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1 DO CAMPAIGN DONATIONS ALTER HOW A POLITICIAN VOTES? OR, DO DONORS SUPPORT CANDIDATES WHO VALUE THE SAME THINGS THAT THEY DO?* STEPHEN G. BRONARS and JOHN R. LOTT, JR. University of Texas University of Chicago Abstract Despite all the work on how campaign donations influence a politician s behavior, the nagging question of whether contributions alter how the politician votes or whether these contributions constitute support for like-minded individuals remains unresolved. By combining the campaign contributions literature with the work on politicians intrinsically valuing policy outcomes, we offer a simple test that examines how politicians voting patterns change when they retire and no longer face the threat of lost campaign contributions. If contributions are causing individual politicians to vote differently, there should be systematic changes in voting behavior when future contributions are eliminated. In contrast, if contributors donate to candidates who intrinsically value the same policies, there should be no changes in how a politician votes during the last period. I. Introduction Do special interest campaign contributions significantly alter how politicians vote on legislative issues? Can these political action committee (PAC) contributions buy votes within the Congress? Despite the large number of studies measuring the positive correlation between contributions and congressional voting behavior, these questions remain unanswered. 1 The * We would like to thank Andrew Dick, Gertrud Fremling, Robert Gibbons, Kevin Grier, David Levy, Sam Peltzman, Thomas Stratmann, Michael Waldman, and the participants in seminars at the University of Chicago, Cornell University, George Mason University, University of Pennsylvania, the University of Western Ontario, the March 1993 and March 1994 Public Choice annual meetings in New Orleans and Houston, respectively, and the February 1993 Atlantic Economic Association annual meetings in Philadelphia. Lott would like to thank the Law and Economics program at the University of Chicago School of Law, for the funding that he receives as the John M. Olin Visiting Law and Economics Fellow, and the Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, where he spent the academic year. 1 See John P. Frendreis and Richard W. Waterman, PAC Contributions and Legislative Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation, 66 Soc Sci Q 401, 401 (1985), who write, [I]t is impossible to eliminate as an explanation for the observed partial correlation the giving of contributions to legislators who would vote in a particular fashion regardless of [ Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XL (October 1997)] 1997 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved /97/ $
2 318 the journal of law and economics empirical evidence in these studies is equally consistent with the hypothesis that interest groups contribute to and support politicians with similar interests and ideologies to their own. These correlations do not represent consistent estimates of the effect of PAC contributions on voting behavior because campaign contributions are endogenously determined by a number of factors, including a politician s ideology. This article attempts to assess the causal link between campaign contributions and a politician s voting behavior by focusing on the effect of changes in campaign contributions during a politician s last term in office. These changes in special interest contributions are largely determined by a politician s retirement decision and subject to less endogeneity between a politician s or a constituent s preferences and contributions. In effect, we use factors that influence politicians retirement decisions as instrumental variables in identifying the relationship between voting behavior and contributions. The economics literature today generally accepts the claim that politiwhether they received contributions. Some early research has shown a large and statistically significant association between PAC contributions and voting behavior on minimum wage legislation (J. I. Silberman and G. C. Durden, Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J Pol Econ 317 (1976)), business and unions and several regulatory bills ( James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin, Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors: Determinants of Roll Call Voting in the House of Representatives (1982)), the American Trucking Association and trucking deregulation (Frendreis and Waterman, id), agricultural legislation (Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S Econ J 606 (1991)), and labor legislation (Sam Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27 J L & Econ 181 (1984); Marick F. Masters, Congressional Support for Unions Positions across Diverse Legislation, 9 J Lab Res 149 (1988)). Stratmann (id at 619) concludes that legislation that reduces PAC contributions to only $2,500 would be insufficient because contributions would still significantly affect the outcome of legislative votes. The continual introduction of new campaign reform legislation in Congress shows the general acceptance of this view. Other economists and political scientists have found smaller though still statistically significant relationships between PAC contributions and voting patterns for a number of areas: a cargo preference bill (Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Voting on the Cargo Preference Bill: A Comparison of Simultaneous Models, 36 Pub Choice 301 (1981)), dairy price supports (W. P. Welch, Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports, 35 W Pol Q 478 (1982)), auto emissions standards, defense appropriations, and truck weight limit regulations (Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model, 64 Rev Econ & Stat 77 (1982)). Papers by James W. Endersby and Michael C. Munger, The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Union PAC Campaign Contributions, 13 J Lab Res 79 (1992); and Kevin Grier and Michael Munger, The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Interest-Group Campaign Contributions, 7 J Lab Res 347 (1986), have attempted to explain which candidates receive labor union contributions. They find that being on a legislative committee with jurisdiction over the activities that affect a union and supporting the union s positions are positively related to union campaign contributions. Others claim that increased access from these contributions must translate into tangible service (Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 Am Pol Sci Rev 797 (1990)).
