text: [House Hearing, 106 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] DRUG TREATMENT OPTIONS FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 4, 2000 __________ Serial No. 106-184 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 70-058 WASHINGTON : 2001 _______________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, D.C. 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York STEPHEN HORN, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JOHN L. MICA, Florida PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio Carolina ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois DAN MILLER, Florida JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee GREG WALDEN, Oregon JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois DOUG OSE, California ------ PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho (Independent) DAVID VITTER, Louisiana Kevin Binger, Staff Director Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian Lisa Smith Arafune, Chief Clerk Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman BOB BARR, Georgia PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas DOUG OSE, California JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois DAVID VITTER, Louisiana Ex Officio DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Sharon Pinkerton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel Steve Dillingham, Special Counsel Lisa Wandler, Clerk Cherri Branson, Minority Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on April 4, 2000.................................... 1 Statement of: Belenko, Steven, senior research associate, National Center of Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University; Dr. Sally L. Satel, M.D., adjunct scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC; and Martin Iguchi, co-director, Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA.. 47 Tauber, Judge Jeff, president, National Association of Drug Court Professionals; and Charles J. Hynes, Kings County District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY............................ 10 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Belenko, Steven, senior research associate, National Center of Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University, prepared statement of...................................... 50 Hynes, Charles J., Kings County District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY, prepared statement of.................................. 34 Iguchi, Martin, co-director, Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA, prepared statement of........ 73 Mink, Hon. Patsy T., a Representative in Congress from the State of Hawaii, prepared statement of..................... 6 Satel, Dr. Sally L., M.D., adjunct scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, prepared statement of 61 Tauber, Judge Jeff, president, National Association of Drug Court Professionals, prepared statement of................. 13 DRUG TREATMENT OPTIONS FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM ---------- TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2000 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2254, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Mica, Ose, Towns, Mink, Kucinich, and Schakowsky. Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief counsel; Steve Dillingham, special counsel; Don Deering, congressional fellow; Lisa Wandler, clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk. Mr. Mica. Good morning. I would like call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order. With concurrence of the minority, we are going to go ahead and begin our hearing. We will be joined by other Members who are currently at other meetings. It will allow us to proceed with the business before us. This is a hearing on drug treatment options for the justice system. We have two panels of witnesses before us today. We will start the proceedings with opening statements. I will begin and will yield to other Members. We will also leave the record open for 2 weeks for additional statements by unanimous request and so ordered. This morning's hearing is going to focus on drug treatment options for our judicial systems. Our subcommittee will examine drug treatment programs and options that hold promise, we hope, in reaching eligible, nonviolent offenders. The focus of our hearing is very straightforward and of critical importance to our Nation. Can we identify approaches and programs for eligible, nonviolent offenders that are successful in bringing the chains of drug addiction and reinforcing individual responsibility and also restoring productive workers to our work force, which result in substantial cost savings to our American taxpayers? If that is possible, we hope that it is an objective we can meet and also shed some light on through today's hearing. If we can, we should act without delay in supporting these programs on a national level. First, we will examine a growing program for handling eligible offenders and drug abusers within the judicial system that has been used for almost a decade in some jurisdictions and appears to be enjoying continued success. The approach I am referring to is generally referred to as drug courts. Drug courts were first implemented by States and local governments which contain our true laboratories of democracy. One of the original drug courts was established more than a decade ago in my home State in Dade County, FL. Specialized drug courts are designed to improve the processing of drug cases, and to respond better to the needs of eligible offenders with drug abuse problems. Another benefit of drug courts is cost savings resulting from reduced burdens on our jails and on our prisons. Federal funding to support this effort first began in 1989 and took the form of Department of Justice discretionary grants to expedite the processing of drug cases. By 1991, the Department also funded what are known as drug night courts, both under its discretionary grants of the Edward Burn Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program, also referred to commonly as Burn grants. This program was named for Eddie Burn, a slain New York City police officer who was brutally murdered in 1988 while enforcing drug laws. For many years, the Burn Program has also served as the primary source of Federal funding for State and local assistance, law enforcement, and drug control efforts. President Bush kept Eddie Burn's badge in his desk drawer in the Oval Office at the White House. I am perplexed, however, today at how the Burn Grant Program and antidrug effort have fallen out of favor with the Clinton administration. Last month, the Clinton administration's budget submission to Congress proposed reducing the funding of the Burn formula grants by $100 million. Congress previously funded the program at the $500 million level. The administration also requested that funding for local law enforcement block grants be eliminated. I feel strongly that the administration should refocus its efforts on drug control and that, in fact, our Department of Justice should do everything possible to once again incorporate antidrug elements into all of our block and discretionary grant programs. Congress has continued to increase Federal funding for drug courts, prosecutor training, and drug treatment for offenders since 1989, eventually leading to the creation of a special funding program for our drug courts. As we will hear today, there are now more than 400 drug courts nationwide. For the past 2 years, Congress has funded the drug court program at the level of $40 million annually with additional funding eligibility under our Burn Grants Program and also under our Juvenile Block Grants Program. We will hear from experienced analysts who will testify on the operation and impacts of our drug courts and describe how they have successfully spread across our Nation. We will also hear of another innovative approach and a 10-year success story in providing drug treatment to eligible, nonviolent offenders. That program has been operating since 1990 in Brooklyn, NY. It has received quite a bit of notoriety for its success. That program is called the Drug Treatment Alternatives to Prison [DTAP]. Although this program has not received the level of attention and Federal support as the Drug Court Program, I plan to do whatever possible to ensure that this successful approach receives increased attention and also bipartisan support in the future. I am very pleased to have a distinguished witness before us today; the District Attorney for King's County, NY, Mr. Charles Hynes, one of those individuals responsible for the development of this program. He will explain in detail the workings of this alternative prison program. As we know, as much as 90 percent of State and local criminal prosecutions are resolved through plea bargaining today. Plea bargains prevent our criminal justice system by bringing it to a screeching halt with the sheer volume of cases that they are incurring today. The DTAP Program is managed by the local prosecutor. It allows prosecutors to select only eligible, nonviolent offenders for a rigorous program that mandates drug treatment and strict observance of program rules and conditions. The prosecutor uses the leverage of a substantial prison sentence which can be invoked if an offender violates the program requirements. The program provides a common sense, cost effective option for prosecutors, as well as a valuable opportunity to offenders who are serious about reforming their lives. As we will learn today, evaluation results of the program indicate high treatment retention rates, low recidivism, and significant cost savings, all elements that the subcommittee and Congress are interested in pursuing. The 1 year retention rate in drug treatment is as much as 66 percent. The recidivism rate for participants is less than half for comparable offenders, 23 percent compared to 57 percent. Nearly all employable program graduates, 92 percent, are working in vocational programs; only 26 percent were employed prior to entering the program. The program has saved the city and State of New York more than $15 million. Our subcommittee was able to visit this program last December and I was able to see firsthand some of the positive results of this program. Today, I am announcing my plans to introduce legislation which I am entitling, ``Prosecutor Drug Treatment Alternatives to Prison for Nonviolent Offenders Program,'' a little lengthy but it does describe what we are trying to achieve with this initiative. It will provide seed funding for State and local prosecutors to establish their own drug treatment alternatives for eligible, nonviolent offenders who desire to turn around their lives, and we are going to use the success of DTAP in Brooklyn as a model. I hope to enlist the support of other Members of Congress who are also interested in enhancing our arsenal of successful approaches to reducing the demand for drugs across this Nation. This program is an innovative, proven program and I think it will also supplement the role of our drug courts which has also been another successful program. This program represents a first important step in fighting the war on drugs in addressing the treatment needs of eligible, nonviolent offenders. That is an area I think we have ignored that needs our attention. Experience has shown that this approach can break addictions, protect lives, assist families, promote employment, and save substantial tax dollars. When I visited the DTAP Program and talked personally with the offenders in this