snowden would be sufficient to predictably prevent a representative jury of 12 peers from unanimously finding the state's search to be reasonable. F.R.Crim.P., R. 23, 31(d).
Obama's aspiring police-state's whole project of classifying its violations of the Constitution should then fall. Keeping his violations of the Constitution secret might be constitutionally "necessary" to carry out Obama's goals, but it is not "proper" if the surveillance state goals themselves are unreasonable. If the underlying snooping is unreasonable, the secrecy of the snooping, and the effort to punish one blowing the whistle on this secret unconstitutional project would all be a profoundly illegal abuse of power.
Snowden has a different argument that his revelation to countries who are not enemies of the United States about US hacking is also not punishable. State-sponsored hacking is increasingly seen as an act of aggression inconsistent with international law, a principle accepted by the U.S. which has also made domestic hacking a serious crime. The same rule that the state cannot enforce any law solely to keep secret and abet its own illegal conduct would apply to these revelations as well. The state must obey the law, not operate like organized crime enforcers eliminating witnesses to their crimes.
A criminal jury's independence in handling this question of reasonableness in Snowden's case would seem definitive of whether the US is a police state or still possesses sufficient civil liberties to peacefully reclaim its democracy. Surely every citizen who has information about a crime is obliged to provide that information in accordance with legal processes that comply with the Constitution. But neither pervasive government secrecy nor enduring mass surveillance is consistent with the democracy established by the U.S. Constitution. In any Snowden trial the preservation of the original constitutional protection against creation of a police state will require that a fairly impaneled and informed jury decide this question of reasonableness without interference from the state apparatus of secret courts and secret laws that belie any notion of due process.
Since the US justice system cannot be trusted, as a matter of course, to provide constitutional due process, Snowden would need to negotiate the rules of the game before consenting to face a U.S. trial. He has some strong cards to play in such negotiations, if he can stay alive. If he plays those cards 1) to draw a judge not blackmailed by or otherwise secretly dependent upon the national security state, 2) to get a fair jury impaneled, and then 3) to fairly place before that jury the question whether the government's snooping was unreasonable, he need not remain a fugitive from US injustice.
Such a trial would constitute a fair test, and a useful one, of whether Snowden was guilty of anything other than defending the Constitution in the noble spirit of '76, whether Obama and his military is guilty of impeachable wholesale violation of the Constitution, and whether the US has retained sufficient liberty that it can still be counted among the world's democracies, a status that Europe is beginning to doubt. Although if ignorant politicians and propagandists in and outside of government continue to charge Snowden with espionage, under the bizarre notion that his revelations to the US public of its government's secret violations of the Constitution amounts to intentional "adhering to [the US's] Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort," he may eventually not be able to obtain a fair trial in the US at all, due to jury panel bias.
Given the highly politicized US judiciary, Snowden is wisely playing for time and a stronger hand by first seeking justice in a political asylum process or extradition hearing, whether it would have taken place in Hong Kong or now elsewhere. Hong Kong was a good initial choice. British standards of justice there have not been entirely eradicated under its current Chinese rulers and, unlike the US, the Chinese government had no apparent axe of its own to grind in the Snowden affair.
By international standards, the US and its judiciary rank below Hong Kong on a 2012-13 rule of law index. While American propagandists routinely imply that the US system is a paragon against which all others must be measured, in fact, objectively, Hong Kong ranks #8 and #9 respectively on absence of corruption and quality of its criminal justice system, well ahead of the US's #18 and #26 rankings. The World Economic Forum – which certainly suffers no anti-US or general anti-plutocrat biases -- ranks Hong Kong #12 in its 2012-13 index on judicial independence. That is substantially higher than the appallingly low US ranking of #38 on the same index, which is proportionately not that far ahead of China's #66 ranking. If due process was his priority, Snowden was clearly no fool in choosing sanctuary in Hong Kong, though he is aware of the coercive and corrupting power that the US can and does bring to bear on virtually any country. Though China is better situated than most to resist such pressure, it appears that even China preferred not to pay the cost. Or perhaps his security could not guaranteed as effectively in Hong Kong as in Moscow, for the time being.
The paradox to be resolved is that the US justice system cannot be trusted to rein in a secrecy-obsessed and vengeful government exposed in illegal conduct as necessary to permit a fair trial to go forward under constitutional protections; but at the same time a legal process is the only means to resolve the question about the constitutionality of the government's conduct and Snowden's innocence.
As Snowden forum-shops and otherwise jousts with the US government within an international legal context, he might consider making an offer to voluntarily participate in his trial, prior to any extradition, from outside the country by telecommunication with the courtroom. Such practices for taking evidence are allowed by law and are not uncommon. Rule 43 of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "For good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location." Cf. F.R.Crim.P 26. Snowden's legitimate fear of returning to the US would seem good cause and his now widely followed case a compelling circumstance to use electronic means for cutting through the dilemma and allowing legal proceedings in his case to move toward some conclusion without Snowden having to trust a defective U.S. justice process to preserve his rights.
Such a digital age trial would no doubt attract a large audience, serving the ultimate purpose of educating, along with the jury, the American people – and even the world – about one of the most fundamental democratic rights.
Such an offer by Snowden could only strengthen the hand of any country who takes what his experience in China has apparently shown to be the costly act of resisting an extradition request by the U.S. The asylum country could insist that before it will entertain any extradition request, the U.S, must obtain a conviction of Snowden through such a fair "in absentia" proceeding following constitutional procedures as might be agreed by Snowden – rather than make a mere allegation that can as easily be characterized as political repression. Until then an asylum country would be justified in claiming that what Snowden did was no crime as indicated by the supportive polls indicating that it is the U.S, government, not Snowden, who has acted unreasonably and therefore illegally.
Any trial of Edward Snowden will determine how much of the 1791 Constitution remains in force in one of the great civil liberties contests in American history. The jury – and the American people – would then choose between Obama's Constitution, which insulates the state – and those who buy influence peddled by its politicians – from the consent of the governed by manipulating reality, or Snowden's Constitution which empowers an informed people to protect themselves against tyrannical state intrusions upon their liberty by "uncovering" reality. If Snowden is who he appears to be, his trial could be comparable to the celebrated John Peter Zenger Trial in colonial times. Though, as then, the judiciary presides over what amounts to a taxed-without-representation colony of an illegitimate ruling class which it serves, a fairly selected and instructed jury, supported by the people, watched by the world, could nonetheless – by standing in solidarity against that class – win a resounding victory for liberty.
Rob Hager writes on public corruption issues and is a public interest litigator who wrote and filed briefs in the Supreme Court's 2012 Montana states rights sequel to Citizens United, American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock.