3 campaign donations 319 cians intrinsically value policy outcomes. 2 The most recent debate has been not over whether politicians have such ideological preferences but whether voters can successfully sort into office those politicians whose preferences coincide with the voters. If sorting is successful, politicians will continue representing their constituents desires even when the threat of reelection is removed during their last term. To the extent that these preferences do not perfectly match, politicians will deviate from constituent interests when the costs of shirking decline. Likewise, if campaign contributions are made to support those politicians who already value the same positions as their donors, there should be no change in voting patterns after campaign contributions stop during a politician s last term in office. 3 Both the ideological sorting and the vote-buying hypotheses are consistent with a positive correlation between PAC contributions and voting behavior. However, the sorting theory predicts that politicians will not alter their last-period behavior, whereas the vote-buying hypothesis predicts the opposite campaign contributions are only rational when they alter how an individual politician votes on an issue. 4 If campaign contributions 2 John R. Lott, Jr., and W. R. Reed, Shirking and Sorting in a Model of Finite-Lived Politicians, 61 Pub Choice 75 (1989), provide a formal model of this type of sorting by voters. It is possible to replace voters with donors in that model without any loss of generality. For a survey of the empirical work on shirking and sorting questions, see Bruce Bender and John R. Lott, Jr., Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature, Pub Choice (in press). Sorting can also be done by the politicians themselves. D. C. Coker and W. Mark Crain, Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions, 81 Pub Choice 195 (1994), show that House members demonstrating more loyalty to the party leaders obtain more important committee assignments. See also W. Mark Crain, Donald R. Leavens, and Robert D. Tollison, Final Voting in Legislatures, 76 Am Econ Rev 833 (1986). 3 While such evidence would also be consistent with voters and donors having no control over politicians, there are fortunately other studies on another dimension of shirking how frequently representatives vote during their last term which can help differentiate these two explanations. If politicians are already shirking as much as they desire prior to their last term in office, the last term should produce no changes in either how frequently they vote or how they vote when they do vote. However, if politicians value both policies and leisure, the ideological sorting hypothesis predicts changes in attendance rates even when there are no changes in how a politician votes. Politicians in their last term will continue to vote for what they believe in, but since they no longer obtain the additional return of larger future support, they just vote less often (John R. Lott, Jr., Political Cheating, 52 Pub Choice 169 (1987)). 4 See, for example, Chappell, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting (cited in note 1); and Thomas Stratmann, Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees, 100 J Pol Econ 647 (1992). Correlations between donations and performance do not imply anything about the effect PAC contributions have on an individual politician s voting behavior. Nor does examining whether contributions are made to committee heads help solve this problem. Campaign contributions may be directed toward those in important positions because the value of returning politicians to office who share your political ideology is highest for the most important positions, and not because of a greater expected return to changing those politicians positions on political issues. However, even after addressing the question of causation, there is still the difficulty of determining the significance of these findings. For example, why are contributors not included as part of a politician s
4 320 the journal of law and economics buy ideological politicians votes, causing them to deviate from their preferred positions, their voting patterns should diverge from contributors interests during their last term in office when the threatened loss of future campaign donations is reduced or eliminated. The following sections test whether politicians receiving campaign contributions from particular special interest groups change their voting behavior between their second to last and last terms in office relative to those who had never received that group s campaign contributions. We first examine if any patterns emerge in comparing the simple changes between periods and then see if any relationships appear after controlling for other effects such as how a politician s behavior varies over his life cycle. Only a few papers that test whether politicians have a personal ideology include measures of campaign contributions, 5 and none of these papers addresses the question of causality we discuss here. Section V tests for whether it was easier to buy off congressmen when they were still able to retain unused campaign funds for personal use. Finally, Section VI examines whether a congressman s last 2 years in the House of Representatives really constitutes his last term in any meaningful sense by controlling for what the politician and his offspring did after he left office. Interest groups may compensate politicians after they leave elective office through future employment opportunities for either themselves or their children. II. A First Look at the Evidence This article identifies whether politicians voting behavior changes between their second to last and last terms in office relative to those who had never received a special interest group s campaign contributions. 6 Our emrelevant constituency? As John R. Wright, PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation, 51 J Pol 713, 726 (1989), points out, Members of Congress seldom experience financial pressures and lobbying pressures from groups that have little or no economic or organizational claims in their districts. While the access that politicians provide donors may change political outcomes, instead of buying votes, such access may simply assist politicians in better representing the constituents from their own district with the most intense preferences. (See Harold Demsetz, Efficiency, Competition, and Policy (Blackwell, 1989), for a further discussion on the question of what is the relevant constituency for politicians.) 5 See James B. Kau, Donald Keenan, and Paul H. Rubin, A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting, 97 Q J Econ 271 (1982); Rodney Fort, William Hallagan, Cyril Morong, and Tesa Stegner, The Ideological Component of Senate Voting: Different Principles or Different Principals? 76 Pub Choice 39 (1993); James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin, Ideology, Voting, and Shirking, 76 Pub Choice 151 (1993). 6 See also John R. Lott, Jr., and Michael L. Davis, A Critical Review and an Extension of the Political Shirking Literature, 74 Pub Choice 461 (1992); and John R. Lott, Jr., and Stephen G. Bronars, Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives, 76 Pub Choice 125 (1993), for a more complete discussion of this type of analysis.
