text:
Report to the Arizona Legislature
By the Auditor General
December 1992
92- 6
December 3, 1992
Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable F i f e Symington, Governor
Colonel F. J. " Rick" Ayars, Director
Department of Public Safety
Transmitted herewith i s a report of the Auditor General, A Performance
Audit of the Department of Public Safety, Criminal Investigations
Bureau. This report i s in response to a December 13, 1991 resolution of
the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee. The performance audit was
conducted as a part of the Sunset review set forth in A. R. S. 9541- 2951
through 41- 2957.
This report addresses the effectiveness and efficiency of the Criminal
lnvestigations Bureau. As the State's only statewide investigations
function, CIB can potentially f i l l a unique and important role addressing
multi- jurisdictional and major criminal cases. Yet, because DPS has not
defined a clear role for CIB, much of i t s e f f o r t s are not focused on
these types of investigations. In addition, we compared CIB
investigations to those of other investigative agencies and found CIB
investigations are not as successful. To improve i t s performance, CIB
needs to develop stronger case management practices, improve i t s case
f i l e documentation, place experienced personnel in i t s supervisory
positions, and strengthen i t s controls over undercover funds.
My s t a f f and I w i l l be pleased to discuss or c l a r i f y items in the report.
This report w i l l be released to the public on December 4, 1992.
D ~ R. NSorton
Auditor General
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of
the Arizona Department of Public Safety ( DPS), Criminal Investigations
Bureau, pursuant to a December 13, 1991, resolution of the Joint
Legislative Oversight Committee. This performance audit is the last of
a series of audits of DPS' five bureaus conducted as part of the Sunset
Review set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ( A. R. S.) 5541- 2951 through
41- 2957.
The Criminal Investigations Bureau ( CIB) is responsible for enforcing
criminal statutes, deterring criminal activity, and assisting other law
enforcement agencies. Its efforts focus on narcotics, organized
crime/ racketeering, liquor laws, and criminal intelligence. For fiscal
year 1992- 93, the Bureau has a budget of $ 11,749,000 and authorization
for 251 ful I- t ime employees ( FTEs).
As detailed in our findings, CIB can potentially fill a unique and
important role as the State's only statewide investigations function.
However, to effectively fill this role, CIB must significantly improve
the number, type and, perhaps most importantly, the qua1 ity of its
investigations. We compared CIB investigations to those of other
investigative agencies and found CIB investigations are not as
successful. To improve its performance, CIB will have to strengthen the
management of almost all of its activities. Many aspects of CIB's
operations are loosely managed and often uncontrolled. Beginning with
the lack of an adequately defined role for CIB, we found weaknesses that
extended to such basic issues as the improper use of undercover funds.
CIB Needs To More Clearlv Define Its Role
As The State's lnvestiaations Bureau
( see pages 5 through 10)
CIB needs to more clearly define its role. Prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies in Arizona see a definite need for a State
investigations bureau to conduct high- level independent investigations.
CIB is viewed as being in a unique position to investigate specific
types of major cases, such as multi- jurisdictional cases, cases involving
economic crime, money laundering, organized crime, and major narcotic
cases. However, much of the work currently performed by CIB
investigators is inconsistent with CIB1s perceived role. Instead of
focusing on major cases, CIB expends significant manpower and resources
on minor cases. For example, our analysis of CIB drug cases found that
major types of drug cases, such as the smuggling, distribution, or
manufacture of narcotics, accounted for only 20 percent of a l l CIB drug
cases submitted to the Maricopa County Attorney in a three- year period.
The Bureau Needs To Take Steps To Improve
Its Case Prosecution Rate ( see pages 11 through 24)
CIB needs to ensure that more of i t s cases result in prosecution. The
success of an investigation can best be judged by what happens to a case
following arrest. In analyzing CIB1s performance, we found that
Maricopa County prosecutors refuse to prosecute CIB cases more often
than similar cases prepared by four other Maricopa County agencies.
( Although less data is available for Pima County, CIB cases there appear
to be prosecuted at rates comparable to other agencies.) A major factor
in CIB1s lower prosecution rate is the Bureau's fai lure to conduct the
case follow up necessary to assist in the prosecution; instead, CIB has
an attitude that an officers1 involvement is over following arrest.
CIB Needs To Develop Stronaer Case
Manaaement Practices ( see pages 25 through 32)
To improve i t s performance in successfully investigating cases, CIB
should strengthen case planning and supervision. While other law
enforcement agencies require officers to submit written plans and obtain
supervisory approvals before beginning casework, CIB officers are
allowed to i n i t i a t e cases as they choose. Further, CIB management does
not adequately track and oversee the cases under i t s investigation. For
example, in one case we reviewed, a CIB officer spent almost 800 hours
conduct i ng a su rve i 1 lance and never saw the suspect . However , we were
unable to find any supervisory approval to j u s t i f y continuing the
surveillance for such an extended period of time.
CIB Case File Documentation
Is Poor ( see pages 33 through 37)
CIB needs to improve i t s case f i l e documentation. CIB officers' case
work is poorly documented. Comprehensive case f i l e s are important for
both monitoring officer actions on a case and for prosecution after
suspects are arrested. However, in our review we found that CIB case
documentation was often incomplete, f i l e s were d i f f i c u l t to locate, and
f i l e documents frequently lacked any evidence of supervisory review.
Department Places Inemrienced
P p
Positions ( see pages 39 through 41)
Stronger case management requires CIB supervisors to assume more
responsibility; however, the Department has been placing personnel in
CIB management positions that, at the time of placement, had no
experience in conducting narcotics or intelligence investigations. The
Bureau's lack of experienced management is caused by the Department's
placement policies. The Department should consider requiring those
placed in CIB management positions to have prior criminal investigations
CIB Does Not Adequately Control Its Undercover
Funds And Flash Roll Monies ( see pages 43 through 48)
CIB needs to strengthen i t s internal controls over undercover funds and
flash r o l l monies. Undercover funds are intended to be used for making
informant payments, purchasing evidence ( such as drugs), and for paying
emergency investigative expenses. However, we found that investigators
were spending these monies on inappropriate items such as office
supplies; a color copy machine; dues for membership in professional
organizations; ice, soda pop, food and ice chests for various events;
and miscellaneous items such as pager chains, street maps, and holster
repairs. For example, in January 1991, almost 60 percent of
investigators' expenditures were for items that should not have been
purchased with these funds. We also found that flash r o l l monies ( large
sums of monies shown to potential suppliers of i l l e g a l drugs to prove
the a b i l i t y of an undercover officer to purchase contraband) were issued
without proper approvals and were not always returned in a timely
manner .
i i i
CIB I s Viewed Favorably
In I t s Service Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CIB Is Viewed As Having A Role
In Investigating Major Criminal A c t i v i t i e s . . . . . . .
CIB Independent Investigations
Are Suffering From The Lack Of A Clear Mission. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Evaluating The Success
Of Investigations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Agencies Outperform CIB
In MaricopaCounty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CIB's Success In Pima County
Appears Comparable To
Other Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Bureau Should Implement Changes
To Emphasize Case Outcome. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FINDING Ill: CIB NEEDS TO DEVELOP
I n i t i a t i o n Of Cases
Is Loosely Controlled. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Once Cases Are I n i t i a t e d , Case Progress
Is Not Adequately Monitored. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE OF CONTENTS ( Con ' t )
Comprehensive Case Files Are
Important For Case Management
And Prosecution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Review Of Case Files
Reveals Poor Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PE- EL IN CIB SUPERVISORY WSlTlONS . . . . . . . . .
Many Supervisors Have
L i t t l e O r No Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Placements Not Based
On Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other Pol ice Agencies
Consider Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Current Procedures
Are Not Being Followed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DPS Should Improve
I t s C o n t r o l s . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE OF CONmNTS ( Con ' t )
AREA FOR FURTHER AUDIT IORK-Has
The Bureau Adequately
Evaluated I t s Task Force 8 Involvement? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
APPENDIX I I : USE OF RlCO MONIES BY
F l L l NG RATES FOR SELECTED CASES
SUBMITTED TO THE UARlCOPA CWNTY ATTORNEY'S
INVOLVING DRUG CHARGES SUBYlll'ED TO THE
WRlCOPA C O W ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
ISSUED BY THE PlMA COUNTY ATTORNEY
ISSUED BY THE PlMA COUNTY ATTORNEY
TABLE 6 DPS RlCO EXPENDITURES BY EXPENDITURE UNIT
( unaudited). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A- 11- ii
LEJlS CRIME CLASSIFICATION COPES
CASES IN PlMA CWNTY
The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of
the Arizona Department of Public Safety ( DPS), Criminal Investigations
Bureau, pursuant to a December 13, 1991, resolution of the Joint
Legislative Oversight Comnittee. This performance audit is the last of a
series of audits of DPS' five bureaus conducted as part of the Sunset
Review set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ( A. R. S.) 9941- 2951 through
41- 2957.
The Criminal lnvestigations Bureau ( CIB), with a budget of $ 11,749,000
and 251 FTEs for fiscal year 1992- 93, is responsible for enforcing
criminal statutes, deterring criminal activity, and assisting other law
enforcement agencies. Its efforts focus on narcotics, organized
crime/ racketeering, liquor laws, and criminal intelligence. The Bureau
also provides investigative and specialized services to local, county,
State, and Federal criminal justice agencies.
Results Of Our
As detailed in our findings, CIB can potentially fill a unique and
important role as the State's only statewide investigations function.
However, to do so effectively, it must significantly improve the number,
type and perhaps most importantly, the quality of its investigations. We
compared CIB investigations to those of other investigative agencies and
found CIB investigations are not as successful. To improve its
performance, CIB will have to strengthen the management of almost all of
its activities. Many aspects of CIB1s operations are loosely managed and
often uncontrolled. Beginning with the lack of an adequately defined
role for CIB, we found weaknesses that extended to such basic issues as
the failure to provide required documentation in case files.
In addition to the weaknesses presented in our findings, many of the
problems in CIB's operations are illustrated in our review of a Tucson
case, also referred to as the " Castro Case." Due to the importance of
the Castro Case to Bureau operat ions, we have s u m r ized the case in the
Other Pertinent Information section of this report ( see pages 49 through
54). This case, which resulted in the brief suspension of the Director
and Deputy Director of the Department in late 1991, in many ways provides
a summary case example of many changes that are needed.
Audit Sc~ gq!
Our report presents findings and recommendations in six areas:
8 The need for CIB to better define i t s role
8 The need for CIB to take actions to improve i t s case prosecution rate
0 The need for CIB to develop stronger case management practices
The adequacy of case f i l e documen tat i on
8 The experience levels of CIB management
8 The adequacy of internal controls over undercover funds and flash
r o l l monies
Due to restrictions on our access to information, we did not audit the
operations of the Organized Crime/ lntelligence Division. According to
Bureau o f f i c i a l s , the databases used in the Intelligence Division are
regulated by Federal law, which prohibits distribution of certain
information to non- law enforcement agencies. Short of granting our
Office law enforcement status, we would be unable to conduct our own
review of the Division. Although we could not audit the Division, the
Division was reviewed in June 1991 by an external task force assessment
team, at the Department's request. The assessment team, consisting of
m i l i t a r y intelligence personnel, identified a number of concerns
including the lack of coordination between the intelligence and criminal
investigation functions, untimely processing of intelligence reports,
comingling of public domain and intelligence information within the same
report, inadequate intelligence information collection practices, and
f i l e s with questionable intel ligence value.
As part of our review of the cases submitted by DPS and other law
enforcement agencies for prosecut ion, we obtained data from two primary
sources: the Law Enforcement Justice Information System ( LEJIS) and
County Attorney Prosecutors System ( CAPS). Due to concern for the
confidentiality of information about suspects, we were provided only case
number and outcome information ( suspect's name was withheld).
Consequently, we were unable to trace this information to source
documents because the source documents contained information about the
suspect. However, through interviews of personnel in charge of the
systems, we found that both systems had existing controls to identify and
correct input errors.
In the Area for Further Audit Work section of this report, we discuss the
need to evaluate CIB1s involvement in task forces ( see pages 55 through
The aud i t was conducted in accordance w i th government aud i t i ng standards .
The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the Director and
Deputy Director of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and the
Assistant Director and staff of the Criminal Investigations Bureau for
their cooperation and assistance during the audit.