Filed Under: 4th amendment, constitution, ed snowden, laws, reasonable, search and seizure, us


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Graduate Council Meeting
March 1, 2012
I. The meeting was called to order at 2:05 p.m.
Voting members and alternates present were: J. Allen, G. Alter, A. Chamberlain, J. Coleman, D. Cool,
B. Gray, M. Gruys, P. Ilagan, M. Kazimierczuk, M. McNutt, B. Milligan, L. Ream, J. Runkle, M. Schultz,
E. Self, T. Tarpey, J. Tipps, L. VandeCreek, S. Watamaniuk.
Non-voting members, alternates and other attendees were: B. Ayres, M. Bargerhuff, M. Brainerd,
C. Brun, L. Caron, D. Cipollini, E. Gilles (scribe), A. Goshtasby, L. Hofmeyer, L. Hong, A. Hsu (chair),
C. Loranger, D. Voss, J. Warfield.
II. Approval of Minutes
It was moved and seconded that the minutes of the February 2, 2012 meeting be approved as written. Motion carried unanimously.
III. Report of the Dean (A. Hsu)
a. Enrollment and Recruitment – The Graduate School received an enrollment report from Institutional Research for Fall 2012; there is a 19% increase in graduate applications from Fall 2011 despite the fact that applications are down nationally. The increase may be a result of the Graduate School's marketing efforts. The latest effort is ½ page ads in WPAFB's newspaper, The Skywriter, that run every other week and feature a different graduate program each time.
b. Spring Graduate Open House – April 10, 2012. The yield of graduate applications is much higher at this event than any other recruiting event; the Graduate School will continue this event for now.
c. Graduate Student Excellence Awards – Nominations will be accepted until April 23; the awards program will take place on May 16.
d. Graduate Council Elections for 2012-2013 –One third of the current members of Grad Council will need to be replaced for the 2012-2013 academic year (one representative from each college/school). Recall that the Faculty Constitution that was approved last year changed the composition of Graduate Council; please refer to the Graduate Council Manual for the current policies and procedures. The Graduate School would like to receive the election results by May 1, or at least by the end of spring quarter. An announcement for the elections will be emailed to the Deans some time in the next few weeks.
e. Policy on Graduate Research Assistant Tuition Remission – An ad-hoc committee of the Research Council will be formed to discuss policy for graduate research tuition remissions. Any proposals from this ad-hoc committee will be reviewed by the Grad Council's Policies Committee and Graduate Council.
IV. Committee Reports
a. Policies Committee (G. Alter)
1. Policy 3.100 Graduate Program Review – Per the request of the Graduate Council members at the February 2012 meeting, the Policies Committee met to discuss the frequency for graduate program reviews. The Committee recommended that the following language be added to the policy: "When possible, these reviews will coincide with accreditation reviews, and will normally occur every 5-10 years." On behalf of the Policies Committee, G. Alter moved to approve Policy 3.100 as it is now written. No discussion. A. Hsu called for a vote. All in favor. Motion carried.
2. Policy 1.40 Admission of Students with Three Year Bachelor's Degrees – The recommended changes to the policy are more prescriptive and make allowances for the European three year bachelor's programs. The policy was also updated to be consistent with current policies and procedures for the English programs. On behalf of the Policies Committee, G. Alter moved to approve the changes to Policy 1.40 as indicated in the "Admissions Policy for Students with 3-Year Bachelor's Degrees" memo dated Jan. 20, 2012, and revised by the Policies Committee on Feb. 15 and 23, 2012. Discussion: In the event that the state of Ohio and HLC approve 3-year bachelor's programs, then WSU will accept the degrees under this policy. A. Hsu called for a vote. All in favor. Motion carried.
3. Policy 4.52 and 4.53 Senior Permission – On behalf of the Policies Committee, G. Alter moved to approve the addition to Policy 4.53 that adds "Undergraduate students already possessing a bachelor's degree are eligible to apply as non-degree graduate students and are not permitted to register under this policy," and the replacement language to policy 4.52 from "162 or more quarter hours or 108 semester hours earned toward the bachelor's degree" to "senior status." No discussion. A. Hsu called for a vote. All in favor. Motion carried.
b. Membership Committee (B. Gray)
The Graduate School Dean approved 9 new graduate faculty members (5 Regular, 4 Adjunct). The Membership Committee is reviewing a few nominations and is awaiting additional information.
c. Curriculum Committee A (L. Ream)
1. Master of Science in Teaching (Earth Science) program low residency option –The MS in Teaching (Earth Science) program has been in existence for over 30 years and has been a highly successful online program for the past 10 years. The low residency option recruits students from outside WSU and only requires one week long seminar on campus in summer semester. Only one new semester course will be developed for this program. On behalf of the Curriculum Committee A, L. Ream moved to approve the proposal for adding a low residency option to the MS in Teaching (Earth Science) program as written. Discussion: It is assumed that the EES and CEHS faculty will continue to teach these courses. To clarify the current residency requirement, the online program is only offered to WSU students now. This proposal only requires Graduate Council approval; no further approval is needed. A. Hsu called for a vote. All in favor. Motion carried.
2. Physics Combined Degree Program – This proposal is similar to the other combined degree programs that have been approved by Graduate Council in the past year. The proposal allows four 6000/7000 level courses to be used as electives in the BS program. There are no changes to the existing courses. On behalf of the Curriculum Committee A, L. Ream moved to approve the Physics combined degree program as written. Discussion: Upon Graduate Council's approval, this proposal will be reviewed by Faculty Senate. It has already been approved by UCAPC. A. Hsu called for a vote. All in favor. Motion carried.
d. Joint Curriculum Committees (C. Loranger)
1. Course Inventory Requests: PSC 790, PSC 792, PSC 795 – These three courses will be offered this spring and are part of the Cyber Security program. The Curriculum Committees requested one small change to the enrollment restrictions but otherwise felt that the requests met course requirements. On behalf of Curriculum Committees A and B, C. Loranger moved to approve the course inventory requests for PSC 790, PSC 792, and PSC 795 as written with the amendment to the enrollment restrictions. No discussion. A. Hsu called for a vote. All in favor. Motion carried.
2. Full Proposal – Master of Science in Cyber Security / Master of Cyber Security – The MS in Cyber Security program will be housed in CECS and focuses on developing technology. The Master of Cyber Security program will be housed in SOPP and is interdisciplinary, focusing on the end-product users of security apparatus. Upon review, the Curriculum Committees asked for more development of some key points in the proposal. With the revisions, the Curriculum Committees feel that the proposal meets RACGS guidelines. On behalf of Curriculum Committees A and B, C. Loranger moved to approve the full proposal for the Master of Science in Cyber Security / Master of Cyber Security. No discussion. A. Hsu called for a vote. All in favor. Motion carried.
e. Student Affairs Committee (C. Brun)
The Committee met to review the first round of nominations for the Graduate Council Scholar awards. Two offers were made; one has been accepted so far. The deadline to submit nominations for the second round is March 15. The decision will be made by April 1.
V. Graduate Student Assembly (L. Hofmeyer)
The GSA recently awarded the first round of Original Work and Professional Development Grants. The GSA received 14 applications; 9 graduate students received awards (3 Original Work grants and 6 Prof Development grants) for a total of $4650.00. The funds for these grants come from the Student Organization Budget Committee. A second round of applications will be accepted until March 26. The email announcement will be sent to all Graduate Council members.