5 campaign donations 321 phasis on changes in donations and voting, rather than the correlation between the levels of these variables, recognizes that it is rational for PACs to allocate their funds to their highest valued use. These PAC contributions are likely to have the greatest effect on election outcomes in districts where the contest is expected to be close. Hence PAC contributions are likely to flow to candidates for open seats and in competitive districts, not necessarily to the strongest advocate of the special interest. In addition, because PACs are interested in producing majorities and not unanimity, contributions are directed toward politicians representing relatively indifferent constituencies. 7 Thus our approach identifies changes in contributions to politicians in their last term whose voting behavior was most likely to have been altered by the campaign contributions throughout their careers. The data are primarily limited to members of the House of Representatives who served in office from 1977 to Additional data on campaign contributions are available from the Federal Election Commission back to 1975, though they are not disaggregated by the source of the donation for 1975 and We use this additional aggregate data only in Section III, where we examine data reporting on politicians careers after leaving the House of Representatives. Because our empirical analysis focuses on changes in a politician s voting over time, we typically limit our sample to the 661 congressmen who held office for at least 2 terms between 1977 and These congressmen accounted for 94.5 percent of the terms served during that period. 8 By 1990, 285 of these multiterm congressmen had left the House through retirement (91), to seek another office (97), or by losing their bid for reelection (97). 9 In Section IV, where our empirical analysis focuses on how aggregate PAC contributions change, our sample includes the 731 multiterm congressmen who held office between 1975 and Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of real PAC contributions (in thousands of 1982 dollars) and the average fraction of congressmen receiving contributions by seven different categories of contributors. The top panel of Table 1 presents sample statistics for multiterm representatives in all terms other than their last term. Political action committee con- 7 See, for example, Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, Am Pol Sci Rev 89 (1986); and Stratmann (cited in note 4). 8 Over the period there are 820 individuals serving a total of 3,045 2-year terms. The mean completed tenure among the multiterm representatives in our sample is 6.24 terms. At a moment in time the tenure for a randomly selected congressman in our sample is 4.19 terms. 9 We exclude the last-term observations for the 28 congressmen who died while in office. If these congressmen did not anticipate their death, their inclusion would bias our results towards not finding significant changes in last-period behavior.
6 TABLE 1 Mean Real PAC Contributions, , in Thousands of 1982 Dollars National Non- Corporate Labor Conservative Security Trade Cooperative connected Representatives continuing in Congress: % recipients Mean (39.5) (36.5) (1.98) (.87) (27.9) (5.11) (12.1) PAC recipients in penultimate and last term: All reasons for last term: Mean in t (39.9) (33.8) (2.83) (.86) (27.4) (5.70) (11.0) Mean in t (37.8) (36.1) (1.96) (.42) (27.8) (5.06) (14.8) Mean change (43.3) (34.0) (2.76) (.60) (31.5) (5.87) (15.2) Retiring: Mean in t (32.1) (25.5) (4.02) (.83) (22.3) (4.07) (9.03) Mean in t (11.5) (9.41) (.33) (.27) (7.79) (1.35) (1.97) Mean change (26.9) (23.4) (3.81) (.65) (19.2) (3.80) (8.37) Other office: Mean in t (46.5) (38.1) (2.52) (.97) (31.1) (6.62) (11.1) Mean in t (24.1) (16.0) (.60) (.50) (15.6) (.99) (5.15) Mean change (41.3) (34.1) (2.49) (.60) (29.6) (6.53) (11.0) Lost: Mean in t (36.3) (35.1) (2.61) (.71) (25.4) (5.82) (12.0) Mean in t (48.7) (48.6) (2.86) (.45) (32.1) (7.36) (21.5) Mean change (38.6) (31.2) (2.16) (.56) (23.9) (5.29) (18.5) Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
7 campaign donations 323 tributions were legally limited to $10,000 ($5,000 per primary and general election campaign) during the sample. Over 90 percent of representatives continuing in Congress received contributions from corporate, trade, and nonconnected PACs, and nearly 90 percent received labor PAC contributions. In contrast, less than 15 percent of continuing congressmen received contributions from conservative or national security PACs. 10 The bottom panel of Table 1 focuses on representatives final 2 terms in office. We limit the sample to congressmen who received PAC contributions in their penultimate term in office (denoted by period t 1) and present the change in PAC contributions between their last (period t) and penultimate terms. The first six rows aggregate last-term representatives into a single group. It is important to note that the time-series pattern of PAC contributions differs substantially across congressmen who retire, run for other office, and lose their reelection bid. This is not surprising because the congressmen we classify as retiring publicly announced their retirement prior to the filing date for primaries, so they were not eligible for general election campaign contributions. These retiring congressmen were eligible to receive PAC contributions prior to the primary filing date and therefore faced some (although greatly reduced) costs to voting against these groups interests even during their final term. Table 1 shows that representatives in their last term owing to retirement or because they are running for other office are less likely to receive PAC contributions, and when PAC contributions are made the magnitude of the contributions declines substantially. The average labor PAC recipient experienced a decrease of $16,900 in labor contributions in their retiring term (84 percent of their previous level of labor contributions) and a decrease of $22,600 when running for other office (72 percent of their previous contributions). There are similarly large percentage declines in contributions for other categories of PACs. Consequently, there is significantly less dispersion in PAC contributions across congressmen when they are in their final term in office. If contributions are indeed buying votes, one would expect these large declines in PAC contributions (especially corporate and labor) 10 The conservative PACs include such groups as the Conservative Victory Fund, Fund for a Conservative Majority, Americans for Constitutional Action, and Citizens for the Republic; the trade PACs include all the trade associations such as the American Bankers Association, American Medical Association, National Association of Home Builders; the cooperative PACs are primarily agricultural and include groups such as the Sunkist PAC, Rice Growers of California, and MidAmerica Dairymen PAC; and the nonconnected PACs represent all ideological PACs (like the conservative PACs listed above) and other PACs like the Jewish American PAC, the Jimmy Carter PAC, and Friends of Right to Work PAC. Total nonparty PAC donations are almost entirely accounted for by either the corporate, labor, trade, cooperative, or nonconnected categories.
