text: content LE Magazine January 2004 Melatonin and Cancer TreatmentBy Eileen M. Lynch, PhDOncology Research Scientist Melatonin and Cancer SurgeryIn peri- and post-operative cancer surgery, melatonin may prove beneficial in wound healing through its natural anti-inflammatory properties.14,59 Melatonin reduces tissue destruction during inflammatory reactions60 by limiting hypoxia-reoxygenation-induced damage,61 scavenging free radicals, and reducing the upregulation of pro-inflammatory cytokines,60 such as the interleukins and tumor necrosis factor-alpha. Furthermore, surgery induces immunosuppression, which could adversely affect tumor-host interactions in cancer patients having their tumors surgically removed. As melatonin inhibits the activation of the acute inflammatory response, it may inhibit immunosuppression while contributing to an immune reaction against the tumor.14 Moreover, melatonin can reverse the perception of pain sensation (hyperalgesia) that is secondary to inflammation associated with wound healing.56 In cancer patients undergoing surgical removal of gastrointestinal tract tumors, preoperative neuroimmunotherapy with melatonin and interleukin-2 (IL-2) was capable of neutralizing the surgery-induced reduction in white blood cell counts (lymphocytopenia).14 Melatonin thus may prove to be beneficial to cancer patients who elect surgical removal of their tumors, by improving wound healing, inhibiting tissue damage, reducing pain sensation and weakness, counteracting reduced blood cell counts and anemia, and preventing immunosuppression. Melatonin and Radiation TherapyRadiation requires the presence of oxygen to generate free radicals to kill tumor cells. It is well established, however, that most human tumors are poorly oxygenated (hypoxic) because of blood perfusion and diffusion limitations,62 intermittent blood flow in the tumor microcirculation,63 and the occurrence of anemia in cancer patients (reduced hemoglobin indicates reduced oxygen levels).64,65 In fact, radiation therapy itself usually induces anemia, which is associated with a poor prognosis in cancer patients.66 Melatonin stimulates platelet production (thrombopoiesis)67 and has been shown to effectively treat cancer patients with low platelet counts and anemia.68 Moreover, melatonin has an anti-serotonergic effect, which means that it may block the inhibition of blood flow by serotonin.26 This consequently may increase blood flow and allow restoration of the microcirculation, which is compromised in the tumor microenvironment.69 Melatonin may improve the blood supply to the tumor, increasing tumor oxygen levels and thus increasing radiation-induced tumor cell death (by overcoming radio-resistance).70 In addition, melatonin is lipid soluble and can presumably cross the blood-tumor barrier as it does the blood-brain barrier.71 Melatonin may further increase the delivery of radiation (and chemotherapeutic drugs) to poorly oxygenated regions within the tumor microenvironment, consequently increasing the effectiveness of these anti-cancer modalities. Radiation, which frequently causes inflammation of the mucosa (mucositis), may substantially reduce melatonin levels in the body13 by damaging the mucosa of the gastrointestinal tract where melatonin is known to be localized.26 A radioneuroendocrine approach utilizing radiotherapy with melatonin supplementation in brain glioblastoma patients showed that the likelihood of survival at one year was significantly higher in those who received melatonin with radiotherapy versus radiotherapy alone.12 It recently has been suggested that melatonin may diminish the risk of hypoperfusion-induced cerebral ischemia.72 Therefore, melatonin supplementation may prolong the survival of patients undergoing radiotherapy.3 Melatonin also may provide relief from the inherent detrimental side effects of radiation treatment73 (including toxicity to the heart, kidneys, and nerves—cardiotoxicity, nephrotoxicity, and neurotoxicity, respectively), immune suppression, pain, anemia, fatigue, and sleep disturbances.12 Melatonin is a safe and effective facilitator of tissue repair processes, required for recovery from radiation-induced injury,74 and thus offers a promising co-treatment approach for patients undergoing radiation therapy for cancer. Summary of Studies Using MelatoninLissoni's Phase II Randomized Clinical Trial Results One-Year Survival Tumor Type Patient Number Basic Therapy Melatonin Dose Melatonin Placebo Level Of Significance Metastatic Non- Small-Cell Lung 100 Chemotherapy 20 mg 5-year survival 6% 5-year survival 0% N/A Metastatic Non- Small-Cell Lung 63 Supportive Care Only 10 mg 5-year survival 6% Under 1% <0.05 Glioblastoma 30 Conventional Radiotherapy 10 mg 43% Under 1% <0.05 Metastatic Breast 14 Tamoxifen 20 mg 64% 36% <0.01 Brain Metastases 50 Conventional Radiotherapy 20 mg 38% 12% <0.05 Metastatic Colorecta 50 IL-2 40 mg 36% 12% <0.05<0.05 Metastatic Non- Small-Cell Lung 60 IL-2 40 mg 24% 19% <0.05 Adapted from Life Extension (March 2002). Originally compiled by Cancer Treatment Centers of America. Melatonin and ChemotherapyChemotherapy, through immunosuppressive and cytotoxic actions, exerts detrimental effects on patients' physiological anti-cancer defense mechanisms. Melatonin, by improving immune status,52,75 has been shown to prolong survival and increase performance status in those undergoing chemotherapy. In conjunction with various chemotherapy regimens, melatonin has provided patients with a significant advantage over chemotherapy alone by increasing five-year survival rates, improving quality of life, and increasing the therapeutic effectiveness of many chemotherapeutic agents,76 while lessening or eliminating their negative and potentially detrimental side effects on normal healthy cells and tissues.4,77,78 Melatonin reduced chemotherapy-induced cardiotoxicity, neurotoxicity, nephrotoxicity, thrombocytopenia (reduced platelet counts), stomatitis (inflammation of mouth), and asthenia (weakness), and improved response in cancer patients.79,80 Melatonin should be seriously considered in combination with extremely toxic chemotherapy regimes—such as anthracyclines (adriamycin),81 cyclosporine, cytarabine,78 IL-2, cisplatin,55,79 5-fluorouracil,75,82 and methotrexate78,82—to reduce the incidence of their well-established side effects,80 which include but are not limited to mucositis and heart and liver toxicity.75 Melatonin recently has been shown to prevent methotrexate-induced liver and kidney toxicity in animals.83 It should be remembered that fasting reduces melatonin levels, typically within two days,84 suggesting that nausea, vomiting, and reduced appetite—side effects of chemotherapy—may reduce melatonin levels. Melatonin and ChronotherapyBecause of the circadian rhythm dictated by the body's melatonin levels, some types of chemotherapy work best if administered at an appropriate time of day, and are thus termed "chronotherapy."3 The daily rhythm of melatonin exerts a "chronobiotic" effect and, as a circadian mediator, melatonin delivers the circadian signals to melatonin targets, including the internal body clock (in the suprachiasmatic nucleus).85 Chronotherapy is associated with maximum patient tolerability, tumor susceptibility, and attempts to improve the efficacy of treatment and the quality of patients' lives. It takes advantage of asynchronies in growth rate between normal and tumor cells that are regulated by the circadian rhythm, thus minimizing damage to the patient and maximizing drug toxicity to tumor cells. The growth of tumor cells may intrinsically follow a tumor-specific rhythm. It may be possible to modulate this rhythm by manipulating cancer patients' melatonin levels.86 The local effect produced on the circadian clock could thus modulate the circadian rhythm.87 Slow-growing tumors could more likely be controlled by the patients' circadian clock, whereas fast-growing or advanced-stage tumors may have altered circadian rhythms even though they are not temporally disorganized masses. High doses of melatonin are necessary to induce a phase-shifting effect on the circadian rhythm.88 Melatonin thus may have a unique ability to control the biological clock, consequently suppressing malignant growth and increasing the efficacy of cancer therapies. Chronotherapy has been shown to increase the survival time in children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia.89 Continued on Page 3 of 5


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Posted on May 13, 2013 – 3:15 pm | Author: chrisolds
Baseball, Basketball, Beckett 20 Questions, Boxing, Football, Hockey, MMA, Pro Wrestling, Racing, Soccer | 1991 Pro Line, 1993 Maxx, Barry Bonds, Beckett Sports Card Monthly Families Issue, Bobby Bowden, brothers in sports, Cal Ripken Jr., college football, Eli Manning, families in sports, Father's Day, Gina Carano, Gordie Howe, Jose Canseco, Karl Malone, Ken Griffey Jr, Kobe Bryant parents, Lisa Leslie, Mia Hamm, Mike Ditka, MLB twins, Peyton Manning, Richard Petty, top families in sports, Vince McMahon, WWE | Comments (8)
Explore the family ties that go along with sports and collecting and take a look at some of the notable fathers, sons, mothers and daughters who share cardboard with us all.
Posted on January 31, 2013 – 2:26 pm | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | Andrew Luck, Drew Brees, Eli Manning, Peyton Manning, Robert Griffin III, Super Bowl LVII, Super Bowl Promo, Topps | Comments (3)
Topps is giving away exclusive cards.
Posted on December 17, 2012 – 4:19 pm | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | Adrian Peterson, Andrew Luck, Eli Manning, Oyo Sportstoys, Tom Brady | Comments (0)
Oyo Sportstoys started its business on the diamond, but the company is expanding to the gridiron.
Posted on December 10, 2012 – 11:29 am | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | 2012 National Treasures Football, Andrew Luck, Eli Manning, featured, Jerry Rice, Panini America | Comments (16)
Panini America is gearing up for its top football product with National Treasures.
Posted on November 26, 2012 – 1:46 pm | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | 2012 Topps Triple Threads, Andrew Luck, Beckett Football, Brock Osweiler, Doug Martin, Eli Manning, Jerry Rice, Justin Blackmon, Nick Foles, printing plates, Robert Griffin III, Trent Richardson, White Whale | Comments (0)
Between turkey, stuffing and Black Friday sales, Topps released 2012 Triple Threads Football last Friday.