drug treatment program, I saw that it was making an important difference in their lives and some of them their whole lives. Almost all of them I talked to, some in their mid-30's, had spent half their lives in prison or in the revolving door of our criminal justice system or victims of addiction. This program will give them an alternative. This program will be funded, that I propose, through grants administered by the U.S. Department of Justice. The funds will go to every State and directly to urban, suburban, and rural communities with demonstrated needs and interest in programs of this nature. I welcome all of our distinguished witnesses today and thank each of you for taking time out of your schedules, your busy professional lives, to share with the subcommittee both your experience and your recommendations on this important topic. I hope we will be able to work together to ensure that the future drug demand reduction successes such as the ones I have talked about are put into place immediately. Time is short and lives really remain in the balance. We must act now if we are going to make a difference, particularly for so many of those that have no alternative but prison today. I am pleased at this time to yield to the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose. Mr. Ose. None. Mr. Mica. No opening statement. Mrs. Mink has not arrived at this point, but we shall proceed. We have Ms. Schakowsky. Did you have an opening statement? Ms. Schakowsky. No. Mr. Mica. She doesn't have an opening statement at this time. Again, we will leave open the record for a period of 2 weeks for additional statements or for additions to the record. With no additional opening statements at this time, I am going to introduce our first panel of witnesses. The first panel consists of Judge Jeff Tauber, president of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals from Alexandria, VA. The second witness is the Honorable Charles J. Hynes, the Kings County District Attorney for Brooklyn, NY. Let me welcome both of our panelists. Let me also inform you that we are an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. For that, we do swear our witnesses. If you will stand to be sworn, raise your right hands, please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee of Congress is the whole truth and nothing but the truth? [Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] Mr. Mica. The witnesses answered in the affirmative. Welcome, both of you. At this point, normally we run the clock. However, we won't run the clock today, because we only have two witnesses on this panel. If you have additional or lengthy statements you would like made a part of the record or some data or information that deserves to be entered into the record, I would be glad to grant that request. We have been joined now by the ranking member of our subcommittee, the Honorable Member from Hawaii. Before we proceed with our two witnesses who I have introduced and sworn, it is my pleasure to recognize the gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Mink, for an opening statement. Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is perfect timing. I want to personally thank you for accommodating my concerns about the drug problem in Hawaii and enabling the subcommittee to have a hearing in Hawaii on this very important matter. I thought the hearings were very productive. Mr. Mica. I am still recovering from my 22-hour flight back here. Mrs. Mink. I am sorry you could only stay 36 hours. That is not our fault, that is the leadership. We would have loved to have you stay longer. This matter of the criminal justice system's use of drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration is a very important subject. I believe that our discussions today will add a great deal to what we have already learned. The trip we took to Hawaii, we met and talked extensively with inmates who were undergoing drug treatment in the closed prison system environment. They were eligible for this treatment I believe 14 months before their release. We had an opportunity to sit around and talk with about five or six of them, to hear the various details of their experience and how the treatment was going to impact their ultimate release and their ability to stay out of prison again. The difficulties that they anticipated upon release were quite profound. We also had an opportunity to visit the drug court and to see how that system operates as an alternative to imprisonment, and to see whether that works. Definitely the criminal justice system has a role, not only in law enforcement but in this very difficult area of drug treatment. I look forward to our discussion today and ask unanimous consent that my statement be put in the record at this point. Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered. [The prepared statement of Hon. Patsy T. Mink follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.004 Mr. Mica. I know that many who didn't get to go to Honolulu, HI, and visit are disappointed. I had envisioned sandy, beautiful beaches, young women in grass skirts. Instead I was greeted by the ranking member who took me immediately to the Honolulu Police Station and from there took me to the State prison where we spent most of the afternoon. Next, we went to a housing project with local authorities. The next day we had a 5-hour hearing and then I thought maybe those beaches were still going to be seen, but we ended up in drug court for the afternoon before catching our flight to fly all night. I have a new admiration for our ranking member who does this on a regular basis, going back and forth. Mrs. Mink. That just shows you, Mr. Chairman, how important treatment is. Mr. Mica. Yes. I needed treatment when I got back. [Laughter.] Again, I thank the ranking member for her invitation. It was a very productive hearing and visit. I thank her for that opportunity. Once again, we have our two witnesses, Judge Jeff Tauber, president of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals and the Honorable Charles J. Hynes, Kings County district attorney, Brooklyn, NY. I will recognize first, Judge Jeff Tauber. You are recognized and I also understand you have a video. You are free to proceed. STATEMENTS OF JUDGE JEFF TAUBER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS; AND HON. CHARLES J. HYNES, KINGS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BROOKLYN, NY Judge Tauber. Good morning. Chairman Mica, Representative Mink, and esteemed members of the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Reform, my name is Jeff Tauber. I am a former judge of the Oakland-Alameda County Drug Court and president of the National Association of Drug Court Professionals. Thank you for affording me this opportunity to testify before you today to address drug courts and other innovative drug treatment and drug testing programs in the criminal justice system. Before I begin speaking about these programs, I would like to show you a brief 5 minute video. A little bit of background, last year was our 10th year of drug courts. ABC national news did a short, 3-minute news tape on the national conference. I think it portrays in a very visceral way where drug courts have come from, their effectiveness, and where they are going. Following the film is an actual visit or segment of a visit to a drug court in San Diego where Judge Sue Finley sits. I might add that Judge Finley is a former judge, recently retired, but previously had been dean of California Judicial College and a well respected judge in the California State system. You will see her dealing with someone who is in relapse in a very different way than you would expect in a traditional court system. The significance of the two I think demonstrates the effectiveness of drug courts. I might add that when we first began our association in May 1994, there were 24 persons sitting in a room in Alexandria from 12 drug courts. Today, I am pleased to announce that our conference in Miami had some 2,400 persons and roughly 700 drug courts existing and being implemented. So we have come a long way in a short time. If we could roll that short segment now? [Video presentation.] Mr. Tauber. Perhaps for those who haven't seen a drug court, that gives you just a glimpse at the kind of balance, both toughness and support that a drug court provides to the offender coming through the program. At this time, I would like to continue my remarks. Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell stated in the Congressional Record on May 26, 1999, ``Drug courts are revolutionizing the criminal justice systems. Statistics show us the drug courts work, they are clearly cost effective and help convert many drug-using offenders into productive members of society. Traditional incarceration has yielded few gains for our drug offenders.'' What is a drug court? A drug court is a special court that is given the responsibility to handle cases involving drug using offenders through comprehensive supervision, drug testing, judicial monitoring, treatment services, immediate sanctions, and incentives. Drug courts bring the full weight of all intervenors to deal with their substance abuse problems. That means judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, substance abuse treatment specialists, probation officers, law enforcement and corrections personnel, educational and vocational experts, community leaders, and others. In addition, they ensure consistency in judicial decisionmaking and enhance the coordination of agencies and resources increasing the cost effectiveness of programs. The design and structure of drug court programs are developed at the local level to reflect the unique strengths, circumstances, and capacities of each community. Since 1989, the drug court phenomena has been sweeping the Nation. It is very difficult to get a hard number because as we speak, drug courts are being created. We know that there are easily over 700 that are existing or in the planning stages. Sometimes it is hard to know exactly where we are within those numbers. Since 1989, approximately 200,000 persons have actually entered drug court programs. Many of these programs have achieved remarkable success in reducing the levels of drug abuse, incarceration, and criminal recidivism among drug using offenders. That interest is heightened by the realization that these same offenders would otherwise clog our court calendars, strain our treasuries, and flood our jails and prisons. In 1997, the General Accounting Office reported that over 70 percent of those who entered drug court programs since 1989 have either successfully completed their programs or are still currently participating. General Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, has stated, ``The establishment of drug courts with their judicial leadership constitutes one of the most monumental changes in social justice in this country since World War II.'' More recently, Columbia University's National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse has provided the first major academic review and analysis of drug court research to date and Dr. Steven Belenko is here and will speak specifically to that at a later moment. Drug courts make sense as a single drug court judge and dedicated program staff apply a direct, immediate and personal approach to the drug offender handling all drug cases from start to finish. Court procedures are adapted to reflect the realities of the offender's substance abuse, a cost effective approach to the use of sanctions and incentives is applied, and coordinated programs are