text: Trusts & Estates - Justia Case Law Summaries http://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/estate-planning-probate/200 2014-09-30T21:55:19+00:00 Justia Inc http://www.justia.com/ Justia Law http://law.justia.com/sites/law.justia.com/files/justia_law_theme_logo.png Copyright 2014 Justia Inc http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130587.html In the matter of the Estate of Alice Earle F. Harper 2014-09-29T19:06:22+00:00 2014-09-29T19:06:21+00:00 The decedent died in Monroe County in Spring, 2013. She had three adult children who survived her: Alice Harper-Taylor, William C. Harper, and James R. Harper. The decedent's husband died in 2002. Alice filed in Monroe County a petition to probate a 1995 will allegedly executed by the decedent. In her petition, Alice acknowledged that there was in existence a 2007 will that purported to be the will of the decedent, but she challenged the validity of the 2007 will on several grounds, including lack of mental capacity and the existence of a reciprocal will by the decedent's husband that had been admitted to probate in 2002. The Monroe County probate judge recused himself from hearing the petition, and the Supreme Court appointed a special probate judge to hear the proceedings in Monroe County. Meanwhile, in early 2014, William filed a petition in Escambia County to probate a 2007 will allegedly executed by the decedent. Alice filed a motion to dismiss and/or to stay the proceeding in Escambia County until the proper venue for the probate proceeding was determined. The Escambia Probate Court admitted the 2007 will to probate and issued letters testamentary to William, as the personal representative named in the 2007 will. Alice appealed the Escambia Court's decision, while William filed a motion to dismiss Alice's petition to probate the 1995 will in Monroe County. The Monroe Probate Court granted William's motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Alice appealed the Monroe Probate Court's grant of the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will (case no. 1130884). In case no. 1130587, Alice appealed the Escambia Probate Court's admission to probate the 2007 will, and in case no. 1130884, she appealed the Monroe Probate Court's order granting the motion to dismiss her petition to probate the 1995 will. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that venue in this case was proper in the Monroe Probate Court, therefore, the Court reversed the Escambia Court's judgment admitting the 2007 will. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Monroe Court erred in dismissing Alice's petition. The case was remanded to Monroe County for further proceedings. View "In the matter of the Estate of Alice Earle F. Harper" on Justia Law 2014-09-26 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Bolin 1130587 1130884 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-670-s-13-671.html In re Trust Created by Nabity 2014-09-29T13:00:11+00:00 2014-09-27T19:09:32+00:00 In 1998, a trust was established for the care of Evelyn A. Nabity. In 2011, Evelyn amended the trust agreement that changed the identity of the trustees. In 2012, Evelyn's son, Robert, petitioned for the appointment of a guardian, conservator, and guardian ad litem for Evelyn and for registration and administration of the trust. Robert argued that Evelyn had not been competent to amend the trust agreement and requested a determination of the proper trustees. In the trust administration proceeding, the county court found that Evelyn was not competent to execute the trust amendment and entered an order declaring Robert and his brother cotrustees. In the guardianship proceeding, the county court set aside a health care power of attorney Evelyn executed in 1998 and ordered Robert to serve as Evelyn's permanent guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was clear and convincing evidence that Evelyn was incompetent to execute the amendments to the trust agreement; and (2) the appointment of a permanent guardian and conservator for Evelyn did not deny her the benefit of a valid health care power of attorney. View "In re Trust Created by Nabity" on Justia Law 2014-09-26 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Wright S-13-670, S-13-671 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0150.html In re Estate of Kelly 2014-09-26T13:11:25+00:00 2014-09-24T04:04:40+00:00 After executing her last will and testament in Montana, Laura Jean Kelly, who neither married nor had children, died at age sixty-two. Laura's siblings petitioned the district court for a determination that Laura's interest in a family partnership was not part of her residuary estate. The district court concluded that Laura's interest in the family partnership was a non-probate asset and did not constitute part of the residue of Laura's estate. As such, Laura's partnership interest passed to Laura's siblings, her "heirs-at-law." Laura's niece appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its interpretation of the term "heirs," its application of Montana law, and its conclusions of law. View "In re Estate of Kelly" on Justia Law 2014-09-23 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Cotter DA 14-0150 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s14a0620.html Barzey v. City of Cuthbert 2014-09-26T13:13:28+00:00 2014-09-22T14:46:08+00:00 Appellant Louise Shorter Barzey challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act that precluded her, as a non-dependent parent, from recovering benefits for the death of her son, Deron Shorter, from his employer, the City of Cuthbert. Shorter was killed in 2010 while acting in the course of his employment with the City. He was 37 at the time of his death, was not married, and had no dependents. His mother Barzey was his only heir at law. After Shorter's death, Barzey filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking a judgment declaring that she has the right to sue the City. Barzey acknowledged that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy of an employee's heirs for the employee's death during the course of his employment. She also acknowledged that the Act expressly said that the compensation for a deceased employee "shall be payable only to dependents and only during dependency." After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the Act's limitation on the recovery of nondependent heirs did not violate Barzey's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. View "Barzey v. City of Cuthbert" on Justia Law 2014-09-22 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Nahmias S14A0620 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130486.html Ferguson v. Critopoulos 2014-09-26T13:11:23+00:00 2014-09-20T02:12:58+00:00 Edward "Tiger" Ferguson, V. appealed a probate court's judgment awarding an omitted-spouse share of his stepfather's estate to Katina Critopoulos. Dimitrios Critopoulos (the decedent) died in 2012. The decedent had no children. His parents predeceased him, and he had no siblings. At the time of his death, the decedent was married to Katina. The couple had wed less than a year earlier. The decedent had a valid will at the time of his death, but the will, which was executed prior to their marriage, made no provision for Katina. The decedent's first wife, Dorothy Marie Hayes Critopoulos, had been married to the decedent for 35 years when she predeceased him in 2009. Dorothy had three children from a prior marriage: Crystal M. Hanawalt, Tiger, and Timothy Ferguson ("Tim"). Although the decedent did not adopt Crystal, Tiger, and Tim, it was undisputed that the three enjoyed a parent-child relationship with the decedent. Crystal, Tiger, and Tim were named as the residual legatees under the decedent's will. When the will was probated, Katina filed a petition for an omitted-spouse share. The probate court granted Katina's request. Tiger appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the record showed that the amount of the transfers made during the marriage, along with the testimony that the decedent considered the terms of his will, the fact that Katina was not included in the will, the fact that the decedent did not change his will, and the fact that the will ultimately benefited Dorothy's children provided reasonable proof to satisfy Tiger's burden of proving an exception to the omitted-spouse share under the facts of this case. "[I]t was the main role of the probate court in this case to apply the law to the largely undisputed material facts." View "Ferguson v. Critopoulos " on Justia Law 2014-09-19 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Bolin 1130486 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130890.html Willingham v. Matthews 2014-09-26T13:11:22+00:00 2014-09-20T02:12:26+00:00 Brandy Matthews and Joshua Taylor Matthews were married in 2004. In 2011, Brandy died as a result of gunshot wounds inflicted by Joshua. Brandy's death was determined to be a homicide. On the same date, Joshua died as a result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Brandy and Joshua both died intestate. Deborah Willingham (Brandy's mother) was appointed by the Probate Court as the administrator of Brandy's estate. Rodney Matthews (Joshua's brother) was appointed as the administrator of Joshua's estate. Willingham filed for a declaratory judgment, stating that there was a justiciable controversy between Brandy's estate and Joshua's estate as to their respective rights, duties, and liabilities based on Willingham's interpretation of section 43-8-253 ("the Slayer's statute). She contended that, upon application of the statute, Joshua would have been unable to inherit from Brandy, and that his property was to pass as if he had predeceased Brandy. Matthews filed a response to Willingham's motion for a summary judgment, arguing that the statute only addressed how Brandy's estate would pass but not how Joshua's estate would pass, and that it therefore would have no bearing on the administration of Joshua's estate. The trial court entered a summary judgment declaring that 43-8-253 applied to the passing of Brandy's estate but not to the passing of Joshua's. Willingham appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that Willingham did not establish that the trial court erred in finding that 43-8-253 was not applicable to the administration of Joshua's estate. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Willingham v. Matthews" on Justia Law 2014-09-19 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Wise 1130890 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/13-60472/13-60472-2014-09-15.html Estate of James A. Elkins, Jr., et al. v. CIR 2014-09-19T13:19:06+00:00 2014-09-17T04:00:14+00:00 Petitioners sought review and eventually eliminate the federal estate tax deficiency assessed against the Estate by the Commissioner. The deficiency resulted solely from the Commissioner's disallowance of the "fractional-ownership discount" applied by the Estate in determining the taxable values of decedent's pro rata shares of the jointly stipulated fair market values of 64 original works of art in which decedent owned only fractional interests at his death. The court affirmed and agreed in large part with the Tax Court's underlying analysis and discrete factual determinations, including its rejection of the Commissioner's zero-discount position. The court reversed, however, the Tax Court's analysis that led it not only to reject the quantums of the Estate's proffered fractional ownership discounts but also to adopt and apply one of its own without any supporting evidence. The court held that the taxable values of decedent's fractional interests in the works of art are the net amounts reflected for each on Exhibit B of the Tax Court's opinion. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and rendered judgment in favor of petitioners for a refund of taxes overpaid in the amount of $14,359,508.21, plus statutory interest. View "Estate of James A. Elkins, Jr., et al. v. CIR" on Justia Law 2014-09-15 federal U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals Wiener 13-60472 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-14-0116.html In re Estate of Benjamin 2014-09-12T13:10:44+00:00 2014-09-10T04:35:10+00:00 After Norman Benjamin, the father of Delmar and Cecil, passed away, Cecil, who was named personal representative in Norman's will, filed a petition for determination of testacy, for determination of devisees and for settlement and distribution of a testate estate. After a hearing, the probate court entered a decree approving the petition, which designated Norman's wife, Joyce, as the sole devisee under the will. Delmar filed an action against Cecil and Joyce, alleging that Cecil violated his fiduciary duty by distributing Norman's tangible personal property by distributing it among Norman's other children, but not to Delmar. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Delmar's claim. Subsequently, Delmar filed a petition to reopen probate, alleging that Cecil misrepresented the extent of Norman's tangible personal property and engaged in self-dealing with regard to this property and that there was newly discovered tangible personal property that needed to be distributed. The district court sua sponte denied Delmar's petition under principles of res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that res judicata did not bar Delmar's fraud and newly discovered tangible personal property claims in this case. View "In re Estate of Benjamin" on Justia Law 2014-09-09 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Rice DA 14-0116 http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2014/89788-3.html Anderson v. Dussault 2014-09-05T13:12:48+00:00 2014-09-04T21:34:30+00:00 When Rachel Anderson (formerly Rachel Rodgers) was six years old, a horse kicked her in the face and she sustained serious injuries. Her many fractures and lacerations required multiple surgeries and she suffered severe cognitive and emotional trauma. Rachel's family hired respondent Richard McMenamin to pursue a personal injury action against the owner of the horse. In 1997, the Superior Court approved a personal injury settlement of $3 00,000.00 and the creation of the "Rachel Marguerite Rodgers Trust." McMenamin hired respondent attorney William Dussault to draw up the trust agreement. After attorney's fees and other costs, a net amount of$187,160.66 entered the trust. Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, NA served as trustee. The agreement also created a trust advisory committee (T AC) composed of petitioner's mother, Andrea Davey (formerly Andrea Rodgers) and McMenamin, were tasked with making distribution decisions for Rachel's benefit. Rachel later took issue with how her trust has been administered, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and legal malpractice. Rachel questioned several purchases with trust money that she said were never used for her benefit - a vehicle, computers and software and a house (which was purchased in the name of her mother's boyfriend). Furthermore, Rachel questioned the trustee and legal fees that were charged to the trust as excessive and at above market rates. Rachel sued her mother, McMenamin, Wells Fargo, and Dussault, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and malpractice. Motions for summary judgment were filed by Dussault, McMenamin, and Wells Fargo. The court granted their motion. The superior court then dismissed all of Rachel's remaining claims, including claims against her mother. Rachel appealed as to McMenamin, Dussault, and Wells Fargo, but chose not to appeal her claim against Andrea. The appellate court affirmed. At issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether the superior court's approval of annual accountings of Rachel's trust under the Trustees Accounting Act (TAA), chapter 11.106 RCW, barred this suit, which was timely under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), chapter 11.96A RCW. The Supreme Court found that because Rachel was not represented by a guardian ad litem when the court approved the trust's annual accountings, she did not have notice of these proceedings and accordingly could bring a breach of trust action under TEDRA. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated its award of attorney's fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Dussault" on Justia Law 2014-09-04 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Madsen 89788-3 http://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/2014/68s05-1404-tr-296.html Old Nat'l Bancorp v. Hanover College 2014-09-05T13:12:46+00:00 2014-09-04T15:55:00+00:00 Hanover College, the beneficiary of two trusts, filed petitions requesting that the trusts be terminated. Old National Bancorp, d/b/a Old National Trust Company, as trustee for both trusts, filed responses to Hanover's petitions. The trial court granted the petitions and ordered the two trusts dissolved and the trust assets distributed to Hanover. Rather than seek a stay of the trial court's dissolution orders, Old National appealed. The court of appeals dismissed Old National's appeal, concluding (1) Old National lacked standing in its representative capacity because it failed to obtain a stay of the trial court's termination orders and was therefore no longer the trustee of the trusts; and (2) because Old National did not intervene in its individual capacity at trial it could not be an aggrieved party on appeal. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed Old National's appeal, holding that the trustee lacked standing to pursue the appeal in its representative capacity and did not appeal in its individual capacity. View "Old Nat'l Bancorp v. Hanover College" on Justia Law 2014-09-03 state Indiana Indiana Supreme Court David 68S05-1404-TR-296 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130372.html Krueger v. Grand Forks County 2014-09-05T13:14:48+00:00 2014-08-30T11:11:30+00:00 After a jury trial, Faith Krueger appealed and Grand Forks County cross-appealed a judgment in favor of the County in Krueger's action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, trespass to chattel, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision of a public administrator. In July 2012, Krueger sued the County alleging she lost over $300,000 in property and assets after Barbara Zavala, the Grand Forks County Public Administrator, was appointed her guardian and conservator. Krueger claimed the County was liable for Zavala's actions under N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03 because Zavala was a county employee. Krueger argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying her motion to compel discovery, denying her motion for a continuance, denying her claim for damages for mental anguish, erred in its evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and by allowing certain statements by the County's attorney during closing arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Krueger v. Grand Forks County" on Justia Law 2014-08-28 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Sandstrom 20130372 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ca-02010-sct.html Parker v. Benoist 2014-08-29T13:15:23+00:00 2014-08-29T12:26:45+00:00 Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. In 2010, B.D. executed a will which granted significantly more property to William and consequently, less to Bronwyn than did a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn has sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will was reversed, and granted judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father's 2010 will. The Court affirmed the chancellor's decisions to permit William to pay attorneys with funds obtained from his father's estate and to permit William to continue as executor, and the chancery court's decision to deny attorney fees to the estate. View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law 2014-08-28 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Kitchens 2012-CA-02010-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2012-074.html In re Theresa Houlahan Trust 2014-08-29T13:19:46+00:00 2014-08-23T12:24:42+00:00 In 1993, John Houlahan and his wife, Theresa, established the "Theresa M. Houlahan Revocable Trust of 1993" containing the marital home. John was named successor trustee of, and granted certain powers over, the Theresa Trust. Upon the deaths of Theresa and John, the real property was to be distributed to their son, petitioner Thomas Houlahan. Theresa died in 1996. In 1997, John established the "John F. Houlahan 1997 Revocable Trust." John named his daughter (respondent) as successor trustee. In November 2002, John conveyed the real property by deed to himself, as trustee of the John Trust. John died in 2009. Under the terms of the John Trust, "[a]ny interest this trust may have in any real estate" was to be distributed in equal shares to four of his children: petitioner, respondent, John F. Houlahan, Jr., and Terrence B. Houlahan. In 2011, petitioner filed a "Petition for Injunction" seeking, among other things, an order that the property be returned to the Theresa Trust and that respondent, as successor trustee of the John Trust, be enjoined from making any attempt to dispose of the property. In late 2011, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" that John's "actions in his capacity as Trustee violated the terms of [the Theresa Trust] and specific provisions of the Uniform Trust Code." Following a hearing, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were many disputed factual issues that could not be decided on the pleadings. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the transfer of the real estate in 2002 effectively terminated the trust and the petitioner's interest in the trust. He asserted that "[w]hen John breached his fiduciary duties, the trust gained an additional asset– a cause of action against John or his estate," and, thus, "[n]either [the petitioner's] beneficial interest nor the trust was terminated by John's conveyance." After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Theresa Trust did not terminate in 2002, and neither did the petitioner's interest therein. The trial court's finding, that there were "many disputed issues of material fact" that could not be decided on the pleadings, was not erroneous. Accordingly, the Court affirmed its denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Theresa Houlahan Trust" on Justia Law 2014-08-22 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Bassett 2012-074 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ct-00075-sct-0.html Strait v. McPhail 2014-08-22T13:19:52+00:00 2014-08-22T12:18:53+00:00 In 1987, Joseph Bagley purchased a cancer and dread-disease policy through his friend and insurance agent, Jackie McPhail. The policy was issued by American Heritage Life Insurance Company. McPhail worked as an independent insurance broker, and she was a registered agent with American Heritage at the time the policy was written. The policy indicated that Bagley purchased coverage concerning cancer and dread disease, a home-recovery rider, and a hospital intensive-care rider. Bagley also had an option to purchase life insurance; however, McPhail testified that Bagley did not purchase life insurance under this policy because he had purchased a separate life-insurance policy. In 2008, Bagley was diagnosed with cancer. Bagley contacted McPhail to file a claim under the policy and to "change the beneficiary" of the policy from his estate to Michael and Betty Strait. McPhail testified that she had ceased writing policies for American Heritage; however, she still retained the authority to service Bagley's policy, and she acquired his written consent to receive information regarding his policy from the insurance company. While Bagley was in the hospital, McPhail presented an American Heritage change-of-beneficiary form, which Bagley ultimately signed. The signature was witnessed by Bagley's physician, a nurse, and McPhail. Bagley orally communicated that he wished for the beneficiary to be changed from his estate to the Straits. At the time that Bagley signed the form, the Straits had yet to be listed as beneficiaries on the form. McPhail met with the Straits after the form was signed to confirm their correct legal names to be placed on the change-of-beneficiary form at a later time. McPhail provided that she did not fully complete the form because she was attempting to contact American Heritage to confirm the correct procedure for completing the process; however, American Heritage's office was closed because of Hurricane Fay, and McPhail never succeeded in speaking with American Heritage regarding the matter. Bagley's physician, who witnessed Bagley signing the form, later communicated to Betty Strait that his attorney advised that the form could not be used because the Straits' names were not listed on the form prior to Bagley's signature. Betty Strait relayed this to McPhail, who then attempted to contact American Heritage's legal department. McPhail called the company on multiple occasions, but she never received a return phone call. Soon thereafter, Bagley passed away, and the form was never completed. The estate was probated and the Straits did not contest the passage of the policy proceeds to the estate at the time that the estate was being settled. The executor of Bagley's will, William Kinstley, petitioned for the approval of the estate's final accounting, which included the policy proceeds. The Straits initiated legal action against McPhail and American Heritage in Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing that Bagley intended for them to receive the proceeds from the cancer policy. The Straits alleged breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, negligence and gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, bad-faith refusal to pay benefits and to promptly and adequately investigate the claim, misrepresentation and/or failure to procure, promissory and/or equitable estoppel, and they sought a claim for declaratory relief. McPhail filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the circuit court. The circuit court found that the issue had been previously litigated and resolved in chancery court, and that no appeal had been taken from the chancery court judgment. Likewise, the circuit court granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case, finding that genuine issues of material fact did exist and that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the Straits' claims. Because the Straits failed to raise any issues upon which relief may be granted, the circuit court's grant of McPhail's motion to dismiss was proper. However, the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Furthermore, the circuit court properly granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment: the Straits were never eligible to be third-party beneficiaries under the policy, and they have failed to show any equitable entitlement to reimbursement. For those reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment. View "Strait v. McPhail " on Justia Law 2014-08-21 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Pierce 2012-CT-00075-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27438.html Malloy v. Thompson 2014-08-22T13:16:59+00:00 2014-08-20T20:43:04+00:00 This action stems from a dispute between plaintiff James Robert Malloy and Swain R. Thompson, regarding assets of Robert L. Chamblee (Decedent). The complaint alleged that Thompson, with the assistance of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., acted to disrupt Decedent's estate plan and divert Decedent's assets from Malloy to Thompson. Malloy characterized his claims against Merrill Lynch as: (1) intentional interference with inheritance; (2) aiding and abetting intentional interference with inheritance; (3) and civil conspiracy. Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss and compel arbitration arguing that its only connection to this dispute was through its contractual duties under the client relationship agreements (CRAs) entered into between Decedent and Merrill Lynch, which contained mandatory arbitration clauses. Merrill Lynch argued that although Malloy was a non-signatory to the agreements, any duty, if any, owed by Merrill Lynch to Malloy derives from the CRAs, and therefore, he is bound by the arbitration clauses. The circuit court denied the motion and found that while non-signatories may be bound to an arbitration agreement under common law principles of contract and agency law, none of those principles applied in this case, and therefore, there was no basis to compel Malloy to arbitrate. Merrill Lynch appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Malloy v. Thompson" on Justia Law 2014-08-20 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Pleicones 27438 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27435.html Williams v. GEICO 2014-08-22T13:19:53+00:00 2014-08-20T14:11:46+00:00 Delores Williams, the personal representative of the Estate of Edward Murry, and Matthew Whitaker, Jr., the personal representative of the Estate of Annie Mae Murry (PRs), brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a GEICO motor vehicle insurance policy issued to the Murrys provided $15,000 or $100,000 in liability proceeds for bodily injury for an accident in which both of the Murrys were killed. The circuit court concluded coverage was limited to the statutory minimum of $15,000 based on a family step-down provision in the policy that reduced coverage for bodily injury to family members from the stated policy coverage of $100,000 to the statutory minimum amount mandated by South Carolina law during the policy period. The PRs appealed, contending the step-down provision was ambiguous and/or violative of public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court agreed with the circuit court that GEICO's policy is not ambiguous, but concluded the family step-down provision, which reduced the coverage under the liability policy from the stated policy amount to the statutory minimum, was violative of public policy and was, therefore, void. "The provision not only conflicte[d] with the mandates set forth in section 38-77-142, but its enforcement would be injurious to the public welfare." View "Williams v. GEICO" on Justia Law 2014-08-20 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Beatty 27435 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2014/sc93760.html Ellison v. Fry 2014-08-22T13:16:55+00:00 2014-08-20T03:27:29+00:00 In this family dispute over the inheritance of money and property, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff Arthur Fry's claims and some of the claims of Plaintiffs Mary Ellison, Susan Sleeper, and David Fry. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Mary, David and Susan on three of their claims that J.D. Fry committed frauds and other wrongs that resulted in J.D.'s pecuniary gain. J.D. Fry died after suit was filed but before trial, and the trial court substituted J.D.'s wife, Linda Fry, in her capacity as trustee of J.D.'s trust. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the jury verdicts for Mary, Susan and David, holding that Susan and David's claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations and that Mary's claims were barred because the trial court erred in substituting Linda upon J.D.'s death. The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' other claims. View "Ellison v. Fry" on Justia Law 2014-08-19 state Missouri Missouri Supreme Court Stith SC93760 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130609.html Stephens v. Colley 2014-08-22T13:16:53+00:00 2014-08-16T11:47:55+00:00 Defendant Franklin Stephens appealed a circuit court order granting an injunction to plaintiff Hazel Colley. Franklin is nephew to Sara Dees and Colley. In late 2011, Dees was residing at Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center. On approximately January 15, 2012, Stephens checked Dees out of the center and moved her back into her house in Troy. Stephens and an unidentified female companion also moved into the house and began caring for Dees. Colley alleged that Stephens thereafter began restricting access to Dees, preventing Colley and Dees's friends from speaking with her on the telephone or visiting with her outside his or his female companion's presence. Colley, who lives in Opelika, alleged she had previously had a close relationship with her sister and had stayed with her for weeks at a time to help with her medical needs; however, she alleged once Stephens moved into Dees's house Stephens would no longer allow her to stay with Dees overnight. Throughout 2012, Stephens took steps to "assist" Dees: (1) in executing a durable power of attorney; drafting a new will (replacing Colley as executor of Dees' estate and naming himself sole heir); and adding himself to all of Dees' bank accounts. Dees died in early 2013; Stephens thereafter began exercising control of her accounts. As executor, Stephens submitted Dees' will to probate. Colley moved the probate and circuit courts to set aside the power of attorney and will executed in 2012 alleging Stephens procured them via fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence. The circuit court granted Colley's request for injunctive relief. On appeal, Stephens argues both that Colley failed to establish by competent evidence the four elements set forth in Alabama case law and that the circuit court's preliminary-injunction order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2). In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "clear on its face" that the circuit court's order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2) because the circuit court failed to state its reasons for entering the preliminary injunction. "This noncompliance obviates the need to consider Stephens's other argument that there was insufficient evidence before the circuit court to merit the entry of a preliminary injunction." The injunction order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephens v. Colley " on Justia Law 2014-08-15 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Stuart 1130609 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-105.html In re Estate of Snow 2014-08-15T13:13:15+00:00 2014-08-15T02:03:17+00:00 After Harold Forest Snow died, Linda Moulton, as personal representative, filed a civil action against Susan Snow, alleging that one of the transfers identified in Harold's codicil was an improvident transfer and a product of undue influence. During discovery, the parties' attorneys announced that they had settled the case. Neither side, however, would agree to sign the other's proposed settlement documents. Linda subsequently filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The probate court granted Linda's motion to enforce, finding that the record contained an "unequivocal stipulation by the parties' attorneys that the matter was settled" and that the material terms of the agreement were clearly defined in the transcript. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was ample evidence that the parties intended to enter into an enforceable settlement agreement and that the terms placed on the record reflected all of the material terms of the contract; and (2) the probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement without holding a trial or an evidentiary hearing. View "In re Estate of Snow" on Justia Law 2014-08-14 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Silver http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b243061.html Vance v. Bizek 2014-08-15T13:13:14+00:00 2014-08-12T21:54:42+00:00 Don Bizek obtained a judgment against Sally Gordon, a trustee and beneficiary of the WPB Trust, and sought to execute his judgment against Gordon's beneficial interest in the WPB Trust. If the disclaimer is valid, it caused Gordon's beneficial interest to descend to Cyndi Vance, Gordon's daughter and successor beneficiary. If the disclaimer is void, Bizek may attach Gordon's beneficial interest in the WPB Trust. The trial court ruled that Gordon's disclaimer was void. However, the court concluded that the presumption created by section 16004 of the Probate Code that a trustee who commingles trust funds with her own funds violates her fiduciary duty to the trust applies only to the relationship between a trustee and trust beneficiaries. In this case, the trial court applied the presumption for the benefit of a creditor of the trustee, not a beneficiary of the trust. Therefore, the trial court committed error and the court reversed and remanded. Bizek was not entitled to the section 16004 presumption and thus had the burden to prove that Gordon's use of WPB Trust funds demonstrated acceptance of her beneficial interest in the Trust. View "Vance v. Bizek" on Justia Law 2014-08-12 state California California Court of Appeal O'Donnell B243061 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-1879/13-1879-2014-08-11.html Griswold v. Coventry First LLC 2014-08-15T13:15:47+00:00 2014-08-12T18:09:37+00:00 In 2006, Lincoln T. Griswold purchased an $8.4 million life insurance policy. Griswold established a Trust for the sole and exclusive purpose of owning the policy and named Griswold LLP as the Trust's sole beneficiary. In 2008, the Trust sold its policy to Coventry First LLC. The written purchase agreement contained an arbitration clause. After learning that the policy was sold for an allegedly inflated price that included undisclosed kickbacks to the broker, Griswold sued. Coventry moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that both Griswold and the LLP had standing and that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as to the plaintiffs, who were non-signatories. Coventry appealed. The Third Circuit (1) concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of Coventry's motion to dismiss; and (2) affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration against the plaintiffs, as they never consented to the purchase agreement. View "Griswold v. Coventry First LLC" on Justia Law 2014-08-11 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Hardiman 13-1879 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/13-1708/13-1708-2014-08-11.html Brown v. Brown-Thill 2014-08-15T13:13:12+00:00 2014-08-11T20:05:44+00:00 Richard L. Brown and Susan Brown-Thill, co-trustees of the EDB Trust, signed an Arbitration Agreement for resolving a broad range of disputes. These consolidated appeals concern two awards following an initial arbitration. The March 14 award authorized distributions from family-owned limited partnerships to family trusts. The December 12 award declared invalid Brown's attempt to resign as co-trustee and name his successor, and removed Brown as co-trustee, applying the Uniform Trust Code's standards for the statutory removal of a trustee as adopted in Missouri, the situs of the controversy, and Florida, the situs of the EDB Trust. The district court denied Brown's attempt to vacate both awards and Brown-Thill's request for a contractual award of attorneys' fees in both suits. The court concluded that the March 14 award cannot be vacated on the ground of procedural irregularities and the arbitrator's procedural errors did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2), (3), and (4). In regards to the December 12 award, the district court did not err in interpreting the EDB Trust Agreement; the arbitrator's interpretation of the Trust Agreement's removal provision is not a ground for vacating the award; the court concluded that Brown-Thill properly submitted the removal issue under the Arbitration Agreement, the arbitrator then had power to construe and apply the Trust Agreement's removal provision and to make findings regarding the statutory standards for removal which Brown-Thill could present in a judicial proceeding, but the arbitrator exceeded his powers by exercising the exclusively judicial function of removing Brown on statutory standards; however, this decision is of no practical importance because of Brown's unconditional resignation as co-trustee; and the court rejected Brown's FAA challenge. Finally, the court concluded that Brown-Thill was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed except with a modification and denied Brown's motion to take judicial notice. View "Brown v. Brown-Thill" on Justia Law 2014-08-11 federal U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Loken 13-1708 13-1795 13-1710 13-1797 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2014/s-14495.html Moffitt v. Moffitt 2014-08-15T13:13:13+00:00 2014-08-09T09:06:47+00:00 Linda Moffitt filed suit as her mother's guardian and conservator and the successor trustee of her parents' living trusts, seeking to rescind or reform a deed they executed in 1995 and a contract they signed in 1998. The superior court dismissed Linda's claims, concluding that the statutes of limitations had run before Linda filed her lawsuit in 2005. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the superior court properly applied the statutes of limitations. The Supreme Court concluded that Linda's mostly equitable claims were subject to the defense of laches, and the statutes of limitations did not apply to these claims. View "Moffitt v. Moffitt" on Justia Law 2014-08-08 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Bolger S-14495 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2013-039.html In re Estate of Ruth C. McCarty 2014-08-15T13:14:33+00:00 2014-08-09T09:01:43+00:00 Appellant Kerry McCarty, as executrix of the Estate of Ruth C. McCarty, appealed a circuit court order denying her motion to dismiss the claim of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for repayment of medical assistance provided to the decedent through the State's Medicaid program. She argued the court erred by concluding that DHHS's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Estate of Ruth C. McCarty" on Justia Law 2014-08-08 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Lynn 2013-039 http://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2014/62160.html In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979 2014-08-08T13:13:34+00:00 2014-08-08T03:31:53+00:00 Daisy Monzo gifted a condominium that she owned to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of her daughter, Charron Monzo. Daisy subsequently signed another deed transferring the condo back into her own name. Charron filed a petition seeking an order requiring Daisy to transfer the condo back to the trust. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Daisy, concluding that Daisy's execution of the deed transferring title to the condo into the trust was based on unilateral mistakes. Charron then filed this original writ petition challenging the district court's partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) a donor may obtain relief from an erroneous gift if she proves by clear and convincing evidence that her intent was mistaken and not in accord with the donative transfer; (2) remedies available to correct such mistakes depend on the nature of the unilateral mistake in question; and (3) because it was uncertain what Daisy's donative intent was at the time of the donative transfer, genuine issues of fact remained as to whether unilateral mistakes affected Daisy's execution of the deed transferring the condo into the trust, and therefore, partial summary judgment was improper. View "In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979" on Justia Law 2014-08-07 state Nevada Nevada Supreme Court Hardesty 62160 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-4521-vcg.html In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litigation 2014-08-08T13:13:33+00:00 2014-08-07T03:07:33+00:00 At issue in this case was a trust ("the Raiff Trust") that had expired under the terms of the trust instrument that established the trust. The trust was funded with shares of Jenzabar, Inc. At the time of this litigation, the Raiff Trust continued to hold shares of Jenzabar stock on behalf of its beneficiary. Plaintiff, trustee of a trust holding stock in Jenzabar, brought derivative claims related to a bonus payment for Jenzabar's CEO and Chairman. The Raiff Trust moved to intervene in the litigation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trust lacked the capacity to prosecute this action on behalf of Jenzabar because it had no beneficial or economic interest in Jenzabar. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the trust could take only actions related to preserving its assets for purposes of distribution and wind-up, together with those actions for which the trust instrument specifically provided, which did not include the maintenance of the derivative litigation contemplated in this action. View "In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litigation" on Justia Law 2014-07-30 state Delaware Delaware Court of Chancery Glasscock CA 4521-VCG http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/court-of-chancery/2014/ca-9685-vcl.html In re Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust 2014-08-08T13:13:33+00:00 2014-08-07T02:54:07+00:00 During divorce proceedings between Daniel Kloiber (Dan) and Beth Ann Kloiber the Kentucky Family Court issued status quo orders that restricted Dan in his capacity as a human being over whom the Kentucky Family Court had personal jurisdiction, thereby restricting Dan's actions as special trustee of the Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust and sole manager of three LLCs. Dan subsequently resigned from his positions and appointed Nick Kloiber as special trustee. Nick proceeded to take action contrary to the status quo orders, and the Kentucky Family Court issued a rule to show cause why Nick should not be held in contempt. PNC Delaware Trust Company (PNC), the trustee of the Dynasty Trust, and Nick filed petitions seeking instructions and declarations from the Court of Chancery, arguing that the Kentucky Family Court improperly asserted jurisdiction over the trustee, special trustee and trust and was requiring them to take actions contrary to their fiduciary duties. The Court of Chancery denied Nick's application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent Beth from seeking to enforce the status quo orders, including the pending rule to show cause, holding that, because the Kentucky Family Court was not interfering with the Court's jurisdiction, Nick lacked a colorable claim on which to base a TRO. View "In re Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust " on Justia Law 2014-08-06 state Delaware Delaware Court of Chancery Laster CA 9685-VCL http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/b245202.html Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Parker 2014-08-08T13:13:32+00:00 2014-08-05T00:58:56+00:00 Creditor sought to collect an exemplary damages award from a tortfeasor who was placed under a conservatorship after he was sued for his wrongdoing. The court held that a conservator's debts incurred before creation of the conservatorship must be paid from his estate. In this case, the court concluded that the debt was incurred when the conservatee committed the tort, not when the jury rendered its verdict awarding damages for the wrongful conduct. Therefore, the conservator must pay the punitive damages awarded to the creditor from the conservatee's estate. View "Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Parker" on Justia Law 2014-08-04 state California California Court of Appeal Boren B245202 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/13-3232/13-3232-2014-07-31.html Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen 2014-08-01T13:14:23+00:00 2014-08-01T00:56:50+00:00 Brooklyn Coons (called "Brook" by her estate) died from being shaken and possibly struck on the head while in the care of her father's girlfriend. Her estate, the remaining plaintiff in this case, alleged that Defendant Linda Gillen, a social worker, knew that Brook was in danger and subject to abuse but did not respond to reports of the abuse, increasing Brook's vulnerability to danger. The estate sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating Brook's right to substantive due process. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment, holding that she was entitled to qualified immunity because she did not take any affirmative action that increased the child's vulnerability to danger and because there was no clearly established law that her alleged conduct violated Brook's due-process rights. Finding that Defendant's conduct was not a violation of clearly established law, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of B.I.C., et al v. Gillen" on Justia Law 2014-07-31 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Hartz 13-3232 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-13-0642.html Gibbs v. Altenhofen 2014-08-01T13:13:17+00:00 2014-07-30T04:26:11+00:00 James Altenhofen was the trustee of the Gibbs' family trust and Delwin Nordtvedt was the successor trustee. Nordtvedt filed an action requesting that the court determine whether any restrictions existed in the trust agreement limiting the trustee's power to sell the real and personal property included in the trust estate. The Gibbs filed cross-claims against Nordtvedt. The district court granted summary judgment for Nordtvedt, concluding that the prudent investor rule called for the sale of certain property. The Gibbs then filed a complaint against Nordtvedt and Altenhofen, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court concluded (1) the claims against Nordtvedt were barred by the doctrines of issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, and claim preclusion; and (2) the claims against Altenhofen were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in finding that some of the Gibbs' claims against Nordtvedt were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion; (2) did not err in finding that some of the Gibbs' claims were barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel and issue preclusion; and (3) did not err in concluding that the claims against Altenhofen were time-barred. View "Gibbs v. Altenhofen" on Justia Law 2014-07-29 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Cotter DA 13-0642 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2014/s-15230.html Harris v. Millennium Hotel 2014-08-01T13:16:44+00:00 2014-07-26T11:30:10+00:00 The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied a death benefit claim filed by the decedent's same-sex partner because the death benefit statute grants benefits only to a worker's "widow or widower" as defined by statute. The Board construed these terms by applying the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska Constitution, which defined marriage as "only between one man and one woman," thus excluding a decedent's same-sex partner. Because this exclusion lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that this restriction on the statutory definition of "widow" violated the surviving partner's right to equal protection under the law. View "Harris v. Millennium Hotel" on Justia Law 2014-07-25 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Bolger S-15230 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2014/510-2013.html R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al. 2014-08-01T13:17:47+00:00 2014-07-25T15:13:47+00:00 Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment on a jury verdict of $2,864,583.33 plus interest to Plaintiff-appellees-cross-appellant Darcel Galliher, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Michael Galliher. The decedent, Michael Galliher, contracted and died from mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos or asbestiform material while employed by Borg Warner at a bathroom fixtures facility. Vanderbilt provided industrial talc to Borg Warner, which was alleged to be the source of the substance that caused Michael's illness. At trial, Vanderbilt denied causation and claimed that Borg Warner was responsible because it did not operate the facility in a manner that was safe for employees like Michael. Vanderbilt argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the duty of care required of Borg Warner, as Michael's employer; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on the admission of unreliable and inflammatory evidence that previously was ruled inadmissible. Galliher argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed post-judgment interest for a certain period of months. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to provide any instruction to the jury on Borg Warner's duty of care to Michael, despite Vanderbilt's request that it do so. The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied Vanderbilt's motion for a new trial based upon the substantial prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, that it had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al." on Justia Law 2014-07-24 state Delaware Delaware Supreme Court 510, 2013 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2014/26870.html In re Estate of Ricard 2014-07-25T13:12:08+00:00 2014-07-25T03:50:12+00:00 Ella Richard died leaving a will naming her son, Kelly Ricard, as personal representative of the estate and the sole devisee. The circuit court entered an order for complete settlement declaring the will valid. Thereafter, Renee Laas, another of Ella's children, filed a petition to set aside informal probate and determine intestacy, alleging undue influence. The circuit court denied the petition, determining that the order for complete settlement was final and appealable and that Laas failed to appeal the order. Laas appealed the denial of her petition, arguing that the will was never formally probated and that S.D. Codified Laws 29A-3-108 and 29-3-401 allow an interested person to file a petition for formal administration of a will any time within three years of the decedent's death, even after a complete settlement of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the estate in this case was completely settled and closed in a formal probate proceeding, that Laas had notice of this proceeding, and therefore, the circuit court did not err when it denied Lass's petition to set aside informal probate and declare intestacy. View "In re Estate of Ricard" on Justia Law 2014-07-23 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court Gilbertson 26870 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2014/sjc-11390.html Woodward School for Girls, Inc. v. City of Quincy 2014-07-25T13:12:05+00:00 2014-07-24T15:52:43+00:00 The City of Quincy (Quincy) served as trustee of the Adams Temple and School Fund and the Charles Francis Adams Fund (together, the Funds) through two boards. The Woodward School for Girls, Inc. (Woodward) has been the sole income beneficiary of the Funds since 1953. In 2007, Woodward filed suit against Quincy seeking an accounting and asserting that Quincy committed a breach of its fiduciary duties in several respects. A probate and family court judge concluded that Quincy committed a breach of its fiduciary duties by failing to invest in growth securities and failing to heed certain investment advice, removed Quincy as trustee, and ordered Quincy to pay a nearly $3 million judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment as to liability, reversed with respect to the calculation of damages on the unrealized gains, and remanded, holding (1) Woodward's claims were not barred on the grounds of sovereign immunity, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, or laches; (2) the judgment against Quincy for committing a breach of its fiduciary duties to the Funds was proper; (3) the award of damages was erroneous in the calculation of unrealized gains on the investment portfolio; and (4) the judge did not err in including prejudgment interest. View "Woodward School for Girls, Inc. v. City of Quincy" on Justia Law 2014-07-23 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Court Cordy SJC-11390 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0227.html Meyer v. Miller 2014-07-25T13:12:09+00:00 2014-07-23T03:50:13+00:00 Evelyn Carlsen, a settlor of the 1999 Carlsen Family Living Trust who also served as trustee, amended the trust on two separate occasions before she died. After Mrs. Carlsen's death, Appellant Catherine Meyer, a beneficiary of the trust who stood to receive less because of the amendments, brought an action against Appellee, the successor trustee, challenging the validity of the amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that the amendments were valid because their terms did not constitute a repayment of a debt, which might invoke the Statute of Frauds; and (2) properly determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact with regard to Appellant's claim that Mrs. Carlsen was unduly influenced to amend the trust by other beneficiaries. View "Meyer v. Miller " on Justia Law 2014-07-22 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Davis S-13-0227 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2014/13-wap-2012.html Dorsey v. Redman 2014-07-25T13:13:50+00:00 2014-07-22T22:54:59+00:00 Andre Leonti, a resident of Fayette County, died intestate in 2006. Thereafter, Cheryl Keefer, a purported friend of Decedent, filed a petition with the Register for the grant of letters of administration which listed the heirs and personal assets of Decedent as "unknown" and indicated that there was no real estate. The Register refused to grant letters to Keefer because she did not have Decedent's death certificate, was not his next of kin, and, therefore, was not a person entitled to letters. Keefer, through her attorney, filed a petition to authorize the Register to issue letters to her without producing a death certificate and further directing the Mon Valley Hospital to release the Decedent's remains for a funeral and burial. Keefer attached a purported copy of a power of attorney executed by Decedent. No one contested this petition, and, on the same day the petition was filed, the orphan's court issued an order authorizing and directing the Register to issue letters "without the necessity of requiring a death certificate," and further ordering and directing the Hospital to release Decedent's remains to Keefer for funeral and burial. In compliance with this order, the Register issued letters to Keefer, but did not secure a bond from her. Several months later, Keefer filed with the Register an inventory of the estate. One month later, Appellee Elvira Dorsey, a resident of Texas who claimed to be Decedent's niece, became aware of Decedent's estate, and alleged she was the sole surviving heir of Decedent. Appellee petitioned for Keefer's removal as administratrix. The orphan's court granted Appellee's petition, issued an order, and required Keefer to deliver to Appellee the custody and possession of Decedent's estate's assets. Keefer, however, did not deliver the assets of the estate to Appellee. The orphan's court issued an order holding Keefer in contempt, sentencing Keefer to six months imprisonment, and directing that a verdict be entered in favor of Appellee and against Keefer in the amount of $192,769.19. Appellee filed praecipes for entry of judgment with the Fayette County Prothonotary and the Register to enter judgment against Keefer. Appellee then filed a complaint against the Register, individually, and Western Surety Company, alleging that the Register and Surety were liable for damages resulting from the Register's failure to secure bonding, which, Appellee asserted, was required by law. In this appeal by allowance, the primary issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the applicability of governmental and official immunity with respect to a claim alleging a violation of bonding requirements mandated under the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code ("PEF Code"). Ultimately, the Court held that the General Assembly intended that 20 Pa.C.S.A. 3172 created a targeted form of accountability for such registers, resting outside the scope of governmental and official immunity. Therefore, the Fayette County Register of Wills was not immune under the Tort Claims Act from liability for an alleged violation of Section 3172. The case was remanded back to the orphan's court for an assessment of the applicability of the the immunity defense, and for a more developed factual record. View "Dorsey v. Redman" on Justia Law 2014-07-21 state Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Supreme Court Todd 13 WAP 2012 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130161.html Estates of Vizenor and Vizenor v. Mesling 2014-07-25T13:17:50+00:00 2014-07-18T13:56:30+00:00 Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor were married and lived most of their lives together in Minnesota. Ragna Mesling, a widow and Carolyn Vizenor's mother, owned real estate outside of New England, in Hettinger County. The Stechers were long-time renters of the Mesling farmland. The Vizenors sued Mesling and the Stechers, seeking to avoid a deed executed in 2006, in which Mesling, as Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, transferred certain real estate to the Stechers. The Vizenors alleged the transaction directly resulted from improper conduct by the Stechers. The Estates of Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor appealed a judgment dismissing their action against Clifford and Linda Stecher and orders denying their post-judgment motions. The Stechers cross-appealed the judgment. The Supreme Court concluded Ragna Mesling, as her daughter Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, was authorized under a power of attorney to transfer real estate to the Stechers and sufficient evidence supported the district court's findings the transfer was not the product of undue influence. Because the court did not err in dismissing the action and denying the post-judgment motions, the Court therefore affirmed. View "Estates of Vizenor and Vizenor v. Mesling" on Justia Law 2014-07-17 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Crothers 20130161 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/h038826.html Conservatorship of G.H. 2014-07-18T13:15:07+00:00 2014-07-17T20:35:28+00:00 In 1998, the superior court established a conservatorship over G.H.'s person pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000. G.H. has been under continuous conservatorship since that time. In 2012, the Santa Clara County Public Guardian sought to be reappointed G.H.'s conservator, alleging that G.H remained gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder. G.H.'s counsel requested t an evidentiary hearing. On the date of the hearing G.H. was not present in court. The Public Guardian explained that G.H. had refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian's doctor, and that it did not intend to transport G.H to court unless G.H. submitted to the mental examination. At a second hearing, the Public Guardian explained that G.H. had again refused to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian's doctor. G.H. was not present at a third hearing. The court granted the reappointment petition, reasoning that G.H.'s failure to submit to a mental examination with the Public Guardian's doctor authorized the court to impose an evidence sanction or a terminating sanction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.410. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the court erred in imposing a terminating, as opposed to an evidence sanction. View "Conservatorship of G.H." on Justia Law 2014-07-17 state California California Court of Appeal Rushing H038826 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2014/g047495m.html Hasso v. Hapke 2014-07-18T13:20:14+00:00 2014-07-16T13:46:37+00:00 In August 2007, the initial trustee of two family trusts invested millions in the Rockwater American Municipal Fund, LLC (RAM Fund), a hedge fund engaged in municipal arbitrage. The RAM Fund was managed by Rockwater Municipal Advisors, LLC (RMA), its managing member. In November 2007, Charles Fish Investments, Inc. (CFI) transferred its assets to Rockwater CFI, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of RMA, in exchange for a 15 percent interest in RMA. CFI had an option to unwind the transaction, if its interest in RMA did not meet certain benchmark values. The RAM Fund was devastated by the stock market crash and the trust investments were largely wiped out by 2008. CFI exercised its option to unwind the transaction with RMA and Rockwater CFI, LLC, and obtained a return of the assets originally belonging to it. The successor trustee of the trusts sued the RAM Fund, RMA, Bryan Williams (founder of the RAM Fund and the chief executive officer of RMA), John Hapke (the chief financial officer of the RAM Fund), CFI, and Charles Fish (the chairman and chief executive officer of CFI). After it had seen clips from the movie Wall Street 2 (Twentieth Century Fox 2010) and a power point presentation with eight screens captioned "Greed," a jury awarded the successor trustee a $4.6 million judgment against the RAM Fund, RMA, Williams, and Hapke. The successor trustee was unsuccessful in obtaining a judgment against CFI and Fish. The RAM Fund, RMA, Williams, and Hapke, on the other hand, have each filed an appeal claiming the RAM Fund was simply the victim of the market crash. The successor trustee appealed too, seeking to hold liable CFI and Fish, the defendants who "got away." After review, the Supreme Court: reversed the judgment in favor of RAM, RMA and Willians, and affirmed the judgment against CFI and Fish on actual and constructive fraudulent transfer; to the extent the judgment held the Rockwater Defendants and Hapke liable on the causes of action for fraud by intentional misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, and/or negligent misrepresentation, it was reversed. The judgment in favor of CFI and Fish on those causes of action was affirmed. The judgment against the RAM Fund and Hapke for breach of fiduciary duty and professional negligence was reversed. However, the judgment against RMA and Williams on those causes of action was affirmed. The judgment in favor of CFI and Fish on the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action was affirmed. The ruling that CFI was not liable for the debts of RMA was affirmed. The ruling that Fish was not liable for the debts of CFI was moot, and the judgment in favor of CFI on all causes of action is affirmed. View "Hasso v. Hapke" on Justia Law 2014-07-15 state California California Court of Appeal Moore G047495M http://law.justia.com/cases/washington/supreme-court/2014/88045-0.html In re Estate of Toland 2014-07-11T13:09:58+00:00 2014-07-10T19:51:59+00:00 The estate of Etsuko Futagi Toland appealed a Court of Appeals decision upholding summary judgment that denied registration of a Japanese divorce decree awarding Etsuko Toland a monetary award against her former husband, Peter Paul Toland. The question to the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying recognition of the divorce decree under comity principles because Paul was not given notice of a Japanese guardianship proceeding involving the couple's daughter. The Washington Court reversed: the 2008 guardianship had no effect on Paul's legal obligations under the 2006 divorce decree. The divorce decree was valid, and whether it should have been recognized as a matter of comity did not depend on whether Paul had notice of the guardianship proceeding. The Washington Court held that the trial court abused its discretion, and remanded this case back to the trial court for registration of the divorce decree. View "In re Estate of Toland" on Justia Law 2014-07-10 state Washington Washington Supreme Court Madsen 88045-0 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0226-4.html In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bratton 2014-07-11T13:09:59+00:00 2014-07-10T03:28:24+00:00 Seventy-six-year-old William suffered from a lifelong mental disability. William's brother Robert and sister Jeanne were the sole trustees of a trust established by William's mother to support William. Because Williams had fallen prey to financial scammers, Robert and Jeanne took steps to prevent William from trust money. Thereafter, Robert petitioned for appointment as William's guardian, and Jeanne cross-petitioned seeking to be appointed as William's guardian and conservator. The district court dismissed Robert's petition as a sanction for his failure to appear at a pretrial conference and temporarily appointed Jeanne as William's guardian and conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed Robert's guardianship petition; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in disposing of Robert's motions to submit the case to mediation and to quash the proposed order dismissing Robert's petition; and (3) the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Robert's petition to disqualify the presiding judge. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bratton" on Justia Law 2014-07-08 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Davis S-13-0226 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2014/sc93872.html Ivie v. Smith 2014-07-11T13:09:30+00:00 2014-07-09T04:36:17+00:00 In 2002, three months after she married her fourth husband, Patricia Watson created a trust that left substantially all of her property to her half siblings. The trust expressly stated that Watson's husband, Arnold Smith, would not receive any part of the trust estate. Thereafter, Watson's mental health began deteriorating, and in 2007, Watson began making changes to her trust. Watson signed two trust amendments, signed changes to several of her bank and retirement accounts, and signed documents retitling several of her accounts and vehicles. The effect of the changes was that almost all of Watson's personal property passed to Smith when Watson died. After Watson's death, the half siblings filed this action seeking to set aside the trust amendments, beneficiary designations, and property transfers. The circuit court ruled that the changes to the estate plan were void due to a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the circuit court's judgment that Watson lacked testamentary capacity to make the changes to her estate plan and that the judgment was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Ivie v. Smith" on Justia Law 2014-07-08 state Missouri Missouri Supreme Court Fischer SC93872 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2014/s209376.html In re Conservatorship of McQueen 2014-07-11T13:12:40+00:00 2014-07-08T05:11:30+00:00 Plaintiff prevailed at trial in an action for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. After judgment, Plaintiff brought a separate action seeking to prevent or reverse Defendant's transfer of real property to third persons. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the fraudulent transfer action pursuant to an agreement with Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for costs and attorney fees incurred both on appeal from the elder abuse judgment and in the fraudulent transfer action. The court of appeals concluded that the fees and costs motion was untimely under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 685.040. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) as to attorney fees on appeal from the elder abuse judgment, the motion was not subject to section 685.080 because Plaintiff's efforts in opposing Defendant's appeal were not undertaken to enforce the judgment but to defend it against reversal or modification; and (2) Plaintiff's motion was untimely as to fees incurred enforcing the judgment through the separate fraudulent transfer action because the fees incurred in that action could only be recovered under section 685.040. View "In re Conservatorship of McQueen" on Justia Law 2014-07-07 state California California Supreme Court Werdegar S209376 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130051.html Alabama et al. v. Boys And Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. 