Posted on September 17, 2012 – 8:18 am | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | Brandon Weeden, C.J. Spiller, Dante Rosario, Eli Manning, Hakeem Nicks, Monday Morning Collector, Reggie Bush, Victor Cruz | Comments (9)
The second week of football season has already seen some interesting storylines: the Philadelphia Eagles are somehow undefeated, the New Orleans Saints are winless and the rookie quarterbacks shined on Sunday.
Posted on August 14, 2012 – 4:55 pm | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | 2012 Topps Magic Football, Andrew Luck, David Wilson, Eli Manning, featured, Robert Griffin III, Tim Tebow | Comments (5)
The next installment of Topps Magic Football is coming to hobby and retail stores.
Posted on August 1, 2012 – 9:43 am | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | 2012 Topps Football, Aaron Rodgers, Drew Brees, Eli Manning, Joe Montana, Joe Namath, Terry Bradshaw, Tim Tebow, Tom Brady | Comments (1)
The signal-callers get plenty of attention starting next week.
Posted on July 31, 2012 – 2:25 pm | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | 2012 Panini Momentum Football, Andrew Luck, Austin Miles, Dez Bryant, Eli Manning, John Elway, Justin Blackmon, Robert Griffin III, Shannon Sharpe | Comments (1)
Panini Momentum, which is currently scheduled for Aug. 29, will include many of the top rookies.
Posted on July 26, 2012 – 1:58 pm | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | Aaron Rodgers, Calvin Johnson, cam newton, Eli Manning, nfl, Panini Sticker Album, Pop Warner, Rob Gronkowski, Tim Tebow | Comments (1)
What do Eli Manning, Tim Tebow, Aaron Rodgers, Cam Newton, Rob Gronkowski and Calvin Johnson have in common?
Posted on July 25, 2012 – 8:44 am | Author: Susan Lulgjuraj
Football | 2012 Topps, 2012 Topps Football, Andrew Luck, Eli Manning, Eric LeGrand, featured, nfl, Peyton Manning, Robert Griffin III, Tom Brady | Comments (2)
For set collectors who don't want to buy pack after pack and search singles on eBay for every card in 2012 Topps Football, there is an easy way to get the entire collection, including subsets.
Posted on February 6, 2012 – 12:15 pm | Author: tolentinotown
Football | Eli Manning, featured, Justin Tuck, Mario Manningham, Monday Morning Collector, super bowl, Super Bowl XLVI | Comments (1)
By Dan Hitt | Sports Data Publishing Manager Every Monday morning throughout the NFL season, we selected our rookie, veteran and breakout players of the week with a run down on why collectors should take notice. For the postseason we'll select three standout players for each round. Here are our choices for the Super [...]
Posted on February 2, 2012 – 5:47 pm | Author: chrisolds
Baseball, Basketball, Football, Hockey | Adrian Peterson, Albert Pujols, Blake Griffin, Bleacher Creatures, Eli Manning, Kobe Bryant, LeBron James, MLB, NBA, New York Yankees, nfl, NHL, Peyton Manning, plush, sports toys, Tom Brady, toys | Comments (0)
Just think if Sesame Street came to your street — or maybe Lansdowne Street, Blake Street or any other street with a sports arena to be found.
Posted on January 23, 2012 – 10:55 am | Author: tolentinotown
Football | 2011 NFL Playoffs, Conference Championships, Devin Thomas, Eli Manning, Monday Morning Collector, Tom Brady | Comments (2)
For the postseason we'll select three standout players for each round. Here are our picks for the conference championship round of the 2011 NFL Playoffs.
Posted on January 18, 2012 – 11:20 am | Author: tolentinotown
Football | 2011 NFL Playoffs, Alex Smith, Eli Manning, Hakeem Nicks, Joe Flacco, Rob Gronkowski, Tom Brady | Comments (1)
Who's the next cardboard icon from the narrowing postseason picture?
Posted on January 9, 2012 – 11:31 am | Author: tolentinotown
Football | 2011 NFL Playoffs, Drew Brees, Eli Manning, featured, Monday Morning Collector, NFL Wild Card, Tim Tebow | Comments (0)
For the postseason we'll select three standout players for each round. Here are our picks for the Wild Card round of the 2011 NFL Playoffs:
Posted on July 29, 2011 – 11:08 am | Author: tolentinotown
Box Busters & Ripping Retail, Football | 2011 Rookies and Stars Football, Andy Dalton, Bilal Powell, Blaine Gabbert, Box Busters & Ripping Retail, Colin Kaepernick, Danny Woodhead, Eli Manning, Rookies & Stars | Comments (0)
The first post-lockout product of the season, 2011 Rookies & Stars Football is now live and leaving a lasting impression on hobby history.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
looking for accommodation on Mull?
Please contact the accommodation provider direct using the web site,
we do not act as an agent for booking accommodation on the isle of Mull.
contact us only if you are an accommodation provider, and you are looking for information about becoming a member and adding your property to the Accommodations Mull web site.
Jim Spence
Isle of Mull
Telephone: 01688 400507
(no answer please email us)
email firstname.lastname@example.com
About Us
Accommodations Mull is run by Jim Spence,
Jim lives on the isle of Mull and has been involved in Self Catering Tourism for more than 30 years, he has been building and promoting web sites for more than 19 years.
Accommodations Mull was created sometime around the winter 1994 to promote holiday Accommodation on the island of Mull.
From these early days the web site has remained in constant development making use of the latest web practices and technologies.
Accommodation Mull has a fairly narrow focus - promoting accommodation on the isle of Mull - and does not compete for rankings with other Scottish / UK Accommodation promotion web sites, The site therefore enjoys high page 1 rankings with the Google search engine, in searches for e.g - accommodation on the isle of Mull. Extra advertising is used such as, Google adwords campaigns.
The concept is straight forward, stick to promoting Accommodation on Mull and nothing else.
The challenge, keep the pages as simple as possible whilst presenting the information in an interesting way and keep load times to a minimum.
Visitors to the web site are presented with a clean page with an attractive map of the island. Visitors first choose a category of accommodation e.g. Self Catering, Bed and Breakfast hotelsand guest house or Wildlife trips; this then loads an overlay showing the location of these types of properties on the island Map, on mouse-over the property locators, a picture of the holiday property appears, and if the visitor clicks on the picture they are taken to web page full of information about the holiday property.
Accommodations Mull also has a Late Availability page where members can advertise any Last Minute Availability, Cancellations or Special offers.
There is also a popular feature which allows visitors to send one general email enquiry off to all the Accommodations Mull members, - without enquiries we can not generate sales.....
This web site and many others promoting Accommodation on Mull are designed by Jim Spence, contact me if you would like to have a web site built for your enterprise using latest web practices and principles.
Click here for Accommodations Mull Membership form
W3C A body of people creating common Web standards and guidelines.
All our web sites are built in XHTML language and validated by W3C.
We use Cascading Style Sheets to control style. Our CSS is validated by W3C.
We have read and make every effort to adhere to the guidelines laid out regarding accessibility.
About Us/Contact Us I ©Accommodations Mull 2009


text:
Related Content: North Korea
PBS NewsHour: Could U.S. 'Start Fresh' With North Korea's New Leader?
Web content
Mourners in North Korea said goodbye to Kim Jong-il Wednesday. The funeral procession, led by Kim's designated successor, signified the end of an era for an isolated nation. Gwen Ifill discusses how the leadership change could affect U.S. policy with Donald Gregg of The Korea Society and Georgetown University's Balbina Hwang.
North Korea's Nuclear Program
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After the death this week of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, we look back at the development of North Korea's nuclear program over the decade as reported on Washington Week. In 2003, North Korea confirmed its nuclear capability. Then in 2006, reports of that nation's first nuclear weapons test and the reaction from the international community.
North Korea Faces 2nd Leadership Change In 60 Years
On The Radar
Intelligence analysts are scrambling to assess North Korea's designated leader Kim Jong Un, of whom very little is known. He is untested, and North Korea watchers wonder whether he will be challenged by the military or others in the leadership elite. Similar questions were raised about his father when he took over following the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994.
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The U.S. has "no new concerns" about North Korea's nuclear arsenal following the death of dictator Kim Jong Il, White House press secretary Jay Carney said. The U.S. is monitoring the situation in North Korea and has consulted with allies South Korea and Japan as well as China and Russia, the other members of the six-party talks on getting North Korea to shed its nuclear weapons, Carney said at a briefing.
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Called the "Dear Leader" by his people, Kim Jong-il, the son of North Korea's founder, presided with an iron hand over a country he kept on the edge of starvation and collapse, fostering perhaps the last persona
Kim Jong-il, North Korean Dictator, Dies
On The Radar
Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader who realized his family's dream of turning his starving, isolated country into a nuclear-weapons power even as it sank further into despotism, died on Saturday of a heart attack while traveling on his train, according to an announcement Monday by the country's state-run media. Word of Kim's death sent shock waves through North Korea's Asia neighbors and reverberated around the world, reflecting the unpredictable outcome of an abrupt leadership change in one of the most opaque and repressive countries.
On the Radar: December 6, 2010
Legacy: On The Radar
On the Radar: November 30, 2010
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May 28, 2010
Weekly Show
Oil continues to spill into the Gulf as the President turns up the heat on his response to the crisis. Congress votes to repeal Don't Ask Don't Tell and tension continues to mount between North and South Korea.
And the conversation continues online with the Washington Week Webcast Extra. The panel sifts through the questions swirling around Rep. Joe Sestak (D-PA). Also, ABC News' Martha Raddatz shares more details of her report from an F-15E combat jet on a mission in Afghanistan.