created for all participants, not just the offender. All participants are held accountable for their performance and government agencies and community organizations work together as part of a unified drug court system. With almost 80 percent of arrestees testing positive for illegal substances, drug courts and drug testing are logical modifications of the traditional criminal justice system. Drug courts, in fact, mark a turning back of the judicial time clock to a time when judges ran their own calendars and were responsible for their court's operations. Defendants had to answer directly and immediately to the judge for their conduct, and cases moved slowly and purposefully through the judicial system instead of relying on negotiated pleas and other structures to speed up the court process. I would like to add that this extraordinary phenomena is a non-partisan phenomena. Both Democrats and Republicans have strongly supported it, Conservatives and Liberals as well. I would add it has been endorsed by the National District Attorneys Association as well as the National Sheriffs Association and on the other side, the National Legal Aid and Public Defender Associations. For those who think of drug courts as perhaps being soft on crime, I might add that of the judges who have been drug court judges and are drug court judges, 58 percent are former prosecutors, while only 23 percent are former defense attorneys. Drug courts are providing a model for other kinds of court involved, community based programs such as DUI drug courts, drug courts that deal with multiple DUI offenders, mental illness courts that deal with those who are duly diagnosed, domestic violence offenders and juvenile and family drug court participants and finally, most recently, reentry drug courts which actually deal with offenders who are leaving jails or prisons and enter drug courts as a means to monitor their behavior and also to provide rehabilitation services to them. Finally, I wanted to indicate that this idea, system, or approach has spread now to the international community. There is an International Association of Drug Court Professionals. The United Nations Drug Control Program has developed its own standards for drug courts and there are some six nations now that have drug courts besides the United States and 12 more that are in the planning stages. We believe this is an extraordinary phenomena and one we hope this committee and the Congress will continue to support. Thank you very much for your patience. [The prepared statement of Judge Tauber follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.023 Mr. Mica. Thank you, Judge Tauber. I would now like to welcome the Honorable Charles Hynes, District Attorney, Kings County, NY. Mr. Hynes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Ose. I surely want to thank Chairman Mica and Congresswoman Mink and the other members of the committee, and my distinguished colleague from Brooklyn, Ed Towns, for the opportunity to speak to this committee about our drug treatment as an alternative to prison. I have copies of the annual report which I have submitted and I would like to touch on a few highlights of the program. My county is known to most people as Brooklyn and is the largest county in New York State. It has 2.3 million people, the seventh largest county in the United States and were it a city, it would be the fourth largest. At the time I became district attorney in 1990, our slogan was, ``Brooklyn, a nice place to visit, a great place to live,'' a cruel joke because by 1990, Brooklyn had become the fifth most violent municipality in the United States per capita. There were 765 murders in Brooklyn in 1990, more than 2 a day. There were 36,000 armed robberies, 39,000 burglaries and nearly 55,000 larcenies. Obviously, anybody looking at the problem knew it was fueled by drugs. It was out of control and there didn't seem to be any way of looking at this other than a jail being only solution. It was a decision I made in 1990 that we had to do something about reducing the demand for drugs in society. So we had to do something about ending the revolving door that literally had people going to jail for life on the installment plan, getting arrested, going to jail, getting out, going back to the neighborhood without a job, getting arrested again, and off they go to jail and so on. We decided to try a coercive form of rehabilitation, that people who were charged with selling drugs for their own drug habit would have a choice, come into our program, go into long- term drug rehabilitation, 15 to 24 months, and if you successfully complete it, we will give you something you have never had before, an education opportunity or a job opportunity. I hired a job developer, and worked with a business advisory council in Brooklyn to identify jobs for these graduates. If you don't do it, or leave the program, we have an enforcement theme that will pick you up and when 96 percent effective within 9 days on the average, you will plead guilty before we will put you into the program to a felony that sends you to prison for as much as 9 years. If you get caught after leaving the program, you are going back to prison, or you are going to prison and will get no credit for any time served in the program. Ten years after this program started, I am proud that it is a successful model which I am very grateful to Congressman Mica for considering legislation to advance it for other prosecutors throughout the country. It is controlled by the prosecutors, and is very selective about who we take. Typically, we take one in three. These are all people who are facing a second felony offense, a minimum of 2-1/3 to 4 years in prison and up to 4 to 9 years in prison. We have had the toughest laws in the country called the Rockefeller drug laws. We followed those laws up with mandatory minimum sentences for second felony offenders. The problem has been that we have had no alternative to the use of those programs. There was no opportunity to have people try another way. We think the drug treatment alternative is that other way. No one with any history of violence is permitted into the program, no one with a history of absconding is allowed in the program, no one with any very serious psychiatric problems--we are beginning to deal with the problems of those affected in a dual way with psychiatric problems but we are very careful as to who we put into the program. If the person successfully completes the 15 to 24 months in drug treatment and is in job development, we then dismiss the felony charge. The enforcement team is a critical part of this effort as well as the fact that we have job opportunities. We compared a study of recidivism and our graduates have a 23 percent recidivism rate as compared to 47 percent of those who go to prison who are eligible for our program but don't accept it. It cuts the recidivism rate in half. Its retention rate for 1 year is 66 percent, much higher than the national average and 60 percent of our participants who have graduated are still in treatment. DTAP is a money saver. It helps our graduates find jobs because of our job training program and 92 percent of our employable graduates are working or in some form of job training programs. Of the 441 graduates, they have saved the taxpayers of New York State over $16 million in reduced costs for incarceration, health care, and public assistance and with their increased tax revenues based on their jobs. DTAP is less costly than incarceration. A typical drug offender in New York State, spending 2 years in prison, will cost our taxpayers $82,000 for that period. In the same period, a drug treatment placement costs $42,000. The saving in prison cost is at minimum, $11 million during the period of the program. DTAP has credibility with other prosecutors. All of the other four district attorney offices in New York City are using the program as is our citywide Special Narcotics Prosecutor. I am very confident that based on the track record, DTAP can be successful in other States because it has shown a high retention rate, lower recidivism rates, and cost savings of millions of dollars. As I have said to Congressman Mica and his staff, I would be more than happy to help any other jurisdiction in this country to create their own DTAP initiative. I would be happy to take any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hynes follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.029 Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. We have been joined by the gentleman from Brooklyn, with whom I have had the honor and privilege of working together on this subcommittee and other subcommittees. One of which he chaired visited Brooklyn under his chairmanship and also recently conducted a hearing in New York City at his request; the gentleman from New York, Mr. Towns. You are recognized if you want to make a statement or proceed in any way at this point. Mr. Towns. I would like to insert my statement in the record but I would also like to say to the witnesses, especially my friend from Brooklyn, the District Attorney Joe Hynes, that we know of his great work, so I am happy to hear his testimony. I will just hold any further statements until the question and answer period. Mr. Mica. Without objection, your statement will be made a part of the record. First of all, in the video we saw, Mr. Tauber, at the end it said the drug courts had an 80 percent success rate. Is that an accurate statement? Judge Tauber. It is very difficult to give statistical analysis. I am going to leave that to Dr. Belenko. For one thing, every community is so different that to ascribe a specific ratio, to compare Brooklyn to Scarsdale, for example, you have very different populations, different drugs of choice, and the level of addiction can be very different. I don't feel like I personally ought to respond to that. I will allow Dr. Belenko to do that. Mr. Mica. Is there any percentage you would care to provide for the subcommittee as far as the success rate through the drug courts, 50 percent, 25 percent? Is there any collection of data that is available that would substantiate some success? Judge Tauber. Yes, I think there is. There have been a number of studies completed. One study by the Government Accounting Office looked at those persons who have entered drug courts since 1989 and found that over 70 percent have either successfully graduated from the program or were still actively participating. It is interesting to note; American University revised or looked at that data again since 1997 in 1999 and found the numbers were consistently over 70 percent. I also think Dr. Belenko can speak to this better than I but in his statistics, he shows that of those who do not enter drug courts but enter treatment, half leave within 90 days. When you look at drug courts, 60 percent of those who enter are still in drug courts after a year, which shows an extraordinary retention rate. All the scientific data and investigation I have ever seen has created a direct correlation between the length of time a person stays in treatment and the success of that person in the program and the length of sobriety they enjoy afterwards. On those two bases, we can see there have been great successes in drug courts. In my own drug court we found that we had half the number of days persons spent in custody over the 3-years following drug courts and as a matter of fact, double those who succeeded and graduated from the program. Once again, that is just one program and was a number of years ago. I think more significantly Dr. Michael Finigan