8 324 the journal of law and economics in a congressman s retiring term to lead to substantial changes in his voting behavior on issues valued by interest groups. Note that losing congressmen actually experience an increase in PAC contributions in their final term. This increase probably occurs because these candidates and their contributors have correctly anticipated a difficult reelection campaign. Moreover, PAC contributions are likely to be larger, on average, in competitive congressional districts that are likely to have close election outcomes. This suggests that even larger declines in contributions will occur when a representative in a competitive district retires or runs for another office. We define a competitive district as one in which the average election outcome (over the period ) had a vote differential of less than 20 percentage points. 11 Using this definition, 19 percent of congressional districts in our sample are competitive. Table 2 presents a description of changes in PAC contributions for retiring congressmen and congressmen running for other office during their last 2 terms in office in both competitive and noncompetitive districts. These changes in contributions are only computed for representatives who received contributions from a PAC of the designated type in their penultimate term. For most categories of PAC contributions, congressmen in competitive districts received higher average PAC contributions in their penultimate term and experienced a relatively larger percentage decrease in contributions after deciding to retire or run for another office. This raw data can also potentially test the sorting versus vote-buying hypotheses by answering whether PACs simultaneously give donations to two different candidates in the same race. It would be difficult to reconcile simultaneous contributions with the sorting hypothesis. Unfortunately, the Federal Election Commission data on campaign contributions does not distinguish well between primary and general election contributions. To help answer this question, we interviewed those running 20 of the PACs used in our sample, and representatives of all these PACs insisted that either they never provided simultaneous contributions to two opponents in the same race or that they did so only under the most exceptional circumstances (for 11 We used several other methods for conditioning on the competitiveness of a district: (1) we defined a competitive district as one in which the margin of victory in the previous election was less than 20 percent, (2) we used a margin of victory residual from a regression that included state and term dummies, presidential election outcomes in the district, and average demographic characteristics in the district to define a competitive district, and (3) we included interactions between changes in PAC contributions and the average margin of victory in the district in the regression models in Tables 4 6. None of these approaches indicated any significant differences in behavior across competitive and noncompetitive districts.
9 TABLE 2 Change in Real PAC Contributions, , in Thousands of 1982 Dollars by District Competitiveness National Non- Corporate Labor Conservative Security Trade Cooperative connected PAC recipients in penultimate and last term before retiring: Competitive districts: Mean in penultimate term (36.0) (31.8) (4.73) (.23) (26.8) (5.49) (15.1) Mean in last term (13.6) (3.91) (.43) (.15) (8.90) (.47) (1.50) Mean change (29.1) (32.6) (4.38) (.13) (21.6) (5.50) (13.9) Noncompetitive districts: Mean in penultimate term (32.2) (23.8) (.94) (.91) (21.5) (3.76) (6.50) Mean in last term (11.6) (6.41) (.25) (.30) (7.44) (1.41) (1.59) Mean change (27.0) (20.4) (1.18) (.71) (18.5) (3.13) (5.55) PAC recipients in penultimate and last term before running for other office: Competitive districts: Mean in penultimate term (62.4) (49.7) (.26) (.44) (40.6) (7.97) (16.3) Mean in last term (20.3) (27.8) (.00) (.30) (17.9) (1.31) (4.65) Mean change (61.6) (49.9) (.26) (.23) (43.8) (7.68) (16.6) Noncompetitive districts: Mean in penultimate term (40.2) (29.4) (2.78) (1.07) (28.6) (5.50) (8.11) Mean in last term (24.5) (9.70) (.68) (.54) (15.6) (.94) (5.03) Mean change (35.2) (26.9) (2.77) (.67) (25.5) (5.53) (7.80) Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
10 326 the journal of law and economics example, a PAC may feel obligated to support one of their members who is running for office even if they expect him to lose). 12 The changes in voting behavior are defined as the changes in five different special interest indexes of congressional voting: (1) American Conservative Union (ACU), (2) Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), (3) AFL-CIO s Committee on Political Education (COPE), (4) National Security Council (NSC), and (5) National Taxpayers Union (NTU). The unit of observation is the individual member of the House of Representatives. Each of these special interest groups assigns a congressman an index number between 0 and 100, indicating the percentage of votes that he casts in accord with the wishes of that group. 13 The one exception is the liberal ADA index, which records abstentions as conservative votes and thus reports a lower score when a representative abstains from voting. 14 The change in each voting index subtracts the interest group score he received during the ith 1 Congress from his average value from that same group during the ith Congress. While ignoring the effect of campaign donations and the question of causation, the changes in voting indexes shown in Table 3 are generally consistent with other studies that examine these indexes over a slightly longer time period. 15 With the exception of the ACU index, it reveals that there are no statistically significant differences in the mean change in voting score for continuing congressmen and for those who are leaving office to retire or run for other offices, though the table does reveal that the standard deviations for how these voting indexes change are consis- 12 A detailed account of these telephones interviews is available from the authors. We interviewed the American Conservative Union, Conservative Victory Fund, American Medical Association, American Bankers Association, National Association of Life Underwriters, National Association of Home Builders, Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Phillip Morris, Tenneco, National Association of Automobile Dealers, National Association of Retired Federal Employees, United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, United Auto Workers, the International Machinists & Aerospace Workers Union, Americans for Democratic Action, American Dental Association, National Rifle Association, Realtors PAC, Rockwell International Corp., and Lockheed Employees. 13 A particular term s index may be based on as few as 13 votes (COPE) or as many as 430 votes (NTU). While four of the indexes are constructed with votes over a 2-year congressional term, the NSC index is based solely on votes occurring during the second year of each term. This fact about the NSC index is useful when we note the timing of public announcements to retire. 14 The ADA approach produces both some potential difficulties as well as opportunities. Since congressmen tend to vote less frequently during their last term (see Lott (cited in note 3)), the ADA index will indicate that congressmen are more conservative during their last term when the only real change may be that the return to voting has declined. However, adjusting for this effect will not alter the results shown in this article. One benefit from using the ADA index as it was originally constructed is that donations might alter not only how a politician votes but also whether he abstains from voting. The ADA index will help measure whether donations alter politicians decisions to abstain from voting. 15 Lott and Bronars, at (cited in note 6).