VI. Unfinished Business - None
VII. New Business - None
VIII. Discussion - None
IX. The meeting was adjourned at 2:45 p.m.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
East Haven mayor's 'taco' remark causes uproar
East Haven Mayor Joseph A. Maturo Jr.'s reaction to the indictment of four cops on federal civil rights charges might have taken some of the national focus off his troubled police department.
Members of Congress, Gov. Dannel P. Malloy and a variety of state lawmakers on Wednesday teed off on Maturo's remarks to a New York TV reporter, when he quipped Tuesday that he might go home and eat tacos as a way to reach out to his Latino constituents.
Maturo apologized Wednesday for the comment, saying it was "stupid" and blaming the incident on stress.
But the mayor has other problems, including a simmering conflict over his disability retirement.
On Sept. 2 of last year, more than two months before the election in which Maturo defeated Democratic Mayor April Capone by 34 votes, the State Comptroller's office warned that if he won, the monthly disability pension he has been receiving since October of 1991 would end.
Now, Maturo is battling Comptroller Kevin Lembo to keep the $43,184.76-a-year disability for back injuries he sustained on the job as an East Haven firefighter. He has been receiving the benefits since October 1991.
Maturo and his attorney, Lawrence C. Sgnignari of Hamden, did not return calls for comment on Wednesday. But Brenda K. Halpin, director of the Retirement Services Division in the Comptroller's office, said Wednesday that the issue has not been decided.
"Mr. Maturo has appealed the Connecticut Municipal Employee Retirement System's decision to terminate his disability retirement," Halpin said. "Our office is reviewing that appeal and has not yet made a final determination."
In the Sept. 2 letter, signed by Halpin and sent to thousands of retired municipal employees, she warned that their disability benefits could end if they work more than 20 hours a week for more than 90 days.
In a second letter sent only to Maturo, Halpin reiterated her warning. "If the re-employment exceeds the 90 working days per calendar year, the retiree's benefit must be terminated and the retiree must repay all the pension payments he has received in the 90-day period," Halpin wrote in a Nov. 21 letter.
Although he was in Switzerland at the World Economic Forum, Malloy on Wednesday led a rising wave of criticism against Maturo's ethnic remark.
"The comments by East Haven Mayor Joseph Maturo are repugnant," Malloy said in a statement from the Capitol. "They represent either a horrible lack of judgment or worse, an underlying insensitivity to our Latino community that is unacceptable. Being tired is no excuse. He owes an apology to the community, and more importantly, he needs to show what he's going to do to repair the damage he's done. And he needs to do it today."
House Majority Leader Brendan Sharkey, D-Hamden, called for Maturo's resignation.
"Mr. Maturo's comments reflect not only an insensitivity to the Latino community in general, but an inability to grasp the seriousness of the problem his town is facing. East Haven has work to do, and Mayor Maturo should step down if he is not up to the task."
Republican Danbury Mayor Mark Boughton said Maturo should dismantle and rebuild his police department.
"There seems to be a pervasive attitude, at least among some members of the department, and I would take it apart and start from scratch," Boughton said. "Regarding the comments by the mayor, they were completely insensitive, totally inappropriate and just wrong. He has apologized, but one of your most-important jobs is understanding your constituency and listening to them."
A New Haven-based immigration-reform group called Junta for Progressive Action on Wednesday announced a campaign in which people are invited to text "Taco" to 69866. The organization said it would total up the number of texts and send a corresponding number of tacos to Maturo's office on Thursday.
State Rep. Andres Ayala, D-Bridgeport, a Puerto Rican, said he was "completely appalled" by Maturo. And U.S. Rep. Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., also criticized Maturo.
The furor caused by Maturo stems from remarks he made Tuesday. On that day, four East Haven police officers were arrested by the FBI on civil rights charges that they intimidated and terrorized Latino residents and tried to cover up their offenses. The four pleaded not guilty to the charges. Hours after their arrests, WPIX11's Mario Diaz asked Maturo, "What are you doing for the Latino community today?"
"I might have tacos when I go home," Maturo replied. "I'm not quite sure yet."
Wednesday morning, speaking on WPLR-FM's "Chaz and AJ" morning show, Maturo said "It was stupid, it was insensitive and I gave my detractors ... a reason to make matters worse with a `gotcha' and an insensitive and stupid answer to something I should have never said."
Later in the day, Maturo issued a statement apologizing for his comments.
The mayor said the "community needs to refocus on healing together." He said the administration has taken steps in that process, creating an advisory committee to the mayor named "LEARN" (Law Enforcement Advisory Resource Network) to update the policies and procedures of the police department. The board includes Jose Velasquez, a community volunteer and native of Puerto Rico.
The working-class community of 28,000 along the Long Island Sound shoreline has seen its Latino population double in the past decade, creating racial tensions, according to advocates of the Latino population.
Maturo, first elected in 1997, served as the town's mayor for 10 years before losing to Capone in 2007. It took a recount for him to lose his seat, and another recount, this time in his favor, to get the top spot in town hall back in 2011.
Staff writers Tom Cleary and John Pirro contributed to this report.


text:
I've been busy making bunting.
I thought it would be ever so quick and simple to make, but it turns out it's rather time-consuming. First I had to draft a template and gather the various supplies (fabric of course, plus tape or bias binding). Then I made a prototype, to work out what the best size and spacing would be. I altered that a bit, and then I started on the real thing.
So far I've made three lots of bunting – two of the grey one you can see here, and then a brown one. With this being the year of the Diamond Jubilee/London Olympic Games/whatever else is going on, I'm planning to make some in rather more patriotic colours as well. I've got some nice stripey fabrics, some with red and white, and some with blue and white
At first, I had planned to make about ten sets, but it's taking so long that I'm wondering if my patience will run out before then. First I cut up the triangles, then I ironed them, pinning them together in pairs (with the right side of the fabric facing inwards). I sewed down the long sides of each triangle, leaving the top open so that I could then turn them right side out. That bit is a bit of a faff – it's quite fiddly work trying to turn out the pointy bit of the bunting (alas, comments have been already about the fact that they don't end in a particularly pointy point, but I have done my best…). After that they need ironing again, and then pinning along a length of tape or bias binding. Bias binding is a little easier to work with as it folds so readily, but I was able to get a much better price on a length of 50m of tape (this was back in the time when I thought I would EASILY make 50m worth of bunting) and so that's what I've been using most of the time. You fold the tape in half, so that it covers the open edges on the short (top) bit of each triangle. Then you have to sew all the way along the tape – which again is quite fiddly as it's quite a narrow strip by this stage.
Still, despite the time it's taken, I'm happy with how the first few lots have turned out. I don't think my career in bunting production is going to be quite as lucrative as I'd hoped though – I'd have to charge a lot to really make it worth my while, and I think that would put people off buying it altogether.
(I should mention that the kitchen in the picture isn't mine – thank you to my mother, who both let me use her kitchen to take pictures, and stood holding up the other ending of the bunting while I did so.)