from the University of Oregon did a cost benefit analysis of the Portland Drug Court which has been around since 1992 and found that for every dollar spent in the drug court, the county was saving $2.50. When he looked at the State savings, he found some $10 saved for every $1 saved. There is one other point I would like to make in that regard. The typical drug court costs approximately $2,000 to $2,500 a year per participant. The typical jail and/or prison starts at $20,000 to $25,000 per year to incarcerate. Clearly, there is a very strong cost savings element as well. Mr. Mica. The other question I would have would be what percentage of those involved in committing some type of a drug offense are eligible for drug courts? Judge Tauber. Drug courts are a grassroots phenomena. That is where its strength is. They reflect their communities politically, economically as well as otherwise, so it is very difficult to describe to you the population that is going to get in because in one community, honestly, it will be persons charged with possession of small amounts of drugs, and in other communities, they will be dealing with people charged with burglaries, minor felonies, and others who are not even charged with drug offenses but where it is clear the offense is related to drugs. Mr. Mica. Are they designed for first time offenders and also for minor offenses? Judge Tauber. They started out in Miami dealing specifically with divertees and first-time offenders. As they have become more successful, and as they have proven themselves in places like Las Vegas, San Bernardino, CA, they have gone from small programs with 100 or 75 persons in San Bernardino to where Judge Pat Morris now has some 1,400 in his drug court or Las Vegas where they started out with 100 persons and now have 1,800. By the way, the Nevada Governor has instituted and passed legislation so that individuals presently in prison for drug offenses, some 300 this next year are expected to be released into the drug court rather than go to parole because the drug court has proven more successful than parole and is far cheaper. Mr. Mica. I have additional questions but I would like to yield to the ranking member, Mrs. Mink. Mrs. Mink. Judge Tauber, the system that we have in existence switched from giving courts discretion in sentencing to a huge array of mandatory minimums. In the drug court situation, how does that system circumvent the mandatory minimum requirement that the States impose upon the conviction of individuals for certain very specific crimes? Judge Tauber. Many States don't have mandatories or if they do, judges are able to sentence people to jail or prison and to suspend the sentence and allow them to enter the drug court program with the condition that if they successfully complete the program, the probation will be terminated or the sentence will not be served. There are several kinds of drug courts. One is a diversion court which goes back to Miami which is a pre-plea court and most recently, we are seeing more and more, perhaps 70 percent, of courts now are post-plea courts dealing with more serious offenders and many, many courts, perhaps the majority of courts, have both divergent courts dealing with light, first offenders and post-plea courts dealing with more serious offenders. Mrs. Mink. My question was, in jurisdictions where you have minimum mandatories, how do you overcome those statutes in existence and place individuals who have pleaded guilty into this program rather than serve their minimum mandatory jail sentence? Judge Tauber. I couldn't respond except to say that there are drug courts in every State in the Union. Mrs. Mink. They are not abiding by the law? Judge Tauber. I can tell you there are 110 drug courts in California and I think there is one in Rhode Island. Mrs. Mink. I realize that. I am just wondering how they get started under the circumstances of these prior existing mandatories. Mr. Hynes. Can I help out because we have mandatory sentencing in New York State. Mrs. Mink. So do we in Hawaii and I have a drug court. I was wondering how they balance it. Mr. Hynes. Preindictment, I have total authority in my county. Mrs. Mink. Is that by statute? Mr. Hynes. Yes. Mrs. Mink. So the legislature, in my case, would have to pass a law which says that the courts would have the right. Mr. Hynes. Once there is an indictment, there is no discretion in New York, so I do it pre-indictment. Mrs. Mink. Or you don't require them to plead guilty? Mr. Hynes. No, I require them to plead guilty to a State or Supreme Court information but it is pre-indictment, so I retain the discretion. Judge Tauber. There is a drug court in Brooklyn that I believe, Mr. Hynes. Do they use the same procedure? Mr. Hynes. Yes. Mrs. Mink. I think that in order for people to understand exactly what the drug court is, we have to be able to explain how an individual is selected for the program. Some go to jail, some go to drug court. What is the definition between those two areas? Obviously it is better to be in drug court. Obviously it works better, obviously it is cheaper for the government. The question is, are there statutory steps that must be taken. In the selection process, we have to be very careful that we are not selecting people out by various factors of discrimination. I believe it works. We went to see one in Hawaii as it is practiced. The foundations of it seem somewhat hazy, as to exactly how the program distinguishes between those that go to jail and those that don't. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. I would like to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose. Mr. Ose. I have a couple of questions on the testimony from District Attorney Hynes. There is a phrase in here that I didn't understand on page 2. I know what the word means in normal language. I don't quite understand it in this context. It says, ``The program is offered only to non-violent, predicate drug offenders for a certain punishment.'' What does that word mean? Mr. Hynes. Predicate means they have been previously convicted of a sale of drugs for their own habit. If you remember the young fellow who testified before you and the rest of the committee several months ago, Fred Cohen; he was someone who had been convicted of selling drugs for his own habit. Then he got arrested again. He was a predicate offender. New York State law has a mandatory jail sentence unless I exercise discretion pre-indictment. Mr. Ose. The second question I have, I noticed in your testimony you highlight a recidivism rate of 23 percent and a retention rate of 66 percent. Mr. Hynes. Yes. Mr. Ose. I am hopeful that you can explain. If I understand, the recidivism rate is someone who has been through the program and a retention rate is someone who is in the program? Mr. Hynes. Within the first year of the program, the retention rate is 66 percent. Mr. Ose. Retention rate meaning? Mr. Hynes. Staying in the program. Mr. Ose. So they are clean, have stayed in the program for a year, two-thirds of the people have complied. So one-third have not? Mr. Hynes. Yes, which to the national average is like 12-15 percent retention rate for this population. Mr. Ose. In terms of a non-drug court. Mr. Hynes. For this population in non-drug court. These are the people who have hit bottom, Mr. Ose. This is their last chance. Mr. Ose. Pre-indictment? Mr. Hynes. Yes, sir. Mr. Ose. The recidivism rate is people who have completed the program whether it be drug court or non-drug court and it is 23 percent? Mr. Hynes. Our population is 23 percent for the drug treatment alternative to prison. Mr. Ose. I think District Attorney Hynes said there is a retention rate in treatment of 50 percent and courts, 66 percent. The treatment you are referring to there, would that be private treatment? Mr. Hynes. It is not 50 percent. Mr. Ose. I have lost the reference. I will come back to that. Judge Tauber, if I understand correctly, your testimony is ``District Attorney Hynes very clearly says that 96 percent of the absconders are returned to court in a median time of 9 days.'' Your testimony says, ``The failure to appear rate has dropped from 36 percent to 3 percent.'' So that would be consistent. You would be at 97 percent and he is at 96 percent. Mr. Hynes. It is a different population, Congressman. Judge Tauber. It is a different population. I think different parameters as well. Mr. Ose. You talk here in terms of a drug court? Judge Tauber. Yes, sir. Mr. Ose. Talking about the rate at which people fail to appear. You are talking about the DTAP program where the prosecutors have control? Mr. Hynes. These are people actually in treatment, residential treatment. The coercive part of it is if they leave the program, they are picked up. Let me say a word about the drug court. I was not a great fan initially of the drug court. I am now convinced that the drug court is an exceptionally efficient way to do cases in my county for misdemeanors and a selected number of felonies, so we are very satisfied with the success of our drug court in Brooklyn. Mr. Ose. I want to make clear that the appearance rate under the prosecutor-driven process is 96 percent and the appearance rate within a 9-day median under the Drug Corp is different. Mr. Hynes. Let me try and explain. When someone leaves my program, they are in Daytop Village and are in the middle of their 15 or 20 month stay at Daytop Village. If they leave, there is a 96 percent chance they are going to be grabbed within 9 days. So 96 percent of the people who left our program are picked up within a median time of 9 days. They are in the program and they just walk off. Mr. Ose. Those are the only questions I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Mica. I would be pleased to recognize the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you very much. I am not an attorney but I was a State legislator and there was a period where we were every other day passing some kind of mandatory minimum sentence relating to drugs. Like my colleague from Hawaii, I am a bit confused about the interface between these mandatory minimum sentences and this alternative programming. Am I to understand that what really matters here is what people end up being charged with, what the indictment is, and that there is discretion there. Once there has been an indictment, if there is a mandatory minimum, there is no way around it? Mr. Hynes. In New York state, once we have an indictment, we lose discretion. Ms. Schakowsky. What we are talking about here is the prosecutor's discretion? Is that what enables this? Mr. Hynes. They need our involvement in the drug court. We have to agree to it. We are a partner in the DTAP program. We totally control the process because we are dealing with a much more severe kind of population. Under the State constitution in New York State, the district attorney is the chief law enforcement officer of the county. He or she decides who is going to be prosecuted and under what charge. Using that authority before indictment, I exercise discretion. Once we get an indictment, I have lost discretion. Ms. Schakowsky. I understand that. Judge Tauber. I might add. It may not sound like a very satisfactory answer but there are 50 States and every one of them has a different statutory setup. Drug courts have managed to find ways to deal with mandatories to my knowledge in every one of them. In some places, it is like New York where you have to move either preindictment. Washington, DC, the place where they find room to maneuver is between the time of plea and the time of sentence because once a person