11 campaign donations 327 tently different between continuing congressmen and those running for other offices. 16 For 74 of the 91 retiring congressmen where we know the exact date that they publicly announced their retirement, the average announcement was made months prior to the November general election. 17 Twenty-four congressmen made the announcement after Congress reconvened during the last year of their last term, with two making the announcement as late as June of the election year. If survey information on when congressmen who privately decided that 1978 was to be their last year in public office is a reliable guide for later congressmen, 18 they privately decided to retire about eight months prior to their public announcement. 19,20 Table 4 provides a first pass at combining changes in contributions and voting behavior. The change in the different voting indexes is given for various subsamples of congressmen: those continuing in office, those retiring from office, and those leaving Congress to run for another political office. For each group of representatives, we calculate the percentage change in their contributions from a special interest group relative to their contribution in the previous congressional election cycle. As in Table 2, we exclude politicians from Table 4 who received no PAC contribution from each special interest group in their next-to-last term. Our tests of whether campaign contributions buy votes focus on retiring congressmen, where it is quite common that PAC contributions decline by more than 50 percent of their previous value. 21 In situations where PAC contributions decline by more than 50 percent, we present changes in voting indices overall and separately for competitive and noncompetitive districts. In the different sections of Table 3, we compare a voting index with the most relevant types of PAC contributions. The change in the AFL-CIO s COPE voting index is compared 16 Lott (cited in note 3) and Lott and Bronars (cited in note 6) provide a more extensive analysis of this question. 17 This information was obtained using a NEXIS search with the keywords being the congressman s last name, his state, and the words retire and Congress. 18 Lott (cited in note 3). 19 Wiggins, from California, said that he had made his retirement decision and publicly announced it when he first ran for Congress 10 years earlier. His response is excluded from this average. 20 Unlike earlier work examining the life-cycle changes in political voting behavior, we primarily focus on the change in voting indexes and not the absolute value of that change since if changes in contributions are made to alter how politicians vote there should be systematic changes in voting. 21 A detailed breakdown for those congressmen who lost their reelection campaign is available from the authors. No significant relationships between changes in donations and changes in voting indexes were found for this category. We also performed this test for the NTU index for both the change and the absolute value of that change, but we again were unable to observe any systematic relationships.
12 TABLE 3 Comparing the Change in How Continuing Congressmen Vote and the Standard Deviation in That Change to the Comparable Measures for Congressmen in Their Last Term Change in COPE Change in ACU Change in ADA Change in NSC Continuing: All districts ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Competitive districts ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Noncompetitive districts ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Last term: All districts ( )* ( )* ( ) ( )* Competitive districts ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Noncompetitive districts ( )* ( ) ( ) ( ) 328
13 Retiring: All districts * ( )* ( ) ( ) ( ) Competitive districts ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Noncompetitive districts ( )* ( ) ( ) ( ) Other: All districts * ( )* ( )* ( ) ( ) Competitive districts ( )* ( ) ( ) ( ) Noncompetitive districts * ( )* ( )* ( ) ( )* Lost election: All districts * * ( ) ( )* ( ) ( )* Competitive districts * * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Noncompetitive districts 4.80* 2.10* ( )* ( )* ( ) ( )* Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. See text for definitions of abbreviations. * Significant difference between competitive and noncompetitive districts at 5% level. Significant difference between competitive and noncompetitive districts at 10% level. 329
14 TABLE 4 Change in Voting Index by Change in Campaign Contributions Change in COPE Index: Percent Change in COPE Index: Percent Change in Labor PAC Change in Corporate PAC Contributions Contributions Contributions Continue Retire Other Continue Retire Other 50 percent 3.27* * (.75) (4.40) (.61) (7.16) 0 50 percent * (.64) (6.00) (18.8) (.56) (14.8) 50 0 percent (.63) (3.68) (9.54) (.75) (1.92) (3.84) 50 percent (1.10) (2.58) (2.41) (1.63) (2.32) (2.45) By level of competitiveness 50 percent competitive races (3.21) (3.95) (5.50) (5.33) (3.33) (5.62) 50 percent noncompetitive races (1.17) (3.08) (2.66) (1.70) (2.83) (2.67) Change in ACU Index: Percent Change in ADA Index: Percent Change in Conservative PAC Change in Conservative PAC Contributions Contributions Contributions Continue Retire Other Continue Retire Other 50 percent (1.97) (.63) 0 50 percent (2.08) (.44) 50 0 percent * (2.01) (.93) 330
15 50 percent (.86) (4.47) (2.51) (.57) (2.15) (1.91) By level of competitiveness 50 percent competitive races (1.53) (5.93) (1.76) (1.19) (2.18) (1.53) 50 percent noncompetitive races (1.01) (2.86) (.66) (2.38) Change in NSC Index: Percent Change in NSC PAC Contributions Continue Retire Other 50 percent (1.07) 0 50 percent (3.33) 50 0 percent (1.19) 50 percent (1.55) (2.99) (2.50) By level of competitiveness 50 percent competitive races (5.14) (5.00) (.00) 50 percent noncompetitive races (1.59) (3.31) (3.43) Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. See text for definitions of abbreviations. * Denotes significance at the 5% level. 331