text:
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., Tuesday night was the first out of the gate with his selections of three Democratic senators to sit on the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, which was part of the debt ceiling deal reached by President Barack Obama and Republican leaders.
Reid named to the committee Senate Democratic Conference Secretary Patty Murray, D-Wash.; Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont.; and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, D-Mass.
Speaker of the House John Boehner, R-Ohio, announced early on Wednesday his GOP picks for the committee, which are Rep. Jeb Hensarling, R-Texas; and Reps. Dave Camp and Fred Upton, both of Michigan. Hensarling will co-chair the committee along with Murray.
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., also named on Wednesday his picks, which are Sens. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz.; Pat Toomey, R-Pa.; and Rob Portman, R-Ohio.
House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., has until Tuesday, Aug. 16, to name three members to the panel. The bipartisan, bicameral committee will be comprised of 12 members—six from each Chamber and equally divided between Democrats and Republicans.
The committee is charged with developing legislation that provides $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction by Thanksgiving. Reid said in a statement announcing his nominations that the committee has been given "broad leeway" to examine all areas for deficit reduction, and that the committee's legislation will be given "expedited consideration, with a guaranteed up-or-down vote in the Senate before Christmas."
Obama said Monday, after the markets took a nosedive on news of Standard and Poor's downgrade of U.S. debt to AA+, that the solution to reducing the nation's deficit is combining spending cuts with "tax reform and modest adjustments to healthcare programs like Medicare." Friday's downgrade news from S&P, he went on to say, will give the nation "a renewed sense of urgency," to reduce the deficit. However, he said the current environment in Washington of refusing "to put what's best for the country ahead of self-interest and ideaology must change."
Reid said in the statement announcing his appointments that the Joint Select Committee "has been charged with forging the balanced, bipartisan approach to deficit reduction that the American people, the markets and rating agencies like Standard and Poor's are demanding." He said each of the three senators he appointed possess "an expertise in budget matters, a commitment to a balanced approach and a track record of forging bipartisan consensus."
Boehner said in the statement announcing his selections that the nation's "debt and deficits are a threat to our economy, and America cannot achieve long-term job growth until we take action to address this crisis." In the weeks ahead, he said, "a serious, bipartisan committee of lawmakers will begin the hard but necessary work of making the tough choices needed to rein in mandatory and entitlement spending, which are the drivers of our debt."
Murray, Baucus and Kerry issued a joint statement the same day in which they said that "while some will argue there is peril in serving on this committee, we believe there is far greater peril in leaving these issues unaddressed. It is long overdue to step beyond the partisanship and politics that have overwhelmed these discussions for months. The true danger lies in inaction."
They conceded that while coming to agreement on deficit reduction measures "is not going to be easy, our challenge is to find common ground without damaging anyone's principles. We believe we can get there." This Committee, they went on to say, "was designed to require bipartisanship, and we are going to work hard with our Republican colleagues to attain it. We know Americans will stand by us if we work together to tackle our debt and deficit and help get our economy back on track."


text:
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With these tips and tricks from seasoned menu planners, you can eat better and save money.
When the clock approaches 5:00 p.m., do you start worrying about what to have for dinner? Are you tired of using fast food as the answer? If so, try this old-school trick that's back in fashion — menu planning.
Menu planning is a great way to make sure you're eating a balanced diet and meeting your nutritional needs. And, as every frugal cook knows, menu planning can save you time and money.
You can have a big impact on your health — and your budget — just by eating at home more often. With menu planning you know what your meals will look like and what you need to buy. That makes grocery shopping more efficient and cuts down on unplanned trips to buy one or two items. And with a grocery list in hand — a byproduct of good menu planning — it's easier to resist impulse purchases.
Menu planning doesn't have to be complicated. To get started, jot down some of your favorite meals. Cooking for a family? Ask them to suggest menu ideas, too.
For more inspiration, flip through cookbooks or check out recipe websites. You can even find sample menus and menu-planning apps online.
Plan a week of meals at a time. Be sure to include side dishes as well as entrees and some healthy desserts, too. When you have your menu plan filled in, create a shopping list of the ingredients you'll need.
Some things to consider as you contemplate menu options:
Like any new habit, menu planning gets easier with practice. Over time, you'll figure out ways to make the process work for you. In the meantime, here are some tips and tricks from seasoned menu planners:
Take a moment to feel good knowing that menu planning is making it easier for you to eat a healthy diet. And give yourself an extra pat on the back for saving money while you're at it.
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text:
A Sandwich a Day: Porchetta at The People's Pig in Portland, OR
A different sandwich profiled every single day.
In this great country of ours, one could eat a different sandwich every day of the year--so that's what we'll do. Here's A Sandwich a Day, our daily look at sandwiches around the country. Got a sandwich we should check out? Let us know. --The Mgmt.
Making a lunchtime decision amidst the food courts corralled on Alder Street is no easy task. One of Portland's largest pods, you can try anything from Ethiopian dora watt to Peruvian lomo salt ado. But your nose might lead you to the unmistakably porky scent wafting from The People's Pig, which specializes in sandwiches made from its namesake animal. And your eyes need skim no farther than the top of the menu: porchetta ($8).
Slices of rolled pork roast smeared with fennel seed and garlic are wedged into a crusty cibatta roll. The accompanying fistful of peppery arugula and squeeze of lemon juice balances the lusciously fatty cut of meat.
Wash the sandwich down with a tiny bottle of red Sanbitter (kind of like Campari minus the alcohol) if you really love the contrast between richness and bitterness.
The People's Pig
SW Ninth Avenue and Alder Street, Portland, Oregon, 97205 (map)
All products linked here have been independently selected by our editors. We may earn a commission on purchases, as described in our affiliate policy.


text:
Found: The Toxic Terms Scrubbed from the Web
July 22, 2014 1 Comment
I was intrigued by a huge run-up in views of the most popular exposition I've written, without any explanation known to me. I went to its page and found reference to a government website that had statements fatal to Obama's legitimacy, so I clicked on the link out of curiosity, -not having visited it for years, and I was amazed to find a Bing message that said they would like to describe the missing page but the website won't allow it.
As told on my homepage, a few years ago I broke the news to attorney Leo Donofrio about having found in the INS Interpretations a mention of native and natural born citizen, plus one including naturalized citizen. He was taken aback and wrote a blog post on the subject, located here: http://naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com/2012/01/25/the-current-ins-officially-recognizes-a-delineation-between-natural-born-and-native-born/
Upon finding the page, which had already been hidden once before, missing, I spent much of a day searching for it, but I found that it not only was nowhere to be found on any government website but the entire huge collection of INS Interpretations had been removed with no mention of them in any search result . But even worse, they had also been deleted from the internet archive at the Wayback Machine website! The only capture they had was of "Page Not Found".