Criminal justice agencies in Arizona see a definite need for a State
investigations bureau to provide service to local jurisdictions and to
conduct independent high- level investigations. CIB is currently viewed
favorably in i t s service role. However, instead of focusing on major
cases, CIB's independent investigators spend much of their time on minor
cases. CIB needs to more clearly define i t s role as Arizona's only
statewide investigative agency.
CIB Is Viewed Favorably
In Its Service Role
CIB provides a variety of services to local law enforcement agencies in
the State. In general, local law enforcement and other criminal justice
agencies are pleased with the services CIB provides and feel that DPS
management has improved i t s relations with local agencies in recent years.
Current services provided - CIB provides services to other law
enforcement agencies by assigning officers to narcotics task forces in
rural counties, offering statewide assistance in intelligence and
specialty services, and responding to ad hoc service requests.
Of 146 sergeants and officers in investigative functions, 59 are assigned
to formal task forces, and 11 of Arizona's 13 rural counties have a task
force in operation. Additionally, in the Tucson area, CIB contributes
officers to MANTIS, a metropolitan task force, and to the Fugitive
Investigative Strike Team, designed to apprehend fugitives. CIB also
contributes officers to four Federal task forces in Arizona. A l l but one
of the 17 task forces in the State target narcotics crimes.
CIB also provides unique services on a statewide basis. The Special
Investigations Unit ( SIU), consisting of 11 s t a f f , responds to requests
throughout the State for c r i t i c a l incident investigations or pub1 ic
corruption investigations that necessitate an independent outside
agency. CIB1s Clandestine Lab teams provide specially trained personnel
to dismantle i l l e g a l drug laboratories and properly dispose of hazardous
chemicals. CIB also has a centralized intelligence system that is
accessible to a l l Arizona law enforcement agencies.
In addition to work on the standing task forces and specialized statewide
functions, CIB also provides services on an " as needed" basis, either
performing investigations or providing manpower. For example, during
1991- 92, CIB contributed officers to the Monk Homicide Task Force that
investigated the slaying of Buddhist monks in Maricopa County and an
investigator to handle an embezzlement case in La Paz County.
Communities receivina services are satisfied with CIB service functions -
We interviewed prosecutors from a l l 15 Arizona counties as well as
representatives from law enforcement agencies in 14 counties. The local
comunities expressed overall satisfaction with the services CIB
provides. The CIB officers on the narcotics task forces are, for the
most part, greatly appreciated and considered c r i t i c a l for the continued
effectiveness of the task forces. The SIU and the Clandestine Lab teams
were praised by those we spoke with that used their services.
Additionally, several of those interviewed consider CIB to have improved
i t s approach to service in recent years, being much less l i k e l y now to
come in and take over an investigation as they had been known to do in
the past. According to one County Attorney, CIB now treats local
agencies more deferentially, or more as customers of i t s services.
CIB Is Viewed As Havina A Role
In lnvestiaatina Major Criminal Activities
Our interviews with criminal justice professionals in the State support
the need for a CIB role beyond service, and CIB is viewed as being in a
unique position to investigate specific types of serious crime. We found
that both rural and urban counties in the State support the idea of an
independent investigative function within CIB in addition to i t s service
Specifically, CIB has unique characteristics as a State investigations
agency that make i t well- suited to perform the following types of
Uulti- iurisdictional cases crossina countv and State lines - CIB has
worked in the majority of Arizona counties for several years and has
established contacts in both law enforcement and criminal justice
agencies throughout the State. Due to these contacts, criminal
justice professionals believe that CIB is able to investigate
mu1 t i - j u r i s d i c t ional cases more e f f i c i e n t l y than local agencies.
Further, local agencies, although authorized as peace officers
throughout the State, typically w i l l not have their officers work
outside their jurisdiction for an extended period of time.
Economic crime. nonev Iaunderina. oraanized crime. and other
corn~ licated cases reauiring the lona- term dedication of resources -
Prosecuting attorneys in the State indicated that economic crime is
not being pursued to the extent that i t should be. Attorneys and law
enforcement representatives feel more emphasis should be put on money
laundering and cases involving paper fraud. CIB is viewed as the
most l i k e l y group to concentrate on these investigations. Although
local agencies in large communities have organized crime units,
current resources are perceived as insufficient. The majority of
Arizona jurisdictions do not have the resources to dedicate officers
to cases that may continue for years. Even the largest agencies, the
Phoenix and Tucson Police Departments, are able to pursue only a
limited number of large- scale investigations annually. Because CIB
is not as pressured as local police and sheriffs to respond to crimes
that have already been committed ( e. g., burglary, theft, assault,
etc.) i t is in a better position to dedicate i t s resources to
long- term cases.
Maior narcotics cases - CIB is considered to have a role in
narcotics, but not in pursuing street- or middle- level drug
trafficking organizations. Law enforcement and prosecuting agencies
believe CIB's appropriate role should be to target the leaders of the
drug distribution organizations. These cases are consistent with the
multi- jurisdictional and economic crimes discussed above because
leaders of drug trafficking organizations often operate across State
boundaries and are involved in money laundering. CIB is also
perceived as the agency that should follow up on investigations of
drug traffickers that are intercepted through DPS Highway Patrol
CIB lnde~ endent lnvestiaations
Are Sufferina From The
Lack Of A Clear Mission
Much of the work performed by CIB investigators not assigned to task
forces is inconsistent with what is viewed as CIB's appropriate role.
Although some CIB officers are successful in apprehending major criminals,
we found CIB's efforts often appear unfocused and not particularly
effective. CIB needs a clear mission and management commitment to i t s
role in performing independent, State- level investigations.
Few CIB officers conduct naior investiaations - Some CIB officers are
successful in apprehending the major criminals viewed as CIB's
appropriate target. When we interviewed State and Federal prosecutors,
several were very positive about the quality and importance of certain
investigations conducted by CIB officers. These prosecutors were able to
identify the CIB officers that submit such cases by name and these
officers account for only a small portion of the total CIB investigators.
As explained in detail in Finding II, we conducted an analysis of the
outcomes of cases submitted to the Maricopa County Attorney's Office, and
found that CIB officers' performance in certain major drug cases
( including the manufacture, smuggling, or distribution of narcotics) was
comparable to that of other Maricopa County law enforcement agencies.
Although DPS performs well in these major drug cases, these cases account
for only 20 percent of CIB drug cases submitted to the Maricopa County
Attorney in the last three years. In addition, the number of these cases
has been decl in i ng from 71 in 1989, to 34 in 1990, to 18 in 1991.
Much of CIB's efforts are unfocused and in areas outside those it can
uniauel~~ erform- Based on interviews both inside and outside CIB, our
review of 52 case f i l e s , and our observations of CIB a c t i v i t i e s , we found
that instead of focusing on major criminal a c t i v i t y , CIB expends
significant manpower and resources on minor cases. The following
examples depict a c t i v i t i e s that were clearly not focused on the major
criminal .
Management and officers in CIB's Phoenix- based organized crime and
major violators squads are investigating small drug possession cases
as a result of Demand Reduction Programs at the Veteran's Memorial
Coliseum in Phoenix.
One non- task force officer working on a service request to break up a
crack ring ( his only case at the time) said that this type of case
was very unproduct i ve , because when one such suspect i s ar rested , a
new one steps in to take his or her place.
The cases we samp l ed f r m the l i quor squads i nvo l ved bar tenders c i ted
for serving minors and minors cited for consuming alcohol. One
county attorney in a rural county said i f we wanted to know where the
" fat" was in CIB, i t was in liquor. He said he w i l l not bother to
prosecute any CIB Covert Underage Buying ( CUB) program defendants and
that i f the liquor establishment was being targeted for a bigger
reason, the case might be justified, but just to come in " fishing for
trouble" was not worthwhile. ( In the CUB program, undercover minors
attempt to purchase alcohol .)
Because many CIB squads are not focused on a specific type of crime or
criminal, they may investigate a broad range of criminal a c t i v i t i e s with
marginal effectiveness. As one person in CIB management said, " DPS has
been referred to as ' one mile wide and one inch deep,' i. e., being
involved in everything but becoming experts at nothing." A look at the
f i l i n g rates of the following charges submitted to the Maricopa County
Attorney in the past three years serves to i l l u s t r a t e this point:
Gamb I i ng 10 charges submi t ted - 0- f i l ed
Vehicle Theft 18 charges submi t ted - 0- f i l ed
Fraud 47 charges submitted 13 f i led
Liquor 25 charges submi t ted - 0- f i led
Lack of a clear role is also evident in frequent Bureau reorganizations.
CIB has undergone 13 reorganizations between 1986 and 1991. Of the 13
reorganizations, 7 involved significant changes. Each of the
reorganizations represented, to some degree, a change in the focus of
CIB's enforcement a c t i v i t i e s . For example, one squad shifted from being
an Air Smuggling Unit to handling Hotel/ Motel narcotic cases, and then to
i t s current focus on trucking companies. As the focus changed, on- going
projects were not completed, and new projects were begun.
Clear mission needed - DPS management needs to define the role i t w i l l
assume for the State with i t s independent investigations function. This
mission should emphasize the types of investigations i t is perceived as
uniquely suited for as the State- level criminal investigations group.
However, in defining this role, DPS needs to recognize that CIB w i l l not
be able to s h i f t i t s focus overnight. It has been doing narcotics work
for over 20 years. The street- level and mid- level cases that may have
been important in the early 1970s are not CIB's appropriate focus today.
CIB needs to increase i t s involvement in economic and organized crime;
however, the officers need training and technology to make this
transition. An officer that has been doing primarily street- or
mid- level narcotics cannot be expected to identify money laundering or
fraud from financial records without training. Additionally, few CIB
investigators have access to computers. Even in the organized crime and
f i nanc ia I invest igat ions squads where computers are essent i al for case
documentation, officers are sharing computers or using computers that are
ten years' old. One prosecuting attorney said, " I t ' s amazing that the
State ( CIB officers) is able to catch anyone considering that they do not
have the technological resources necessary for investigating crime in the
1990~.~' DPS management needs to make a comnitment to expenditures in
training and technology to accomplish a s h i f t to higher- level
1. CIB needs to define a clear mission for i t s independent investigative
functions and' comunicate this mission to the law enforcement and
prosecuting agencies in the State.
2. CIB management needs to clearly define which types of service
requests from outside agencies i t w i l l respond to, when, and how the
p r i o r i t y of service requests w i l l affect officerst responsibilities
in non- service request investigations. CIB should then comnunicate
this position to jurisdictions using their assistance.
3. Once the Department has established a clear role for the Bureau, CIB
needs to establish a structure to carry out this role.
4. CIB needs t o t r a i n and technologically equip i t s officers to do the
types of high- level crime viewed as i t s focus.
CIB needs to ensure that more of i t s cases result in prosecution.
Maricopa County prosecutors refuse to prosecute CIB cases more often than
similar cases prepared by the four other agencies reviewed. Although
less data is available for Pima County, CIB cases there appear to be
prosecuted at rates comparable to other agencies. A major factor in
CIB's lower prosecution rate may be a general attitude that an o f f i c e r ' s
job is completed following an arrest.
Evaluat ina The Success
Of Investigations
How do you best evaluate the success of i nves t i gat ions? We be l i eve you
must look at what happens to cases after arrest. I f the quality of an
investigation is such that the prosecutors w i l l not accept and f i l e a
case, or later drop the case, the case is closed and the suspect is back
on the street, and the time, e f f o r t , and expense of the investigation may
have been for nothing.
We analyzed the outcomes of 690 cases submi tted to the Mar icopa and Pima
County Attorney's Offices, the Offices that prosecute the majority of
CIS'S non- task force cases. ( Comparable data was not readily available
for the 104 cases submitted to the Attorney General's Office.) CIB's
performance was then compared to other major agencies submitting similar
types of cases to these offices.(')
( 1) I n Maricopa County, comparisons were based on a l l cases submitted between January 1,
1989 and December 31, 1991, that had charges submitted i n any of the 22 crime
categories i n which CIB might normally do casework. These included drug crimes,
fraud, t h e f t , l i q u o r offenses, weapon offenses, etc. I n Pima County, comparisons were
based on the disposition of cases issued by the County Attorney during the same time
f tame.