16 332 the journal of law and economics with the change in labor and corporate PAC contributions, the ACU and ADA indexes with conservative PAC contributions, and the NSC index with that group s own PAC. 22 Table 4 points to a generally weak and statistically insignificant relationship for retiring politicians between their change in donations and their voting behavior. In fact, we often see a statistically insignificant increase in support for a special interest group by retiring congressmen even though their PAC contributions from the interest group have decreased by more than 50 percent. This relationship for retiring congressmen shows up in the comparison of COPE scores to labor contributions (an increase of.14 percentage points) and ACU scores to conservative PAC contributions (an increase of 3.38 percentage points). In other words, larger drops in contributions from a special interest group as a congressman retires are associated with the retiring congressman voting more in accord with the special interest group during his last term. While these results are not statistically significant, they imply the opposite of that predicted by the vote-buying hypothesis. 23 In addition, there is no evidence of systematic differences in last term voting behavior across competitive and noncompetitive districts. The only evidence in favor of the vote-buying hypothesis in Table 4 is statistically insignificant: retiring congressmen who experience a more than 50 percent drop in national security PAC contributions are 4.46 percent less likely to vote in accordance with the NSC interest group. Since the ADA index records abstentions as conservative votes, these initial results also provide us with some information on whether donations can buy a politician s decision not to vote. This also provides a second reason to expect that during a politician s last term lower conservative contributions will be associated with higher ADA scores, and it implies that if donations affect abstentions, it seems most likely to be observed for this index. However, the results for the ADA index fail to confirm that contributions affect politicians behavior through abstention in their last term The strongest comparisons are obviously those where we can directly link a group s index with its own decisions on whom to contribute to. We had hoped to use the ADA s PAC contributions to make comparisons with the ADA index but could not since their PAC made no contributions to retiring congressmen in either their last or next to last terms in office. However, the relationship between the COPE index and corporate PAC contributions provides the weakest comparison since, while corporations and unions often disagree on issues, some legislation benefits both groups. 23 Those who made their decisions to retire late may have received more contributions, but there was also a shorter period of time over which their votes during their last term would be affected by their decision not to run for reelection. 24 The difference in the NTU index (which aggregates votes on all spending issues) between two consecutive terms and the absolute value of this change was compared to the change in total contributions. The results implied that there were no systematic changes in politicians views (that is, whether they prefer larger or smaller government) and no in-
17 campaign donations 333 For continuing congressmen, higher labor and corporate PAC contributions are correlated with significantly greater support for pro-union legislation, and less conservative PAC money implies a significantly higher ADA index. The pattern of results for changes in corporate contributions and COPE scores is somewhat puzzling since it implies that larger contributions by corporations are associated with increased pro-union voting by congressmen. While these correlations between changes in PAC contributions and voting indices parallel previous findings, it is difficult to infer from continuing congressmen whether contributions altered a politician s voting decisions or whether PAC donors anticipated changes in a congressman s support on key issues. III. Controlling for Changing Constituent Interests and How the Costs of Opportunistic Behavior Vary over a Politician s Life-Cycle Economists have argued that the costs of deviating from constituent interests depend on whether a politician faces the threat of reelection and on the entry barriers created when the politician accumulates additional brand name capital. To complicate matters, voters are simultaneously trying to sort out of office politicians who deviate from constituent interests, and these interests may be themselves changing over time. 25 Consistent with previous studies, we measure the cost of deviating from constituents interests by controlling for whether it is the last term, along with a variable for tenure and tenure squared. Dummy variables are used to differentiate the various reasons for the last term: retiring, lost, or running for another office. Changing constituency interests are measured in two sets of regressions: first by using term and state dummies and then rerunning the regressions with those dummy variables in addition to a set of socioeconomic variables. The socioeconomic variables include the percent of the congressional district that is white-collar, blue-collar, service workers, white, black, and other racial groups along with the district s average creased dispersion in their views of government spending. Total donations were used since no identifiable PAC exists that unambiguously supports either more or less government spending on all questions 25 See Lott and Reed (cited in note 2) for a discussion of how these effects imply that to the extent shirking exists it will increase over a politician s lifetime. For discussions of the existence of entry barriers in political markets, see Morris Coats and Thomas Dalton, Entry Barriers in Politics and Uncontested Elections, 49 J Pub Econ 75 (1992); P. L. Hersch and G. S. McDougall, Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in Congressional Races, Econ Inquiry 630 (1994); and John R. Lott, Jr., The Effect of Nontransferable Property Rights on the Efficiency of Political Markets: Some Evidence, 32 J Pub Econ 231 (1987). See also Bender and Lott (cited in note 2) for a more complete discussion of these trade-offs.