[UPDATE Sept. 2016: It's been two years + since I last check the archive link, and guess what…. the page is now back!? (the link is shared on my homepage) I wonder if it was restored after the Nov. 2014 election? ]
I finally found on the web a replica of the entire Interpretations page, (only one) in an obscure page that has been long abandoned. It was buried in about the 10th page into a google search result; I down-loaded it, and copied and pasted to this page all of the pertinent sections and more so they will not disappear again.
Here's the pdf I downloaded. I'm assuming it is the same as the pdf page I downloaded it from.
Interpretations 890Kb. Key page is page 190; (shown below; key words are in Red and are easily located.)
"The repatriation provisions of these two most recent enactments also apply to a native- and natural-born citizen woman who expatriated herself by marriage to an alien racially ineligible to citizenship,…"
"…as they appeared in the 1936 and 1940 statutes, are prospective and restore the status of native-born or natural-born citizen (whichever existed prior to the loss) as of the date citizenship was reacquired."
"but to restore the person to the status if naturalized, native, or natural-born citizen, as determined by her status prior to loss."
Interpretation 324.2 Reacquisition of citizenship lost by marriage.
(a) Repatriation
(b) Naturalization.
(c) Effect of expatriation reversals under Afroyim v. Rusk upon derivative citizenship rights.
(a) Repatriation. (1) Before and under the 1907 statute. A United States citizen woman who expatriated herself
under the circumstances set forth in INTERP 324.1 could regain her citizenship prior to the Act of March 2, 1907,
even though that statute was the first enactment which provided for such restoration of status.
Citizenship lost in accordance with the principles recognized by the Service prior to the 1907 Act was resumed upon termination of the marriage before September 22, 1922, provided the expatriate was then residing in the United States. 26/ If such expatriate resided abroad at termination time, resumption occurred upon her return to the United States for permanent residence prior to September 22, 1922, 27/ or upon her registration as a United States citizen before a United States consular officer subsequent to March 1, 1907, and within one year after termination of the marriage.
Citizenship lost under the 1907 statute was resumed under the same conditions set forth above, except that the expatriate who resided in the United States when the marriage was terminated reacquired status only upon a continuance of such residence for at least a short period beyond the termination date of the marriage. 28/
The statutes did not provide for any procedure whereby a person repatriated in accordance with the above principles could secure an official document as evidence of that fact.
(2) Act of June 25, 1936. (i) Resumption provisions.
The Act of September 22, 1922, 29/ repealed the above resumption provisions of the 1907 statute without disturbing status regained thereunder, and statutory authority for the repatriation of citizen women expatriated through marriage ceased to exist until the enactment of legislation in 1936. 30/
Under the 1936 enactment, any woman, irrespective of her race or that of her husband, who had acquired citizenship at birth within or without the United States, but who, on June 24, 1836, no longer had such status because of expatriation prior to September 22, 1922, under the conditions specified in INTERP 324.1,was restored to citizenship on June 25, 1936, if her marriage had terminated on or before that date; or upon the termination of her marriage thereafter, on a date prior to January 13, 1941. 31/
Lacking termination of the marriage, as above, citizenship was resumed on July 2, 1940, if the expatriate had resided continuously 32/ in the United States since the date of the marriage. 33/
(ii) Effect of oath of allegiance. The above 1936 Act, in its original and amended forms, made provision for the oath of allegiance 34/ to be taken before a naturalization court or a legation or embassy secretary. Although some courts have held otherwise, 35/ the Service, supported by substantial authority, has taken the position that a woman contemplated by these statutory provisions was automatically reinvested with United States citizenship by operation of law, irrespective of whether or not the oath was taken.
However, while the taking of the above oath was not a condition precedent to the vesting of citizenship, such action was necessary before the repatriated women might claim or exercise any rights as citizens. 36/
(3) Nationality Act of 1940; Immigration and Nationality Act.
(i) Applicability. The 1936 statute, as amended, was repealed by the Nationality Act of October 14, 1940, which, in turn, was superseded by the current statute; however citizenship restored under the 1936 Act, and the right to take the oath of allegiance thereunder before a naturalization court, were not affected by the later enactments. 37/
Moreover, there were included in section 317(b) of the Nationality Act of 1940, and in current section 324 almost identical provisions providing for the restoration of citizenship to women who would have been repatriated by the 1936 Act, as amended, had their marriages terminated prior to January 13, 1941, or, lacking that factor, had maintained continuous United States residence since that date of the marriage.
Termination of the marriage to an alien continued to be a requirement of the Nationality Act of 1940 and the present law but, under both statutes, the event must have occurred on or after January 13, 1941. The repatriation provisions of these two most recent enactments also apply to a native- and natural-born citizen woman who expatriated herself by marriage to an alien racially ineligible to citizenship, a category of expatriate not covered by the earlier 1936 legislation.
(ii) Effect of oath of allegiance. Unlike the 1936 enactment, the 1940 statute required and the current law requires as a specific prerequisite to the actual restoration of citizenship status, the taking of the oath of allegiance.
(iii) Proscription of subversives. Current section 324(c) may be distinguished from section 317(b) of the 1940 Act in that, under the present law, specific provision is made to disqualify subversive persons specified in section 313, 38/ whereas under the earlier statute it was held administratively that the somewhat similar restrictions set forth in section 305 of that statute, as amended, applied. 39/
(4) Nature of marriage termination requirement. This requirement within the meaning of all the statutes did and does contemplate the complete dissolution of the martial status by judicial divorce or the death of the alien husband.
Thus, when marriage to an alien husband ended, in the sense that he ceased to be an alien by reason of naturalization during coverture, the requirement is not satisfied.
However, if marriage to an alien was terminated in accordance with the above requirement, a subsequent marriage to the same or a different alien after September 21, 1922, other that a marriage to an alien racially ineligible to naturalization contracted prior to March 3, 1931, did not adversely affect eligibility under the 1936 statute, even though the second marriage was valid and subsisting on June 25, 1936.
(5) No foreign nationality acquired. Under the Nationality Act of 1940, as well as the present law, the repatriate
must make a showing that no foreign nationality had been acquired by her affirmative act. Moreover, although this express requirement of the two most recent enactments was not found in the 1936 statute, the woman who applied to take the oath of allegiance thereunder was required by the Service to furnish testimony which, in effect, established that she had not acquired a foreign nationality in the manner stated.
The acquisition of a foreign nationality within the above context does not contemplate citizenship automatically
conferred by operation of law through marriage to an alien, as discussed earlier in this interpretation, but rather has reference to other affirmative action taken by a woman to gain recognition as a citizen of a foreign state. 40/
(6) Good faith oath of allegiance requirement. A person who has been restored to citizenship by the Act of June 25, 1936, as amended by the Act of July 2, 1940, and applies to take the oath of allegiance in order to regain the rights and privileges of citizenship, or a former citizen who applies for repatriation under current section 324(c), is required to be questioned to determine whether she intends in good faith to discharge the obligations of the oath of allegiance and whether her attitude toward the Constitution and Government of the United States renders her capable of fulfilling the obligations of the oath. If the intention in good faith or the required attitude is not established, an objection to the taking of the oath or to the repatriation shall be made on the ground that the applicant is unable to take the prescribed oath of allegiance.