On the Radar: May 26, 2010
Legacy: On The Radar


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And another page of Boost Mobile reviews and ratings
Share your opinion and experience with this device. Influence others and their buying decisions, or just make your voice heard!
- 4.0 overall
I've been with Boost a long long time...By Natalie Nichole, posted: Sep 12Although I'm rather upset that they increased their monthly shrinkage plan limit from 35 a month to 40 a month, I get great service from BoostMobile. Just a little insight, Boost is great for texting, as the text messages get sent via Verizon and Sprint cell towers. Sprint has a contract with Verizon so this is possible. When calling, however, it has to connect to a Sprint tower primarily, but if there is a nearby cellphone tower too it sometimes creates a clash with the frequency waves. (Much like when you go by a Radio Tower and the Radio will give you static for a short distance) Boost is great for users who Text primarily and use data who don't want a contract. Sprint is also good for this, if you want a contract.
- 4.0 overall
Been with BOOST since 2006 and staying...By penafamilyrocks, posted: Aug 12yes they dont have the best customer service but neither does wal-mart and all you cry babies still go. i love this company and its affordability, i have the blackberry flip phone and it works just fine. all of you cry babies that want to get on the internet and be on there like your life depends on it might as well just carry your ipad or laptop around. cell phones are just that, cell phones...those of you who depend on them for EVERYTHING all the time will always be bitching. get off BOOST'S ass and the phones, run a few laps, spend time with real humans and not the apparatis and loose a few pounds. i bet all you complaining are at least 200lbs. so yeah. cell phones are meant to make quick simple phone calls and not to be depended on for everything, if you wanna listen to music turn your car radio on when driving or wait to go home so you can turn your radio on. wanna get on the internet and it dont work...GET ON A POWERFUL COMPUTER. i just cant wait till all this high gadget, technology shit goes down the shitter and we all have to do things old school..
- 1.0 overall
Terrible Reception / Terrible Customer ServiceBy Jim Breunig, posted: Aug 12Coverage is very spotty, I just purchased the Evo 4g, Love the phone but service areas are extremely limited and definitely NO 4G and Very Limited 3 G. Stay AWAY!!!
- 1.0 overall
Worst mobile experience everBy Fogeddaboudit, posted: Aug 12In the two miserable months I've used Boost, not one call has successfully been carried out or received. I've had to redial and reconnect 4 and 5 times just to finish a sentence. Without cause, calls just end. Doesn't matter where I am. Bars up, battery charged. Texting and the camera works, that's about it. Local or long distance calls? Forget about using this cell phone for speaking to anyone. The web site is teensy grey letters on black (how brilliant is that?) and difficult to navigate. Customer service by phone is as difficult as everyone else has described. I'm done. Switching to Verizon or AT&T tomorrow.
- 3.0 overall
Yes and No - And we'll see...By 7welker7, posted: Aug 12I've been a Boost customer for around 3 years - I've never had any service issues at all, but their customer service is the absolute worst I have ever encountered. Trying to navigate their web of automated attendants is impossible and reaching a live rep usually results in being transferred back into the black hole of automation, which becomes a virtual endurance contest, they will disconnect you eventually, if you don't hang up first. Just this morning I spent a little over an hour simply trying to update my payment information including a change of address - I first attempted to use their website as from my previous experiences with calling customer service I preferred to deal online rather than work through their automated maze, however, the online experience was futile as well. I really do believe their pricing is competitive, and as I stated earlier, I've not experienced any service issues, but after this morning's debacle I'm not sure I will continue with their service. I'm not very confident that my information was updated properly, but we'll see in a few days when I am billed. Stay tuned.
- 1.0 overall
Boost should definitely be a NO-GO!By Thirdeye, posted: Aug 12Boost Mobile's provided service is nothing but a huge scam. Sure they give you a $50 a month plan. But, when you add on $200 for the phone, $5 a month for insurance for said phone, $60 deductible for the piece of shit phone that breaks twice and uses up your ONLY two claims... forcing you to buy another piece of shit phone... Nah, it isn't worth it. You might as well just pay a huge bill a month, get free upgrades, have replacement phones offered, etc... with a contract company. Also, customer service is unbelievable, and Boost is always dropping calls. Worst experience with any company of my entire life.
- 1.0 overall
BOOST SUCKS...!!!! Stay FAR awayBy IH8Boost, posted: Aug 12BOOST SUCKS...!!!! If you don't believe me try calling Customer Service. The automated service is the WORSE. Most of the Reps don't speak good English and that's frustrating. The phone service is intermittent at best, they have a lot of excuses for their issues. I've been with them way too long. Got away from Sprint and headed to BOOST years ago ONLY to have Sprint buy Boost. You can't contact Corporate because they won't give that information. Trying to write a letter to affect change is the equivalent of trying to pass a camel through the eye of a needle. As for the comments by Yesii Muameeh in this Post, you are probably a Rep for Boost and it's obvious why their customer service is horrendous.
- 1.0 overall
Dont let them fool you!By Sharon Cappolella Townsley, posted: Aug 12Please stop putting your money into a service that isn't helping you! Yes it is contract free, but is it 4g nationwide? Do they give you money off your bill or in your bank account for referring a friends? Or adding a family memeber? NO! They do not! you just pay it bc its a phone, you can text call, get on the web and it's no contract right? WELL lucky for you! So are we! Differnce is, instead of putting money into mobile networking, We put it into our customers!!! You want to help you spread the word by paying you when you refer people! Check it out! http://www.riptercell.com/
- 1.0 overall
hate automated messagesBy Nate Sears, posted: Aug 12I think boost may have switched something up on me. I've made 2- 1 hour long calls within the past week. I can't make or receive any calls for approximately 30 minutes after. It says something about not being able to complete the call, even though I have perfect signal. If they put a call time cap, it must be new. I tried calling customer support to ask about it and had to wait 30 mins to call, I have yet to find a way through their maze of automated messages and talk with someone who can answer some questions. Well Boost, its been a good 3 1/2 year run. Good Bye
- 1.7 overall
Service interruptionsBy cwgkeeperdad, posted: Jul 12BoostMoble is NOT a good choice if you leave in the Amarillo,TX area. The service continually drops from 3G to their slower 1x network as soon as you start connecting to the Internet. Don't even think about using Pandora because you will be buffering most of the time. The call clarity is not very good either. Customer service has been very polite and understanding but if you can't fix or solve the issue then it is worthless to even call.


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2012 L.A. Auto Show
The 2012 L.A. Auto Show, at the Los Angeles Convention Center, saw some major debuts, a sign of increasingly fierce competition in the industry on all fronts. 360-degree view
More: Major debuts on L.A. Auto Show opening day
More: Major debuts on L.A. Auto Show opening day
Image 89 of 93
Mercedes-Benz SLS AMG Black Series( Mercedes-Benz / December 4, 2012 )
The SLS Black Series also gets a completely revamped suspension system with two selectable modes, the car's track has been widened, and the speed-sensitive steering has been revised. This SLS also benefits from standard carbon-ceramic brakes.