18 334 the journal of law and economics age, average education, average income, and total population. Each of these pooled cross-section/time-series regressions has 2,211 observations, except the National Security Council PAC, with 1,815 observations, because their PAC ended in To proxy for a district s changing conditions, we interacted the term dummies with measures of the socioeconomic conditions from either the 1970 or 1980 Census depending on whether the terms compared were during the 1970s or 1980s. 27 These interactions allow us to put different weights on the socioeconomic variables to explain voting patterns some years after the Census data were collected. The regressions in Table 5 attempt to explain the change in COPE, ACU, ADA, and NSC voting scores through the changes in related PAC contributions along with the changes in those contributions multiplied by a retirement dummy. It is likely that a change in an interest group s contributions will have the largest effect on voting behavior when these contributions comprise a large fraction of the total contributions. To control for this, we not only tried interacting the retirement dummy with the change in PAC contribution but also with the percent of a politician s total contributions accounted for by this group s contributions. All these regressions also control for other reasons a politician is leaving office, as well as tenure, and state and term dummies. Specifications 10, 11, and all indicate that campaign contributions are significantly related to changes in how a politician votes. The results generally parallel the preliminary findings shown in Table 4. Higher labor contributions are thus associated with a significantly more pro-union voting record and higher National Security Council contributions with a significantly more pro-defense voting record. While these correlations are consistent with politicians being influenced by PAC contributions, they are also consistent with greater contributions being made to those politicians that interest groups believe will represent their positions in future votes. Again, 26 Another way of viewing these regressions is that contributions from PACs and voting records are correlated because of omitted (unobserved) measures of a politician s ideology. Under the null hypothesis that contributions do not influence voting behavior, an exogenous change in contributions that is, a change in contributions that is uncorrelated with a change in the politician s unobserved ideology should not influence a politician s voting behavior. In this article we argue that decreases in contributions due to retirement decisions are uncorrelated with ideology and hence provide an excellent opportunity for testing the null hypothesis that PAC contributions do not buy votes. 27 The 95th and 96th Congresses ( ) used the data obtained from the 1970 Census for those district boundaries formed after the 1972 redistricting; the 97th Congress ( ) used the data from the 1980 Census for those boundaries formed after the 1972 redistricting; and the 98th 101st Congresses ( ) used the data from the 1980 Census in those districts formed after the 1982 redistricting.
19 campaign donations 335 the positive and significant coefficients on corporate contributions in the change in COPE index regression are puzzling since they imply that larger contributions by corporations are associated with increased pro-union voting by congressmen. While the coefficients on the change in PAC contributions have an ambiguous interpretation, the coefficients for the change in contributions and the retirement dummy interaction provide a relatively consistent story. In most of the specifications that interact these 2 terms (with and without the weighting of these contributions by their share of total contributions), the coefficients are insignificant, and in 11 of the 15 cases the signs imply that reductions in contributions during a politician s last term are associated with votes that are more in accord with the political action group s desires. If campaign contributions cause ideological congressmen to vote in the contributors interest, eliminating those contributions should encourage the congressmen to move away from positions that benefit the contributors and vote more according to their own preferences during their retirement term. In addition, the ADA index does not support the hypothesis that contributions affect politicians behavior through abstentions. 28 There is one case where the empirical evidence in Table 5 provides some support for the vote-buying hypothesis. Specification 18 shows that a $1,000 decrease in contributions by the NSC PAC during a retirement term is associated with a significant 1.36 percent ( ) decrease in the NSC voting index. Specification 20 shows that this effect occurs only in noncompetitive districts; in competitive districts there is an insignificant increase in the NSC voting index when NSC PAC contributions fall during the retirement term. The second piece of evidence that strongly rejects the vote-buying hypothesis is seen in the relationship between conservative PAC contributions and ACU scores in specification 11. Evaluated at sample means, for each $1,000 decrease in conservative PAC contributions experienced by a retiree, the retiring representative would vote with the ACU 5.2 percent more of the time. The large significant coefficient on the interaction term (Retire* Conservative$*%Conservative$) suggests, however, that a retiring representative who had received a high enough fraction of donations from conservative PACs would be expected to substantially reduce his ACU voting score in his last term. For example, a retiring congressman who had 28 The drop in attendance that occurs during a politician s last term should not alter our discussion on the effect of lower conservative donations because we are already controlling for the average drop with the last term dummy. The question is whether those who experience a drop in conservative contributions become more liberal relative to the entire set of retiring politicians.