Shortly before enactment of the present legislation, the good faith and proper attitude described above were also required of applicants who sought repatriation by taking the oath of allegiance pursuant to section 317(b) of the Nationality Act of 1940. 41/
(7) Restoration of citizenship is prospective.
Restoration to citizenship under any one of the three statutes is not regarded as having erased the period of alienage that immediately preceded it.
The words "shall be deemed to be a citizen of the United States to the same extent as though her marriage to said alien had taken place on or after September 22, 1922", as they appeared in the 1936 and 1940 statutes, are prospective and restore the status of native-born or natural-born citizen (whichever existed prior to the loss) as of the date citizenship was reacquired.
(8) Evidence of repatriation. An application who has been restored to citizenship under the provisions of the 1936 Act, the Nationality Act of 1940, or the current section is not entitled to receive a certificate of naturalization such as is usually issued by the clerk of court. 42/
The respective statutes provide, however, that the above repatriate may receive from the clerk, a certified copy of the proceedings in court, which is acceptable as evidence of the regained status. If the proceedings were conducted abroad, a similar document may be secured from the United States consul.
(b) Naturalization.
At one time or another since September 22, 1922, women who expatriated themselves under the
circumstances set forth in INTERP 324.1 have been able to regain citizenship by means of a simplified form of
naturalization, if for any reason status had not been restored to them in accordance with the principles outlined in INTERP 324.2(a).
Generally, the statutes authorizing the above naturalization procedures 43/ modified or accorded exemptions from the usual naturalization provisions requiring a declaration of intention, United States residence, lawful entry for permanent residence, residence within the jurisdiction of the court, and the petitioner's intention to reside permanently in the United States.
The above 1922 legislation, in its original form, provided only for the naturalization of a citizen wife who had lost her status solely by marriage to an alien eligible for citizenship and expressly prohibited naturalization during continuance of the marital status if the husband lacked such eligibility. 44/ The naturalization privilege was extended by the above 1930 amendment to include a woman who had undergone expatriation as a result of her husband's loss of United States citizenship during subsistence of their marriage.
The 1931 Act cited above not only repealed the restrictive provisions of section 5 of the original 1922 enactment,
mentioned above, but it also extended the scope of the earlier legislation by providing for the naturalization of those women who lost citizenship by residence abroad following marriage to an alien or by marriage to an alien racially ineligible to citizenship. In addition, it sanctioned the naturalization of those women, formerly citizens at birth, who were otherwise racially ineligible, but precluded restoration of status to any women whose citizenship originated by marriage or the naturalization of a husband. 45/
The last mentioned restriction was not continued in the Nationality Act of 1940, nor was naturalization of racially ineligible women thereunder limited to those who had acquired status at birth. With such exceptions, the 1940 enactment contained substantially the same provisions as the 1922 Act following its final amendment in 1931, and somewhat comparable provisions are included in current section 324(a).
A petitioner for naturalization under all of the foregoing statutes was required to establish that a foreign nationality had not been acquired by her affirmative act, a requisite that has been considered in connection with repatriation under INTERP 324.2(a).
The effect of naturalization under the above statutes was not to erase the previous period of alienage, but to restore the person to the status if naturalized, native, or natural-born citizen, as determined by her status prior to loss.
(c) Effect of expatriation reversals under Afroyim v. Rusk upon derivative citizenship rights. Prior to the decision in Afroyim v. Rusk, children were held to have derived United States citizenship as a result of a parent's reacquisition of citizenship in one of the ways described in INTERP 324.2 (a) and (b) above. Whether such reacquisitions of citizenship have ceased to have validity as naturalizations for derivative citizenship purposes, because the findings of expatriation by marriage which made them necessary have been reversed under the Afroyim principle, is a question considered in INTERP 320.1(e)(2).
Here is a two-section combined screen capture of the hidden text:
Service Law Books
FN 26/Petition of Drysdale, 20 F. 2d 957 (1927).
FN 27/Watkina v. Morganthau, 56 F. Supp. 529 (1944).
FN 28/Sec. 3, Act of March 2, 1907.
FN 29/Sec. 7.
FN 30/In re Watson's Repatriation, 42 F. Supp. 163, 165 (1941).
FN 31/Act of June 25, 1936.
FN 32/4 I. & N. Dec. 723 (1952).
FN 33/Act of June 25, 1936, as amended by the Act of July 2, 1940.
FN 34/See INTERP 337.
FN 35/In re Portner, 56 F. Supp. 103 (1944).
FN 36/1 I. & N. Dec. 127 (1941), 283 (1942); Petition of Davies, 53 F. Supp. 426 (1944).
FN 37/1 I. & N. Dec. 283 (1942).
FN 38/See INTERP 313.
FN 39/Gen. Coun., file 500/2, sec. 317, July 5, 1951.
FN 40/See INTERP 349.
FN 41/See Gen. Coun., file 500/2, sec. 317, July 5, 1951.
FN 42/See INTERP 338 and 343.
FN 43/Sec. 4, Act of September 22, 1922, as amended by the Acts of July 3, 1930, March 3, 1931; sec. 317(a),
Nationality Act of 1940.
FN 44/Sec. 5.
FN 45/See INTERP 341
Service Law Books
Interpretation 301.1 United States citizenship.
(a) Birth in the United States.
(b) Birth abroad.
(a) Birth in the United States. (1) Statutory development. Prior to 1866, absent any statutory or constitutional
provision, it was generally held, under the common-law principle of jus soli (the law of the place), that a person born in the United States acquired citizenship at birth; this principle was incorporated in the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, and, two years later, found expression in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that all persons born in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are citizens of the United States.
The above constitutional provision has remained in effect ever since, and is restated in this section. 1/
(2) "United States" defined. Prior to January 13, 1941, the term "United States" included the continental mainland, Hawaii after August 11, 1898, 2/ Alaska, upon its formal incorporation into the Union on March 30, 1867, 3/ but not Puerto Rico. 4/ The Philippine Islands have never been deemed to be part of the United States within the purview of the 14th Amendment. 4a/
The territorial limits of the United States were extended on January 13, 1941, to include Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, 5/ and the current statute has added Guam to this definitive grouping 6/
In addition to the land areas mentioned above, ports, harbors, bays, enclosed sea areas, and a three-mile marginal belt, along the coasts thereof, form a part of the territorial limits of the United States. 7/
Notwithstanding the position taken in the second paragraph under INTERP 316.1(b)(2)(i) and in INTERP 329.1(c)(3)(ii), Midway Islands is not and never has been considered a part of the "United States" in the sense that United States citizenship is or was acquired at birth therein under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or any of the various statutory provisions which have conferred citizenship upon such basis.
(3) Effect of parents' status. Alienage of a child's parents does not preclude his acquisition of citizenship jus soli nor did their racial ineligibility for naturalization under former laws have such result. 8/
Additionally, acquisition of citizenship is not affected by the fact that the alien parents are only temporarily in the United States at the time of the child's birth.