The key variable in reviewing the success of investigations in Maricopa
County appears to be whether cases are f i l e d . This involved comparing
the percentage of cases submitted to, but not accepted by the Maricopa
County Attorney's Office. An examination of conviction rates showed that
once cases were accepted, conviction rates among agencies were f a i r l y
uniform at approximately 80 percent. In Pima County, we were unable to
obtain data on the number of cases submitted but rejected by
prosecutors. Instead, an analysis was conducted on the numbers of cases
accepted but later dropped by prosecutors and the conviction rates for
cases. See Appendix I for a discussion of our methodology.
Other Aaencies Outmrform
CIB In Maricwa County
CIB investigations in Maricopa County are not as successful as similar
investigations of four other agencies., Not only do the prosecutors f i l e
a smaller percentage of CIB cases, they request CIB to do additional work
on i t s cases much more often than they do for the other agencies. In
addition, data suggests that CIB's productivity may be lower than other
agenc i es .
CIB f i l i n a rates are low - Data from Maricopa County presented in Table 1
( see page 13) shows CIB has the lowest f i l i n g rate of a l l agencies
compared. In drug cases, which are considered to be CIB's specialty,
almost one- half of the defendants CIB submitted cases against were not
prosecuted. Table 1 presents the number of cases against individual
defendants in the three calendar years studied and the percentage of
these defendants that had charges f i l e d against them for prosecution.
Table 1 shows that during the three calendar years 1989 through 1991, CIB
submitted charges for prosecution by the Maricopa County Attorney's
Office against 755 defendants. Of these 755 defendants, the County f i l e d
charges against 47.4 percent ( 358 people). Table 2 ( see page 14)
presents the same information but only for cases involving drug charges.
I t is important to note that we were unable to separate detective cases
from patrol cases for the other agencies. Because detective cases
typically have a higher f i l i n g rate than those of the patrol officers
Law Enforcement
Percentage of
Number of Defendants Having
Defendants Charaes F i l ed
CIB 7 5 5 ( a )
Maricopa County Sheriff's Office 3,536
Mesa Police Department 4,395
Phoenix Police Department 36,433
Scottsdale Police Department 1 ,495
( a) CIB data i s f o r detective cases only; a l l four comparison agencies include patrol and
detective data. DPS, including CIB and Highway Patrol, submitted cases against 2,644
defendants. Of these 2,644 defendants, the County f i l e d charges against 42.9
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Maricopa County Law
Enforcement Judicial Information System ( LEJIS) data on cases
involving charges for 22 selected crime types.
Law Enforcmnt
N h e r of Percentage of Defendants
Defendants Having Charaes F i led •
CIB 5 9 6 ( a )
Maricopa County Sheriff's Office 1 ,969
Mesa Police Department 1 ,820
Phoenix Police Department 17,986
Scottsdale Police Department 484
( a) CIB data i s f o r detective cases only; a l l four comparison agencies include patrol and
detective data. DPS, including CIB and Highway Patrol, submitted cases against 1,775
defendants. Of these 1,755 defendants, the County f i l e d charges against 47.4 percent. •
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of LEJlS data on cases involving drug
CIB rates would probably compare even less favorably to those of other
agencies had we been able to isolate detective cases for comparison.(')
other aaencies are nore responsive to the needs of n rose cut ion - Another
indicator of the quality of investigations i s the need for further
investigation after cases are submitted. Cases not f i l e d for prosecution
are either rejected or are " furthered," meaning further investigation is
requested. In comparison with the other agencies, not only does CIB have
the highest rate of requests for further investigation, i t also has the
lowest rate of response to these requests. Table 3 ( see page 16) shows
that CIB was requested to do further investigation at more than double
the rate requested of Mesa and almost double the rate requested of
Scottsdale. The Phoenix Police Department also had a lower rate of
" furthers."
The rate of " furthers," however, may not be as important as an agency's
response to " furthers" since, i f the work is completed, the case can be
f i l e d for prosecution. However, CIB's response to " furthers" is
particularly low in comparison with other agencies. Table 3 shows that
CIB responded to only 51 percent of the prosecutors1 requests, while the
other law enforcement agencies responded to close to or over 70 percent
of the requests.
( 1) On the whole, uniformed o f f i c e r s i n an enforcement agency f i l e a higher rate of minor
charges than detectives. Prosecutors frequently refuse cases with minor charges
because these cases are not cost e f f e c t i v e t o prosecute.
Law Enforcement
Maricopa County
Sheriff's Office
Mesa Police Department
Phoenix Police Department
Scottsdale Pol ice
Number of
Requests for
Further Work( a)
Percentage of
Total Requests
Responded TQ
( a) The number of cases requiring f u r t h e r work i s s l i g h t l y less than the number of t o t a l
requests for further work because a case may be furthered more than once.
( b) CIB data i s f o r detective cases only; a l l four comparison agencies include patrol and
detective data. DPS, including CIB and Highway Patrol, had 2,644 defendant cases. O f
these 2,644 defendant cases. 31.2 percent had requests f o r f u r t h e r work, and 55.5 percent
of these requests were responded to.
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of LEJlS data on defendant cases
submitted from 1989 to 1991 that involved charges for 22 selected
crime types.
CIB management could improve i t s responsiveness to requests for further
investigation. In examining the response rate of individual CIB
officers, we found some officers had very high response rates, while
others had a high number of " furthers" and very low response rates. For
example, one officer responded to only one of the ten requests for
further investigation on his defendant cases; consequently the other nine
defendants w i l l not be prosecuted. By not making case follow- through a
p r i o r i t y , CIB is abandoning cases in which they have invested time and
money. A total of 102 additional defendants ( 28 percent of the 358
defendants f i l e d against) over the three- year period might have been
prosecuted had CIB been w i l l i n g to do the follow- up work.
Comnen ts f rm prosecutors conf i rm weaknesses in case documentat ion and
follow throu~ h - We spoke with eight attorneys in the Phoenix
Metropolitan area, representing three prosecuting agencies ( Maricopa
County, Attorney General, and U. S. D i s t r i c t Attorney). Seven of the
eight c r i t i c i z e d the way CIB cases are presented for prosecution. One
attorney predicted that CIB1s [ lack of1 thoroughness in preparing cases
w i l l differentiate CIB from the better agencies. Some of the attorneys'
comments a re summa r i zed be low.
The CIB work is good u n t i l they consider their part to be over.
After the last arrest has been made, the last warrant served, and
the last asset seized, they think i t ' s a l l the prosecutor's job.
Getting reports from them after indictment is l i k e pulling teeth.
DPS is notorious for stopping at arrest and not following the case
a The investigators lack the requisite s k i l l s to prepare the case for
a When I see a CIB case come in , a chi l l goes up my spine because I
know a lot more work w i l l need to be done for proper documentation
for prosecution.
One prosecutor mentioned a case in which he thought he could obtain a
l i f e sentence with some additional documentation. However, he ended up
with a plea to a far lesser sentence because CIB officers would not
submit reports, even though repeated requests were made by the
prosecuting agency.
Data also suaaests lower oroductivity - Finally, not only does CIB have a
lower f i l i n g rate, but case data suggests i t may also have a lower
productivity rate than other agencies. Based on case information
obtained from the Maricopa County Attorney's Office, we found that the
number of cases submitted by officers varied considerably. Comparing
CIB1s productivity with other agencies in Maricopa County, we found the
Mesa Police Department had an average of eight officers that f i l e d 94
major drug cases from 1989 through 1991('), or an average of over 11
( 1 ) For t h i s analysis, major drug cases p r i m a r i l y include the manufacture, smuggling or
d i s t r i b u t i o n of drugs.
cases per officer.(') The Phoenix Police Department had an average of 36
officers that f i l e d 1,194 such cases in the same time period, an average
of over 33 cases per officer.( 2) CIB has 31 officers working in Maricopa
County and f i l e d only 123 major drug cases in the same three- year time
frame, less than 4 cases per officer. Additionally, prosecutors in three
separate offices questioned CIB productivity, stating that the number of
cases seemed low in relation to the Bureau's manpower.
CIB's Success In Pima County
Appears Comparable TQ
Other Aaencies
Although less data is avai lable for comparison, CIB investigations in
Pima County appear to result in as many prosecutions as those of two
other Pima County agencies. In addition, prosecutors evaluate CIB case
quality and responsiveness as similar to that of other agencies.
Pi ma County and Mar i copa County d i f fer i n how they hand l e cases and the
types of information they track. For example, Pima County w i l l accept
cases without some documentation, however, i f the missing documentation
is not provided later, the case w i l l be dropped. In Maricopa County, a l l
documentation must be complete before a case i s f i l e d . In addition,
because the Pima County Attorney does not track the number of cases
submitted but not accepted for f i l i n g , or the number of requests made for
further investigation, we used dismissal rates and conviction rates to
compare CIB's effectiveness to that of the other Pima County agencies.
( 1) As a r e s u l t of receiving a grant, Mesa had up to 12 o f f i c e r s working on narcotics
cases during 1989. During 1990 and 1991, Mesa had 6 o f f i c e r s working on narcotics
( 2) Phoenix o f f i c e r s ' average would be expected to be somewhat higher than the Mesa
o f f i c e r s ' o r CIB o f f i c e r s ' because Phoenix o f f i c e r s are assigned t o drug cases f u l l
time; CIB and Mesa officers may be assigned to other types of cases.
CIB outcones - Dear simi lar to other aaencies - CIB is comparable to the
Tucson Police Department and the Pima County Sheriff's Office in
conviction rates and in rates of case dismissal prior to indictment.
However, because the data for the Pima County Sheriff's Office and the
Tucson Police Department includes patrol as well as detective cases, we
cannot conclude that CIB case outcomes would equal those of the other
agencies' detective squads.
Table 4 ( see page 20) shows comparat ive convict ion and dismissal rates
for a l l cases involving the selected crime types for three years. Table
4 shows that from 1989 through 1991, the Pima County Attorney f i led
charges on 329 CIB defendants. As of April 1992 when we obtained the
data, 243 of the cases had been disposed by the County Attorney: 43.2
percent of the defendants were convicted and the cases against 42 percent
of the defendants were dismissed. Table 5 ( see page 21) presents the
same data but for cases involving only drug charges.
Based on conviction and dismissal rates, the quality of CIB cases f i l e d
with the Pima County Attorney appears simi lar to that of the other two
agencies.(') Additionally, in analyzing case dismissals we found the
primary reasons for case dismissal are similar to a l l agencies.
Specifically, insufficient evidence and the need for further
investigation are the most frequent reasons for dismissal in a l l agencies.
( 1) We were able to i d e n t i f y one year of cases ( 1991) f o r MANTIS, a multi- agency narcotics
task force operating i n the Tucson metropolitan area. We found MANTIS to have higher
conviction rates than the other agencies. However, due to audit time constraints, we
were unable to explore the potential reasons f o r MANTIS' higher rates.
ISSUED BY THE PlMA COUNTY ATTORNEY
Number of Dismissed
Defendants Gu i I ty As As A
Law Enforcement Number Of With Cases A Percent Percent
Aaencv Defendants D i sposed D i swsed D i s~ osed
CIB 329( a) 243 43.2% 42.0%
Pima County
Sheriff's Off ice 1,595 1,410 46.7% 41.2%
Tucson Pol i ce
Department 8,770 7,682 48.8% 40.2%
( a) CIB data i s f o r detective cases only; comparison agency data includes patrol and
detective cases. DPS, including both CIB and Highway Patrol, had 630 defendant
cases. Of the 630 defendant cases, 506 were disposed: 39.5 percent of the defendants
were convicted and the cases against 51.6 percent of the defendants were dismissed.
Source: Auditor General staff analysis of Pima County Attorney data on
cases involving selected crime types.
ISSUED BY THE PlMA COUNTY ATTORNEY
Number Of Dismissed
Defendants Guilty As As A
LawEnforcernent NunberOf With Cases A Percent Percent
Aaenc~ Defendants D i sposed D i sposed D i s~ osed
CIB 251( a) 180 42.8% 42.2%
Pima County
Sheriff's Office 486 442 29.2% 69.0%
Tucson Police
Department 3,937 3,476 48.9% 46.0%
( a) CIB data i s f o r detective cases only; comparison agency data includes patrol and
detective cases. DPS, including CIB and Highway Patrol, had 437 defendant cases. O f
the 437 defendant cases, 338 were disposed: 41.4 percent of the defendants were
convicted and the cases against 48.2 percent of the defendants were dismissed.