text: Gregory v. W. A. Brown & SonsDownload as PDF IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 447A08 FILED: 29 JANUARY 2010 ANDREA GREGORY, Employee v. W.A. BROWN & SONS, Employer, PMA INSURANCE GROUP, Carrier Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 192 N.C. App. 94, 664 S.E.2d 589 (2008), affirming an opinion and award entered by the North Carolina Industrial Commission on 11 May 2007. Heard in the Supreme Court on 1 April 2009. DeVore, Acton, & Stafford, P.A., by William D. Acton, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee. Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by M. Duane Jones, for defendant-appellants. NEWBY, Justice. This case involves a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act for disability and medical payments due to a workplace accident. Plaintiff-employee failed to give the employer written notice of the accident within thirty days after the accident's occurrence as directed by N.C.G.S. § 97-22. The question presented is whether, in order for any compensation to be payable under such circumstances, the Industrial Commission must (1) conclude as a matter of law that the employer has not been prejudiced by the employee's failure to provide timely written notice and (2) support that conclusion with appropriate -2findings of fact. Because the express language of section 97-22 requires us to answer this question in the affirmative, we reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further remand to the Industrial Commission for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issue of prejudice. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff began working for defendant W.A. Brown & Sons ("Brown & Sons") in June 1999. As of October 2001 plaintiff had been experiencing pain in her lower back for approximately six months and was taking over-the-counter medication for her pain. During the week of 11 October 2001, plaintiff sustained an injury to her lower back while lifting a heavy container at work. Although plaintiff testified before a representative of the Industrial Commission ("the Commission") that the incident occurred on the morning of 11 October 2001, Brown & Sons' time records showed that plaintiff was not at work that morning. Presumably because the precise timing of plaintiff's injury is therefore uncertain, the Commission simply found plaintiff suffered an injury "on an unknown date" during the week of 11 October 2001. Plaintiff alleged that, immediately after the incident, she reported her injury to Rick Dunaway, her team leader. Dunaway in turn reported the incident to Barry Christy, plaintiff's supervisor, who gave plaintiff a back support belt. Plaintiff worked the remainder of the week. On Sunday 14 October 2001, plaintiff saw a doctor about her back pain. She told the -3doctor she had been having pain for about six months and described the incident at work. However, because Brown & Sons had not authorized the medical visit, the doctor's office "would not treat [plaintiff] as a possible workers' compensation patient and made no record of her report of injury." The following Tuesday, plaintiff reported for work but was so visibly impaired by pain that Christy referred her to Pam Cordts in human resources. Plaintiff told Cordts about her pain and inability to work, but she did not then claim that her injury was work related. According to the opinion and award of the Full Commission, Cordts "gave plaintiff paperwork on Family Medical Leave and short-term disability, but did not discuss the possibility of workers' compensation" because she "believed that [plaintiff's injury] was something that had occurred outside of work." Cordts told plaintiff to see a doctor and that "for her own safety she would not be allowed to return to work without a note from the doctor." During the ensuing year, plaintiff saw an orthopedic surgeon, a neurosurgeon, and a chiropractor and underwent a variety of examinations to determine the nature and cause of her pain. Throughout this process, the doctors' examinations were limited because plaintiff would complain of severe pain during the tests. As a result, the Full Commission found "it was initially difficult for the treating physicians to sort out diagnoses for [plaintiff's] physical problems and to determine the relationship between her symptoms and the injury at work." Based on expert testimony that plaintiff "likely had a pre- -4existing [sic] back condition at the time of her work-related injury," the Full Commission found that plaintiff "sustained an injury to her back that aggravated her preexisting degenerative condition." Plaintiff failed to give Brown & Sons written notice of her accident as directed by N.C.G.S. §§ 97-22 and 97-23 until she filed a Form 18, entitled "Notice of Accident to Employer (G.S. 97-22) and Claim of Employee or His Personal Representative or Dependents (G.S. 97-24)." Plaintiff completed her Form 18 on 1 February 2002, and it was filed with the Commission on 5 February 2002, nearly four months after the claimed accident. The matter was initially heard before Deputy Commissioner Morgan S. Chapman ("the deputy"), who, on 28 April 2004, entered an opinion and award denying plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits. The deputy made numerous findings of fact, the most pertinent of which are as follows. When Barry Christy, plaintiff's supervisor, gave plaintiff a back support belt on the day of the accident, Christy "was unaware of a specific injury." When Pam Cordts in human resources asked plaintiff about her injury, "plaintiff indicated that she did not know how she had done it and that she had been having back problems for quite a while." After Cordts told plaintiff she would not be allowed to return to work without a doctor's clearance, plaintiff saw a doctor and "stated that the onset of her symptoms was six months previously and that she was not injured on the job." During plaintiff's neurosurgical evaluation on 12 December 2001, "she gave a six-month history of symptoms -5and did not describe the incident at work, although she advised that her job involved heavy lifting." In addition, the deputy found: 13. Defendants denied this claim since there was no record of an injury at work in plaintiff's medical records and since she had denied that her back condition was related to a work-related injury to Ms. Cordts, to the adjuster, Brian Gray, who spoke with her on November 9, 2001 regarding her short term disability claim, and on the claims forms for the disability benefits. . . . . 15. . . . . Defendants were prejudiced by the delay in receiving written notice since they otherwise might well have accepted the claim as compensable, but rather allowed plaintiff to pursue disability benefits, for which they would not receive a credit since the benefits were not totally employer funded, since defendants were not able to designate the medical treatment plaintiff would receive and since the treatment which plaintiff obtained was unusually protracted. The fact that the claim was denied was due to plaintiff's own statements to representatives of defendants which gave defendants very good grounds to believe that the back condition was not due to a compensable injury at work. Based upon these findings of fact, the deputy concluded as a matter of law that "plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant." However, the deputy further concluded that plaintiff's claim is barred due to her failure to give her employer written notice of the injury within thirty days since she did not have reasonable excuse for the delay and since defendants were prejudiced by it. Defendants did not have actual knowledge of the injury despite the initial verbal report since plaintiff repeatedly thereafter denied that she was injured at work. G.S. §97-22. -6Plaintiff appealed the deputy's opinion and award to the Full Commission, and defendants cross-appealed. The Full Commission reviewed the case and reversed the deputy's opinion and award, entering its opinion and award on 18 January 2005. The Full Commission determined that Brown & Sons did have actual notice of plaintiff's work-related injury and concluded that plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for failing to give Brown & Sons timely written notice of her accident in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 97-22. The Full Commission made the following conclusions of law: 1. On an unknown date during the week of October 11, 2001, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant in that she sustained a back injury as the result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned. 2. The aggravation or exacerbation of plaintiff's pre-existing back condition as a result of a specific traumatic incident, which has resulted in loss of wage earning capacity, is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. 3. Defendants had actual notice of plaintiff's work-related injury, and resulting workers' compensation claim, (1) when plaintiff immediately reported her injury to her team leader, (2) when plaintiff's supervisor gave her a back support brace so that she could continue working; and (3) when her supervisor sent her to human resources to discuss her injury. Because defendants had actual knowledge of plaintiff's work-related injury, plaintiff's failure to give written notice of her claim did not bar her claim for compensation. 4. Even if defendants had not had actual notice, given the nature of plaintiff's injury and her pre-existing back condition, plaintiff's failure to give written notice within 30 days is reasonably -7excused because plaintiff did not reasonably know of the nature, seriousness, or probable compensable character of her injury until after extensive treatment with Dr. Roy, her treating physician. (Citations omitted.) The Full Commission also found that Cordts "failed to ask specific questions regarding the cause of plaintiff's injury," "did not take proper action to assess whether or not plaintiff's injury was, in fact, work related," and that "there is no evidence that Ms. Cordts spoke, as she should have, with either [plaintiff's team leader] or [plaintiff's supervisor] to determine if plaintiff's supervisors had actual knowledge of a work-related injury or incident involving plaintiff." Regarding plaintiff's visit to an orthopedic surgeon following her meeting with Cordts, the Full Commission found that plaintiff did, in fact, tell the surgeon that she had been injured on the job. The Full Commission made no findings that plaintiff failed to describe the workplace accident during her neurosurgical evaluation or that she repeatedly denied to defendants that her back condition was due to a work-related injury. Most importantly, the Full Commission reversed the deputy's conclusion that "[d]efendants were prejudiced by the delay in receiving written notice" of the accident. However, the Full Commission made no findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to the issue of prejudice to defendants. Regarding plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice requirement of N.C.G.S. § 97-22, the Full Commission simply concluded: "Because defendants had actual knowledge of plaintiff's work-related -8injury, plaintiff's failure to give written notice of her claim did not bar her claim for compensation." The Full Commission remanded the matter for assignment to a deputy commissioner "for the taking of additional evidence or further hearing, if necessary, and the entry of an Opinion and Award with findings on the issues of (1) the extent of plaintiff's disability; (2) the amount of indemnity benefits due plaintiff; and (3) the extent of medical compensation due plaintiff." Defendants sought immediate review, but the Court of Appeals dismissed their interlocutory appeal. After remand, a deputy commissioner entered an opinion and award in the case on 4 May 2006. Defendants appealed, and on 11 May 2007, the Full Commission entered an opinion and award in which it stated: "The Full Commission's Opinion and Award of January 18, 2005 is incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein." The Full Commission concluded that "[p]laintiff was totally disabled from her compensable specific traumatic incident from October 16, 2001, and continuing to May 31, 2005," and ordered defendants to pay plaintiff temporary total disability compensation for that time period. The Full Commission reserved for future determination the issue of "the extent of plaintiff's disability, if any, after May 31, 2005." Defendants appealed the Full Commission's opinion and award. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Full Commission's conclusion that Brown & Sons had actual knowledge of plaintiff's injury was supported by findings of fact, which were in turn supported by competent evidence. -9Gregory v. W.A. Brown & Sons, 192 N.C. App. 94, 106, 664 S.E.2d 589, 596 (2008). Unlike the Full Commission, the Court of Appeals then addressed the issue of prejudice, with the majority stating: "In light of this actual knowledge, we also hold that Defendant-Employer was not prejudiced by Plaintiff's failure to provide written notice of her injury within thirty days." (citation omitted). Id. The dissenting judge questioned the majority's decision to "infer a lack of prejudice when the Commission has not addressed that issue specifically," 192 N.C. App. at 111, 664 S.E.2d at 599 (Jackson, J., dissenting in part), and would have "remand[ed] to the Commission for findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the issue of prejudice as required by section 97-22," id. at 114, 664 S.E.2d at 601. Defendants appealed to this Court on the basis of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals. II. ANALYSIS We begin by observing a significant incongruity between the findings of fact made by the deputy and the findings of fact made by the Full Commission. We have long held that the Full Commission is the ultimate fact finder in a workers' compensation case and that its determinations of credibility are conclusive. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998). Here, however, while the deputy specifically found that plaintiff actively denied to defendant's representative that her injury was work related, the Full Commission made no related finding of its own either accepting or rejecting this finding by the deputy. Instead, the Full Commission implicitly required -10defendant to ascertain that plaintiff's injuries were work related. Because we need not resolve this anomaly to decide this case, we leave for another day the issue whether a finding by a deputy remains effective if that finding is not addressed either directly or indirectly by the Full Commission. Section 97-22 of the General Statutes deals with notice by an injured employee to the employer, while section 97-23 deals with the contents of written notice. Section 97-22 provides: Every injured employee or his representative shall immediately on the occurrence of an accident, or as soon thereafter as practicable, give or cause to be given to the employer a written notice of the accident, and the employee shall not be entitled to physician's fees nor to any compensation which may have accrued under the terms of this Article prior to the giving of such notice, unless it can be shown that the employer, his agent or representative, had knowledge of the accident, or that the party required to give such notice had been prevented from doing so by reason of physical or mental incapacity, or the fraud or deceit of some third person; but no compensation shall be payable unless such written notice is given within 30 days after the occurrence of the accident or death, unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby. N.C.G.S. § 97-22 (2007) (emphases added). Section 97-23 provides: The notice provided in the foregoing section [G.S. 97-22] shall state in ordinary language the name and address of the employee, the time, place, nature, and cause of the accident, and of the resulting injury or death; and shall be signed by the employee or by a person on his behalf, or, in the event of his death, by any one or more of his dependents, or by a person in their behalf. -11No defect or inaccuracy in the notice shall be a bar to compensation unless the employer shall prove that his interest was prejudiced thereby, and then only to such extent as the prejudice. Said notice shall be given personally to the employer or any of his agents upon whom a summons in civil action may be served under the laws of the State, or may be sent by registered letter or certified mail addressed to the employer at his last known residence or place of business. Id. § 97-23 (2007) (brackets in original). It is clear from these sections that, in enacting the Workers' Compensation Act, the General Assembly was concerned to avoid prejudice to employers resulting from insufficient notice of their employees' accidents. It is equally clear that the legislature wished to prevent unnecessary disputes, such as occurred in the instant case, regarding whether notice of an accident was given and what that notice might have contained. The General Assembly sought to resolve these concerns by requiring employees to put notice of their accidents in writing, to include certain vital information therein, and to submit such notice in a timely fashion to an appropriate representative of the employer. Id. §§ 97-22, -23. The legislature also recognized, however, that employees would not always give written notice in perfect compliance with the statutes. The General Assembly therefore provided that an employee who fails to give the employer written notice of an accident within thirty days can still receive compensation based on that accident if "[(1)] reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and [(2)] the Commission is satisfied that the -12employer has not been prejudiced thereby." Id. § 97-22. This two-pronged test eschews a preference for form over function while simultaneously ensuring that workers' compensation benefits will only be payable when there is at least substantial compliance with the purposes of the written notice requirement. This Court has previously read section 97-22 to mean that the plaintiff in a case under the Workers' Compensation Act is not entitled to recover unless he can show that he has complied with the provisions of the statute in respect to the giving of a notice, or has shown reasonable excuse to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby. Singleton v. Durham Laundry Co., 213 N.C. 32, 36, 195 S.E. 34, 36 (1938) (emphasis added) (applying N.C. Code § 8081(dd) (1935), recodified as N.C.G.S. § 97-22 pursuant to Act of Feb. 1, 1943, ch. 15, sec. 3, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 13, 13-14). Singleton also states, "It is the duty of the Commission to make . . . specific and definite findings upon the evidence reported . . . particularly when there are material facts at issue." 35, 195 S.E. at 35. Id. at 34- This Court in Singleton ultimately found error in the Commission's failure to make findings of fact on the "controverted issue" of the plaintiff's compliance with the statutory provisions regarding written notice, or alternatively, on the issues of reasonable excuse and lack of prejudice. Id. at 36, 195 S.E. at 36. The principles set forth in section 97-22 and elucidated in Singleton were recently reiterated in Watts v. Borg Warner Automotive, Inc., 171 N.C. App. 1, 613 S.E.2d 715, aff'd -13per curiam, 360 N.C. 169, 622 S.E.2d 492 (2005). In Watts, the Commission awarded compensation despite a lack of timely written notice after concluding that the plaintiff-employee had a reasonable excuse for not giving written notice of his accident and that the defendant-employer was not prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 5, 613 S.E.2d at 719. The Court of Appeals stated that due to the plaintiff-employee's failure to give timely "written notice," section 97-22 allowed compensation only if the failure of notice was reasonably excused and the defendant-employer was not prejudiced. Id. at 4, 613 S.E.2d at 718 (citation omitted). Although the Commission had made conclusions of law on these issues, the Court of Appeals held the Commission failed to support those conclusions adequately and remanded for additional findings of fact. omitted). Id. at 6, 613 S.E.2d at 719 (citations In so holding, the Court of Appeals rightly did not suggest that this analysis applies only when the defendantemployer lacked actual notice of the accident. This Court subsequently affirmed the Court of Appeals in a per curiam decision. 360 N.C. 169, 622 S.E.2d 492. A careful reading of section 97-22 confirms that these prior decisions represent proper applications of that statute. Section 97-22 begins by establishing a presumptive requirement of written notice of accidents as a prerequisite to compensation. The statute goes on to provide that an employee who fails to give such written notice may still be entitled to physician's fees and compensation "which may have accrued . . . prior to the giving of [written] notice" if the employer had actual knowledge of the -14accident. N.C.G.S. § 97-22 (emphasis added). The remaining portion of the statute is then set off by a semicolon. The language following the semicolon initially provides that "no compensation shall be payable unless such written notice is given within 30 days after the occurrence of the accident or death." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the language after the semicolon applies to all workers' compensation benefits, regardless of whether they accrue before or after the giving of written notice. Section 97-22 then provides that the requirement of written notice within thirty days after the accident will be waived only if "reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby." Id. Thus, when the employee fails to provide written notice of the accident within thirty days, "no compensation shall be payable" unless the Commission is satisfied both that the delay in written notice was reasonably excused and that the employer was not prejudiced. Id. According to the statute's plain language, these two factors must be found regardless of whether the employer has actual knowledge of the accident. Requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of prejudice is consistent with section 97-22, with Singleton and Watts, and with this Court's recent decision in Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Group, 362 N.C. 657, 669 S.E.2d 582 (2008), reh'g denied, 363 N.C. 260, 676 S.E.2d 472 (2009). In Richardson, the plaintiff-employee failed to give written notice of her accident within thirty days. Id. at 658- -1559, 669 S.E.2d at 584. It was uncontested that the defendants in that case had actual notice of the plaintiff's accident, and in light of that actual notice, the Commission concluded that the defendants were not prejudiced by the delay in written notice. Id. at 661, 669 S.E.2d at 585. This Court agreed, concluding in light of Richardson's particular facts "that the Commission's findings and conclusions were adequate." Id. at 662, 669 S.E.2d at 585. We indicated in Richardson that the plaintiff was not required to give her employer written notice of her accident under the circumstances of the actual notice in that case. Id. at 658, 669 S.E.2d at 583 (stating that written notice was not necessary "when the employer has actual notice of [the employee's] on-the-job injury, as the employer had here" (emphasis added)). The actual notice the employer had in Richardson is different from Brown & Sons' actual notice in several significant respects. The employer in Richardson made no efforts to mitigate the employee's injuries and failed to investigate the circumstances of her accident despite the employer's "aware[ness] of plaintiff's injuries and medical treatments based on her regular communications." S.E.2d at 586. Id. at 662, 669 By contrast, in the instant case, the Full Commission found that the doctor who initially treated plaintiff did not view her as a possible workers' compensation patient and made no record of plaintiff's report of injury. The Full Commission also found that Pam Cordts in human resources "believed that [plaintiff's injury] was something that had -16occurred outside of work," in part because plaintiff "did not report it as a workers' compensation claim, didn't allude to it being a workers' comp claim." Furthermore, the employee in Richardson was involved in an automobile accident, which was a discrete occurrence resulting in relatively certain injuries. In this case, on the other hand, plaintiff had been experiencing back pain for approximately six months when her accident occurred and sought workers' compensation after she "aggravated her preexisting degenerative condition." The timing of plaintiff's injury was uncertain both because of the discrepancy in the evidence as to the time and place of the injury and because plaintiff continued reporting for work after her accident. As a result of plaintiff's actions, initial attempts by physicians to diagnose plaintiff's problem and determine whether it was work related were inconclusive. The foregoing distinctions accentuate the most important factual difference between Richardson and the instant case, which concerns whether the parties disputed the issue of actual notice. In Richardson, "[t]he defendants acknowledge[d] the plaintiff's same-day notification of the accident," id. at 660, 669 S.E.2d at 585, and there was no indication in the record of any dispute as to whether the contents of the plaintiff's notification were sufficient to prevent prejudice to the defendants, see N.C.G.S. § 97-23 (setting forth the necessary contents of written notice under N.C.G.S. § 97-22). By contrast, in this case, the issue of actual notice was a primary point of contention at the hearing level that engendered irreconcilable -17findings by the deputy and the Full Commission, respectively. The result we reached in Richardson was proper in light of the defendants' failure in that case to argue that they did not receive actual notice sufficient to prevent them from being prejudiced. Richardson demonstrates how the facts of a particular case can justify a determination by the Full Commission that an employer had actual notice sufficient to obviate written notice, even in the absence of a specific finding of fact. Nevertheless, as a general rule, when a