is sentenced, they must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum. So they enter the person into the drug court at the time of plea and the person is not sentenced until they complete the program or flunk out. I guess what I am suggesting is that there is flexibility in systems. We would like more flexibility from the State legislators but drug courts have been able to operate. One of our disappointments is that perhaps we are reaching 3 or 4 percent of the eligible population throughout the United States. There are some 2 million persons placed on probation, according to the Bureau of Justice statistics for drug and alcohol offenses who, BJA determined or concluded, have a serious drug or alcohol problem. Of that, we have perhaps 250,000 involved in these programs. We would like to see drug courts expand because as they are proving themselves, it is important they have that opportunity. Ms. Schakowsky. Let me ask you this, because I think that is an important piece of it. Who gets chosen and how does that happen? I am wondering if we have a profile of those individuals who are diverted from the usual incarceration? Is it a middle class phenomenon, are we talking also a proportionate number of people of color? Judge Tauber. This is my standard response; it depends on the community. In communities where such is open, let me give Oakland as an example. The persons entering the program were 80 percent African American males, because that reflected those persons being charged with possession for small amounts of drugs, typically crack-cocaine or other serious drugs. People were actually diverted under the California statute out of the regular system in California. Ms. Schakowsky. By statute, you say? Judge Tauber. By statute. Ms. Schakowsky. People who might be eligible are nonviolent. Judge Tauber. I can tell you book and footnote about California, that is one State. I could not do that for New York, but in California if you did not have a prior felony, did not have prior drug conviction for 5 years, and if you were not charged with an offense that involved sales or violence, you were eligible for diversion. Hawaii, I am quite certain, has a very different setup but drug courts, the genius of them, is that they are community- based and that individual communities find what populations are appropriate. That may be very different depending on the politics, resources, and the socioeconomic background of that community. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. Mr. Hynes did you have a comment on that? Mr. Hynes. It depends where the program fits. In Kings County, a very high percentage of our client population are Latinos, the largest population of participants are people of color. If it was in Jefferson County or Clinton County in the north country, it would be all Caucasian. The client population are drug addicts who typically come from impoverished situations, little or no education, almost no jobs and they have drifted into this lifestyle. We eliminate people charged with violent felonies, those who have serious prior absconding records and we try and select people we believe have a real interest in turning around their lives. We are very, very careful in the screening process. I think that is key because we are dealing with a population that has hit rock bottom. Representative Mink was here when Fred Cohen testified before this panel. Here was a kid who for 20 years was in the gutter. He now makes $45,000 a year and pays taxes on that, has a wife and two kids but he was so bad, he used to take glasine envelopes and sniff them to try to get residue to get high. It was a tragic problem, but today he is actually the President of our drug treatment association. Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. Mr. Mica. I want to thank our panelists. You bring to the Congress and to our subcommittee several alternatives to incarceration. One is the drug court program which has been successful in many jurisdictions; second, being the DTAP Program, which again does offer some alternative and both good examples of what we can do. Unfortunately, these only address a small percentage of the population we have to deal with, but they do provide us with some positive alternatives and steps that hopefully can be replicated. Mr. Hynes. May I close with two points? First, thank you, Congressman Mica, for having the foresight to introduce this kind of legislation. You are right, it is not an extraordinarily large population. As I said to a good friend of mine and a Member of Congress 10 years ago when he said, ``what is it, a damned 100 people?'' I said, ``it is a damned 100 people we have never tired to cure.'' We have 441 taxpayers out of that program and I am very proud of them and pleased and grateful to you, Congressman Mica, for this opportunity. Mr. Mica. Thank you both and we look forward to working with you and hopefully we can replicate these successful programs across the country. We will call our second panel which consists of Steven Belenko, senior research associate, National Center of Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University, New York; Dr. Sally L. Satel, adjunct scholar, American Enterprise Institute here in Washington, DC; and Mr. Martin Iguchi, co- director, Drug Policy Research Center, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA. I am pleased to welcome all three of our witness. If you will stand at this time to be sworn and raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee of Congress is the whole truth and nothing but the truth? [Witnesses respond in the affirmative.] Mr. Mica. The witnesses answered in the affirmative. We will hear first from Steven Belenko, senior research associate, National Center of Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University, New York. Welcome and you are recognized. STATEMENTS OF STEVEN BELENKO, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, NATIONAL CENTER OF ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; DR. SALLY L. SATEL, M.D., ADJUNCT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC; AND MARTIN IGUCHI, CO- DIRECTOR, DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, RAND CORP., SANTA MONICA, CA Mr. Belenko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to come before you this morning and talk about my research on drug courts and innovative prosecution programs. I have been studying the impact of drugs on the justice system, including policy and programmatic responses to this problem, for some 15 years. During the past 8 years, I have had a particular interest in drug courts and have visited many around the country, studied their impacts and reviewed a number of research reports and evaluations on their effectiveness. In addition, for the past 5 years, I have been conducting an extensive evaluation of the Kings County DTAP Program under a grant from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. My remarks will center on two areas, one, the lessons learned thus far about the operations and effectiveness of drug courts and the potential role of prosecutorial based treatment in saving tax dollars by introducing treatment to other segments of the criminal justice population. The first program was implemented in Dade County in 1989. The current generation of treatment drug courts has established an important presence in America's criminal court system. In many jurisdiction, drug courts have become the intervention of choice for linking drug or alcohol-involved offenders to community-based treatment and related interventions. The key goals of drug courts are to reduce drug use and associated criminal behavior by engaging and retaining drug involved offenders in treatment and related services. Also, to concentrate expertise about drug abuse and addiction and treatment into a single courtroom under a single judge and staff, and to address other defendant needs through case management and clinical assessment. The question of whether drug courts should be thought of as coerced treatment is an interesting one but difficult to answer. Drug courts are generally considered voluntary in that offenders generally have the right to accept or decline participation once screened for eligibility and to have their case prosecuted through regular channels. Some drug courts also allow offenders an opportunity to opt out of the drug court after a week or two of trying it out with no loss of legal rights. However, there are some coercive elements to the drug court experience which may help to explain their success in retaining offenders. For example, defendants may feel subtle or direct pressure to participate in drug court because of fears of the consequences of prosecution. Also the close judicial supervision and monitoring, regular drug testing, and graduated sanctions typical of drug courts may be considered coercive in their own right. Also the immediacy of sanctions imposed in most drug courts, unlike sanctions imposed under probation or parole supervision, may increase the relevance and behavioral impact of judicial responses. When interviewed, participants have noted the importance of the certainty, the swiftness and the predictability of the sanctions for noncompilant behaviors. My review of drug court research is based on an article I produced in 1998 which was published in the National Drug Court Institute Review in which I reviewed about 30 existing evaluations. I recently updated that and that will be out shortly in a new issue of the National Drug Court Institute Review. I have reviewed another 30 evaluations so my remarks and assessment about drug court impacts is based on review of those 60 evaluations, as well as the GAO report from 1997 and periodic surveys of drug courts conducted by American University Drug Court Clearinghouse. The structure and procedures in drug courts do result in closer and more frequent supervision of offenders than typically seen under standard probation or pretrial supervision. The data indicate that a number of court appearances, number of drug tests, the level of supervision and the contacts with treatment providers are substantially more frequent under drug court law than under other forms of community supervision. The drug court model also differs in important ways from previous efforts to provide drug treatment of offenders. The various components of the criminal justice and substance abuse treatment systems work together to try and use the coercive power of the court to promote abstinence and pro social behavior, as well as treatment retention. By comparison, the types of nonviolent drug offenders typically targeted by drug courts will often receive probation or short jail sentence with little treatment or close supervision in the community. In addition, drug courts often seek to standardize the treatment process by requiring discrete treatment phases, a minimum length of program involvement or specific requirements for the quantity and type of services. This structure offers an opportunity for the judicial officer to monitor compliance with the drug court requirements, provide rewards for advancing through different phases or participating in certain levels of treatment in a way that can be quantified. That is predictable for the participant. Some of my key conclusions are, first of all, in terms of drug use and treatment history, there is some discussion about the type of population generally served by drug courts. As Judge Tauber pointed out, there is a lot of local variation in the target populations but trying to generalize across the country, drug courts generally serve