text: Communications Law - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/communications-law/200 2014-09-22T18:17:52+00:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law http://law.justia.com/sites/law.justia.com/files/justia_law_theme_logo.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/13-55486/13-55486-2014-09-19.html Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. 2014-09-20T13:02:00+00:00 2014-09-19T20:34:07+00:00 Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleging claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 42 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), that Campbell-Ewald instructed or allowed a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on behalf of the Navy, with whom Campbell-Ewald had a marketing contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Campbell-Ewald under the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity. The court rejected Campbell-Ewald's claim that the personal and putative class claims were mooted by petitioner's refusal to accept the settlement offer; Campbell-Ewald's constitutional claims were unavailing where the company relied upon a flawed application of First Amendment principles; the TCPA imposes vicarious liability where an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, is established between the defendant and a third-party caller; and the application of the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity is inapplicable in this case. Because Campbell-Ewald failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co." on Justia Law 2014-09-19 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Benavides 13-55486 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-56638/12-56638-2014-09-17.html Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc. 2014-09-19T13:17:18+00:00 2014-09-17T20:28:24+00:00 Plaintiff, an aspiring model, filed a failure to warn suit against Internet Brands, the company who owns the website modelmayhem.com. Plaintiff had posted information about herself on the website and two rapists used the website to lure her to a fake audition where they drugged her, raped her, and recorded her for a pornographic video. The district court dismissed plaintiff's action because her claim was barred by the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230(c). The court held that section 230(c)(1) precludes liability that treats a website as the publisher or speaker of information users provide on the website. This section protects websites from liability for material posted on the website from someone else. In this case, plaintiff does not seek to hold Internet Brands liable as a "publisher or speaker" of content someone posted on modelmayhem.com, or for Internet Brands' failure to remove content on the website. Plaintiff also does not claim to have been lured by any posting that Internet Brands failed to remove. Instead, plaintiff attempts to hold Internet Brands liable for failing to warn her about how third parties targeted and lured victims through the website. The duty to warn allegedly imposed by California law would not require Internet Brands to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it publishes such content. Therefore, the CDA does not bar plaintiff's failure to warn claim and the CDA was not a valid basis to dismiss the complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-09-17 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Clifton 12-56638 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-3004/13-3004-2014-09-15.html Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC 2014-09-19T13:16:57+00:00 2014-09-15T19:28:50+00:00 While a student at University of Wisconsin in 1969, Soglin attended the first Mifflin Street Block Party. Now in his seventh term as Mayor of Madison, Wisconsin, Soglin wants to shut down the annual event. For the 2012 Block Party, Sconnie sold 54 t-shirts and tank tops displaying an image of Soglin's face and the phrase "Sorry for Partying." Photographer Kienitz accused Sconnie of copyright infringement. Sconnie conceded starting with a photograph that Kienitz took at Soglin's inauguration that it downloaded from the city's website. The picture was posterized, background was removed, and Soglin's face was turned lime green and surrounded by multi-colored writing. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, applying the fair use statutory defense to infringement, 17 U.S.C. 107. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that a shirt is no substitute for the original photograph; Kienitz does not argue that defendants reduced demand for the original work or any use that he is contemplating. Defendants removed so much of the original that, "as with the Cheshire Cat, only the smile remains." What is left, besides a hint of Soglin's smile, is the outline of his face, which cannot be copyrighted. Defendants chose the design as a form of political commentary, not for profit. View "Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-09-15 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Easterbrook 13-3004 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-4400/13-4400-2014-09-12.html Government of the VI v. Vanterpool 2014-09-19T13:18:07+00:00 2014-09-12T18:52:00+00:00 Vanterpool was convicted under V.I. Code tit. 14, section 706(1) for obsessive phone calls and faxes to his ex-girlfriend Jacqueline Webster. On appeal, he argued that: Section 706 was unconstitutional under the First Amendment; that his trial counsel's performance amounted to an ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; and that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support Vanterpool's multiple convictions. The Third Circuit remanded. While the First Amendment challenge would have been viable had it been raised during trial, the plain error standard precluded relief on appeal. Trial counsel's failure to preserve the First Amendment challenge satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, but the record was insufficient regarding whether trial counsel's performance fell below professional norms. View "Government of the VI v. Vanterpool" on Justia Law 2014-09-12 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Greenaway 13-4400 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-4429/13-4429-2014-09-11.html King v. Governor of NJ 2014-09-12T13:12:41+00:00 2014-09-11T17:20:46+00:00 In 2013, Governor Christie signed AB A3371 into law, providing: A person who is licensed to provide professional counseling ... shall not engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a person under 18 years of age. Plaintiffs provide licensed counseling to minor clients seeking to reduce or eliminate same-sex attractions and include providers of religious-perspective counseling. Plaintiffs describe their efforts as "talk therapy," involving only verbal communication about potential "root causes" of homosexual behavior, such as childhood sexual trauma or a distant relationship with the same-sex parent, with discussion of "traditional, gender-appropriate behaviors and characteristics" and how the client can foster and develop those behaviors and characteristics. They challenged the law as a violation of their rights to free speech and free exercise of religion and asserted claims on behalf of their minor clients. The district court rejected the First Amendment claims and held that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of their minor clients. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the statute is a regulation of professional speech that passes intermediate scrutiny. A3371 does not violate plaintiffs' right to free exercise of religion, as it is a neutral and generally applicable law that is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. View "King v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law 2014-09-11 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Smith 13-4429 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3572/11-3572-2014-09-10.html Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 2014-09-12T13:12:14+00:00 2014-09-10T22:13:41+00:00 Satkar owns Schaumburg, Illinois hotel and was mentioned in blog posts and a television news report as having made a large donation to a local politician and later won a property-tax appeal. In response, the Cook County Board of Review revoked Satkar's property-tax reduction and opened an inquiry. Satkar sued the Board, its members and staff, the blog, the television station, and reporters, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for defamation and false light. The district court dismissed the 1983 claims against the Board and the officials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court separately dismissed the state-law claims against the media defendants, applying the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute. Because the section 1983 claims were still pending, the judge entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) to permit appeal of the SLAPP issue. Later, the judge orally invited Satkar to ask for a Rule 54(b) judgment on the SLAPP dismissal, forgetting that he had already entered final judgment. Satkar did not correct the judge, did not seek clarification, and did not file a notice of appeal. After the deadline to appeal expired, Satkar sought an extension, claiming that the judge's comment created confusion. The judge granted the extension, relying on the defunct "unique circumstances" doctrine. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting that the Supreme Court has disavowed the unique circumstances doctrine and Satkar has not otherwise demonstrated excusable neglect. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-09-10 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Sykes 11-3572 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-3838/13-3838-2014-09-04.html Lavin v. Husted 2014-09-05T13:11:55+00:00 2014-09-04T16:51:17+00:00 Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality "clear" and "unavoidable." The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that "taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation" and that "counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees." The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law 2014-09-04 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Gibbons 13-3838 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1215/13-1215-2014-09-02.html Sorenson Communications, Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al. 2014-09-05T13:13:46+00:00 2014-09-02T17:41:51+00:00 Sorenson, a leading provider of video relay service (VRS), petitioned for review of the FCC's 2013 Rate Order as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a). The court found no fault with the new rates because the 2013 Rate Order is not arbitrary and capricious for ignoring costs incurred unnecessarily, even when the consequence for the provider that incurred those costs might be ruinous. However, Sorenson has demonstrated that additional consideration by the FCC is necessary in regards to providing service under the more demanding speed-of-answer requirement that the agency adopted as part of the 2013 Rate Order. Therefore, the court vacated the new speed-of-answer requirement and remanded that portion of the Order. In regard to tiered rates, the court held that the FCC adequately justified the 500,000- and 1,000,000-minute cut-offs. The court deferred to the FCC's decision concerning the tiered structure because the task of balancing the goals of setting rates to reflect economies of scale and transitioning the industry from rate regulation to competitive bidding is fairly within the discretion of the agency. View "Sorenson Communications, Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law 2014-09-02 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Ginsburg 13-1215 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-1635/13-1635-2014-08-27.html Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty. 2014-08-29T13:08:14+00:00 2014-08-27T18:09:48+00:00 Dearborn hosted the Arab International Festival from 1995 until 2012, welcoming roughly 250,000 people with carnival attractions, entertainment, and international food. The 2012 Festival had 85 vendors, information tables, and booths, including several affiliated with Christian and other groups. Bible Believers attended the 2011 Festival, bearing "Christian signs, banners, and t-shirts" that provoked confrontations. Preparing for the 2012 Festival, their attorney wrote a letter, asserting that the sheriff sided with "the violent Muslims," that "officers have a duty to protect speakers … from … hostile audiences," and demanding protection. Counsel responded, stating that the sheriff "owes a duty to the public as a whole and is not required to serve as a security force for the sole benefit of … Believers … cannot protect everyone from the foreseeable consequences that come from speech that is designed and perhaps intended to elicit a potentially negative reaction." The sheriff claims to have allocated more personnel to the Festival than to "the World Series or the President of the United States." At the 2012 Festival, Believers displayed messages including "Islam Is A Religion of Blood and Murder." One carried a severed pig's head on a stick; others preached, using a megaphone, referring to a "pedophile" prophet. The crowd yelled, threw debris, and shoved a Believer to the ground. Officers detained debris-throwers and attempted to quell the crowd. As the confrontation intensified, Believers continued to preach. Officers reiterated safety concerns. Officers escorted the Believers out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the county defendants. Finding no constitutional violations, it did not address qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the plan for Festival security was content-neutral and that the Believers were not treated differently than the counter-protestors. View "Bible Believers v. Wayne Cnty. " on Justia Law 2014-08-27 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Donald 13-1635 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-3956/13-3956-2014-08-27.html Kiser v. Reitz 2014-08-29T13:08:17+00:00 2014-08-27T17:08:59+00:00 Dr. Kiser is trained as a general dentist and as an endodontist specializing in root canal procedures. In 2009, the Ohio State Dental Board issued a warning to Kiser for practicing "outside the scope" of his declared specialty, stating, "if you wish to continue to declare yourself as a specialist in endodontics, you must advertise accordingly, and limit your practice per the ADA's definition. If you would prefer to practice in areas outside the scope of endodontics, you may do so by no longer holding yourself out as a specialist in endodontics. You can be a general dentist, and then advertise and perform specialty services you are qualified to perform, so long as you also state you are a general dentist." The Board took no further action and declined to answer Kiser's 2012 inquiry about signage including the terms "endodontist" and "general dentist." Kiser challenged the regulations as chilling his exercise of First Amendment commercial speech rights. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the Supreme Court decision, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) and finding that Kiser alleged facts demonstrating that he faces a credible threat that the regulations will be enforced against him in the future, so that he has standing to assert his pre-enforcement challenge. View "Kiser v. Reitz" on Justia Law 2014-08-27 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Moore 13-3956 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/13-3190/13-3190-2014-08-22.html NE Colorado Cellular v. City of North Platte 2014-08-29T13:06:50+00:00 2014-08-23T15:18:36+00:00 Viaero sought to construct a telecommunications tower in the City. After the City Council voted to deny Viaero's application for a permit to build the tower, Viaero filed suit for violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 332. The court affirmed the district court's upholding of the City's decision where the City Council's denial of was "in writing" by being memorialized in a final resolution and "supported by substantial evidence." View "NE Colorado Cellular v. City of North Platte" on Justia Law 2014-08-22 federal U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Smith 13-3190 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-870.html Telrite Corp. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 2014-08-29T13:16:42+00:00 2014-08-23T04:37:22+00:00 Telrite Corporation was designated as an eligible telecommunications carrier and a Nebraska eligible telecommunications carrier by the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC). The designation allowed Telrite to participate in the "Lifeline" program and receive subsidies from federal and state funds for the provision of telecommunications service to low-income households. Soon after receiving its designations, Telrite held its first enrollment event in Omaha. Telrite, however, used the wrong enrollment form at the event. Consequently, the PSC revoked Telrite's ETC designation and ordered Telrite to cease and desist from offering services as a Lifeline provider in Nebraska. The Supreme Court reversed the order, holding that the penalty ordered by the PSC was excessive. Remanded. View "Telrite Corp. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-08-22 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Connolly S-13-870 http://law.justia.com/cases/kentucky/supreme-court/2014/2012-sc-000621-dg.html Virgin Mobile U.S.A., LP v. Commonwealth 2014-08-22T13:07:58+00:00 2014-08-22T02:29:48+00:00 Virgin Mobile USA (Virgin) began doing business in Kentucky as a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider in 2002. In July 2006, the General Assembly amended Ky. Rev. Stat. 65.7629(3), which required Virgin to collect a CMRS service charge from its customers. In 2008, the Commercial Mobile Radio Emergency Service Telecommunications Board (Board) filed suit against Virgin to recover from Virgin all monthly 911 services charges owed by Virgin for commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) connections before July 2006. The circuit court entered summary judgment against Virgin for $547,945, concluding that under the pre-July 2006 version of section 65.7629, Virgin was to collect the CMRS service charges and remit them to the Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the CMRS service charge did not apply to Virgin prior to the July 2006 amendment. View "Virgin Mobile U.S.A., LP v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law 2014-08-21 state Kentucky Kentucky Supreme Court Venters 2012-SC-000621-DG http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-1516/13-1516-2014-08-18.html Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia 2014-08-22T13:09:38+00:00 2014-08-19T02:00:30+00:00 The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), an incorporated collective bargaining organization that represents the approximately 6,600 active police officers employed by the Philadelphia, operates a political action committee, COPPAC, for purposes of distributing contributions to candidates for local and state office. FOP, COPPAC, and four police officers challenged the constitutionality of section 10-107(3) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, which prohibits employees of the Philadelphia Police Department from making contributions "for any political purpose," 351 Pa. Code 10.10-107(3). The provision was enacted in 1951, based on Philadelphia's history of political patronage. As interpreted by its implementing regulation, employees of the police department cannot donate to COPPAC because it uses some of its funds for partisan political purposes. The Charter ban applies only to the police, and does not proscribe political donations made by Philadelphia's other 20,000 employees, the vast majority of whom are organized interests. The Third Circuit reversed summary judgment upholding the ban. Despite its valid concerns, the city did not explain how the ban serves in a direct and material way to address these harms. Given the lack of fit between the stated objectives and the means selected to achieve it, the Charter ban is unconstitutional. View "Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law 2014-08-18 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Hardiman 13-1516 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/a140922.html People v. McGraw-Hill Co., Inc. 2014-08-22T13:07:58+00:00 2014-08-18T22:25:44+00:00 The defendants were charged with violations of the California False Claims Act (CFCA) arising out of their alleged business practice of inflating the credit ratings of various structured finance securities. Defendants moved to strike the CFCA causes of action under section 425.16, subdivision (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. The superior court denied the motion, holding that the enforcement action was exempt from the special motion to strike procedure pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (d), which provides that "This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor." The court of appeal dismissed, concluding that the order is not appealable. View "People v. McGraw-Hill Co., Inc." on Justia Law 2014-08-18 state California California Court of Appeal Richman A140922 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-56766/11-56766-2014-08-14.html American Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego 2014-08-15T13:18:30+00:00 2014-08-14T21:17:20+00:00 ATC filed suit challenging the City's denial of its Conditional Use Permit (CUP) applications for three of its San Diego telecommunications facilities. ATC raised claims under, among other provisions, the California Permit Streamlining Act (PSA), Cal. Gov't Code 65956(b); the Federal Telecommunications Act (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 332; California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5; and the Equal Protection Clause. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of ATC on the PSA claim because the court concluded that the CUP applications were not deemed approved before the City denied them. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the TCA claim where the City evaluated the CUP applications under the proper provision of the Land Development Code and supported its decision to deny them with substantial evidence; the City did not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services because ATC and the City are not "similarly situated" providers; and ATC has failed to show effective prohibition because it has not demonstrated that its proposals were the least intrusive means of filling a significant gap in coverage. ATC could not prevail on California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5 because it does not have a fundamental vested right to the continued use of the Verus, Border, and Mission Valley Facilities. There was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the City's decision to deny the CUP applications was rationally related to the City's legitimate interest in minimizing the aesthetic impact of wireless facilities and in providing public communications services. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "American Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law 2014-08-14 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Bybee 11-56766 11-56767 11-56861 11-56862 http://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2014/2012ap001965-d.html Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sommers 2014-08-08T13:17:14+00:00 2014-08-05T15:31:48+00:00 A referee recommended that Attorney Sommers' license to practice law be suspended for 60 days for professional misconduct. He did not appeal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the misconduct warrants public discipline, but deemed a public reprimand sufficient and imposed the full costs on Attorney Sommers, which total $5,033.16. Sommers was admitted to practice law in Wisconsin in 1992. His Wisconsin law license is currently suspended for nonpayment of State Bar dues and for noncompliance with continuing legal education requirements. Sommers was previously suspended for 30 days as discipline based on a related matter: allegations relating to improper ex parte communications, press releases, and other statements involving the judiciary. View "Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Sommers" on Justia Law 2014-08-05 state Wisconsin Wisconsin Supreme Court per curim 2012AP001965-D http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-1938/13-1938-2014-07-29.html 520 S. MI Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1 2014-08-01T13:12:31+00:00 2014-07-29T18:26:01+00:00 A strike against the hotel began in 2003, but apparently escalated in 2008, when the union pursued a more aggressive strategy. It began engaging in secondary activity by targeting organizations that had made arrangements to reserve large blocks of rooms or space at the hotel, in the hopes that they would cancel their plans and pressure the hotel to end the strike. The union would send delegations, consisting of striking hotel workers and union staff in groups of two-10 people, to the stores and offices of potential hotel patrons. The hotel claims that these delegations violated 29 U.S.C. 187(a) and 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) by coercing the customers into cancelling their agreements to book rooms. Although the strike ended in 2013, the hotel sought damages for past activity. At the close of discovery, the district court granted the union summary judgment, finding that the union's conduct was not coercive, and that barring it as a matter of federal labor law would raise important free speech concerns. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded for a trial regarding whether certain of the union's actions were coercive, whether any such coercive conduct damaged the hotel, and if so, to what extent. View "520 S. MI Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1" on Justia Law 2014-07-29 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Tinder 13-1938 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-3383/12-3383-2014-07-28.html Heath v. WI Bell, Inc. 2014-08-01T13:14:44+00:00 2014-07-28T21:03:23+00:00 The Educational Rate Program, a subsidy program authorized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is implemented by the FCC, which established USAC, a private non-profit corporation, to administer the Program. USAC provides subsidies to eligible school districts for the cost of telecommunication services. FCC regulations require that providers offer schools the "lowest corresponding price" (LCP) for their services: the "lowest price that a service provider charges to non-residential customers who are similarly situated to a particular school, library, or library consortium for similar services." Heath operates a business that audits telecommunications bills and was retained by Wisconsin school districts. Heath found that certain schools paid much higher rates than others for the same services. As a result, many districts did not receive the benefit of LCP and the government paid subsidies greater than they should have been. Heath informed Wisconsin Bell of the discrepancy, but it refused to provide the more favorable pricing. Heath also learned of an even lower price charged to the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA). Heath filed a qui tam lawsuit. The government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the public disclosure bar applied and that Heath was not saved by the original source exception, because the DOA pricing was on its website. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the claim was not based on the DOA website information and that Heath was not an opportunist plaintiff who did not contribute significant information. View "Heath v. WI Bell, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-07-28 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Kanne 12-3383 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b247151.html Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. 2014-07-25T13:15:52+00:00 2014-07-24T19:28:30+00:00 Plaintiff filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent Yelp, a popular website, from making claims about the accuracy and efficacy of its "filter" of unreliable or biased customer reviews. The trial court granted Yelp's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 because Yelp's statements at issue were matters of public interest. The court concluded that Yelp's representations about its review filter constitute commercial speech squarely within the public speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c) where Yelp's statements about its review filter consists of representations of fact about Yelp's website that are made for the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing advertisements on Yelp's website, and Yelp's statements were made in the course of delivering Yelp's website. Further, Yelp's intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential buyer or customer. The court rejected Yelp's assertion that the federal Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, barred plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order. Finally, plaintiff shall be given an opportunity to move to amend his complaint to substitute the real party in interest in this action as plaintiff. View "Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-07-24 state California California Court of Appeal Johnson B247151 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/a137035m.html Hardin v. PDX, Inc. 2014-07-25T13:16:59+00:00 2014-07-21T19:56:32+00:00 Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful scarring after she took Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal. Hardin sued the prescribing physician, the manufacturer, the store where she bought the prescription (Safeway), WKH, which produced the drug information pamphlet (monograph), and PDX, a software provider that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers. Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by the FDA, but are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan required under 110 Stat. 1593. The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first filled her prescription for Lamictal. The abbreviated warning used by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted the "Black Box" warning: "BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE" that stated: "SERIOUS AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE. Hardin says that had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication. WKH moved to strike Hardin's claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the "anti-SLAPP" (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ) statute.. The trial court ruled that WKH's production of drug monographs was protected speech concerning a public issue or an issue of public interest and that Hardin had no probability of prevailing because she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty. The court denied PDX's motion to strike, finding that the activity underlying PDX's alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Hardin v. PDX, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-07-21 state California California Court of Appeal Siggins A137035M http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/13-1496/13-1496-2014-07-14.html Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc. 2014-07-18T13:19:02+00:00 2014-07-14T18:45:42+00:00 A Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) system wireless cellular network has a base station and mobile stations, such as cellular telephones. To establish communication between a mobile station and a base, the mobile station transmits a known signal (preamble) over a random access channel (RACH). The CDMA system allows multiple signals to be sent over the same RACH by using different numerical spreading codes that enable the stations to distinguish a particular wireless communication from other concurrent communications. If too many mobile stations transmit simultaneously at high power levels, the signals can interfere with each other. GBT's patents disclose an improvement that reduces the risk of interference: a mobile station seeking to communicate with the base will transmit preambles at increasing power levels until it receives an acknowledgment signal from the base. Once the mobile station receives that acknowledgment, it stops transmitting preambles and starts transmitting message information, so that each data signal is transmitted at the lowest power necessary to reach the base, reducing the risk of interference. In Texas litigation, the court construed preamble as "a signal used for communicating with the base station that is spread before transmission" and granted summary judgment of anticipation, which the Federal Circuit affirmed. While appeal was pending, GBT sought new claims during reexamination of one patent and in a pending continuation application and submitted the claim construction order from the Texas litigation and filings setting forth GBT's stipulated definition of preamble. The claims GBT asserted, in this case, against Apple were added during the proceedings. The district court construed the disputed terms, including preamble, and granted Apple summary judgment of noninfringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law 2014-07-14 federal U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Moore 13-1496 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1231/13-1231-2014-07-11.html Spectrum Five LLC v. FCC 2014-07-18T13:18:13+00:00 2014-07-11T15:54:20+00:00 This petition involves Bermuda's efforts to secure rights from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to operate a satellite at the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Bermuda partnered with EchoStar to deploy and maintain its satellite at this orbital location. Meanwhile, the Netherlands also sought rights from the ITU to operate a satellite at a nearby orbital location. Petitioner, Spectrum Five, a developer and operator of satellites working in partnership with the Netherlands, filed an objection to the FCC to EchoStar's request to move its satellite from 76.8 degrees W.L. to 96.2 degrees W.L. The FCC granted EchoStar's request and determined that Bermuda secured rights to the 96.2 degree W.L. orbital location. Spectrum Five petitioned for review of the Commission's order, claiming principally that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court dismissed the petition for lack of Article III standing because Spectrum Five failed to demonstrate a significant likelihood that a decision of this court would redress its alleged injury. View "Spectrum Five LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law 2014-07-11 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Wilkins 13-1231 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-2605/13-2605-2014-07-09.html Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prods, Inc. 2014-07-11T13:05:14+00:00 2014-07-09T19:03:49+00:00 In 2006, American Copper & Brass received an unsolicited advertisement on one of its facsimile (fax) machines for a product sold by Lake City. The fax had been send by B2B, a "fax-blasting" company employed by Lake City. American filed suit, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 and sought class-action certification under FRCP 23. B2B, brought in as a third party, failed to appear. The district court granted class certification and entered summary judgment in favor of American. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the approved class definition included individuals who lacked standing to assert TCPA claims, based on the "successfully sent" language in the statute and that the class was not objectively ascertainable. Rule 3.501(A)(5) of the Michigan Court Rules (MCR), which prohibits class actions in TCPA lawsuits, does not apply to TCPA suits in federal court. View "Am. Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Lake City Indus. Prods, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-07-09 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Gilman 13-2605 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-2317/13-2317-2014-07-02.html Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Kurzon Strauss, LLP 2014-07-04T13:17:45+00:00 2014-07-02T18:30:28+00:00 America's largest law school, Thomas M. Cooley, has four Michigan campuses and one in Florida and about 3,500 students. . Anziska was "of counsel" at a New York law firm. On June 8, 2011, under the title "Investigating the Thomas Cooley School of Law," Anziska posted on the website "JD Underground," that the firm was investigating law schools for preying on the ignorance of "naive, clueless 22-year-olds. Perhaps one of the worst offenders is the Thomas Cooley School of Law, which grossly inflates its post-graduate employment data and salary information…. students are defaulting on loans at an astounding 41 percent… most likely … will continue to defraud unwitting students unless held civilly accountable. If you have any relevant information or know of anyone who has attended Thomas Cooley … correspondences will be kept strictly confidential." On June 13, the firm received a cease-and-desist letter from Cooley, claiming that the post was defamatory. On June 15, under the title "Retraction re: Investigating the Thomas Cooley School of Law," a partner posted on JD Underground that the earlier post "contained certain allegations which may have been couched as fact regarding employment and default data. These statements are hereby retracted." Meanwhile, Anziska disseminated a draft proposed class action complaint involving 18 former or current Cooley students, containing the same allegations. The complaint became publicly available on the internet. Cooley sued, alleging defamation, tortious interference with business relations, breach of contract, and false light. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Cooley was a limited-purpose public figure and the record would not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendants published the challenged statements with actual malice. View "Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Kurzon Strauss, LLP" on Justia Law 2014-07-02 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Griffin 13-2317 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/12-1168 McCullen v. Coakley 2014-06-27T13:14:42+00:00 2014-06-26T16:43:01+00:00 Massachusetts amended its Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act to make it a crime to knowingly stand on a "public way or sidewalk" within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any "reproductive health care facility," defined as "a place, other than within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where abortions are offered or performed." Mass. Gen. Laws, 266, 120E½. Exemptions cover "employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment." Another provision proscribes knowing obstruction of access to an abortion clinic. Abortion opponents who engage in "sidewalk counseling" sought an injunction, claiming that the amendment displaced them from their previous positions and hampered their counseling efforts; attempts to communicate with patients are also thwarted by clinic escorts, who accompany patients to clinic entrances. The district court denied the challenges. The First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, first noting the involvement of a traditional public forum. The Court employed "time, place, and manner" analysis, stating that the Act is neither content nor viewpoint based and need not be analyzed under strict scrutiny. Although it establishes buffer zones only at abortion clinics, violations depend not "on what they say," but on where they say it. The Act is justified without reference to the content of speech; its purposes include protecting public safety, patient access to health care, and unobstructed use of public sidewalks and streets. There was a record of crowding, obstruction, and even violence outside Massachusetts abortion clinics but not at other facilities. The exemption for employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment was not an attempt to favor one viewpoint. Even if some escorts have expressed views on abortion inside the zones, there was no evidence that such speech was authorized by any clinic. The Act, however, burdens substantially more speech than necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. It deprives objectors of their primary methods of communicating with patients: close, personal conversations and distribution of literature. While the Act allows "protest" outside buffer zones, these objectors are not protestors; they seek to engage in personal, caring, consensual conversations with women about alternatives. Another section of the Act already prohibits deliberate obstruction of clinic entrances. Massachusetts could also enact legislation similar to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248(a), which imposes sanctions for obstructing, intimidating, or interfering with persons obtaining or providing reproductive health services. Obstruction of driveways can be addressed by traffic ordinances. Crowding was a problem only at the Boston clinic, and only on Saturday mornings; the police are capable of ordering people to temporarily disperse and of singling out lawbreakers. View "McCullen v. Coakley" on Justia Law 2014-06-26 federal U.S. Supreme Court Roberts 12-1168 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-2914/13-2914-2014-06-25.html Cabral v. City of Evansville 2014-06-27T13:06:43+00:00 2014-06-25T23:51:54+00:00 West Side Christian Church applied to the City of Evansville, Indiana, for a permit to set up its "Cross the River" display, consisting of 31 six-foot tall decorated crosses on four blocks of public Riverfront. After Evansville approved the application, residents sought an injunction, claiming that the display violated their First Amendment rights. The district court agreed. The City did not appeal, but West Side, which was an intervenor in the district court, did. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, finding that West Side did not have standing to appeal. The court could not redress any injury West Side might have suffered because Evansville was not party to this appeal and could prohibit the display regardless of any order issued. Any First Amendment injury West Side might have suffered from the injunction was not fairly traceable to, or caused by, Evansville. View "Cabral v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law 2014-06-25 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Williams 13-2914 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/13-461 Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. 2014-06-27T13:16:25+00:00 2014-06-25T16:05:27+00:00 The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the "exclusive righ[t]" to "perform the copyrighted work publicly," 17 U.S.C. 106(4), including the right to "transmit or otherwise communicate ... the [copyrighted] work ... to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times," section 101. Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet. Aereo's server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by an antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder and streams the show to the subscriber, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast. The owners of program copyrights unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to "perform" their copyrighted works "publicly." The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Aereo performs the works within the meaning of section 101 and does not merely supply equipment that allows others to do so. The Court noted that the Act was amended in 1976 to make the law applicable to community antenna television (CATV) providers by clarifying that an entity that acts like a CATV system "performs," even when it only enhances viewers' ability to receive broadcast television signals. Aereo's activities are similar; it sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast. That Aereo's system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program is not critical. Aereo transmits a performance whenever its subscribers watch a program. The Court stated that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it "transmit[s] ... a performance" to them, regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes and whether it makes an individual personal copy for each viewer. Aero subscribers are "the public" under the Act: a large number of people, unrelated and unknown to each other. View "Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-06-25 federal U.S. Supreme Court Breyer 13-461 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-3876/13-3876-2014-06-23.html Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny 2014-06-27T13:06:38+00:00 2014-06-23T19:08:43+00:00 In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: "Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!" and has a directional arrow with "1 BLOCK" written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: "This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!" Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law 2014-06-23 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals 13-3876 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1122/13-1122-2014-06-20.html Sorenson Communications Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al. 2014-06-27T13:14:06+00:00 2014-06-20T21:10:20+00:00 Sorenson is a purveyor of telephones for the hearing-impaired that have words scrolling on a screen during a call. Sorenson's technology uses the Internet to transmit and receive both the call itself and the derived captions (IP CTS). Sorenson gives its phones out for free, with the captioning feature turned on. On appeal, Sorenson challenged the FCC's promulgation of rules regarding IP CTS under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court concluded that the FCC's rule requiring all new users to register and self-certify their hearing loss, but only if the provider sold the IP CTS equipment for $75 or more, was arbitrary and capricious because the FCC failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. Further, the FCC's requirement that IP CTS phones "have a default setting of captions off, so that all IP CTS users must affirmatively turn on captioning," was unsupported by the evidence and, rather, contradicted by it. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review. View "Sorenson Communications Inc., et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law 2014-06-20 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Brown 13-1122 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-1284/14-1284-2014-06-16.html United States v. Daoud 2014-06-20T13:20:19+00:00 2014-06-16T21:18:33+00:00 Daoud, an 18-year-old American citizen, had an email conversation with undercover FBI employees posing as terrorists who responded to messages that he had posted online. Daoud planned "violent jihad" and discussed his interest in committing attacks in the U.S, using bomb-making instructions that he had read in Inspire magazine, an English-language organ of Al Qaeda, and online. Daoud selected a Chicago bar as the target of a bomb that the agent would supply. The agent told him the bomb would destroy the building and would kill "hundreds" of people. Daoud replied: "that's the point." On September 14, 2012, Daoud parked a Jeep containing the fake bomb in front of the bar. In an alley, in the presence of the agent, he tried to detonate the fake bomb and was arrested. In jail, he tried to solicit someone to murder the undercover agent with whom he had dealt. The government notified Daoud, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801, that it intended to present evidence derived from electronic surveillance conducted under the Act. His attorney sought access to the classified materials submitted in support of the government's FISA warrant applications. The government supplied a heavily redacted, unclassified response and a classified version, accessible only to the court with a statement that disclosure "would harm the national security." The harm was detailed in a classified affidavit signed by the FBI's Acting Assistant Director for Counterterrorism. The district judge ordered the materials sought by defense counsel turned over. In an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that in addition to having the requisite security clearance the seeker of such information must establish need to know. View "United States v. Daoud" on Justia Law 2014-06-16 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Posner 14-1284 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-5946/13-5946-2014-06-16.html Jones v. Dirty World Entm't 2014-06-20T13:20:18+00:00 2014-06-16T16:33:02+00:00 The Dirty World website enables users to anonymously upload comments, photographs, and video, which Richie selects and publishes along with his own editorial comments. Jones is a Kentucky high school teacher and a member of the cheerleading squad for the Cincinnati Bengals football team. She was the subject of several submissions posted by anonymous users and of editorial remarks posted by Richie, including photographs of Jones and a statement that she "slept with every other Bengal Football player." Jones requested that the post be removed. Richie declined. A subsequent post alleged that her former boyfriend "tested positive for Chlamydia Infection and Gonorrhea ... sure Sarah also has both ... he brags about doing sarah in … her class room at the school she teaches at DIXIE Heights." Richie's responded to the post: "Why are all high school teachers freaks in the sack?" Jones brought claims of defamation, libel per se, false light, and intentional inflection of emotional distress. The district court rejected arguments that the claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230. A second trial resulted in a verdict for $38,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Under the CDA, Richie and Dirty World were neither creators nor developers of the challenged content. Jones's tort claims are grounded on the statements of another content provider, but sought to impose liability on Dirty World and Richie as if they were the publishers or speakers of those statements. Section 230(c)(1) bars those claims. View "Jones v. Dirty World Entm't" on Justia Law 2014-06-16 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Gibbons 13-5946 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/13-193 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus 2014-06-20T13:14:47+00:00 2014-06-16T15:36:48+00:00 A former congressman filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that SBA violated an Ohio law that criminalizes some false statements made during a political campaign. SBA had stated that his vote for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was a vote in favor of "taxpayer funded abortion." After he lost his re-election bid the complaint was dismissed. SBA pursued a separate challenge on First Amendment grounds. COAST also challenged the law, arguing that it had planned to disseminate a similar message but refrained because of the suit against SBA. The district court consolidated the suits and dismissed them as nonjusticiable, concluding that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury to establish standing or ripeness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently imminent injury under Article III. An "injury in fact" must be "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Challenging a law before enforcement requires alleging "an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution." The plaintiffs alleged a credible threat of enforcement. Their intended future conduct is arguably proscribed by the statute. The statute sweeps broadly; the Elections Commission already found probable cause to believe that SBA violated the law when it made statements similar to those they plan to make in the future. SBA's insistence that its previous statements were true did not preclude finding probable cause. The threat of future enforcement is substantial. There is a history of past enforcement; a complaint may be filed by "any person," not just a prosecutor or agency. Commission proceedings impose a burden on electoral speech. The target of a complaint may be forced to divert significant time and resources in the crucial days before an election. Those proceedings are backed by the additional threat of criminal prosecution. The Court found the "prudential factors" of fitness and hardship "easily satisfied." View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law 2014-06-16 federal U.S. Supreme Court Thomas 13-193 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-1059/13-1059-2014-06-13.html Illinois Public Telecommunications v. FCC, et al. 2014-06-20T13:17:33+00:00 2014-06-13T22:42:00+00:00 Congress prohibited Bell Operating Companies from subsidizing their own payphones or charging discriminatory rates to competitor payphone providers. At issue were the remedies available for violations of that prohibition. Specifically, whether independent payphone providers who were charged excessive rates by Bell Operating Companies were entitled to refunds or instead were entitled only to prospective relief in the form of lower rates. The court concluded that Congress granted discretion to the FCC to determine whether refunds would be required in those circumstances and that the Commission reasonably exercised that discretion here. The court denied the petitions in part and dismissed the remainder for lack of jurisdiction. View "Illinois Public Telecommunications v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law 2014-06-13 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Kavanaugh 13-1059 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/13-7017/13-7017-2014-06-13.html Klayman v. Zuckerberg, et al. 2014-06-20T13:20:20+00:00 2014-06-13T22:00:53+00:00 Plaintiff filed suit against Facebook and its founder, alleging that their delay in removing a page entitled "Third Palestinian Intifada," and related pages, which called for Muslims to rise up and kill the Jewish people, constituted intentional assault and negligence. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 230, shielded Facebook and its founder from suit where Facebook qualified as an interactive computer service; the complaint acknowledges that the objected-to information was provided by third party users, not Facebook itself; and the complaint seeks to hold Facebook liable as the "publisher or speaker" of that information. View "Klayman v. Zuckerberg, et al." on Justia Law 2014-06-13 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Millet 13-7017 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-1910/13-1910-2014-06-11.html United States v. Stanley 2014-06-13T13:14:06+00:00 2014-06-11T18:42:32+00:00 Erdely was investigating online distribution of child pornography when he discovered a computer on a peer-to-peer network sharing 77 files that he suspected contained child pornography. With information available to anyone, he found the Internet protocol address (IP address) through which it connected to the internet. Searching publicly available records, Erdely determined that the IP Address was registered to a Comcast subscriber and obtained a court order. Comcast gave Erdely the Neighbor's name and Pittsburgh address. Erdely executed a warrant. None of the Neighbor's computers contained child pornography or the file-sharing software; his wireless router was not password-protected. Erdely deduced that the computer sharing child pornography was connecting without the Neighbor's knowledge. With the Neighbor's permission, Erdely connected a computer to the router for remote access. Later, while working in Harrisburg, Erdely learned that the computer was again sharing child pornography on the Neighbor's IP address. Erdely determined the mooching computer's IP address and MAC address, which belonged to an Apple wireless card. Erdely had not discovered any Apple wireless devices in the Neighbor's home, so he decided to use a "MoocherHunter" mobile tracking software tool, which can be used by anyone with a directional antenna. Not knowing which residence the signal was coming from, Erdely proceeded without a warrant. From the sidewalk the MoocherHunter's readings were strongest when aimed at Stanley's apartment. Erdely obtained a warrant for Stanley's home. When officers arrived, Stanley fled, but returned and confessed that he had connected to the Neighbor's router to download child pornography. Erdely seized Stanley's Apple laptop and recovered 144 images and video files depicting child pornography. Stanley was charged with possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a). The district court denied a motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed. Use of the MoocherHunter was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Stanley" on Justia Law 2014-06-11 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Smith 13-1910 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-3884/13-3884-2014-06-10.html Siding & Insulation Co. v. Acuity Mut. Ins. Co. 2014-06-13T13:05:19+00:00 2014-06-10T22:41:32+00:00 A purported class action alleged that Beachwood Hair Clinic violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, by disseminating more than 37,000 unsolicited fax advertisements in 2005 and 2006. Facing more than $18 million in statutory damages, Beachwood and its insurer, Acuity, agreed to a $4-million class settlement with the Ohio-based class representative, Siding. The settlement stipulated that separate litigation between Acuity and Siding would resolve a $2-million coverage dispute under Beachwood's policy. Siding sought a declaratory judgment under Beachwood's policy. The district court granted summary judgment to Acuity denying coverage. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that Siding did not establish diversity jurisdiction, which requires an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Unable to identify a singular interest exceeding $75,000 in the remaining $2-million coverage dispute, Siding sought to aggregate its interest with putative class members to satisfy that requirement, or to have the court consider the value of the policy dispute from Acuity's perspective: $2 million. Acuity suggested ancillary jurisdiction via the settlement judgment in the underlying class action. The court rejected all arguments. View "Siding & Insulation Co. v. Acuity Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2014-06-10 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Cook 13-3884 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/12-14564/12-14564-2014-06-05.html Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2014-06-06T13:06:55+00:00 2014-06-06T05:38:13+00:00 Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her minor child, filed suit alleging that Wells Fargo violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991's (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), prohibition on autodialing cell phones without the express consent of the called party. Wells Fargo had called the cell phone number used by the child to collect a debt from a former customer who had listed the phone number on a Wells Fargo account application. Wells Fargo was unaware that the cell phone number was no longer assigned to the former customer and the former customer never revoked his consent or requested that Wells Fargo cease calling the number. The court concluded that "called party," for purposes of section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) means the subscriber to the cell phone service or user of the cell phone called. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in plaintiff's favor. View "Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law 2014-06-05 federal U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Tjoflat 12-14564 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27394.html Horry Telephone v. City of Georgetown 2014-06-06T13:11:19+00:00 2014-06-04T15:20:03+00:00 Appellant, Horry Telephone Cooperative Inc. (HTC), is a telecommunications company providing services in the Georgetown and Horry County areas. In 2007, as required by the South Carolina Competitive Cable Services Act, HTC filed for a state-issued certificate of franchise authority, where it sought to provide cable television services in the City of Georgetown (City). The Secretary of State, pursuant to 58-12-310, forwarded the notice of application to the City which was required to respond to the request within 65 days. On second reading from a city council meeting, the request was denied. The City informed the Secretary of State of the denial, and notice was sent to HTC informing them that their franchise for the City of Georgetown had been denied. HTC filed for reconsideration, which was ultimately denied. Finally, HTC applied for a third time, and after consideration, the application was tabled and subsequently failed. HTC then filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court to declare that the City's denial was unlawful under the Act. The circuit court held a bench trial and ruled that the Act did not create a private cause of action and the City's denial of HTC's consent request was a reasonable and valid exercise of legislative discretion. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed HTC's complaint with prejudice. This issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the City's denial HTC's multiple franchise applications was a violation of the Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded it was not, and affirmed the circuit court. View "Horry Telephone v. City of Georgetown" on Justia Law 2014-06-04 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Pleicones 27394 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/11-9900/11-9900-2014-05-23.html IN RE: FCC 11-161 2014-05-30T13:09:54+00:00 2014-05-23T17:19:07+00:00 In late 2011, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking comprehensively reforming and modernizing its universal service and intercarrier compensation systems. Petitioners, all parties to the rulemaking proceeding, filed petitions for judicial review of the FCC's Order. In multiple briefs, petitioners asserted a host of challenges to the portions of the Order revising how universal service funds are to be allocated to and employed by recipients. After carefully considering those claims, the Tenth Circuit found them either unpersuasive or barred from judicial review. Consequently, the Court denied the petitions to the extent they were based upon those claims. View "IN RE: FCC 11-161" on Justia Law 2014-05-23 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Briscoe 11-9900 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2014/116389.html Bridgeview Health Care Ctr., Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 2014-05-23T13:10:09+00:00 2014-05-22T20:46:23+00:00 Bridgeview Health Care Center filed a class action complaint against Clark, an Illinois resident who operates Affordable Digital Hearing, a sole proprietorship out of Terre Haute, Indiana. Bridgeview alleged that Clark sent Bridgeview and others unsolicited faxes and claimed violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227; common law conversion of its fax paper and toner; and violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2. Clark had a comprehensive general liability policy issued by State Farm, an Illinois corporation. The policy was purchased through an Indiana agent and issued to Clark's Indiana business address. State Farm sought declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend in Indiana state court. The action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Bridgeview. Bridgeview sought a declaration, in Illinois state court that State Farm had a duty to defend and indemnify Clark under the advertising injury and property damage provisions of the policy. State Farm argued that Illinois law conflicts with Indiana law on coverage issues and that Indiana law should apply. The circuit court found that there was no conflict and no need to conduct a choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court reversed, finding that decisions cited by State Farm were sufficient to raise the possibility of a conflict, requiring a choice-of-law analysis The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that State Farm failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that an actual conflict exists between Illinois and Indiana law. View "Bridgeview Health Care Ctr., Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law 2014-05-22 state Illinois Illinois Supreme Court Burke 116389 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/13-1765/13-1765-2014-05-13.html CoreTel Virginia, LLC v. Verizon Virginia, LLC 2014-05-16T13:07:48+00:00 2014-05-13T19:17:10+00:00 This case arose from a dispute between CoreTel and Verizon regarding their respective responsibilities under an interconnection agreement (ICA), a private contract that implements duties imposed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. Each party contended that the other improperly billed it for various services. The district court granted summary judgment in Verizon's favor on each claim. The court concluded that CoreTel was entitled to summary judgment in its favor on both its and Verizon's claims for declaratory relief relating to Verizon's facilities charges where the ICA entitled CoreTel to order entrance facilities for interconnection at TELRIC. The court remanded for consideration of CoreTel's claim for injunctive relief. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on CoreTel's facilities claims where the facilities CoreTel provided were not entrance facilities under ICA 1.25 and CoreTel pointed to no provision of the ICA that authorized it to simply levy facilities charges for any piece of equipment that handled Verizon's traffic. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in Verizon's favor on CoreTel's reciprocal compensation claims. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in Verizon's favor on Verizon's switched-access claims. View "CoreTel Virginia, LLC v. Verizon Virginia, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-05-13 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Duncan 13-1765 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-5956/13-5956-2014-05-13.html Bickley v. Dish Network LLC 2014-05-16T13:07:26+00:00 2014-05-13T18:33:59+00:00 American Satellite, a third party retailer of Dish Network satellite television services, received a call from a potential customer. A woman, who identified herself as "Dickley," provided what she claimed to be her social security number. In actuality, the number belonged to a man named Bickley. Dickley was an identity thief. The agent entered Dickley's name and social security number into an interface that connects to credit reporting agencies. Unable to verify the information, American Satellite informed Dickley that her attempt to open an account was declined. Bickley later received a credit report indicating that Dish had made an inquiry on his name. Dish informed him that someone had attempted to open an account in his name, providing a recording of the conversation between the agent and the identity thief. A year later, despite knowing that the inquiry had prevented the theft of his identity, Bickley filed suit under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681b, alleging request and use of his credit report without a "permissible purpose" and sought emotional distress damages. The district court entered summary judgment for Dish, including a counterclaim for abuse of process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, referring to the conspicuous underdevelopment of key factual detail in Bickley's complaint and in briefs as "bordering on deceitful" and to the adage that no good deed goes unpunished. View "Bickley v. Dish Network LLC" on Justia Law 2014-05-13 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Mckeague 13-5956 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/12-2427/12-2427-2014-05-09.html CTIA - The Wireless Assoc. v. P.R. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd. 2014-05-16T13:06:32+00:00 2014-05-10T12:46:10+00:00 In 2011, in order to combat the use of anonymous prepaid cell phone for criminal purposes, the Puerto Rico Governor signed into law the Registry Act, which requires telephone companies and other sellers of prepaid phones to provide information about the purchasers of the phones to the government of Puerto Rico, which then compiles a registry with the names, numbers, and addresses of the purchasers. Plaintiff, a non-profit corporation that represents the interests of the wireless communications industry, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the Registry Act was preempted by the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) because the SCA prohibits Plaintiff's members from turning over to the government without a subpoena the information required by the Registry Act. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Registry Act is preempted by the SCA, and its enforcement should be enjoined. View "CTIA - The Wireless Assoc. v. P.R. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd." on Justia Law 2014-05-09 federal U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Torruella 12-2427 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/13-10485/13-10485-2014-05-02.html J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures L.L.C., et al. 2014-05-09T13:04:56+00:00 2014-05-05T21:01:21+00:00 This case involved the rights to broadcast the Floyd "Money" Mayweather, Jr. v. Ricky Watton WBC Welterweight Championship Fight. On appeal, defendants challenged summary judgment in favor of J&J on its Federal Communication Act (FCA) claims pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 553 & 605. J&J alleged that defendants violated sections 553 and 605 by receiving and displaying the fight without first paying a licensing fee to J&J. The court concluded that J&J failed to meet its summary judgment burden under section 553 where there was at least a dispute of material fact as to whether defendants fell into the "safe harbor," that precluded the imposition of liability on the majority of cable recipients - customers of cable providers. This exclusion constrained the reach of the statute by exempting from liability those individuals who receive authorization from a cable operator. The court joined the majority of circuits in holding that section 605 does not encompass the conduct presented here: the receipt or interception of communications by wire from a cable system. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute compelled this interpretation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law 2014-05-02 federal U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Haynes 13-10485 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/13-2163/13-2163-2014-04-23.html Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard 2014-04-25T13:10:25+00:00 2014-04-24T02:47:11+00:00 Green Mountain Realty Corp. ("GMR") sought to erect a 140-foot cell phone tower in Milton, Massachusetts that would fill a significant gap in the wireless coverage provided by T-Mobile's networks. The Town of Milton rejected the proposed tower. GMR sued Milton in federal court. The district court granted summary judgment to Milton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of whether Milton's denials resulted an "effective prohibition" of personal wireless services in contravention of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. On remand, GMR submitted evidence indicating that a shorter tower would suffice to eliminate the coverage gap in T-Mobile's network. The district court granted summary judgment for Milton. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a reasonable finder of fact could have found Milton's denials rejected the only feasible plan for remedying the coverage gap and therefore constituted an unlawful effective prohibition of T-Mobile's provision of wireless services, unless GMR was allowed to build a cell phone tower between ninety and 120 feet tall. Remanded. View "Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard" on Justia Law 2014-04-23 federal U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Thompson 13-2163 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-1816/13-1816-2014-04-11.html United States v. Auernheimer 2014-04-18T13:14:51+00:00 2014-04-11T17:07:41+00:00 Apple introduced the iPad in 2010. To send and receive data over cellular networks (3G), customers had to purchase a data contract from AT&T and register on an AT&T website. AT&T prepopulated the user ID field on the login screen with customers' email addresses by programming servers to search for the user's Integrated Circuit Card Identifier to reduce the time to log into an account. Spitler discovered this "shortcut" and wrote a program, the "account slurper," to repeatedly access the AT&T website, each time changing the ICC-ID by one digit. If an email address appeared in the login box, the program would save that address. Spitler shared this discovery with Auernheimer, who helped him to refine the account slurper, which collected 114,000 email addresses. Auernheimer emailed the media to publicize their exploits. AT&T fixed the breach. Auernheimer shared the list of email addresses with Tate, who published a story that mentioned some names of those whose email addresses were obtained, but published only redacted email addresses and ICC-IDs. Spitler was in California. Auernheimer was in Arkansas. The servers t were physically located in Texas and Georgia. Despite the absence of any connection to New Jersey, a Newark grand jury indicted Auernheimer for conspiracy to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii), and identity fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7). The Third Circuit vacated his conviction. Venue in criminal cases is more than a technicality; it involves "matters that touch closely the fair administration of criminal justice and public confidence in it." View "United States v. Auernheimer" on Justia Law 2014-04-11 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Chagares 13-1816 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-3012/13-3012-2014-04-08.html Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman 2014-04-11T13:05:15+00:00 2014-04-08T15:00:57+00:00 The plaintiffs deal in silver and gold jewelry, ingots, numismatics, and other related items. They challenged the facial constitutionality of the Precious Metals Dealers Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4728, alleging violation of the commercial speech rights of businesses dealing in precious metals, vagueness, and violation of the Fourth Amendment by imposing overly burdensome retention, reporting, and record-keeping requirements. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the Act violated the First Amendment because only those engaged in commercial speech are subject to its licensing requirement. The injunction prohibited the state from requiring licenses or fining those, like plaintiffs, who previously violated the statute. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying "rational basis" review. The Act does not burden the commercial speech rights of unlicensed precious metals dealers. Such dealers do not have a constitutional right to advertise or operate a business does not comply with reasonable requirements of Ohio law and cannot "hold themselves out" to the public without a license, regardless of whether they advertise. The issue is not advertising, but whether a business holds itself out to the public, which can occur by posting a sign, placing goods in a window, or simply conducting business in a manner that is visible to the public. The court noted the public interest in the statutory scheme . View "Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman" on Justia Law 2014-04-08 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Clay 13-3012 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/12-2396/12-2396-2014-04-03.html T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. The Loudoun Cty. Bd. 2014-04-04T13:16:01+00:00 2014-04-03T22:55:12+00:00 T-Mobile filed suit under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B), challenging the Board's denial of T-Mobile's application for permits to build two telecommunications towers in Loudoun County - one disguised as a bell tower and one disguised as a silo on a farm. The district court concluded that the Board improperly denied T-Mobile's application for the silo tower and affirmed the Board's decision denying permits for the bell tower. The court concluded that the Board's decision to deny T-Mobile's Bell Tower Site application was supported by substantial evidence; did not have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services in view of the possibility of other alternatives; and was not made on the basis of health concerns about radio frequency emissions. In regards to the Silo Site, the court concluded that while the aesthetic concerns that the Board gave for denying T-Mobile's application were supported by substantial evidence, its decision to base the denial of T-Mobile's application on improper environmental concerns about radio frequency emissions was prohibited by the Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. The Loudoun Cty. Bd." on Justia Law 2014-04-03 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Niemeyer 12-2396 12-2397 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/572/12-536 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n 2014-04-04T13:10:26+00:00 2014-04-02T20:33:02+00:00 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, impose base limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, and aggregate limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees, 2 U.S.C. 441a. In the 2011–2012 election cycle, McCutcheon contributed to 16 federal candidates, complying with all base limits. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to additional candidates and political committees and that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future. McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee challenged the aggregate limits under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, with five justices concluding that those limits are invalid. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the "closely drawn" test applies, the analysis depends on the fit between stated governmental objectives and the means selected to achieve the objectives. The aggregate limits fail even under the "closely drawn" test. Contributing to a candidate is an exercise of the right to participate in the electoral process through political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is not a "modest restraint." To require a person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes penalizes that individual for "robustly exercis[ing]" his First Amendment rights. The proper focus is on an individual's right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The justices noted the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence and that the Court must "err on the side of protecting political speech." Given regulations already in effect, fear that an individual might make massive unearmarked contributions to entities likely to support particular candidate is speculative. Experience suggests that most contributions are retained and spent by their recipients; the government provided no reason to believe that candidates or committees would dramatically shift their priorities if aggregate limits were lifted. Multiple alternatives could serve the interest in preventing circumvention without "unnecessary abridgment" of First Amendment rights, such as targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and committees, tighter earmarking rules, and disclosure. View "McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-04-02 federal U.S. Supreme Court Roberts 12-536 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/14-8004/14-8004-2014-03-31.html Wagener Equities, Inc. v. Chapman 2014-04-04T13:07:36+00:00 2014-03-31T17:20:28+00:00 A business that manages commercial real estate and its owners were sued in a purported class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, for having paid a "fax blaster" (Business to Business Solutions) to send unsolicited fax advertisements. Aggregate statutory damages would be more than $5 million or, if the violation is determined to be willful or knowing, as much as three times greater. The Seventh Circuit denied leave to appeal class certification in the suit, which is more than five years old. The court noted that it had no knowledge of the value of the defendant-business and that, even if the defendants could prove that they will be forced to settle unless class certification is reversed, they would have to demonstrate a significant probability that the order was erroneous. Rejecting challenges concerning individual class members, the court noted that no monetary loss or injury need be shown to entitle junk‐fax recipient to statutory damages. The adequacy of the class representative was not challenged. View "Wagener Equities, Inc. v. Chapman" on Justia Law 2014-03-31 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Posner 14-8004 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-4476/12-4476-2014-03-21.html Bray v. Planned Parenthood Columbia-Willamette, Inc. 2014-03-28T13:06:25+00:00 2014-03-21T15:49:34+00:00 Bray is an antiabortion activist and wrote a book, A Time to Kill. In 1985, Bray was convicted for a felony relating to physical damage to abortion centers. He spent four years in prison. Planned Parenthood (PPCW) was a plaintiff in a 1995 suit against antiabortion activists (including Bray) for intimidation by threat of force under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248. In 2005, PPCW sought to collect its $850,000 judgment and obtained a writ of execution authorizing seizure of specified property. The Bray family filed a "Bivens" suit, claiming that U.S. Marshals conspired with PPCW to seize their property in an unconstitutional manner. The complaint alleged that during a "surprise raid" Bray was required to sit on his couch while flak-jacketed Marshals, advocates for political positions that Bray despised, plus unknown persons, seized the books, papers, computers and cameras, of Bray and his family, excepting only children's books and Bibles. Bray was not allowed to leave the couch or to call his lawyer. Eventually a Marshal called Bray's lawyer. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Bray had settled with all defendants, except the Marshals, who were entitled to qualified immunity in carrying out a presumptively valid federal court order, even by "highly questionable ways." The unconstitutionality of certain actions was not then clearly established with sufficient specificity. If the alleged facts are true, the incident was "more like home raids by Red Guards during China's Cultural Revolution than like what we should expect" in the U.S., even if Bray's ideas are "repugnant." View "Bray v. Planned Parenthood Columbia-Willamette, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-03-21 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Rogers 12-4476 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2014/115776.html People v. Clark 2014-03-21T13:09:35+00:00 2014-03-20T20:26:47+00:00 Clark was indicted under 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) for having used an eavesdropping device to record a conversation between himself and attorney Thomas without her consent and having used a device to record a conversation between himself, Judge Janes, and Thomas while Janes was acting in the performance of official duties, without the consent of either. Defendant stated that he was in court and attorney Thomas was representing the opposing party; there was no court reporter nor was there any recording device, so he made recordings to preserve the record. He claimed he had a first amendment right to gather information by recording officials performing their public duties. The circuit court dismissed, holding that the statute is unconstitutional on substantive due process and first amendment grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that if another person overhears what we say, that person may write it down and publish it, but if that same person records our words with a recording device, even if it is not published in any way, a criminal act has been committed. The statute goes too far in its effort to protect individuals' interest in the privacy of their communications and burdens substantially more speech than necessary to serve interests it may legitimately serve. It does not meet the requirements necessary to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law 2014-03-20 state Illinois Illinois Supreme Court Garman 115776 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2014/114852.html People v. Melongo 2014-03-21T13:09:35+00:00 2014-03-20T17:58:27+00:00 Defendant was charged with computer tampering in an unrelated case. The docket sheet, the judge's half sheet, and the court call sheet for the arraignment date indicate that defendant was not in court and that the arraignment did not take place. Defendant's efforts to have a court reporter change the transcript were unsuccessful. The court reporter referred defendant to her supervisor, Taylor. In a telephone conversation, Taylor explained that any dispute over the accuracy of a transcript should be presented to the judge. Defendant surreptitiously recorded three telephone conversations with Taylor and posted recordings and transcripts of the conversations on her website. Defendant eventually obtained a fraudulent court transcript. Defendant was charged with eavesdropping, (720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), and using or divulging information obtained through the use of an eavesdropping device, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3). Defendant claimed am exception for "reasonable suspicion that another party to the conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal offense against the person … and there is reason to believe that evidence of the criminal offense may be obtained." The state argued that the exception did not apply because the reporter accused of creating a forged transcript was not a party to the recorded conversations. After a mistrial, the court found the statute facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding the statutes overbroad as criminalizing a range of innocent conduct. The eavesdropping statute does not distinguish between open and surreptitious recording and burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to serve a legitimate state interest in protecting conversational privacy. The language of the recording statute criminalizes the publication of any recording made on a cellphone or other such device, regardless of consent. View "People v. Melongo" on Justia Law 2014-03-20 state Illinois Illinois Supreme Court Garman 114852 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/12-2572/12-2572-2014-03-06.html Core Communications, Inc. v. Verizon Maryland, Inc. 2014-03-07T14:09:43+00:00 2014-03-06T23:34:33+00:00 This case arose from a dispute over Core's interconnection agreement with Verizon. On appeal, Core challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Verizon with respect to tort claims pursued by Core under Maryland law. Core also contended that the district court erred when it awarded nominal damages to Core on its related claim for breach of contract (Reconsideration Order). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Verizon to raise the Exculpatory Clause, post-remand, in the summary judgment proceedings; the district court did not err in enforcing the Exculpatory Clause in the consolidated proceedings where the Clause was not void under principles of Maryland contract law; the district court did not err in awarding Verizon summary judgment on Core's state law tort claims for concealment and unfair competition where Core failed to establish that Verizon acted with intent to defraud or deceive; and the district court properly entered judgment on Core's breach of contract claim in the nominal sum of one dollar. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Core Communications, Inc. v. Verizon Maryland, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-03-06 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals King 12-2572 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-1365/12-1365-2014-02-28.html Blanca Telephone Co., et al. v. FCC 2014-03-07T14:18:58+00:00 2014-02-28T20:16:26+00:00 The Commission granted waivers with nunc pro tunc effect to many of the companies seeking relief from a compliance deadline regarding regulations that required digital wireless service providers to offer telephone handsets that are compatible with hearing aids. Petitioners sought review of the Commission's denial of waivers for petitioners and raised several challenges to the procedural regularity of the Commission's adjudication of their waiver petitions. Because the three petitioners did not comply until after January 1, 2007, and because they reported to the Commission that they had done nothing to seek out compliant telephones beyond contacting their existing suppliers, petitioners failed to satisfy either of the Commission's reasonable criteria for waiver. Accordingly, the Commission's decision to deny the waiver petitions was reasonable. The Commission did not treat similarly situated carriers differently without offering an adequate explanation. The court rejected petitioners' remaining arguments and denied the petition for review. View "Blanca Telephone Co., et al. v. FCC" on Justia Law 2014-02-28 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Garland 12-1365 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/571/12-1038 United States v. Apel 2014-03-07T14:22:35+00:00 2014-02-26T16:58:25+00:00 Vandenberg Air Force Base is a designated a "closed base." Civilians may not enter without express permission. The Air Force has granted an easement over areas of the Base, so that two public highways traverse the Base. One highway has an adjacent area designated for peaceful protests. The Base commander enacted rules to control the protest area and issued an advisory that anyone who fails to adhere to those policies may be barred from entering the Base. Apel was barred from the Base for trespass and vandalism, but continued to enter the protest area and was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1382, prohibiting reentry of a "military... installation" after having been ordered not to do so "by any officer or person in command." The district court rejected his defense that the section does not apply to the protest area. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. A "military ... installation" encompasses the commanding officer's area of responsibility, including Vandenberg's highways and protest area. Section1382 does not require exclusive possession and control. Although the highways and protest area are outside fenced areas on the Base, the entire Vandenberg property is under the administration of the Air Force. Although the Base commander has occasionally closed the highways to the public for security purposes or when conducting a military launch, section 1382 does not require base commanders to make continuous, uninterrupted use of a place within their jurisdiction, lest they lose authority to exclude certain individuals. View "United States v. Apel" on Justia Law 2014-02-26 federal U.S. Supreme Court Roberts 12-1038 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/12-1694/12-1694-2014-02-24.html Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility, LLC 2014-03-07T14:22:51+00:00 2014-02-24T16:52:51+00:00 Starhome owns the 487 patent, titled "System and Methods for Global Access to Services for Mobile Telephone Subscribers," aimed at solving a problem that arises when mobile phone users are in a network other than their home network (roaming). For example, in a home network, a mobile phone user might dial a short code, such as "121," to access voice mail. While roaming, a network may not recognize the code, resulting in an error message. The 487 patent demonstrates a system providing roaming services and employing an "intelligent gateway" that contains information about multiple home networks, including short-code translation tables, subscriber profile data, and roaming patterns. Starhome sued AT&T. The court construed the term "intelligent gateway" to mean "a network element that transfers information to and from a mobile network and another network external to the mobile network" and the parties stipulated to a judgment of noninfringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-02-24 federal U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Schall 12-1694 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-2229/13-2229-2014-02-20.html Graboff v. Colleran Firm 2014-02-21T14:13:43+00:00 2014-02-21T00:47:40+00:00 AAOS is a voluntary professional organization for orthopaedic surgeons, which has adopted professional standards, including member grievance procedures. Most orthopaedic surgeons are members of the AAOS, but it is not a licensing authority. AAOS member Dr. Meller initiated a grievance against another AAOS member, Dr. Graboff, claiming that Graboff wrote an inaccurate report based on incomplete information that was used against him in a civil malpractice case. After determining that Graboff's testimony violated the AAOS's Standards of Professionalism, which require members to provide honest and accurate testimony when serving as expert witnesses, the AAOS suspended Graboff from membership for two years and published a description of the proceedings in AAOS Now, its newsletter. Graboff sued, alleging that the AAOS article was defamatory and a false-light invasion of privacy because it selectively recounted the circumstances of the grievance proceedings to imply that he had testified falsely. A jury awarded Graboff $196,000 in damages for "false light" invasion of privacy. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that, as a matter of law, the jury's finding that the AAOS had not made false statements foreclosed the possibility that it could be liable on the false-light claim. View "Graboff v. Colleran Firm" on Justia Law 2014-02-20 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Greenberg 13-2229 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-1992/12-1992-2014-02-19.html Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc, 2014-02-21T14:06:23+00:00 2014-02-19T16:17:45+00:00 When basketball legend Michael Jordan was inducted into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in 2009, Sports Illustrated produced a special commemorative issue devoted exclusively to Jordan's remarkable career. Jewel Foods was offered free advertising space in the issue for agreeing to stock the magazine in its 175 stores. Jewel submitted a full-page ad congratulating Jordan, which ran on the inside back cover of the commemorative issue. To Jordan the ad constituted a misappropriation of his identity for the supermarket chain's commercial benefit. He sought $5 million in damages, alleging violations of the federal Lanham Act, the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, the Illinois deceptive-practices statute, and the common law of unfair competition. The district court accepted Jewel's First Amendment defense, that its ad was "noncommercial" speech with full First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Jewel's ad prominently featured the "Jewel-Osco" logo and marketing slogan, which were creatively and conspicuously linked to Jordan in the text of the ad's congratulatory message. The ad was a form of image advertising aimed at promoting the Jewel-Osco brand; it was commercial speech and subject to the laws cited by Jordan. View "Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc," on Justia Law 2014-02-19 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Sykes 12-1992 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3794/11-3794-2014-02-18.html United States v. Shannon 2014-02-21T14:09:02+00:00 2014-02-19T01:16:18+00:00 Shannon pled guilty to possessing child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)) and received a sentence of 46 months' imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release. About 13 months after he began his supervised release, Shannon's probation officer filed a petition alleging that Shannon violated conditions of his supervised release by having a web camera connected to his computer without prior permission and by accessing several websites, including those with "teengal" and "teenplanet" in their domain names. The government proceeded only with respect to the web camera because it could not determine the exact ages of the persons in the websites Shannon viewed, but expressed its concern that Shannon viewed sexually explicit websites where the models were intended to depict teenage girls and that Shannon had at one point wiped his hard drive clean. The district court revoked Shannon's supervised release despite his contention that the websites contained disclaimers that the sites did not actually depict any minors. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that the condition banning possession of any sexually explicit material was not restricted to material involving minors, nor was it limited to visual depictions, and that there were no findings or explanation for such a lifetime ban. View "United States v. Shannon" on Justia Law 2014-02-18 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Williams 11-3794 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-2569/13-2569-2014-02-18.html Americana Art China Co., Inc. v. Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc. 2014-02-21T14:13:37+00:00 2014-02-18T20:25:19+00:00 In 2008, defendant faxed tens of thousands of unsolicited advertisements, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. After defendant's insurer intervened, a second proposed class action settlement was reached. The insurer, Continental, agreed to make $6.1 million available to class members. The total is approximately equal to the number of faxes sent (110,853) times per-fax damages offered by Continental ($55.03) with an attorney fee award of 1/3 the total amount: $2,033,333.33. The district court preliminarily approved the settlement and 24,389 of the 28,879 class members were successfully notified; five requested exclusion. None objected. Only 1,820 returned a claim form, seeking damages for 7,222 unlawful fax transmissions, so that Continental would pay out only $397,426.66 of the $6.1 million, with the remainder, less attorney fees and incentive awards, to revert. Despite the relatively meager final payout to class members, plaintiffs' attorneys continued to demand more than $2 million. The district court employed the lodestar method, rather than the percentage method, applying a risk multiplier of 1.5 to arrive at a final fee award of $1,147,698.70. After arguments on appeal, the attorneys sought to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit declined to dismiss and affirmed the reduced fee award. View "Americana Art China Co., Inc. v. Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-02-18 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Kanne 13-2569 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-4736/13-4736-2014-02-07.html In Re: Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, NY 2014-02-14T14:04:58+00:00 2014-02-08T00:41:46+00:00 Plaintiff filed suit in district court in Vermont against the Diocese and its former priest, alleging that the priest transported plaintiff from New York to Vermont for the purpose of sexually abusing him, and did sexually abuse him. The Diocese, a New York special act corporation with its principal office in Albany, subsequently petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court in Vermont to dismiss the case against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the Diocese's petition, concluding that this was an extraordinary case warranting mandamus relief where the court considered (a) the irreparable harm caused by a needless foray into prior abuse investigations within the Diocese, exposing victims and their families to grueling inquires that would not be undertaken in the absence of the district court's erroneous ruling, (b) the clarity of the district court's error and futility of remand, and (c) the opportunity in this case to shed light on the Supreme Court's most recent expressions on general jurisdiction, especially as applied to religious and other charitable organizations, constituted "exceptional circumstances" that warrant the issuance of the writ. View "In Re: Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, NY" on Justia Law 2014-02-07 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Per curiam 13-4736 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-15807/12-15807-2014-02-05.html Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness v. CNN 2014-02-07T14:06:15+00:00 2014-02-05T23:01:17+00:00 GLAAD filed a putative class action alleging that CNN violated California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51 et seq., and California's Disabled Persons Act (DPA), Cal. Civ. Code 54 et seq., by intentionally excluding deaf and hard of hearing visitors from accessing the videos on CNN.com. CNN filed a motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16 et seq., arguing that GLAAD's claims arose from conduct in furtherance of CNN's free speech rights and that GLAAD failed to establish a probability of prevailing on its claims. The court concluded that CNN's conduct was in furtherance of its free speech rights on a matter of public interest; where, as here, an action directly targeted the way a content provider chose to deliver, present, or publish news content on matters of public interest, that action was based on conduct in furtherance of free speech rights and must withstand scrutiny under California's anti-SLAPP statute; GLAAD failed to establish a probability of success on the merits of its Unruh Act claims because it has not shown intentional discrimination based on disability as required under California law; at this juncture, none of CNN's constitutional challenges posed a barrier to GLAAD's pursuit of its DPA claims; GLAAD's DPA claims were not foreclosed by the doctrines of field preemption and conflict preemption; GLAAD's DPA claims have the requisite minimal merit to survive CNN's free speech challenge and dormant Commerce Clause challenge; and the court certified to the California Supreme Court the remaining dispositive question of state law regarding GLAAD's DPA claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying CNN's motion to dismiss. View "Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness v. CNN" on Justia Law 2014-02-05 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 12-15807 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-1939/13-1939-2014-02-04.html Smith v. Exec. Dir. of IN War Mem'ls Comm'n 2014-02-07T14:06:12+00:00 2014-02-04T17:08:27+00:00 The Indiana War Memorials Commission requires a permit for even small gatherings at the Soldiers and Sailors Monument at Monument Circle in Indianapolis and at several other monuments. Smith and his young son were expelled from Monument Circle for protesting, without a permit, a proposed United Nations arms treaty. Smith sought an injunction against the policy's enforcement. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the U.S. has signed, but has not ratified the treaty and that the permit policy has changed since the district court denied the motion. The new policy retains the problematic features of the old, so Smith's appeal is not moot. Smith seems likely to succeed in showing that the 14‐person limit on demonstrations without a permit, and a provision that, if a gathering has been advertised or the public has been invited, a permit is required even if the group ultimately is made up of fewer than 15 people, are not narrowly tailored. View "Smith v. Exec. Dir. of IN War Mem'ls Comm'n" on Justia Law 2014-02-04 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Hamilton 13-1939 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/571/12-315 Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper 2014-01-31T14:09:52+00:00 2014-01-27T18:07:04+00:00 After Air Wisconsin stopped flying aircraft that Hoeper was certified to fly, Hoeper failed three attempts to gain new certification. Air Wisconsin gave him one final chance. He performed poorly during required training and responded angrily, tossing his headset, using profanity, and making accusations against the instructor. Airline officials discussed the outburst, Hoeper's impending termination; the history of assaults by disgruntled employees; and the chance that Hoeper, a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), permitted "to carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation," 49 U.S.C. 44921(f)(1) might be armed. An airline executive notified the TSA that Hoeper "was an FFDO who may be armed," that the airline was "concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm," and that an "[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was terminated today." The TSA removed Hoeper (returning home from training) from his plane, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his gun. Hoeper sued for defamation. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 49 U.S.C. 44941(a), provides airlines and employees immunity for reporting suspicious behavior except where such disclosure is "made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading" or "made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure." The jury found for Hoeper. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. ATSA immunity, patterned after the Times v. Sullivan "actual malice" standard, may not be denied to materially true statements, even if made recklessly; a falsehood cannot be material absent a substantial likelihood that a reasonable security officer would consider it important in determining a response. Any falsehoods in the statement to the TSA were not material. A reasonable TSA officer, knowing that Hoeper was an FFDO, upset about losing his job, would have wanted to investigate whether he was armed. While Hoeper had not actually been fired at that time, everyone knew that termination was imminent. It would be inconsistent with the ATSA's text and purpose to expose Air Wisconsin to liability because the manager who placed the call could have chosen a slightly better phrase to articulate the airline's concern. View "Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper" on Justia Law 2014-01-27 federal U.S. Supreme Court Sotomayor 12-315 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-1500/13-1500-2014-01-24.html Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis 2014-01-31T14:05:14+00:00 2014-01-25T03:23:36+00:00 Indianapolis requires adult bookstores to remain closed between midnight and 10 a.m. every day and all day Sunday. Other retail businesses are not subject to the restrictions. Indianapolis contended that closure would curtail secondary effects, but the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim. The district court then held a trial and accepted the city's claim of fewer armed robberies at or near adult bookstores. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of an injunction prohibiting enforcement. The city did not use a multivariate regression to control for other potentially important variables, such as the presence of late‑night taverns. The difference in the number of armed robberies is not statistically significant. The data did not show that robberies are more likely at adult bookstores than at other late-night retail outlets, such as liquor stores and convenience stores, which are not subject to the hours imposed on bookstores. The secondary-effects approach endorsed by the Supreme Court permits governments to protect persons who want nothing to do with adult uses from harms created by adult businesses; the Supreme Court has not endorsed an approach under which governments can close adult bookstores to reduce crime directed against businesses that accept the risk of being robbed, or persons who voluntarily frequent their premises. View "Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law 2014-01-24 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Easterbrook 13-1500 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-2699/13-2699-2014-01-23.html Scott v. Westlake Servs., LLC 2014-01-24T14:05:45+00:00 2014-01-23T23:13:05+00:00 Scott alleged that Westlake repeatedly called her cell phone using an automated dialer in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and sought, for herself and a putative class, statutory damages of $500 for each negligent violation and $1500 for each intentional violation, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. Before she moved for class certification, Westlake sent Scott's attorney an offer to pay Scott $1500 (the statutory maximum) "for each and every dialer-generated telephone call made to plaintiff." Westlake agreed to pay costs and to entry of an injunction. The message concluded by warning Scott that, in Westlake's opinion, its offer rendered her case moot. The next day, Scott moved for class certification and declined the offer, stating that there was "a significant controversy" concerning how many dialer-generated calls Westlake had placed to her phone, so the offer was inadequate and did not render her case moot. The district court dismissed, finding that Westlake had offered Scott everything she sought, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction, but retained jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the offer and directed the parties to conduct discovery to determine how many calls Scott received from Westlake. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the case is not moot. View "Scott v. Westlake Servs., LLC" on Justia Law 2014-01-23 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Hamilton 13-2699 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-1761/13-1761-2014-01-22.html Chasensky v. Walker 2014-01-24T14:09:12+00:00 2014-01-22T21:04:41+00:00 In Wisconsin, Register of Deeds is an elected position. If a vacancy occurs mid-term, the governor may appoint an interim Register for any unexpired portion of the term. The Marinette County Register announced her mid-term retirement. Chasensky, then employed as Chief Deputy Register of Deeds, sought the interim appointment. Chasensky was interviewed by Esser, Walker's appointments official, who informed Chasensky that he would forward her application to Governor Walker for appointment to the position. Esser subsequently learned that Chasensky was involved in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. Esser informed Chasensky that Walker would not appoint her as interim Register. Chasensky claims that Werwie, Walker's official spokesperson, publically broadcast that she was not appointed because she was in a bankruptcy proceeding and that "[d]erogatory comments and innuendo regarding [her] bankruptcy, personal financial matters and character which impugned and harmed [her] professional and personal reputation were intentionally publically disclosed by Governor Walker and Mr. Werwie" when Governor Walker spoke on the FOX television network. Werwie publically announced that Walker had planned to appoint her until he learned of her bankruptcy. In her suit alleging violation of privacy rights, employment rights, and of 11 U.S.C. 525(a) (bankruptcy discrimination), the district court held that the defendants waived qualified immunity by failing to raise it before their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Chasensky's privacy and equal protection claims. View "Chasensky v. Walker" on Justia Law 2014-01-22 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Manion 13-1761 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-35238/12-35238-2014-01-17.html Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox 2014-01-24T14:09:55+00:00 2014-01-18T04:37:40+00:00 Plaintiffs filed a defamation suit against defendant where defendant published blog posts on several websites that she created accusing plaintiffs of fraud, corruption, money-laundering, and other illegal activities. The court joined its sister circuits in concluding that the protections of the First Amendment did not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others' writings, or tried to get both sides of a story; therefore, the court held that the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.'s negligence requirement for private defamation actions was not limited to cases with institutional media defendants; because defendant's blog post addressed a matter of public concern, even assuming that Gertz was limited to such speech, the district court should have instructed the jury that it could not find defendant liable for defamation unless it found that she acted negligently; the district court also should have instructed the jury that it could not award presumed damages unless it found that defendant acted with actual malice; the court rejected defendant's argument that plaintiffs are public officials; and the court found no error in the district court's application of the Unelko Corp. v. Rooney test and rejected plaintiffs' cross-appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox" on Justia Law 2014-01-17 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Hurwitz 12-35238 12-35319 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/11-1355/11-1355-2014-01-14.html Verizon v. FCC, et al. 2014-01-17T14:11:33+00:00 2014-01-15T02:07:30+00:00 Verizon challenged the FCC's Open Internet Order, which imposed disclosure, anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination requirements on broadband providers. The court concluded that the Commission has established that section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 1302(a), (b), vests it with affirmative authority to enact measures encouraging the deployment of broadband infrastructure; the Commission reasonably interpreted section 706 to empower it to promulgate rules governing broadband providers' treatment of Internet traffic, and its justification for the specific rules at issue here - that they will preserve and facilitate the "virtuous circle" of innovation that has driven the explosive growth of the Internet - was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence; given that the Commission has chosen to classify broadband providers in a manner that exempts them from treatment as common carriers, the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 201 et seq., expressly prohibits the Commission from nonetheless regulating them as such; and because the Commission has failed to establish that the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules did not impose per se common carrier obligations, the court vacated those portions of the Open Internet Order. View "Verizon v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law 2014-01-14 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Tatel 11-1355 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/12-9543/12-9543-2014-01-03.html Council Tree Investors, Inc., et al v. FCC 2014-01-10T14:08:24+00:00 2014-01-04T13:32:38+00:00 Council Tree Investors, Inc. requested nullification of the FCC's auction of the 700-MHz wireless spectrum conducted in early 2008 pursuant to a Waiver Order. Council Tree filed a Petition for Reconsideration of the Waiver Order in 2007, as well as a Supplement to the Waiver Reconsideration Petition in 2011. In its Waiver Reconsideration Order, the FCC dismissed the Waiver Reconsideration Petition as moot and dismissed the Supplement as untimely. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the FCC's decision. View "Council Tree Investors, Inc., et al v. FCC" on Justia Law 2014-01-03 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Holmes 12-9543 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-1334/12-1334-2013-12-27.html Agape Church, Inc, et al. v. FCC, et al. 2014-01-03T14:06:32+00:00 2013-12-27T17:03:23+00:00 In 2007, the FCC promulgated a rule requiring "hybrid" cable companies to "downconvert" from digital to analog broadcast signals from must-carry stations for subscribers with analog television sets. In 2012, the FCC allowed the downconversion requirement to expire and promulgated a new rule that allowed cable operators to provide conversion equipment to analog customers, either for free or at an affordable cost (Sunset Order). Petitioners, a group of must-carry broadcasters, sought review of the Sunset Order, arguing that the FCC's new rule could not be squared with Congress's mandate that must-carry broadcast signals "shall be viewable via cable on all television receivers of a subscriber which are connected to a cable system" pursuant to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the Cable Act), 47 U.S.C. 534(b)(7). The court concluded that petitioners' claims lack merit. The FCC's 2007 rule was not mandated by the statute. Rather, the rule was promulgated by the Commission as a stopgap measure. Since 2007, the telecommunications market has changed dramatically. Petitioners' argument effectively freezes time in the face of shifting technology and finds no support in the law. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Agape Church, Inc, et al. v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law 2013-12-27 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Edwards 12-1334 http://law.justia.com/cases/hawaii/supreme-court/2013/scwc-28948-0.html Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. 2013-12-20T14:13:54+00:00 2013-12-19T15:51:32+00:00 Pacific Lightnet, Inc. (PLNI) brought claims against Time Warner, asserting that it had been wrongfully billed by Time Warner for services that it had never received and that it was owed credits to its account from Time Warner based on assets PNLI had purchased, called Feature Group D claims. The circuit court entered judgment for Time Warner on all claims, notwithstanding a jury verdict in favor of PLNI on certain claims. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the Feature Group D claims based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and vacated the jury verdict on those same claims. PLNI appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the ICA erred in vacating the jury's verdict because it violated the filed-rate doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine to dismiss this case; and (2) inasmuch as the filed-rate doctrine applied, the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Appellant could not recover for any claims involving charges not filed within 120 days of receipt of billing in accordance with the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission and Federal Communications Commission filed tariffs. View "Pacific Lightnet, Inc. v. Time Warner Telecom, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-12-18 state Hawaii Hawaii Supreme Court Acoba SCWC-28948 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/10-56877/10-56877-2013-12-11.html Omnipoint v. City of Huntington Beach 2013-12-13T14:06:38+00:00 2013-12-12T01:21:32+00:00 The City appealed the district court's determination that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, preempted its decision to require T-Mobile to obtain voter approval before constructing mobile telephone antennae on city-owned park property. T-Mobile cross-appealed the denial of permanent injunctive relief. The court concluded that section 332(c)(7)(A) of the Act has the following preemptive scope: (1) it preempts local land use authorities' regulations if they violate the requirements of section 332(c)(7)(B)(i) and (iv); and (2) it preempts local land use authorities' adjudicative decisions if the procedures for making such decisions do not meet the minimum requirements of section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (iii). In this case, the voter-approval requirement imposed by Measure C was outside the City's framework for land use decision making because it did not implicate the regulatory and administrative structure established by the City's general plans and zoning and subdivision code. Therefore, the court concluded that it was not preempted and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Omnipoint v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law 2013-12-11 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Ikuta 10-56877 10-56944 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/571/12-815 Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs 2013-12-13T14:13:12+00:00 2013-12-11T03:09:28+00:00 Sprint, a national telecommunications company, declined to pay intercarrier access fees imposed by Windstream, an Iowa telecommunications carrier, for long distance Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls, concluding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) preempted intrastate regulation of VoIP traffic. Windstream threatened to block Sprint customer calls; Sprint sought an injunction from the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB). Windstream retracted its threat, and Sprint sought to withdraw its complaint. Concerned that the dispute would recur, IUB continued the proceedings, ruling that intrastate fees applied to VoIP calls. Sprint sought a declaration that the TCA preempted the IUB decision. Sprint also sought review in Iowa state court. Invoking Younger v. Harris, the district court abstained from adjudicating Sprint's complaint in deference to the state-court proceeding. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Younger abstention was required because the state-court review concerned Iowa's important interest in regulating and enforcing state utility rates. The Supreme Court reversed. The case does not fall within any of the classes of exceptional cases for which Younger abstention is appropriate to avoid federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions; interfering with pending "civil proceedings . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions;" and certain civil enforcement proceedings. IUB's proceeding was not criminal and did not touch on a state court's ability to perform its judicial function. Nor is the IUB order an act of civil enforcement of the kind to which Younger has been extended; the proceeding is not "akin to a criminal prosecution," nor was it initiated by "the State in its sovereign capacity," to sanction a wrongful act. The court rejected an argument that once Sprint withdrew its complaint the proceedings became, essentially, a civil enforcement action. IUB's authority was invoked to settle a civil dispute between private parties. View "Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs" on Justia Law 2013-12-10 federal U.S. Supreme Court Ginsburg 12-815 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-1398/13-1398-2013-12-03.html Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 2013-12-06T14:07:59+00:00 2013-12-03T22:15:12+00:00 Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, "It's Her Fault," in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig's employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that "It's Her Fault" did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district's interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig's speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that "It's Her Fault" would disrupt the learning environment at Craig's school because some students, learning of the book's hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig's advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law 2013-12-03 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Williams 13-1398 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/13-1267/13-1267-2013-11-25.html Qwest Corp. v. MN Public Utilities Comm., et al. 2013-11-29T14:08:43+00:00 2013-11-26T02:18:54+00:00 Qwest appealed from the district court's order entered on remand from the court's decision in Qwest Corp. v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 684 F3d 721 (8th Cir. 2012). In Qwest, the court held that the district court erred in upholding an order from the commission which asserted that the commission had authority under state law to regulate rates for certain telecommunication network elements that Qwest provided to its competitors voluntarily or as required under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 271. The court held in Qwest that the commission's order was preempted by its entirety and the court reversed the district court's original judgment with respect to both the elements Qwest provided pursuant to section 271. The court reversed the judgment of the district court again and remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the whole April 23, 2010 order of the commission as preempted by federal law and to enjoin the commission from enforcing the order in its entirety. View "Qwest Corp. v. MN Public Utilities Comm., et al." on Justia Law 2013-11-25 federal U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Riley 13-1267 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3265/11-3265-2013-11-21.html Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of IN 2013-11-22T14:19:05+00:00 2013-11-22T00:03:21+00:00 Indiana enacted the Automated Dialing Machine Statute, which bans "robocalls" unless the receiver has consented to the calls in advance, Ind. Code 24–5–14–1, with limited exemptions. School districts may send messages to students and parents and employers may send messages to employees. There is no exception for political calls. Patriotic Veterans, an Illinois not‐for‐profit corporation whose purpose is to inform voters of positions taken by candidates and office holders on issues of interest to veterans, uses automatically dialed calls. For example, its website states that "in 2010, Patriotic Veterans, in partnership with singing idol Pat Boone sponsored nearly 1.9 million calls to veterans and seniors across the U.S. about cuts in Medicare as a result of the passage of Obamacare." Patriotic Veterans claims that it cannot afford to make the calls without using an automatic dialer and a recorded message and that live operators cannot make calls fast enough when time is of the essence, such as on the eve of an election, and sought a declaration that the law violated the First Amendment and was preempted by the Federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, which also regulates use of autodialers. The district court found that the TCPA preempted Indiana's statute as applied to the interstate use of autodialers and entered an injunction against enforcement with regard to political messages. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to preemption and remanded for consideration of other issues. View "Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. State of IN" on Justia Law 2013-11-21 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Rovner 11-3265 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-3999/12-3999-2013-10-31.html Young v. Gannett Satellite Info.Network, Inc. 2013-11-01T13:27:33+00:00 2013-10-31T15:38:34+00:00 In 1997, the Miami Township police department fired Sergeant Young for allegedly forcing sex on a woman while on the job; the termination was overturned by an arbitrator. The arbitrator concluded that the department had not proven its allegations, noting that DNA samples from the scene did not match Young, that Young and his accuser had been in a relationship, and that the accuser had a history that cast doubt on her credibility. In 2010, the newspaper published the statement "Young had sex with a woman while on the job" in an article about the suspension of another officer. Young sued for defamation and obtained a $100,000 verdict. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide that the editor knew that the accusation was probably false and published it regardless. View "Young v. Gannett Satellite Info.Network, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-10-31 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Rogers 12-3999 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-1582/12-1582-2013-10-09.html Bovee v. Broom 2013-10-11T13:24:26+00:00 2013-10-09T17:12:56+00:00 Bovee contends that his sister, Broom, violated the due process clause when, in her role as guidance counselor at his children's school, she criticized his parenting methods and called him a "bad father." Bovee claims that this alienated his children's affections, violating his fundamental liberty interest in familial relations. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should have been on the merits. "The suit is about words, and only words." Bovee's lawyer conceded that Broom has not taken any official act adverse to his interests. Defamation, words not accompanied by any other official action, does not violate the due process clause. View "Bovee v. Broom" on Justia Law 2013-10-09 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Easterbrook 12-1582 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-2729/13-2729-2013-10-02.html Addison Automatics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. 2013-10-04T13:34:58+00:00 2013-10-02T17:38:49+00:00 Addison filed a class action, alleging that Domino had sent thousands of "junk faxes" in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, and had committed the tort of conversion. Domino's insurers refused to defend. Domino negotiated a settlement to protect its own interests; Addison and Domino agreed that the state court should certify a class and enter a judgment of $18 million. Addison agreed that the class would not recover any money from Domino, but that Domino would assign to Addison, as class representative and for the class, whatever claims Domino might have against its insurers. The state court approved the settlement. Addison sought a state court declaratory judgment holding Hartford liable for the judgment. Hartford removed the case to federal court. Addison dismissed the case voluntarily and filed another state court suit, naming Addison as the only plaintiff. Hartford again removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453. The district court granted remand, finding that the suit did not fit the CAFA definition. Hartford argued that under the assignment in the underlying settlement, Addison had standing only as a class representative. The Seventh Circuit agreed, reversed, and remanded to state court. View "Addison Automatics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law 2013-10-02 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Hamilton 13-2729 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/12-12250/12-12250-2013-10-01.html T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, GA 2013-10-04T13:17:29+00:00 2013-10-02T03:13:06+00:00 The City appealed the district court's order granting T-Mobile's motion for summary judgment and issuing an injunction on the basis that the City's denial of T-Mobile's requested cell phone tower permit violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 322(c)(7)(B)(iii). The district court held that the City's short denial letter failed to satisfy the "in writing" requirement under the Act. Under the court's recent analysis in T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, the court concluded in this instance that the documents at issue collectively were enough to satisfy the writing requirement under the Act. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, GA" on Justia Law 2013-10-01 federal U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Hull 12-12250 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3731/11-3731-2013-09-30.html Truck Ins. Exch. v. CE Design Ltd. 2013-10-04T13:34:56+00:00 2013-09-30T21:57:52+00:00 CE is a small Chicago-area engineering firm that has filed at least 150 class action suits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. In this case, CE sued Cy's Crab House on behalf of a class of junk-fax recipients. Truck is the liability carrier for the Cy's Crab House restaurants and provided a defense under a reservation of rights. The case was certified as a class action, and went to trial. In the middle of trial, without notifying the insurer, Cy's settled with the class, for policy limits. State-court coverage litigation ensued. The district court approved the final settlement and entered final judgment. Less than a month later, the Seventh Circuit issued a decision casting doubt on the conduct of class counsel. In light of that decision, Truck moved to intervene to reopen the judgment, challenge the settlement, and seek class decertification based on misconduct by class counsel. Instead of filing a conditional appeal, Truck asked the district court for a 14-day extension of the time to appeal. Ultimately the court denied intervention as untimely. Truck Insurance filed a notice purporting to appeal both the order denying intervention and the final judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the order denying intervention, but could not grant any meaningful relief because it lacked jurisdiction to review the final judgment. View "Truck Ins. Exch. v. CE Design Ltd." on Justia Law 2013-09-30 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Sykes 11-3731 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/12-3798/12-3798-2013-09-19.html United States v. Elonis 2013-09-20T13:25:47+00:00 2013-09-19T20:27:16+00:00 Elonis's wife left their home with their children. Elonis began experiencing trouble at work at an amusement park, reportedly leaving early and crying at his desk. An employee Elonis supervised, Morrissey, claimed sexual harassment. In October Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph taken for his employer's Halloween Haunt. The photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey's neck. Elonis added the caption "I wish." Elonis's supervisor saw the posting and fired Elonis. Days later, Elonis began posting statements on Facebook about having "keys for the fucking gates … sinister plans for all my friends," and, concerning his wife, "would have smothered your ass … dumped your body … and made it look like a rape and murder" that their son "should dress up as matricide for Halloween … head on a stick" and "I'm not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts." Following issuance of a state court protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife's house, using explosives, and "I'm checking out and making a name for myself … hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class." After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure the person of another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. A 2003 Supreme Court decision, Virginia v. Black, did not overturn its prior holding that a statement is a true threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted as a threat. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law 2013-09-19 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Scirica 12-3798 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-17483/11-17483-2013-09-10.html Joffe v. Google, Inc. 2013-09-13T13:34:21+00:00 2013-09-11T03:37:16+00:00 Plaintiffs filed suit against Google under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, after the antennas and software installed in Google's Street View cars collected basic identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks, as well as gathered and stored "payload data" that was sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections. On appeal, Google challenged the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss based on the Wiretap Act's exemption for electronic communication that was readily accessible to the general public. The court held that the phrase "radio communication" in section 2510(16) excluded payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. Consequently, the definition of "readily accessible to the general public [] with respect to a radio communication" in section 2510(16) did not apply to the exemption for an "electronic communication" that was "readily accessible to the general public" under section 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(g)(i). The court also held that payload data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network was not "readily accessible to the general public" under the ordinary meaning of the phrase as it was used in section 2511(2)(g)(i). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Joffe v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-09-10 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Bybee 11-17483 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2013/2013-me-78.html Callaghan v. City of South Portland 2013-09-13T13:29:27+00:00 2013-09-10T19:13:20+00:00 Since 2001, Callaghan has worked part-time at the South Portland Library. Edwards works for the Parks and Recreation Department about four hours per week. Both are subject to a personnel policy, which, following 2010-2011 amendments, provides that city employees may not seek or accept nomination or election to any South Portland elective office; use the influence of their employment for or against any candidate for city elective office; circulate petitions or campaign literature for any city elective office; solicit or receive subscriptions, contributions or political service from any person for or against any candidate for any city elective office; or use city property to assist or advocate for or against any candidate. Callaghan has served on the School Board since 2007. When Callaghan sought reelection in 2011, the City Clerk stated that the personnel policy amendments prevented placement of her name on the ballot. Edwards had served on the Board for 18 years. In 2010, Edwards expressed interest in filling a vacancy on the Board. After the City Clerk questioned whether Edwards could be appointed given his city employment, Edwards did not pursue the appointment. Edwards and Callaghan filed a complaint, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the policy was an unconstitutional restraint on political speech. The trial court entered partial summary judgment for the employees and an injunction barring enforcement of a prohibition on any city employee seeking election to or serving on the School Board or, on their own time, from circulating petitions or campaign literature and soliciting or receiving contributions or political service for or against candidates in School Board elections. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed as to the employees, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it invalidates the policy as to employees who were not parties. View "Callaghan v. City of South Portland" on Justia Law 2013-09-10 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Mead http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2013/ca-8168-vcl.html In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. Derivative Litigation 2013-09-06T13:20:52+00:00 2013-09-05T22:08:57+00:00 Trusts that owned fifty percent of the common stock of nominal defendant IMS alleged that two of the company's three most senior officers mismanaged the company in breach of their fiduciary duties. Trusts moved to compel IMS to produce the senior officers' work email accounts. The senior officers asserted the attorney-client privilege but did not invoke the work product doctrine. The court concluded that the In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd. factors weighed in favor of production, absent a statutory override that could alter the common law result. Because IMS conducted its business in Maryland, the federal government and the State of Maryland were the sovereigns whose laws IMS must follow when dealing with its employees' email. The Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; the Federal Store Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701; the Maryland Wiretap Act, Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-401 to 10-414; and the Maryland Stored Communications Act, Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-4A-01 to 10-4A-08, did not change the common law privilege analysis. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to compel. View "In re Info. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law 2013-09-05 state Delaware Delaware Court of Chancery Laster CA 8168-VCL http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/12-10487/12-10487-2013-09-05.html T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, Georgia 2013-09-06T13:23:21+00:00 2013-09-05T20:03:31+00:00 This appeal concerned the City of Milton's decision to deny T-Mobile's applications for permits to build three cell phone towers. At issue was the writing requirement of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), which stated that "[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless services shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." The court concluded that T-Mobile had access to documents - including transcripts of the planning commission's hearings, letters the city sent to T-Mobile, and detailed minutes of the city council hearings- before its deadline for filing the lawsuit and collectively, these documents they were enough to satisfy the writing requirement of section 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, Georgia" on Justia Law 2013-09-05 federal U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Carnes 12-10487 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-4138/11-4138-2013-09-04.html Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC 2013-09-06T13:17:51+00:00 2013-09-04T16:05:22+00:00 Time Warner petitioned for review of the FCC's 2011 order promulgated under section 616(a)(3) and (5) of the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act), as amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act), 47 U.S.C. 536(a)(3), (5). Section 616(a)(3) and (5) and that part of the 2011 Order establishing the standard for demonstrating a prima facie violation of these statutory provisions (the program carriage regime) were intended to curb anticompetitive behavior by limiting the circumstances under which a distributor of video programming could discriminate against unaffiliated networks that provided such programming. The court concluded that the program carriage regime did not violate the First Amendment where its case-specific standards for identifying affiliation-based discrimination served important government interests in promoting competition and diversity in an industry still posing serious competitive risks and were narrowly tailored not to burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests. The court concluded, however, that the 2011 Order was substantive and therefore subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Because the FCC failed to comply with such requirements, the court granted the petition for review insofar as it raised an APA challenge. View "Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law 2013-09-04 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Raggi 11-4138 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-6122/12-6122-2013-08-28.html Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC 2013-08-30T13:25:25+00:00 2013-08-28T16:40:57+00:00 Grand Resort, which has operated in the Great Smoky Mountains since 1982, claims that TripAdvisor's publication of a survey that concluded that Grand Resort was the dirtiest hotel in America caused irreparable damage to its business and that TripAdvisor used a flawed rating system that distorted actual performance and perspective. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the "dirtiest hotels" list is protected opinion; it reflects TripAdvisor's users' subjective opinions and is not capable of being defamatory. The court rejected a motion to amend to add claims of trade libel-injurious falsehood and tortious interference with prospective business relationships to the claims of false light-invasion of privacy and of defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that amendment of the complaint would be futile. View "Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC" on Justia Law 2013-08-28 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Moore 12-6122 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3188/11-3188-2013-08-26.html Holtzman v. Turza 2013-08-30T13:25:56+00:00 2013-08-26T21:10:16+00:00 Attorney Turza sent out a fax, titled the "Daily Plan-It," containing business advice. The fax was sent to CPAs who were not Turza's clients, about every two weeks. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227, prohibits any person from sending unsolicited fax advertisements; even permitted fax ads must tell the recipient how to stop receiving future messages. Turza's faxes did not contain opt-out information. The district court certified a class of the faxes' recipients and ordered Turza to pay $500 in statutory damages for each of 8,430 faxes. ($4,215,000): $7,500 to the representative plaintiff ; $1,430,055.90 to class counsel for attorneys' fees and expenses; and any residue, after payments to class members, to the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago "as a cy pres award." The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the merits, rejecting an argument that the faxes were not ads, but vacated the remedial order. View "Holtzman v. Turza" on Justia Law 2013-08-26 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Easterbrook 11-3188 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/12-2914/12-2914-2013-08-26.html United States v. Stock 2013-08-30T13:25:24+00:00 2013-08-26T17:35:21+00:00 Stock was indicted for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 875(c) after he posted a notice on Craig"s List: i went home loaded in my truck and spend the past 3 hours looking for this douche with the expressed intent of crushing him in that little piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass down to creek hills and just drowning him in the falls. but alas i can't fine that bastard anywhere . . . i really wish he would die, just like the rest of these stupid fucking asshole cops. so J.K.P. if you read this i hope you burn in hell. i only wish i could have been the one to send you there." The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss, stating that it was satisfied that the government included sufficient context in the indictment that a reasonable jury could find that Stock's statement expressed intent to injure in the present or future. View "United States v. Stock" on Justia Law 2013-08-26 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals 12-2914 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/12-2823/12-2823-2013-08-22.html Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs. LLC 2013-08-23T13:37:51+00:00 2013-08-22T17:04:41+00:00 In 2007, Gager applied for a line of credit to purchase computer equipment. The application required that she provide her home phone number. Gager listed her cellular phone number without stating that the number was for a cellular phone, or indicating that Dell should not use an automated telephone dialing system to call her at that number. Gager defaulted on the loan Dell granted. Dell began using an automated telephone dialing system to call Gager's cell phone, leaving pre-recorded messages concerning the debt. In 2010, Gager sent a letter, listing her phone number and asking Dell to stop calling it regarding her account. The letter did not indicate that the number was for a cellular phone. Dell continued to call, using an automated telephone dialing system. Gager filed suit, alleging that Dell violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court dismissed on the theory that she could not revoke her consent once it was given. The Third Circuit reversed. The fact that Gager entered into a contract with Dell does not exempt Dell from the TCPA. Dell will still be able to call Gager about her delinquent account, but not using an automated dialing system. View "Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs. LLC" on Justia Law 2013-08-22 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals 12-2823 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2013/2012-398.html Appeal of Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC 2013-08-23T14:08:03+00:00 2013-08-22T13:00:36+00:00 Respondent Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications – NNE (FairPoint), appealed two orders of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Petitioners are all "competitive local exchange carriers." The PUC ordered Verizon New Hampshire to stop imposing "carrier common line charges" upon certain telephone calls that did not require the use of Verizon's common line. The PUC found that Verizon did not provide switched access service in connection with these calls. Under the plain language of Verizon's access tariff, the Supreme Court concluded that Verizon was allowed to impose a "carrier common line access charge" (CCL charge) upon "each aspect of switched access service," and that "common line access" is only one component of switched access service. It was undisputed that Verizon provided other aspects of switched access service with respect to the calls at issue. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the PUC reopened the proceeding and ordered FairPoint, which had purchased Verizon's New Hampshire assets, to modify the Tariff to clarify that it could "charge CCL only when a FairPoint common line is used in the provision of switched access services." Ultimately, the PUC approved in part, and rejected in part, tariff revisions that FairPoint submitted. The PUC approved FairPoint's revision of the CCL charge, but rejected FairPoint's proposal to increase the rate of an interconnection charge under the Tariff. The PUC granted the petitioners' motion to dismiss the portion of the docket related to the interconnection charge. FairPoint unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of both orders, and this appeal followed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC" on Justia Law 2013-08-21 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Dalianis 2012-398 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-3294/12-3294-2013-08-21.html Pippen v. NBC Universal Media LLC 2013-08-23T14:15:42+00:00 2013-08-21T22:16:17+00:00 Scottie Pippen won six championship rings with the Chicago Bulls and was named to the National Basketball Association's list of the 50 greatest players in its history. Since he retired in 2004, he has lost much of the fortune he amassed during his playing days through bad investments. He has pursued multiple lawsuits against former financial and legal advisors. The media learned of Pippen's problems and several news organizations incorrectly reported that he had filed for bankruptcy. Pippen contends that the false reports have impaired his ability to earn a living by product endorsements and appearances. He filed suit, alleging that he was defamed and cast in a false light. The district court dismissed, finding that the falsehoods did not fit any of the categories of statements recognized by Illinois law to be so innately harmful that damages may be presumed and that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendants had published the falsehoods with knowledge the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false, as required for a public figure such as Pippen to recover defamation damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Pippen v. NBC Universal Media LLC" on Justia Law 2013-08-21 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Easterbrook 12-3294 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-2213/12-2213-2013-08-14.html Speet v. Schuette 2013-08-16T13:08:12+00:00 2013-08-14T15:35:27+00:00 The Michigan anti-begging statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 900, has existed since at least 1929 and provides that "[a] person is a disorderly person if the person is any of the following: ... (h) A person found begging in a public place." A person convicted under section 750.167(1)(h) is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. The Grand Rapids police recorded 409 incidents of police enforcing the anti-begging law from 2008–2011. Plaintiffs, two homeless adults, were arrested. One was holding signs saying: "Cold and Hungry, God Bless" and "Need Job, God Bless." The other, a veteran, needed money for bus fare, and asked a person on the street: "Can you spare a little change?" The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the law was unconstitutional. Begging is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment protects and the statute cannot withstand facial attack because it prohibits a substantial amount of solicitation, but allows other solicitation based on content. View "Speet v. Schuette" on Justia Law 2013-08-14 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Martin 12-2213 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-6598/12-6598-2013-08-14.html The Contributor v. City of Brentwood 2013-08-16T13:08:13+00:00 2013-08-14T15:21:00+00:00 The Contributor produces a street newspaper to educate people about homelessness and poverty and helps develop job skills for homeless and formerly homeless persons, employing them as street vendors. Two such vendors were cited for attempting to sell issues of the newspaper on the streets and sidewalks of Brentwood, Tennessee, under an ordinance that provided that no person could use or occupy any portion of the city street, alley, sidewalk or the public right-of-way to sell any goods or materials. The city then revised the ordinance to provide that it should not "be construed as prohibiting the sale or distribution of newspapers, magazines, periodicals, handbills, flyers or similar materials, except that: (1) Such activity shall be prohibited on any portion of any street within the city. (2) Such materials shall not be handed to the occupant of any motor vehicle that is on a street, nor shall any action be taken which is intended or reasonably calculated to cause the vehicle occupant to hand anything to the person selling or distributing the materials." The district court upheld the revised ordinance as leaving open adequate alternative channels of communication. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "The Contributor v. City of Brentwood" on Justia Law 2013-08-14 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals McKeague 12-6598 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2013/a-53-11.html New Jersey v. Earls 2013-08-02T13:10:50+00:00 2013-08-02T12:59:35+00:00 Defendant was indicted on several charges, including third-degree burglary, third-degree theft, and third-degree receiving stolen property. Defendant filed a motion to suppress. The trial court found that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy under State law and that the police should have obtained a warrant before tracking defendant via cell-tower information from T-Mobile. Nonetheless, the court admitted the evidence under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. Defendant pled guilty to third-degree burglary and third-degree theft and was sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence and later allowed defendant to reopen his appeal to challenge the suppression ruling. The Appellate Division affirmed on different grounds, concluding that defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-phone location information and that the police lawfully seized evidence in plain view. The panel did not consider the emergency aid doctrine. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition review of the validity of defendant's arrest based on law enforcement's use of information from defendant's cell phone provider about the general location of the cell phone and the application of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. The Court concluded that the New Jersey Constitution protects an individual's privacy interest in the location of his or her cell phone. Police must obtain a warrant based on a showing of probable cause, or qualify for an exception to the warrant requirement, to obtain tracking information through the use of a cell phone. View "New Jersey v. Earls" on Justia Law 2013-07-08 state New Jersey New Jersey Supreme Court Rabner a-53-11 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/11-20884/11-20884-2013-07-30.html In re: Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data 2013-08-02T13:06:29+00:00 2013-07-31T17:54:39+00:00 The Government filed three applications under section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701-2712, seeking evidence relevant to three separate criminal investigations. At issue on appeal was whether court orders authorized by the Act to compel cell phone service providers to produce the historical cell site information of their subscribers were per se unconstitutional. The court concluded that cell site data are business records and should be analyzed under that line of Supreme Court precedent; because the magistrate judge and district court treated the data as tracking information, they applied the wrong legal standard; using the proper framework, the Act's authorization of section 2703(d) orders for historical cell site information if an application meets the lesser "specific and articulable facts" standard, rather than the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard, was not per se unconstitutional; and as long as the Government met the statutory requirements, the Act did not give the magistrate judge discretion to deny the Government's application for such an order. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to grant the applications. View "In re: Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data" on Justia Law 2013-07-30 federal U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Clement 11-20884 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/12-803/12-803-2013-07-22.html In Re: WorldCom, Inc. 2013-07-26T13:19:13+00:00 2013-07-22T20:20:19+00:00 The IRS challenged the district court's judgment upholding the bankruptcy court's decision to grant the objection of the reorganized Worldcom debtors to the IRS's proof of claim for taxes owed and the debtors' refund motion for the taxes WorldCom had already paid. At issue was whether WorldCom must pay federal excise taxes on the purchase of a telecommunications service that connected people using dial-up modems to the Internet. The court held that WorldCom purchased a "local telephone service" when it paid for the telecommunications service and that WorldCom must therefore pay federal communication excise taxes on those transactions. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: WorldCom, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-07-22 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Katzmann 12-803 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-3562/12-3562-2013-07-09.html Peele v. Burch 2013-07-12T13:10:40+00:00 2013-07-09T16:12:35+00:00 Peele worked for the Portage Police Department as a detective. In 2007 he supported Charnetzky's Democratic primary campaign to become mayor. Charnetzky lost. Peele spoke to a local reporter and criticized Sheriff Lain for endorsing the opponent, apparently stating that Sheriff Lain "won't get any support here." The day after the comments were published, Peele was reassigned to the more deskbound position of "Station Duty Officer." Peele sued, claiming that he was demoted and constructively discharged without due process; retaliation for his support of Charnetzky; and defamation. The defendants counterclaimed malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to retaliation, noting that the district court did not address conspiracy, immunity, or the city's liability. View "Peele v. Burch" on Justia Law 2013-07-09 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Kanne 12-3562 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-6396/11-6396-2013-07-09.html Entm't Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty. 2013-07-12T13:16:12+00:00 2013-07-09T15:06:38+00:00 The Tennessee Adult-Oriented Establishment Registration Act of 1998 is a county-option state law to address deleterious secondary effects associated with adult-oriented businesses, including crime, spread of venereal disease, and decreased property values. Adult-oriented establishments that are subject to the Act, and their employees, must obtain licenses. The Act prohibits nudity, certain sexual activities, touching of certain anatomical areas, all physical contact during performances, sale or consumption of alcohol on the premises; it requires that all performances occur on a stage at least 18 inches above floor level with all performers at least six feet away from customers and other performers. Shelby County adopted the Act in 2007. Owners of adult establishments challenged the ordinance. Following denial of a preliminary injunction, the district court granted summary judgment upholding the law, except with respect to a claim of facial invalidity attacking the reasonableness of coverage of establishments featuring "briefly attired" dancers. The court then rejected that challenge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting First Amendment challenges. View "Entm't Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty." on Justia Law 2013-07-09 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Boggs 11-6396 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-1124/12-1124-2013-07-02.html The Conference Group, LLC v. FCC, et al. 2013-07-05T13:22:12+00:00 2013-07-03T00:15:49+00:00 The Conference Group challenged the Commission's decision that the audio bridging services provided by InterCall were properly classified as "telecommunications" under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and thereby obligated it and "similarly situated" providers to contribute directly to the Universal Service Fund (USF), 47 U.S.C. 254(d). The court concluded that the Conference Group had standing to challenge the Commission's decision as procedurally unlawful rulemaking; on the merits, the Commission's decision involved a statutory interpretation that could be rendered in the form of an adjudication, not only in a rulemaking; because the decision was an adjudication and The Conference Group was not a party, it lacked standing to challenge the merits of the adjudication; and, therefore, the court dismissed in part and denied in part The Conference Group's petition for review. View "The Conference Group, LLC v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law 2013-07-02 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Rogers 12-1124 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/12-2084/12-2084-2013-06-27.html Cooksey v. Futrell 2013-06-28T13:07:27+00:00 2013-06-27T23:10:41+00:00 Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State Board, alleging that it violated his First Amendment rights by causing him to self-censor certain speech on his website wherein he offered both free and fee-based dietary advice to website visitors. The court reversed the district court's holding that plaintiff did not have standing to bring these claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in not analyzing plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment standing framework where, under that analysis, plaintiff satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement by showing that the State Board's action had an objectively reasonable chilling effect on his speech. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claims were ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooksey v. Futrell" on Justia Law 2013-06-27 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Thacker 12-2084 12-2323 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/12-2414/12-2414-2013-06-26.html ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc. 2013-07-05T13:25:04+00:00 2013-06-26T17:18:13+00:00 Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief, alleging that defendants violated, inter alia, the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1), and New York General Business Law 349 when defendants published a scientific article reporting research results related to plaintiff's production of surfactants. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, statements of scientific conclusions about unsettled matters of scientific debate could not give rise to liability for damages sounding in defamation. The court also concluded that the secondary distribution of excerpts of such an article could not give rise to liability, so long as the excerpts did not mislead a reader about the conclusions of the article. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim based on publication of the article itself because the challenged statements were protected scientific opinion and plaintiff failed to adequately allege that defendants Chiesi and Cornerstone distributed misleading excerpts of the article. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-06-26 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Lynch 12-2414 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-1045/13-1045-2013-06-24.html Seitz v. City of Elgin 2013-07-05T13:27:57+00:00 2013-06-24T17:01:16+00:00 Seitz and Welter were partners in Wasco, a property management company. Greg was also a police officer. Elgin's police chief confronted Greg with the emails showing that Greg had used the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) to research cars parked in front of Wasco properties. Illinois limits use of LEADS to criminal justice purposes. The chief notified Gregg of a misconduct investigation regarding his use of LEADS. The city allegedly received its information after Tamara, Greg's then wife and a fellow police officer, and Beeter accessed Greg's email account and conveyed print-outs to the corporation counsel under cover of anonymity. Greg and Seitz sued Tamara and Beeter, alleging violations of the Federal Wiretap Act (FWA), the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state law claims. They sued Elgin under the FWA. The district court dismissed the complaint against the city, concluding that the FWA, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1) prohibits "persons" from intercepting communications, but does not extend its definition of "person" to municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A 1986 amendment permits suit against governmental units by adding "entity" to the text, but only for substantive provisions that identify an "entity" as a potential violator of that provision. View "Seitz v. City of Elgin" on Justia Law 2013-06-24 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Flaum 13-1045 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/12-10 Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. 2013-06-21T13:23:35+00:00 2013-06-20T15:40:09+00:00 The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. 7601, authorizes appropriations to fund nongovernmental efforts to combat HIV/AIDS worldwide, with conditions that: no funds "may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution" and no funds may be used by an organization "that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution" (the Policy Requirement). To enforce the Policy Requirement, the Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Agency for International Development require funding recipients to agree that they oppose prostitution. Funding recipients, wishing to remain neutral on prostitution, sought a declaratory judgment that the Policy Requirement violates their First Amendment rights. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, barring the government from cutting off funding during the litigation. The Second Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. The First Amendment "prohibits the government from telling people what they must say." The Spending Clause grants Congress broad discretion to fund private programs for the general welfare and to limit the use of funds to ensure they are used in the manner intended. There is a distinction between conditions that define the limits of the spending program and specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the federal program itself. The Act's other condition, prohibiting use of funds "to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking," ensures that federal funds will not be used for prohibited purposes. The Policy Requirement goes further and, by its very nature, affects protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program. The Requirement goes beyond preventing recipients from using private funds in a way that could undermine the federal program and requires them to pledge allegiance to government policy. View "Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-06-20 federal U.S. Supreme Court Roberts 12-10 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/12-25 Maracich v. Spears 2013-06-21T13:25:17+00:00 2013-06-17T18:32:37+00:00 Using FOIA requests directed to the South Carolina DMV, attorneys obtained names and addresses, then sent letters to more than 34,000 individuals, seeking clients for a lawsuit against car dealerships for violation of a state law. The letters were headed "ADVERTISING MATERIAL," explained the lawsuit, and asked recipients to return an enclosed card to participate in the case. Recipients sued the attorneys, alleging violation of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(4), by obtaining, disclosing, and using personal information from motor vehicle records for bulk solicitation without express consent. The district court dismissed, based on a DPPA exception permitting disclosure of personal information "for use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding," including "investigation in anticipation of litigation." The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. An attorney's solicitation of clients is not a permissible purpose under the (b)(4) litigation exception. DPPA's purpose of protecting privacy in motor vehicle records would be substantially undermined by application of the (b)(4) exception to the general ban on disclosure of personal information and ban on release of highly restricted personal information in cases there is any connection between protected information and a potential legal dispute. The Court noted examples of permissible litigation uses: service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and execution or enforcement of judgments and orders. All involve an attorney's conduct as an officer of the court, not a commercial actor, seeking a business transaction. A contrary reading of (b)(4) could affect interpretation of the (b)(6) exception, which allows an insurer and certain others to obtain DMV information for use in connection with underwriting, and the (b)(10) exception, which permits disclosure and use of personal information in connection with operation of private tollroads. View "Maracich v. Spears" on Justia Law 2013-06-17 federal U.S. Supreme Court Kennedy 12-25 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/11-1467/11-1467-2013-06-07.html Northern Valley Communications v. FCC, et al. 2013-06-14T13:13:54+00:00 2013-06-08T01:03:08+00:00 Northern Valley challenged the FCC's ruling that Northern Valley could not tariff long-distance carriers for calls to Northern Valley's non-paying customers. The court rejected Northern Valley's contention that the FCC's ruling contradicted two previous FCC orders because the FCC construed only the terms of the tariff at issue in those cases, not FCC regulations; the FCC reasonably interpreted and applied the relevant regulations; nothing in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 153(53), precluded the FCC's approach in this case; and, therefore, the court upheld the FCC's decision that competitive long-distance carriers (CLECs) could not rely on tariffs to charge long-distance carriers for access to CLECs' non-paying customers. Finally, the court upheld the FCC's decision that Northern Valley's 90-day provision violated the two-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Northern Valley Communications v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law 2013-06-07 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Kavanaugh 11-1467 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/12-1337/12-1337-2013-05-28.html Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. FCC, et al. 2013-05-31T13:03:00+00:00 2013-05-28T19:14:22+00:00 Tennis Channel, a sports programming network and intervenor in this suit, filed a complaint against Comcast Cable, a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD), alleging that Comcast violated section 616 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 536(a)(3), and the Commission's regulations by refusing to broadcast Tennis as widely as it did its own affiliated sports programming networks, Golf Channel and Versus. An ALJ ruled against Comcast, ordering that it provide Tennis carriage equal to what it afforded Golf and Versus, and the Commission affirmed. The court concluded that Comcast prevailed with its third set of arguments on appeal, that even under the Commission's interpretation of section 616, the Commission had failed to identify adequate evidence of unlawful discrimination. The Commission had nothing to refute Comcast's contention that its rejection of Tennis's proposal was simply "a straight up financial analysis." Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law 2013-05-28 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Williams 12-1337 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2013/114617.html Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lay 2013-05-24T13:09:35+00:00 2013-05-23T20:27:39+00:00 Lay, a real estate company, hired a business to send advertising faxes on its behalf by "blast fax," which sends advertisements to thousands of fax machines cheaply. As a result, Lay became the defendant in a class action filed by Locklear under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The matter settled. A monetary judgment was entered against Lay to be paid only from Lay's insurance policies. The Act in question provides for $500 in damages for each violation, and, with a putative class of 3,478 in the underlying action, the total damage amount reached $1,737,500, plus costs. Lay's insurer, Standard, successfully sought a declaration of noncoverage. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the damage provision of the Act allows for punitive damages, which are uninsurable under Illinois law as a matter of public policy. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, reasoning that the Act is a remedial statute, even though it provides for $500 in liquidated damages per violation. The ban on insurability does not apply. View "Standard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lay" on Justia Law 2013-05-23 state Illinois Illinois Supreme Court Freeman 114617 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/11-1460/11-1460-2013-05-21.html Nack v. Walburg 2013-05-24T13:05:02+00:00 2013-05-21T21:16:48+00:00 Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in this case arising under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394. Plaintiff's claims were based upon the receipt of one fax advertisement from defendant, which plaintiff's agent undisputedly consented to receive. The one fax plaintiff received did not contain opt-out language that he argued was mandated by federal regulation. According to the FCC, the contested opt-out language was required, even on faxes sent after obtaining a potential recipient's consent. The court reversed because the Administrative Orders Review Act (Hobbs Act), 28 U.S.C. 2342 et seq., precluded the court from entertaining challenges to the regulation other than on appeals arising from agency proceedings. Without addressing such challenges, the court could not reject the FCC's plain-language interpretation of its own unambiguous regulation. View "Nack v. Walburg" on Justia Law 2013-05-21 federal U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Melloy 11-1460 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/11-3750/11-3750-2013-05-21.html Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. 2013-05-24T13:08:54+00:00 2013-05-21T20:57:31+00:00 Hart was a quarterback, player number 13, with the Rutgers University NCAA Men's Division I Football team, 2002 through 2005, and was required to adhere to the NCAA amateurism rules. These rules state that a collegiate athlete loses his or her "amateur" status if the athlete uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport or accepts any remuneration or permits the use of his or her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind. Hart was very successful and was included in EA's successful NCAA Football videogame franchise. In the game NCAA Football 2006, for example, Rutgers' quarterback, player number 13, is 6'2" tall, weighs 197 pounds and resembles Hart; it shares his home town, team, and class year. Hart sued EA, alleging violation of his right of publicity by appropriating his likeness for use in the NCAA Football series of videogames. The district court dismissed on First Amendment grounds. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the games did not sufficiently transform Hart's identity to escape the right of publicity claim. . View "Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-05-21 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Greenaway 11-3750 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/11-1545 Arlington v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n 2013-05-24T13:08:04+00:00 2013-05-20T18:45:11+00:00 The Communications Act of 1934 requires state or local governments to act on siting applications for wireless facilities "within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed." 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). The FCC issued a Declaratory Ruling concluding that the phrase "reasonable period of time" is presumptively (but rebuttably) 90 days to process an application to place a new antenna on an existing tower and 150 days to process all other applications. The cities of Arlington and San Antonio challenged the Ruling. The Fifth Circuit found the statute ambiguous and upheld the FCC's determination that section 201(b)'s broad grant of regulatory authority empowered it to administer section 332(c)(7)(B). The Supreme Court affirmed. Courts must apply the Chevron framework to an agency's interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of the agency's statutory authority (i.e., its jurisdiction). The Court rejected a contention that Chevron deference was not appropriate because the FCC asserted jurisdiction over matters of traditional state and local concern. The statute explicitly supplants state authority. There is no case in which a general conferral of rule-making or adjudicative authority has been held insufficient to support Chevron deference for an exercise of that authority within the agency's substantive field. A general conferral of rule-making authority validates rules for all the matters the agency is charged with administering. It is sufficient that the preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the Communications Act through rule-making and adjudication, and the interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. View "Arlington v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law 2013-05-20 federal U.S. Supreme Court Scalia 11-1545 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-1811/12-1811-2013-05-13.html Platinum Sports Ltd. v. Snyder 2013-05-17T13:03:21+00:00 2013-05-13T18:16:21+00:00 In 2011, the Michigan legislature enacted laws that barred sexually oriented businesses from displaying signs on the premises that contained more than "words or numbers," Mich. Comp. Laws 125.2833; and imposed similar restrictions on off-site billboards, Mich. Comp. Laws 252.318a. In response to a First Amendment challenge, the district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement. The state stipulated to a final judgment declaring both laws facially unconstitutional and permanently enjoining enforcement. Two months later, Platinum, represented by the same attorney who had won the first lawsuits, sued the same defendants, challenging the same laws on the same free speech grounds. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The legal possibility that "this Governor or this Attorney General will enforce these laws in the face of these injunctions is: zero." Platinum Sports has no cognizable theory of injury. View "Platinum Sports Ltd. v. Snyder" on Justia Law 2013-05-13 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Sutton 12-1811 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-1803/12-1803-2013-05-09.html Bailey v. Callaghan 2013-05-10T13:08:16+00:00 2013-05-09T15:39:49+00:00 Michigan's 2012 Public Act 53 provides: "A public school employer's use of public school resources to assist a labor organization in collecting dues or service fees from wages of public school employees is a prohibited contribution to the administration of a labor organization," so that unions must collect their own membership dues from public-school employees, rather than have the schools collect those dues via payroll deductions. The Act does not bar public employers other than schools from collecting membership dues for unions who represent their employees. Unions and union members challenged the Act under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring enforcement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, quoting the Supreme Court: "The First Amendment prohibits government from 'abridging the freedom of speech'; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression." The court further reasoned that there is a legitimate interest in support of the Act's classification; the legislature could have concluded that it is more important for the public schools to conserve their limited resources for their core mission than it is for other state and local employers. View "Bailey v. Callaghan" on Justia Law 2013-05-09 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Kethledge 12-1803 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-2332/11-2332-2013-05-01.html Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Comcast 2013-05-03T13:03:03+00:00 2013-05-01T18:14:29+00:00 Appellants, an Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC), appealed the district court's judgment under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA), 47 U.S.C. 251-261. At issue was whether the TCA obligated ILECs to provide a connection service known as transit traffic service at negotiated rates or at lower regulated rates to new entrants seeking to exchange traffic with each other through the ILECs' facilities. The court affirmed the district court's determination that appellant was obligated to provide appellees with transit service under the TCA at regulated rates. Further, the court affirmed the district court's reversal of an order requiring appellant to apply regulated rates to all of its contracts for the provision of transit traffic service. View "Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Comcast" on Justia Law 2013-05-01 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Parker 11-2332 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/12-1322/12-1322-2013-04-29.html Central Telephone Co. v. Sprint Communications Co. 2013-05-03T13:09:08+00:00 2013-04-29T21:39:17+00:00 Sprint entered into interconnection agreements with incumbent local exchange carriers (CenturyLink Plaintiffs) providing for the mutual exchange of telecommunications traffic pursuant to the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. When Sprint began to withhold payments under the agreement, CenturyLink brought a breach of contract claim in federal district court. The court held that the 1996 Act did not require a State commission to interpret and enforce an interconnection agreement (ICA) in the first instance; neither the text of the 1996 Act nor prudential considerations compelled federal deference to State commissions in the first instance; the district court judge's ownership of shares in plaintiff did not constitute a financial interest in plaintiff for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 455(b); the district court did not violate the recusal statute and therefore did not abuse his discretion in deciding that neither recusal nor vacatur was appropriate; when viewed in conjunction with the ambiguity in the ICA's coverage of voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) traffic over Feature Group D (FGD) trunks, the parties' course of dealing reinforced the court's conclusion that the district court did not err in entering judgment for plaintiff on its breach of contract claim; and, in the face of ambiguity, the court construed the relevant provisions of the North Carolina ICA against Sprint and in favor of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Central Telephone Co. v. Sprint Communications Co." on Justia Law 2013-04-29 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Duncan 12-1322 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/12-1425/12-1425-2013-04-18.html K-Tech Telecomm., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. 2013-04-19T13:11:31+00:00 2013-04-18T17:53:34+00:00 In 2011, K-Tech sued DirecTV for patent infringement against DirecTV. On the same day, K-Tech filed a similar action against TWC. The complaints named four patents identifying systems and methods for modifying a major channel number, a minor channel number, and/or a carrier frequency to identify a television program. The district court dismissed both complaints and K-Tech's amended complaints, for failure to state a claim. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the district court applied the incorrect standard in evaluating the adequacy of K-Tech's complaints. District courts must evaluate complaints alleging direct infringement by reference to Form 18 of the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. K-Tech's amended complaints satisfied those standards. DirecTV and TWC know what K-Tech's patents claim, and they know what K-Tech asserts their systems do, and why. K-Tech has alleged that DirecTV and TWC must and do modify or "translate" digital signals they receive, and it has alleged that they do so using K-Tech's patented methods and systems. View "K-Tech Telecomm., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-04-18 federal U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals O'Malley 12-1425 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-16938/11-16938-2013-04-15.html Sams v. Yahoo! Inc. 2013-04-19T13:11:12+00:00 2013-04-15T23:41:20+00:00 Plaintiff appealed the district court's order dismissing her putative class claims against Yahoo!, alleging that Yahoo! violated the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701-2712, when it disclosed some of her noncontent subscriber information to the government pursuant to allegedly invalid subpoenas. Plaintiff further argued that even if the subpoenas were valid, Yahoo! failed to comply with their terms when it produced the requested documents prior to the deadline set in the subpoenas. The court held that the good faith defense under 18 U.S.C. 2707(e) was met when the defendant complies with a subpoena that appeared valid on its face, in the absence of any indication of irregularity sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the subpoena may be invalid or contrary to applicable law. In this case, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's SCA claims because Yahoo! was statutorily immune from suit because it produced the requested documents in good faith reliance on grand jury subpoenas. Yahoo!'s early compliance with the subpoenas did not vitiate Yahoo's immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sams v. Yahoo! Inc." on Justia Law 2013-04-15 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Smith 11-16938 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-1327/11-1327-2013-04-08.html Modrowski v. Pigatto 2013-04-12T13:11:33+00:00 2013-04-08T15:43:24+00:00 Allegedly in retaliation for Modrowski's unwillingness to skimp on building repairs, defendants fired him, withheld $11,000 in wages, had Modrowski jailed, and locked Modrowski out of his personal Yahoo email account. Modrowski sued, challenging the refusal to relinquish control over his email account. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, but Modrowski discovered that years' worth of personal correspondence had vanished. Modrowski claimed violation of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701), the Federal Wire Tapping Act (18 U.S.C. 2511), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030). The district court dismissed the first two claims because Modrowski acknowledged that he voluntarily linked his personal account with the defendants' business account. The district court dismissed without prejudice the Computer Fraud Act claim for failure to allege an injury of at least $5,000. When Modrowski returned his first amended complaint, defendants moved for summary judgment. The window for fact discovery had closed and neither party had sought an extension. Modrowski responded by attacking perceived deficiencies of the defendants' motion. Noting Modrowski's failure to offer "any evidence in response to defendants' motion, let alone evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact," it granted defendants' motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Modrowski v. Pigatto" on Justia Law 2013-04-08 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Wood 11-1327 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/12-1331/12-1331-2013-04-05.html Southern Walk at Broadlands v. Openband at Broadlands, LLC 2013-04-12T13:06:27+00:00 2013-04-06T03:35:04+00:00 Southern Walk, a homeowners association, brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment against OpenBand, the corporation with which it had contracted in 2001 for wire-based video services. Southern Walk alleged that the 2007 Exclusivity Order issued by the FCC rendered "null and void" OpenBand's exclusive rights under the 2001 contracts to provide such wire-based video services to Southern Walk homeowners. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court to the extent that it held that Southern Walk failed to allege facts supporting standing in this case, but vacated that judgment to the extent that it dismissed the case with prejudice, and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. The court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees to OpenBand. View "Southern Walk at Broadlands v. Openband at Broadlands, LLC" on Justia Law 2013-04-05 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Motz 12-1331 12-2083 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/12-1925/12-1925-2013-04-05.html Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Assoc. v. Openband at Lansdowne, LLC 2013-04-12T13:06:27+00:00 2013-04-06T03:28:58+00:00 The homeowners association sued OpenBand, a group of interlocking entities that provided cable services to Lansdowne real estate development. The homeowners alleged that OpenBand entered into a series of contracts that conferred upon Open Band the exclusive right to provide video services to the the development, in violation of an order of the FCC prohibiting such exclusivity arrangements. Because the contract prohibited competing cable providers from accessing the Lansdowne development in patent violation of the FCC's Order, the court affirmed the district court's judgment declaring the challenged provisions null and void and permanently enjoining their enforcement. View "Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Assoc. v. Openband at Lansdowne, LLC" on Justia Law 2013-04-05 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Wilkinson 12-1925 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-6215/11-6215-2013-04-05.html KY Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecommunications Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc. 2013-04-12T13:12:50+00:00 2013-04-05T15:22:49+00:00 TracFone provides prepaid wireless phone service primarily through third-party retailers. The Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board, created by the Kentucky General Assembly to develop an emergency 911 system for wireless customers, sued to collect unpaid fees from TracFone. KRS § 65.7635 requires wireless providers to collect a fee from their customers and remit the money to the CRMS for the cost of maintaining the 911 system. The district court ruled in favor of the Board with respect to the interpretation of the statute but declined to award prejudgment interest on TracFone's unpaid fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument concerning ambiguity in the statute. TracFone was required to remit fees from the effective date of the statute, regardless of what method it chose. View "KY Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecommunications Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-04-05 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Keith 11-6215 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/11-4471/11-4471-2013-04-03.html In Re: Kendall 2013-04-05T13:08:04+00:00 2013-04-03T18:09:24+00:00 Former Superior Court Judge Kendall enforced an oral plea agreement that the prosecution had attempted to withdraw; Kendall believed that the defendants could not obtain a fair trial, due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus. Kendall published an opinion chastising the mandamus decision and recusing himself from the case due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Justices cited Kendall for criminal contempt and found him guilty because his opinion, in their view, obstructed the administration of justice and because his recusal was a pretextual effort to avoid complying with the writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the contempt conviction, finding that the First Amendment protects a sitting judge from being criminally punished for his opinion unless that opinion presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing ongoing proceedings. Kendall's opinion did not pose such a threat. There was insufficient evidence that his recusal was pretextual. View "In Re: Kendall" on Justia Law 2013-04-03 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Smth 11-4471 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-5493/12-5493-2013-04-03.html Cogent Solutions Grp, LLC v. Hyalogic, LLC 2013-04-05T13:07:09+00:00 2013-04-03T15:53:03+00:00 Cogent sued, alleging that Hyalogic was disseminating false information regarding Cogent's product Baxyl, an "oral, liquid HA supplement that is sold into the human natural products market." Shortly after the filing, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Cogent moved to enforce the settlement agreement, claiming that Hyalogic caused false and misleading videos to be uploaded to You Tube and by statements made at a conference. The district court found no breach of the settlement agreement and denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The contract unambiguously refers to a clear statement "about the other Party's product." Statements that refer to preservatives that can be found in a number of products, including Cogent's products, are not statements "about the other Party's products." View "Cogent Solutions Grp, LLC v. Hyalogic, LLC" on Justia Law 2013-04-03 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Tarnow 12-5493 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2013/2012-109.html Investigation into Regulation of Voice Over Internet Protocol 2013-04-05T13:11:32+00:00 2013-03-30T02:55:19+00:00 The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned whether the Vermont Public Service Board had jurisdiction to regulate interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services provided in Vermont. The Board concluded that fixed VoIP was a "telecommunications service" under Vermont law and Vermont regulation of VoIP was not preempted by federal law because intrastate calls could be separately identified. The Board deferred consideration of what type of regulation to impose to a separate phase of the proceeding. On appeal, Comcast Phone of Vermont, LLC argued that the Board erred in not addressing whether interconnected fixed VoIP was an information service or telecommunications service under federal law because, according to Comcast, VoIP is an information service and therefore any regulation is preempted by federal law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Board must reach this question and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Investigation into Regulation of Voice Over Internet Protocol" on Justia Law 2013-03-29 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Reiber 2012-109 http://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2013/38735.html Syringa Networks v. Idaho Dept of Admin 2013-04-05T13:11:40+00:00 2013-03-30T02:51:37+00:00 In 2008, the legislature enacted legislation to establish the Idaho Education Network (IEN), which was to be a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance learning in every public school in the state. Syringa Networks, LLC (Syringa), an Idaho telecommunications company, entered into a "teaming agreement" with ENA Services, LLC (ENA). Pursuant to their agreement, ENA submitted a proposal in response to a request-for-proposals (RFP) with the Department of Administration, although the cover letter stated that both ENA and Syringa were responding jointly to the proposal. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, and Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., also submitted responsive proposals. The proposals were then scored based upon specific criteria; the ENA and Qwest proposals received the highest scores. The Department issued a letter of intent to award contracts to Qwest and ENA. One month later, it issued amendments to the two purchase orders to alter the scope of work that each would perform. Qwest became "the general contractor for all IEN technical network services" (providing the "backbone") and ENA became "the Service Provider." The effect of these amendments was to make Qwest the exclusive provider of the backbone, which was what Syringa intended to provide as a subcontractor of ENA. Syringa filed this lawsuit against the Department, its director, the chief technology officer, ENA and Qwest. The district court ultimately dismissed Syringa's lawsuit against all of the Defendants on their respective motions for summary judgment. Syringa then appealed the grants of summary judgment, and the State Defendants cross-appealed the refusal to award them attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three seeking to set aside the State's contract with Qwest on the ground that it was awarded in violation of the applicable statutes. Furthermore, the Court reversed Qwest's award of attorney fees against Syringa. We remand to the trial court the determination of whether any of the State Defendants were entitled to an award of attorney fees against Syringa for proceedings in the district court. The Court awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal to ENA. Because the State Defendants and Syringa both prevailed only in part on appeal, the Court did not award them either costs or attorney fees on appeal. View "Syringa Networks v. Idaho Dept of Admin" on Justia Law 2013-03-29 state Idaho Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Eismann 38735 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-3145/12-3145-2013-03-28.html OH Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils Comm'n of OH 2013-03-29T13:13:42+00:00 2013-03-28T19:01:10+00:00 AT&T and Intrado, rival telecommunications carriers, submitted to an arbitration conducted by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio to determine how to interconnect their networks to service 9-1-1 calls. AT&T insisted that all points of interconnection be on its network, relying on the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C 251(c), a provision only applicable to incumbent carriers like AT&T. The Commission rejected this request, relied on the general provisions of Section 251(a), and ordered the carriers to establish interconnection points on both AT&T's and Intrado's networks. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Commission exceeded its arbitral authority by applying Section 251(a) because Intrado had petitioned for interconnection only under Section 251(c). The Commission properly interpreted an incumbent carrier's interconnection duties under the Act. View "OH Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils Comm'n of OH" on Justia Law 2013-03-28 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Norris 12-3145 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/569/11-864 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend 2013-03-29T13:04:21+00:00 2013-03-27T19:59:24+00:00 Comcast and its subsidiaries allegedly "cluster" cable television operations within a region by swapping their systems outside the region for competitor systems inside the region. Plaintiffs filed a class-action antitrust suit, claiming that Comcast's strategy lessens competition and leads to supra-competitive prices. The district court required them to show that the antitrust impact of the violation could be proved at trial through evidence common to the class and that damages were measurable on a classwide basis through a "common methodology." The court accepted only one of four proposed theories of antitrust impact: that Comcast's actions lessened competition from "overbuilders," i.e., companies that build competing networks in areas where an incumbent cable company already operates. It certified the class, finding that the damages from overbuilder deterrence could be calculated on a classwide basis, even though plaintiffs' expert acknowledged that his regression model did not isolate damages resulting from any one of the theories. In affirming, the Third Circuit refused to consider Comcast's argument that the model failed to attribute damages to overbuilder deterrence because doing so would require reaching the merits of claims at the class certification stage. The Supreme Court reversed: the class action was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The Third Circuit deviated from precedent in refusing to entertain arguments against a damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification. Under the proper standard for evaluating certification, plaintiffs' model falls far short of establishing that damages can be measured classwide. The figure plaintiffs' expert used was calculated assuming the validity of all four theories of antitrust impact initially advanced. Because the model cannot bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in general and supra¬competitive prices attributable to overbuilder deterrence, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating subscribers in the Philadelphia cluster as members of a single class. View "Comcast Corp. v. Behrend" on Justia Law 2013-03-27 federal U.S. Supreme Court Scalia 11-864 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-55497/11-55497-2013-03-25.html Luvdarts LLC, et al v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al 2013-03-29T13:12:22+00:00 2013-03-25T22:11:37+00:00 Luvdarts sued mobile wireless carriers, who own multimedia messaging networks (MMS networks), for copyright infringement. At issue was whether the carriers could be held liable for copyright infringement that allegedly occurred on their networks. Because Luvdarts failed to allege adequately that the carriers had the necessary right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct, the district court properly determined that they could not prevail on their claim of vicarious copyright infringement. Because Luvdarts failed to allege adequately that the carriers had the necessary specific knowledge of infringement, it could not prevail on its claim of contributory copyright infringement. Accordingly, Luvdarts failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and the district court properly dismissed its complaint with prejudice. View "Luvdarts LLC, et al v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, et al" on Justia Law 2013-03-25 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals O'Scannlain 11-55497 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-3345/12-3345-2013-03-25.html Gakuba v. O'Brien 2013-03-29T13:04:22+00:00 2013-03-25T20:43:12+00:00 In 2006 a teenager accused Gakuba of kidnapping and raping him. State charges are pending Gakuba sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that investigating police barged into his Rockford hotel room without a warrant and seized his wallet and other items after obtaining Gakuba's video rental records from Hollywood Video to corroborate the accuser's story that he had spent time watching videos in Gakuba's room. He also sought damages under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court dismissed without prejudice, granting Gakuba leave to amend his complaint if the indictment concluded in his favor. The court advised Gakuba that certain claims would be barred on immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Gakuba's claims of damages resulting from illegal searches, seizures, and detentions involve constitutional issues that may be litigated during the course of his criminal case. Monetary relief is not available to him in his defense of criminal charges and his claims may become time-barred by the time the state prosecution has concluded, so the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed Gakuba's civil-rights claims. The court noted that Hollywood Video employees knowingly disclosed his rental information to the police without a warrant. View "Gakuba v. O'Brien" on Justia Law 2013-03-25 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Wood 12-3345 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/568/11-697 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2013-03-22T13:08:56+00:00 2013-03-19T18:19:45+00:00 Wiley, an academic publisher, often assigns to its foreign subsidiary (WileyAsia) rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley's English language textbooks abroad. WileyAsia's books state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the U.S. When Kirtsaeng moved to the U.S., he asked friends to buy foreign edition English-language textbooks in Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him. He sold the books at a profit. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng's unauthorized importation and resale was an infringement of Wiley's 17 U.S.C. 106(3) exclusive rights to distribute its copyrighted work and section 602's import prohibition. Kirtsaeng cited section 109(a)'s "first sale" doctrine, which provides that "the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." The district court held that the defense did not apply to goods manufactured abroad. The jury found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley's American copyrights and assessed damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that section 109(a)'s "lawfully made under this title" language indicated that the "first sale" doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. The Supreme Court reversed; the "first sale" doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad. Section 109(a) says nothing about geography. A geographical interpretation of the first-sale doctrine could re¬quire libraries to obtain permission before circulating the many books in their collections that were printed overseas; potential practical problems are too serious, extensive, and likely to come about to be dismissed as insignificant—particularly in light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. View "Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-03-19 federal U.S. Supreme Court Breyer 11-697 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/12-1728/12-1728-2013-03-12.html K. A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. 2013-03-15T13:16:50+00:00 2013-03-12T17:15:25+00:00 K.A., a fifth-grade student, attempted to distribute, before the start of class, an invitation to a children's Christmas party at her church. Students were normally allowed to distribute invitations to birthday parties, Halloween parties, and similar events during non-instructional time. The teacher told K.A. that the principal would have to approve the flyer. The principal later notified K.A.'s father that the superintendent had not approved the flyer, based on a policy concerning events not related to the school. Her father filed suit, alleging that the school district had violated K.A.'s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court, applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), and finding no evidence that distribution of the invitations would threaten a "substantial disruption‖ of the school environment or interfere with the rights of others," granted preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the original policy and subsequent revisions were broader than allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into a narrow exception. View "K. A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist." on Justia Law 2013-03-12 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Vanaskie 12-1728 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-2345/12-2345-2013-03-11.html Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills 2013-03-15T13:17:24+00:00 2013-03-11T14:22:18+00:00 Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek's speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek's only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, "albeit barely," that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a "Monell" claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law 2013-03-11 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Williams 12-2345 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/11-4162/11-4162-2013-03-08.html Kendall v. Daily News Publ'g Co. 2013-03-15T13:21:07+00:00 2013-03-08T17:51:25+00:00 Judge Kendall contends that the Daily News and Blackburn defamed him while reporting on his decision to grant bail to Castillo, who subsequently murdered a child; his decision to use house arrest for Williams, who was subsequently involved in a police standoff; and his decision to retire. After a jury verdict awarded $240,000, the trial court awarded the defendants judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Virgin Island Supreme court affirmed after denying Kendall's motion for recusal based on its previous contempt proceedings against him. The Third Circuit affirmed without reaching the issue of recusal. Judge Kendall could not establish actual malice as necessary in a public-figure libel action. View "Kendall v. Daily News Publ'g Co." on Justia Law 2013-03-08 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Smith 11-4162 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3012/11-3012-2013-03-06.html Stayart v. Google Inc. 2013-03-08T14:23:44+00:00 2013-03-06T15:11:52+00:00 Plaintiff, an active genealogist and animal rights activist, claimed that her name had commercial value and that search engines generated revenue as a result of internet searches of her name. She specifically alleges that various features of Google's search engine violate her right of publicity by using her name to trigger sponsored links, ads, and related searches to medications, including Levitra, Cialis, and Viagra, all of which are trademarks of nationally advertised oral treatments for male erectile dysfunction. The district court dismissed her suit alleging common law misappropriation and violation of the state right-of-privacy law, Wis. Stat. 995.50(2)(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the public interest and incidental use exceptions. View "Stayart v. Google Inc." on Justia Law 2013-03-06 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Williams 11-3012 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/11-1146/11-1146-2013-02-26.html American Electric Power Serv. Corp., et al v. FCC, et al 2013-03-01T14:20:45+00:00 2013-02-26T20:51:17+00:00 Petitioners challenged the FCC's three revisions to the interpretation of Section 224 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 224. Section 224 provided a variety of advantages to certain types of firms seeking to attach their wires, cable, or other network equipment to utility poles. The FCC's Order allowed incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share the benefits of some of Section 224's provisions; reformulated the ceiling on the rate that pole-owning utilities could charge "telecommunications carriers" seeking to make pole attachments; and moved back the date as of which compensatory damages started to accrue in favor of parties filing successful complaints against utilities. The court upheld the FCC's view that ILECs were "providers of telecommunications services" for purposes of section 224(a)(4). Because the FCC's methodology was consistent with the unspecified cost terms contained in section 224(e), and the FCC's justifications were reasonable, the telecom rate revision warranted judicial deference. Petitioners' arguments regarding the refund period had no serious statutory basis. The court considered petitioners' many subsidiary arguments and found them all to be without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "American Electric Power Serv. Corp., et al v. FCC, et al" on Justia Law 2013-02-26 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Williams 11-1146 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/568/11-1025 Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA 2013-03-01T14:24:30+00:00 2013-02-26T18:46:21+00:00 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,50 U.S.C. 1881a,2008 amendments, permit the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing surveillance of individuals who are not "United States persons" and are reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. They normally must first obtain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approval; 1881a surveillance is subject to statutory conditions, congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. United States persons who claim to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance sought a declaration that 1881a is facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction. The district court found that they lacked standing, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they showed an "objectively reasonable likelihood" that their communications will be intercepted in the future and that they suffer present injuries from costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. The Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs do not have Article III standing, which require an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient. Plaintiffs' standing theory rests on a speculative chain of possibilities. The Court stated that it is "reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decision-makers will exercise their judgment." Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. View "Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA" on Justia Law 2013-02-26 federal U.S. Supreme Court Alito 11-1025 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-6006/11-6006-2013-02-21.html Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union 2013-02-22T14:05:13+00:00 2013-02-21T16:03:55+00:00 KDMC operates a regional medical center. SEIU is a labor union that represents health care and social service workers and has a collective bargaining agreement with KDMC. In 2010, concerned about the cost of health care for KDMC employees, SEIU launched a two-day robo-call campaign, targeting KDMC, to protest proposals that would shift a larger cost to employees. Residents within KDMC's service area received calls from an automated system that played a prerecorded voice message criticizing KDMC's plans in dramatic terms. The message did not disclose that the SEIU was responsible for the call. Call recipients who opted to press "1" during the call were patched through to the direct extension for KDMC CEO Jackson. KDMC alleges that Jackson's extension received 536 live calls over the two-day period and that the high volume of calls overwhelmed its main trunk lines. KDMC filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act does not extend to purposeful calls made by individuals seeking to express an opinion, noting that the calls required a real person to "exercise independent judgment" in order to connect to Jackson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union" on Justia Law 2013-02-21 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Cole 11-6006 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/12-1020/12-1020-2013-02-13.html Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc. 2013-02-15T14:08:41+00:00 2013-02-13T16:41:19+00:00 FM sued Google for infringing three patents relating to advertising on multiple outlets such as newspapers and websites. The specification characterizes the prior art as inefficient because it requires advertisers to manually ensure that their ads conform to the differing requirements of each advertising venue. The invention is designed to eliminate this inefficiency by automatically formatting the ads to fit each publisher's requirements and sending them out for publication. In each of the patents, a "central computer" coordinates interactions between sellers (wishing to place ads), media venues, and buyers (targets of the ads). The central computer hosts a number of databases and software processes, including the presentation rules database and the Presentation Generating Program. The district court invalidated of one of FM's patents as indefinite and a jury found that two others were invalid and not infringed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court abdicated to the jury its responsibility to construe disputed claim terms; that the court incorrectly denied its motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and that the verdicts of infringement and invalidity are irreconcilable. View "Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law 2013-02-13 federal U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Reyna 12-1020 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/11-3837/11-3837-2013-02-11.html Interstate Outdoor Advertising, L.P. v. Zoning Bd., Twp of Mount Laurel 2013-02-15T14:09:21+00:00 2013-02-12T03:38:08+00:00 Interstate requested approval for nine outdoor advertising signs along U.S. Interstate-295, a major transportation corridor. The township then adopted an ordinance prohibiting billboards. The district court dismissed a constitutional challenge. The Third Circuit affirmed. A reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that there was an insufficient basis for the township's conclusion that its billboard ban would directly advance its stated goal of improving the aesthetics of the community. The fact that Interstate will not be able to reach the distinct audience of travelers that it desires to target does not mean that adequate alternative means of communication do not exist. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that complete billboard bans may be the only reasonable means by which a legislature can advance its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. View "Interstate Outdoor Advertising, L.P. v. Zoning Bd., Twp of Mount Laurel" on Justia Law 2013-02-11 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals McKee 11-3837 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/10-4588/10-4588-2013-01-24.html In re: WorldCom, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom Communications 2013-01-25T14:02:18+00:00 2013-01-24T18:03:55+00:00 This case stemmed from bankruptcy court proceedings between MCI and CNI where MCI sought to recover from CNI allegedly unpaid telecommunications services. CNI counterclaimed. At issue on appeal was whether the district court properly granted relief under Rule 4(a)(6) to CNI when it claimed that it never received the Civil Rule 77(d) notice and therefore failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The court agreed with the district court that CNI met the express preconditions of Rule 4(a)(6). The court held that relief under the rule was discretionary and its grant in this case was inappropriate. The failure to receive Civil Rule 77(d) notice was entirely and indefensibly the fault of CNI's counsel. Granting such relief in these circumstances was at odds with the purposes and structure of the procedural scheme. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the motion to reopen and dismissed CNI's appeal as untimely. View "In re: WorldCom, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom Communications" on Justia Law 2013-01-24 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Kaplan 10-4588 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-2512/12-2512-2013-01-23.html Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County 2013-01-25T14:04:07+00:00 2013-01-23T17:23:40+00:00 Indiana Code 35-42-4-12 prohibits certain individuals required to register as sex offenders (Ind. Code 11-8-8) from knowingly using a social networking web site, an instant messaging, or chat room program that the offender knows allows access or use by a person who is less than 18 years of age. Violation constitutes a Class A misdemeanor; subsequent violations constitute Class D felonies. The law does not differentiate based on the age of victim, the manner in which the crime was committed, or the time since the predicate offense. It provides a defense if the individual did not know the website allowed minors or upon discovering it does, immediately ceased use, and exempts persons convicted of consensual "Romeo and Juliet relationships" where the victim and perpetrator are close in age. In 2000, Doe was convicted of child exploitation. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds on behalf of a class of similarly-situated sex offenders. The district court rejected the challenge. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the law unconstitutional. Though content neutral, it is not narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest. It broadly prohibits substantial protected speech rather than specifically targeting the evil of improper communications to minors. View "Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County" on Justia Law 2013-01-23 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Flaum 12-2512 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-1923/12-1923-2013-01-17.html Bogie v. Rosenberg 2013-01-18T14:06:09+00:00 2013-01-17T17:12:17+00:00 Bogie attended a comedy show featuring Joan Rivers, who told a joke about Helen Keller, offending an audience member who had a deaf son. The audience member heckled Rivers; their brief exchange was filmed and was part of the documentary. When Rivers exited to a backstage area, closed to the public, Bogie gained entry and expressed frustration with the heckler and sympathy for Rivers. Rivers responded with an expression of sympathy for the heckler. The film shows at least three others present. The interaction was filmed and included in the documentary entitled Joan Rivers: A Piece of Work. Bogie's conversation lasted 16 seconds in the film's 82 minutes, 0.3 percent of the entire film. The documentary was distributed nationwide. Bogie alleges that she was portrayed in the film as having approved of condescending and disparaging remarks by Rivers toward Wisconsin, its citizens, and the heckler. Bogie's complaint alleged that her privacy was invaded by the distribution of the film and that the film misappropriated her image for commercial purposes without her consent. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the footage was "incidental," newsworthy, and not used for advertising. View "Bogie v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law 2013-01-17 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals 12-1923 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/04-1033/04-1033-2013-01-15.html EchoStar Satellite, LLC v. FCC, et al 2013-01-18T14:05:37+00:00 2013-01-15T22:52:41+00:00 DISH, a direct broadcast satellite provider, challenged two orders of the Commission because they imposed "encoding rules," which limited the means of encoding that cable and satellite service providers could employ to prevent unauthorized access to their broadcasts. The court held that the FCC's decision to apply these encoding rules exceeded the agency's statutory authority. Consequently, the court need not reach DISH's alternate contention that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "EchoStar Satellite, LLC v. FCC, et al" on Justia Law 2013-01-15 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Brown 04-1033 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/12-3863/12-3863-2013-01-15.html PG Publ'g Co. v. Aichele 2013-01-18T14:04:53+00:00 2013-01-15T19:27:40+00:00 PG sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of 25 Pa. Stat. 3060(d), a portion of the Pennsylvania Election Code mandating that all persons, except election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, persons in the course of voting, persons lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace and police officers, when permitted by the provisions of this act, must remain at least ten (10) feet distant from the polling place during the progress of the voting. PG claimed that the statute infringed on its First Amendment "right to access and gather news at polling places" and that selective enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. There is no protected First Amendment right of access to a polling place for news-gathering purposes and there was no evidence of "invidious intent" or intentional discrimination. View "PG Publ'g Co. v. Aichele" on Justia Law 2013-01-15 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Greenaway 12-3863 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-2599/12-2599-2013-01-09.html Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., Inc. 2013-01-11T14:06:01+00:00 2013-01-09T19:53:04+00:00 The Chicago-area law firms (Anderson) represent plaintiffs in class action lawsuits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act-Junk Fax Prevention Act, which authorizes $500 in damages for faxing an unsolicited advertisement, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3). This award triples upon a showing of willfulness, and each transmission is a separate violation. Advertisers would pay a fee, and B2B would send an ad to hundreds of fax numbers without obtaining permission from the recipients. When Anderson learned that defendants in four cases under the Act had contracted with B2B, B2B records became the focus of discovery. Despite obtaining all information necessary to certify classes in the four cases, Anderson continued pushing for B2B, and, at a deposition at which B2B was represented by Ruben, obtained the names of other B2B clients, and sent solicitation letters. Anderson attempted to give Ruben $ 5000. Defendants in new cases learned that Anderson had promised B2B confidentiality and unsuccessfully challenged class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that when an ethical breach neither prejudices an attorney's client nor undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings, state bar authorities are generally better positioned to address the matter through disciplinary proceedings, rather than the courts through substantive sanction in the underlying lawsuit. View "Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., Inc." on Justia Law 2013-01-09 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Flaum 12-2599 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/12-1212/12-1212-2012-12-19.html In re: Fox 2012-12-21T14:10:19+00:00 2012-12-19T17:11:08+00:00 In 2001 Fox sought to register a mark having a literal element, consisting of the words COCK SUCKER, and a design element, consisting of a drawing of a crowing rooster. Since 1979, Fox has used this mark to sell rooster-shaped chocolate lollipops, which she "displays . . .in retail outlets in small replicas of egg farm collecting baskets to emphasize the country farmyard motif." The consumers targeted by Fox's business are, primarily, fans of teams that have gamecocks as mascots. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed refusal by the examiner to register her mark, citing 15 U.S.C. 1052(a). The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that a mark that creates a double entendre falls within the proscription of the section where, as here, one of its meanings is clearly vulgar. The section's prohibition on registration of "immoral ... or scandalous matter" includes a mark that is "vulgar." View "In re: Fox" on Justia Law 2012-12-19 federal U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Dyk 12-1212 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-3218/12-3218-2012-12-17.html Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo 2012-12-21T14:06:27+00:00 2012-12-17T15:42:21+00:00 In 2008, Dixon, an African-American woman and then-interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources at the University of Toledo, wrote an op-ed column in the Toledo Free Press rebuking comparisons drawn between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements. Shortly thereafter, Dixon was fired. Claiming violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Dixon filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speech of a high-level Human Resources official who writes publicly against the very policies that her government employer charges her with creating, promoting, and enforcing is not protected speech. View "Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo" on Justia Law 2012-12-17 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Moore 12-3218 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/11-1330/11-1330-2012-12-14.html PMCM TV, LLC v. FCC 2012-12-21T14:03:25+00:00 2012-12-15T04:27:30+00:00 Relying on section 331(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 331(a), appellant filed an application to reallocate VHF channels from Nevada and Wyoming to New Jersey and Delaware. The FCC denied the application, interpreting section 331(a) to require reallocations of channels only between neighboring locations. Because the Commission's decision conflicted with the statute's text and purpose and because appellant could move its channels without creating signal interference, the court reversed. View "PMCM TV, LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law 2012-12-14 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Tatel 11-1330 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/11-41118/11-41118-2012-12-12.html Garcia v. City of Laredo, Texas, et al 2012-12-14T14:03:21+00:00 2012-12-13T17:20:00+00:00 Plaintiff contended that the district court's interpretation of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701, was erroneous. Plaintiff alleged that the statute applied and protected all text and data stored on her personal cell phone which defendants accessed without plaintiff's permission. The Act prohibited accessing without authorization a facility through which an electronic communications service was provided and thereby obtain access to electronic communication while it was in electronic storage. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the text messages and photos stored on plaintiff's cell phone were not in "electronic storage" as defined by the Act and were thus outside the scope of the statute. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to recuse the district court judge. View "Garcia v. City of Laredo, Texas, et al" on Justia Law 2012-12-12 federal U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Davis 11-41118 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/11-6233/11-6233-2012-12-11.html Hancock v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, Inc. 2012-12-14T14:04:31+00:00 2012-12-12T04:33:49+00:00 Plaintiffs Gayen Hancock, David Cross, Montez Mutzig, and James Bollinger sought to represent a class of customers dissatisfied with "U-verse," a digital telecommunications service offered by Defendants AT&T and several of its subsidiaries. The Oklahoma federal district court dismissed their claims based on forum selection and arbitration clauses in the U-verse terms of service. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims. Finding no error in the district court's interpretation of the terms of service, and finding no abuse of the court's discretion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims. View "Hancock v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, Inc." on Justia Law 2012-12-11 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Matheson 11-6233 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/12-60027/12-60027-2012-12-10.html Teltech Systems, Inc., et al v. Bryant, et al 2012-12-14T14:03:37+00:00 2012-12-11T22:15:19+00:00 Defendants contested a summary judgment holding that the Mississippi Caller ID Anti-Spoofing Act (ASA), Miss. Code Ann. 77-3-805, violated the Commerce Clause. Plaintiffs provide nationwide third-party spoofing services to individuals and entities. In light of the carefully-drafted language in section 227(e)(1) of the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 (TCIA), 47 U.S.C. 227(e)(1), and legislative history, and in spite of the presumption against preemption that attached to a state's exercise of its police power, there was an inherent federal objective in the TCIA to protect non-harmful spoofing. The ASA's proscription of non-harmful spoofing frustrated this federal objective and was, therefore, conflict preempted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Teltech Systems, Inc., et al v. Bryant, et al" on Justia Law 2012-12-10 federal U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Barksdale 12-60027 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/11-1135/11-1135-2012-12-04.html Cellco Partnership v. FCC 2012-12-07T14:06:24+00:00 2012-12-04T16:36:56+00:00 Recognizing the growing importance of mobile data in a wireless market in which smartphones are increasingly common, the FCC adopted a rule requiring mobile-data providers to offer roaming agreements to other such providers on "commercially reasonable" terms. Verizon challenged the data roaming rule on multiple grounds. The court held that Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq., plainly empowered the FCC to promulgate the data roaming rule. And although the rule bears some marks of common carriage, the court deferred to the FCC's determination that the rule imposed no common carrier obligations on mobile-internet providers. In response to Verizon's remaining arguments, the court concluded that the rule did not effect an unconstitutional taking and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "Cellco Partnership v. FCC" on Justia Law 2012-12-04 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Tatel 11-1135 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2012/2011-892.html Appeal of Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc. 2012-11-30T14:07:45+00:00 2012-11-29T14:15:12+00:00 The petitioners, Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc., Dixville Telephone Company, Dunbarton Telephone Company, Inc., and Granite State Telephone, Inc., four exempt incumbent rural local exchange carriers (RLECs), appealed an order of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that denied their motion to rescind or declare null and void registrations of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) authorized by the PUC to engage in business as telephone utilities in the service territories of RLECs. Citing RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, among other statutes, the petitioners alleged that the PUC, before issuing the registrations, had failed to provide notice, hold hearings, and determine whether allowing such competition would be consistent with the public good. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Appeal of Union Tel. Co.," the petitioners specifically argued that federal law did not preempt these requirements. The PUC ultimately denied the petitioners' request and ruled that section 253(a) of the Telecommunications Act preempted RSA 374:26 and RSA 374:22-g, II. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that section 253(a) preempted state and local laws, regulations, and requirements that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." View "Appeal of Bretton Woods Telephone Company, Inc." on Justia Law 2012-11-28 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Lynn 2011-892 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/11-13998/11-13998-2012-10-30.html Self v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., et al 2012-11-02T13:04:42+00:00 2012-10-31T03:30:54+00:00 This case stemmed from the FCC's issuance of an order requiring telecommunications carriers to make payments into a Universal Service Fund for subsidizing services for certain categories of consumers. At issue was what should happen to the intrastate portion of the fees that the customers paid to reimburse the carriers for the payments they made to the fund. The court held that the district court correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the claims. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the FCC's orders at all, it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the orders were invalid because they were outside the jurisdictional authority of the agency. View "Self v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., et al" on Justia Law 2012-10-30 federal U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Carnes 11-13998 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/12-30084/12-30084-2012-10-26.html Ackal, et al v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, et al 2012-11-02T13:04:36+00:00 2012-10-30T00:10:48+00:00 This case involved an interlocutory appeal from an order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification where the certified class putatively consisted of various governmental entities within the State of Louisiana whose representatives entered into contracts with defendants for cellular telephone service. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants engaged in deceptive billing practices that constituted a breach of contract and violated the state's unfair trade and consumer protection laws. The court agreed with defendants that the district court abused its discretion when it certified plaintiffs' class because, in doing so, it effectively certified an "opt in" class, which was impermissible under Rule 23. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanding for further proceedings. View "Ackal, et al v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, et al" on Justia Law 2012-10-26 federal U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals King 12-30084 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-1538/11-1538-2012-10-25.html Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'l Transp. 2012-10-26T13:03:28+00:00 2012-10-25T19:40:15+00:00 American Freedom Defense Initiative is a nonprofit corporation that wanted to place an advertisement on the side of city buses in Michigan. The advertisement read: "Fatwa on your head? Is your family or community threatening you? Leaving Islam? Got Questions? Get Answers! RefugefromIslam.com". Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART), refused to display the advertisement. AFDI sued, claiming a First Amendment violation. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs likely could show that SMART's decision was arbitrary. The Sixth Circuit reversed. SMART's policy prohibits: political or political campaign advertising; advertising promoting the sale of alcohol or tobacco; advertising that is false, misleading, or deceptive; advertising that is clearly defamatory or likely to hold up to scorn or ridicule any person or group of persons; and advertising that is obscene or pornographic; or in advocacy of imminent lawlessness or unlawful violent action. The restrictions, which concern a nonpublic forum are reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limits that do not deny AFDI's First Amendment rights. The injunction would cause substantial harm to others, compelling SMART to post on its buses messages that have strong potential to alienate people and decrease ridership; the public interest would not be served by this preliminary injunction. View "Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'l Transp." on Justia Law 2012-10-25 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Rogers 11-1538 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2012/112-map-2011.html Hearst Television Inc. v. Norris 2012-10-19T13:09:05+00:00 2012-10-18T03:56:09+00:00 Following the death of a college student in Shippensburg, Hearst Television, Inc., d/b/a WGAL-TV and its reporter, Daniel O'Donnell (Requester), filed a Right to Know Law (RTKL) request with Michael Norris, the Coroner of Cumberland County (Coroner), seeking the student's manner of death. The Coroner rejected the request, and the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records (OOR) upheld the Coroner's decision. On appeal, the trial court and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Section 1236.1(c) of the Coroner's Act and the under the RTKL, the record indicating the manner of death was immediately available to Requester. View "Hearst Television Inc. v. Norris" on Justia Law 2012-10-17 state Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Supreme Court Baer 112 MAP 2011 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/11-12221/11-12221-2012-09-26.html LSSi Data Corp. v. Comcast Phone, LLC 2012-09-28T13:02:44+00:00 2012-09-26T16:47:39+00:00 Comcast appealed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief, compelling the telecommunications company to provide its directory assistance listing data directly to LSSi. LSSi alleged that Comcast's refusal to provide LSSi, and similar companies, with direct access to its directory assistance listing data while providing this access to Targus constituted a violation of Sections 202, 222(e), and 251(b)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 202, 222(e), and 251(b)(3). Having concluded that LSSi failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its discrimination claims against Comcast, the court did not address the additional elements required for a preliminary injunction. Instead, the court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "LSSi Data Corp. v. Comcast Phone, LLC" on Justia Law 2012-09-26 federal U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Martin 11-12221 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/10-1974/10-1974-2012-09-18.html Thayer v. Chiczewski 2012-09-21T13:05:58+00:00 2012-09-18T17:58:48+00:00 Chicago police officers arrested plaintiffs for disorderly conduct at a 2005 antiwar demonstration. The plaintiffs brought claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false arrest, Fourteenth Amendment class-of-one equal protection violations, and state law malicious prosecution. They also brought facial challenges against Chicago's disorderly conduct ordinance, as overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of qualified immunity. The facial attack on the ordinance was rendered moot by an earlier decision, which partially invalidated the subsection on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' arrests under a now-invalid ordinance may have affected their free speech rights, but that they did not bring an as-applied challenge to redress such an injury. View "Thayer v. Chiczewski" on Justia Law 2012-09-18 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Tinder 10-1974 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3693/11-3693-2012-09-10.html Ctr, for Individual Freedom v. Madigan 2012-09-14T13:08:58+00:00 2012-09-10T18:25:54+00:00 The Center broadcasts advertisements, maintains a website, publishes a weekly e-mail newsletter, produces a bi-weekly radio show, and engages in other forms of mass media communications. Its tax exempt status under section 501(c)(4) is incompatible with partisan political activity, so the Center cannot endorse candidates. During election seasons, the Center runs advertisements that refer to the positions of candidates or to ballot issues and call for actions such as contacting candidates. The Center claims that it feared that Illinois's new campaign finance laws (10 ILCS 5/9) would require it to register as a "political committee" and to disclose election-related expenditures and significant contributors and that its donors require assurances that their identities will not be disclosed. The Center argued that the law was vague and overbroad. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Illinois law is modeled on federal law. The Center did not establish that the statute "prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech," or that its "deterrent effect on legitimate expression is ... real and substantial." View "Ctr, for Individual Freedom v. Madigan" on Justia Law 2012-09-10 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Hamilton 11-3693 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/10-3739/10-3739-2012-09-06.html Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad. Inc. 2012-09-07T13:07:06+00:00 2012-09-06T19:44:46+00:00 Leyse received a prerecorded telemarketing call from a radio station. He sued, alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2394, which prohibits certain prerecorded telemarketing calls. The district court dismissed, finding that the Federal Communications Commission had issued regulations exempting the type of call at issue from the TCPA's prohibitions; that the FCC was authorized by Congress to do so; that the court should defer to the resulting regulation; and that the regulation passed muster under Chevron. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that "Chevron deference" applies to the regulation and that the regulation is valid under Chevron. The court rejected an argument that it lacked jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. View "Leyse v. Clear Channel Broad. Inc." on Justia Law 2012-09-06 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Stranch 10-3739 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/10-4139/10-4139-2012-09-05.html In re: Search of Fair Finance 2012-09-07T13:09:55+00:00 2012-09-05T19:40:17+00:00 Federal officers applied for a warrant to search the offices of Fair Finance in Akron, as part of an investigation into its owner, Durham, who was suspected of employing the company to engage in a Ponzi scheme. A Magistrate granted a warrant and, at the government's request, sealed the file. Officers executed the search. The warrant and inventory of seized items were placed in the sealed file. Newspapers requested an order unsealing the files, arguing that they had a right of access under common law and the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion. After an indictment issued, the court granted the government's motion to unseal the face sheet of the warrant, the form application (excluding the affidavit in support of the application), the inventory, two attachments to the warrant and application, the motion to seal the documents, and the order granting that motion. The affidavit filed in support of the warrant application and the docket sheet remained sealed. The newspapers are no longer contesting the sealing of the affidavit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The First Amendment right of access does not permit the newspapers to obtain the documents filed in connection with these warrant proceedings. View "In re: Search of Fair Finance " on Justia Law 2012-09-05 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Roth 10-4139 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-1175/11-1175-2012-09-05.html Park West Galleries, Inc. v. Hochman 2012-09-07T13:08:00+00:00 2012-09-05T16:22:53+00:00 Park sells art from its gallery, online, by catalog, and by phone, and conducts auctions in different cities and on cruise ships. Franks, CEO of Global Fine Art Registry, published online articles alleging that Park engaged in suspect business practices and sold inauthentic art. Park sued, claiming defamation, tortious interference, interference with prospective business advantage, and civil conspiracy to destroy goodwill and reputation. During trial, the district court gave several warnings and sanctioned Franks's counsel for failure to honor rulings regarding improper lines of questioning. Despite repeated instances of misconduct, Park did not request a mistrial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants on defamation, tortious interference with business expectancies, and civil conspiracy, but did not find in favor of defendants on counterclaims. The jury found in favor of GFAR on its Lanham Act counterclaim and awarded $500,000.00. The district court decided that the misconduct was serious enough that there was a reasonable probability that the verdict was influenced and granted a new trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to reinstate the verdict. Failure to seek a mistrial based on misconduct occurring during the trial did not waive Park's right to seek a new trial under FRCP 59. View "Park West Galleries, Inc. v. Hochman" on Justia Law 2012-09-05 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Gibbons 11-1175 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/11-2984/11-2984-2012-09-04.html Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs, et al 2012-09-07T13:03:28+00:00 2012-09-05T03:46:55+00:00 Sprint contested the IUB order compelling it to pay intrastate access charges to Windstream, an Iowa communications company, for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) calls. Sprint filed a complaint in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The same day, Sprint also filed a petition for review in Iowa state court, asserting, among other claims, that the IUB's order was preempted under federal law. The federal district court abstained pursuant to Younger v. Harris and dismissed the action. The court affirmed the district court's decision to abstain, but the court vacated the judgment of dismissal and remanded the case with instruction to stay the proceedings. View "Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs, et al" on Justia Law 2012-09-04 federal U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Wollman 11-2984 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/10-15663/10-15663-2012-09-04.html Autotel v. Nevada Bell Telephone Co. 2012-09-07T13:03:29+00:00 2012-09-04T21:12:53+00:00 Plaintiff, a Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) provider, wished to provide wireless service in and around Pahrump, Nevada. Plaintiff sought digital interconnection with the facilities and equipment of defendant, the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC) in the area. After the parties' efforts to negotiate an interconnection agreement failed, plaintiff brought suit alleging that defendant violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, by refusing to negotiate in good faith and by failing to provide digital interconnection with symmetrical pricing on an interim basis during negotiations, as required by the FCC regulations. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's good faith claim because it did not exhaust its administrative remedies under the court's prudential exhaustion requirement. The court also held that the interim arrangement and symmetrical pricing requirements applied only when the competing carrier did not have an existing interconnection arrangement with the incumbent LEC that provided for the transport and termination of telecommunications traffic. Because plaintiff had such an arrangement with defendant at all relevant times, defendant had no obligation to provide plaintiff an interim arrangement with symmetrical rates. The court remanded, however, to permit the district court to consider what, if any, relief was available to plaintiff under 47 C.F.R. 51.717. View "Autotel v. Nevada Bell Telephone Co." on Justia Law 2012-09-04 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Fisher 10-15663 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3834/11-3834-2012-08-28.html Schepers v. Comm'r of IN Dep't of Corr. 2012-08-31T13:08:21+00:00 2012-08-28T17:35:19+00:00 A class of persons required to register on the state's online sex and violent offender database sued the Indiana Department of Correction, alleging that failure to provide any procedure to correct errors in the registry violates due process. In response, the DOC created a new policy to give notice to current prisoners about their pending registry listings and an opportunity to challenge the information. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the new policy was sufficient to comply with due process. The new procedures still fail to provide any process at all for an entire class of registrants: those who are not incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. State judicial post-deprivation remedies cited by the DOC are insufficient to meet the requirements of due process. Although registrants can challenge registry errors in the course of criminal prosecutions for failure to comply with registration requirements, due process does not require a person to risk additional criminal conviction as the price of correcting an erroneous listing, especially where a simple procedural fix is available much earlier. View "Schepers v. Comm'r of IN Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law 2012-08-28 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Wood 11-3834 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-788/11-788-2012-08-27.html WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc. 2012-08-31T13:08:19+00:00 2012-08-27T19:32:22+00:00 Plaintiffs, producers and owners of copyrighted television programming, sued defendants for streaming plaintiffs' copyrighted television programming over the Internet live and without their consent. The court, applying Chevron analysis, held that: (1) the statutory text was ambiguous as to whether defendant, a service that retransmitted television programming over the Internet, was entitled to a compulsory license under section 111 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 111; (2) the statute's legislative history, development, and purpose indicated that Congress did not intend for section 111 licenses to extend to Internet retransmissions; (3) the Copyright Office's interpretation of section 111 - that Internet retransmissions services did not constitute cable systems under section 111 - aligned with Congress' intent and was reasonable; and (4) accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of the case. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding irreparable harm; in balancing the hardships; and considering the public interest. View "WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc." on Justia Law 2012-08-27 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Chin 11-788 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-5722/11-5722-2012-08-27.html United States v. Jeffries 2012-08-31T13:08:19+00:00 2012-08-27T17:27:06+00:00 Tangled in a prolonged legal dispute over visitation rights to see his daughter, Jeffries wrote a song, "Daughter's Love," which contains passages about relationships between fathers and daughters, but also includes complaints about his ex-wife, ranting gripes about lawyers and the legal system, and threats to kill the judge if he doesn't "do the right thing" at an upcoming custody hearing. Jeffries created a video of himself performing the song on a guitar painted with an American flag and posted the music video on YouTube. He shared it with friends, family and the media. In the video, Jeffries says "This song's for you, judge." Agents charged Jeffries with violating a federal law that prohibits "transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to . . . injure the person of another" 18 U.S.C. 875(c). A jury convicted Jeffries. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. All that the First Amendment requires in the context of a section 875(c) prosecution is that the threat be real; there was sufficient evidence to convict. View "United States v. Jeffries" on Justia Law 2012-08-27 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Sutton 11-5722 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/11-1538/11-1538-2012-08-24.html ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'n, Inc. 2012-08-31T13:08:45+00:00 2012-08-24T17:13:19+00:00 ActiveVideo asserted that Verizon's video on demand (VoD) feature of the FiOS-TV system infringed its 578, 678, and 883 patents, which share a common specification and generally disclose and claim interactive television systems and methods for delivering interactive television to subscribers. Verizon counterclaimed that ActiveVideo infringed three of its patents. The jury found that Verizon infringed four ActiveVideo patents and that ActiveVideo infringed two Verizon patents and awarded damages to both. The court entered an injunction against Verizon but delayed enforcement for six months during which Verizon was ordered to pay a sunset royalty. The Federal Circuit reversed the injunction and the judgment of infringement against Verizon as to one patent; vacated the grant of summary judgment of invalidity as to one Verizon patent is vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed other findings of infringement and the imposition of a sunset royalty. View "ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Commc'n, Inc." on Justia Law 2012-08-24 federal U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Moore 11-1538 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-1568/11-1568-2012-08-21.html T-Mobile Central, LLC v. Twp. of W. Bloomfield 2012-08-24T13:09:18+00:00 2012-08-21T17:26:29+00:00 T-Mobile proposed to build a cellular tower in an area of West Bloomfield Township, Michigan, that had a coverage gap. After deciding that sites in the township zoning ordinance's cellular tower overlay zones were infeasible, T-Mobile decided that the best option would be to construct a facility at a utility site on property owned by Detroit Edison. The facility contained an existing 50-foot pole, which T-Mobile wanted to replace with a 90-foot pole disguised to look like a pine tree with antennas fashioned as branches. The township denied special approval. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of T-Mobile in a suit under the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Five stated reasons for denial of the application were not supported by substantial evidence and the denial had "the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services" in violation of 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). View "T-Mobile Central, LLC v. Twp. of W. Bloomfield" on Justia Law 2012-08-21 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Boggs 11-1568 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/11-50862/11-50862-2012-08-16.html United States v. Stevens 2012-08-24T13:06:49+00:00 2012-08-18T00:06:33+00:00 An FCC investigation concluded that Jerry and Deborah Stevens operated an unlicensed FM radio station from their Austin, Texas residence in violation of section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934. The FCC issued a forfeiture order in the amount of $10,000. Thereafter, the government brought an action to enforce the forfeiture in district court pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 504(a). The Stevenses moved to dismiss the enforcement action, arguing that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to regulate intrastate broadcasts and that section 301 did not apply to radio broadcasts. The district court denied the motion, determining it did not have jurisdiction to consider legal challenges to the validity of an FCC forfeiture order in a section 504(a) enforcement action. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Stevenses' legal defenses in the government's action to enforce the forfeiture order, as the Stevens failed to raise legal challenges to the validity of the order in a timely petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals. View "United States v. Stevens" on Justia Law 2012-08-16 federal U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Dennis 11-50862 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-3445/11-3445-2012-08-16.html Balsley v. LFP, Inc. 2012-08-17T13:09:44+00:00 2012-08-16T15:28:17+00:00 The "Hot News Babes" feature of Hustler magazine invites readers to nominate young, attractive female news reporters for a monthly prize. In 2003, Bosley, a 37-year-old news anchor, entered a "wet t-shirt" contest at a Florida bar and ultimately danced nude. Durocher, took pictures without Bosley's knowledge and published them on lenshead.com. Durocher included a visual copyright notice and a general warning. A few months later, Bosley lost her job when the story was reported. To end the photographs' dissemination, Bosley bought and registered the copyright. In 2004, Bosley was employed as a television reporter in another city. In 2005, a reader advised Hustler of the availability of the pictures online and of Bosley being the "HOTTEST." Hustler published the Durocher nude photograph in 2006 with text describing Bosley. Bosley's suit alleged direct copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. 101; contributory infringement, 17 U.S.C. 101; vicarious infringement, 17 U.S.C. 106(1), (3), (5); violation of Ohio common law right of privacy; violation of the Ohio statutory right of publicity; and violation of the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Only the direct infringement claim survived. The jury rejected a fair use defense, but found the violation not willful, and awarded $135,000 plus fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Balsley v. LFP, Inc." on Justia Law 2012-08-16 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Clay 11-3445 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-2741/11-2741-2012-08-10.html Teesdale v. City of Chicago 2012-08-17T13:04:45+00:00 2012-08-10T16:39:05+00:00 The Church holds a festival, open to the public, without charge, and obtains a Chicago permit to close portions of streets to vehicles. For the 2008 festival, the parish used a team of paid security guards and volunteer off-duty police officers (parishioners), headed by Kolasinski, a parishioner and Chicago police officer. Members of another church (Garfield) attended the festival to conduct ministry. Its pastor (Teesdale) carried a bullhorn; others carried signs with Scripture verses. The group distributed gospel tracts. Kolasinski, off-duty, wearing a shirt that read "St. Symphorosa Police," told Teesdale that he could not use a bullhorn or distribute literature without permission. Teesdale attempted to use the bullhorn. Kolasinski handcuffed Teesdale and stated that he was under arrest. Police arrived 30 minutes later. Teesdale was arrested for trespass, a charge eventually dismissed. Teesdale, and others alleged violations of First and Fourth Amendment rights and sought to enjoin the city from preventing attendance at future festivals. A court order permitted Garfield members to enter the festival during specific hours with limitations on the size of signs and a prohibition on sound-enhancement. The 2009 festival passed without incident. The court ruled in favor of the city, but found that First Amendment rights at future festivals were threatened by official policy. The Seventh Circuit remanded that holding for dismissal, based on lack of standing. View "Teesdale v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law 2012-08-10 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Manion 11-2741 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/11-1706/11-1706-2012-08-09.html Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard 2012-08-10T13:10:20+00:00 2012-08-09T22:32:50+00:00 Green Mountain owns cellular phone towers and leases space to federally licensed providers of wireless telecommunications services, who mount antennae on the towers to service their cellular networks. Green Mountain entered into an agreement with an agency of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to lease land in Milton, an unzoned triangular section, approximately 2,700 square feet, formed by the intersection of I-93 and the southbound on-ramp. Applications to the Town Zoning Board of Appeals and the Milton Conservation Commission were denied. Green Mountain challenged the decisions as not supported by "substantial evidence," as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(iii); as constituting an "effective prohibition" on provision of wireless services in the area in violation of the TCA; and as violating Massachusetts state law. The district court granted summary judgment upholding the denials. The First Circuit affirmed with respect to the substantial evidence claims, but vacated in part. The district court did not adequately address evidence supporting the effective prohibition claim. View "Green Mountain Realty Corp. v. Leonard" on Justia Law 2012-08-09 federal U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Lipez 11-1706 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/12-706/12-706-2012-08-08.html Gelder, et al v. CoxCom Inc., et al 2012-08-10T13:04:42+00:00 2012-08-09T12:24:50+00:00 The plaintiffs filed this action against Cox Enterprises, Inc., on behalf of themselves as well as a putative class consisting of all persons in the United States who subscribe to Cox for so-called premium cable and who paid Cox a monthly rental fee for the accompanying set-up box. In order to receive full access to Cox's premium cable services the plaintiffs had to rent the set-up box from Cox. The plaintiffs alleged that this constituted an illegal tie-in in violation of the Sherman Act. The case came before the Tenth Circuit on the district court's denial of their request for class certification. Upon review of the materials filed with the Court and the applicable law, the Tenth Circuit concluded the case was not appropriate for immediate review, and denied plaintiffs' request. View "Gelder, et al v. CoxCom Inc., et al" on Justia Law 2012-08-08 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Per curiam 12-706 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/10-1435/10-1435-2012-08-08.html Gol TV v. Echostar 2012-08-10T13:05:38+00:00 2012-08-09T11:49:22+00:00 Plaintiff Gol TV produces soccer-related television programming, while Defendants EchoStar Satellite Corporation and EchoStar Satellite L.L.C. (known as DISH Network) distribute television programming to individual viewers via satellite. From 2003 until 2008, Gol TV's programming was made available to subscribers of certain EchoStar service packages in exchange for EchoStar's payment to Gol TV of contractually determined licensing fees. Gol TV brought a breach-of-contract suit against Echostar to recover monies due under the contract. The issue on appeal central to this dispute involved: (1) the calculation of licensing fees for the final ten days of the contract period; and (2) the accrual of interest for overdue payments. Upon review of the contract at issue, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's interpretation and affirmed its disposition of the case. View "Gol TV v. Echostar" on Justia Law 2012-08-08 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals McKay 10-1435 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2012/27156.html Alltel v. SCDOR 2012-08-10T13:10:04+00:00 2012-08-09T11:48:57+00:00 The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Alltel Entities (collectively Petitioners Alltel Communications, Inc. and its regional subsidiaries), were included in the definition of "telephone company" for the purpose of increased license fees in S.C. Code Ann. section 1220-100 (2000). Pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment, the Administrative Law Court (ALC) granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioners, finding that they were not telephone companies for purposes of section 12-20-100. Alternatively, the ALC found that if the statute were ambiguous, Petitioners would prevail under the rule that an ambiguity in a taxing statute must be construed in favor of the taxpayer. Though the court of appeals recognized that the application of section 12-20-100 to Petitioners was not "absolutely clear," it reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for additional fact finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the ALC's grant of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. The term "telephone company" was not a defined term and its application to Petitioners was "doubtful." The presence of an ambiguity in a tax assessment statute requires that a court resolve that doubt in favor of the taxpayer. View "Alltel v. SCDOR" on Justia Law 2012-08-08 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Kittredge 27156 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/10-9543/10-9543-2012-08-06.html Qwest Corp. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n 2012-08-10T13:07:59+00:00 2012-08-07T12:11:39+00:00 Petitioner Qwest Corporation sought review of an order of the Federal Communications Commission which denied Qwest's petition for regulatory forbearance pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 160(a). Qwest filed a petition with the Commission in March 2009 seeking relief from certain regulations pertaining to telecommunications services in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The Commission denied the petition, citing insufficient evidence of sufficiently robust competition that would preclude Qwest from raising prices, unreasonably discriminating, and harming consumers. Qwest challenged the Commission's decision only as it pertained to Qwest's mass-market retail services. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit denied Qwest's petition: "We are not a 'panel of referees on a professional economics journal,' but a 'panel of generalist judges obliged to defer to a reasonable judgment by an agency acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority.'" The Court found the Commission's order was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." View "Qwest Corp. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n" on Justia Law 2012-08-06 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Holmes 10-9543 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/11-3499/11-3499-2012-08-06.html Razorback Concrete Co. v. Dement Constr. Co. 2012-08-10T13:05:37+00:00 2012-08-07T02:40:59+00:00 Razorback Concrete Company (Razorback) sued Dement Construction Company (Dement) for breach of contract and fraud based on disputes over performance of a concrete supply contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Dement on the fraud claim and partial summary judgment to Dement as to the measure of damages for the breach of contract claim, holding that Razorback was not entitled to recover damages under a lost profits theory. After obtaining a judgment on the contract claim, Razorback appealed the grants of summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Dement on Razorback's fraud claim, as Razorback failed to identify any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dement knew its representation as false at the time it was made; and (2) granting partial summary judgment to Dement on Razorback's claim for lost provides, holding that Razorback failed to supply evidence creating a fact issue regarding whether it was a lost volume seller or whether damages provided or under Ark. Code Ann. 4-2-708(1) were otherwise inadequate. View "Razorback Concrete Co. v. Dement Constr. Co. " on Justia Law 2012-08-06 federal U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Gruender 11-3499 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/10-4355/10-4355-2012-08-02.html Marcavage v. City of New York 2012-08-03T13:03:21+00:00 2012-08-02T20:20:34+00:00 Two protesters at the 2004 Republican National Convention at Madison Square Garden were arrested after they failed to comply with police instructions to move from an area where demonstrating was prohibited to one designated for protesting. They sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the policy violated the First Amendment and that their arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Second Circuit affirmed. The restriction on speech was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, and plaintiffs' arrest was supported by probable cause. View "Marcavage v. City of New York" on Justia Law 2012-08-02 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Jacobs 10-4355 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/11-1262/11-1262-2012-08-02.html Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Denver 2012-08-03T13:07:39+00:00 2012-08-02T20:02:19+00:00 The Eastern Orthodox monastic order began a spiritual affiliation with the bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR)in 1965. Although the Monastery concedes it commemorated the bishops of ROCOR until 1986, it considers itself an independent entity. The Monastery's 35 monks worked on translating religious texts from their original Greek into English. The works were in demand amongst parishes, but the Monastery obliged requests on a limited basis. One of the monks went to Colorado where he formed Dormition Skete, dedicated to painting traditional Orthodox icons. A Skete member, the Archbishop, created a website devoted to the Orthodox faith. Based on postings on that site, the Monastery sued the Archbishop, in state court, for copyright infringement. The parties settled with the Archbishop acknowledging the Monastery's ownership of the works. The website continued to include its translations; the Monastery filed a federal suit, 17 U.S.C. 101. The district ruled in favor of the Monastery, rejecting claims or public domain, that ROCOR was the true owner of the copyrights, and of fair use. The First Circuit affirmed. The Archbishop offered identical or near-identical versions of the works on his website for the precise purpose for which the Monastery originally created them, harming their potential market value. View "Soc'y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory of Denver" on Justia Law 2012-08-02 federal U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Torruella 11-1262 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3190/11-3190-2012-08-02.html Flava Works, Inc v. Marques Rondale Gunter, et al 2012-08-03T13:07:39+00:00 2012-08-02T18:05:03+00:00 Flava, which specializes in production and distribution of videos of black men engaged in homosexual acts, obtained a preliminary injunction against myVidster, an online social bookmarking service by which people refer sites to those with similar tastes, based on a finding that myVidster is a contributory infringer. The Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction. A Flava customer is authorized only to download the video for his personal use. If instead he uploaded it to the Internet and so by doing so created a copy (because the downloaded video remains in his computer), he was infringing. The court remanded for determination of whether myVidster was a contributory infringer if a visitor to its website bookmarks the video and later someone clicks on the bookmark and views the video. View "Flava Works, Inc v. Marques Rondale Gunter, et al" on Justia Law 2012-08-02 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Posner 11-3190 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/11-3914/11-3914-2012-08-02.html Toston v. Thurmer 2012-08-03T13:05:04+00:00 2012-08-02T17:24:15+00:00 A Wisconsin inmate checked out two books from the prison library, and purchased, with the prison's permission, a copy of To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton (the founder of the Black Panthers). Plaintiff copied on a sheet of paper the Panthers' "Ten-Point Program," which appears in all three books. He put the sheet in the footlocker in his cell. A guard discovered the sheet in a random search of the cell. Plaintiff was found guilty, in a prison disciplinary proceeding, of possession of "gang literature" in violation of Wis. Admin. Code DOC 303.20(3). He was given 90 days of confinement in segregation. The prison also destroyed the sheet of paper on which he'd copied the Ten-Point Program. The district court rejected his free speech and due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the free speech claim, but vacated with respect to due process. "Freedom of speech is not absolute, and the curtailment challenged in this case is slight and the justification adequate, though not ample." The court made no findings that would enable an inference that plaintiff's 90-day sentence to segregation was, or was not, a deprivation of liberty. View "Toston v. Thurmer" on Justia Law 2012-08-02 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Posner 11-3914 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2012/ca-7476-vcg-ol.html Tang Capital Partners LP, v. Norton 2012-08-03T13:08:26+00:00 2012-07-27T22:05:10+00:00 Plaintiffs are holders of Savient's 4.75% convertible senior notes due in 2018, which are unsecured and subject to the terms of an indenture. Collectively, Plaintiffs own a face value of $48,709,000, approximately 40% of the outstanding Notes. Defendants are members of Savient's board of directors USBNA serves as trustee for the Indenture governing the Notes. Following dismal sales of its new drug, KRYSTEXXA, Savient's Board approved a financing transaction to exchange some existing unsecured Notes for new senior secured notes with a later maturity date. Through the Exchange, Savient exchanged around $108 million in Notes, raised around $44 million in new capital, and issued additional SSDNs with a face value of approximately $63 million. Like the Notes, the SSDNs are subject to an indenture for which USBNA serves as trustee. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Savient was insolvent and brought derivative claims alleging waste and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the Exchange Transaction; alleged breach of fiduciary duty and waste claims in connection with the Board's approval of retention awards for certain Savient executives. The chancellor dismissed the receivership claim for lack of standing and granted a declaration that an Event of Default has not occurred. View "Tang Capital Partners LP, v. Norton" on Justia Law 2012-07-27 state Delaware Delaware Court of Chancery Glasscock CA 7476-VCG (OL) http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-5515/11-5515-2012-07-27.html Berry v. Schmitt 2012-08-03T13:07:48+00:00 2012-07-27T14:39:40+00:00 The Legislative Ethics Commission conducted a hearing regarding fund-raising by Kentucky Senate President Williams, which attorney Berry attended. Following an executive session from which the public, the media, and Berry were excluded, the Commission dismissed. Berry wrote a letter criticizing disposition of the matter and disseminated copies to the media. The Inquiry Commission of the Kentucky Bar Association issued a warning asserting that the letter violated Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(a), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer," by publicly implying that the Commission did not conduct its review appropriately. The disciplinary complaint against Berry was dismissed. Berry did not appeal because Kentucky does not provide for an appeal of the Commission's findings. Berry sued, alleging that he wished to engage in further criticism of the investigation but has refrained from such speech because he fears professional discipline. The district court granted the KBA summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed; Rule 8.2(a) is unconstitutional as applied to Berry's speech. View "Berry v. Schmitt" on Justia Law 2012-07-27 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Rogers 11-5515 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/11-3257/11-3257-2012-07-26.html In Re: Philadelphia Newspapers 2012-07-27T13:02:41+00:00 2012-07-26T18:28:37+00:00 Philadelphia Inquirer (debtors) published print and online articles discussing the CSMI's contract management of the Chester Community Charter School. After CSMI filed a defamation action, the Inquirer filed for relief under Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. 101. CSMI alleged that post-petition, debtors published an article that links to and endorses earlier articles and filed the administrative expense requests: $1,800,000 for alleged post-petition defamation and $147,140 in alleged damages for post-petition conduct and prosecution of claims against CSMI. The Bankruptcy Court denied the requests. Debtors conducted an auction of substantially all assets, and the sale was consummated under a plan that provided that the purchaser would assume certain administrative expense claims, not including claims arising from the CSMI's administrative expense requests. The district court held that an appeal was equitably moot: the plan had been substantially consummated and no stay was sought. The court also stated that merely posting a link to the charter school webpage that contained the original articles was not distinct tortious conduct upon which a defamation claim can be grounded. The Third Circuit affirmed. While the appeal was not equitably moot, CSMI cannot advance a sustainable cause of action to support the requests. View "In Re: Philadelphia Newspapers" on Justia Law 2012-07-26 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Ambro 11-3257 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/11-1094/11-1094-2012-07-13.html Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC 2012-07-20T13:05:23+00:00 2012-07-14T04:52:01+00:00 The Rural Cellular Association and the Universal Service for America Coalition (together the RCA) petitioned for review of an order of the FCC amending he "interim cap rule," which limited at 2008 levels the amount of support available to competitive eligible telecommunications carriers. In the order under review, the FCC amended the interim cap rule to provide that when a carrier relinquishes its status as an eligible communications carrier, the cap on the support available in that carrier's state is reduced by the amount the relinquishing carrier would have received had it retained it status. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied the RCA's petition for review, holding that the order was a lawful exercise of the FCC's authority under the Communications Act of 1934 as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, did not violate the agency's regulations, and was neither arbitrary and capricious nor unconstitutional. View "Rural Cellular Ass'n v. FCC" on Justia Law 2012-07-13 federal U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Ginsburg 11-1094 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-91/11-91-2012-07-10.html 23-34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. NY City Bd. of Health 2012-07-13T13:06:19+00:00 2012-07-10T16:10:06+00:00 In 2009, the Board of Health of the City of New York adopted a resolution requiring all tobacco retailers to display signs bearing graphic images showing certain adverse health effects of smoking. The district court held that the resolution is preempted by federal labeling laws. The Second Circuit affirmed, citing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. 1331-41, a comprehensive program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising, which includes a preemption provision, limiting the extent to which states may regulate the labeling, advertising, and promotion of cigarettes. View "23-34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. NY City Bd. of Health" on Justia Law 2012-07-10 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Chin 11-91 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/11-2511/11-2511-2012-07-06.html In Re: Request from the United Kingdom 2012-07-13T13:06:57+00:00 2012-07-06T20:25:03+00:00 The Belfast Project collected taped interviews of the recollections of members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Provisional Sinn Fein, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and other paramilitary and political organizations involved in the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland from 1969 forward. The Project had various confidentiality measures in place, but in 2011, the United States submitted an application to the district court ex parte and under seal pursuant to the US-UK Mutual Assistance Treaty and 18 U.S.C. 3512, seeking appointment of an Assistant U.S. Attorney to collect evidence and to take other action to effectuate a request from law enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom, concerning the 1972 murder and kidnapping of Jean McConville. The district court granted the government's application. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that there was no First Amendment basis for challenging the subpoenas. The fact that communications were made under a promise of confidentiality does not create a privilege. View "In Re: Request from the United Kingdom" on Justia Law 2012-07-06 federal U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Lynch 11-2511 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2012/11-148.html Burke v. Gregg 2012-07-06T13:03:14+00:00 2012-07-06T11:32:22+00:00 The controversy at the center of this case arose from a newspaper article written by Defendant Katherine Gregg that sparked an "acrimonious and childish on-air rant" by Defendant Dan Yorke, a well-known radio talk show host, about Plaintiff Robert I. Burke, a local restaurateur. The article described an annual St. Patrick's Day lunch hosted by William Murphy, the then-Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Rhode Island General Assembly, at one of Burke's restaurants. The lunch, a private event, was in large measure a "roast" of local public figures. In a story published by the Providence Journal, Gregg was openly critical of an "off the record" rule that allowed members of the media to attend the event, but banned them from disclosing the jokes made during the lunch. Her article attributed the creation and enforcement of the policy to both Burke and Murphy. Apparently incensed by the article, Yorke used his talk show as a platform to hurl a series of crude and disparaging remarks at Burke. Burke filed a complaint alleging various counts of libel and slander against Gregg, the Providence Journal Company, Yorke, and Citadel Broadcasting Corporation. Two other plaintiffs also joined in the action: BOEA, Inc. and the Food & Beverage Corporation. Food & Beverage Corp., which operated Burke's restaurant and is a parent corporation of BOEA, alleged its own counts of libel, slander, and interference with contractual relations against Yorke and Citadel. BOEA, the entity that operates Federal Reserve Special Events, alleged libel, slander, and breach of contract against Yorke and Citadel. All defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, and those motions were granted by a justice of the Superior Court. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. "It is beyond question that Burke was justifiably offended by Yorke's . . . broadcast. Yorke's rambling diatribe would without a doubt ruffle the sensibilities of any listener at whom it was directed. Nevertheless, 'it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste * * *.' Therefore, his opinions unquestionably represented his interpretation of the facts presented in her article. Furthermore, as discussed above, even if Gregg's assertion that Burke was responsible for the 'off the record' rule was false or inaccurate, [the Court] concluded that as a matter of law it was not defamatory. Therefore, Yorke's comments were based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts, and [the Court] affirm[ed] the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing those claims." The Court vacated the decision pertaining to the breach of contract claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "Burke v. Gregg" on Justia Law 2012-07-05 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Flaherty 11-148 http://law.justia.com/cases/florida/supreme-court/2012/sc11-133.html Atwater v. Kortum 2012-07-06T13:06:17+00:00 2012-07-05T16:45:00+00:00 Based on unethical actions during the 2004-2005 hurricane season, the Legislature enacted Section 626.854(6), Florida Statutes: A public adjuster may not directly or indirectly through any other person or entity initiate contact or engage in face-to-face or telephonic solicitation or enter into a contract with any insured or claimant under an insurance policy until at least 48 hours after the occurrence of an event that may be the subject of a claim under the insurance policy unless contact is initiated by the insured or claimant. An adjuster sued. The trial court upheld the law, accepting an interpretation that it prohibited only in-person or telephonic communication, that it primarily regulates conduct, not speech, and furthers an important governmental interest. The appeals court reversed, finding that the section regulates commercial speech and that the Department failed to demonstrate that prohibiting property owners from receiving information from public adjusters for 48 hours is justified by the possibility that some public adjuster may unduly pressure traumatized victims or otherwise engage in unethical behavior. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute unconstitutionally restricts commercial speech and was not narrowly tailored to serve interests in ensuring ethical conduct by public adjusters and protecting homeowners. View "Atwater v. Kortum" on Justia Law 2012-07-05 state Florida Florida Supreme Court Canady SC11-133 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/11-5233/11-5233-2012-07-05.html United States v. Sypher 2012-07-06T13:04:00+00:00 2012-07-05T15:43:31+00:00 Sypher alleged that University of Louisville's head basketball coach, Pitino raped her; Pitino testified that they had consensual sex. Sypher learned that she was pregnant and contacted Pitino. Sypher alleges that Pitino raped her a second time. Eventually, Pitino, arranged for an abortion. Goetzinger, a friend of Sypher's, testified that Sypher asked Goetzinger to call Pitino to request $200,000 to $400,000. Goetzinger testified that he made three anonymous calls to Pitino's cell phone. Eventually, Sypher admitted her involvement to FBI agents. Sypher was convicted of willfully causing another to transmit threatening communications in interstate commerce with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 875(d); making threatening communications with intent to extort, under 875(d); mailing threatening communications with intent to extort, 18 U.S.C. 876(d); making false statements to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1001; and retaliating against an individual for providing truthful information about a crime to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. 1513(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments of ineffective assistance by counsel and that the district court erred by denying a change of venue; creating a web page for public access to trial materials; releasing completed juror questionnaires before seating a jury; denying post-trial access to documentary and other evidence; and denying her motion for recusal. View "United States v. Sypher" on Justia Law 2012-07-05 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Martin 11-5233 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2012/sjc-11162.html In re Wadja 2012-07-06T13:04:27+00:00 2012-07-02T17:07:00+00:00 Petitioner's son was charged with assault and battery on a person over 60 years of age and with resisting arrest. The petitioner is the alleged victim. The son unsuccessfully moved to suppress a recording made by a third party, allegedly in violation of the wiretapping statute, G.L. c. 272, 99. The recording includes statements made by the defendant and the petitioner. The motion was denied. Petitioner sought relief under G.L. c. 211, 3, on the ground that the introduction of the recording into evidence in the defendant's trial would violate her privacy rights. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed. Nothing in G.L. c. 211, 3, or rule 2:21 grants a nonparty to a criminal case standing to obtain review of an interlocutory order. The Legislature has expressly provided a civil remedy, including compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees, for any aggrieved person whose oral or wire communications are unlawfully intercepted, disclosed, or used, or whose privacy is violated by means of an unauthorized interception. G.L. c. 272, 99 Q. The petitioner does not address this remedy or explain why it would not be adequate to vindicate her privacy interests. View "In re Wadja" on Justia Law 2012-07-02 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Court SJC-11162 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/10-1285/10-1285-2012-06-29.html Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC 2012-07-06T13:02:08+00:00 2012-06-29T17:23:40+00:00 Until late 2008, Sprint included a flat-rate early termination fee provision in its cellular telephone contracts, which allowed it to charge a set fee to customers who terminated their contracts before the end date stated in the contract. Class action lawsuits were brought against cellular phone service providers who charged flat-rate ETFs, including Sprint. In this case, the plaintiffs entered into negotiations with Sprint, and, after five months of mediation, the parties decided to settle the matter for $17.5 million. Over objections lodged by several class members, the district court certified the settlement class and approved the Settlement Agreement. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court did not adequately protect the rights of absent class members when it determined that it would be unreasonable to require a search of billing records for the purpose of providing individual notice to those class members. The court also suggested that the district court consider whether class representatives can adequately represent all members. View "Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC" on Justia Law 2012-06-29 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Jordan 10-1285 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/11-1455/11-1455-2012-06-26.html Chapo v. Astrue 2012-06-29T13:10:04+00:00 2012-06-27T11:52:22+00:00 Plaintiff Lisa R. Chapo appealed a district court's order upholding the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability and supplemental security income benefits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits at the last step of the five-step process for determining disability. At step five the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled because, "[c]onsidering [her] age, education [high school], work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [she] can perform," namely the jobs of appointment clerk, escort vehicle driver, and office helper identified by the vocational expert (VE) who testified at the evidentiary hearing. On appeal to the Appeals Council, Plaintiff challenged the ALJ's decision in several respects, in particular the ALJ's treatment of the opinion evidence in the record. Upon review of the record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that ALJ's handling of a testifying doctor's findings was erroneous and, as a result, the dispositive hypothetical inquiry put to the VE was fatally defective. "Indeed, that hypothetical did not even include a restriction (to 'simple' work) that the ALJ himself recognized in his decision." The Court concluded that this matter be remanded for further proceedings, "wherein the ALJ must either obtain a mental RFC determination from an examining source to oppose [the doctor], articulate some other adequate basis for discounting [his] findings, or come back to the VE with a proper hypothetical including those limitations (and his own restriction to 'simple' work, should the ALJ find it appropriate to re-impose such a restriction in the RFC determined on remand)." View "Chapo v. Astrue" on Justia Law 2012-06-26 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Porfilio 11-1455 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/11-1179 Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock 2012-06-29T13:07:11+00:00 2012-06-25T19:41:27+00:00 Montana state law provides that a "corporation may not make ... an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party." Mont. Code 13–35–227(1). The Montana Supreme Court rejected a claim that the statute violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the Montana decision, based on its 2010 decision, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Court struck down a similar federal law, holding that "political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation." Dissenting Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan stated that "Montana's experience, like considerable experience elsewhere since the Court's decision in Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court's supposition that independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to do so." View "Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock" on Justia Law 2012-06-25 federal U.S. Supreme Court per curiam 11-1179