workers' compensation plaintiff has not given written notice of the accident within thirty days thereafter, the plaintiff cannot receive any compensation unless the Commission makes proper findings and conclusions with respect to the issues of reasonable excuse and prejudice to the employer. In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to provide written notice until she filed her workers' compensation claim nearly four months after her accident. Thus, under section 97-22, plaintiff can receive no workers' compensation benefits unless the Commission concludes as a matter of law that the delay in written notice was reasonably excused and that Brown & Sons was not prejudiced. Because the Full Commission's opinion contains no conclusion that Brown & Sons was not prejudiced, that opinion is an insufficient basis upon which to award compensation to plaintiff. A mere conclusion that Brown & Sons was not prejudiced, however, would not render the Full Commission's opinion and award adequate. To enable the appellate courts to perform their duty -18of determining whether the Commission's legal conclusions are justified, the Commission must support its conclusions with sufficient findings of fact. Pardue v. Blackburn Bros. Oil & Tire Co., 260 N.C. 413, 415-16, 132 S.E.2d 747, 748-49 (1963). The Commission is not required to make a finding as to each detail of the evidence or as to every inference or shade of meaning to be drawn therefrom. But specific findings of fact by the Commission are required. These must cover the crucial questions of fact upon which plaintiff's right of compensation depends. If the findings of fact of the Commission are insufficient to enable the Court to determine the rights of the parties upon the matters in controversy, the proceeding must be remanded to the end that the Commission make proper findings. Id. at 416, 132 S.E.2d at 749 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). While the following example is provided for guidance and is not intended to limit either deputies or the Full Commission, findings of fact to the effect that an employer had actual knowledge within thirty days after an employee's accident, and that the actual knowledge included such information as the employee's name, the time and place of the injury or accident, the relationship of the injury to the employment, and the nature and extent of the injury, could support a legal conclusion that the employer was not prejudiced by the delay in written notice. This Court has previously provided similar direction as to the "crucial questions of fact" that underlie legal conclusions regarding reasonable excuse and lack of prejudice. In Booker v. Duke Medical Center, we held that an employer had waived its right to appeal the issue of notice by failing to raise that issue before the Commission. 297 N.C. 458, 481-82, -19256 S.E.2d 189, 204 (1979). In so holding, we noted that if the employer had raised the notice issue before the Industrial Commission, it would have been appropriate for the Commission to "conduct[] an inquiry in accordance with G.S. 97-22," id., and make findings of fact with respect to whether the lack of notice "was excusable and nonprejudicial," 297 N.C. at 481, 256 S.E.2d at 203. We also stated: requirement is two-fold. "The purpose of the notice-of-injury It allows the employer to provide immediate medical diagnosis and treatment with a view to minimizing the seriousness of the injury, and it facilitates the earliest possible investigation of the circumstances surrounding the injury." Id. at 481, 256 S.E.2d at 204 (citing 3 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 78.20 (1976)). Findings of fact to the effect that these purposes of the notice requirement were vindicated despite the lack of timely written notice of an employee's accident could likewise support a legal conclusion that the employer was not prejudiced by the delay in written notice. Not every instance of actual notice will satisfy the statutory requirements of reasonable excuse and lack of prejudice. The Industrial Commission is therefore obligated to apply the test in each case in which timely written notice of the accident is lacking, and the Commission cannot award compensation in such a case unless it concludes as a matter of law that the absence of such notice is reasonably excused and that the employer has not been prejudiced. Further, because the right to compensation of an employee who did not give timely written -20notice depends on the Commission's conclusions on these legal issues, the Commission must support those conclusions with appropriate findings of fact as detailed above. Pardue, 260 N.C. at 416, 132 S.E.2d at 749. As observed previously, it is undisputed in this case that plaintiff failed to provide written notice until she filed her workers' compensation claim nearly four months after her accident. Therefore, the Full Commission erred in awarding benefits to plaintiff without concluding that defendants were not prejudiced by the delay and supporting such a conclusion with appropriate findings of fact. In addition, we note that N.C.G.S. §§ 97-22 and 97-23 place the burden of notice on the employee, not the employer. In its opinion and award, the Full Commission found that Pam Cordts in human resources "failed to ask specific questions regarding the cause of plaintiff's injury" and "did not take proper action to assess whether or not plaintiff's injury was, in fact, work related," and that "there is no evidence that Ms. Cordts spoke, as she should have, with either [plaintiff's team leader] or [plaintiff's supervisor] to determine if plaintiff's supervisors had actual knowledge of a work-related injury or incident involving plaintiff." (Emphasis added.) Thus, assuming without deciding that plaintiff stated to Cordts that the injury was not work related, the Full Commission's analysis incorrectly placed upon defendant the burden to disprove plaintiff's denial that her injury was work related. The Commission may not shift the burden of notice from the employee to the employer and then use the -21resulting findings as the factual basis for a conclusion that defendants were not prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to give timely written notice of her accident.1 Cf. Jacobs v. Safie Mfg. Co., 229 N.C. 660, 661-62, 50 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1948) (holding that the burden of notice did not shift to employer after employee requested a meeting with employer's superintendent and employee's sister told the superintendent that employee had been injured on the job). In enacting N.C.G.S. § 97-22, the General Assembly expressed its intention that an employee who has an accident and does not timely notify the employer in writing should not receive compensation based on that accident unless the Industrial Commission is satisfied that the lack of timely written notice was reasonably excused and that the employer was not prejudiced. Thus, we hold that, when the employee does not give timely written notice as required by section 97-22, regardless of whether the employer had actual notice of the accident, the Industrial Commission cannot award compensation unless it (1) concludes as a matter of law that the lack of timely written notice was reasonably excused and that the employer was not 1 We are cognizant that certain sections of the Workers' Compensation Act place burdens on employers rather than employees. Sections 97-18 and 97-92, however, apply to employers that have knowledge of employees' "injuries," not employers with knowledge of employees' "accidents." N.C.G.S. §§ 97-18, -92 (2007). Unlike "accident," "injury" is a defined term under the Workers' Compensation Act, meaning "only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." Id. § 972(6) (2007). An employer's notice of an employee's "accident," standing alone, does not necessarily trigger any statutory duties for the employer. -22prejudiced and (2) supports those conclusions with appropriate findings of fact. III. DISPOSITION The Full Commission in this case erred in awarding benefits to plaintiff without concluding that defendants were not prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to give written notice within thirty days after her accident and without supporting such a conclusion with appropriate findings of fact. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the issue raised by the dissenting opinion in that court. The remaining issues addressed by the Court of Appeals are not before this Court, and its decision as to those issues remains undisturbed. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Industrial Commission with instructions to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issue of prejudice in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. No. 447A08 - Gregory v. W.A. Brown & Sons Justice HUDSON dissenting. We squarely decided the question presented here in our recent, unanimous decision in Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Group, 362 N.C. 657, 669 S.E.2d 582 (2008). Despite no change to the governing statutory framework, the majority would essentially overrule Richardson just one year later, while claiming not to do so, in order to reach a particular outcome here. By this decision the majority adds nothing but confusion and inconsistency to our own jurisprudence2 and strays from the proper role and approach of this Court. As such, I respectfully dissent. The sole issue presented to this Court on appeal is whether a defendant-employer's actual knowledge of a plaintiff-employee's work-related injury satisfies the notice-of-injury requirement under N.C.G.S. § 97-22, obviating the need for findings of fact as to any alleged prejudice. In our decision in Richardson we unanimously held that, under N.C.G.S. § 97-22, "[w]hen an employer has actual notice of the accident, the employee need not give written notice, and therefore, the Commission need not make any findings about prejudice." Id. at 663, 669 S.E.2d at 586. The majority here maintains that we somehow limited the holding of Richardson to "the unique circumstances of the actual notice in that case." Even a cursory reading of that opinion clearly illustrates that we attached no such conditions to our 2 The General Assembly could, if it so desired, quickly eliminate any confusion by clarifying the language of N.C.G.S. § 97-22, which has not been amended since it originally passed in 1929. -2statement of the law. If the majority has decided to overrule Richardson, by now "[r]equiring findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of prejudice," regardless of whether the employer has actual knowledge or notice of the injury, the Court should do so directly and avoid creating unnecessary confusion in the law for employers, employees, and the Industrial Commission regarding which types of actual knowledge are sufficient and which are not. Providing such certainty is fundamental to our judicial role: It is, then, an established rule to abide by former precedents, stare decisis, where the same points come up again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion, as also because, the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or swerve from according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land-not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one--jus dicere et non jus dare. McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 218 N.C. 586, 591, 11 S.E.2d 873, 876 (1940) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 712, 549 S.E.2d 840, 851-52 ("A primary goal of adjudicatory proceedings is the uniform application of law. In furtherance of this objective, courts generally consider themselves bound by prior precedent, i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis." (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 736-37 (1991) ("Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and -3perceived integrity of the judicial process."), and Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 472, 206 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1974) (observing that stare decisis "promotes stability in the law and uniformity in its application"))), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 975, 150 L. Ed. 2d 804 (2001). Indeed, the distinction the majority attempts to draw between the facts of Richardson and those presented here demonstrates the need for a straightforward, easily applied rule such as the one enunciated just one year ago in Richardson. The majority goes to great lengths in its attempts to find a material difference between the actual knowledge of the employer in Richardson and that of the employer here. These efforts ignore the fundamental reality that, for purposes of our appellate review of an Industrial Commission opinion and award, there is no meaningful difference between the "uncontested" actual knowledge in Richardson and the Commission's finding of fact and conclusion of law that defendant-employer here had actual notice of plaintiff's injury. Because that finding and conclusion were not the basis of the dissent in the Court of Appeals, they are binding on us on appeal, and the degree to which they were contested is irrelevant to our review. See