Source: Auditor General s t a f f analysis of Pima County Attorney data on
cases involving selected crime types.
Pima County attorneys feel CIB case aual i ty i s s i a i lar to other aaencieg
- Overall, the quality of CIB cases and the responsiveness of CIB
officers to the needs of prosecution is viewed as equal to that of other
agencies operating in Pima County. Seven attorneys representing two
prosecuting agencies in the Tucson metropolitan area were interviewed,
and none indicated that CIB had any particular problems with case
documentation or responsiveness. In fact, in cases involving major fraud
and economic crime, CIB was perceived particularly favorable, while in
narcotics cases, CIB case quality was considered equal to that of other
agenc i es .
The Bureau Should Imlenient
Chanaes To Emphasize Case Outcome
To improve i t s f i l i n g and conviction rates, CIS should begin to emphasize
case out come. Th i s w i l l requ i re changes i n ove ra l l management ph i l osophy
as well as the implementation of various practices used by other
enforcement agencies to ensure responsiveness to the needs of prosecution.
CIB manaaement ~ erceived as unconcerned about case outcome - Some
attorneys that f e l t positively about the efforts of individual CIB
officers say CIB management lacks commitment to a case after arrest. One
attorney spoke of the belief held by CIB lieutenants and captains that
the job is over at arrest and of their reluctance to emphasize quality
casework. We saw evidence of the philosophy that the job is finished at
arrest when we spoke w i th Bureau management about do i ng a case out come
analysis. Bureau management indicated that such a measure would be
invalid because officers had no control over what happened to a case
after arrest.
Additionally, few of the officers interviewed knew about the outcomes of
their cases. We sampled and reviewed 42 non- task force cases. Of the 21
cases sampled in which there was an arrest or a referral for prosecution,
in only two instances was the CIB officer aware of whether the prosecutor
had f i l e d or dismissed the case.
Practices in other aaencies - During our interviews with other law
enforcement agencies, we found a variety of practices used by detective
units to promote responsiveness to the needs of prosecutors and emphasize
case outcome.
a Court Liaison Function - Some detective units within the Phoenix,
Tucson, and Mesa Po l i ce Departments have f u l I- t i me pos i t i ons
dedicated to faci l i tat i ng case movement between the i r agencies and
the County Attorney. Functions of the court liaisons may include
retrieving the furthered cases from the attorney, routing them to
the investigating officer for follow up, and resubmitting these
cases. The volume of cases received by the Maricopa County Attorney
( over 33,000 cases in 1991) prohibits them from contacting officers
directly when follow up is needed. Although the DPS Highway Patrol
Bureau has a court l i ai son i n Mar i copa County, CI B has no such
posit ion.
Oualitv Review Mechanisms - Two detective units we spoke with have a
quality review prior to submitting cases to the prosecuting agencies
to ensure a l l the appropriate documentation is included and that the
reports are clear and complete. When we asked about the process,
one of the comparison agencies said, " Why would we turn in a bad
case and waste the attorney's time and our time in sending i t back,
when we are capable of determining i f we have a l l the necessary
elements ourselves." In the Drug Enforcement Bureau of the Phoenix
Police Department, a l l cases turned down or furthered by prosecutors
are routed to the investigator's supervisor for review.
a Open Lines of Co~ rmunication With Prosecutorial Aaencies - Some law
enforcement agencies we spoke with talked about the open
relationship they had with criminal justice agencies. One commander
in a Maricopa County enforcement agency said he made i t a point to
get continuous feedback from prosecutors regarding h i s o f f i c e r s '
cases and their presentation in court so that he is aware of and can
correct any problems right away. Attorneys in different prosecuting
agencies in Maricopa County suggested that CIB management is not
concerned about the needs of prosecutors.
a Bnsideration of Case Quality in the Evaluation of Officers - We
found that some agencies consider case outcomes in their evaluation
of officers. A t the Drug Enforcement Administration, officers are
promoted as a result of the submission and review of their best
cases by management. In the Tempe Police Department's Criminal
Investigations Bureau, 25 percent of the officers are rotated out to
patrol positions annually based on poor productivity and case
outcome. A t the present time, CIB management has no way to identify
those performing well on cases and being responsive to prosecution
requests for " furthers."(')
( 1 ) We examined the Maricopa County data by individual officer, and found that some
o f f i c e r s are submitting numerous cases whi 1 e maintaining high fi 1 i ng rates and high
rates of response to " furthers." However, other officers are submitting a high
number of cases but maintain f i l i n g rates below 25 percent and response rates t o
" furthers" at only 25 percent. Other o f f i c e r s appear to be submitting very few
1. CIB should begin to track case outcome and set measurable goals for
2. Case disposition should be a required element in the case f i l e and
any automated case management system that i s developed.
3. CIB management should develop a plan to obtain suggestions and
feedback from a l l prosecuting agencies with which i t is involved.
4. In connection with i t s case tracking system, the Bureau needs to
develop a mechanism to capture caseload by officer. This information
shou Id be used by Bureau management in evaluating officer
productivity and effectiveness.
FINDING Ill
To improve i t s performance in prosecuting cases, CIB should take steps to
improve i t s case management practices. CIB has few guidelines to help
i t s officers determine whether a case is worth pursuing, and does not
require officers to plan how they w i l l conduct the investigation.
Further, Bureau supervisors do not provide adequate oversight of cases in
progress. Guidelines should be adopted to ensure proper manpower
u t i l i z a t i o n and officer accountability.
Because of the types of investigations CIB conducts, systematic practices
are necessary to ensure proper case management. Planning, case
i n i t i a t i o n procedures, tracking, p r i o r i t i z a t i o n , accountability, and
oversight are a l l important components of a law enforcement case
management sys tem . Because the major i ty of CI B cases now i nvo l ve drugs
and narcotics, effective case management is essential. According to a
Drug Enforcement Administration ( DEA) o f f i c i a l , any time drugs,
confidential informants, and large amounts of money are involved, case
management, which includes planning and controls, is essential to ensure
officer accountabi l i ty and safety.
Initiation Of Cases
Is Looselv Control led
CIB needs better p r i o r i t i z a t i o n and planning when i t begins work on a
case.(') While other law enforcement agencies appear to have stringent
c r i t e r i a for i n i t i a t i n g an investigation, CIB does not. CIB does not
require an evaluation or p r i o r i t i z a t i o n before i n i t i a t i n g an
( 1 ) We compared DPS case management practices to professional standards and other law
enforcement department practices. This comparison involved contacting the Drug
Enforcement Admini s t r a t i on and local law enforcement agencies t o obtain t h e i r case
management procedures, and reviewing 1 aw enforcement standards regarding case
management. We then reviewed a judgmental sample of 52 CIB case f i l e s and compared
CIB1s case management practices against i d e n t i f i e d c r i t e r i a .
Case Screening - The Standards for Law Enforcement ~ ~ ei ensc(') manual
establishes certain c r i t e r i a for effective case management. The
standards mandate screening cases for importance before they are
initiated, and developing controls that address investigator assignments
and resource usages.
According to a DEA o f f i c i a l , the DEA evaluates and p r i o r i t i z e s i t s cases
prior to i n i t i a t i o n . The Geographical Drug Enforcement Program ( G- DEP)
allows DEA to classify cases by types and level. Specifically, before a
case is i n i t i a t e d , an agent must evaluate the case against four classes
of cases.( 2) ( Class I cases involve the largest amount of drugs.) The
case designation is reviewed by an agent's imediate supervisor and the
next level of supervision to insure proper classification and
p r i o r i t i z a t i o n . This allows DEA to determine whether to conduct an
investigation, what resources w i l l be needed, anticipated outcome, and
overall cost. Generally, cases are only investigated i f they are
classified as Class I or Class I I .
Case Planning - In add i t ion to assessing the importance of a case, some
agencies require agents to develop a basic plan when i n i t i a t i n g a case.
Often these plans are based on a limited preliminary investigation. The
Organized Crime Bureau of the Phoenix Police Department allows i t s
officers to spend up to 16 hours conducting a preliminary investigation.
It then requires an investigating officer to submit a case i n i t i a t i o n
request form to a sergeant before f u l l investigation begins. This
request contains the o f f i c e r ' s case plan and the estimated man- hours
needed to conduct the investigation. This request must be processed and
approved through the Bureau chain of command. No investigation can be
initiated without approval of at least a sergeant. The request includes
information about the type of investigation, names of suspects, total
number of suspects, summary of preliminary information, investigative
( 1 ) The Standards for Law Enforcement Asencies manual provides both required and
recomnended standards for 1 aw enforcement agencies desi ring accredi t a t i on.
( 2) Class designation i s determined by the type of drug, and the quantity of drugs a
suspect i s moving or capable of moving i n a specific time frame.
objectives, and an estimate of the investigative man- hours necessary.
Supervisors then review the case i n i t i a t i o n request for c r i t e r i a such as
the following.
Validity of the original intelligence information
Criminal nature of the problem
lmportanceof the problem
Presence of lead information
Possible investigative techniques
Sufficiency of agency resources
Possible operational problems
Like the Phoenix Police Department, DEA also emphasizes preparing a case
plan and points out that department resources are unavoidable factors in
planning a case. Factors such as available manpower, funding, time,
equipment, and legal assistance a l l need to be evaluated when beginning
an investigation. According to the DEA handbook, narcotics investigation
is not an area for t r i a l and error tactics. The success or failure of
such an investigation often hinges on small procedural details that
should be considered during the i n i t i a l planning of the case.
CIB Practices - Un l i ke DEA and the Phoen i x Po l i ce Department , CI B does
not require specific c r i t e r i a or written documentation before an
investigation begins. In a judgmental sample of 52 CIB cases, we found
that over 90 percent of CIB enforcement squad cases were initiated by the
case investigator. In most instances, supervisor approval for case
i n i t i a t i o n could only be documented in the f i l e s after the case began.
Even when cases involved larger Itst i ng" narcot i c purchases, we were
unable to find documentation explaining why the case was being
investigated, what factors were considered before the case was i n i t i a t e d ,
or whether supervisor approval was obtained prior to i n i t iat ing the
The fol lowing investigations i l lust rate the Bureau's fai lure to plan a
case, document the reasons for manpower and resource needs, and ensure
the investigating o f f i c e r ' s s k i l l s or a b i l i t i e s are considered prior to
case i n i t i a t i o n .
The Bureau assisted in and secured the release of a convicted felon
who was then used as a confidential informant C . . in a money
laundering investigation. This felon was previously the major target
of a CIB investigation that required considerable manpower and
resources and resulted in the felon ( now the Bureau's C . I . ) facing a
lengthy j a i l sentence. However, during the money laundering
investigation, this felon stole evidence purchased with CIB
undercover funds and l e f t the State while supposedly being supervised
by CIB investigators.
Colrments: CIB case f i l e s did not document the reasons for conducting
this investigation or indicate the c r i t e r i a for assigning
investigators. In addition, the case f i l e s did not indicate the case
outcome, the reason a convicted felon was used as a C . I . , the overall
responsibilities for this informant's a c t i v i t i e s , or the fact that
the C . I . had fled the State. A squad sergeant and an o f f i c e r who
previously worked with the felon claimed neither of them wanted to
work with the C . I . or conduct the investigation because the felon was
unreliable. Further, we could not document the approvals of CIB
upper management for i n i t i a t i n g an investigation of such magnitude,
especially considering the u n r e l i a b i l i t y of the informant and the
fact that the Bureau secured this convicted felon's release in order
to conduct the investigation.
Based on a written complaint from the Department of Liquor Licenses
and Control ( DLLC), the Bureau conducted a covert investigation of a
local bar. The investigation was directed by a DPS officer.
According to the DPS o f f i c e r , investigators were attempting to
substantiate a complaint that underage drinking and sexual acts were
being committed in the bar's parking l o t . Surveillance was
conducted, both inside and outside the premises, for approximately
four hours. The DPS officer obtained substantial resources to
conduct the surveillance -- six CIB officers as well as four officers
from other law enforcement agencies. Although no violations
supporting underage drinking could be substantiated, two males and
one female were cited for public sexual indecency.