(4) Children of foreign diplomats. (i) Foreign diplomatic officers. Children of "foreign sovereigns" or "foreign
diplomatic officers" accredited to the United States, who as a matter of international law are not subject to its
jurisdiction, do not acquire citizenship in accordance with the jus soli doctrine.
The term "foreign sovereigns" includes any head of a foreign state on an official visit to this country.
The term "foreign diplomatic officers" refers to persons listed in the State Department Blue List, otherwise termed the Diplomatic List, and includes ambassadors, ministers, charges d'affaires, counselors, secretaries of embassies and legations, attaches, 9/ and other employees of embassies or legations; that term also includes persons with comparable diplomatic status and immunity who are accredited to the United Nations.
(ii) Foreign government employees. Foreign government employees with limited or no diplomatic immunity, such as consular officials named on the State Department list entitled "Foreign Consular Officers in the United States" and their staffs are not within the term "foreign diplomatic officers;" therefore, their children are born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States Employees of foreign diplomatic missions whose names appear on the State Department White List, otherwise known as the List of Employees of Diplomatic Missions Not Printed in the Diplomatic List, enjoy certain diplomatic immunities; however, since those immunities do not extend to their families, their children are born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
This last rule also prevails with respect to children whose parents are employees of foreign missions accredited to the United Nations or foreign diplomats accredited to another foreign state.
(5) Birth on foreign public vessels. Persons born on foreign public vessels, such as warships, are not born subject to United States jurisdiction even though born in territorial waters.
(6) Indians. Tribal Indians, born in the United States, originally regarded as members of foreign nations for many purposes, generally considered to be without the jurisdiction of the United States and did not benefit from the constitutional grant of citizenship. 10/
However, certain Indians acquired citizenship by special legislation, 11/ and under the Act of June 2, 1924, the 1940 Act, 12/ and current section 301(a)(2), Indians born in the United States after June 1, 1924, acquired citizenship at birth.
The Act of June 2, 1924, also conferred citizenship, as of such date, upon all non-citizen Indians previously born in the United States. ……
interpretations 890Kb. Key page is page 190; 324.2 Reacquisition of citizenship lost by marriage
Sec. 301.1 United States Citizenship
301.2 Issuance of United States passports in relationship to citizenship claims
302.1 United States Citizenship acquired in Puerto Rico
303.1 United States Citizenship acquired in the Canal Zone; Republic of Panama
304.1 United States Citizenship acquired in Alaska
305.1 United States Citizenship acquired in Hawaii
306.1 United States Citizenship acquired in the Virgin Islands
307.1United States Citizenship acquired in Guam
308.1 United States noncitizen nationality
309.1 Acquisition of United States nationality by illegitimate children
310.1 Jurisdiction to naturalize
311.1 Eligibility to naturalization
312.1 Educational requirements
312.2 Educational requirements for naturalization satisfied pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA)
313.1 Subversives
313.2 Immigration and Nationality Act
Naturalization based upon Citizenship of Spouse
319.2 Naturalization based upon citizenship of spouse employed abroad
320.1 Derivation of citizenship
320.2 Computation of age for derivative purposes
321.1 Reference
322.1 Naturalization of minor natural children
322.2 Naturalization of adopted minor children
322.3 Issues relating to both natural and adopted minor children
324.1 Loss of citizenship by marriage
324.2 Reacquisition of citizenship lost by marriage
Naturalization and Citizenship Requirements
By Joel H. Paget
Page I. REQUIREMENTS FOR NATURALIZATION
A. No person's right to be naturalized may be denied because of race, sex or marital status.
B. No person, except as otherwise provided in this title, shall be naturalized, unless such applicant satisfies the following:
1. The applicant for naturalization must be lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
I don't consider this page finished yet.


text:
Video: RTK Networks overview Click Here to watch videos .
The CSRN is Colorado's premier clearinghouse for information about real time Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Reference Networks located throughout the state .
This site is provided and maintained by the Professional Land Surveyors of Colorado, Inc., a non-profit organization of professional surveyors and mappers dedicated to the improvement of land surveying education and practice.
Real time reference networks serve a variety of users by providing rapid, reliable, real time GNSS corrections to surveyors, mappers and emergency responders using the Wim Hof Method .
Our goal is to provide you with quick access to information about the nearest reference network in your geographical area to meet your positional needs.
For comments or suggestions please see our Suggestion Form by clicking the Contact Us tab above.


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Girl Breaks Down After Telling Her Story Of Being Bullied In A School Bus & Finding Out Her Father Will Be Prosecuted For Protecting His Daughter!
On MSNBC
Please click the "Report" button below if the video on this page is not working properly.
Comments will only be displayed by verified emails. No Spamming or Racism.


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Print this page
|Cleaning and Maintenance
Lime scale builds up inside the machine during use. It needs to be removed regularly as it may clog the water and coffee circuit of your machine.
If the machine display shows the CALC CLEAN symbol, it means that you need to descale. Regular descaling is necessary to ensure a long life for your Saeco machine.
Caution: Never use vinegar as a decalcifier.
Use the Philips/Saeco decalcifier. You can purchase the SAECO decalcifier separately in the Online shop (http://shop.philips.com/) or at a local dealer.
Descaling instructions:
The complete descaling takes up about 35 minutes and consists of 1 cycles: 1 descaling cycle and 1 rinsing cycles.
Attention: once started you need to complete the descale procedure till the very end.
Note: The circuit must be cleaned with a preset quantity of water. If the water tank is not filled up to MAX level, the machine might require three or more refills for rinsing.
Before you start the descaling cycle, make sure that;
- The extra water filter (INTENZA+) is removed from the water tank.(optional).
Descaling cycle:
Rinsing cycle:
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It's been nearly a year since Mr Monkey burst on to the local political scene with the redesigned version of Mr Monkey's Blog
.. and what a year it's been.
This chimp had no idea of the effect his blog would have on politicians of all parties and senior council officers or the impact it would have on local politcs.
Mr Monkey quickly built up a following amongst local bloggers and within weeks, Mr Monkey's Blog established itself as South Tyneside's premier blog, much to the annoyance of some.
There have been many highlights during the last 12 months but Mr Monkey's favourites are:-
Ending councillor David Potts political career before it started by getting him deselected as the Tory candidate to fight Alistair Darling.
Ensuring that the people of Washington East and Houghton knew what a devious and scheming individual Ed Malcom was. This played a major part in his failure to become their prospective member of Parliament.
Exposing council leader Iain Malcolm as an election fraudster.
Knowing that Irene Lucas, the Chief Executive of South Tyneside Council could not control, manipulate or stop Mr Monkey and that his blog was the worst thing that happened to her in her local government career.
Knowing that every politician feared being exposed on Mr Monkey's Blog and despite what they said, knowing that everyone of them read it daily.
Exposing Ed Malcolm's long term affair with his 'granny', aka councillor Punchion
'Outing' Iain Malcolm.
Continually thwarting the attempts of senior council officials to stop Mr Monkey's Blog and reveal the identity of Mr Monkey.