State ex rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 362 N.C. 431, 436, 666 S.E.2d 107, 111 (2008) ("'Where the sole ground of the appeal of right is the existence of a dissent in the Court of Appeals, review by the Supreme Court is limited to a consideration of those questions which are . . . specifically set out in the dissenting opinion as -4the basis for that dissent . . . . '" (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 16(b); accord State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 681-82, 351 S.E.2d 286, 287 (1987))). Notwithstanding decades of case law on both stare decisis and our proper standard of review concerning findings of fact and conclusions of law that are binding on appeal, the majority here indulges defendant-employer's improper efforts to relitigate once again the question of actual notice.3 While offering the disclaimer that such detail is offered only to demonstrate that "the issue of actual notice was a primary point of contention at the hearing level," the majority's subsequent analysis reveals that they simply disagree with the Full Commission's finding. To bolster their position, the majority even recites the findings and conclusions of the deputy commissioner, purportedly to show that the issue "engendered irreconcilable findings by the deputy and Full Commission, respectively." Of course, these findings are not "irreconcilable"; they have indeed been reconciled and determined--by the Full Commission, in its proper statutory role as the ultimate fact finder in worker's compensation cases. The majority's analysis can only be characterized as precisely the type of reweighing of evidence that our statutes and case law explicitly disallow: On appeals from the Industrial Commission, the Commission's findings of fact must be sustained if there is competent evidence in the record to support them. Lawrence v. Hatch Mill, 265 N.C. 329, 144 S.E.2d 3 (1965). This is so even if there is evidence which would support a contrary finding, because "courts are 3 In fact, we specifically denied defendant-employer's petition for discretionary review on that issue. -5not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside the findings of the Commission, simply because other inferences could have been drawn and different conclusions might have been reached." Rewis v. Insurance Co., 226 N.C. 325, 330, 38 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1946). Hill v. Hanes Corp., 319 N.C. 167, 172, 353 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1987); see also N.C.G.S. § 97-86 (2007) ("The award of the Industrial Commission . . . shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact . . . ."); Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co. 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965) ("The Workmen's Compensation Act, G.S. 97-86, vests the Industrial Commission with full authority to find essential facts. The Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The courts may set aside findings of fact only upon the ground they lack evidentiary support. The court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight." (citations omitted)); Johnson v. Erwin Cotton Mills Co., 232 N.C. 321, 322, 59 S.E.2d 828, 829 (1950) (holding that, because "[t]he evidence permits the inferences therefrom which were drawn by the Commission, though other inferences appear equally plausible," "[t]he courts are not at liberty to reweigh the evidence because different conclusions might have been reached." (citations omitted)); Riddick v. Richmond Cedar Works, 227 N.C. 647, 648, 43 S.E.2d 850, 851 (1947) ("Where the record is such as to permit either finding [a compensable or non-compensable injury], the determination of the Industrial Commission is conclusive on appeal." (citations omitted)); Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 41-42, 153 S.E. 591, 593 (1930) (holding that, when -6there is evidence to support a finding by the Commission, "whether the Appellate Court agrees with the conclusion of the Commission or not, the finding of such fact is conclusive, by express declaration of the statute"). Indeed, the bulk of the majority opinion concentrates on whether plaintiff's actual notice of her injury to defendantemployer was somehow sufficient to trigger defendant-employer's duties under N.C.G.S. § 97-92 to keep a record of the injury and file a report with the Industrial Commission. This distraction from the actual question at hand is a classic straw man, as that issue has already been definitively decided and is not before us for review. Moreover, the majority's emphasis and reliance for its holding on the extent to which the issue of actual notice was disputed at trial impermissibly allow defendants yet another bite at the apple--their third, at least--regarding this issue, which has been conclusively decided in plaintiff's favor. This case presents us with the Commission's finding and conclusion that defendant-employer had actual notice of plaintiff's work-related injury when she immediately reported it to her team leader, received a back brace from her supervisor, and was sent by her supervisor to human resources. The Commission further concluded that "plaintiff's failure to give written notice within 30 days is reasonably excused because plaintiff did not reasonably know of the nature, seriousness, or probable compensable character of her injury until after extensive treatment." Given these binding findings and conclusions, the sole question before us is whether, as a matter -7of law, the Full Commission is required under N.C.G.S. § 97-22 to make findings regarding prejudice when a defendant-employer has actual knowledge of a plaintiff-employee's injury. In pertinent part, the statute provides: Every injured employee or his representative shall immediately on the occurrence of an accident, or as soon thereafter as practicable, give or cause to be given to the employer a written notice of the accident, . . . unless it can be shown that the employer, his agent or representative, had knowledge of the accident, . . . but no compensation shall be payable unless such written notice is given within 30 days after the occurrence of the accident or death, unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the Industrial Commission for not giving such notice and the Commission is satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced thereby. N.C.G.S. § 97-22 (2007) (emphasis added). Notably, in Richardson we analyzed N.C.G.S. § 97-22 and observed that "in enacting N.C.G.S. § 97-22, the General Assembly did not intend to require an injured worker to give written notice when the employer has actual notice of her on-the-job injury, as the employer had here." 362 N.C. at 658, 669 S.E.2d at 583. Here, even though the employer had immediate knowledge, and failed to carry out its own statutory duty to investigate, plaintiff also gave detailed written notice less than four months later, when she filed her Form 18 Notice of Accident to Employer and Claim of Employee for Workers' Compensation Benefits. In Richardson we explicitly discussed both the requirements under N.C.G.S. § 97-22 and the potentially prejudicial effect of a lack of notice: The plain language of section 97-22 requires an injured employee to give written notice of an accident "unless it can be shown that the employer, his agent or representative, had knowledge of the accident." When -8an employer has actual notice of the accident, the employee need not give written notice, and therefore, the Commission need not make any findings about prejudice. The second clause of N.C.G.S. § 97-22, following the semicolon, applies to those cases in which written notice is required because the employer has no actual notice of the accident. It explains that an employee may be excused from even that requirement by providing a reasonable excuse for failing to give notice and by showing that the employer has not been prejudiced. Here, the employer's immediate actual notice of plaintiff's injury by accident satisfied the purposes of section 97-22 . . . . Moreover, although we now hold it was not required to do so, the Commission specifically concluded that the employer here suffered no prejudice . . . . Id. at 663-64, 669 S.E.2d at 586-87 (emphases added) (emphasis omitted). Thus, as established in Richardson, if a defendant-employer has actual knowledge of a plaintiff-employee's work-related injury, N.C.G.S. § 97-22 does not require the employee to provide written notice or the Full Commission to make explicit findings about prejudice, or the lack thereof, to the defendant-employer. Certainly, it is logical that, if a defendant-employer has actual knowledge of an injury, the Full Commission has no need to be "satisfied that the employer has not been prejudiced" by the employee's "not giving such notice," N.C.G.S. § 97-22, as there can be no prejudice due to lack of knowledge when there is, in fact, no lack of knowledge.4 4 This result is also entirely Following this logic, I note the absurdity of the majority's disposition here, to once again remand this case to the Full Commission "with instructions to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issue of prejudice," concerning an injury that occurred more than eight years ago. The Commission has already found and concluded that defendant-employer had actual notice of the injury. Now, the majority would require the Commission to enter yet another opinion and award–-its third in this case, not including that of the deputy commissioner–-to enter a finding that would -9consistent with the purpose of the notice statute. See 7 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law ch. 126, at 126-1 (Dec. 2007) [hereinafter Larson's Workers' Compensation Law] ("Since the purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the employer to protect itself by prompt investigation and treatment of the injury, failure to give formal notice is usually no bar if the employer had actual knowledge or informal notice sufficient to indicate the possibility of a compensable injury . . . ."); id. § 126.03[1][a] ("The present tendency is to excuse lack of notice whenever the employer acquired actual knowledge of the accident, no matter how that knowledge was acquired."); see also J. Maynard Keech, Workmen's Compensation in North Carolina 1929-1940, at 49 (1942) ("When delay of notice beyond thirty days is excused by the Commission because the employer was not prejudiced, . . . or when the employer had knowledge of the accident or death, the employee . . . is not barred from compensation." (emphasis added)); id. app. A at 174 ("Employee or representative must report immediately by written notice to employer or agent (unless these had knowledge of fact) the facts of injury or death." (emphasis added) (summary of accident reporting provisions of N.C. Workmen's Compensation Law)). This analysis likewise conforms with the standard practice in the majority of jurisdictions throughout the country concerning the possible prejudicial effects of failure to comply essentially amount to "defendant-employer was not prejudiced by a lack of notice because defendant-employer did have notice." A remand is an unnecessary waste of time and resources. -10with the notice-of-injury requirement. See Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 126.04[4], at 126-16 ("The requirement [of notice] is no mere technicality. It serves a specific function in protecting the legitimate rights of the employer . . . . Accordingly, there is no lack of cases in which compensation claims have foundered on the rock of prejudice to the employer due to noncompliance with the notice provision." (emphasis added)); see also Booker v. Duke Med. Ctr., 297 N.C. 458, 481, 256 S.E.2d 189, 204 (1979) (observing that the notice-of-injury requirement "allows the employer to provide immediate medical diagnosis and treatment with a view to minimizing the seriousness of the injury, and it facilitates the earliest possible investigation of the circumstances surrounding the injury." (citation omitted)). North Carolina courts have also followed this practice: as the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals noted, that court has held in numerous prior opinions that actual knowledge of an injury negates any requirement to make a finding regarding prejudice. Gregory v. W.A. Brown & Sons, 192 N.C. App. 94, 111- 12, 664 S.E.2d 589, 599 (2008) (Jackson, J., dissenting in part) (referring to such a holding in Legette v. Scotland Mem'l Hosp., 181 N.C. App. 437, 448, 640 S.E.2d 744, 752 (2007), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 177, 658 S.E.2d 273 (2008), and citing Davis v. Taylor-Wilkes Helicopter Serv., Inc., 145 N.C. App. 1, 11, 549 S.E.2d 580, 586 (2001), and Sanderson v. Ne. Constr. Co., 77 N.C. App. 117, 123, 334 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1985)); see also Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Grp., -11188 N.C. App. 337, 358-60, 657 S.E.2d 34, 47-48 (Wynn, J., dissenting in part) (discussing Jones v. Lowe's Cos., 103 N.C. App. 73, 76-77, 404 S.E.2d 165, 167 (1991), and Chavis v. TLC Home Health Care, 172 N.C. App. 366, 378, 616 S.E.2d 403, 413 (2005), appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 