Comnents: Although the surveillance was not conducted u n t i l more
than two months after DLLC submitted the complaint to CIB, no case
planning and review appears to have been done. While considerable
manpower and resources were used, there is no indication a
preliminary investigation was completed to j u s t i f y the manpower and
resources committed. The Standards for Law Enforcement Aaencies
states that a preliminary investigation "... may be sufficient to
bring the case to satisfactory conclusion."
In reviewing one case, we asked an officer to describe the case or
cases he was present l y i nves t i gat i ng . He said he was work i ng on one
auto case that involved i l l e g a l tampering with a speedometer or a
" speedometer rollback" fraud. When questioned about his experience
in this area, he replied he had very l i t t l e experience, and admitted
because of his limited knowledge and expertise in this area, he was
meeting with a local prosecutor for some " assistance" with the
Cements: I f case planning and supervisory approval had been
required, this case may never have been i n i t i a t e d . This
invest igat ion was not assigned based on experience or
qualifications.(') Even i f this case had been i n i t i a t e d a f t e r
reviews, case planning may have helped the officer obtain expertise.
For example, although the Bureau had other experienced officers
conducting similar investigations, i t did not appear from our
discussion that these investigators were being consulted.
Once Cases Are Initiated. Case Proaress
Is Not Adequatelv Monitored
Once cases begin, CIB does not systematically monitor case progress. In
addition, CIB lacks the management information necessary to oversee
cases. Further, unlike other law enforcement agencies, CIB has no
standardized mechanism in place to periodically assess case progress and
determine whether cases should be continued.
Bureau lacks c r i t i c a l case manaaement information - CIB division and
squad management lack information about the cases being investigated, and
the status of such cases. During our audit, we questioned squad
sergeants about their methods for tracking cases under investigation.
Some sergeants indicated that no squad logs of current case assignments
or a c t i v i t i e s were being kept. One sergeant said that he would have to
" poll" his three officers to determine which cases they were presently
investigating. Other sergeants indicated that some case information was
being maintained in their personal datebooks or computers. A DPS
inspection team assigned to review case management procedures also found
( 1 ) The Standards f o r Law Enforcement Aqencies mandates that personnel be assigned t o an
investigation on the basis of expertise. I n addition, the manual suggests cases
requi ring speci a1 i zed ski 11 , know1 edge, and abi 1 i t i e s be assigned t o personnel wi t h
those credentials.
that systematic logs were not being kept and that case tracking methods
employed by supervisors were inconsistent and unstandardized. Unlike
CIB, both units of the Phoenix Police Department's Drug Enforcement and
Organized Crime Bureaus require squad sergeants to maintain logs of a l l
approved investigations. Further, the Organized Crime Bureau's logs must
be reviewed by lieutenants on a monthly basis to ensure proper adherence
to Bureau c r i t e r i a .
Because case information is not being captured at the officer level, the
Bureau lacks the management information necessary to effectively oversee
i t s operations. Although the Bureau has 87 sergeants and officers
ass i gned to C I B i nves t i gat i ens(') , Bureau management cannot i den t i fy the
The number of DPS cases
Case i n i t i a t i o n dates
Current status of cases ( i . e . , open or closed)
Types of cases ( i. e., narcotics, fraud, liquor, etc.)
The names and number of officers assigned
Whether the case is being investigated solely by DPS or in
conjunction with other law enforcement agencies
Amount of resources expended
Man- hours expended
A l i s t i n g of the type and dollar value of assets seized ( i f any)
Case outcome ( i . e., arrest, convict ion)
Recognizing the need for more complete and timely case management
information, the Bureau is developing a plan to obtain an automated
system to help track such information. However, the new system w i l l not
address a l l the problems documented during our audit. For example,
( 1) The Bureau has another 59 sergeants, o f f i c e r s , and c i v i l i a n analysts assigned to task
forces i n other j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
i t w i l l not have procedures for addressing case i n i t i a t i o n approvals or
planning. Without procedures addressing when a case begins and
components such as supe rv i so ry rev i ews and app rova I , p l ann i ng and
accountability problems w i l l continue even under a new system.
Additionally, because the automated case management system w i l l not be
implemented in the near future, the Bureau may want to institute a manual
logging and tracking system.
CIB has no svstem for assessina case continuation - Although other law
enforcement agencies require additional management approval for case
continuation, CIB has not developed a system for determining whether
cases warrant continuation. For example, the Phoenix Police Department's
Drug Enforcement Bureau requires the approval of the unit lieutenants to
conduct an investigation exceeding 400 man- hours and the approval of the
Bureau Commander to conduct an investigation exceeding 600 man- hours. A
case management review report must be completed to j u s t i f y continuing an
investigation when the time invested exceeds that authorized by the last
supervisor granting approval. Officers cannot continue an investigation
u n t i l the investigation is approved by the appropriate supervisor.
Under the system used by DEA, active status cases are reviewed by the
supervisor as significant a c t i v i t i e s occur or at a maximum interval of 30
days. I f no evidence is obtained to arrest at least one suspect during
this period, the immediate supervisor closes the case. I f evidence is
available, the investigation continues. I f a case is closed and later
information suggests new evidence, a new case f i l e is opened.
I f CIB had more specific guidelines, i t might be able to u t i l i z e i t s
investigators' time more effectively. For example, specific guidelines
might have eliminated a CIB investigator spending nearly 800 man- hours on
a surveillance case in which the officer never saw the suspect. A brief
description of this investigation follows:
Based on a suggest ion from another law enforcement entity, an
invest i gator in i t i ated and conducted a su rve i l lance . The
investigator alone spent nearly 800 man- hours ( the equivalent of four
and one- half months) conducting the surveillance, and other
investigators also spent time on this case. During the entire period
of surveillance, the investigating officer never saw the suspect. We
could find no documentation of supervisor approval or involvement to
justify continuing this investigation for such an extended period of
1. CIB officers should not be allowed to initiate cases without
supervisor approval.
2. CIB needs to adopt and adhere to the following criteria for case
planning and initiation.
a. A case initiation form should be used to document the reasons
for beginning a case, and the form should be reviewed and
approved by the appropriate supervisor when a case is initiated.
b. Case plans should be developed for larger complex cases. The
plans should include the reasons for the investigation,
resources needed, anticipated results, appropriate management
approval, and anticipated costs.
c. Documented supervisory approval should be obtained for
continuing work on lengthy cases.
3. The Bureau should take actions to ensure that the automated case
management system it is developing will capture the critical case
information necessary for management reports. The system should
allow management to access information such as the number of cases
being investigated, the status of those cases, the number of
man- hours and resources expended on each case, the number of arrests,
and the outcome of each case. Further, the Bureau needs to include
all aspects of case planning and initiation as part of the case
management system. Because implementation of the automated system
will be delayed, CIB should consider instituting a manual logging and
tracking system in the meantime.
The Bureau's case file documentation needs improvement. CIB does not
adequately document its officers' casework. Comprehensive case files are
important for both monitoring officer actions on a case and for
prosecution once suspects have been arrested. However, in our review of
CIB case documentation, we found that case documentation was often
incomplete, files were difficult to locate, and file documents
frequent ly lacked evidence of supervisory review . Because of the
extremely poor condition of case files, we were often unable to determine
what transpired in a given case, and we had to conduct extensive follow
up to reconstruct the case.
Comprehensive Case Files Are
lrn~ ortant For Case Manaaement
And Prosecution
Comprehensive case files are an important means of monitoring officer
actions. Because the purpose of a case file is to document the events
surrounding an investigation, the file serves as a basis for supervisory
review of officers' actions. In addition, a case file can assist a
supervisor in determining the future actions necessary to conclude an
For cases with arrests, comprehensive case files are also an important
part of prosecution. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration's
Drua Enforcement Handbook, preparing a case for court includes
documenting everything of significance that occurs during an
investigation leading to arrest. From case f i le materials and field
notes, an officer should be able to provide a prosecutor with a
chronological report of the activities leading to an arrest,
documentation of evidence, a listing of the items seized, whether any
samples were submitted for laboratory analysis, and the name's of those
arrested and on what charges. Further, the officer will probably need
to consult the file to recall details of a case if called to testify.
The need for thorough case documentation is also emphasized by time
lapse between when a case is completed and the t r i a l . It is not
uncommon for a t r i a l to be held several months to a year after an arrest
has been made.
Review Of Case Files
Reveals Poor Documentation
CIB case f i l e s are in poor condition. We reviewed a sample of CIB case
f i l e s and found that case f i l e s were often incomplete, d i f f i c u l t to
locate, and frequently lacked evidence of supervisory review.
h l e of f i l e s were selected - Because the Bureau did hot have a
comprehensive l i s t i n g of the cases i t was investigating, or the status
of these cases, to determine the quality of CIB case documentation, we
reviewed a judgmental sample of 52 cases. These cases were selected
from CIB enforcement squads ( 42 f i l e s ) as well as from task forces to
which CIB officers were assigned ( 10 f i les). In selecting enforcement
squad cases, we considered for review at least one case from each squad
u n i t . I n addition, we selected the county task force cases from cases
for which a CIB officer was listed as the officer in charge.
Based on our review of these f i l e s , we noted the following deficiencies.
Files were often incom~ lete - According to the Standards for Law
Enforcement Asencies, case f i l e s should contain a copy of
preliminary investigative reports, records of statements, results of
physical evidence examinations, case status reports, and other
reports and records needed for investigative purposes. The Bureau's
procedure manual requires this type of information in i t s case
f i l e s .
CIB f i l e s often lack important documentation. Of the 52 case f i l e s
we reviewed, 22 ( 42 percent) were missing key documentation,
including narrative reports detailing the events transpiring on the
case; requests for lab analyses; search warrants; seized asset
reports; and approvals for conducting drug buys, reversals('), or
flash operations.
( 1) A reversal i s a c l o s e l y supervised investigation i n which covert o f f i c e r s represent
themselves as suppliers of contraband.
Files were d i f f i c u l t to locate - According to the Standards for Law
Enforcement Aaencies, once a c t i v i t y on a case is suspended or closed,
the f i l e s should be consolidated into a central records system. We
found that CIB f i l e s are not being closed and consolidated. Instead,
case documents were found in three locations: with central records,
with squads, and with the officers. Central records maintains some
information, including narrative reports. In addition, a squad may
have copies of some of the f i l e documents. However, in the majority
of instances, the most comprehensive f i l e documentation is kept by
the officer who investigated the case. For example, although no
further action was planned in 44 of the 50 case f i l e s we reviewed,
the investigating officer s t i l l retained the f i l e in 40 of these 44
Files lacked evidence of su~ ervisorv review - Although Bureau policy
requires supervisory review of cases, we did not find evidence of
such reviews. According to Bureau policy, supervisors are supposed
to review cases and update case folder check l i s t s at least every 30
days. In addition, the supervisors are supposed to sign o f f on case
f i l e documents. However, in our review of 52 cases, we found that 19
case f i l e s did not have evidence of a supervisory review and three
additional case f i l e s had only some documents that appeared to have
been reviewed. In addition, most f i l e s did not contain a case folder
check l i s t . The Department's internal review also indicates
problems with f i l e review. DPS conducted a special inspection of
CIB's Case Management System, and the findings were detailed in an
October 1991 report. The inspection team found that although
sergeants review supplemental reports, they do not routinely review
the entire case f i l e . In addition, the special inspection team found
that the case f i l e folder check l i s t i s not being used consistently
throughout the Bureau.
Because of the extremely poor condition of case f i l e s , we were often
unable to determine what transpired in a given case through f i l e review
alone; consequently, extensive follow up was required. In almost every
case, we had to talk with officers to determine what occurred in the
case, and i t s current status. In addition, we often had to contact
other people ( such as property and evidence custodians and county
prosecutors) to determine the status of a case in specific areas. The
following case examples demonstrate the poor condition of some CIB f i l e s
we reviewed.
In November 1990, a CIB officer obtained a warrant to search a
residence identified as a clandestine lab. Arrests were made and
the case was sent to the county prosecutor. We requested a f i l e
from the squad sergeant. However, the f i l e provided was an " office
f i let' and not the " o f f i c e r ' s f i le." After wai t ing approximately
one week for the o f f i c e r t o return from leave, he informed us that
his f i l e was with the county prosecutor. Our review of the office
f i l e revealed that several key documents were missing, including a
copy of the search warrant, a copy of the property and evidence form
documenting receipt of evidence, a deposit s l i p for seized monies
total l ing $ 8,320, and informat ion indicating the current status of
the case. Further, although the last f i l e notation indicates the
f i l e was closed by arrest and was pending , the squad sergeant
indicated that the case had been dismissed and a l l property had been
returned to the owner. The officer also indicated that the case had
been d i sm i ssed because the l oca l po l i ce department that not i f i ed DPS
about the suspect had l ied about how it learned of the suspected
i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y . However, this information was not noted in the
f i l e we reviewed.