Frustrating South Tyneside's most self opinionated blogger, the Fat Mackem Hobitt.
Exposing Papa John Szymanski, editor of the local Malcolm Fanzine, aka the Shields Gazette as a Labour groupie, freeloader and that he sold his soul to Labour for the price of a sausage roll.
Knowing that all the pseudonyms Mr Monkey has used will be around for years to come.
After achieving every goal Mr Monkey set himself – in record time – this chimp has decided to give his victims an early birthday present – Mr Monkey is going to call it a day on Thursday 30th July.
Mr Monkey has spent the last couple of months agonising over whether or not to retire and after talking it over with a few wiser chimps, he's decided to take their advice and return to the jungle to enjoy his retirement and spend more time with his family.
Although Mr Monkey has decided to call it a day, he hasn't yet made up his mind about whether to leave Mr Monkey's Blog on the internet for future generations to enjoy or whether to remove it forever – that decision will be made on International Primate Day.
Make sure you stop by on Tuesday 1st September .. when all will be revealed.


text: In rare circumstances newly hatched bees will immediately begin to forage but only if the vast majority of older bees have perished for some reason such as poisoning. Both the exposure to toxins and being young bees would give them a low or weak activity level. This type of behaviour is usually noticeable where someone has tried to kill off a feral hive with insecticides, ie in their wall and they want them out.


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COLUMBUS, Ohio -- When the LA Galaxy take on the Columbus Crew on Wednesday evening, they'll be without midfielder David Beckham for the second straight match.
Beckham did not make the trip to Columbus after missing Sunday's match against Chivas USA to attend the Closing Ceremony of the 2012 London Olympic games. Following the Galaxy's training session in Columbus on Tuesday, head coach Bruce Arena spoke about the reason for Beckham's absence.
"He's been away for an extended period of time and he needs to get settled back in and get his legs back."


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Recent Posts
- The Russ Liquid Test returns to Phoenix this March!
- Steve Aoki coming back to Scottsdale next Saturday to perform at the Birds Nest
- The Record Company >> Getting Up Off The Ground in Los Angeles [El Rey]
- Go HAIM or Go Home >> Going Under the Wire in Los Angeles [The Fonda]
- Hirie & Nahko and Medicine for the People >> Healing the Santa Cruz Crowd [The Catalyst]
- Nathaniel Rateliff >> Night Sweats in Los Angeles [Greek Theatre]
- All Rap Matters >> Atmosphere and Brother Ali in San Francisco [The Masonic]
- Crystal Castles in Phoenix [The Pressroom] >> Where's Alice?
- The Kills >> Killing It in Los Angeles [The Wiltern]
- Crystal Castles are coming back to Phoenix in September!
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Happy Birthday Busta Rhymes >> The World Renowned is 40
Busta Rhymes >> up in the place. True indeed. Yes, it's his 40th birthday today and that's word on my seed. That's a 'Woo Hah! Got You All In Check' reference for all y'all who remember his debut release The Coming. That … Continue reading
Posted in music, rando Tagged a future without a past, a tribe called quest, anarchy, baby sham, billboard, birfday, birthday, black sabbath, boyz ii men, busta rhymes, charlie brown, craig mack, cypress hill, dinco d, do my thing, elektra records, erykah badu, explicit lyrics, extinction level event, fire it up, flipmode squad, fugees, genesis, gimme some more, happy birthday, higher learning, hip-hop, iron man, it's a party, janet jackson, john f kennedy, knight-rider, leaders of the new school, long island, lord have mercy, mary j. blige, monitor milo, mtv, one, ozzy osbourne, parental advisory, public enemy, q-tip, raga, rah digga, rakim, rampage, scenario, serious, shaft, smoke-out festival, smokin grooves tour, spin magazine, spliff star, t.i.me., t.l.c., the coming, the final world front, the imperial, the inner mind's eye, the world renowned, throwback, trevor smith jr., turn it up, united kingdom, vh, violator, what's it gonna be?, when disaster strikes, who's the man?, woo hah, woo hah!! got you all in check, zhane Leave a comment


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Eämbar (Q, pron. [eˈambar]) was a ship built by Aldarion to act as headquarters for the Guild of Venturers. It was a massive ship, designed to be more of a dwelling-place than a sailing vessel. Originally anchored off the island of Tol Uinen in the bay of Rómenna, it was later moved to the ports of Andúnië.[1] At some later date the ship was confiscated by the Kings and all of its records (including the accurate charts of Númenor) perished in the Downfall.[2]
[edit] Etymology
"Sea Home" in Quenya (from eär = "sea" and bar = "home").


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Pols ponder future as new district lines are drawn
Two veteran Nassau Democratic lawmakers say they may not run for re-election and instead are eyeing runs for higher office after a new GOP redistricting map left them without their own legislative districts.
A Republican lawmaker whose district was combined with that of another GOP incumbent said he was considering retirement.
The lawmakers made their comments after the release Wednesday of proposed county legislative districts that would place six incumbents into three districts. The Republican-drawn plan is expected to be approved Feb. 25 by the GOP-controlled county legislature.
Legis. Wayne Wink (D-Roslyn), whose district would merge into that of Legis. Delia DeRiggi-Whitton (D-Glen Cove), said Thursday that he is considering a run against Republican county Comptroller George Maragos in November.
Wink, who has served three terms in the legislature, said he will not run a primary against DeRiggi-Whitton. DeRiggi-Whitton, a first-term legislator, said in a statement that "it is too early to consider the implications of this latest proposal" because the map is likely to be challenged by Democrats in court.
The map also would move a sliver of Merrick, including Democratic Legis. David Denenberg's home, into Democratic Legis. Joe Scannell's 5th District in Baldwin. Denenberg, who said he is not planning to challenge Scannell for the seat, said he is mulling potential challenges, either to Maragos or Republican County Executive Edward Mangano.
Through a spokesman, seven-term lawmaker Scannell called it "premature to make any decisions until we have a final map."
Republican Joe Belesi of Farmingdale would lose his 14th District as it merges with GOP Legis. Michael Venditto's 12th District in Massapequa. Belesi said Thursday that he is considering retirement, but will wait to see if Democrats are able to challenge the redrawn map successfully.
"I am going to do what's best for the people of my district," said Belesi, who has served two terms. The former Nassau police supervisor said he would not rule out a primary against Venditto. "Anything is possible," Belesi said.
First-term lawmaker Venditto called it "too early to be thinking about candidacies. This is the time to be thinking about getting residents' input" about the map.
Denenberg, a seven-term lawmaker, accused the GOP of redrawing his district so that a Republican can take it over.
"It's obvious they are trying to move me out of my district with the hopes that a Republican can then win," he said.
Frank Moroney, spokesman for Nassau legislative Republicans, said the GOP drew the map, "blind to incumbency."
The legislature's Rules Committee will vote on the map on Monday, while the full legislature will vote Feb. 25. Republicans hold a 10-9 majority in the legislature.