a clientele that do have extensive histories of substance abuse, but little prior treatment. The average age of adult drug court participants is in the early 30's, as it is in the DTAP Program, and they have been using illegal drugs for some 10 to 15 years. In the survey conducted by the American University Clearinghouse of drug court participants, only 26 percent of the participants had been in a prior substance abuse treatment program, although 72 percent had been in jail or prison. These rates are similar for overall rates for both treatment participation and prior incarceration found in surveys of arrestees. Similarly for surveys of probationers. In terms of treatment retention, I think that a key impact of drug courts as well as the DTAP Program has been its ability to retain offenders in treatment. The research on drug treatment outcomes has consistently found that time in treatment is closely related to successful outcomes, including reduced relapse and reduced criminal behavior. I estimate nationally about 60 percent of those who enter drug courts are still in treatment after 1 year, although most drug courts require a minimum program length of 1 year. The percentage of all admissions who actually graduate from drug courts is a little bit lower than that 60 percent figure. The GAO report in 1997 estimated that 48 percent of those who enter drug courts graduate. My conclusion is that is probably a little low but generally around 50 percent of those who enter drug courts would be expected to graduate. These retention and completion rates are substantially higher than seen in studies of community based treatment programs. In terms of drug use and criminal behavior while under drug court supervision, the existing research suggests that drug court participants have a low rate of drug use as measured by urine tests which indicates high rate of program compliance. For example, for 13 drug courts reporting test results in 1998, an average of only 10 percent of those tests were positive for illegal drugs, in contrast to drug tests of other defendants in those jurisdictions under probation supervision where the positive rate was 31 percent. In terms of recidivism, a number of drug court evaluations have found that rearrest rates were substantially reduced while offenders are under drug court supervision. There are probably four or five evaluations that have looked at the costs and benefit of drug courts, although they have used different measures, different time periods and it is hard to generalize. But all have found in one area or another reduced costs and the data thus far suggest that for the long term, drug court economic benefits will outweigh the costs. The study was done by Dr. Michael Finigan in Oregon and he did find substantial local and State taxpayer savings as measured with a number of outcome measures from that drug court. A key issue in drug courts is their effect on recidivism and public safety. The studies I have reviewed thus far, 21 of those evaluations have examined post program recidivism generally measured by rearrest and generally for a time period of 1 year after completing the drug court. Of those 21 evaluations that have also used a comparison group from which we can measure the relative impact of drug courts, 16 of those studies found that the drug court reduced rearrest for those who went through the system, looking at everyone who went into the drug court, not just those who successfully graduated. The size of that impact does vary across jurisdictions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Belenko follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.038 Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. We will now recognize Dr. Satel. Dr. Satel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am also a staff psychiatrist at a local substance abuse clinic, and worked in the D.C. Drug Court a few years ago. I was asked to talk to you today about the clinical aspects of mandated treatment and why it works. It certainly does work as volumes of data can confirm. How can this be? How can it be that drug abusers, many of whom actually have little interest in going into the treatment--that is something you don't hear a lot about but many of these folks are not interested in treatment at first. They are interested in either avoiding the mark on their record or avoiding potential jail or probation. That is why they choose it. So how can people who don't have that much interest in treatment benefit from it? How is it that drug abusers can respond when they are told by the criminal justice system that they either participate in this program or something bad will happen to them, they will either go to jail or get a record? A lot of people can't believe that addicts who enter treatment unwillingly or halfheartedly can still benefit as much or more than addicts who show up freely at a clinic and ask to be admitted. This reality forces us to rethink one of the most trusted fictions in drug treatment; that a person has to want to get better in order to benefit from treatment. That is the fiction that drug courts and other forms of mandated treatment put to rest. The main reason that mandated treatment works is that it keeps people in longer. You have heard that before. Retention is key, the longer one stays, the better one does, the better health, the less drug use, the less crime, the more employment. Addicts who are levered into treatment do tend to stay longer. This is for two reasons. First, they stay longer because as I said before, the alternative in their eyes can be worse, but later because they really do see the benefits of treatment at the work programs they participate in or the educational programs which do help them feel more confident and more encouraged about their future. They feel physically better and they often get reabsorbed into the warmth of their families, something they have been estranged from for quite a while. I have introduced dozens of drug court patients and not all, but a lot of them are enthusiastic from day one, but many of them are not. One might say they weren't happy campers when they came into the program but the longer they stayed, the rehabilitation made sense to them. In other words, they stay at first because they have to, but ultimately they complete it, most of them, about 50 to 60 percent, because they want to. Ultimately, without some sort of leverage, the standard dropout rate is very large. We have heard this already and refer to it as the retention deficit disorder. About half drop out in the first 3 months and at the end of 1 year, between 1 and 10 and 1 and 20 remain. When you think about the psychology of addiction, these dropout rates make perfect sense. Residents who enter a therapeutic community may rebel against the rigid structure and the deprivation of getting high. A lot of addicts are very ambivalent about giving up drugs, as destructive as they have been. There is a powerful psychological force pulling them back to the street. Even patients with strong motivation make experience flagging resolve or intense drug cravings or they feel better and think they either can handle life drug free or that they can handle their drugs. Either way, they leave. Self discipline, as you know, is not a strong suit of this population. Again, when mandated to residential or community treatment, the patient can't succumb to these pressures and bolt without consequences. In summary, these observations and the objective data that support them tell us some very important things. First, they expose two myths about addiction. The first is that in order to benefit from treatment, all patients have to want it. Second, to benefit from treatment, a patient has to hit bottom. We can catch people before they hit bottom and hopefully you do because otherwise, there are diseases to catch and overdoses to be suffered. Second, for treatment to work, patients have to stay in it and one of the best ways to get hard core addicts to stay is through leverage. As a clinician, I am certainly happy for all the leverage I can get. It is very good to have an outsider like a judge calling the shots with swift and certain consequences so that I don't wait my time getting caught up in negotiations with patients about the rules of compliance. The rules are spelled out, and my job is to work collaboratively with the patient to help him conform and progress. When drug courts work well, they really represent a marriage between the so-called moral and medical models of addiction. The moral model is punishment, sanctions, and that drug users should be held accountable with no assistance. The medical model, on the other hand, is all help with no expectation of accountability for the patient. I reject both of them out right. We know that neither of these alone are especially useful. In other words, addicts who are incarcerated frequently relapse once they are out of jail, but that hard core patients who enter treatment 1 day are very likely to bolt the next. Together the moral and medical elements complement each other for an optimal chance to help addicted men and women. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Satel follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.047 Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony. We will hear next from Martin Iguchi with the RAND Corp. from Santa Monica, CA. You are recognized. Mr. Iguchi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this opportunity to testify. My name is Martin Iguchi. I am a senior behavioral scientist and co-director of the Drug Policy Research Center at RAND. I am also a psychologist. My specialty over the past decade has been in development and evaluation of drug treatment, drug treatment outcomes, as well as evaluation of different policy initiatives such as drug treatment on demand. Most recently, we have been also working with L.A. County Probation to set up a DUI Court in Los Angeles, so we have quite a bit of experience in this area. While the statement is based on research conducted at RAND, the opinions and conclusions are mine and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any other agency sponsoring our research. I ask that my full written statement be entered into the record. I am pleased to have this opportunity to comment on the use of treatment as an alternative to incarceration as I believe that drug courts and other diversion alternatives are exciting and valuable innovations by the criminal justice system. My colleagues and I have had an opportunity to study this relatively new phenomenon and while I may be counted as a supporter of such courts, I do have a few comments about problems that may arise in implementation. Over the past several decades, lawmakers in the United States have responded to the drug epidemic with tougher laws and longer sentences in an attempt to deter drug use. The increase in drug cases has resulted in seriously overloaded judicial dockets and a need for reasoned alternatives. In 1992, the Drug Policy Research Center conducted a drug policy seminar game involving public officials in Florida and Washington, DC, that anticipated such a scenario. The players in that policy game focused, as we are today, on the need to provide drug treatment for those involved in the criminal justice system. This emphasis was consistent with our drug policy modeling work that indicated treatment might well be a more cost effective way to spend additional funds intended to reduce cocaine use than other such options as domestic enforcement, interdiction or source country control. However, as