In October 1990, a CIB officer sold marijuana t o t a l l i n g 61 pounds
for which he received $ 72,750. A search warrant was obtained and a
total of $ 95,550 was seized from four suspects. Our review of the
f i l e revealed three documentation deficiencies, which we attempted
to follow up. F i r s t , because the case involved the sale of
marijuana by CIB to suspects, direction should have been obtained
from a prosecutor. However, the f i l e did not contain any evidence
of prosecutor involvement. The officer provided the name of a
prosecutor who he stated approved of the sale. We contacted the
prosecutor and he told us that he had never been contacted regarding
the sale.
Second, we could not determine from the f i l e where the marijuana was
obtained or whether supervisory approval had been obtained for the
sale. The officer indicated that he obtained the marijuana from DPS
Property and Evidence, and that the DPS form would show supervisory
approval. We contacted Property and Evidence o f f i c i a l s who, after
much searching, were able to locate a form that indicated " 4 bales"
of marijuana were checked out of Property and Evidence. The officer
indicated that he had checked out approximately 80 pounds of
marijuana for the operation. Although we found documentation that
indicated 61 pounds were u t i l ized and returned to Property and
Evidence, we were unable to locate documentation that indicated the
remaining 19 pounds were returned. Further, Property and Evidence
employees were unable to produce documentat ion of approval for the
removal of the marijuana.
Third, although the seized cash had been forfeited through a court
order in July 1991, the f i l e did not contain any indication of the
status of the cash.
In January 1991, an officer used a confidential informant to
purchase marijuana from two suspects. The suspects were not
arrested at the time of the sale. The purchased drugs were
submitted for analysis, and the results were positive. The f i l e
included narrative reports about the transaction as well as forms
denoting the results of the analysis and placement of the drugs into
evidence. Although one of the suspects was subsequently arrested,
the documentation was unclear as to whether the arrest was related
to this case. Further, there was no documentation to indicate
whether the other suspect had been arrested or whether such a
pursuit was being planned. The arresting o f f i c e r ' s sergeant
indicated that he did not know the outcome of the case, and said
that the officer assigned to the case had been transferred to
Highway Patrol. He also said that no further follow up was planned.
CIB needs to take the following actions to correct deficiencies in i t s
case f i l e documentation:
Track cases assigned to officers so that supervisors are aware of
what cases need to be reviewed
Require consistent u t i l i z a t i o n of the case f i l e folder check l i s t
Conduct routine supervisory reviews of f i l e s to ensure case officers
are preparing comprehensive f i l e s
Develop a policy for storage of case f i l e s that allows management to
easily retrieve them
PERSONNEL IN ClB SUPERVISORY POSITIONS
Developing stronger case management w i l l place more responsibility on CIB
supervisors. However, CIB management consists of many personnel that
have no experience in criminal investigations prior to being placed in a
CIB supervisory position. The Bureau's lack of experienced management
personnel is a result of the Department's placement practices. The
Department should consider requiring that those placed in CIB management
positions have criminal investigations experience.
The nature of the work performed by CIS warrants supervisors with related
experience. CIB cases often involve working with narcotics and large
amounts of money -- cases that require extensive planning and supervision
to ensure success and officer safety. However, most CIB officers are
recruited from the Highway Patrol Bureau and lack the investigatory
training needed for such cases. The training provided to those officers
is primari ly on the job, and supervisors have primary responsibi I i t y for
such training.
Manv Suwrvisors Have
Little Or No Exwrience
DPS does not require i t s supervisors to have prior CIB experience. We
analyzed a l l management personnel at the levels of sergeant, lieutenant,
and captain to determine the CIB experience these personnel had prior to
being promoted into CIB management. Our analysis revealed that of the 58
supervisory personnel, 21 had no experience in CIB as an investigative
officer prior to being placed in CIB management. Further, other officers
that had exper i ence had not been emp loyed by the Bureau for several years
prior to returning to CIB.
A prosecutor we spoke with stated that when a Highway Patrol officer is
promoted into a CIB sergeant position, " He is now supervising people who
he doesn ' t understand and a funct ion he has no knowledge of. . . One of the
worst problems is that the narcotics agents who have been doing their
work for years have no respect for the sergeant." Another former
prosecutor stated that supervisors are transferred or promoted in without
experience in or knowledge of the type of work CIB officers are doing.
Compounding the lack of experienced CIB management personnel is the
constant turnover in Bureau upper management. We reviewed the number of
personnel changes for the captain, major and lieutenant colonel positions
since 1987.(') In the five- year time frame reviewed, the Bureau has had
four lieutenant colonels in the Assistant Director position and four
majors in the Chief of Staff position. In addition, the Bureau has had
twelve officers in captain positions.(*) Such constant personnel changes
cause a lack of continuity and accountability.
Placements Not Based
On E x ~ re ie nce
The reason for lack of experience is the Department's placement policy.
The Department does not require those placed in CIB management positions
to have related experience. For example, when a sergeant position
becomes available within the Bureau, consideration is f i r s t given to
internal transfers, then to inter- Bureau transfers, and final ly, to
promotions. Because DPS considers a l l sergeants equally qualified for
any sergeant position in the Department, a sergeant with no prior CIB
experience is able to transfer into the Bureau. Further, promotions are
made from e l i g i b i l i t y l i s t s of a l l officers in the Department that have
passed the sergeant exam. The officer at the top of the l i s t is
generally given the f i r s t opportunity for promotion. Thus, Highway
Patrol officers can be promoted to CIB sergeants even though the officers
have no prior CIB experience. DPS procedures are the same for promotions
to lieutenant or captain.
( 1) The Department has no means of tracking personnel changes f o r each of i t s positions.
Thus, the information presented i s based on an interview with the former Bureau Chief
of Staff who had been i n the Bureau over 14 years.
( 2) The number of captain positions has varied over the years from three t o f i v e .
Currently, CIB has four captain positions.
The system not only places inexperienced personnel into CIB, i t also
encourages exper i enced per sonne I to leave C I B to pursue promot i ona I
opportunities. According to Department policy, i f a candidate on an
e l i g i b i l i t y l i s t refuses a promotion, the candidate is dropped to the
bottom of the l i s t . Consequently, i f a CIB officer qualified to become a
sergeant refuses a promotion in another Bureau ( such as Highway Patrol)
to wait for a CIB sergeant position, the officer is dropped to the bottom
of the e l i g i b i l i t y l i s t . Thus, many officers leave CIB to take advantage
of a promotional opportunity. For example, we identified one employee
who had been with CIB for 10 years, but transferred to the Highway Patrol
Bureau to become a sergeant.
Other Police Aaencies
Consider Exoerience
We contacted other pol ice agencies to learn about their promotional
system. An o f f i c i a l with the Drug Enforcement Bureau of the Phoenix
Police Department said that sergeant positions are usually f i l l e d with
personnel experienced in investigations, and that screening for such
experience is part of the interview process. An o f f i c i a l with the Drug
Enforcement Administrat ion ( DEA) indicated that al l supervisors in DEA
have been through the agent ranks before being promoted to supervisor.
DPS should revise i t s promotional system to consider experience. I t s
current policies and procedures do not require related experience as a
consideration in determining promotions. To require related experience,
the Department w i l l need to establish separate job classifications for
CIB, and then request approval for the classifications from the Law
Enforcement Merit System Council.
The Department should consider developing a placement system for CIB
management personnel that requires prior experience in investigations and
narcotics cases.
CIB also needs to strengthen internal controls over specific aspects of
i t s operations, including undercover and flash r o l l funds. Guidelines
established by DPS to control and account for undercover and flash r o l l
funds are not being followed.
DPS receives undercover and flash r o l l funds as a result of criminal
asset forfeitures. Undercover funds, also referred to as evidence
acquisition funds, are issued to individual investigators(') for
informant payments, purchasing evidence ( such as drugs), and for paying
emergency investigative expenses that cannot be paid from any other
source. Flash rol l monies( 2) are not spent, but they are shown to
potential suppliers of illegal drugs during undercover operations.
During calendar year 1991, DPS incurred $ 443,933 in evidence acquisition
fund expenditures and issued 77 flash rolls.( 3) To protect these monies
from abuse, loss, and theft, i t is imperative that DPS develop and
enforce strong internal controls.
Current Procedures
Are Not Beina Followed
CIB investigators are not following current procedures for the use of
evidence acquisition and flash r o l l funds. The evidence acquisition
monies issued to individual officers are not being controlled. DPS is
( 1) Each CIB d i v i s i o n can receive up to $ 40,000 for issuance to personnel, although the
amount an individual o f f i c e r can obtain varies by rank. Officers can receive up t o
$ 250, sergeants $ 750; and comnanders $ 1,000. Monies issued remain with the o f f i c e r s
at a l l times.
( 2) DPS has set aside $ 150,000 i n Phoenix and $ 100,000 i n Tucson to be used as flash money.
( 3) The 77 flash r o l l s disbursed during calendar year 1991 totaled $ 5,083,500; the
smallest flash r o l l was $ 4,000 and the largest was $ 150,000.
also not conducting routine aud i ts to account for al I evidence
acquisition monies. Furthermore, DPS i s not controlling flash r o l l funds
issued t o o f f i c e r s and other enforcement agencies.
Evidence acquisition monies are not beina controlled - We reviewed a l l
expenditure forms submitted from January through June 1991, and found
that officers are spending evidence acquisition monies on items other
than informant payments, evidence purchases, and emergency expenses. For
example, during January 1991, almost 60 percent of officers' expenditures
were for items that should not have been purchased with evidence
acqu i s i t i on funds . Even when the i tems were necessary, they shou Id have
been purchased through routine State purchasing procedures. In
situations where routine purchasing procedures would not have been
expedient, the use of a petty cash fund would have been more appropriate
than the use of the Department's evidence acquisition fund. The
following items purchased with evidence acquisition monies i l l u s t r a t e how
the fund is being misused:
Ice, soda pop, food, and ice chests for various events such as the
d i s t r i c t shoot, assault r i f l e school, training, meetings, special
details, surveillance, and extended duties
Equipment such as a color copier, video camera, night vision
equipment, and a computer part
Training ammunition
Vehicle o i l and service parts
Subscriptions to the Los Angeles Times, Arizona Daily Sun, Daily
Spectrum, and other publications
Extra keys, locks, door alarms, and the change of office safe
Office supplies such as stamps, drafting paper, typewriter ribbon,
and printer supplies
Dues for membership in various organizations such as the American
Legion Post and the International Association of Asian Crime
Miscellaneous items such as a pair of sunglasses, pager chains,
street maps, holster repair, b i l l s for pager use, photo frames, photo
albums, and a buff and wax for an undercover vehicle
Undercover fund ex~ enditures are not beina routinelv reviewed - Although
DPS requires five separate reviews of undercover fund expenditures for
appropriateness, we saw no evidence to indicate these expenditures were
being questioned. In our review of investigator expenditure logs
submitted between January and June 1991, we could not identify anv
expenditures that had been disapproved by a supervisor, Bureau s t a f f , or
the Comptroller's Office. However, as previously mentioned, for January
1991, we found that almost 60 percent of these expenditures did not meet
policy guidelines.
Even i f an e f f o r t was being made to scrutinize expenditures for
appropriateness, current practices would make such an e f f o r t d i f f i c u l t .
In our review, we found that expenditure forms sometimes contained vague
descriptions of expenditures. Further, because the Bureau does not
require receipts, expenditures cannot be verified. Lack of such
documentation hampers review and allows for approval of inappropriate
expenditures. For example, one investigator showed a $ 44 surveillance
expense with the explanation " Statewide Intel. Mtg." When we asked the
investigator what the expenditure was for, he indicated i t was for
meeting supplies. Upon further questioning, we found that the
expenditure was for coffee, creamer, sugar, and cups. Other examples of
vague descriptions of expenditures included " odd and unusual expense^,^'
" investigative supplies," " expense for traveling," and " surveillance."