288, 627 S.E.2d 464 (2006)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 362 N.C. 657, 669 S.E.2d 582 (2008). Likewise, the Court of Appeals majority in this case quoted Lakey v. U.S. Airways, Inc., in which an earlier panel more recently held that, "[f]ailure of an employee to provide written notice of her injury will not bar her claim where the employer has actual knowledge of her injury," 155 N.C. App. 169, 172, 573 S.E.2d 703, 706 (2002) (citations omitted), disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 251, 582 S.E.2d 271 (2003), as well as the older case of Chilton v. Bowman Gray School of Medicine, 45 N.C. App. 13, 18, 262 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1980). Moreover, the case relied on by the majority, Singleton v. Durham Laundry Co., 213 N.C. 32, 195 S.E. 34 (1938), did not involve the factual situation presented here, namely, an employer who had actual knowledge of the employee's injury. Rather, in Singleton, "[t]he record further shows that at the same time the defendants denied liability, for that the matter was never reported, the employer had no knowledge that the accident existed until the notice was received from the Industrial Commission." Id. at 33-34, 195 S.E. at 35 (emphasis added). Significantly, the language from Singleton quoted by the majority, that an employee "is not entitled to recover unless he can show that he has complied with the provisions of the statute in respect to the -12giving of a notice," uses an indefinite article, referring to "a notice," suggesting that either actual knowledge or written notice would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. Similarly, contrary to the majority's assertion that "[t]he principles set forth in section 97-22 and elucidated in Singleton were recently reiterated in Watts v. Borg Warner Automotive, Inc., 171 N.C. App. 1, 613 S.E.2d 715 (2005)," we issued no written opinion in that case, instead simply affirming per curiam a decision by the Court of Appeals in a case that did not implicate the question of actual knowledge but only involved the employee's delay in providing written notice. 622 S.E.2d 492 (2005) (per curiam). See 360 N.C. 169, This Court has, in fact, concluded explicitly that an employer's actual knowledge obviates the need for written notice: we did so one year ago in Richardson. As we noted there, our decision was in keeping with the numerous Court of Appeals opinions outlined above, the prevailing practice in jurisdictions around the country, and the purpose of the notice requirement. See Richardson, 362 N.C. at 663, 669 S.E.2d at 586 ("When an employer has actual notice of the accident, the employee need not give written notice, and therefore, the Commission need not make any findings about prejudice."). If a defendant-employer has actual knowledge of an injury, as it did here, yet itself fails to take action either to "minimiz[e] the seriousness of the injury" or to "investigat[e] . . . the circumstances surrounding the injury," Booker, 297 N.C. at 482, 256 S.E.2d at 204, then any prejudice it suffers due to -13that failure cannot be attributed to the plaintiff-employee. Any prejudicial effect is therefore irrelevant to the Full Commission's evaluation of the employee's claim for workers' compensation. Cf. Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 126.04[5] ("Once the record shows that the required notice has not been given, the fatal effect of this showing must be offset by definite findings showing the kind of excuse or lack of prejudice that will satisfy the statute." (emphasis added)). Finally, this interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 97-22 is also in keeping with our long-standing directive that the Worker's Compensation Act must be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of providing compensation to employees injured during the course and within the scope of their employment. Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 208, 60 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1950); see also Keller v. Elec. Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 225, 130 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1963) ("The Compensation Act requires that it be liberally construed to effectuate the objects for which it was passed--to provide compensation for workers injured in industrial accidents."); Thomas v. Raleigh Gas Co., 218 N.C. 429, 433, 11 S.E.2d 297, 300 (1940) ("It is a familiar rule that the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed and liberally applied." (citations omitted)). This liberal construction prevents the sort of denial of benefits engaged in by the majority here, namely, "upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation" of the Act, in contravention of its purpose. Graham v. Wall, 220 N.C. 84, 90, 16 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1941); see also Hall v. Thomason Chevrolet, -14Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 577, 139 S.E.2d 857, 862 (1965) ("In the absence of other than technical prejudice to the opposing party, the liberal spirit and policy, of the Compensation Act should not be defeated or impaired by a too strict adherence to procedural niceties." (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Johnson, 199 N.C. at 40, 153 S.E. at 593 ("It is generally held by the courts that the various Compensation Acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow, and strict interpretation."). Thus, our history of liberal construction has been in favor of the claimant. See, e.g., Derebery v. Pitt Cty. Fire Marshall, 318 N.C. 192, 199, 347 S.E.2d 814, 819 (1986) ("This liberal construction in favor of claimants comports with the statutory purpose of allocating the cost of work-related injuries first to industry and ultimately to the consuming public." (citing Petty v. Associated Transp., Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970) and Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88, 63 S.E.2d 173 (1951))). Here, the Full Commission both found as fact and concluded as a matter of law that defendant-employer had immediate actual knowledge of plaintiff's work-related injury, on the day that it occurred. Even though plaintiff's supervisor provided plaintiff a back brace, referred her to human resources, and knew that plaintiff was unable to return to her job for a substantial period thereafter, defendants failed to investigate the claim, as required by statute, or to take any action to mitigate the effects of the injury. As such, the notice-of-injury requirement -15under N.C.G.S. § 97-22 was satisfied, and under our holding in Richardson, the Full Commission was not required to make any additional findings about prejudice, or the lack thereof, to defendants. The majority opinion attempts to have it both ways: claim that it is consistent with Richardson by improperly limiting that holding to its facts, while simultaneously turning that holding on its head by requiring the Commission to make findings and conclusions on prejudice "regardless of whether the employer had actual notice of the accident." Even worse, the majority's discussion of what kind of actual notice is "sufficient" and their so-called "test" for the same create uncertainty and confusion in the law regarding the degree to which actual knowledge must be disputed, or when such knowledge might obviate the need for written notice. I would abide by stare decisis and apply our recent, unanimous decision in Richardson and the proper standard of review to the Full Commission's findings of fact. Thus, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision upholding the Full Commission's opinion and award. Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.


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This was a great and easy everyday dinner. I did omit the crushed red pepper (due to a picky eater) but she loved it. I served it with grilled asparagus and rice pilaf. Will definately make this again.
Saucy Pork Chops With Orange Slices
MommaTie Posted: 07/21/09
bfify80 Posted: 04/15/11
Pretty good
LPintheCITY Posted: 12/19/12
My dad got some quality cut chops for Christmas so I wanted to prepare them in a worthy manner. This recipe is excellent, I let the chops marinate for an hour. I will definitely be making this again.
idahoemily Posted: 08/12/13
These were really good and very easy and quick to throw together. I didn't have any orange marmalade on hand, but I have used apricot jam in a barbecue combo, so I used that since I already had some in the fridge. It turned out perfectly. Tender pork with a sweet-tangy sauce--and I didn't have to turn on my oven! This is something that we will make again. It's even nice enough for company.
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A woman was arrested Sunday morning after police say she drove into Lady Bird Lake in the early morning hours killing a passenger in her car.
Police have charged 25-year-old Madeline Rackley with intoxication manslaughter.
Two APD officers witnessed the crash and rescued the driver and a passenger.
Around 1:45 a.m. the officers were sitting in their patrol cars writing a report underneath the I-35 bridge when a car went into the water. Police are not sure what exactly caused the driver to slam into the Lady Bird Lake, but they say the car was traveling from Holly Street.
The officers got out of their car and rescued two women. When they found out there was another person in the car it was too late. The car, police say, quickly went under. APD's dive team responded and the car was pulled out. Inside they found the body of 25-year-old Jarrett Whittington.
The two women were taken to UMC Brackenridge.
"They just said they were sitting there typing a report and the vehicle came around the corner and lost control of the vehicle and went straight into the water," said Craig Smith, APD Sr. Police Officer.
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Local history: Barberton singer's heartache inspires country classic
Barberton singer George Morgan performs in 1947 at WWST radio in Wooster. His theme song was Candy Kisses. (Beacon Journal file photo)
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George Morgan (1924-1975) was inducted into the Country Music Hall of Fame in Nashville. (Beacon Journal file photo)


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Regent Fit Narrow Stripe 1818 Suit
$ 1098.00
Regent Fit Narrow Stripe 1818 Suit
$ 1098.00
Description & features
The Regent Fit
The Regent is a contemporary take on the classic Brooks Brothers suit. Updated with slimmer lines, a shorter jacket, narrower lapel with pickstitch detail and trimmer trousers. Hand-sewn upper armhole for comfort and easy movement. Fully lined with Bemberg. Two-button. Side vents. Plain-front trousers. Genuine corozo buttons. Dry clean only. Made in Italy.


text: When the new enameled floral jewelry from Betsey Johnson dropped, I was immediately reminded of the work that Victoire de Castellane does for Dior Haute Joaillerie! Castellane, who has worked for Dior for over 10 years, is currently showing her "Fleurs d'Excès" line at the Gagosian Gallery's Paris Space. The line is inspired by opiates, hallucinogens, and other mind altering substances… Tres swanky, and tres risque, no? It's probably safe to say that we won't be getting our paws on a piece of the Dior line anytime soon, but we're plenty content to stick with these pretty baubles by Betsey. I especially like the Secret Garden Flower Studs, the Secret Garden Orange Flower Rings, and the Secret Garden Flower Cuff Bracelet!


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James Baugh pleaded guilty to manslaughter at the Madison County Courthouse Friday.
Baugh, the owner of One Hour Bonding, shot and killed 19-year-old Danny Laray Moore in 2010. Police said Baugh shot Moore while trying to apprehend him for a revoked bond.
Baugh faces two to 20 years for the manslaughter charged. He will be sentenced at a later date.
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I bought this as a replacement for my beloved 2 qt oval ceramic casserole that developed crazing in the glaze. I can't live without a 2 qt casserole. I just received it and have already used it twice. Oven roasted garlic mushrooms, and a tamale casserole. I like that the bottom is smaller than the top, most casseroles have some sort of topping that you brown and with the larger, wider top, you get more crunchy topping. I'm also going to use it for a large braided egg bread, a pot pie, roasted chicken, mac n cheese, peach cobbler, green bean casserole, I can use this for just about anything, and I don't have to worry about it breaking in the oven. Just use a little oil spray on it and it's non-stick. This can also go in the fridge to keep your potato, pasta, or fruit salad cold longer. This is the bargain of the century!
It's beautiful, and would be an awesome addition to anyone's collection of kitchen bakeware. I'm giving it as a gift - and I'm so excited - I know my friend will love it.
My review is this is a very pretty piece of cookware. The will be use many times. it will be wonderful to use..
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