2014-07-04T13:19:08+00:00 2014-07-04T01:08:23+00:00 The Boys and Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. ("BGCSA"), sought a writ of mandamus to order the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss a declaratory-judgment action filed against it and The Community Foundation of South Alabama by the attorney general of Alabama, Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc. ("Rotary Inc."), and Ruff Wilson Youth Organizations, Inc. ("Wilson Inc.") In 1996, B.R. Wilson, Jr., one of the incorporators and a principal benefactor of BGCSA, executed a deed transferring to BGCSA approximately 17 acres of real estate. Contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, Wilson gave a letter to BGCSA that stated Wilson's intentions and stipulations concerning his gift of the property. The letter stated that BGCSA was "'free to ultimately dispose of this property,'" but that it was Wilson's "'desire and understanding that [BGCSA] will use the proceeds from any such disposition for [BGCSA's] facilities and/or activities in the Fairhope–Point Clear area.'" Wilson died in 1997. In 2010, the Eastern Shore Clubs filed an action in the Baldwin Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against BGCSA. The Eastern Shore Clubs alleged that BGCSA "ha[d] used," or, perhaps, was "anticipat[ing] using," the proceeds from the sale of the property for its own operations, rather than for the benefit of the Eastern Shore Clubs. In 2012, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered a judgment concluding Wilson's intent was that the Wilson funds should be used for the "exclusive benefit of the Fairhope and Daphne Clubs." The Baldwin Circuit Court ordered the disbursal of the remainder of the Wilson funds. This case was the third action that has come before the Supreme Court arising out the dispute between BGCSA and the Eastern Shore Clubs over the Wilson funds. The Supreme Court concluded Section 6-5-440 compelled dismissal of this case because another action involving the same cause and the same parties ("the Mobile action") was filed first. Therefore, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its most recent order in this case, and to enter an order dismissing this case. View "Alabama et al. v. Boys And Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-07-03 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Murdock 1130051 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1110057.html Campbell et al. v. Taylor et al. 2014-07-04T13:13:38+00:00 2014-07-04T01:07:29+00:00 A series of appeals before the Alabama Supreme Court involved a challenge to the disposition of the estate of A.V. Campbell, Sr., who died in 1977. He had at least four children: A.V. Campbell, Jr., William J. Campbell, Sr., Ethel C. Taylor, and Archie Paul Campbell. His will was admitted to probate in 1977; those proceedings languished in the probate court until 2005. During this time, A.V., Jr., and Archie Paul Campbell died. Ethel was ultimately named the executrix of the estate. In 2005, Gladys Campbell, one of Archie Paul Campbell's descendants, filed a petition to remove the probate proceedings to the Baldwin Circuit Court. She alleged, among other things, that Ethel, as the executrix, had failed to have the estate's property devised under the terms of the will. After several hearings, in 2006, the circuit court issued a judgment that, among other things, distributed property according to the testator's will. Specifically, certain property was awarded separately to (1) Ethel, (2) to Paula and Gladys, and (3) to "the heirs at law of William J. Campbell[, Sr.]." Jewel appealed that judgment, and the Supreme Court affirmed without issuing an opinion. In 2009, the underlying action was filed in the Baldwin Circuit Court: plaintiffs purported to be the heirs of William J. Campbell, Sr. Some plaintiffs participated in the 2005 circuit court action; others did not. This new action was described as a "complaint to set aside judicial decree" and was alleged to be filed "pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent action to set aside the 2006 judgment. The plaintiffs contended that, as the heirs of William J. Campbell, Sr., they were also heirs of A.V. Campbell, Sr., and were thus entitled to certain ownership interests in the property distributed in the 2005 circuit court action. Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged that they had not all been "named as parties" in the 2005 circuit court action at the time of the final adjudication," and "not subject to" and "not bound by" the 2006 judgment, and they asked that it be set aside. After various motions and after granting a motion by the defendants to strike certain affidavit testimony filed by plaintiffs, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Ethel. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. Proceedings resumed in the trial court; Ethel and the remaining defendants moved for a summary judgment. In case no. 1110057, plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In case no. 1110104, Paula and Gladys cross-appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to strike. In case no. 1110057, Jewel Campbell, Acie A. Campbell, William J. Campbell, Jr., Roy J. Campbell, Eva Campbell, William C. Campbell, Kelly Calvert, and Amanda Givens appealed summary judgment in favor of Ethel C. Taylor, Paula Buettner, Gladys A. Campbell, Jason Bennett, and Mendi Bennett. In case no. 1110104, Paula Buettner and Gladys A. Campbell cross-appealed the denial of their motion to strike certain affidavits filed by plaintiffs in opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in case no. 1110057; its holding in case no. 1110057 rendered moot the cross-appeal in case no. 1110104. View "Campbell et al. v. Taylor et al. " on Justia Law 2014-07-03 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Per curiam 1110057 1110104 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-1614/13-1614-2014-06-30.html Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. 2014-07-04T13:19:04+00:00 2014-06-30T19:43:49+00:00 Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims against four trusts to which their loans and mortgages were assigned in transactions involving the mortgagee bank, and against those trusts' trustee. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that plaintiffs were neither parties to nor third-party beneficiaries of the assignment agreements and therefore lacked standing to pursue the claims. It is undisputed that in 2009 or 2010, each plaintiff was declared to be in default of his mortgage, and foreclosure proceedings were instituted in connection with the institution of said foreclosure proceedings, the trustee claimed to own each of plaintiff's mortgage and that plaintiffs are not seeking to enjoin foreclosure proceedings. Assuming that these concessions have not rendered plaintiffs' claims moot, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their challenges to defendants' ownership of the loans and entitlement to payments. Plaintiffs neither established constitutional nor prudential standing to pursue the claims they asserted. View "Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co." on Justia Law 2014-06-30 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Kearse 13-1614 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-12-1029.html In re Rolf H. Brennemann Testamentary Trust 2014-07-04T13:13:40+00:00 2014-06-29T03:58:35+00:00 After Kim Abbott, a beneficiary of her grandfather's trust, learned that the trust had become "non-economical," she filed a complaint against the trustees, alleging that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties to maintain trust records, to properly inform and report to the beneficiaries, and to administer the trust in good faith. The county court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trustees had breached their duty to inform and report but the breach was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Court of Appeals (1) did not err in ultimately concluding that the trustees' breach of their duty was harmless; but (2) erred in concluding that the annual schedule K-1 tax reports were sufficient to reasonably inform beneficiaries of the trust and its administration. Remanded. View "In re Rolf H. Brennemann Testamentary Trust " on Justia Law 2014-06-27 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Connolly S-12-1029 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130365.html Matter of Emelia Hirsch Trust 2014-06-27T13:12:44+00:00 2014-06-27T12:06:15+00:00 Timothy Betz appealed an amended judgment awarding the trustees of the Emelia Hirsch Trust $5,000 plus interest for attorney fees and costs, and an order denying his post-judgment objection to costs and his request for a hearing. In 1994, the "Emelia Hirsch June 9, 1994, Irrevocable Trust" was created, whose beneficiaries were Emelia Hirsch's three children, Carolyn Twite, Marlene Betz, and Duane Hirsch, and Emelia Hirsch's ten grandchildren, including Timothy Betz. The trust became the source of protracted litigation and has divided the family into two factions, with Emelia Hirsch, Carolyn Twite and her children, and Duane Hirsch and his children contending Emelia Hirsch did not intend to create an irrevocable trust and give up control of her property during her lifetime. Marlene Betz and her children, including Timothy Betz, claimed the trust was irrevocable and they were entitled to benefits under the terms of the trust. In 2003, Emelia Hirsch petitioned to dissolve the trust. After further proceedings, Carolyn Twite and Duane Hirsch moved in April 2008 to reform the trust from an irrevocable trust to a revocable trust, with Emelia Hirsch retaining control over the trust property. The district court thereafter granted reformation of the trust after allowing the Betz faction further opportunity to comment or object to the reformation. Upon review of Timothy Betz's appeal of the district court decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment and the order denying Betz's objection. The Court directed him to pay attorney fees in the amount of $1,000 plus double costs for his frivolous appeal. View "Matter of Emelia Hirsch Trust" on Justia Law 2014-06-26 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Kapsner 20130365 http://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/2014/111492-consol-w-111961.html In the Matter of the Guardianship of Berry 2014-06-27T13:13:14+00:00 2014-06-26T14:10:39+00:00 A daughter was appointed special guardian for her parents. Two lawyers entered an appearance on behalf of the parents and alleged that the parents had selected them as nominated counsel. The daughter sought to be named guardian and then a nephew and niece of the parents sought to be named guardians. Upon agreement of the parties an independent guardian was named. Hearings were held and an order issued that: (1) rejected the two lawyers as nominated counsel for the parents; and (2) denied a motion to reconsider a previous denial of a motion for unsupervised visitation by the nephew and niece and change of guardian to the nephew and niece. The allegedly nominated attorneys commenced an appeal which the Supreme Court retained. The trial court also denied a motion for emergency relief to change supervised visitation. A request for extraordinary relief from supervised visitations was filed during the appeal and the request was consolidated with the appeal. Subpoenas duces tecum were quashed relating to the wards' trusts. An additional request for extraordinary relief was filed during the pendency of the appeal based upon the order quashing the subpoenas, and we treat that proceeding as a companion case. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision that nominated counsel had a conflict of interest and were not independent, and that Petitioners failed to show that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or acted in excess of its authority when it denied an emergency motion to modify the supervised visitation, and that while the trial court incorrectly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to issue subpoenas duces tecum to a trustee of a ward's trust, it must hold a hearing on the objections to the discovery request and adjudicate which parties are entitled to participate in the discovery and determine whether a sustainable objection to discovery exists pursuant to the Discovery Code. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of Berry" on Justia Law 2014-06-24 state Oklahoma Oklahoma Supreme Court Edmondson 111492 (Consol. w/111961) http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-3954/13-3954-2014-06-25.html Asarco LLC v. Goodwin 2014-06-27T13:12:42+00:00 2014-06-25T19:16:31+00:00 Asarco appealed from the district court's dismissal of its Second Amended Complaint. As part of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved two settlement agreements related to the environmental contamination of the Everett Smelter and the Monte Cristo Mining area in Washington State. Asarco paid the United States as a result of those settlements and the Port of Everett $50.2 million for costs related to the remediation of the sites. Asarco then sought contribution, directly and as a purported subrogee, from the Trustees of the residuary trust created by the will of John D. Rockefeller Sr. in 1937. At issue was whether, in 2014, the Trustees may be made to contribute to cleanup costs of environmental contamination allegedly caused by corporations controlled by Rockefeller in Washington State between 1892 and 1903. Assuming arguendo that New York law permitted the imposition of liability on testamentary beneficiaries in this instance, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Asarco's contribution claims because they were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, and its subrogation claims because Asarco was not a subrogee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Asarco LLC v. Goodwin" on Justia Law 2014-06-25 federal U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Lynch 13-3954 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-543.html In re Estate of Greb 2014-06-27T13:12:43+00:00 2014-06-21T17:08:27+00:00 Ralph Greb died in 2010. At issue in this case was the distribution of Ralph's estate in kind to two beneficiaries, his son, Richard, and his daughter, Nanette. The county court overruled Richard's and Nanette's objections and approved the proposed distribution of the estate. Nanette appealed and Richard cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the county court's order of distribution, holding (1) two multiple-party bank accounts were correctly excluded from the probate estate because Nanette failed to meet her burden of proving a lack of survivorship rights; (2) because a corporation dissolved by the state for failure to pay taxes continued as a de facto corporation, Ralph's gifts of corporate stock during his lifetime were not part of his probate estate; and (3) because Nanette was not obligated to pay indebtedness owed to the estate by her spouse, the county court did not err in ordering distribution of the asset in kind to both Richard and Nanette. View "In re Estate of Greb" on Justia Law 2014-06-20 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Cassel S-13-543 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2014/115997.html In re the Estate of Powell 2014-06-20T13:21:07+00:00 2014-06-19T17:37:08+00:00 Powell was adjudicated a disabled adult due to severe mental disabilities in 1997. His parents, Perry and Leona, were appointed as co-guardians of Powell's person, but were not appointed as guardians of his estate. In 1999, Perry died following surgery. Leona engaged the Wunsch law firm to bring a claim against the doctors and hospital, Leona was appointed special administratrix of Perry's estate. Wunsch filed a complaint under the Wrongful Death Act on behalf of Leona individually and as administratrix estate. The estate's only asset was the lawsuit. A 2005 settlement, after attorney fees and costs, amounted to $15,000, which was distributed equally between Leona, Emma (the couple's daughter) and Powell. The settlement order provided that Powell's share was to be paid to Leona on Powell's behalf. Leona placed both shares into a joint account. The probate court was not notified. Wunsch had referred the action to attorney Webb, for continued litigation. Emma waived her rights under a second settlement, Leona and Powell each received $118,000. A check was deposited into the joint account. The order did not provide that Powell's was to be administered under supervision of the probate court and Powell did not have a guardian of his estate. Wunsch purportedly advised that it was "too much trouble" to go through the probate court for funds every time Leona needed money for Powell. In 2008, Emma petitioned to remove Leona as guardian of Powell's person. The probate court appointed Emma as guardian of Powell's person and the public guardian as guardian of his estate. Leona had withdrawn all but $26,000 and provided no accounting. The public guardian sued the attorneys and Leona. The trial court dismissed as to the attorneys, finding that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege defendants owed Powell a duty and to allege proximate cause. The appellate court determined that an attorney retained by a special administrator of an estate to bring a wrongful death action for the benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin owed a fiduciary duty to those beneficiaries and remanded, with respect to the second settlement. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re the Estate of Powell" on Justia Law 2014-06-19 state Illinois Illinois Supreme Court Freeman 115997 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27401.html Dean v. Heritage Healthcare 2014-06-20T13:18:16+00:00 2014-06-18T17:16:46+00:00 Appellants Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, Uni-Health Post-Acute Care - Tanglewood, LLC (Tanglewood), and UHS-Pruitt Corporation (collectively, Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death and survival action involving Appellants' allegedly negligent nursing home care. Tanglewood is a skilled nursing facility located in Ridgeway, owned and controlled by Appellants. In January 2007, Tanglewood and Respondent Darlene Dean entered into a nursing home residency agreement in which Tanglewood assumed responsibility for the care of Respondent's mother, Louise Porter (the patient). The same day, Respondent signed a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. The patient did not sign either the residency agreement or the Agreement on her own behalf, although she was competent at the time of her admission to Tanglewood. Moreover, Respondent did not have a health care power of attorney empowering her to sign on the patient's behalf. In 2009, the patient fell three separate times within a ten day period, fracturing her hip in the third fall. Over the next two months, the patient underwent two hip surgeries; however, due to complications following the surgeries, the patient died on September 30, 2009. In late 2011, Respondent (acting in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate) filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, as well as an expert affidavit in support of her NOI. Respondent also alleged claims for survival and wrongful death. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Relying on "Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc.," (678 S.E.2d 435 (2009)), the circuit court invalidated the Agreement in its entirety and refused to compel arbitration between the parties. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Respondent's argument that Appellants' waived their right to enforce the Agreement was without merit. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the circuit court consider her remaining arguments (concerning Respondent's authority to sign the Agreement and whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties) prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration between the parties. View "Dean v. Heritage Healthcare" on Justia Law 2014-06-18 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Toal 27401 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-75.html Estate of O'Brien-Hamel 2014-06-13T13:11:01+00:00 2014-06-11T04:26:21+00:00 Ruth married Donald on the same day that she executed a will. Ruth died the following day. Donald was appointed personal representative, and the will was informally admitted to probate. Jennifer, Ruth's daughter, filed a petition for a formal adjudication of intestacy and for her appointment as personal representative, alleging that Ruth lacked the capacity to execute the will. The probate court denied Jennifer's petition and admitted the will to probate, concluding that Donald sustained his burden of showing due execution of the will and that Jennifer failed to prove the absence of testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err in its evidentiary rulings and did not err in finding that Ruth had the requisite testamentary capacity to execute a will. View "Estate of O'Brien-Hamel" on Justia Law 2014-06-10 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Silver http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/13-5103/13-5103-2014-06-10.html Liftin v. United States 2014-06-13T13:15:51+00:00 2014-06-10T17:20:29+00:00 Liftin died in 2003, survived by his wife, then a citizen of Bolivia, and his son, John, who became the executor of the estate. Although John is an attorney, he retained his former law partner, who practiced tax planning. The executor had to file a federal estate-tax return, Form 706, 26 U.S.C. 6018(a), within nine months after the date of death. The statute authorizes an extension for no more than 6 months, 26 U.S.C. 6081(a). The executor obtained an extension so that the new deadline to file and to pay the tax was June 2, 2004. There were uncertainties regarding the marital deduction, 26 U.S.C. 2056(a), which is available if a surviving spouse is a citizen or becomes a citizen before the day on which the return is made. Mrs. Liftin began the process of applying for citizenship in February 2004. The estate was also engaged in litigation with Mrs. Liftin relating to her rights under a prenuptial agreement. Neither uncertainty had been resolved as of June 2, 2004. In January 2004 John made an estimated payment of $877,300, sufficient to cover the taxes due even if the estate could not claim the marital deduction. John relied on his attorney's advice that "a late Form 706 could be filed after the extended due date" without identifying any basis for delaying filing. In 2005, Mrs. Liftin became a citizen. John, did not file the estate-tax return until 2006, when Mrs. Liftin and the estate settled their litigation. The return stated a tax liability of $678,572.25, entitling the estate to a refund of $198,727.75. The IRS assessed a $135,714.45 late-filing penalty under 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1). The Claims Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Liftin v. United States" on Justia Law 2014-06-10 federal U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals Taranto 13-5103 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2014/120800.html In re Estate of Waterman 2014-06-13T13:11:01+00:00 2014-06-07T23:05:33+00:00 The administrators of Decedent's estate listed residential real estate for sale. Decedent's common law spouse objected to the proposed sale, claiming it was her marital home. The district court recognized the surviving spouses's common law rights but nonetheless approved the sale. The buyers took possession and made improvements to the home. Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for consideration of the homestead interest of the spouse. On remand, the district court gave the surviving spouse the option of taking possession of the home upon paying the buyers a substantial part of the cost of their improvements to the home or receiving the proceeds from the estate's sale of the real estate. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the surviving spouse could retake possession upon payment of the approximate value of the home before the improvements were made less any credit to which she was entitled from the buyers for rent during the period the spouse had been dispossessed; and (2) the spouse could transfer title to the buyers and receive the proceeds from the estate's sale of the home plus credit for rent from the date of the conveyance to the buyers until the date of judgment. View "In re Estate of Waterman" on Justia Law 2014-06-06 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Hecht 120800 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1130114.html Alabama et al. v. Estate Yarbrough 2014-06-13T13:12:01+00:00 2014-06-07T05:28:49+00:00 The State of Alabama, the Alabama Department of Finance, and the Comptroller of the State of Alabama, nonparties to the underlying action, appealed a circuit court order denying the State's motion to intervene as of right. Mrs. Frances Ann Yarbrough died intestate with no heirs that were in the line of descendant distribution. As a result, her assets escheated to the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court ordered the Estate to pay certain expenses of the Estate, and then to pay the balance of the Estate's funds to the State of Alabama. In that same order, the Court ordered the State of Alabama to pay the escheated funds to the St. Clair County's Circuit Clerk's office to be used by the Clerk 'to rehire some of the employees lost to proration.' The State, through its counsel Mr. Bledsoe, stated that the Estate's escheated funds must be used or applied in furtherance of education in accordance with the Alabama Constitution.Through counsel, Mr. Bledsoe, declared that there was no objection to disbursing the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. Based on that representation, the Estate moved the Supreme Court to Alter, Amend, or Vacate its earlier order to direct the State to pay the Estate's escheated assets to the Pell City Board of Education and the St. Clair County Board of Education. The State objected to the Supreme Court's order. In turn, the Supreme Court treated the objection as a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, filed it with the circuit clerk, and set the matter for a hearing. Because the State was not a party to this matter, the State did not receive direct notice of the hearing. The Estate's counsel, Ms. Williams, however, provided the State notice of the hearing by e-mail to Mr. Bledsoe. The State did not appear at the hearing, and the Supreme Court denied the relief requested by the State. The circuit court then denied the State's motion to intervene. Because the circuit court failed to follow the Supreme Court's order, it reversed the circuit court's order denying the State's motion to intervene. "The circuit court exceeded its authority in attempting to appropriate the escheated funds." All issues having been decided on both the motion to intervene and the underlying action, a judgment was rendered for the State. View "Alabama et al. v. Estate Yarbrough" on Justia Law 2014-06-06 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Parker 1130114 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/13-1900/13-1900-2014-06-06.html Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC 2014-06-13T13:15:26+00:00 2014-06-06T21:19:14+00:00 Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal with prejudice of their Maryland quiet title claim. Where, as here, a property is encumbered by a deed of trust and its release is conditioned on a party's performance under a note, determining who holds title to the property necessarily involves determining whether the party has performed under the note. Therefore, the court could not decouple the questions of plaintiffs' personal liability and the security interest in the property. In this case, plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefits of a quiet title action because they are not authorized by statute to resolve clouds on a legal title which they do not own. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The court also held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law 2014-06-06 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Duncan 13-1900 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2014/131283.html Bartee v. Vitocruz 2014-06-06T13:12:00+00:00 2014-06-06T03:40:18+00:00 After Tonia Begley died, Robert Bartee and Wiley Begley qualified as co-administrators of Begley's estate. Wiley Begley subsequently died. Thereafter, Bartee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against an emergency department physician. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that Bartee lacked standing to sue alone. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bartee had standing to file the action under the doctrine of survivorship because the power of appointment given to Bartee and Wiley Begley as co-administrators of the estate to prosecute a wrongful death action could be exercised by Bartee as the sole remaining survivor. Remanded. View "Bartee v. Vitocruz" on Justia Law 2014-06-05 state Virginia Virginia Supreme Court Lacy 131283 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2014/12-1541.html Cyfers v. Cyfers 2014-06-06T13:10:42+00:00 2014-06-06T03:35:47+00:00 Before she died, Decedent executed a Will. The Will had an "Exhibit A" attached to it at the time the Will was submitted to probate. The exhibit set forth bequests made by Decedent to various relatives. Both Exhibit A and the Will contained handwritten notices. After a dispute arose between the co-executors of the Will and some of the beneficiaries of the Will concerning the administration of Decedent's estate, the co-executors filed a petition for declaratory relief. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the beneficiaries, concluding (1) Exhibit A to the Will was properly incorporated by reference into the Will; (2) the handwritten notations found on the Will and Exhibit A that were made after the date the Will was executed were "surplusage" and could be disregarded; and (3) Decedent intended Exhibit A to be incorporated into the Will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to allow Exhibit A to be incorporated by reference into the Will. View "Cyfers v. Cyfers" on Justia Law 2014-06-05 state West Virginia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Workman 12-1541 http://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/2014/82s01-1305-ct-363.html Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc. 2014-06-06T13:11:56+00:00 2014-06-04T03:16:14+00:00 In November 2006, The Good Samaritan Home, a nursing home where Venita Hargis was living, told Hargis's family that Hargis had suffered a fall. Hargis died later that month as a result of the injury she sustained in the alleged fall. In November 2009, Hargis's family discovered that Hargis's injury had been caused by an attack from another resident and not by a fall. In October 2011, Hargis's Estate filed a wrongful death complaint against Good Samaritan, alleging that Good Samaritan negligently caused Hargis's death and then fraudulently concealed its negligence. Good Samaritan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to the Estate's failure to file the action within two years of Hargis's death. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that fraudulent concealment does not extend or delay the two-year statutory period to file a wrongful death action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that if a plaintiff makes the necessary factual showing, the fraudulent concealment statute may apply to toll the Wrongful Death Act's two-year filing period. View "Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc." on Justia Law 2014-06-03 state Indiana Indiana Supreme Court Massa 82S01-1305-CT-363 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1110353.html Beasley v. Poellnitz 2014-06-06T13:10:39+00:00 2014-06-01T14:32:40+00:00 Mary Leila Beasley Schaeffer and the estate of Emma Glass Beasley appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages on mismanagement-of-trust and conversion claims in an action by William Poellnitz, as administrator of the estate of Edwin Glass Young, Adele Young Sommers, and Willard Young. The Beasleys raised five issues on appeal: (1) it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (JML) on the mismanagement-of-trust claim; (2) it was entitled to a JML on the conversion claim; (3) punitive damages were not warranted, or in the alternative, the trial court improperly apportioned the punitive damages and that they were excessive and must be vacated or remitted; (4) it was entitled to a JML on the Youngs claim to a one-half ownership interest in the furnishings and heirlooms from the estate or to a reduction of the value of those furnishings and heirlooms; and (5) it was entitled to a JML on all of its counterclaims for moneys loaned to the Youngs. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying the Beasleys motions for a JML as to the mismanagement-of-trust claim. The Court also reversed the award of punitive damages with respect to that claim. The trial court also erred in denying the motion for a JML filed by Emma's estate as to the conversion claim. The Court affirmed as to the conversion claim against Mary, including the amount of the compensatory damages awarded the Youngs on that claim. However, because there was no clear and convincing evidence that Mary "consciously and deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice," the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it awarded punitive damages on the conversion claim against Mary, as well as against Emma's estate. The Court affirmed the judgment as to the Young branch's one-half interest in the furnishings and heirlooms in the house and on the Beasleys counterclaims for money loaned. View "Beasley v. Poellnitz" on Justia Law 2014-05-30 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Main 1110353 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2014/13-22.html Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust v. Notarianni 2014-06-06T13:13:48+00:00 2014-06-01T04:13:30+00:00 Decedent established a Trust that required, upon Decedent's death, the trustee to distribute a parcel of land to the trustee and to distribute the remainder of the land to Decedent's children. The Trust filed a complaint for eviction for unlawfully holding over after the termination of tenancy against Defendants, Decedent's children. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Trust. Defendants appealed, arguing that the Trust was not a landlord and Defendants were not tenants, but rather, tenants in common with the trustee. Therefore, Defendants argued, an action for eviction could not lie. The superior court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the Trust lacked standing. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that the superior court did have jurisdiction over trespass and ejectment matters, and therefore, the motion justice erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing with respect to the issue of standing. View "Joseph P. Notarianni Revocable Trust v. Notarianni" on Justia Law 2014-05-30 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court 13-22 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-73.html In re Estate of Weatherbee 2014-05-30T13:09:13+00:00 2014-05-30T04:04:45+00:00 Michael Weatherbee brought litigation to recover money misappropriated by his sister, Peggy McPike, while she was handling their parents' money before their deaths. The superior court entered judgment in favor of the parents' estates in the amount of $92,400 in restitution. The probate court subsequently directed that Weatherbee be compensated of the estates for attorney fees and expenses. McPike appealed, claiming, among other things, that the probate court erred in applying the common fund doctrine to require that attorney fees be paid by the estates. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that neither the common fund doctrine nor the Probate Code nor any other equitable exception to the American Rule provided a basis for the award of attorney fees out of the estates. View "In re Estate of Weatherbee" on Justia Law 2014-05-29 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Saufley http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2014/s-13-633.html In re Estate of Gsantner 2014-05-30T13:09:13+00:00 2014-05-24T16:31:16+00:00 After Decedent died in 2012, Ryan Gray was appointed as personal representative of Decedent's estate. The final value of the estate was more than $5 million. When filing a petition for formal probate of the will, Gray submitted a request for a personal representative fee in the amount of two and a half percent of the estate. Five heirs of the estate objected to the request as excessive and unwarranted. The county court determined that Gray was entitled to a fee of $25,000 and overruled Gray's motion to reconsider the fee. The Supreme Court affirmed the award of a personal representative fee of $25,000, holding that the award was neither contrary to the law nor arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "In re Estate of Gsantner" on Justia Law 2014-05-23 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Wright S-13-633 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2014/131082.html Hussemann v. Hussemann 2014-05-30T13:09:12+00:00 2014-05-24T02:13:29+00:00 In 1991, Husband and Wife were married in Florida. Later that year, the couple signed a postnuptial agreement expressly providing that Florida law would apply. The agreement contained a provision stating that Wife waived all claims against Husband's estate upon his death, including her elective share. In 2005, the couple moved to Iowa. After Husband died in 2012, Wife claimed her spousal elective share under Iowa law. The agreement was enforceable under Florida law, but Wife argued that the agreement could not be enforced in Iowa because it would violate Iowa's public policy against postnuptial agreements waiving a spouse's elective share. The district court denied relief based on the choice of law provision in the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Florida law applied to the enforceability of Wife's waiver of her spousal elective share contained in the agreement. View "Hussemann v. Hussemann " on Justia Law 2014-05-23 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Mansfield 131082 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2014/cv-13-881.html In re Estate of Thompson 2014-05-23T13:08:17+00:00 2014-05-23T01:10:42+00:00 After Decedent died in 2010, Appellee, Decedent's wife, filed a complaint seeking to have a Will and Trust Decedent executed in 2009 set aside on grounds of incapacity and undue influence, or alternatively, to elect to take against the Will. The circuit court concluded (1) Appellee's election take against the Will of Decedent was valid; and (2) Decedent's intent in creating the Trust was to deprive Appellee of her elective share in his Estate, and therefore, the Trust assets would be included as part of the Estate for the limited purpose of calculating Appellee's elective share. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) including the assets of the Trust in Decedent's estate; (2) finding that Decedent intended to defraud Appellee of her statutory rights to his property; and (3) finding that when a settlor creates an inter vivos revocable trust with the intent to deprive his or her surviving spouse of marital rights to property, then the trust assets will be included in the settlor probate estate for the limited purpose of calculating the elective share. View "In re Estate of Thompson" on Justia Law 2014-05-22 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Corbin CV-13-881 http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2014/75-13.html Zook v. Pesce 2014-05-23T13:08:18+00:00 2014-05-16T22:05:44+00:00 In 2008, twenty-two days before his death, Decedent amended his 2007 Living Trust. Petitioner, Decedent's daughter, filed a complaint for inspection of records questioning the validity of the 2008 Living Trust. Petitioner subsequently requested access to a copy of the 2007 Living Trust. The trial court denied the request, finding that the unamended trust was subject to the attorney-client privilege. Thereafter, trial court found that the revisions to Decedent's 2007 Living Trust were fair and reasonable. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by failing to require that Decedent's attorney produce the 2007 Living Trust pursuant to the testamentary exception to the attorney-client privilege, but the error was harmless. View "Zook v. Pesce" on Justia Law 2014-05-16 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Adkins 75/13 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-6314/12-6314-2014-05-16.html Cartwright v. Garner 2014-05-23T13:08:16+00:00 2014-05-16T15:44:53+00:00 Trusts established by James Cartwright before his death have resulted in litigation in several jurisdictions involving his adopted children and others. The cases involve spendthrift trusts, Crummey Trusts, limited partnerships, and other entities, and tort claims of conversion, conspiracy, self-dealing, and manipulation of trust fund assets. The federal district court held that it lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that both state and federal court actions alleged claims involving administration of the trusts and were quasi in rem and that the Tennessee state court first asserted jurisdiction over the property at issue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Cartwright v. Garner" on Justia Law 2014-05-16 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Dowd 12-6314 http://law.justia.com/cases/massachusetts/supreme-court/2014/sjc-11422.html Estate of Gavin v. Tewksbury State Hosp. 2014-05-16T13:14:08+00:00 2014-05-16T03:53:05+00:00 The Estate of Steven Gavin filed a wrongful death action against the Commonwealth and Tewksbury State Hospital under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, alleging that Gavin's death was caused by the negligence of hospital staff members. The presentment of the claim was made by the Estate, through its attorney, and not by the executor or administrator of the Estate. The superior court allowed Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the statutory requirements for presentment of a claim under the Act were not met in this case. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the presentment made by the Estate, before the appointment of an executor or administrator, was proper. Remanded. View "Estate of Gavin v. Tewksbury State Hosp." on Justia Law 2014-05-15 state Massachusetts Massachusetts Supreme Court Botsford SJC-11422 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-1603/13-1603-2014-05-13.html Estate of Thouron v. United States 2014-05-16T13:15:59+00:00 2014-05-13T17:19:37+00:00 Sir John Thouron died in 2007 at the age of 99, leaving a substantial estate. Thouron's grandchildren are his only heirs. His named executor retained Smith, an experienced tax attorney. The Estate's tax return and payment were due November 6, 2007. On that date, the Estate requested an extension of time and made a payment of $6.5 million, much less than it would ultimately owe. The Estate timely filed its return in May 2008 and requested an extension of time to pay. It made no election to defer taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6166, it had conclusively determined it did not qualify. The provision allows qualifying estates to elect to pay tax liability in installments over several years. The IRS denied as untimely the Estate's request for an extension and notified the Estate that it was imposing a failure-to-pay penalty. The Estate unsuccessfully appealed administratively. The Estate then filed an appropriate form and paid all outstanding amounts, including a penalty of $999,072, plus accrued interest, then filed a request with the IRS for a refund. After not receiving a response from the IRS, the Estate filed a complaint, alleging that its failure to pay resulted from reasonable cause, reliance on Smith's advice, and not willful neglect and was not subject to penalty. The district court granted the government summary judgment, holding that under Supreme Court precedent the Estate could not show reasonable cause. The Third Circuit vacated, reasoning that the precedent did not apply to reliance on expert advice. View "Estate of Thouron v. United States" on Justia Law 2014-05-13 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Ambro 13-1603 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2014/s-14830.html Achman v. Alaska 2014-05-16T13:14:05+00:00 2014-05-10T12:49:13+00:00 Charles Kemp attempted suicide while in administrative segregation at the Anchorage Correctional Complex. He survived but suffered a serious brain injury. His mother, Marjorie Achman, sued the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging both a negligent failure to protect Kemp from self-harm and medical malpractice. The superior court granted summary judgment to DOC and awarded attorney's fees to DOC as the prevailing party. Achman appealed that decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Achman v. Alaska" on Justia Law 2014-05-09 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Maassen S-14830 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/13-1332/13-1332-2014-05-08.html Hall v. Metropolitan Life Ins., et al. 2014-05-09T13:10:49+00:00 2014-05-08T15:53:27+00:00 Plaintiff filed suit against MetLife, alleging that MetLife abused its discretion in denying her claim to receive the proceeds of her late husband's life insurance policy under an employee-benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to MetLife. The court concluded based on the evidence - the 1991 form, the husband's will, and the November 2010 form - that MetLife did not abuse its discretion in determining that the husband's son, rather than plaintiff, was the beneficiary of the life insurance proceeds. Even assuming that the substantial-compliance doctrine was available to federal courts in the interpleader context, the court would not extend it to the circumstances presented here. Where an ERISA plan administrator is given discretion under the plan to determine eligibility for benefits, the doctrine does not deprive the administrator from requiring strict compliance with the terms of the plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hall v. Metropolitan Life Ins., et al." on Justia Law 2014-05-08 federal U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Colloton 13-1332 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2014/da-13-0657.html In re Estate of Hedrick 2014-05-09T13:10:50+00:00 2014-05-08T13:07:09+00:00 In 1983, Marilyn and Stanley Hedrick executed a joint will. When Stanley died in 1995, his estate passed to Marilyn. The next year, Marilyn transferred much of her property to the Marilyn M. Hedrick 1996 Living Trust. Sheena Lamach, one of Stanley's children from another marriage, was not included as a beneficiary of Marilyn's trust. Marilyn died in 2012, and the estate entered informal probate. Under the terms of the joint will, the residue of Marilyn's estate, which consisted of the proceeds from the sale of Marilyn's home and personal property, was to be divided equally among the couple's six children. Leroy Lamach, the husband and attorney-in-fact of Sheena, filed a petition objecting to the proposed distribution, arguing that the transfer of assets to the trust violated the terms of the joint will and asking that the trust assets be distributed equally among the six children. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lamach, concluding that the joint will prohibited Marilyn from transferring property to the trust after Stanley's death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the will allowed Marilyn to transfer property into a trust during her lifetime. View "In re Estate of Hedrick" on Justia Law 2014-05-07 state Montana Montana Supreme Court McGrath DA 13-0657 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s14a0260.html Ammons v. Clouds 2014-05-09T13:10:49+00:00 2014-05-06T13:26:20+00:00 Ellis and Tomasia Ammons, the propounders of a will of Eulady Thomas, appealed a trial court judgment granting a directed verdict in favor of the caveators in a trial of the caveat to the will. Thomas executed a will in 2007; she was blind at the time. The will left all of her property to her caregiver, Tomasia Ammons, and her husband Ellis. Propounders petitioned to probate the 2007 will in solemn form. Margie Clouds and other members of Thomas's family ("Caveators") objected to the will's validity on the grounds, mainly that Thomas did not sign the will and that the witnesses to the will's execution did not sign it. The probate court admitted the will to probate in solemn form; Caveators appealed to the superior court and demanded a jury trial. Although the jury found that the propounded will was Thomas's valid last will and testament, the trial court granted Caveators' motion for directed verdict. At the time of trial, both witnesses to the propounded will were deceased. Propounders contended that the superior court erred in excluding from trial certain testimony of the attorney who drafted the will and his office assistant, regarding the authenticity of Thomas's signature. The Supreme Court concluded that on this matter, the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony, as the Court found no foundation laid for the assistant to testify that she was familiar with Thomas's signature such that she could recognize it if seen. Although there was conflicting evidence from witnessed as to whether the will had been properly executed, that simply created factual questions for the jury's resolution. The Court concluded that issue had been properly placed before the jury, and it was error for the trial court to grant Caveators' motion for directed verdict. View "Ammons v. Clouds" on Justia Law 2014-05-05 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Hines S14A0260 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2014/26748.html In re Estate of Long 2014-05-02T13:08:25+00:00 2014-05-02T03:34:51+00:00 After Earl Long died, Earl's daughter, Brenda Chafin, challenged the validity of Earl's estate plan, which included certain gifts and amendments to his trust. The circuit court concluded that Earl's estate plan was valid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it determined that Earl had the requisite testamentary capacity to carry out his estate plan; (2) the circuit court was correct in determining that Earl's estate plan was not the product of undue influence; and (3) the circuit court did not err by not requiring the distributions to be equalized under a review of Earl's entire estate plan. View "In re Estate of Long" on Justia Law 2014-04-30 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court Gilbertson 26748 http://law.justia.com/cases/alaska/supreme-court/2014/s-14770.html Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust 2014-04-25T13:09:34+00:00 2014-04-19T04:12:11+00:00 Olive Kathryn Purcella (Kathryn) filed a petition in the Anchorage superior court to reform or terminate the Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust. The superior court held, after trial, that Kathryn had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that she did not intend to execute an irrevocable trust or that the trust was the product of undue influence, and denied her petition. Kathryn appealed, arguing that the factual findings on which the superior court predicated its ruling were in error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust" on Justia Law 2014-04-18 state Alaska Alaska Supreme Court Bolger S-14770 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2014/130971.html Sheppard v. Junes 2014-04-25T13:09:35+00:00 2014-04-18T16:43:39+00:00 John Warren Shepperd, who never married and had no children, died without having executed a will. Fourteen second cousins from John's maternal side and Jason Shepperd, John's half-uncle from John's paternal side, survived John's death. The administrator of John's estate sought judicial assistance to determine the proper distribution proportions of John's estate where all the heirs were collaterals and the estate must be separated into paternal and maternal parts. The circuit court held that, because of Jason's half-blood status, Jason could only take a one-half share of John's estate that was to pass to John's paternal side, and the remainder of John's estate was to go to the fourteen maternal second cousins. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Va. Code Ann. 64.2-200(A)(5) requires John's estate to be separated into two moieties, each valued at one-half of John's estate, with one moiety half passing to John's maternal kindred and the other moiety passing to John's paternal kindred; (2) the maternal side moiety passes to John's fourteen second cousins, and the other moiety passes to John's paternal kindred; and (3) Va. Code Ann. 64.2-202(A) requires John's paternal side moiety to be distributed entirely to Jason. View "Sheppard v. Junes" on Justia Law 2014-04-17 state Virginia Virginia Supreme Court Millette 130971 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2014/131512.html Dean v. Morris 2014-04-18T13:11:03+00:00 2014-04-18T12:41:24+00:00 Shirley Gregg Dean (Shirley) and Marion Casey Dean (Casey) married in 1978. Shirley died in 1999. At the time, Shirley's daughters (the sisters) decided not to probate their mother's estate, basing their decision on their belief that Shirley had an oral contract with Casey for him to provide for them in his will. After Casey died in 2010, the sisters sued Casey's estate for breach of an oral contract between Casey and Shirley. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the sisters, concluding that they carried their burden of proving that there was an oral agreement between Casey and Shirley to leave one-third of Casey's estate to Shirley's children if Shirley predeceased Casey. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court ruling that a contract existed between Shirley and Casey, holding that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence as to the terms of the agreement between Casey and Shirley. View "Dean v. Morris" on Justia Law 2014-04-17 state Virginia Virginia Supreme Court Powell 131512 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca4/12-2465/12-2465-2014-04-17.html Anderson v. Architectural Glass Construction 2014-04-18T13:14:14+00:00 2014-04-17T22:32:10+00:00 Debtor transferred her interest in real property to AGC, a corporation wholly owned by her husband. Seven months later, debtor declared bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court concluded that the conveyance was constructively fraudulent. The bankruptcy court found AGC did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it paid for the property or intended to pay for it on the date of the property's purchase. The bankruptcy court also found that, at the time of the purchase, the parties intended that AGC would serve as the property's tenant, not the property's owner. AGC also did not prove that it intended to own the property on the date of acquisition. Therefore, the bankruptcy court found no justification for a resulting trust. The district court found no fault in the bankruptcy court's findings of fact, but nonetheless reversed. The court reversed the district court insofar as it found a resulting trust to sever debtor's legal and equitable interests in the property. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Architectural Glass Construction" on Justia Law 2014-04-17 federal U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Motz 12-2465 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0116.html Erdelyi v. Lott 2014-04-18T13:12:49+00:00 2014-04-13T20:36:08+00:00 In February 2011, two years and four months after Plaintiff learned she had been disinherited by her mother, Plaintiff filed a complaint against financial advisor Bradley Lott for fraud and constructive fraud. A jury found that Lott had committed constructive fraud but that Plaintiff knew or should have known before February 2007 that the fraud occurred. Based on the jury's findings, the district court dismissed the action, concluding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding (1) the evidence did not support a finding that Plaintiff could have discovered the fraud sooner, and (2) therefore, the district court erred by dismissing the case based on the statute of limitations. Remanded for a new trial. View "Erdelyi v. Lott" on Justia Law 2014-04-11 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Kite S-13-0116 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1120612.html Regions Bank v. Lowrey 2014-04-18T13:11:02+00:00 2014-04-11T20:18:23+00:00 Regions Bank, as sole trustee of the J.F.B. Lowrey Trust, appealed a circuit court order that awarded Regions $312,257.36 from the Lowrey Trust as reimbursement for attorney fees and expenses Regions incurred as trustee during the successful defense of an action brought against Regions by Sam G. Lowrey, Jr., and Shelby Jones, two of the beneficiaries of the Trust. The beneficiaries sued Regions, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, claiming Regions failed to protect and preserve the assets of the Lowrey Trust, which consisted primarily of approximately 20,000 acres of timberland located in Monroe and Conecuh Counties and which have been the subject of much intra-family litigation. Hurricane Ivan made landfall and moved over Monroe and Conecuh Counties, causing severe wind damage and destruction of much of the standing timber owned by the Lowrey Trust. In their complaint, the beneficiaries asserted that Regions should have purchased casualty-loss insurance on the timber, should have sold most of the timberland before Hurricane Ivan in order to diversify the investments of the trust estate, should have cut the timber more rapidly, or should have pursued some combination of these tactics in order to preserve the corpus of the Trust. The trial court entered a detailed order in favor of Regions, rejecting the beneficiaries' claims of mismanagement of the trust assets and taxing costs against the beneficiaries. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Regions was entitled to reimbursement of fees and expenses and costs arising out of the litigation. The trial court exceeded its discretion by reducing Regions' reimbursement by both a line-by-line reduction and a percentage reduction. The trial court's January 8, 2013 was reversed in its entirety and remanded for consideration of the reasonableness of each aspect of Regions' reimbursement request. View "Regions Bank v. Lowrey" on Justia Law 2014-04-11 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Parker 1120612 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s13g1709.html England v. Simmons 2014-04-04T14:07:27+00:00 2014-04-04T14:07:27+00:00 Robert Haege died in 2006. Three months earlier, Haege made a will, in which he left his "personal assets" to his brother and sister, and in which he left his "business interests, both tangible and intangible, real or personal, connected to the business known as Traditional Fine Art, Ltd." to his brother, sister, and two longtime employees. After Haege died, questions arose about the disposition of property associated with Traditional Fine Art, Ltd., insofar as Traditional Fine Art was a sole proprietorship and, therefore, had no legal existence separate and apart from Haege himself. The will was admitted to probate, and Sharon Haege England (sister) was appointed executrix of his estate. England failed to distribute any property to James Simmons and Elery Stinson, the two employees. The employees filed suit against England, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the meaning of the will with respect to the property associated with Traditional Fine Art. The trial court ruled in favor of England, concluding that, because Traditional Fine Art was only a sole proprietorship, the property associated with the business was merely the personal property of Haege. Simmons and Stinson appealed, and in a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. To the Supreme Court, England did not dispute the fundamental premise of the decision of the Court of Appeals, that a sole proprietor could separately dispose in his will of personal property connected with his sole proprietorship and his other personal property. Instead, England argued that Haege did not actually intend to separately dispose of any property associated with his sole proprietorship. Taking the will as a whole, the Supreme Court concluded that the most natural and reasonable understanding of the provisions of the will was that Haege left his personal property that amounted to "business interests . . . connected to the business known as Traditional Fine Art, Ltd." specifically including, but not limited to, membership certificates that he owned, to Simmons, Stinson, and his brother and sister, and he left all of his other personal property to his brother and sister alone. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "England v. Simmons" on Justia Law 2014-03-17 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Blackwell S13G1709 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130181.html Estate of Wicklund 2014-04-04T13:11:23+00:00 2014-04-04T06:15:03+00:00 The surviving children of Maurice Wicklund appealed an order granting Betty Wicklund's petition for an elective share, personal representative fees, attorney fees, and funeral and last illness expenses from Maurice Wicklund's estate after remand in "Estate of Wicklund" (812 N.W.2d 359). Finding no abuse of discretion in granting Betty Wicklund's petition, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Wicklund" on Justia Law 2014-04-03 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Sandstrom 20130181 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130217.html Erickson v. Olsen 2014-04-04T13:11:23+00:00 2014-04-04T06:12:39+00:00 Appellants Dean Olsen, Susan ("Sue") Olsen, Bobby Olsen, Clee Raye Olsen, and Marion Bergquist appealed a district court judgment invalidating transfers of money and real property from Clarence Erickson to the appellants and invalidating Clarence Erickson's will on the bases of lack of capacity and undue influence. The appellants also appealed a district court order denying the appellants' N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b) motion to amend the district court's findings and judgment. Because the district court findings were not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment. The appellants' appeal of the district court's Rule 52(b) order was dismissed. View "Erickson v. Olsen" on Justia Law 2014-04-03 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Kapsner 20130217 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2014/cv-13-939.html Bryant v. Osborn 2014-04-04T13:11:21+00:00 2014-04-04T02:21:29+00:00 At issue in this case was real property owned by Lacy Bryant at the time of his death. Lacy left a will devising a life estate in the realty to his wife, Naomi, and devising the remainder to his youngest child, Brenda Osborn. Lacy's will was never admitted to probate. Instead, Osborn filed an affidavit for collection of small estate, and later executed and filed an "Administrator's Deed" transferring the real property from Lacy's estate to herself. After Naomi died, Appellants, some of Lacy's heirs, filed an action against Osborn, asking the court to, among other things, declare that the terms of the will were invalid and that Lacy had died intestate. Ultimately, the circuit court found that Osborn had fully complied with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 28-41-101, the statute governing the collection of small estates, and that the Administrator's Deed was a valid conveyance of Lacy's real property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that Osborn satisfied the statutory procedures for collection of a small estate and that the Administrator's Deed was a valid conveyance. Remanded. View "Bryant v. Osborn" on Justia Law 2014-04-03 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Hart CV-13-939 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2014/120627.html Sabin v. Ackerman 2014-04-04T13:15:32+00:00 2014-03-29T10:49:48+00:00 Elmer Gaede, who owned a 120-acre farm together with his wife, died testate on February 2005. Elmer's daughter, Diean, was named executor under the will. Diean designated Ivan Ackerman to render legal services in the administration of the estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings, Elmer's son James and his wife, who were leasing the farm, exercised the option under the lease agreement to purchase the farm. Diean later filed this legal malpractice lawsuit against Ackerman, alleging that Ackerman failed to adequately protect her personal interests relating to the enforceability of the option. The district court granted summary judgment for Ackerman, determining that Ackerman did not have a duty to protect Diean's personal interests. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute existed over the question of whether Diean had a reasonable expectation that Ackerman was representing her personal interests. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that insufficient facts supported Diean's claim that Ackerman reasonably understood that Diean expected him to protect her personal interests in challenging the option. View "Sabin v. Ackerman" on Justia Law 2014-03-28 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Cady 120627 http://law.justia.com/cases/florida/supreme-court/2014/sc11-2147.html Aldrich v. Basile 2014-03-28T13:10:38+00:00 2014-03-28T06:55:11+00:00 Ann Aldrich died before having revised her will to dispose of an inheritance she received from her sister. Ann's husband, James Aldrich, argued that the most appropriate construction of the will was that Ann intended for the property she had acquired from her sister to pass to him. Ann's nieces disagreed with James's construction of the will. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of James pursuant to the purported authority of Fla. Stat. 732.6005(2), which provides that a will shall be construed to pass all property that the testator owned at death, including property acquired after the will is executed. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that section 732.6005(2) did not control because the disputed property was not alluded to in the will and, therefore, it was irrelevant whether it was acquired before or after the will was executed. The Supreme Court approved the decision of the First District, holding that section 732.6005 does not require construing a will as disposing of property not named or in any way described in the will, despite the absence of any residuary clause, or any other clause disposing of the property, where the decedent acquired the property in question after the will was executed. View "Aldrich v. Basile" on Justia Law 2014-03-27 state Florida Florida Supreme Court Quince SC11-2147 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1111018.html Jakeman v. Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, et al. 2014-03-28T13:14:00+00:00 2014-03-22T12:23:33+00:00 Kenneth Jakeman appealed the trial court's dismissal of his claims against defendants Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, Montgomery Memorial Cemetery ("MMC"), and Judy A. Jones. Lawrence Group owned and operated Montgomery Memorial Cemetery. Lawrence Group purchased the cemetery from Alderwoods, Inc. in or around 2002. In 1967, Jakeman's father, Ben, purchased a 'family plot' in the cemetery containing 10 separate burial spaces. The plot Ben selected was specifically chosen because of its location adjacent to plots owned by Ben's mother, Frances O'Neal. Pursuant to the terms of the purchase agreement, burial within Ben's plot was limited to members of either the Jakeman family or the O'Neal family. In 2002, MMC allegedly mistakenly conveyed two spaces in Ben's family plot to James Jones and his wife, Judy. James was interred in one of those two spaces. In 2006, Kenneth Jakeman learned that James had been buried in Ben's family plot, at which time, Kenneth says, he immediately notified MMC and Ben. In response to demands by Kenneth and Ben, MMC disinterred James and moved both his body and his marker; however, James was reinterred in another space on Ben's family plot. Ben died in 2008. At the time of Ben's death, James's body remained buried in one of the spaces in Ben's plot. Despite the offer of an exchange of burial spaces, and based upon their purported refusal to again exhume and move James's body and marker, in May 2010 Kenneth Jakeman filed suit against Alderwoods, Lawrence Group, MMC, and Judy Jones, alleging breach of contract; trespass; negligence, willfulness, and/or wantonness; the tort of outrage; and conversion. In her answer to Kenneth's complaint, Judy asserted her own cross-claim against Alderwoods, Lawrence Group, and MMC, based on their alleged error in conveying to her spaces already owned by Ben and the initial erroneous burial of James, his disinterment, and his subsequent erroneous reburial in another of Ben's spaces. Alderwoods moved to dismiss Kenneth Jakeman's complaint, arguing he lacked 'standing' to pursue the stated claims, that the asserted tort claims did not survive Ben's death, and that some of the claims were barred by the expiration of the applicable limitations periods. Lawrence Group and MMC later joined Alderwoods's dismissal motion. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that Kenneth Jakeman was entitled to pursue his individual breach-of-contract claim concerning MMC's reinterment of James Jones in one of the his family's plots, and that he was entitled to pursue his claim for injunctive relief. View "Jakeman v. Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, et al. " on Justia Law 2014-03-21 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Murdock 1111018 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1101290.html Wehle v. Bradley 2014-03-28T13:10:37+00:00 2014-03-21T16:55:58+00:00 Daughters Bonnie Wehle, Penny Martin, and Sharon Ann Wehle appealed a Circuit Court's order on final settlement of the estate of their father, Robert G. Wehle. In this "final order," the circuit court denied the daughters' claims against Thomas H. Bradley III, James H. McGowan, and Grady Hartzog, as the co-personal representatives of the estate; the order also denied the daughters'request that McGowan be removed as a cotrustee of the family trust created under Robert G. Wehle's will. After review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order insofar as the amount of compensation awarded to the personal representatives and insofar as it refused to remove McGowan as a cotrustee of the family trust. The Court reversed the circuit court's order insofar as it denied the daughters' interest claims, awarded attorney fees and costs to the personal representatives, and failed to tax the costs of the appeal in "Wehle I" against the personal representatives. The case was remanded back to the circuit court for the purpose of taxing the costs of the appeal in Wehle I against the personal representatives, and for the award of interest against the personal representatives. View "Wehle v. Bradley" on Justia Law 2014-03-14 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Murdock 1101290 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ca-02029-sct.html Kimbrough v. Estate of David Kimbrough 2014-03-21T13:10:50+00:00 2014-03-21T05:14:02+00:00 David "Junior" Kimbrough died in 1998, leaving his entire estate to his long-time girlfriend, Mildred Washington. Matthew Johnson was named executor of the estate. Johnson petitioned the court to probate Kimbrough's will. Contestants filed to contest the will, and no other entries were filed during the next ten years. In September 2008, an entry of appearance was entered on behalf of four remaining contestants, which was followed by an entry of appearance on behalf of Johnson. In 2009, the chancery court denied Executor's Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss, granted Contestants' motion to compel discovery, granted Contestants' motion to remove executor, and appointed the chancery clerk of Marshall County as executor. Johnson then filed his motion to dismiss alleging a violation of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h), because Washington was served process almost eleven years after the commencement of the action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but it granted a stay of the proceedings pending petition for interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court, which was subsequently denied. A trial on the matter was held in 2012. After Contestants rested their case, Proponents moved the trial court for dismissal, and the chancellor ultimately granted their motion and dismissed the case. Contestants appealed to the Supreme Court, raising nine issues all pertaining to the validity of the will, and whether the trial court erred in granting Proponents' Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in granting Proponents' Mississippi Rules Civil Procedure 41(b) motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the chancery court. View "Kimbrough v. Estate of David Kimbrough" on Justia Law 2014-03-20 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Pierce 2012-CA-02029-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27367.html In the Matter of Charles Rider 2014-03-21T13:10:51+00:00 2014-03-19T16:07:55+00:00 The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in "Rider v. Estate of Rider," (713 S.E.2d 643 (Ct. App. 2011)), which applied the common law of agency to hold that certain financial assets were part of the decedent's probate estate. The decedent had directed his bank to transfer specified assets in his investment account to a new account for his spouse, but died before all of the assets were credited to the account. The issue in this case was one of first impression for the Supreme Court, and after review of the facts, the Court reversed the appellate court: "[o]nce Husband issued the entitlement order and was the appropriate person, Wachovia was obligated by the UCC and the parties' Account Agreement to obey his directive. Wachovia had set up a new investment account in Wife's name and commenced the transfer of securities within a few days of Husband's request, so at that point, Wife already had a recognizable interest, even though Wachovia had not posted all of the securities to her account. The Court of Appeals, in focusing solely on the date of the 'book entry,' which it took to mean the date the securities were credited or posted to Wife's account, seemed to view this as the exclusive means for obtaining an interest in the securities." View "In the Matter of Charles Rider" on Justia Law 2014-03-19 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Beatty 27367 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/12-2532/12-2532-2014-03-14.html United States v. Phillips 2014-03-21T13:14:51+00:00 2014-03-14T17:53:20+00:00 In 2009 Betty and Wayne submitted a tax return on behalf of a Betty Phillips Trust, signed by Betty, who was listed as the trustee, claiming income of $47,997. A second return on behalf of a Wayne Phillips trust, was signed by Wayne, but Betty was listed as trustee. This return reported income of $1,057,585. Both returns claimed that all income had gone to pay fiduciary fees, so that the trusts had no taxable income. The Wayne Trust claimed a refund of $352,528. The Betty Trust claimed $15,999. The IRS issued a check for $352,528. They endorsed the check and deposited it into a joint account. The returns were fraudulent. The IRS had no record of any taxes being paid by the trusts. In December, the IRS served summonses. That month, the couple withdrew $244,137 remaining from their refund proceeds using 13 different locations. They followed the same strategy the next year, but did not receive checks. A jury convicted Betty of conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to claims (18 U.S.C. 286), and of knowingly making a false claim to the government (18 U.S.C. 287.1). The district court sentenced her to 41 months' imprisonment and ordered them to pay $352,528 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the court improperly admitted evidence, and that the government constructively amended the indictment and violated Betty's right against self‐incrimination. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law 2014-03-14 federal U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Flaum 12-2532 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2014/cv-13-756.html Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v. Matthews 2014-03-14T13:13:32+00:00 2014-03-14T02:31:38+00:00 Appellee, as special administrator of the estate of Rufus Owens and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Owens, filed a lawsuit against Pine Hills Health and Rehabilitation, LLC and others for injuries Owens sustained during his care and treatment at Pine Hills. Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. Appellee argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because there was no evidence of mutual assent where the agreement was signed by Appellee as the "responsible party" but did not bear the signature of a representative of Pine Hills. The circuit court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no objective evidence of mutual assent, and therefore, the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. View "Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v. Matthews" on Justia Law 2014-03-13 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Hart CV-13-756 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-70323/12-70323-2014-03-12.html Estate of Saunders v. CIR 2014-03-14T13:15:47+00:00 2014-03-12T21:24:02+00:00 Petitioners challenged the Commissioner's disallowance of a $30 million deduction on the Estate's tax return for a lawsuit pending at the time of Gertrude Saunders' death (the Stonehill Claim). The court concluded that the Stonehill Claim was disputed at the date of the decedent's death, and its estimated value as of that date was not ascertainable with reasonable certainty. Therefore, the tax court properly disallowed the Estate's deduction, but correctly allowed a deduction in the amount paid to settle the Stonehill Claim after the decedent's death. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Estate of Saunders v. CIR" on Justia Law 2014-03-12 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Smith 12-70323 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2014/sc93606.html In re Brockmire 2014-03-14T13:11:16+00:00 2014-03-12T09:45:09+00:00 In 2011, Lonnie Brockmire ("Decedent") died intestate. Decedent was survived by his only biological child, Sherri, and Sherri's daughter, Bella. Sherri was adopted by her stepfather after she became an adult and prior to Decedent's death. After Decedent died, Sherri sought a partial distribution of Decedent's estate to Bella. The circuit court granted the distribution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bella had no right to inherit Decedent's estate pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 474.060.1 and 474.010(2) because (1) Sherri was not a "child" of Decedent at the time he died, and (2) even if she was, Sherri did not predecease Decedent. View "In re Brockmire" on Justia Law 2014-03-11 state Missouri Missouri Supreme Court Wilson SC93606 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-40.html Estate of Collopy 2014-03-07T14:17:09+00:00 2014-03-07T10:29:41+00:00 In 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. issued a mortgage to Robert Collopy, who transferred the mortgaged property to a trust. Collopy died later that year. In 2010, the Bank of New York Mellon, which had assumed trustee responsibility for administration of the mortgage, filed an action to foreclose on the mortgage, naming Collopy, in his individual capacity and as trustee of the trust, as the defendant. Collopy's heir and co-trustee, Bobbie King, defended against the foreclosure action. In 2013, after an unfavorable ruling in the foreclosure action, the Bank filed a petition for the formal appointment of a special administrator to Collopy's estate. The probate court dismissed the petition as untimely under Me. Rev. Stat. 18-A, 3-108(a), which prohibits the initiation of appointment proceedings more than three years after the decedent's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bank's petition was properly denied for having been filed outside the three-year limitations period in section 3-108(a). View "Estate of Collopy " on Justia Law 2014-03-06 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Per Curiam http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0121.html Courtenay C. & Lucy Patten Davis Found. v. Colo. State Univ. Research Found. 2014-03-07T14:23:48+00:00 2014-03-05T10:09:03+00:00 In 1997, the Courtenay C. Davis Foundation and Amy Davis (together, "Davis Interests") entered into an agreement with the University of Wyoming Foundation and the Colorado State University Research Foundation (together, "University Foundations") in which the Davis Interests donated land and other interests to the University Foundations subject to the terms of the agreement. In 2011, the University Foundations decided to sell the gifted property and listed it for sale. In 2012, the Davis Interests filed an action against the University Foundations seeking to enjoin the sale of the property. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the donation from the Davis Interests to the University Foundations was a gift, that the agreement did not create an implied trust, and that only the attorney general had standing to enforce the terms of a charitable gift. View "Courtenay C. & Lucy Patten Davis Found. v. Colo. State Univ. Research Found." on Justia Law 2014-03-04 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Golden S-13-0121 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-39.html McCollor v. McCollor 2014-03-07T14:17:10+00:00 2014-03-05T10:02:11+00:00 After Frederick McCollor died in 2010, Frederick's wife, Patricia, brought suit against the couple's children, John and Cheryl, for violation of the Improvident Transfers of Title Act (ITTA), undue influence, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The suit stemmed from actions John and Cheryl took at the end of Frederick's life, including persuading Frederick and Patricia to transfer Frederick's home to John and Cheryl and transferring over $22,000 from Frederick's account to a joint account while John acted under a power of attorney obtained from Frederick five days after Frederick had a stroke. The superior court (1) concluded that the transfer of the real property was obtained through undue influence and was therefore void pursuant to the ITTA; (2) determined that John breached his fiduciary duty as the holder of Frederick's power of attorney with regard to his transfer and use of Frederick's money; and (3) ordered that the real property be held in constructive trust for the benefit of Frederick's estate, and that John reimburse the estate in the amount of $22,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "McCollor v. McCollor" on Justia Law 2014-03-04 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Levy http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s13a1390.html Copelan v. Copelan 2014-03-07T14:17:07+00:00 2014-03-04T18:34:40+00:00 Four children-beneficiaries to the estate of Evelyn Copelan contested her will. Appellants sought to probate a will in which their mother left almost her entire estate to them, leaving only one dollar each to the appellees. In turn, the appellees opposed the admission of the will to probate, claiming that their mother was without testamentary capacity when she executed the will, and asserting that their mother made the will under the undue influence of the appellants. The probate court admitted the will to probate, the appellees sought review in the superior court. Following a jury trial, the superior court entered a judgment for the appellees, denying the petition of the appellants to probate the will. The appellants sought the Supreme Court's review. But finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Copelan v. Copelan" on Justia Law 2014-03-03 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Blackwell S13A1390 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s13g1162.html Rollins v. Rollins 2014-03-07T14:17:09+00:00 2014-03-04T14:23:01+00:00 O. Wayne Rollins established ten irrevocable trusts, the Rollins Children's Trust (RCT), and nine Subchapter S-trusts, each for the benefit of his nine grandchildren. Wayne's sons, Gary and Randall, and a close friend of the elder Rollins, Henry Tippie, were named trustees. In 2010, four of the nine beneficiaries of the S-trusts brought suit against the trustees alleging breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking, among other things, an accounting of the family entities. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the trustees and refused to order a judicial accounting of the entities which held the trust assets. To this, the trial court noted, in part, that although the trustees failed to provide an accounting of the trust assets, plaintiffs ultimately received a report on trust assets and "complete relief" on their requests through discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding: (1) plaintiffs were entitled to an accounting; (2) the trustees could be held to trustee-level fiduciary standards with regard to the family entities; and (3) genuine issues of material fact remained with regard to whether the trustees breached their fiduciary duties in administering the trusts. The issues this case presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial court should have ordered an accounting of the family entities; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the appellants had trustee-level fiduciary duties. The Court answered 'yes' to both questions presented, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law 2014-03-03 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Thompson S13G1162 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1111006.html Stokes, Jr. v. Cottrell 2014-03-07T14:23:37+00:00 2014-03-01T14:50:17+00:00 The parties in this case separately petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment overturning an award of property from the estate of Estelle Haggerty Alexander. The decedent owned 270 acres of property, and died intestate. Following a bench trial, the court divided the six parcels of land that constituted Estelle's estate, finding that the plaintiffs and their ancestors had adversely possessed three parcels by living on the land and engaging in certain activities there but that the heirs of Larenda Jenkins, as holders of legal title, were entitled to the other three, farmed parcels. Holding that the plaintiffs' possession of the land was permissive rather than adverse, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment in part and instructed the circuit court that title to all six parcels should be quieted in the heirs of Larenda Jenkins. After careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[t]he Court of Civil Appeals stated the ore tenus rule in its standard-of-review section, but in its analysis of the evidence did not accord the circuit court's findings the required deference. . . . we conclude that credible evidence was presented to support the circuit court's allotment to the plaintiffs of the three parcels . . .it is a rare case when this Court will overturn a finding by a trial judge who hears an adverse possession case presented ore tenus." View "Stokes, Jr. v. Cottrell" on Justia Law 2014-02-28 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Moore 1111006 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2014/26728.html In re Conservatorship of Gaaskjolen 2014-03-07T14:17:15+00:00 2014-02-28T13:09:54+00:00 Dora Gaaskjolen was an eighty-seven year-old widow who suffered from a traumatic head injury and other physical ailments. Dora's grandson, Shane, an attorney, filed a petition for appointment of temporary conservator, and the circuit court ordered Dacotah Bank to be Dora's temporary conservator. Shane subsequently moved for Dacotah to be Dora's permanent conservator, but Dora moved to set aside the appointment of Dacotah as temporary conservator and, instead, nominated her daughter Audrey to be her conservator. Ultimately, the circuit court granted Shane's motion for Dacotah to be Dora's permanent conservator and denied Dora's motion, finding that it was in the best interests of Dora that Dacotah be appointed as her conservator. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's finding and conservator appointment had support in the record. View "In re Conservatorship of Gaaskjolen" on Justia Law 2014-02-26 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court Severson 26728 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2014/27360.html Beach First National Bank v. Estate of Gurnham 2014-03-07T14:17:14+00:00 2014-02-26T20:25:12+00:00 Brian Hover, son of decedent Margaret Dever Hover Gurnham and the Personal Representative of her Estate, appealed the circuit court's order confirming the probate court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Beach First National Bank to enforce a deficiency judgment against the Estate. Hover argued the Bank's claim (which arose following a foreclosure action) was untimely and, thus, barred by section 62-3-8031 of the South Carolina Probate Code (Probate Code). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Bank's claim was barred because it was presented outside the time limits of the applicable statute. View "Beach First National Bank v. Estate of Gurnham" on Justia Law 2014-02-26 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Beatty 27360 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0098.html In re Wrongful Death of Daniel P. Soran 2014-03-07T14:21:12+00:00 2014-02-26T18:05:59+00:00 In 2011, Decedent died of injuries incurred in an automobile accident. Decedent was survived by his allegedly estranged wife, Laura Soran, and by his parents and sister. Decedent's father, in his capacity as personal representative, brought a wrongful death claim brought against Robert Curran, the driver of the vehicle in which Decedent was a passenger when he died, and settled with Curran's insurance providers for $400,000. A dispute subsequently arose between Decedent's beneficiaries as to how the settlement proceeds should be distributed. The district court awarded Laura seventy-five percent of the settlement proceeds and divided the remainder among Decedent's parents and sister. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's distribution order was clearly erroneous in that it misapplied the burden of proof and improperly presumed damages in favor of Decedent's wife where Decedent's marital relationship was uncertain. Remanded. View "In re Wrongful Death of Daniel P. Soran" on Justia Law 2014-02-25 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Hill S-13-0098 http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0077.html Estate of Dahlke 2014-03-07T14:17:17+00:00 2014-02-26T18:05:11+00:00 After H. Kent Dahlke died in 2003, leaving a will he had executed in 2001, there were irregularities in the administration of Kent's estate, including the probate court's failure to advise Kent's surviving wife, Sara Dahlke, of her statutory elective share, and the court's failure to assure that Kent's heirs waived a hearing on a decree of distribution. Sara later died. In 2011, five years after the decree of distribution of Kent's estate was entered and its assets were distributed to the devisees, Sara's daughter, Susan Jubie, acting as the personal representative of Kent's estate, the personal representative of Sara's estate, and individually, sought to set aside the decree of distribution of Kent's estate. The district court declined to set the decree aside. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the probate process went awry in this case, the law governing finality of judgments required that the decree of dissolution stand. View "Estate of Dahlke" on Justia Law 2014-02-25 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Davis S-13-0077 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-32.html Estate of Greenblatt 2014-03-07T14:17:10+00:00 2014-02-26T17:47:11+00:00 Ada Greenblatt died testate and without issue. Ada's will did not provide instructions on how to distribute her residuary estate, which consisted primarily of real property and personal property, including a mizrah - an ornamental religious print - valued at $100. Ada's brother, Owen Greenblatt, who was designated as a personal representative of Ada's estate, selected the mizrah. When the personal representatives petitioned the probate court for an order completing settlement of the estate, Mark Levine, a residuary beneficiary of the estate, opposed the petition, claiming that Owen breached his fiduciary duty to the estate by taking the mizrah. The court entered a judgment completing settlement of the estate, finding that the distribution of the personal property was not improper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the distribution scheme and Owen's selection of the mizrah was not an abuse of the personal representatives' discretion, and thus did not violate the fiduciary duty of impartiality. View "Estate of Greenblatt" on Justia Law 2014-02-25 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Jabar http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/13-1005/13-1005-2014-02-25.html Johnson, Jr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 2014-03-07T14:23:36+00:00 2014-02-25T20:01:04+00:00 Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the mortgage trust that claimed to hold his mortgage was not validly assigned the mortgage, and therefore, his mortgage could not be foreclosed by the trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the trustee, Wells Fargo. The court affirmed, concluding that the assignment to the mortgage trust was valid. Given the record, including the custodian's initial certification failing to list the promissory note as missing - which provided a strong inference that the note was not missing - and given the lack of any other reason to believe the note was or is missing, the court agreed with the district court that no reasonable jury could find that the original promissory note was not in the Trust's possession on the startup date of the Trust. View "Johnson, Jr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law 2014-02-25 federal U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Kelly 13-1005 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130162.html Peterson v. Jasmanka 2014-03-07T14:23:44+00:00 2014-02-22T13:04:07+00:00 Monica Clark, as the personal representative of the estate of Lester Jasmanka, appealed a district court order denying her motion to vacate a 1990 default judgment quieting title to certain mineral interests in Jack and Eugene Peterson. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding: (1) the 1990 judgment was not void and therefore could not be vacated; and (2) the motion to vacate the judgment for fraud and misrepresentation was untimely. View "Peterson v. Jasmanka" on Justia Law 2014-02-21 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Sandstrom 20130162 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ca-00601-sct.html Anderson v. LaVere 2014-03-07T14:17:12+00:00 2014-02-22T12:58:13+00:00 When legendary blues musician Robert Johnson died intestate in 1938, he had no money and appeared to have left no assets to distribute to heirs, so no estate was opened at that time. But the increasing popularity of Johnson's music over the years following his death led Steven LaVere, a music producer from Tennessee who owned Delta Haze Corporation, to contact Johnson's half-sister, Carrie Thompson, about previously unpublished photographs of Johnson. Believing Thompson to be Johnson's only heir, LaVere requested the photographs to launch a new release of Johnson's music. The legatees of Carrie Thompson sought to recover royalties and fees from the use of two photographs that were ultimately used in the project. Among the several reasons the trial court denied their claim was that the statute of limitations had expired. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. LaVere" on Justia Law 2014-02-20 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Dickinson 2012-CA-00601-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2014/2012-085.html In re Estate of Lucien Couture 2014-03-07T14:17:13+00:00 2014-02-21T18:37:29+00:00 Respondent Hellen Couture appealed a probate court decision to grant petitioner Thomas Couture's petition to impose a constructive trust for the benefit of the decedent's heirs over certain life insurance proceeds paid to respondent upon the decedent's death. After review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the probate court's decision, and affirmed. View "In re Estate of Lucien Couture" on Justia Law 2014-02-21 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Conboy 2012-085 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2014/13-0290.html Marrara v. Ripley Assocs., LLC 2014-02-21T14:11:05+00:00 2014-02-21T04:57:52+00:00 After disagreements over Ripley Associates, LLC's operation arose, the Domenick Marrara, Jr. Trust, which owned a twenty-five percent interest in Ripley, decided to dissociate from Ripley. The Trust and its Trustees filed this proceeding to enforce Ripley's purchase of the Trust's distributional interest. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court determined the fair market value of the Trust's distributional interest in Ripley. The court subsequently ordered that Ripley should pay interest on this amount from the date the court determined the value of the Trust's distributional interest at the hearing. The Trustees appealed, arguing that they were entitled to receive interest on the Trust's distributional interest from the date of its dissociation from Ripley. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payment of interest upon a dissociated member's distributional interest in an at-will limited liability company is calculated from the date of dissociation. View "Marrara v. Ripley Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law 2014-02-20 state West Virginia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Davis 13-0290 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2014/cv-13-623.html Bell v. McDonald 2014-02-21T14:11:03+00:00 2014-02-21T04:26:36+00:00 After Decedent died, Decedent's will was admitted to probate, and all of Decedent's property was devised to his sister. Appellant petitioned to inherit from Decedent's estate, claiming that she was the pretermitted child of Decedent and that she was entitled to receive all of his estate as his sole heir. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's petition for failing to file her claim against the Estate and failing to establish her paternity within the 180-day period required under Ark. Code Ann. 28-9-209(d). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Appellant's petition due to her failure to satisfy the statutory requirements. View "Bell v. McDonald" on Justia Law 2014-02-20 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Hoofman CV-13-623 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1120678.html Beam v. Taylor 2014-02-21T14:11:02+00:00 2014-02-15T13:46:19+00:00 In appeal no. 1120678, Michael D. Beam appealed circuit court orders in a conservatorship proceeding. In appeal no. 1120679, Michael appealed a will-contest proceeding that was then-pending in the same court. Upon review of these cases, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the conservatorship proceeding and that the orders entered by the circuit court in were void and therefore should have been vacated. Because a void order will not support an appeal, the Court dismissed appeal no. 1120678 and directed the circuit court to vacate its orders. View "Beam v. Taylor" on Justia Law 2014-02-14 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Bryan 1120678 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2014/20130126.html Estate of Huston 2014-02-21T14:11:04+00:00 2014-02-15T05:14:10+00:00 James Huston appealed an order denying his petition to remove Wilma Russell as personal representative of Virgil Huston's estate and from an order denying Russell's petition to determine Virgil Huston's heirs. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the district court did not misapply the law and provided a reasoned explanation for its determination not to remove Russell as personal representative of the estate. The court's decision was not arbitrary, unconscionable or unreasonable, and the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying James Huston's petition to remove Russell as personal representative. View "Estate of Huston" on Justia Law 2014-02-13 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Crothers 20130126 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2014/cv-13-692.html J.B. Hunt v. Thornton 2014-02-14T14:10:40+00:00 2014-02-14T04:16:03+00:00 J.B. Hunt was a judgment creditor of Robert and Frieda Thornton, who were the trustees and life beneficiaries of five trusts, each of which provided that quarterly distributions be made to the Thorntons until their deaths. J.B. Hunt commenced an action to attach the Thorntons' interest in future distributions from the trusts and to apply them to the satisfaction of J.B. Hunt's judgment. The circuit court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, determining that a creditor may not claim a quarterly distribution until the date it becomes due. On appeal, J.B. Hunt asserted that Ark. Code Ann. 28-73-501 provides that a creditor may reach future distributions from a trust. Appellees argued that although attachments of future distributions may be authorized by section 28-73-501 in some situations, it was not permissible in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that J.B. Hunt's complaint improperly sought the Thorntons' uncertain future distributions from the trusts, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it. View "J.B. Hunt v. Thornton" on Justia Law 2014-02-13 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Danielson CV-13-692 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ca-01831-sct.html Collins v. Pinnacle Trust 2014-02-14T14:10:57+00:00 2014-02-14T02:52:54+00:00 The Chancery Court appointed conservators over the person and estate of Stuart Irby. Approximately one year later, Karen Collins Irby, Stuart's ex-wife, filed pleadings to invalidate the conservatorship and set aside the transactions of the conservators. The chancery court denied Karen's petition, and she appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Collins v. Pinnacle Trust" on Justia Law 2014-02-13 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Lamar 2012-CA-01831-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/13-2247/13-2247-2014-02-12.html Ball v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv. 2014-02-14T14:13:56+00:00 2014-02-12T18:24:49+00:00 In 1997, the trusts acquired all shares of AIS with an aggregate basis of $5,612,555. In 1999, the trusts formed Wind River Corporation and contributed their AIS shares in exchange for all Wind River shares. Wind River designated itself a subchapter S Corporation. In 2003, Wind River elected to treat AIS as a qualified subchapter S subsidiary. Before that election, the trusts' aggregate adjusted basis in Wind River was $15,246,099. After the Qsub election, the trusts increased their bases in that stock to $242,481,544. The trusts sold their Wind River interests to Fox. After transaction costs, the sale yielded $230,111,857 in cash and securities in exchange for the Wind River stock. The trusts claimed a loss of $12,247,229: the difference between the amount actually received for the sale and the new basis in the Wind River stock. The trusts shareholders' 2003 tax returns showed that capital loss. The IRS determined that a capital gain of approximately $214 million had been realized from the sale to Fox, for a cumulative tax deficiency of $33,747,858. Deficiency notices stated "the Qsub election and the resulting deemed I.R.C. 332 liquidation did not give rise to an item of income under I.R.C. 1366(a)(1)(A); therefore, [the Trusts] could not increase the basis of their [Wind River] stock under I.R.C. 1367(a)(1)(A)." The Tax Court found the increase in basis and declared loss to be improper. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Ball v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law 2014-02-12 federal U.S. 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals Van Antwerpen 13-2247 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-17.html Lubar v. Connelly 2014-02-14T14:13:46+00:00 2014-02-12T12:25:15+00:00 Lewis Lubar, the trustee of The Clover Trust, filed a complaint for foreclosure against Frederick Connelly. Connelly filed an answer and several affirmative defenses. The superior court granted Lubar's motion for summary judgment and ordered the sale of Connelly's residence. Connelly appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of foreclosure and order of sale, holding that summary judgment was improperly granted because (1) Lubar failed to include the minimum required, properly supported, facts in his statement of material facts, and therefore, Lubar failed to demonstrate that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the record was rife with genuine issues of fact material to deciding the issues raised in this case, including Connelly's affirmative defenses. Remanded. View "Lubar v. Connelly" on Justia Law 2014-02-11 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Alexander http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-19.html Estate of Nickerson v. Carter 2014-02-14T14:13:23+00:00 2014-02-12T11:59:29+00:00 After Daniel Nickerson suffered a fatal heart attack, Nickerson's wife, Cecelia, as personal representative of Nickerson's estate, filed professional negligence and wrongful death claims against Daniel's doctor, Dr. Alan Carter, and vicarious liability claims against Mercy Primary Care, Dr. Carter's employer. A jury found that Dr. Carter was negligent but not the legal cause of Daniel's death. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment, holding that the court erred in admitting the findings of a medical malpractice screening panel, as the panel chair's consideration of evidence outside the record violated the Maine Health Security Act and Maine's procedural rules. Remanded. View "Estate of Nickerson v. Carter" on Justia Law 2014-02-11 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Jabar http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2014/1120260.html Dorough v. Ricks 2014-02-14T14:10:39+00:00 2014-02-08T01:58:42+00:00 Denise Scott Ricks sought to admit a self-proving will to probate. After the will was admitted, Adam Dorough, Rufus Dorough, James Dorough, Patrick Dorough, and Robert Dorough brought a will contest at Circuit Court. The Circuit Court declared the will to be valid, and the Dorough brothers appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the Autauga Circuit Court. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court and reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. View "Dorough v. Ricks " on Justia Law 2014-02-07 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Moore 1120260 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2014/s13a1886.html Britt v. Sands 2014-02-06T20:37:21+00:00 2014-02-06T20:37:21+00:00 The testator's daughter challenges the propounder's petition to probate a copy of the testator's will. The Probate Court found that the propounder was unable to overcome the presumption that the testator intended to revoke the will created when the original will could not be found. Because there was evidence supporting the probate court's finding, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition to probate. View "Britt v. Sands" on Justia Law 2014-01-21 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Nahmias S13A1886 http://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/supreme-court/2014/s060790.html Rice v. Rabb 2014-02-07T14:10:03+00:00 2014-02-01T13:52:25+00:00 Lois McIntyre was the 1930 "Queen of the Pendleton Round-Up." As queen, she was given a "Queen Outfit" that consisted of a white satin shirt, a white leather vest and riding skirt with black and white fringe, and a black scarf. In 1964, McIntyre's son and plaintiff's husband, inherited the outfit from McIntyre. Shortly after inheriting the outfit, plaintiff and her husband were approached by Lieuallen, who requested that she be given the outfit. However, plaintiff and her husband refused to give it to her. Plaintiff and her husband later decided to display the outfit at the Pendleton Round-Up and Happy Canyon Hall of Fame. They delivered the outfit to Lieuallen for her to deliver to the Hall of Fame for that purpose, but did not gift or transfer ownership of the outfit to Lieuallen. Lieuallen delivered the outfit to the Hall of Fame as directed. In 1972, while the outfit was still on display at the Hall of Fame, plaintiff's husband passed away, and plaintiff inherited the outfit. In 2000, defendant, an heir of Lieuallen, went to the Hall of Fame and demanded return of the outfit on behalf of Lieuallen. The Hall of Fame promptly complied with defendant's request, and defendant gained possession of the outfit. Plaintiff, who is legally blind, was unaware that the outfit had been removed from the Hall of Fame. Plaintiff did not learn of the transfer until June 2007, when the Hall of Fame displays were moved to a new building. Plaintiff then demanded that defendant return the outfit, and defendant refused. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court was whether the six-year statute of limitations applicable to conversion and replevin claims under ORS 12.080(4) incorporated a "discovery rule" to determine when such claims "accrue." The Court of Appeals concluded that the limitation prescribed by ORS 12.080(4) begins to run at the time of the wrongful taking of personal property and that the provision does not incorporate a discovery rule. Thus, it affirmed the trial court's judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint as time-barred. On review, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff's allegations adequately invoked a discovery rule as recognized in "Berry v. Branner," (421 P2d 996 (1966)), and reversed. View "Rice v. Rabb" on Justia Law 2014-01-30 state Oregon Oregon Supreme Court Baldwin S060790 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/2014/a-33-12.html Beim v. Hulfish 2014-01-31T14:11:02+00:00 2014-01-30T07:44:20+00:00 In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a change in the federal estate tax law after an alleged wrongful death could give rise to a viable claim under the Wrongful Death Act. The Appellate Division concluded that the estate tax losses alleged by plaintiffs would not compel the factfinder to engage in speculation. It held that by the time the trial court ruled on the motion for reconsideration, the estate tax laws for 2011 and 2012 had been established, and a jury guided by expert testimony would have been in a position to calculate damages. The panel accordingly reinstated plaintiffs' claims for estate tax losses as the measure of damages asserted as an element of their wrongful death claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Wrongful Death Act did not authorize claims for damages based on estate taxes paid by a decedent's estate because such claims do not fit within the statutory cause of action defined by N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 and the alleged damages do not constitute "pecuniary" losses as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:31-5. View "Beim v. Hulfish" on Justia Law 2014-01-28 state New Jersey New Jersey Supreme Court Patterson a-33-12 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-10.html Estate of Hall 2014-01-31T14:09:13+00:00 2014-01-29T09:45:09+00:00 In 1993, Gloria Hall executed a will that devised all personal and real property to her husband. In 2002, Gloria's husband filed for divorce. In 2004, Gloria devised a new will which revoked all earlier wills and which devised nothing to her husband. The probate and family court later appointed a temporary guardian for Gloria due to her dementia. In 2007, the temporary guardian signed a separation agreement with Gloria's husband that stated that neither Gloria nor her husband would modify the wills each had executed in 1993. After Gloria died, the county probate court concluded that the 2004 will could not have been revoked by the agreement entered into by the temporary guardian and admitted the 2004 will to probate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court did not err in admitting Gloria's 2004 will to probate because (1) the parties stipulated that the 2004 was validly executed by a person with testamentary capacity, and the will was not shown to be the subject of undue influence; and (2) the will could not be revoked by the separation agreement because the agreement itself failed to comply with the plain terms of the statute governing will revocation. View "Estate of Hall" on Justia Law 2014-01-28 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Saufley http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/13-2012/13-2012-2014-01-28.html THI of New Mexico at Hobbs v. Patton 2014-01-31T14:10:53+00:00 2014-01-28T17:34:57+00:00 THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, LLC and THI of New Mexico, LLC (collectively THI) operate a nursing home in Hobbs, New Mexico. When Lillie Mae Patton's husband was admitted into the home, he entered into an arbitration agreement that required the parties to arbitrate any dispute arising out of his care at the home except claims relating to guardianship proceedings, collection or eviction actions by THI, or disputes of less than $2,500. After Mr. Patton died, Mrs. Patton sued THI for negligence and misrepresentation. THI then filed a complaint to compel arbitration of the claims. The district court initially ruled that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable and ordered arbitration. Under New Mexico law a compulsory-arbitration provision in a contract may be unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, if it applies only, or primarily, to claims that just one party to the contract is likely to bring. The question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted the state law for contracts governed by the FAA. The Court held that New Mexico law was preempted in this case and the arbitration clause should have been enforced. View "THI of New Mexico at Hobbs v. Patton" on Justia Law 2014-01-28 federal U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Hartz 13-2012 http://law.justia.com/cases/louisiana/supreme-court/2014/2013-c-1181.html Succession of James Jason Holbrook, Sr. 2014-01-31T14:09:12+00:00 2014-01-28T16:38:14+00:00 The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether an incomplete date in an attestation clause invalidated a last will and testament when the full date appeared in the first paragraph of the testament and on every page of the testament, including the page of the attestation clause. The district court granted the testator's daughter's motion for summary judgment seeking to set aside the will as invalid because the attestation clause was not fully dated and, thus, failed to meet the requirements of La. Civ. Code art. 1577. The court of appeal affirmed. Because the Supreme Court concluded the attestation clause in the notarial testament substantially complied with the requirements of Art. 1577, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Succession of James Jason Holbrook, Sr." on Justia Law 2014-01-28 state Louisiana Louisiana Supreme Court Guidry 2013-C-1181 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2014/2012-ca-01895-sct.html In the Matter of the Estate of Justin Michael Smith 2014-01-24T14:08:35+00:00 2014-01-23T20:06:42+00:00 Halley Smith appealed a Chancery Court order which held Smith was not a wrongful-death beneficiary of Justin Smith. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Smith asked the Court to judicially declare that an in loco parentis child qualified as a wrongful-death beneficiary under Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13. Finding that an in loco parentis child does not qualify as a wrongful-death beneficiary, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Justin Michael Smith" on Justia Law 2014-01-23 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Randolph 2012-CA-01895-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2014/s-13-0082.html Symons v. Heaton 2014-01-17T14:09:19+00:00 2014-01-15T10:03:35+00:00 In 2001, Appellant moved into Decedent's home at Decedent's request, where he lived and cared for Decedent until Decedent's death in 2010. After Decedent's death, Appellant filed a creditor's claim against Decedent's estate, seeking compensation for the care and services he provided. Defendants, the co-administrators of the estate, denied Appellant's claim. Appellant subsequently brought an action against Defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding no question of material fact existed and that Appellant failed as a matter of law on his claims for implied-in-fact contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. View "Symons v. Heaton" on Justia Law 2014-01-14 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Hillman S-13-0082 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-17879/11-17879-2014-01-13.html Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States 2014-01-17T14:12:50+00:00 2014-01-13T22:36:32+00:00 This appeal stemmed from the sale of the Chronicle Publishing Company. After the Martin Family Trusts formed a tiered partnership structure, the Martin heirs commenced a series of transactions designed to create losses that would offset the taxable gain realized from the Chronicle Publishing sale. On appeal, taxpayers argued that the 2000-A Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) was time-barred by the restrictive language in the extension agreements. The court agreed with the district court that the extension agreements between the IRS and First Step encompassed adjustments made in the 2000-A FPAA that were directly attributable to partnership flow-through items of First Ship; the FPAA to 2000-A extended the limitations period for assessing tax beyond the extension agreements and through the present litigation; however, the agreements did not extend to adjustments in the 2000-A FPAA that were not directly attributable to First Ship; and because the district court held more broadly that "the extension agreements encompass the adjustments made by the IRS in the FPAA issued to 2000-A," the court remanded to the district court to make a determination of which adjustments in the 2000-A FPAA were directly attributable to partnership flow-through items of First Ship. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Candyce Martin 1999 Irrevocable Trust v. United States" on Justia Law 2014-01-13 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Thomas 11-17879 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2014/121593.html In re Estate of Melby 2014-01-17T14:12:19+00:00 2014-01-12T13:06:03+00:00 Arnold and Vesta Melby were trustors of separate irrevocable trusts. Both Arnold and Vesta received Medicaid benefits. After the Melbys' deaths, the Iowa Department of Human Services notified Arnold's estate that it would seek reimbursement for all Medicaid expenses it had paid on behalf of Arnold and Vesta. The Department then filed an application in the estate seeking a judgment declaring the Melbys had interests in the corpus of their trusts that should be counted as assets available for repayment of the Department's Medicaid claim. The district court concluded (1) the Melbys' interests in the trusts were limited to their right to receive the net income from the trusts' assets, and (2) the Department's right to recover the Medicaid payments could be enforced against such income, but not against the corpus of the trusts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Department's right to recover Medicaid payments under the facts of this case extended beyond the Melbys' net income interests; and (2) the district court erred in determining the scope of medical assistance for which recovery was authorized by the general assembly. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Melby" on Justia Law 2014-01-10 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Hecht 121593 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2014/2014-me-2.html In re Estate of Hiller 2014-01-10T14:07:52+00:00 2014-01-10T11:00:39+00:00 Paul Ligor, the son of Mary Hiller, applied for informal probate and was appointed personal representative of Hiller's estate after her death. Three of Ligor's siblings filed multiple actions, including a petition to remove Ligor as personal representative and a complaint seeking review of Ligor's conduct as Hiller's agent. The probate court (1) found Ligor had solicited a power of attorney when Hiller was not of sound mind and then wrongfully depleted Hiller's assets and estate before and after Hiller's death; (2) found Ligor had breached his fiduciary duty owed to Hiller; and (3) ordered Ligor to repay to Hiller's estate the sums he wrongfully took. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the probate court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the siblings' breach of fiduciary duty claim; and (2) the remainder of Ligor's arguments on appeal were not properly preserved. View "In re Estate of Hiller" on Justia Law 2014-01-09 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Alexander http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2013/121817.html St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo, Ill. v. Ingram 2014-01-03T14:07:03+00:00 2013-12-29T00:49:08+00:00 Defendant, a financial advisor to Decedent, was sued by identified beneficiaries of Decedent's signed written estate plan. The beneficiaries alleged that Defendant was negligent in the performance of his duties, and therefore, the beneficiaries did not receive what they were supposed to receive under the plan. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Defendant, a non-attorney, owed no duty to the beneficiaries. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment entered against plaintiff Steve Bristol and his spouse, holding that Bristol was owed a duty by Defendant and that Bristol raised a genuine of material fact as to whether Defendant's negligent performance of his agency responsibilities caused Bristol not to receive a specific devise set forth in Decedent's will; and (2) affirmed the judgment with respect to the charitable recipient plaintiffs, as their damages were too speculative to establish damages. View "St. Malachy Roman Catholic Congregation of Geneseo, Ill. v. Ingram" on Justia Law 2013-12-27 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Mansfield 121817 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/11-16779/11-16779-2013-12-27.html Graham-Sult v. Clainos 2014-01-03T14:07:21+00:00 2013-12-27T23:05:53+00:00 Bill Graham, a successful promoter of rock and roll concerts, died testate and his will created individual trusts for his sons, Alexander and David. Nicholas Clainos was the trustee of the trusts and the executor of the estate and Richard Greene, through his firm, provided Clainos legal counsel. On appeal, Alexander and David challenged the district court's disposition of a motion to dismiss, a special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Proc. Code 425.16(b)(1), and related attorney's fees awards. The court affirmed the disposition of the motion to strike in part and reversed in part. The court concluded that striking plaintiffs' conversion and unjust enrichment claims against Clainos was erroneous. The court also concluded that striking plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim against Clainos was erroneous. The court further concluded that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged claims for conversion, copyright infringement, and declaratory relief against the BGA Defendants and that dismissal of those claims was erroneous. In regards to attorney's fees, the court vacated the post-motion-to-strike fee award to Clainos, as well as the post-motion-to-dismiss fee award to the BGA Defendants. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Graham-Sult v. Clainos" on Justia Law 2013-12-27 federal U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Smith 11-16779 12-15892 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2013/s202210.html Donkin v. Donkin 2014-01-03T14:05:58+00:00 2013-12-27T21:39:34+00:00 A trust and an amendment to the trust both contained no contest clauses. In 2009, two of the trust's beneficiaries filed a safe harbor proceeding seeking a determination that the petition they proposed to file challenging trustee conduct would not trigger the no contest clauses of the trust's amendment. The probate court concluded the proposed petition did not constitute a contest. At issue on appeal was whether the no contest clause law that became operative in 2010, while the beneficiaries' application was pending, or the no contest clause law in effect at the time the beneficiaries filed their application applied to the beneficiaries' proposed petition. The court of appeal held (1) the former no contest law applied, and (2) the beneficiaries' challenge constituted a contest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) safe harbor proceedings filed before 2010 were not affected by the repeal of the former law, which previously authorized safe harbor applications, and therefore, the probate court correctly ruled on the beneficiaries' application; (2) the current law governed the question of whether the beneficiaries' proposed claims triggered the no contest clauses; and (3) under the current law, the no contest clauses in the amended trust were unenforceable against the beneficiaries' proposed petition. View "Donkin v. Donkin" on Justia Law 2013-12-26 state California California Supreme Court Cantil-Sakauye S202210 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2013/120222.html Burkhalter v. Burkhalter 2013-12-27T14:13:20+00:00 2013-12-21T17:39:33+00:00 The parties in this case, William and Steven Burkhalter, were the sons of Louis Burkhalter. William challenged an unfavorable modification of Louis's revocable trust that occurred just before Louis's death, claiming (1) Steven unduly influenced Louis and tortiously interfered with the trust, and (2) Louis lacked the necessary testamentary intent when he made the modification. The district court directed a verdict for Steven on the tortious interference claim, and the jury returned a verdict for Steven on the testamentary capacity and undue influence claims. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial on the undue influence claim, concluding that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on undue influence, and the error prejudiced William. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict on the undue influence claim, holding that the district court's instruction accurately reflected the law of undue influence and did not unduly emphasize the causation element of the undue influence claim. View "Burkhalter v. Burkhalter" on Justia Law 2013-12-20 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Appel 120222 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2013/2012-070.html Eaton v. Eaton 2013-12-27T14:11:20+00:00 2013-12-20T21:24:30+00:00 Petitioner Daniel Eaton appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of his mother Mary Louise Eaton and her guardian Michael Eaton. This appeal arose from petitioner's attempts to be paid legal fees he incurred in guardianship proceedings involving his mother and other siblings. He alleged that he was entitled to the fees because he acted as his mother's attorney-in-fact pursuant to a durable general power of attorney. The trial court ruled that an acknowledgement-requirement of RSA 506:6, VII(a) was mandatory and therefore petitioner could not have been acting as Mary Lou Eaton's attorney-in-fact when he undertook the acts for which the legal fees were claimed] as a matter of law. Finding no error in the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Eaton v. Eaton" on Justia Law 2013-12-20 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Lynn 2012-070 http://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2013/55303.html In re Aboud Inter Vivos Trust 2013-12-27T14:11:19+00:00 2013-12-20T15:41:18+00:00 At issue in this case was trust property that was transferred from the trust to a limited partnership by consent of the trust beneficiaries. The partnership subsequently transferred the property to a third-party business. The district court (1) imposed a constructive trust on the previous trust property based on the alleged improper transfer made by the partnership to the third party, and (2) entered a personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and the third party holding the former trust assets. At issue on appeal and cross-appeal was whether the in rem jurisdiction over the trust assets conferred upon the district court by Nev. Rev. Stat. 164.010(1) and 164.015(6) permitted the district court to impose the constructive trust and to enter the personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and third-party company. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 164.010(1) and 164.015(6) did not confer jurisdiction upon the district court to enter a constructive trust on the disputed assets and a personal monetary judgment against the former trustee and third-party company because in rem jurisdiction only extends to property, and the disputed assets were no longer trust property after they were transferred to the limited partnership. Remanded. View "In re Aboud Inter Vivos Trust" on Justia Law 2013-12-19 state Nevada Nevada Supreme Court Hardesty 55303 http://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2013/43-map-2011.html Miller v. Pennsylvania 2013-12-20T14:13:50+00:00 2013-12-18T13:59:49+00:00 Appellees (husband and wife) created The Dorothy M. Miller Family Irrevocable Trust, naming Mrs. Miller as settlor, and her and her husband as co-trustees. The sole beneficiaries of the trust were appellees and their only child. Appellees transferred title to their house and farm to the trust, but did not pay realty transfer tax on the transfer, claiming it was an excluded transaction under the Realty Transfer Tax Act as a transfer to a "living trust." The Department of Revenue issued a Realty Transfer Tax Notice of Determination providing the transfer was subject to realty transfer taxes, plus applicable interest and fees. Appellees unsuccessfully petitioned for redetermination with the Department's Board of Appeals. The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that Mrs. Miller's testimony that she intended the Trust to be a substitute for her will was sufficient to define it as a living trust. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court found the Miller Trust failed to meet the statutory definition of a living trust or will substitute. As such, the Court reversed and remanded for calculation of transfer tax. View "Miller v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law 2013-12-17 state Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Supreme Court Eakin 43 MAP 2011 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2013/26641.html Niesche v. Wilkinson 2013-12-20T14:13:43+00:00 2013-12-13T15:43:30+00:00 After Mary Lou Fox died, Plaintiff, Mary Lou's daughter and the administratrix of Mary Lou's estate, sued Mary Lou's former husband, Robert Fox. Plaintiff alleged that Mary Lou jointly owned 960 acres of farmland with Robert, that Robert deprived Mary Lou of her ownership interest in the land, and that Plaintiff was thereby deprived of an inheritance from Mary Lou. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Robert, concluding that Mary Lou had no ownership interest in the 960 acres. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each cause of action brought by Plaintiff failed because Mary Lou had no claim to a right of ownership in the 960 acres and Plaintiff had no authority supporting her claims. View "Niesche v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law 2013-12-11 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court Zinter 26641 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2013/26722.html In re Sunray Holdings Trust 2013-12-20T14:09:49+00:00 2013-12-13T15:42:53+00:00 Lester and Harriet Shoup created an inter vivos trust. After Lester and Harriet died, the couple's only children, Gregory and Larry Shoup, filed a motion to terminate the trust. Gregory and Larry argued that the trust had fulfilled its purpose because it only provided for Lester and Harriet during their lives and no trust provision existed directing disposition of the remaining trust assets. Lee and Linda Shoup, Gregory's children, objected, arguing that the trust had not fulfilled its purpose and that two letters found with the original trust document provided instructions on the disposition of trust assets. The circuit court terminated the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly determined that the letters would substantially change the trust if given effect, but that the change was prohibited because the trustees did not consent to the letters in writing; and (2) correctly concluded that the trust had fulfilled its purpose and should be terminated. View "In re Sunray Holdings Trust" on Justia Law 2013-12-11 state South Dakota South Dakota Supreme Court Zinter 26722 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2013/2012-ca-00653-sct.html Clark v. Neese 2013-12-13T14:14:41+00:00 2013-12-13T13:51:26+00:00 Helen Schroeder was a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband Harry, when a log truck collided with the rear of the automobile. Harry was killed, and Helen was severely injured. A consequence of the accident was that Helen suffered diminished mental capacity. In a federal lawsuit, Helen claimed the truck driver was at fault and denied that Harry was negligent. After the federal judge denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Helen settled the federal suit. Helen then sued Harry's estate in state court, claiming Harry was partially at fault. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the estate on judicial estoppel grounds. But, because the federal judge stated his denial of summary judgment was based on his finding of genuine issues of material fact as to the truck driver's negligence, not "Harry Schroeder's potential contributory negligence," the Supreme Court reversed. View "Clark v. Neese" on Justia Law 2013-12-12 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Dickinson 2012-CA-00653-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/wyoming/supreme-court/2013/s-13-0036.html Estate of Marusich v. State ex rel. Dep't of Health, Office of Healthcare Fin./Equalitycare 2013-12-13T14:12:30+00:00 2013-12-11T11:04:46+00:00 After Joan Marusich died, the State ex rel. Department of Health, Office of Healthcare Financing/Equalitycare (Department) filed a lien against the home Joan owned as tenants by the entirety with her husband, William Marusich, who predeceased Joan. The Department filed the lien to recover the cost of Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of William. Joan's Estate filed a petition against the Department to remove a false lien. The district court granted summary judgment against the Estate on the validity of the lien. After the district court entered a final judgment on the amount of the lien, the Estate appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly granted summary judgment upholding the Department's lien; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Estate's motion to amend the petition. View "Estate of Marusich v. State ex rel. Dep't of Health, Office of Healthcare Fin./Equalitycare" on Justia Law 2013-12-10 state Wyoming Wyoming Supreme Court Kite S-13-0036 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2013/2012-055.html Petition of Stephen Stompor 2013-12-13T14:12:27+00:00 2013-12-07T16:38:21+00:00 Petitioner Stephen Stompor petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a probate court decision that granted him and his brother Stan access to an attorney's file who drafted estate plan documents for their parents. In 2001 and 2002, the parents met with the attorney regarding their estate plans. The attorney drafted plan documents for them, however, due to a conflict, the attorney withdrew from representing them, and the estate plan documents were not executed. In 2004, petitioner wrote to the attorney to inquire whether the attorney would again represent the parents with regard to their estate plans. The attorney declined. Petitioner then helped his parents prepare certain estate plan documents, and the parents executed those documents in October 2004. In October 2007, the respondent filed a petition on the parents' behalf, to determine the legality of certain acts of petitioner and requesting, among other things, an accounting of the petitioner's handling of all of the parents' funds either personally or as a trustee of his father's living trust. In June 2009, respondent successfully moved to amend his petition to allege that, in 2004, the petitioner, as the parents' fiduciary, exercised undue influence over the parents when they lacked the capacity to understand the estate plan documents that gave the petitioner and his family exclusive inheritance rights to the parents' assets to the exclusion of the parents' other children. The parents passed away during the late summer of 2009. In February 2010, while his petition was still pending, the respondent sought disclosure from the Attorney of any information he had regarding his contact with the parents in connection with the challenged 2004 estate plan. Petitioner objected, arguing that the attorney-client privilege prohibited disclosure of any documents the attorney had relating to his consultations with his parents. The court ruled that the attorney's entire file was discoverable because it was relevant to a dispute among the decedents' children and to whether the petitioner unduly influenced the parents' decisions regarding their estate plan. The Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the probate court's ruling. View "Petition of Stephen Stompor" on Justia Law 2013-12-06 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Conboy 2012-055 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2013/2012-346.html Curran v. Building Fund of the United Church of Ludlow 2013-12-13T14:12:30+00:00 2013-12-07T16:37:43+00:00 For over sixty years, the testator lived with her husband "Bill" Agan in the Town of Ludlow, where both were active in a variety of community organizations and activities. After Bill died, the testator placed her assets into trust. The original trust beneficiaries were the testator's brother, sisters, and the testator's niece and nephew. In 1996, the testator amended the trust to reduce the bequest to her brother (with whom she had a falling out), and to add bequests to three local community organizations: the Building Fund of the United Church of Ludlow, the Black River Academy Museum of Ludlow, and the Black River Valley Senior Center of Ludlow. A third trust amendment in May 2004 deleted the brother as a beneficiary. Additional trust amendments in December 2004, February 2005, and May 2005 variously altered the trustee, successor trustee, and trust account. Relatives and others who dealt with the testator during the period from 2004 to 2005, observed personality changes and signs of confusion. Her primary care physician diagnosed dementia in June 2004, and prescribed several medications in 2005 to help arrest the effects of dementia. In May 2005, the testator contacted an attorney to draft a number of additional changes to her trust. Less than a week after that contact, the testator's sister Patricia filed an involuntary guardianship petition, referencing the doctor's dementia diagnosis and recommending the appointment of a guardian. Following a hearing, Patricia withdrew her petition and the probate court granted the testator's petition, finding that the testator understood the nature and consequences of the requested voluntary guardianship. The testator died in May 2008. The estate at the time was worth in excess of eight million dollars. In April 2009, three members of the testator's family named as beneficiaries under a seventh amended trust, the testator's sister Joanne Curran, nephew Michael Curran, and niece Cathleen Curran (plaintiffs), filed a complaint for declaratory relief in superior court naming as defendants the nonprofit organizations receiving bequests under the trust. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the testator lacked the capacity to execute the seventh trust amendment, and that the amendment was the product of undue influence and was invalid as a result. The court found sufficient evidence of "suspicious circumstances" to shift the burden of proof to defendants to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the seventh trust amendment was not the product of undue influence. 11. The jury returned a special verdict, finding that the testator had the capacity to execute the seventh trust amendment, and that it was not the product of undue influence. The court denied plaintiffs' subsequent motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. This appeal followed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Curran v. Building Fund of the United Church of Ludlow" on Justia Law 2013-12-06 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Burgess 2012-346 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2013/2013-003.html Baptie v. Bruno 2013-12-13T14:14:51+00:00 2013-12-07T16:37:25+00:00 Plaintiffs Thomas and Marie Baptie, administrators of the estate of their son, John Baptie, appealed a superior court's decision granting defendant and former police officer Aron McNeil, summary judgment dismissing their negligence case against him. Specifically, plaintiffs argued the officer was liable for the death of their son as the result of the negligent investigation of their complaint against defendant Jonathon Bruno, the man who murdered their son four days after they made a complaint. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusions that defendant was entitled to qualified official immunity from plaintiffs' lawsuit and that, they could not prove all of the elements of their negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims. View "Baptie v. Bruno" on Justia Law 2013-12-06 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Burgess 2013-003 http://law.justia.com/cases/rhode-island/supreme-court/2013/12-273.html Miller v. Saunders 2013-12-13T14:15:04+00:00 2013-12-06T16:57:47+00:00 After Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce from Dean Miller, Plaintiff and Dean executed a property settlement agreement providing that Dean would maintain life insurance for the benefit of the parties' four minor children until they reached the age of majority. Dean subsequently executed a service request form listing his children as the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy and instructing that beneficial interests be paid to and managed by Kristin Saunders as custodial trustee for the benefit of his minor children. After Dean died, funds from his life insurance policy were distributed to Saunders. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief asking the superior court to declare that Dean's four children were the sole beneficiaries of his life insurance policy. The court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that Dean created a valid custodial trust pursuant to the Rhode Island Uniform Custodial Trust Act (RIUCTA) and that the trust was not inconsistent with Dean's obligations under the property settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Dean created a custodial trust pursuant to RIUCTA; and (2) Dean did not violate the property settlement agreement by designating Saunders as custodial trustee on the service request form. View "Miller v. Saunders" on Justia Law 2013-12-05 state Rhode Island Rhode Island Supreme Court Suttell 12-273 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2013/2012-ca-01700-sct.html Jordan v. Booth 2013-12-06T14:08:41+00:00 2013-12-06T13:57:31+00:00 Jessica Norton Jordan appealed a declaratory ruling that she was not entitled to a share of her adoptive father's estate under Mississippi's pretermitted heir statute. A certified copy of the trial court's docket indicated that Jordan was still involved in the probate matter. Further, the declaratory judgment did not contain a Rule 54(b) certification or equivalent language. Because the order denying pretermitted heir status was not a final, appealable judgment, the appeal was dismissed. View "Jordan v. Booth" on Justia Law 2013-12-05 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Kitchens 2012-CA-01700-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/hawaii/supreme-court/2013/scap-11-0001103.html Kealoha v. Machado 2013-12-06T14:08:41+00:00 2013-12-04T09:04:13+00:00 Plaintiffs filed this action against the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) trustees, claiming that the OHA trustees breached their fiduciary duties by improperly expending trust funds on Hawaiians, as opposed to native Hawaiians, in violation of Hawaii law and the Hawaii Constitution. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's complaint because it failed to state a claim; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. View "Kealoha v. Machado" on Justia Law 2013-12-03 state Hawaii Hawaii Supreme Court Recktenwald SCAP-11-0001103 http://law.justia.com/cases/nevada/supreme-court/2013/57749.html In re Estate of Bethurem 2013-12-06T14:08:42+00:00 2013-11-29T18:11:45+00:00 The special administrator of Decedent's estate petitioned to have Decedent's estate set aside without administration according to Decedent's 2007 will. Decedent's stepdaughters opposed the petition, arguing that a beneficiary of the will had unduly influenced Decedent. The district court invalidated the will as the product of the beneficiary's undue influence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in the absence of a presumption of undue influence, a will contestant bears the burden of proving undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) Decedent's stepdaughters failed to meet this burden of proof, and accordingly, the district court's order was not supported by substantial evidence. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Bethurem" on Justia Law 2013-11-27 state Nevada Nevada Supreme Court Parraguirre 57749 http://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-court/2013/2013-me-103.html Estate of Jennings v. Cumming 2013-11-29T14:21:01+00:00 2013-11-27T13:53:07+00:00 William Cumming was appointed as conservator for John Jennings's estate. George and Janetta Jennings, John's brother and sister, signed a bond for the conservatorship. Cumming later conceded that he misappropriated funds from John's estate. John filed suit against Cumming for breach of fiduciary duty, among other torts, and breach of the obligations of the probate bond. The complaint named George and Janetta, sureties of the probate bond, as co-defendants. The superior court entered a default judgment finding George liable for the breach of the bond by Cumming. George subsequently filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, asserting that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The superior court denied George's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the superior court had concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate actions both on the conservator's misconduct and against the sureties of probate bonds; and (2) probate judicial authorization was not required for Plaintiff to bring a suit on the bond in the superior court. View "Estate of Jennings v. Cumming" on Justia Law 2013-11-26 state Maine Maine Supreme Court Levy http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2013/20130142.html Oakland v. Bowman 2013-11-29T14:21:04+00:00 2013-11-26T04:22:07+00:00 Margaret Oakland appealed a district court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Bonnie Bowman, and Evan and Dayna Del Val. Oakland argued on appeal that her claim was not time-barred and equitable tolling should have applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in determining that Oakland's claim was brought after the statute of limitations expired and that equitable tolling did not apply. View "Oakland v. Bowman" on Justia Law 2013-11-25 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Crothers 20130142 http://law.justia.com/cases/indiana/supreme-court/2013/41s01-1306-tr-426.html Fulp v. Gilliland 2013-11-29T14:31:56+00:00 2013-11-23T10:55:53+00:00 Ruth Fulp placed her family farm in a revocable trust with trust assets going to her three children upon her death. Fulp decided to sell the farm to her son, Harold, a few years later. The proposed sale was for a low price to pay for Fulp's retirement home care and to keep the farm in the family. Ruth's daughter, Nancy, opposed the action, arguing that a bargain sale would breach Ruth's fiduciary duty to her children and deprive Nancy of her share of the trust. The trial court found that Ruth breached her fiduciary duty to the children by selling the farm at a low price. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the terms of the trust and the Indiana Trust Code, Ruth did not owe her children a fiduciary duty to sell the farm at less than fair market price and that Ruth did not effectively amend the trust by selling the farm. Remanded. View "Fulp v. Gilliland" on Justia Law 2013-11-22 state Indiana Indiana Supreme Court Rush 41S01-1306-TR-426 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2013/1120578.html Sears v. Hampton 2013-11-29T14:21:47+00:00 2013-11-22T23:01:01+00:00 In 2010, the State of Kentucky entered an order finding that 74-year-old Shirley Day was in need of a guardian and conservator. The Kentucky court appointed her adult daughter, Rhonda Sears, to serve in both capacities. Subsequently, Sears applied to the Kentucky court to transfer the guardianship and conservatorship to Alabama, where she and Day resided. In early 2012, the Kentucky court issued a provisional order granting the request. Sears then applied to the Montgomery Probate Court for a provisional order accepting the transfer from Kentucky. That same day, the probate judge appointed Valerie Cain as a guardian ad litem to represent Day in the transfer proceeding. Cain later submitted a report to the probate court questioning expenditures from Day's estate and requesting a guardian ad litem fee. Although nothing in the report indicated any inappropriate actions regarding Sears's actions in caring for Day, Cain recommended that both the conservatorship and the guardianship be transferred but that, rather than Sears, "the [Montgomery] county guardian and conservator be appointed." The probate court granted the petition to transfer and appointed James Hampton as guardian of Day and conservator of Day's estate. Day was removed from Sears's home and placed in an apartment home. The probate court also approved Cain's guardian ad litem fee to be paid from Day's estate. Sears appealed the probate court's order on the ground that the probate court's order violated Alabama law. Ultimately, the court denied Sears's requested relief and set the matter for further proceedings. Sears then filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that one of Day's other adult daughters disagreed with Sears's expenditures from Day's estate, and could have objected and the probate court could then have held a hearing to determine whether the transfer to Alabama of Sears's Kentucky guardianship and conservatorship would be in Day's best interests. Here, the probate court would have erred by appointing any new guardian and conservator, most especially a different guardian and conservator than the one previously appointed by the transferring court, when the only matter properly before the court was the issue whether a provisional order of transfer would be approved. "This was clearly beyond the scope of the statute, and the probate court acted without authority in doing so." As a result of the erroneous appointment of the Montgomery County guardian and conservator, Day was subjected to removal from Sears's home and Day's estate was subjected to unnecessary fees in this jurisdiction when the Alabama law safeguards the protected person and his or her resources from the transfer of an inappropriate guardianship or conservatorship when it is not in the best interests of the protected person. Because the Court could not ascertain whether the probate court's grant of the transfer petition was dependent upon its erroneous appointment of a new guardian and conservator, the Court felt compelled to reverse both aspects of the court's order. View "Sears v. Hampton" on Justia Law 2013-11-22 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Bolin 1120578 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2013/20120276.html Estates of Shubert 2013-11-29T14:21:03+00:00 2013-11-22T14:45:32+00:00 Appellants Gary Puhr, Kristen Pfahl, Brad Schubert, and Brian Shubert appealed orders in consolidated probates of the estates of Lowell, Gust, and Anne Shubert approving a land sale by the estates' personal representative, Charlene Wikholm, and denying the appellants' petition to remove Wikholm as the estates' personal representative. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal from the order approving the land sale was moot and that the order denying the petition to remove Wikholm was appealable and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition to remove Wikholm as the estates' personal representative. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal of the order approving the land sale and affirmed the order denying the removal of Wikholm as personal representative. View "Estates of Shubert" on Justia Law 2013-11-21 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Maring 20120276 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2013/2011-ca-01908-sct.html Estate of Bloodworth v. Illinois Central Railroad Company 2013-11-22T14:45:39+00:00 2013-11-21T21:35:44+00:00 This appeal stems from a civil suit brought by the estates and wrongful-death beneficiaries of Christopher Allan Bloodworth, Steven Earl Tallant Jr., Marcus Richardson, and A.W. Hilson, four men killed at a railroad crossing when a freight train collided with the truck in which they were traveling. The beneficiaries of Bloodworth, Tallant, Richardson, and Hilson filed their complaint(s) against Illinois Central Railroad Company and several of its employees, including the track crew, as well as other employees of Illinois Central's track department. Defendants filed two motions for summary judgment; the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs' claims alleging negligent operation of the train. The circuit court also granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants on three of four contested issues regarding the engineering and maintenance of the railroad crossing, leaving one surviving claim. The circuit court then granted five of Defendants' motions in limine to exclude Plaintiffs' evidence. Finding that, without the excluded evidence, Plaintiffs could not support the remaining claim, the circuit court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment in their entirety and issued a judgment and certificate pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's decisions to the Supreme Court, and Defendants cross-appealed as to certain trial court rulings. Because the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on each claim by Plaintiffs, the Court dismissed Defendants' cross-appeal as moot. View "Estate of Bloodworth v. Illinois Central Railroad Company" on Justia Law 2013-11-21 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Pierce 2011-CA-01908-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2013/s13a0762.html Johnson v. Fitzgerald 2013-11-22T14:30:16+00:00 2013-11-19T14:09:34+00:00 Lonnie L. Michael died in 2010. He had executed a will in 2002. The original of that will could not be found. Nevertheless, Michael King Fitzgerald, who was named executor in the 2002 will, offered a copy of the will for probate in solemn form, requesting that it be admitted to probate upon proper proof. Danny Johnson, Michael Gwirtz, and Patricia Gwirtz, the Testator's heirs at law, filed a caveat, asserting that the 2002 will had been revoked by the Testator's subsequent destruction of it. After hearing evidence and argument, the probate court admitted the will to probate. Caveators appealed to the superior court, and the case was tried before a jury, which found in favor of the propounded will, which the trial court then admitted to probate in solemn form. After the denial of their motion for new trial, Caveators appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law 2013-11-18 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Hines S13A0762 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2013/s13a0728.html Johnson v. Burrell 2013-11-22T14:30:14+00:00 2013-11-19T14:06:27+00:00 In May 2009, Hubert H. Johnson made a new will, in which he devised his most substantial asset (a 350-acre pecan farm) to Donna Ellis Burrell. He died a few weeks later, and Donna promptly filed a petition to probate the will. Two of his kin filed caveats, alleging that Donna had exerted undue influence upon Hubert with respect to the making of that will, and alleging that Donna had made false statements to Hubert, upon which he relied in making the will. The probate court awarded summary judgment to Donna, and the caveators appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Burrell" on Justia Law 2013-11-18 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Blackwell S13A0728 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2013/115767.html In re Karavidas 2013-11-22T14:37:56+00:00 2013-11-15T18:17:08+00:00 Karavidas, admitted to practice law in Illinois in 1979, worked for the City of Chicago, the Attorney General, and several law firms. In 1988, he opened his own practice. His father executed will and trust documents prepared by another attorney in 2000, and died later the same day. Karavidas was named executor and successor trustee. His dealings with the estate resulted in charges of conversion of assets entrusted to him; breach of fiduciary obligations; conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and conduct tending to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute. The Review Board of the IARDC recommended that charges be dismissed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Before professional discipline may be imposed under Supreme Court Rule 770, the Administrator must demonstrate that the attorney violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Personal misconduct that falls outside the scope of the Rules may be the basis for civil liability or other adverse consequences, but may not result in professional discipline. View "In re Karavidas" on Justia Law 2013-11-15 state Illinois Illinois Supreme Court Garman 115767 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2013/cv-13-210.html Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy 2013-11-15T14:26:29+00:00 2013-11-15T09:20:03+00:00 Decedent was a resident of Searcy Healthcare Center (SHC) from January 7 to January 29. On January 8, Decedent executed a written arbitration agreement with SHC that was binding on Decedent's children, personal representatives, and administrators of Decedent's estate. Decedent died on February 12. The next year, Appellee filed a nursing-home-malpractice action against SHC as administrator of Decedent's estate and on behalf of the statutory wrongful-death beneficiaries. The circuit court denied SHC's motion to compel arbitration against the wrongful-death beneficiaries, concluding that Decedent had not extinguished the substantive rights of the wrongful-death beneficiaries by signing the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in finding that the wrongful-death beneficiaries were not bound by the arbitration agreement executed by Decedent. Remanded. View "Searcy Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Murphy" on Justia Law 2013-11-14 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Baker CV-13-210 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2013/1110959.html Mottershaw v. Ledbetter 2013-11-15T14:29:20+00:00 2013-11-09T03:15:13+00:00 Dr. Ann M. Mottershaw and The Radiology Group, LLC, appealed a trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial filed by plaintiff Shannon Ledbetter, as administrator of the estate of Venoria Womack. These appeals primarily concerned whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in ordering a new trial based on the jury's exposure to certain evidence that the trial court had excluded by an order granting a motion in limine. After careful consideration of defendants' arguments and the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Mottershaw v. Ledbetter" on Justia Law 2013-11-08 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Bryan 1110959 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2013/cv-12-1131.html Moore v. Circuit Court 2013-11-08T14:42:40+00:00 2013-11-08T09:35:33+00:00 Bobbie Troup, in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of Easter Dawkins, filed suit alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against Petitioners. During the trial proceedings, Troup filed a petition requesting that Petitioners be required to pay for the cost of five expert witnesses who had appeared to testify on her behalf on the scheduled trial date but did not testify because the circuit court had granted a motion for continuance made by Petitioners. The circuit court entered an order directing Petitioner to pay Troup for expert-witness costs associated with the continuance of the trial. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of certiorari, against the circuit court, contending that the court exceeded its authority and abused its discretion in ordering them pay the expert-witness costs of Troup. The Supreme Court denied the petitions, as Petitioners had an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal. View "Moore v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law 2013-11-07 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Hannah CV-12-1131 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2013/s12g1390.html Reliance Trust Co. v. Candler 2013-11-08T14:33:30+00:00 2013-11-06T13:47:09+00:00 The remainder beneficiaries of the revocable marital trust created by the wife of Charles Howard Candler III sued Reliance Trust Company, co-trustee of the trust, for breach of trust. They alleged that after the death of the settlor, Reliance made improper distributions from the corpus of the trust to Mr. Candler, who was the life beneficiary. The remainder beneficiaries alleged these improper distributions significantly diminished the value of the trust and thereby damaged them in an amount equal to the improper distributions. The case was tried and the jury found that while Reliance did not act in bad faith, it otherwise found in favor of the remainder beneficiaries. The trial court entered final judgment on the verdict and also awarded the remainder beneficiaries pre-judgment interest, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Reliance petitioned for certiorari, contending that the Court of Appeals erred when it upheld the jury's verdict in favor of the remainder beneficiaries and when it affirmed the trial court's award of interest. Finding only that the remainder beneficiaries were entitled to interest on the damages awarded only from the state of the life beneficiary's death, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's award of interest. The case was remanded for recalculation of interest on damages, but otherwise affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Reliance Trust Co. v. Candler" on Justia Law 2013-11-04 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Benham S12G1390 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2013/cv-12-925.html Taylor v. MCSA, LLC 2013-11-08T14:38:25+00:00 2013-11-01T15:18:39+00:00 After L.C. died, the probate court appointed his son, Bobby, as special personal representative of L.C.'s estate for the limited purpose of investigating and prosecuting all claims relating to nursing home abuse. On behalf of the estate, Bobby subsequently sued Appellees in a wrongful-death action. During the wrongful-death action proceedings, it was revealed that Bobby was a convicted felon who was not qualified to serve as a special personal representative by law. Bobby filed a motion to substitute his brother Ronnie as special personal representative, which the trial court granted. The probate court, however, later vacated its order appointing Bobby, finding the order was invalid from its inception. At issue on appeal was whether Bobby's acts prior to his removal, including his motion to substitute Ronnie, remained valid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bobby's acts as a special personal representative were valid until the date of his removal as special personal representative; and (2) accordingly, the probate court erred by finding that the order of appointment was void ab initio. Remanded. View "Taylor v. MCSA, LLC" on Justia Law 2013-10-31 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Baker CV-12-925 http://law.justia.com/cases/arkansas/supreme-court/2013/cv-13-12.html Taylor v. MCSA, LLC 2013-11-08T14:38:24+00:00 2013-11-01T15:17:51+00:00 L.C. was a nursing home patient when he died. Bobby, L.C.'s son and the special personal representative of L.C.'s estate, filed suit against several nursing home defendants for negligence and medical malpractice. After it was discovered during a deposition that Bobby was a convicted felon and not qualified to serve as special personal representative, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice the complaints against the defendants, concluding that Bobby lacked the authority to act on behalf of the estate because of his disqualification as a felon and that the complaints he filed were nullities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in ruling that the actions of Bobby were invalid and that the complaints filed by Bobby were nullities. Remanded. View "Taylor v. MCSA, LLC" on Justia Law 2013-10-31 state Arkansas Arkansas Supreme Court Goodson CV-13-12 http://law.justia.com/cases/iowa/supreme-court/2013/121340.html In re Estate of Sampson 2013-11-01T13:23:09+00:00 2013-10-26T09:23:05+00:00 Husband died in 1993, and his will was probated. Wife received almost all of Husband's property pursuant to a residuary clause in the will. In 2011, Wife died. Subsequently, several relatives (Relatives) who had not been formally notified of the 1993 probate proceedings reviewed Husband's will. Relatives brought an action to reopen the estate, claiming that a different residuary clause in Husband's will entitled them to Husband's property. The coexecutors of Wife's estate filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the petition was time-barred under Iowa Prob Code 633.488, which states that a party who did not receive formal notice of the final report and accounting has five years from the final report to reopen settlement of an estate. The district court denied the motion, concluding that section 633.489, which allows estates to be reopened without time limit under certain circumstances, governed Relatives' claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 633.488 was the applicable statute in this case. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Sampson" on Justia Law 2013-10-25 state Iowa Iowa Supreme Court Mansfield 121340 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-3765/12-3765-2013-10-25.html Hughes v. Colbert 2013-11-01T13:33:26+00:00 2013-10-25T15:56:24+00:00 A nursing home resident and her community spouse (husband) were penalized based on husband's purchase of an annuity for himself using funds from his IRA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(f)(1) precluded the transfer of assets because it exceeded husband's community spouse resource allowance. Section 1396p(c) requires a state to impose a transfer penalty (a period of restricted coverage) if either spouse disposed of assets for less than fair market value during the look-back period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the transfer occurred before the Ohio agency determined that wife was eligible for Medicaid coverage and section 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) permits an unlimited transfer of assets "to another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse." View "Hughes v. Colbert" on Justia Law 2013-10-25 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals White 12-3765 http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2013/33-11.html Nichols v. Suiters 2013-10-25T13:27:41+00:00 2013-10-23T11:34:02+00:00 At issue in this case was the revocation by divorce statute, which provides that, "unless otherwise provided in the will or decree," a divorce revokes a pre-existing will's provisions "relating to" the spouse. Here Decedent and Respondent were divorced in 2006. Three years earlier, Decedent executed a will that devised property to Respondent. The circuit court held that the revocation by divorce provision applied in this case and that the exceptions did not apply, resulting in the revocation of the will's provision relating to Respondent. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that revocation was not triggered because the exceptions the statute recognized applied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) revocation of provisions in a pre-existing will relating to the divorced spouse is effective upon the subsequent divorce unless there is provided in the will or decree a statement that the decedent intended the bequest even after the parties divorced; and (2) in this case, Decedent did not clearly or unequivocally state his intent in his will or in the divorce decree that Respondent should receive the property at issue even after the divorce. View "Nichols v. Suiters" on Justia Law 2013-10-22 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Bell 33/11 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2013/2012-192.html In re Estate of Fitzsimmons 2013-10-25T13:27:43+00:00 2013-10-19T12:59:29+00:00 Appellant Joanne Fitzsimmons Balkam appealed the superior court's partial summary judgment decision that reversed a probate court decision that had granted her permission, as executor of her mother's estate, to physically partition and sell parts of a real estate property to make a division between the heirs of her mother's residual estate. The appellees were two of her brothers, Dennis and James Fitzsimmons. The issues raised in executor's appeal were whether the probate court had the power to allow the heirs to choose which property they received and whether the executor had the power to contract for a survey. Dennis and James raised five issues on appeal: the first two contested the probate court's ruling on their claim of waste and their claim that the accounting was flawed; the last three addressed the power of the executor and the probate court with respect to the distribution of the property: (1) whether executor had the power to subdivide the estate, (2) whether executor's proposed division met the requirement of the will that the estate be distributed into "as nearly equal shares as possible", and (3) whether the probate court's division was proper under its power to partition in 14 V.S.A. 1729. The superior court, in granting appellees' motion for partial summary judgment, and denying the motion for the license to sell real estate, disagreed with the probate court, and found that because legal title to real property passes to beneficiaries immediately upon the death of a testator, the executor had "limited ability to affect the beneficiaries' ownership of the real property" and could not partition the property. Whether or not by mistake, however, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not take up all the issues before it. Dennis and James filed a motion to reconsider the remand to the probate court, asking the superior court to deal with the remaining issues. Executor did not respond to that motion, but instead filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court requesting that it reverse the superior court's summary judgment order regarding executor's power to partition the property. While the Supreme Court held that the executor has the power to partition or sell the property to distribute to testator's children, it did not suggest that the power was unlimited. "The executor is bound by the requirement that the distribution shares be as equal as possible." The Court found the superior court erred in its reasoning on whether the executor had the power to subdivide. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated the trial court must move on to the fourth and fifth questions in light of executor's action pursuant to her distribution power. It must also answer the first and second questions. View "In re Estate of Fitzsimmons" on Justia Law 2013-10-18 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Dooley 2012-192 http://law.justia.com/cases/illinois/supreme-court/2013/114925.html Relf v. Shatayeva 2013-10-25T13:32:33+00:00 2013-10-18T16:01:05+00:00 A February 2008 automobile accident resulted in the death of the driver who was purportedly at fault. His son was issued letters of office to serve as independent administrator of the driver's estate. The limitations period for plaintiff's claim of personal injuries was two years. Just before that limitations period was to expire, plaintiff filed suit, apparently unaware of the driver's death. Her action against a dead person was invalid. Attempts to serve process were unsuccessful, but a special process server eventually notified the plaintiff that the defendant was dead. The Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/13-209, allows a two-year extension of the limitations period under certain conditions, including when a plaintiff moves to substitute the decedent's personal representative as defendant. The plaintiff did not do so, but obtained the circuit court's permission to have an employee of plaintiff's attorney appointed as "special administrator" to defend the estate, a procedure that has no statutory authorization. The circuit court dismissed the action on limitations grounds, but the appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. Upon learning of the defendant's demise, the plaintiff should have sought leave to amend the complaint to substitute as defendant the decedent's son, as decedent's personal representative, and should have then served process on that representative. The plaintiff failed to use reasonable diligence. View "Relf v. Shatayeva" on Justia Law 2013-10-18 state Illinois Illinois Supreme Court Karmeier 114925 http://law.justia.com/cases/mississippi/supreme-court/2013/2009-ct-01319-sct-0.html Morrow v. Morrow 2013-10-19T13:06:45+00:00 2013-10-18T13:10:26+00:00 The chancery court found that certain property once owned by Gocher and Reba Morrow vested in their estates at the time of their deaths and passed by intestate succession in equal shares to their three sons, Phillip, Ronald, and Joel. Phillip appealed, arguing that he held a remainder interest and the property vested in him at his parents' death. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the chancery court erred by not quieting and confirming title to the property in Phillip, and reversed the Court of Appeals and the chancery court. View "Morrow v. Morrow" on Justia Law 2013-10-17 state Mississippi Mississippi Supreme Court Lamar 2009-CT-01319-SCT 2009-CT-01355-SCT http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2013/s-12-1117.html Klingelhoefer v. Monif 2013-10-18T13:21:24+00:00 2013-10-12T18:02:11+00:00 Constance created an LLC and a revocable trust. Constance transferred her real estate to the LLC and directed that, upon her death, her remaining property be transferred to the Trust. After Constance's death, her son David, as trustee of the Trust and as manager of the LLC, filed a declaratory action to allow the sale of the real estate pursuant to the Trust. Constance's other children, as beneficiaries of the Trust and members of the LLC, filed counterclaims for a declaratory judgment that the LLC should govern disposition of the real property and sought an accounting. The district court determined that the Trust would control the disposition and that David did not breach his fiduciary duties. The court of appeals affirmed. David subsequently moved for attorney fees and postjudgment interest, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's order and denied the beneficiaries' request for attorney fees, holding (1) the award of attorney fees and costs was outside the scope of the mandate given by the court of appeals, and therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the motion; and (2) the beneficiaries were not entitled to attorney fees on the ground that David's motion was frivolous. View "Klingelhoefer v. Monif" on Justia Law 2013-10-11 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court McCormack S-12-1117 http://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/supreme-court/2013/12-2013.html Matter of: Ethel F. Peierls Charitable Lead Unitrust 2013-10-11T13:20:57+00:00 2013-10-09T02:38:23+00:00 Petitions regarding several Peires family Trusts all requested that the Court of Chancery: (1) approve the resignation of the current trustees; (2) confirm the appointment of Northern Trust Company as the sole trustee; (3) determine that Delaware law governed the administration of each Trust; (4) confirm Delaware as the situs for each Trust; (5) reform the trusts' administrative scheme; and (6) accept jurisdiction over the Trusts. The Peierls' Petitions stemmed from their general frustration with Bank of America's lack of communication and responsiveness regarding the handling of Trust assets. Accompanying the Petitions were resignations of the Trusts' current trustees, all expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of Chancery. The appointment of a new corporate trustee is also expressly conditioned upon approval by the Court of Chancery. In case number 11,2013, the Supreme Court upheld the Vice Chancellor's decision not to address the Petition in so far as it related to the 1960 Trusts, because New Jersey retained primary supervision over those Trusts. The Court held that the Vice Chancellor erred in determining that he could not exercise jurisdiction over the 1969 Trusts and address the Petition's merits. In case 12,2013: The Supreme Court concluded the Vice Chancellor properly concluded that no actual controversy existed relating to the approval of trustee resignations, the appointment of a new corporate trustee, the confirmation of Delaware as the situs, or the declaration that Delaware law governed the administration of the Trust at issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the Vice Chancellor properly denied the requests to reform the Trust Agreement, and to retain jurisdiction over the Trust. In case 13,2013: because the Trusts were not then-currently being administered in Delaware, there was no basis to conclude that Delaware law would apply to the Trusts' administration. Therefore, whether the Court of Chancery could properly reform the Trust Instruments was a matter governed by the laws of the Trusts' administration. In this case, the laws were of Texas for the 1953 Trusts and New York law for the 1957 and 1975 Trusts. Because the Vice Chancellor properly concluded that he was "not in a position to address the requests for reformation," the Supreme Court affirmed the Vice Chancellor's decision to refrain granting reformation relief. View "Matter of: Ethel F. Peierls Charitable Lead Unitrust" on Justia Law 2013-10-04 state Delaware Delaware Supreme Court Steele 11, 2013 12, 2013 13, 2013 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2013/s13a0989.html Hasty v. Castleberry 2013-10-11T13:20:58+00:00 2013-10-08T12:36:07+00:00 In consolidated cases, the Superior Court granted partial summary judgment to Joan Hasty Castleberry and denied summary judgment to her brother William Hasty, Jr., with respect to Joan's claims against her brother for his actions as executor of their parents' estate. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to award summary judgment to Joan on the question whether William acted under a conflict of interest simply by serving as Trustee of the Marital Trust while at the same time serving as co-chair of the Reinhardt Capital Campaign Committee. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hasty v. Castleberry" on Justia Law 2013-10-07 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Melton S13A0989 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/12-8050/12-8050-2013-10-07.html In re: Nicodemus 2013-10-11T13:20:55+00:00 2013-10-07T18:37:14+00:00 Debtor was married to Plaintiff's son, John. Plaintiff and John had an extensive model train collection. After John died, Plaintiff sued, seeking $25,000 for Debtor's alleged conversion of the collection. Debtor was appointed administratrix of John's probate estate. After completion of an inventory, Plaintiff and Debtor, individually and as administratrix, entered into a settlement resolving the state court litigation and matters in Probate Court, identifying parts of the collection as belonging to Plaintiff and requiring Debtor to surrender possession of those parts. The remainder of the collection was to be sold at auction and the proceeds were to be split. The court subsequently entered multiple orders directing Debtor to turn over certain trains and accessories to Plaintiff and imposed penalty of $100.00 per day. Finally, the court entered judgment in the amount of $32,186.90 plus interest based on Debtor's "willful contempt." Debtor then filed a bankruptcy petition and Plaintiff sought to except from discharge the entire debt owed to him pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(7). The bankruptcy court held that the entire amount ($32,186), not just $9,386.90, was nondischargeable under 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed. View "In re: Nicodemus" on Justia Law 2013-10-07 federal U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Preston 12-8050 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2013/2012-177.html Carpentier v. Tuthill 2013-10-11T13:24:33+00:00 2013-10-05T12:51:42+00:00 Defendant Douglas Tuthill, Administrator of the Estate of Paul Oakes, appealed a jury's award of $150,000 in punitive damages to plaintiff Doreen Carpentier and the trial court's denial of his motion for remittitur. Defendant also challenged the trial court's denial of his post-judgment motion to vacate a writ of attachment. Paul Oakes was charged with numerous crimes based on acts alleged to have occurred at plaintiff's home. Oakes killed himself shortly before his arraignment on these charges. Following Oakes's death, plaintiff sued his estate, raising claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She sought compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff also requested a writ of attachment against certain real property owned by Oakes. Finding none of defendant's arguments persuasive, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carpentier v. Tuthill" on Justia Law 2013-10-04 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Burgess 2012-177 http://law.justia.com/cases/vermont/supreme-court/2013/2012-118.html CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Balch 2013-10-11T13:29:38+00:00 2013-10-05T12:51:14+00:00 The Probate Court appointed Theodore Ballard's niece, Leala Bell, as Ballard's guardian. Bell signed a promissory note to a mortgage as a "borrower"; she did not expressly indicate that she was signing as Ballard's guardian or that her signature indicated only her "approval" of Ballard's action. The loan was secured by a mortgage on Ballard's real property. The mortgage deed granted and conveyed Ballard's property to CitiFinancial, including the power to sell the property. Ballard signed the mortgage deed but Bell did not. There was no showing that the probate court licensed the mortgage. CitiFinancial alleged that Ballard had failed to make the payments called for under the note and mortgage, and therefore breached these agreements. Ballard moved for summary judgment, arguing in relevant part that he lacked the legal capacity to execute a mortgage deed and promissory note while he was under guardianship. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Ballard's argument relied on the notion that Bell participated in the transaction with CitiFinancial, subjected herself to personal liability as a cosigner of the note, signed the settlement statement as well as the promissory note, but did not actually approve Ballard's signing of the note. Although the mortgage deed purportedly executed by Ballard and the promissory note secured by that deed were executed as part of the same overall transaction, the two documents created distinct legal obligations. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in analyzing the note and mortgage as if they were one and the same, both subject to the requirement of probate court approval. Therefore the Court reversed the award of summary judgment to Ballard on CitiFinancial's claim on the promissory note and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings on that claim. View "CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Balch" on Justia Law 2013-10-04 state Vermont Vermont Supreme Court Robinson 2012-118 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2013/20130035.html Rolla v. Tank 2013-10-04T13:43:14+00:00 2013-10-04T04:48:44+00:00 Greggory Tank appealed a judgment quieting title to certain McKenzie County oil, gas and mineral interests in Debbora Rolla, the personal representative of the estate of George Tank. Because the district court did not err in ruling the challenged quitclaim deeds reserved mineral interests in George Tank and reserved in him a life estate in the surface only, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rolla v. Tank" on Justia Law 2013-10-02 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court VandeWalle 20130035 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2013/da-13-0189.html In re Estate of Harless 2013-10-04T13:29:21+00:00 2013-10-02T18:19:59+00:00 Decedent was the sister of Linda Hyde and the mother of Kelli Martin. Martin petitioned the district court to adjudicate that her mother died intestate and to appoint her as Decedent's personal representative. Hyde opposed the petition, asserting that Decedent had previously executed a will naming Hyde as executrix. The district court concluded that Decedent had revoked the will, and therefore ruled that Harless died intestate and that Martin was entitled to be appointed as personal representative. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Decedent's will was a valid will that Decedent did not revoke. Remanded with instructions that Decedent's will be probated. View "In re Estate of Harless" on Justia Law 2013-10-01 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Cotter DA 13-0189 http://law.justia.com/cases/nebraska/supreme-court/2013/s-12-165.html Guinn v. Murray 2013-10-04T13:41:32+00:00 2013-09-29T09:26:25+00:00 Plaintiffs, relatives of Decedent, sought Attorney's services in the administration of Decedent's estate. Plaintiffs later brought this professional negligence case against Attorney and his firm (Defendants), claiming that Attorney failed properly to disclose a conflict of interest to Plaintiffs, Attorney erroneously advised Plaintiffs to execute disclaimers that should be regarded as invalid and ineffective, and Attorney caused the estate to incur additional taxes by failing to include the purportedly disclaimed property in the qualified terminable interest property election on the estate tax return. The district court (1) entered judgment in favor of Defendants on the conflict of interest claim, and (2) dismissed as time barred Plaintiffs' claims regarding the disclaimed property and associated tax return elections. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment regarding the conflict of interest; but (2) reversed the judgments on Plaintiffs' remaining claims, holding that the district court erred when it concluded that the statute of limitations barred the claims. Remanded. View "Guinn v. Murray" on Justia Law 2013-09-27 state Nebraska Nebraska Supreme Court Per Curiam S-12-165 http://law.justia.com/cases/kentucky/supreme-court/2013/2011-sc-000135-dg.html Jarvis v. Nat'l City 2013-10-04T13:29:20+00:00 2013-09-27T19:48:16+00:00 Ky. Rev. Stat. 386.180 mandated that testamentary trustees make a choice of compensation between either an annual fee or a fee at the termination of the trust. Plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of testamentary trusts managed by Trustees. The Caperton Trust, managed by PNC Bank, operated under a termination-fee compensation option, and the Jarvis Trusts, managed by National City, operated under an annual-fee option. After the General Assembly repealed section 386.180 in 2008, the Trustees brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of whether the repeal of the statute affected their compensation, where the two trusts at issue were in existence for many years before the statute was repealed. The trial court granted the Trustees' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the repeal of section 386.180 eliminated all restrictions on the calculation of trustee fees. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the repeal of section 386.180 was complete and unlimited, and therefore, trustees of testamentary trusts could collect reasonable fees on trusts that predated the repeal of the statute. View "Jarvis v. Nat'l City" on Justia Law 2013-09-26 state Kentucky Kentucky Supreme Court Minton 2011-SC-000135-DG http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2013/s13a1291.html Banner v. Vandeford 2013-09-27T13:27:06+00:00 2013-09-25T13:00:42+00:00 John Huscusson died leaving three adult daughters as heirs of his estate: Tina Banner, Deborah Vandeford and Karen Nee. In his will, Huscusson specifically revoked his previous will, which had been executed in 2006 and had provided that Huscusson's daughters were to share equally in the estate. The 2012 will named Banner as executrix. It provided that Huscusson was "extremely disappointed" in Vandeford and Nee and that each of them was to receive a specific bequest in the amount of $10. Banner was not given a specific bequest. Vandeford and Nee filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an interpretation of the will. Following a hearing, the probate court determined that the will was plain and unambiguous; that it did not contain a residue clause; and that, therefore, the lapsed gift of the residue must pass by intestacy. Banner appealed and after review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Banner v. Vandeford" on Justia Law 2013-09-23 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Thompson S13A1291 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2013/1101051.html Hughes v. Robbie Branton 2013-09-27T13:27:03+00:00 2013-09-23T13:01:26+00:00 Donald Hughes and John Hughes appealed circuit court judgment vacating a deed and imposing a constructive trust upon real property formerly owned by Henry Hughes and Emma Lucille Hughes, both of whom are deceased. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction of the claim at issue, it vacated the judgment and dismissed the appeal. View "Hughes v. Robbie Branton " on Justia Law 2013-09-20 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Murdock 1101051 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2013/da-12-0719.html In re Estate of Gopher 2013-09-20T13:27:49+00:00 2013-09-18T10:38:49+00:00 Dorothy Gopher, an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe, died intestate in 2008. Dorothy was survived by seven children (the siblings), and her estate consisted only of a ceremonial tribal flag. One of the siblings, filed an application for informal probate in the district court. As proceedings commenced in district court, several siblings filed a petition before the Blackfeet tribal court to name two other siblings as personal representatives in their parents' estates. The two siblings then filed consecutive motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in district court. The district court continued its proceedings and denied the motions to dismiss. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction and ordered the estate to transfer the flag to co-trustees of a constructive trust on the estate. Meanwhile, the Blackfeet tribal court declined to assert jurisdiction over the estate property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it assumed jurisdiction over the probate of the estate. View "In re Estate of Gopher" on Justia Law 2013-09-17 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Cotter DA 12-0719 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2013/da-12-0603.html Estate of Irvine v. Oaas 2013-09-20T13:20:27+00:00 2013-09-18T10:36:38+00:00 After John Irvine died, the proceeds from three of his investment accounts were paid to his estate. John's mother, Va Va, sought a declaratory judgment that she was the sole beneficiary of all three accounts. John's stepson, Michael, opposed the action. Both Va Va and Michael filed summary judgment motions. Va Va argued that John intended to benefit his estate under the laws of intestacy, not under the terms of his 1983 will, which included Michael as a beneficiary, and that John intended for her to be the contingent beneficiary for all three accounts. To support her contention, Va Va offered testimony from John's financial planner, who testified that he erroneously believed that John did not have a will when he executed beneficiary designation forms for a number of accounts. Va Va argued that the written contracts should be reformed for mutual mistake. The district court concluded that Michael was entitled to summary judgment under the contract terms and that no legal basis existed to require reformation of the contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) the contracts could not be reformed; and (2) proceeds from John's investment accounts were properly paid to his estate. View "Estate of Irvine v. Oaas" on Justia Law 2013-09-17 state Montana Montana Supreme Court McGrath DA 12-0603 http://law.justia.com/cases/west-virginia/supreme-court/2013/12-0365.html Brown. v. Fluharty 2013-09-13T13:27:41+00:00 2013-09-13T01:01:25+00:00 In 2009 McCausland, executed a "Last Will and Testament" naming Fluharty as executor and bequeating the residue of his estate to a Trust, established in 2002. Months later, McCausland was physically incapacitated and living in a nursing care facility. It is alleged that McCausland dictated the terms of a new will to his nephew, Brown. McCausland did not sign or mark the typewritten will, and no one signed or marked it on his behalf. Two of McCausland's health care providers in the nursing home signed the will and subsequently attempted to attest the document by signing affidavits averring that they "did witness [McCausland] stating that the new last will and testament contained his final desires." In 2010, McCausland died and the original will was probated and recorded. More than a year later, the petitioners sought to have the original will revoked and the second will admitted to probate. The trial court held that, under W. Va. Code § 41-1-3, the second document is not a valid will. The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. A testator's failure to sign his non-holographic will, or to request that it be signed on his behalf, renders the will void under these circumstances. View "Brown. v. Fluharty" on Justia Law 2013-09-12 state West Virginia West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals per curiam 12-0365 http://law.justia.com/cases/virginia/supreme-court/2013/122043.html Ayers v. Shaffer 2013-09-13T13:32:09+00:00 2013-09-12T21:06:27+00:00 Plaintiffs are the estranged great grandchildren of Elsie and legatees to one half of her residuary estate under a will dated 2004 and admitted to probate following Elsie's death in 2010. The defendants are Audrey, Elsie's sister and legatee to the remaining half of her residuary estate, and Elsie's former neighbors, Toni, Bruce, and Mike. Elsie's will nominated Toni as executrix; Toni and Audrey took possession of significant assets from Elsie during Elsie's life. Toni and Bruce began providing assistance to Elsie and her husband in 2004 under a contract providing that Toni and Bruce would be paid $500 per week and would receive $8000 for assistance given in the past. The agreement provided that Toni and Bruce would be paid from her estate, rather than during her lifetime. The trial court found that that Toni, while acting as an agent under the power of attorney, did not arrange for Elsie's assets to pass at death to the defendant, that the assets in question were retitled by Elsie personally. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Toni was in a confidential relationship with Elsie and the burden was on the defendants to rebut the presumption that the transactions were the result of undue influence. View "Ayers v. Shaffer" on Justia Law 2013-09-12 state Virginia Virginia Supreme Court Koontz 122043 http://law.justia.com/cases/georgia/supreme-court/2013/s13a0907.html Martina v. Elrod 2013-09-13T13:27:37+00:00 2013-09-10T23:13:29+00:00 The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal by caveators to determine the validity of the self-proving affidavit attached to the testator's will. The Court found that the affidavit did not substantially comply with the requirements of a self-proving affidavit under OCGA 53-4-24. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's conclusion which held otherwise. View "Martina v. Elrod" on Justia Law 2013-09-09 state Georgia Georgia Supreme Court Hunstein S13A0907 http://law.justia.com/cases/missouri/supreme-court/2013/sc92961.html Smith vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation 2013-09-13T13:27:39+00:00 2013-09-10T22:24:39+00:00 The survivors of Barbara Smith appealed a punitive damage award of $1.5 million against the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation. The Smiths contended that certain evidence admitted by the trial court was outside the court of appeals' prior mandate, and erred in overruling their motion for a new trial on the grounds of juror nondisclosure. The company cross-appealed, contending that the Smiths failed to make a submissible case for punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court's mandate did not address any issues concerning what evidence could be presented at the retrial of punitive damages, and that the trial court did not err in overruling the Smiths' motion for a new trial or the Company's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Smith vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation" on Justia Law 2013-09-10 state Missouri Missouri Supreme Court Fischer SC92961 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2013/20120432.html Four Seasons Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Linderkamp 2013-09-06T13:22:31+00:00 2013-09-06T12:20:04+00:00 Elden and Rita Linderkamp appealed a judgment that required Elden Linderkamp to pay Four Season's Healthcare Center, Inc. for nursing home care provided to his parents, invalidating a contract for deed and warranty deed conveying land from the parents to the Linderkamps, authorizing the parents' personal representative to administer the land in the probate of the parents' estates, and allowing the Linderkamps a net claim against the parents' estates. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence of a claimed oral agreement for Earl Linderkamp to compensate Elden for improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the contract for deed and warranty deed and did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence to support Elden's claim he made improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the deeds. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court erred in declining to rule on an issue about all of the children's liability for their parents' nursing home debt under N.D.C.C. 14-09-10. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Four Seasons Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Linderkamp" on Justia Law 2013-09-04 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Kapsner 20120432 http://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/2013/1120445.html Smith v. Winfield 2013-09-06T13:21:04+00:00 2013-08-31T13:45:37+00:00 Toma E. Smith, as personal representative of the estate of Tiffani P. Smith, appeals the grant of a summary judgment in favor of Dr. James Fleming, and a judgment entered in favor of Dr. Winfield S. Fisher III and the University of Alabama Foundation on her wrongful death claims. Dr. Fisher and the Foundation cross-appealed, arguing that the action should have been dismissed as being void ab initio. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Fleming. The Court concluded the trial court did not err in its judgment in favor of Dr. Fisher and the Foundation. View "Smith v. Winfield" on Justia Law 2013-08-30 state Alabama Alabama Supreme Court Bolin 1120445 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2013/20120313.html Brash v. Gulleson 2013-09-06T13:16:36+00:00 2013-08-31T13:16:19+00:00 Janet L. Brash, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Larry R. Brash, appealed judgment entered after a bench trial that dismissed her action against William M. Gulleson. We affirm. In the mid-1980s, Dr. Brash began running cows on Gulleson's ranch under an oral agreement to operate on a "60/40 share basis." Gulleson provided care and feed and received 60 percent of the calf crop from Dr. Brash's cows, and Dr. Brash provided veterinarian services. In the fall of 1997, Dr. Brash supervised an inventory and evaluation of cows on the Gulleson ranch, which included cows owned by Gulleson, Dr. Brash, and two or three others who had agreements with Gulleson. At that time, Dr. Brash had 108 cows on the Gulleson ranch. In 2000, Dr. Brash and Gulleson executed a written Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Brashes agreed to furnish 130 cows presently situated on the Gulleson farm to be cared for by Gulleson, and Gulleson would in return give the Brashes 40 percent of the calf crop each year. After Dr. Brash's death in 2004, Janet Brash testified she became the sole owner of all 130 cows and their offspring; however, when she demanded the return of the estate's and her portion of the herd, Gulleson returned only seven cows. In 2005, Janet Brash brought this action against Gulleson, alleging Gulleson failed to comply with the Agreement executed in 2000. After trial, the court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, holding in part that Dr. Brash had failed to provide 130 cows as required under the contract, which constituted a failure of consideration, and that Janet Brash had failed to prove a breach of the agreement by Gulleson. The court dismissed Brash's claims with prejudice. Judgment was entered in June 2012. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding there was a failure of consideration in the performance of the Cow/Calf Production Lease Agreement between the Brashes and Gulleson. View "Brash v. Gulleson" on Justia Law 2013-08-29 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court VandeWalle 20120313 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2013/20130012.html Estate of Cashmore 2013-09-06T13:16:34+00:00 2013-08-31T13:09:02+00:00 Thain Cashmore, individually, as personal representative of the estate of Robert Cashmore, and as trustee of the Robert Cashmore Trust, and Bourck Cashmore, individually and as trustee of the Robert Cashmore Trust, appealed an order that held the personal representative in contempt of court and an order denying the personal representative's N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to vacate the contempt order. In 2009, the personal representative moved to approve an "amended" final report and account and proposed distribution which differed significantly from the judgment approving the original final report entered the previous month. The amended final report purported to show estate assets had brought in less money than anticipated in the original final report. The amended final report also requested $2,502.13 in additional personal representative fees, $9,965.20 in additional attorney fees, and $8,000 in additional fees to close the estate. As a result, the amended final report showed the estate with a zero balance instead of the $72,598.56 listed in the original final report, and the estate therefore claimed it would be unable to pay Trudy Cashmore the $6,377.83 approved in the original final report. Undeterred by the Supreme Court's affirmance of the district court's final judgment ordering Trudy Cashmore be paid $6,377.83 within ten days, the personal representative did not pay her. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the personal representative in contempt or in denying the motion to vacate, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Cashmore" on Justia Law 2013-08-29 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court Sandstrom 20130012 http://law.justia.com/cases/north-dakota/supreme-court/2013/20130047.html Johnson v. Finkle 2013-09-06T13:22:32+00:00 2013-08-31T12:56:52+00:00 Nancy Finkle appealed an order and judgment quieting title to 1/2 of the mineral interests in certain real property in Mountrail County in Leslie D. Johnson, Carol Johnson, Merlyn H. Johnson, Thea Donna D. Johnson, Delores Albertson and their children. Finkle claimed she owned 1/4 of the mineral interests. The district court held Finkle did not have an interest in the minerals. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Finkle" on Justia Law 2013-08-29 state North Dakota North Dakota Supreme Court VandeWalle 20130047 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2013/27304.html Poch v. Bayshore Concrete 2013-08-30T13:24:46+00:00 2013-08-29T13:25:37+00:00 Kenneth Poch and Kevin Key were temporary workers contracted through Personnel Resources of Georgia, Inc. and Carolina Staffing, Inc. d/b/a Job Place of Conway, to work for Bayshore Concrete Products/South Carolina, Inc. to clean up a concrete casting worksite and dismantle equipment used to produce concrete forms. As a result of a tragic, work-related accident, Poch was killed and Key was injured. Poch's estate and Key received workers' compensation benefits through Job Place. Subsequently, Key and his wife and the estate of Poch filed suit against Bayshore SC and its parent company, Bayshore Concrete Products Corporation. The circuit court granted the company's motion to dismiss the actions on the ground that workers' compensation was Petitioners' exclusive remedy and, therefore, the company was immune from liability in a tort action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's order. Though the Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, it found the court incorrectly analyzed Petitioners' arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed as modified. View "Poch v. Bayshore Concrete" on Justia Law 2013-08-28 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Beatty 27304 http://law.justia.com/cases/south-carolina/supreme-court/2013/27308.html Hill v. Bell 2013-08-30T13:21:53+00:00 2013-08-29T13:24:40+00:00 This action involved competing claims to the retirement benefits of the late Thomas Sullivan, a former National Football League (NFL) running back for the Philadelphia Eagles. Thomas married Lavona Hill in Maryland in 1979. They separated in 1983, but never divorced. In 1986, Thomas purported to marry Barbara Sullivan in South Carolina. Sullivan was unaware of Thomas' prior marriage to Hill. In 1991, Thomas submitted pension forms to the NFL indicating Sullivan was his current spouse. Thomas died in 2002. Thereafter, Sullivan filed a claim with the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan (the Plan), which provided benefits to a player's surviving spouse, defining the term as "a [p]layer's lawful spouse, as recognized under applicable state law." In November 2002, the Plan began paying Sullivan monthly benefits. Four years later, Hill contacted the Plan to request benefits. Following an investigation, the Plan suspended payments to Sullivan pending a court order identifying Thomas's surviving spouse. After Hill failed to obtain that order, the Plan resumed payments to Sullivan. In 2009, Hill filed this action against the Plan in Pennsylvania state court, claiming entitlement to Thomas's retirement benefits. The Plan promptly removed the case to federal district court and filed an interpleader counterclaim, joining Sullivan as a party. The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the South Carolina Supreme Court over whether South Carolina law recognized the "putative spouse" or "putative marriage" doctrine. The Supreme Court answered the certified question "no." View "Hill v. Bell" on Justia Law 2013-08-28 state South Carolina South Carolina Supreme Court Toal 27308 http://law.justia.com/cases/maryland/court-of-appeals/2013/139-07.html In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K. 2013-08-30T13:21:50+00:00 2013-08-24T20:03:53+00:00 Petitioner filed in the Orphans' Court a petition to obtain legal guardianship of Tracy, her nephew. At the time of the filing of the petition, Tracy's mother (Mother) was deceased and Tracy was living with Petitioner. Also, no legal proceedings had occurred seeking to terminate Tracy's father's (Father) parental rights, nor was Tracy entitled to any disposition from Mother's estate. The court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Orphans' Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Orphans' Court lacks jurisdiction over petitions for guardianship of the person where at least one of the natural parents is alive, parental rights have not been terminated, and no testamentary appointment has been made. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K." on Justia Law 2013-08-23 state Maryland Maryland Court of Appeals Bell 139/07 http://law.justia.com/cases/new-hampshire/supreme-court/2013/2012-368.html In re Estate of Richard B. Wilber 2013-08-23T14:01:05+00:00 2013-08-22T13:01:47+00:00 The Estate of Richard Wilber appealed appeals a probate court decision allowing the Estate of Josephine Wilber to claim a statutory share under RSA 560:10 (2007) of certain real property named in his will. Finding that the lower court erred in allowing the claim, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "In re Estate of Richard B. Wilber" on Justia Law 2013-08-21 state New Hampshire New Hampshire Supreme Court Hicks 2012-368 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2013/da-12-0737.html In re Estate of Quirin 2013-08-23T14:00:35+00:00 2013-08-21T15:57:33+00:00 Decedent, the mother of Cathie and Marcy, died testate. Decedent's will expressly made no provision for her daughters. Decedent named Kristine Fankell as the personal representative of her estate. After Fankell's application for informal probate was accepted, Marcy filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate and a petition for formal probate of the will. Cathie subsequently filed an objection to the application and appointment of Fankell as personal representative as well as a motion for substitute of judge. The district court (1) denied Cathie's motion for substitution of judge as untimely, and (2) granted Fankell's motion to strike Cathie's pleadings because she failed timely to intervene and her interests were adequately represented by Marcy. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Cathie's motion for substitution of judge, holding that the court correctly determined Cathie's motion was untimely. View "In re Estate of Quirin" on Justia Law 2013-08-20 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Cotter DA 12-0737 http://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2013/op-13-0294.html In re Estate of Bennett 2013-08-23T14:15:56+00:00 2013-08-21T15:56:53+00:00 Jeremiah Bennett, the adult son of Abel and Judy Bennett, died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Jeremiah died intestate and was survived by two minor children. The district court appointed Sabrina Bennett, Jeremiah's former wife, as the personal representative of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina subsequently petitioned the district court for a declaration that Abel and Judy (the Bennetts) had no standing to claim wrongful death damages as a result of Jeremiah's death. The district court concluded that Jeremiah's children were the sole heirs of the estate and therefore had priority over any wrongful death and survivorship claims. The Bennetts petitioned the Supreme Court for supervisory control. The Court accepted the petition and vacated the portion of the district court's order holding that the Bennetts could not recover wrongful death claims as a matter of law, holding that the Bennetts were entitled to recover wrongful death damage as Jeremiah's parents and survivors. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law 2013-08-20 state Montana Montana Supreme Court Rice OP 13-0294