In addition to the inadequate review of individual expenditures, we also
found that the Department has not been performing routine audits of i t s
undercover funds. According to DPS policies, the Comptroller's Office i s
responsible for auditing CIB evidence acquisition funds, however, these
funds have not been audited since July 1988. Further, even i f an audit
were attempted, DPS would not be able to account for a l l monies because
neither the Bureau nor the Comptroller's Office know what the fund
balance should be.
Flash r o l l monies are not beina controlled - DPS should strengthen i t s
controls over flash monies. During our review of the flash r o l l log for
calendar year 1991, we learned that 29 flash r o l l s were disbursed
internally and 48 flash r o l l s were disbursed to other agencies. Only 3
of the 29 flash rol Is disbursed internal ly were properly approved by CIB
management, and there was no evidence to indicate that the proper
approvals were obtained for flash r o l l s disbursed to other agencies.
Furthermore, CIB has not developed a policy that addresses the time frame
for the return of flash r o l l s . Although Bureau personnel stated that
flash rol Is are to be returned within 48 hours, of the 77 flash rol Is
disbursed, 36 remained out past the 48- hour period; 10 of the 36 remained
out 10 days or longer. In addition, two flash r o l l s , one for $ 140,000
and one for $ 50,000, remained out for 20 days.
DPS Should lm~ rove
Its Controls
DPS controls over evidence acquisition funds and flash r o l l monies are
weak. We contacted the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Phoenix Police Department, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, the Metro
Area Narcotics Trafficking Interdict ion Squad ( MANTIS)('), and reviewed
guide1 ines establ ished by the U. S. Department of Just ice( 2) and found
more stringent controls. By implementing additional procedures, the
Department could strengthen i t s controls over evidence acquisition and
flash r o l l monies.
The Standards For Law Enforcement Aaenci es mandates the development of an
accounting system that provides adequate control over evidence
acquisition funds. In reviewing the systems developed by other law
enforcement agencies, we found they have developed strong internal
controls ( i. e., issuing funds on a " needs only" basis, requiring receipts
for expenditures, performing frequent reviews of expenditure logs, and
protecting flash r o l l funds against loss.)
( 1) HANTIS i s a multi- agency narcotics task force operating i n the Tucson metropolitan
( 2) Off i c e o f Justice Planni n~ Guide1 i ne Manual : Fi nanci a1 and Admi ni s t r a t i v e Guide f o r
Grants. O f f i c e of Comptroller, Department of Justice, 1990.
Evidence acauisition funds are issued on a " needs onlv" basis - The
DEA disburses funds only after a requisition for funds has been
approved. An investigator receiving funds has three weeks to turn in
any unexpended portion along with an expenditure log that describes
the purchases made and why. The U. S. Department of Justice also
recommends issuing funds on a " needs on ly" basis. Funds are advanced
for a specific purpose, and i f the funds are not expended for that
purpose, they are returned.
DPS maintains that monies need to be available on a daily basis
because investigators never know when undercover funds w i l l be
requ i red. However , i t appears that DPS personne l have not had need
for undercover monies on a daily basis. Of 191 CIB personnel that
carried evidence acquisition funds during January through June of
1991, 24 did not use these funds for the entire six month period, at
least 63 did not use these funds on a monthly basis, and at least 116
incurred total monthly expendi tures of less than $ 30.(')
Recei~ ts are reauired - The Federal agency we contacted as we1 l as
MANTIS require expenditures to be supported by receipts unless
obtaining a receipt would jeopardize the investigator's undercover
status. DPS requires receipts only for payments made to informants
for services rendered. DPS does not require receipts for emergency
expenditures, payments to informants for rent, gas, food or other
expenses paid from the evidence acquisition fund.
Ex~ endtiu res are reviewed weeklv - The Phoenix Pol ice Department
requires expenditure logs to be reviewed for suitableness on a weekly
basis by i t s Internal Affairs Bureau. CIB expenditure logs are
reviewed by Bureau management on a monthly basis; however, they are
not reviewed for propriety by an independent party such as DPS's
Inspections and Control Unit. In addition, we noted numerous misuses
of the evidence acquisition fund during our review of CIB expenditure
logs and we found no evidence to indicate that these misuses were
quest i oned .
Flash rol l monies are closelv auarded when loaned to other aaencies -
A l l agencies that borrow flash money from MANTIS must agree to
reimburse the Department should any of the money be lost. Presently,
DPS has not established agreements with outside agencies that would
protect the Department from loss due to stolen funds and proper
supervisory approvals are often not obtained when flash r o l l monies
are released.
( 1) One sergeant who had $ 1,880 i n his possession, did not use these evidence acquisition
funds during the si x- month period.
1. DPS should develop the following controls to ensure that evidence
acquisition funds are not misused.
Funds shou Id be issued on a " needs on lyl1 basis .
Receipts should be obtained for a l l expenditures unless
obtaining a receipt would jeopardize an undercover operation.
Expenditure logsshould becompletedandverifiedweekly.
The fund balance should be verified each month.
2. To ensure that policies and procedures are followed, expenditure
receipts, logs, and fund verifications should be reviewed by a
designated independent party.
3. To ensure that flash r o l l monies are properly control led, DPS should
implement the following procedures.
Written authorization should be obtained for the disbursement of
flash r o l l monies.
Entities that wish to borrow flash r o l l funds should agree in
writing to reimburse DPS i f any money is lost.
A formal time frame should be established for the return of
flash r o l l monies.
During our audit, we reviewed an internal inspection conducted by DPS on
a prominent Tucson case often referred to as the " Castro Case." We
conducted this review because of the importance of the case to Bureau
operations and allegations that the case involved mishandling of a major
drug investigation. We found that the Department's internal inspection
identified and reported many of the weaknesses in and problems with the
management of the case. However, we found additional deficiencies that
were not reported by the Department. This case i l l u s t r a t e s many of the
problems identified earlier in our report.
In the sumner of 1991, Department management requested i t s Inspections
and Control unit to conduct a review of CIB's case management practices.
The review was to include an analysis of a Tucson case in which a Tucson
attorney had alleged " outrageous governmental misconduct" by the
Department in allowing marijuana to be transported from the Mexico border
to the Tucson area for distribution. The unit conducted an i n i t i a l
review and provided a draft report of i t s findings to the Deputy Director
on October 1, 1991. The Governor, having been informed of alleged
criminal a c t i v i t i e s within DPS, suspended the Director and Deputy
Director to f a c i l i t a t e an investigation of the allegations. A t that
time-, the Governor's Office seized the draft report. A subsequent
external investigation by the Governor's Office and the U. S. Attorney
found that no criminal a c t i v i t i e s had taken place, and the suspension was
l i f t e d . Following his return to duty, the Director released the findings
of the i n i t i a l report, and the investigation that led to his suspension
was continued. The unit issued a final report in February 1992.
The purpose of the Tucson case was to i n f i l t r a t e a major drug
organization operating in the Tucson area. The investigation involved
the use of confidential informants who had been arrested by the
Department for their involvement in the drug organization. The infor-
mants assisted the Department in getting DPS officers " hired1' by the
organization to transport loads from the Mexican border into the Tucson
area where they were l e f t in designated areas to be distributed by those
within the drug organization. Other DPS officers were to monitor the
delivered loads to determine those involved in the drug distribution.
Our review of the case identified weaknesses similar to those reported by
the De~ artInent - As part of our audit work, we reviewed both the i n i t i a l
and final reports prepared by the Department as well as the documents
collected by the Department's inspection team. We also spoke with a
prosecutor and defense attorney for the Tucson case. Our review
supported the following weaknesses identified by the Department's
inspection team and reported in i t s i n i t i a l draft report.
Case oversight - The preapproved guide1 ines for case oversight were
not followed in the Tucson case. Rather than follow the established
chain of command, case officers reported d i r e c t l y t o the Tucson
Captain ( the sergeant and lieutenant were circumvented). Thus, the
Captain was the only management o f f i c i a l kept informed of the
progress on the case. In addition, there were personality conflicts
among CIB personnel invo Ived in the case that hampered
comunications about the case.
Accountability - Many problems were found regarding case
accountability. F i r s t , no concerted e f f o r t was made by case
participants to accurately determine the weight of marijuana
transported from Mexico into Arizona. Second, the transported loads
were not adequately monitored, resulting in loads being f'lost'f in
the Tucson area. In addition, on at least two occasions, marijuana
loads were stored overnight at a DPS employee's home. Third,
Department policies were not followed regarding monies received for
transporting the marijuana shipments. Fourth, the confidential
informant used to assist in the case was paid without proper Bureau
approval. Further, one case officer met socially with one of the
confidential informants and his spouse. Finally, procedures were
not designed to ensure officer safety.
Case documentation, monitorina, and reportinq - Case o f f i cers fai led
to accurately document c r i t i c a l case information. Officer reports
contained inaccurate information about the amount of monies received
and the amount of marijuana transported and subsequently recovered.
Many reports prepared by officers lacked evidence of supervisory
review. In addition, Department management was not kept informed of
case progress on a regular basis.
The second report issued by the Department in February 1992 indicated
problems simi lar to those noted in the f i r s t report. However, the
second report praised the overall success of the operation by noting
that 18 suspects were arrested or indicted and an estimated $ 1.2 mi l lion
in assets were seized. The report's overall conclusions were that
although the case did not conform to Department policies and procedures,
" The i nnovat ive concept used in the Tucson case was a good approach to
an existing problem .... Unequivocally, the Tucson case was a
prosecutorial success ."
Our review identified additional weaknesses not rewrted bv the
De~ artment - Although the Department reported a number of weaknesses in
the Tucson case, other serious problems with the case were not
reported. These serious problems include the following.
Case had serious oversiaht ~ roblernsf or several vears - The Department Is
report of the Tucson case focuses only on an abbreviated time frame
of the investigation of the case. The transportation of marijuana
loads occurred in two distinct phases. In April 1988, the
Department began to use informants to assist them in transporting
loads from the border into the Tucson area for distribution.
Between April 1988 and July 1988, eight loads t o t a l l i n g an estimated
10,800 pounds were transported by DPS officers and informants into
the Tucson area. These early tactics led to several arrests.
However, one of those targeted was not arrested u n t i l March 1989.
In November 1989, this " target" was used as an informant for further
i n f i l t r a t i o n of drug organizations. Between November 1989 and
February 1990, informants and DPS officers transported 15 loads of
marijuana totalling an estimated 20,000 pounds. The inspection
team's report focuses on the operation from this phase forward.
A l though the i nspect i on report focuses on the second phase of the
operation, some of the problems i t discusses occurred during the
i n i t i a l phase of the operation. For example, in the i n i t i a l phase,
only 4,000 of the 10,800 pounds transported were eventually
recovered. In the second phase, only 5,700 of the estimated 20,000
pounds were recovered.(') This loss of drugs was due primarily to
poor surveillance. In both the i n i t i a l and second phase, a load of
transported marijuana was lost prior to delivery to a nstashll
house. In another instance, an insufficient number of officers were
watching a " stash1' house to track those that purchased drugs.
Corrective actions were apparently not taken during the operation to
prevent subsequent drug losses. Further, we found that case
( 1) The estimated street value of the unrecovered drugs was over $ 3.4 m i l l i o n f o r the
i n i t i a l phase, and over $ 7.1 m i l l i o n f o r the second phase.
a c t i v i t i e s throughout the operation were poorly documented. For
example, in the i n i t i a l phase of the case, narrative reports did not
indicate the amount of monies received for deliveries; this
documen tat ion problem con t i nued in the second phase.
Finally, although the case was a significant undertaking, DPS
management was not adequately involved. We could find no evidence
that the i n i t i a l phase of the operation was approved by anyone
within Bureau or Department upper management. In addition, in early
1989, although the Assistant Director in charge of CIB did approve
of using an informant to conduct a second round of drug transports,
the informant he approved was not the informant that was ultimately
used in the second phase. In addition, i t does not appear that
either Bureau or Department management were kept f u l l y informed of
progress on the case.
Confidential informants were poorlv utilized and controlled -
Informants were used as part of the Tucson case. However, some
circumstances surrounding the use of these informants appears
inappropriate, as illustrated by the following examples.