the drug policy game progressed, players came to realize that they had focused exclusively on the benefits of treatment as an alternative to incarceration with no thought given to the possible negative outcomes associated with the approach in a larger context. Specifically, they came to realize given the limited availability of treatment slots for those convicted of crimes and those not, they had created a policy that could be characterized as ``use a gun, get a treatment slot.'' Now I don't mean to overstate the negative here as it is clear that many communities, such as Brooklyn, NY, have been able to implement drug courts without overburdening their drug treatment system. I do want to raise the issue, however, that we need to be certain there is sufficient treatment capacity to support the increase in drug treatment demand. We do not want those voluntarily seeking treatment to be deprived of the opportunity for treatment because the slot is filled with an individual mandated to it. To highlight how damaging such a scenario might be, I offer a short anecdote. A colleague of mine runs a drug education outreach and intervention program in south central Los Angeles. This colleague spends a great deal of time educating young men and women about the dangers of drug use and the advantages of abstinence. Recently, after multiple interactions, he finally convinced two young men to consider treatment for their drug use problem. Unfortunately, my colleague was unable to locate a treatment program with available slots for the two young men. The only publicly funded treatment slots available were set aside for juvenile probationers. This scenario is a tragic one. We need to be certain that we expand treatment in parallel with the development of drug courts so that every person who wants drug treatment can find it. As a second and related issue, not all who participate in drug use in drug courts are screened to determine if they meet the diagnostic criteria for drug dependence. While this comment does not apply to research rich programs such as the Brooklyn Drug-Treatment Alternative to Prison Programs, many programs are not as discriminating. This means that many individuals are sent to drug treatment who do not require it, putting additional pressure on an often overburdened system of care. My third comment has to do with the question, ``who should run drug courts, prosecutors or judges?'' A number of drug courts are operated by the prosecutor's office rather than by judges. While I do not question the integrity of prosecuting attorneys, some public defenders and defense attorneys have voiced concern that prosecutors might be tempted to offer access to drug courts only to those who are ``cooperative.'' While the functional and daily operational characteristic of prosecutor courts appear identical to drug courts run by judges, I want to provide a word of caution about the importance of avoiding perceptions of pressure on defendants. For that reason, it seems reasonable that judges and not prosecutors should be in charge of drug courts. Finally, I want to say that I have been most impressed by the dedicated and enthusiastic efforts put forth by those involved in both the judicial and treatment communities to make drug courts around the country work. While drug courts are clearly responsible for a decrease in the pressures of overcrowded court dockets, the daily workloads of everyone involved in drug courts has actually increased. So what leads these dedicated professionals to give so much more of themselves for drug court? The answer from all involved appears to be that the idea of restorative justice or therapeutic jurisprudence is a hopeful one in a context that breeds cynicism. I attended a drug court graduation ceremony in Rancho Cucamonga this month and had a conversation with the court magistrate. He stated he looks forward to ending his week with drug court every Friday evening. He elaborated that during his normal work day, he is faced with doing unpleasant things to people who have engaged in bad behavior. But on Friday evening, he sees hope and the possibility of rehabilitation. He concluded, ``It is definitely worth the extra work.'' Thank you for your attention to this important matter. [The prepared statement of Mr. Iguchi follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0058.052 Mr. Mica. Thank you for your testimony, each and every one of you. Unfortunately, I have to disagree with some of the products of your corporation, Mr. Iguchi. I think in particular, the RAND study has probably done more damage to this whole effort than anything I have seen in 20 years of dealing with the drug problem. Last week, during the debate that we had on the floor, we heard repeatedly this garbage that was spewed by the study some years ago and used by many of those who come forward with a solution that just treatment on demand is the answer. It has created, I think, a disaster for this country. That happens to be my personal opinion. I think this administration took the RAND study and used it as an excuse to shut down the source country programs and with great difficulty we have been trying to get those programs put back in place. The most recent is the ongoing effort starting last week to get something targeted to Colombia where we know shutting down the interdiction and shutting down the source country programs has created not only a flood of narcotics unlike we even saw in the 1980's, but a more deadly brand, so that 15,973 Americans in 1998, the latest figure that I have received as chairman of the subcommittee, didn't even get a chance for voluntary treatment because they are dead. I think that some of the trash that was put out that has been used for substantiation of just provide treatment, we have nearly doubled the amount of treatment money since 1992 than we have the amount of money in interdiction in source country programs. With $20-$40 million in Peru and Bolivia over the last few years, we have dramatically cut the supply coming in and stopped the programs in Colombia which are now the source of 80-90 percent of 80 percent pure heroin and cocaine coming into this country. Your study, in my opinion, has done more damage and substantiated a false and ineffective approach because you will never end up treating all the people that you are now opening up to addiction with the incredible supply that is coming into this country. If you could stop the supply, we could put you and your study colleagues out of business because we wouldn't have to even deal with this topic before us. Did you want to respond? Mr. Iguchi. I am not fully prepared to respond to that particular criticism. I, frankly, didn't come prepared to defend our ``Controlling Cocaine'' report. We do, however, stand by the integrity of our ``Controlling Cocaine'' report. It was reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences and held up as a very reasonable frame for viewing policymaking decisions. People may quibble with some of the numbers that were input into that model, but in evaluation after evaluation of it, we have come away convinced that it is a very strong model and it is a suitable basis for making policy decisions. Mr. Mica. It is a strong model for what? It has been used as an example for the treatment on demand. I don't have a problem with treatment on demand, but if you have a torrent of narcotics coming in and you are creating an addiction population. We went to Baltimore a week ago and the predictions are somewhere in the neighborhood of 80,000 drug addicts where they have had a liberalization, where they have focused primarily on treatment. They can't keep up with the treatment. Then 50 percent of the folks don't even show up for treatment in the program. I am very concerned that some of these think tanks like yours put out things that are used as justification for only treatment and then we shelve--and this administration shelved the interdiction, cut by 50 percent, and took the military out. We have reports of now cutting out the surveillance to Peru where we have had such great success, 66 percent reduction and not providing that assistance so they could go after these traffickers so that the stuff isn't in the country. In order to qualify for treatment, the big myth in this whole thing is when you get to the point of treatment, that means you are addict. If you are an addict, that means the testimony we have seen, the people we have interviewed in prison have committed crimes of violence to the tune of habits they support for $100 to $500 a day, many of them committing felonies. By the time they get to your treatment on demand, it has made a joke of the whole system and we have created someone we can't deal with. All the programs they are talking about here today are only talking about tiny fractions--drug courts, tiny fractions--even DTAP, a tiny fraction. Yes, we want to help them, but in DTAP most of the people we talked to had spent half their lives in prison or in the judicial cycle. So the treatment on demand is great, but half of those folks don't even want to get in the program or don't show up for the program. The only reason they show up for DTAP is they are in prison or they have no choice that they are going to go back to prison. Again, I think the RAND Corp.--it is nice to have you here today but I think some of your past studies and conclusions have done tremendous damage--maybe you were well intended--but by people who were advocates of this one avenue of approach. Mr. Iguchi. Mr. Chairman, we can only deal with the numbers and data that we have. The studies that have been conducted supply the data that go into those kinds of models, and we stand by them. The problem with focusing on supply reduction is that we don't have demonstrated effective supply reduction methodologies. Mr. Mica. That is crap. That is baloney. I can get the charts out here and we can look at what we did with the Andean strategy, with the South Americans, and with the Vice President's Task Force for going after the stuff. If you want a concentrated program for a few bucks in some of these countries where the peasants are getting a couple of pesos for that crap, you can stop it. There is no question about it. We did it in Peru. Mr. Iguchi. We did it temporarily. Mr. Mica. We did it with President Fujimora. Mr. Hastert, who chaired this subcommittee before me, went down and we talked to those folks. Ten years ago, you couldn't even walk on the streets of Lima because there were bombs going off. The Shining Path was ruling the roost and they were also profiting from the drug trade. We brought that under control, cut it by 66 percent. We can do the same thing anywhere we want if we have the will. Even now the President's own Ambassador to that country has sent letters to this administration that again, they are changing their policy of not providing the intelligence and surveillance information that allows them to shoot down the drug traffickers. It sure as hell will stop anybody on treatment if you shoot down a plane that is carrying cocaine out of that country to the United States. Then you don't have to worry about treating them because they don't have the drugs in the first place to be addicted to get on the treatment program that a lot of them won't even show up or are interested in treatment in the first place. Mr. Iguchi. I am well aware of---- Mr. Mica. Mrs. Mink, you are recognized. Mrs. Mink. Mr. Chairman, that was an astonishing outburst, unforgivable. Mr. Mica. Sorry. I apologize. Mr. Mink. The witness that I invited to this committee, Martin Iguchi, I am sure had nothing to do with the 8-year old report of the RAND Corp. Mr. Mica. And I didn't accuse him personally. Mrs. Mink. You kept saying, ``you, you'' and I found that-- -- Mr. Mica. The RAND Corp., for the record. Mrs. Mink. He is not the RAND Corp., although maybe at times he wishes he were. He simply is an investigator, senior behavioral scientist, co-director of the Drug Policy Research Center at RAND. He doesn't run the entire gamut of the RAND Corp. investigative research activities, I am sure. Do you? Mr. Iguchi. No, I do not. Mrs. Mink. I apologize, Mr. Iguchi, for their asking you to answer for the entire RAND Corp.'s research outcomes. We debated this last week and that is why it is still very much in the environment here because we were debating it last week but the RAND Corp., Mr. Chairman, never stated specifically that activities to curtail supply were not appropriate for this government. I certainly support, as you well know, all efforts that we can engage in to limit the supply but our efforts should not be limited to only the questions of supply but this country has not paid enough attention, as I said on the floor last week, to the whole area of treatment. Efforts have to be made to encourage State and local governments to do more as they are doing in the drug court area and local prosecutors need to be encouraged to do more in their specific areas. So the purpose of this hearing, the purpose of inviting Mr. Iguchi to testify, was to get his insights on the engagement of the criminal justice system into drug treatment and whether it is efficient and whether it is appropriate. It is a question of both. We know that those that exist are efficient. I have visited some, read some of the statements and documents and reports on it. The question that Mr. Iguchi raises is the most important question that we should be debating. That is the preferential selection of individuals to go into these DTAP or drug court programs, require that these two areas have special abilities to get drug treatment programs for their clients. They would be ineffective if while talking to a potential enrollee, there was not a space somewhere to put that individual into a drug treatment program. The whole thing must be interconnected. Whether you are the judge or the prosecutor is irrelevant; you have to have a special privileged line somewhere to get into the program. Otherwise you are just talking in the wind, if only 6 months from now a space will open for you. That is the condition of the public at large today. We can't take everybody who voluntarily says I have a drug problem and I really need help. Instead we say to that individual, you have to wait 6 months; there is no space. But if you commit a crime, you can go to drug court, and they will take care of you. That is a terrible alternative. I think Mr. Iguchi raises that point and that is a very troubling point which goes back ultimately to what the chairman is upset about, and that is our concern about the lack of availability of drug treatment programs in this country. Less than 50 percent of those who seek it are able to get it. Our anxieties are really raised because we want to see more of these treatment programs, not that it is the end all, cure all, but that it is a necessity. If we are going to be honest about trying to help people who have a drug problem, we have to find more funds to create these treatment programs. You testified, Mr. Belenko, that there was a 66 percent retention rate in the treatment programs. That was a question that Representative Ose asked. That is a confusing statement. Exactly what is meant by that statement, there is a 66 percent retention rate in the substance treatment program by those that are in either drug court or DTAP? Mr. Belenko. That figure was referring to the DTAP program. What that means is that of those who start the program, 66 percent of them are still in treatment 1 year later. So it is 1 year. Mrs. Mink. And already detached from DTAP, no longer under the supervision? Mr. Belenko. In DTAP. DTAP requires 15 to 24 months. Mrs. Mink. Even with that coercion as an alternative to going to prison, you only have a 66 percent retention in a treatment program? Mr. Belenko. I think you have to compare it to retention in residential treatment generally which is quite low where only probably 10 to 30 percent of those who enter residential treatment are still there after 1 year. Generally, residential treatment requires long term. Mrs. Mink. What happens to that 34 percent then that don't stay in the program? They are then pushed into the regular criminal justice system and ultimately go to jail? Mr. Belenko. They are prosecuted and under the DTAP model, as the district attorney has designed it, these are offenders who are subject to mandatory prison sentences. In fact, 96 percent of them are returned to court, are prosecuted and sentenced to the prison terms they would have gotten had they not gone to DTAP. Mrs. Mink. The clients that are identified for either drug court or DTAP, how are they able to assure their clients the ability to enter a treatment program? Mr. Belenko. In both models, there are treatment slots dedicated by prior agreement. Mrs. Mink. By prior agreement, by State law or whatever? Mr. Belenko. Yes, through various funding mechanisms. Mrs. Mink. So that sets the limits on the number that DTAP can take or the number the drug court can take, the availability of drug treatment slots. Mr. Belenko. I want to also point out that generally drug courts are set up with an existing treatment infrastructure in place so that they know when participants come into a drug court, there will be a treatment slot. Mrs. Mink. They run their own, maintain their own? Mr. Belenko. Some drug courts operate their own, others use existing community-based providers, others contract with a single provider in the community. Mrs. Mink. But still, the limitation is availability of drug treatment slots? Mr. Belenko. That is always the limitation, yes. Mrs. Mink. If there was not such a limitation and drug treatment spaces were readily available through out the country, what would be that effect on the number of people that would be in the program? Would it double the program, triple the program, quadruple it? Mr. Belenko. There are still limitations because at some point drug court staff would be overwhelmed with cases. As under traditional probation where probation officers may have 150 to 200 probationers to supervise, you don't want a drug course where a case manager or a judge has to supervise too many cases because I think some individual attention is required. So there may be limits in a single courtroom of how many cases you want, but certainly there is room for expansion. Mrs. Mink. In the usual congressional budget-type analysis, the question would be put what is the average cost per client in the drug court system, maintained in the drug court system as against the DTAP system, as against going to prison? Mr. Belenko. Judge Tauber mentioned the figure, I think, of $2,000 per year. Mrs. Mink. $2,000 in DTAP? Mr. Belenko. For drug court. Drug courts generally use outpatient treatment models which is much cheaper than residential. DTAP uses a residential treatment model which is more expensive, my guess would be $10,000-$15,000 per year. Mrs. Mink. DTAP clients are typically detained in residential centers? Mr. Belenko. They are required to be in residential treatment under a therapeutic community model which is very intensive and long-term treatment. The average cost of a prison nationwide, is probably about $22,000 a year or so. In New York, it is closer to $30,000, I believe. Prison is clearly the most expensive; residential is much cheaper. Outpatient treatment, which most drug courts use, is even cheaper than that. Relatively inexpensive, not cheap. Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. Thank the gentlelady. I am sorry for berating your witness today. I just saw RAND Corp., and Mr. Iguchi has been before us and I have been very polite to him. Mrs. Mink. You should apologize to him for ranting and raving. Mr. Mica. After hearing a day and a half of debate. Mrs. Mink. I thought it was a brilliant debate, especially my part. Mr. Mica. You were, in fact, brilliant, but using the RAND Corp. study of past in such a distorted fashion. Mrs. Mink. Don't start again or I will take another 5 minutes. Mr. Mica. I don't know if Mr. Iguchi was involved in that study, I am sure he wasn't. Mr. Iguchi. I joined the RAND Corp. 2 years ago. Mrs. Mink. You didn't extend him the courtesy of asking if he was there. Mr. Mica. Just representing the corporation that did the study that I felt did a lot of damage. Mrs. Mink. He specifically said in his opening, I do not represent the corporation today. Mr. Mica. He had to bear the brunt of it and if you want to hear more, tune in tonight for 1 hour in special orders when I will finish my comments about the misuse of the study. I am sure the RAND Corp. does very good in compiling statistics and data in a fairly level, non-biased fashion but again, the misuse of that concerns me. My concern is that the programs we have heard of today are great. They do serve a very small portion of the population and in order to qualify for those programs, those individuals have had to reach addiction, the need for treatment, had to have committed a crime, in many cases serious crimes and felonies, and they have also had to face the possibility of prison and my concern is that it is much more cost effective if we want to do a cost benefit analysis, if those individuals are never subjected in the first place to even using illegal narcotics and then also a balanced approach. I have never advocated not doing treatment or any of these programs. They are necessary but when you take out key elements, you put yourself at risk, again subjecting more people to becoming victims of illegal narcotics addiction, use of treatment which follows and prison, all of which have even marginal success rates, even these that we have heard from today. I do want to thank all of our witnesses for providing testimony before us today. It does help us, particularly with the model of the DTAP Program. We hopefully can support that nationally. We are already supporting the drug courts nationally and I hope that support will continue and we can have successful programs in both areas. There being no further business to come before the subcommittee at this time, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


text:
Last minute special through
December 15th!!!
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subset: commoncrawl


text:
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text:
NEWS21 September 2010
NEWS21 September 2010
US— GutCheck, a new do-it-yourself online qualitative research service that offers companies the chance to carry out one-on-one, 30-minute interviews with consumers, has launched in beta mode.
The service is supported by iModerate Research Technologies and sources respondents through a tie-up with two undisclosed panel companies.
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The company pitches its offer as ideal for early-stage concept and copy tests. GutCheck is privately-held, and received initial funding from Highway 12 Ventures, Village Ventures, and several "notable entrepreneurs" from the market research world.
GfK MRI partners with Cubeyou https://t.co/HfxIIFTRRd #mrx #marketresearch
Krealinks and Voxpopme announce partnership https://t.co/8XLCGg0Nnh #mrx #marketresearch
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