Example 1
Between April and July 1988, two informants were used by the
Department to inf i l trate a drug organization. The informants
assisted DPS in getting a DPS officer hired by the organization as a
driver. The DPS officer accompanied the informants in transporting
loads into the Tucson area. During their involvement, the
informants were allowed to keep all monies they received for
delivering loads ( except one $ 1,000 payment to a CIB undercover
o f f i c e r ) . ( Based on an estimated rate of $ 30 a pound, these
informants could have received in excess of $ 300,000.) A defense
attorney involved with the case stated that i t was unusual for
confidential informants to be allowed to keep a l l proceeds;
generally informants provide information and/ or assistance in return
for a plea agreement, a reduction in sentence and/ or an agreed upon
dollar amount or percentage. The Attorney General representative
providing guidance on the case was unaware that these informants
were allowed to keep the drug proceeds.
Example 2
In another instance, the Department used an informant who had been a
maior t a r ~ e t of the investigation. Although the Department had
spent considerable time and resources to capture this informant, we
were unable to find any evidence that the use of this informant had
been approved by higher ranking Bureau or Department o f f i c i a l s .
Another informant used by the Department had also been a major
target of the investigation ( he was referred to as a " ringleader" in
the drug operation.) This informant had been arrested by DPS
o f f i c e r s , t r i e d , and was awaiting sentencing. DPS officers worked
with prosecutors to f a c i l i t a t e this informant's release for use in
several additional planned criminal investigations. Again, we were
unable to find any evidence that the use of this informant had been
approved by higher ranking Bureau or Department o f f i c i a l s . After
this informant was released from j a i l he resided with a DPS officer,
and while working with DPS in a money laundering investigation, this
informant purchased a vehicle with DPS undercover funds and later
fled to Mexico in the vehicle. The case agents fai led to f i le a
narrative report detailing the vehicle theft u n t i l after the vehicle
had been recovered several months later. This informant was
eventually captured, returned to j a i l , sentenced to 28 years in
prison, and fined $ 1.6 million.
Monies not accounted for - The Department's second report on the
investigation indicates that " A l l monies received by officers for
t ranspo r t i ng mar i j uana have been accounted for . " However , based on
our review of the f i l e documentation for the second phase of the
operation, i t appears that there are large sums of monies that are
unaccounted for. DPS officers involved in the investigation
received a total of $ 299,215 for delivery of marijuana loads.
However, based on the estimated amount of drugs delivered, the
amount received for delivery should have been at least $ 517,000.
Thus, approx i mat e I y $ 218,000 cannot be accounted for. ( ')
Part of the problem in accounting for these monies is the poor f i le
documentation regarding receipts and deposits. For example, we
identified four instances in which deposits were made but receipt of
such monies was not recorded in departmental reports. In addition,
we found that the case o f f i c e r s did not explain discrepancies
between the monies that should have been received and the monies
recorded as received. For example, officers noted in departmental
reports that they delivered almost 5,500 pounds of marijuana at a
negotiated price of $ 30 a pound ( for an amount due of $ 165,000);
however only $ 113,820 was deposited for this transaction. Although
the officers noted they were to be paid an additional $ 21,000 for
this transaction, they did not indicate whether this money was ever
received. Even with the additional $ 21,000, the amount indicated as
" paid" is almost $ 30,000 less than the amount that shou Id have been
collected ($ 165,000).
( 1) The Department's February 1992 inspection report notes that payments were not being
received i n f u l l i n some instances " because of monies owed to dealers i n Mexico f o r a
load seized by law enforcement o f f i c e r s ." However, reports describing the receipt of
payments f o r the delivery of marijuana did not disclose t h i s information or attempt
to account f o r the monies that should have been received.
Surwrvisor of Tucson case was inexwriend - A l though the Tucson case
was a significant Bureau undertaking to i n f i l t r a t e a major drug
operation, a captain with l i t t l e CIB experience supervised the case.
This captain had been transferred to CIB from the Highway Patrol
Bureau and was placed in charge of Tucson operat ions after only about
60 days' experience with CIB. In addition, the captain circumvented
the lieutenant and sergeant in charge of the officers and personally
directed the officers working on the investigation.
The management and documentation problems found in this case are
consistent with those in other cases we reviewed ( see Finding Ill and
I V ) . Problems with overall case management, including case approval,
accountability, and overall controls are key weaknesses in this case. In
addition, the records we reviewed suggest poor documentation, which
hindered both the Department's and our efforts in accounting for large
amounts of money and large quantities of drugs.
Has The Bureau Adequately
Evaluated Its Task For=
During the audit, we found that the Bureau has not clearly defined how
i t s officers assigned to local task forces are to be u t i l i z e d , nor has
the Bureau evaluated whether participation in a task force should be
continued based on i t s performance. The Standards for Law Enforcement
Aaencie~ recommends that i f task forces are used, a written directive or
agreement be developed that identifies the purpose of the task force,
defines i t s authority and responsibilities, establishes accountability,
identifies available resources, and evaluates the results and continued
necessity of the task force. However, based on the materials provided by
the Bureau, at the present time CIB has only 3 agreements for i t s 17 task
forces . ( I )
We also found that CIB has not periodically evaluated i t s involvement in
each of i t s 17 task forces to determine i f there is a definite need for
DPS involvement or whether any changes are needed. Based on the comments
from the county attorneys we spoke with, most of the rural county task
forces appear to be contributing to the narcotics enforcement efforts in
their areas. However, one county attorney questioned the need for DPS
task force involvement in his county and indicated that the officers may
be better u t i l i z e d i n other areas of the State that have larger drug
problems. He also indicated that the DPS officers assigned to the task
force were performing work for the local s h e r i f f ' s office ( rather than
task force cases). We contacted the sergeant in charge of this
particular task force and asked him what types of cases are currently
being investigated by DPS officers. He told us DPS officers were
currently investigating a prescription fraud, the k i l l i n g of a dog, a
homicide case, and liquor offenses.
( 1 ) One additional task force had an undated agreement, so auditors could not determine
whether i t was current.
Further, we could not locate documentation addressing the rationale for
the numbers of officers allocated to each task force. The number of
officers and sergeants assigned to each task force ranged from one to
Additional audit work is needed to determine whether the current task
force involvement is warranted, whether resource allocations are
justified, and whether the Bureau needs to develop task force agreements.
December 2, 1992
Douglas R. Norton
Auditor General
2700 N. Central Avenue, Ste. 700
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Dear Mr. Norton:
Attached is a revised copy of the Department of Public Safety response to the audit of our
Criminal Investigation Bureau.
Additionally, the Maricopa County Attorney's Office has recently designated Mr. Larry
Morehouse as our contact point at that agency. Mr. Morehouse will be consulting with our
personnel in preparation and prosecution of a variety of criminal cases.
F. J. " Rick" Ayars, Colonel
49+- 4 R( Aguilera, L . Colonel
On October 27, 1992 the command staff of the Criminal Investigations Bureau received the
initial draft of the Auditor General's performance audit on that bureau. Included in the audit
report were seven specific areas of concern which require individual responses from the agency.
This document will provide those detailed responses and explanations so that reviewers at all
levels with the necessary agency - related data can fully comprehend the issues at hand.
It will become apparent that there is differing views and conclusions in many of the areas of
concern between the agency and the auditors. In those areas, the agency had, in all cases,
previously identified the problem or deficiency prior to the audit and had taken or is taking
appropriate measures to correct or enhance our performance in these areas.
There are also other issues on which the auditors and the agency disagree. The substance of
these disagreements is outlined herein in detail.
As to the specific issues which have arisen as a result of the audit, they will be in the response
in the order in which they were presented in the audit report.
Prior to delving into the actual audit report concerns one issue involving the Organized
CrimeIIntelligence Division must be addressed.
As stated in the report, the operational audit of this division was limited due to a variety of
reasons such as grand jury secrecy requirements and other legal issues over which the agency
has little or no control as it pertains to disclosure of information. However, the audit report
makes specific reference to an outside agency audit which dealt exclusively with this division
and disclosed areas of concern which may have or had direct bearing on operational
These areas of concern had already been identified by division and bureau management prior to
the inspection by the military intelligence personnel performing the audit. Therefore, the
ensuing report served only to confirm management's theories and on- going or completed
corrective measures were undertaken.
A copy of both the military inspection report and the DPS review and action plan are included
as Appendix A of this reply.
1. CIB Needs To More Clearlv Define Its Role As The State's Investi~ ations Bureau.
The audit report details opinions and beliefs of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors
which indicate that the Department of Public Safety can and must fill an investigative
void which exists in the state currently. Specifically, these groups view us as the logical
agency to conduct high level investigations in areas such as money laundering, organized
crime, economic crime, and major narcotics trafficking.
The agency concurs fully with this issue and has taken steps to institute appropriate
organizational and philosophical changes to facilitate proper response to the concerns
As a point of fact, while the Auditor General's personnel were involved in on- site
processing of their assignment, the Organized Crime/ Intelligence Division was actively
involved in two cases which are illustrative of the role this agency can fulfill. Both these
cases " Operation Aladdin" , which used a multi- agency investigative approach to interdict
alleged money- laundering, fraudulent schemes, and prostitution related crimes of a
criminal syndicate headed by a group of foreign nationals, and " Operation Desert Run",
which targeted the " Dirty Dozen" motorcycle gang and its criminal enterprises through
a multi- agency approach, were extremely successful.
Other cases of this type and scope are currently under development in CIB.
The most recent reorganization of this bureau has further strengthened our commitment
to these high level investigations. The vast majority of the resources availability in the
Phoenix and Tucson areas are assigned to such complex investigative tasks while only
a small portion of these assets in these areas are delegated to so- called " street level"
narcotics and liquor investigations. Still, the bureau maintains its service to local task
force operations, both rural and urban, which are tasked to deal with such " street level"
It is our sincere belief that this new direction, which has been underway for some sixteen
( 16) months, is the proper utilization of the agency's position, jurisdiction and resources
and will provide a new course for CIB.
The audit indicates that CIB efforts at apprehending major criminals " often appear
unfocused and not particularly effective", and " CIB needs a clear mission and
management commitment to its role in performing independent, state- level
investigations". Such statements may have been somewhat accurate in the CIB
operations prior to the most recent reorganization. During that period, DPS as an agency
had endeavored to become " all things to all people" and as a result of trying to meet all
the demands of our consumer agencies, had fallen victim to the problems associated with
such wide- spread efforts, lack of depth and unfortunately, lack of expertise in many
With the advent of the new CIB, it is clear that the two divisions, Narcotics and
Organized Crime, have clear missions and purposes not previously present in the bureau.
Further, the duties netted out to the individual regions and squads are clearly indicative
of the new emphasis on major investigations, in specific areas of criminal racketeering.
Still more evidence of the new philosophy and commitment can be seen in the support
top level DPS management provided to Operations " Aladdin" and " Desert Run" which
were primarily supported by the use of DPS RICO funds and each of which required
more than one year thus far in investigative effort.
Resulting from this new organization and commitment is a focusing of substantial
manpower and financial resources on major investigations in proper balance with a
continuing commitment to task forces and some " street level" investigative operations.
One of the most perplexing items raised by the audit is that of technological retardation
in the investigative bureau. Certainly, we must concur with not only the auditors
assertions but those of our consumers as it pertains to the unavailability of " state- of- the-art"
technological equipment of all types. Unfortunately, such equipment, and the
requisite training to operate it, share a common hurdle for this agency - money. In a
time of declining revenues and budgets, such necessities are outweighed by survival
requirements. However, there is a bright spot to this dilemma in that CIB officers have
developed contingence for the acquisition and use of such high technology items through
means such as long term loan from other agencies or lease or rental in lien of purchase.
These innovative methods have allowed our personnel to overcome many problems
without placing untenable strain on the already tightly stretched agency budget.
As indicated in the following 92/ 93 Goals and Objectives, emphasis for continuation of
these pursuits is firmly established.
Investigate and prosecute large organized crime operations in Arizona.
By June 30, 1993, conduct six major organized crime investigations providing
funding is available.
On an ongoing basis, act as the facilitator of major organized crime investigations
which cross jurisdictional boundaries and coordinate the strategy of the
investigation with personnel from federal, state, county and local law enforcement
agencies who participate in the investigations.
The Bureau needs to take ste~ tso im~ roveit s case rose cut ion rate.
The premise advanced by the audit team as measuring the success of an investigation,
that is, wha
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