20 TABLE 5 The Effect of Reduced PAC Contributions on the Voting Indices of Retiring Representatives, Dependent Variable: Change in COPE Index Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Retire (.92) (1.29) (1.19) (1.29) (.39) (.19) (.65) (.16) Competitive (.14) (.05) Competitive*Retire (.10) (.02) Labor$ (1.56) (1.72) (1.71) (1.19) Retire* Labor$ (1.01) (.52) (.10) Retire* Labor$*%Labor.385 (1.01) Competitive* Labor$.024 (.68) Competitive*Retire* Labor$.084 (.16) Corporate$ (2.75) (2.66) (2.64) (2.50) Retire* Corporate$ (.14) (1.59) (.07) Retire* Corporate$*.694 %Corporate (1.70) Competitive* Corporate$.005 (.16) Competitive*Retire*.020 Corporate$ (.13) 336
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text: 000 FXUS63 KLOT 172259 AFDLOT Area Forecast Discussion National Weather Service Chicago/Romeoville, IL 459 PM CST Fri Feb 17 2017 .SHORT TERM... 142 PM CST Through Saturday... Daily warm temperature records have already been broken this afternoon and more record breaking is probable on Saturday. A deep, sub-985mb low across the Canadian Prairie provinces helped to usher in the very mild air mass today. With the system`s slow progression into early Saturday, the southwest winds will continue tonight, providing evening temperatures more common for late April. Have forecast low temperatures near daily record warm minimums, which may be broken. A weak cool front that is basically more of a wind shift, will ease its way into northern Illinois midday Saturday, but this should have little impact on temperatures. The 925mb temperatures forecast midday Saturday are again at near to record values for the time of year at 12C-14C which should support highs back at the cusp of or into record territory. Thin high clouds may spread into mainly the southern forecast area Saturday morning though with little impact. So have further warmed the forecast as most guidance seems once again too cool. The warmest highs of mid 60s are forecast ahead of the surface wind shift in the eastern area. Confidence in whether a lake breeze will develop Saturday is low as boundary layer westerly winds look to be at the speed threshold to prevent a lake breeze from moving inland. So while confidence is low in a lake breeze developing, if it develops, it would likely not progress very far inland and also be more of a mid to late afternoon feature. Thus impacts on highs seem limited and given a warm starting point, still have highs in downtown Chicago forecast to reach 60 early in the afternoon. MTF && .LONG TERM... 326 PM CST Saturday night through Friday... No weather concerns through Sunday night from an impact perspective, with concern next week on periodic precipitation chances, and a chance for isolated thunderstorms late Monday through Monday night. Throughout the forecast, focus was on continued spring-like and likely at times record breaking warmth. For reference to daily record warm temperatures, see Climate AFD below. In general, highly amplified pattern with anomalous mid and upper ridging over the central and eastern CONUS will remain with us through Thursday, with changes finally on the way on Friday. On Saturday night into Sunday morning, a weak surface ridge will bring decent radiational cooling after a mild Saturday evening. Favored cool spots in northern Illinois should dip down to or just below freezing, with the rest of the area in the mid to upper 30s for lows. Very weak flow will be in place at the surface and aloft on Sunday thanks to the surface high pressure ridge, presenting a very good setup for early lake breeze formation and passage. Highs inland away from the lake should soar into the 60s once again under full sun. But along the immediate lake shore and a few miles inland, the early lake breeze passage is expected to limit highs to the mid to upper 40s. Warming should be quick enough until lake cooling arrives at O`Hare for another 60 degree there, but it could be close. In addition to the extreme warmth likely on Monday, attention to start next work week turns to possible impacts from an elongated positively tilted trough, with parent surface low well to the north. This is where differences in the guidance creep in, with GFS/NAM on faster side of envelope and ECMWF/GEM on slower side. With strength of ridging over the area and amplification of it likely ahead of the trough, do wonder if the slower solutions will end up being closer to reality. However, it is far enough out to bring in some chance PoPs into the northwest 1/3 to 1/2 of the CWA Monday afternoon and Monday evening. With thermal profiles progged on slower guidance at or above that what occurred today, 70 degree readings are distinctly possible, especially south of I-80. With that said, given uncertainty, favored largely mid to upper 60s (low 60s far north), except for the Illinois shore likely kept several degrees cooler (50s) by gusty southeast winds. Rain showers are then likely to progress eastward across the CWA later Monday night into Tuesday. In the period of shower potential late Monday through Monday night, added in slight chance/isolated thunder given decent low level jet, dew points into 50s and cold enough temperatures at mid-levels for sufficient MUCAPE. There will be literally no cooling of the air mass behind Tuesday`s "cold" front passage, with another bout of readings well into 60s area wide possible Wednesday. A change in the pattern will finally be in the works late in the week, with the formation of a strong surface low over the Plains as a deep trough carves across the West. The unseasonable warmth will likely continue through Friday as we probably stay on the warm side of the system, with rain increasingly likely, followed by a return of much cooler weather in the wake of the system beyond day 7. Castro && .CLIMATE... 142 PM CST An unseasonably warm stretch that has already broke daily records on Friday February 17th will continue, with probable more breaking of records. Here are statistics on daily records. Chicago: Rockford: High: High Min: High: High Min: 2/18: 62 (1981) 45 (1981) 58 (1981) 38 (1997) 2/19: 65 (1930) 51 (1994) 63 (1930) 42 (1994) 2/20: 64 (1930) 49 (1930) 61 (1983) 46 (1930) 2/21: 67 (1930) 47 (1930) 64 (1930) 42 (1930) For more, including February warmth on consecutive days, see our web top news headline or Public Information Statement. KMD/RC && .AVIATION... For the 18Z TAFs... The weather pattern provides limited concerns and those are only low-level wind shear tonight and the possibility of a lake breeze Saturday afternoon. Southwest winds will show more gusts beginning by 19Z as mixing deepens. The pressure gradient remains strong enough this evening to keep surface sustained speeds at 10-12 kt though gusts should be more sporadic. A stout southwest low-level jet is forecast to develop tonight with 40-45 kt forecast between 700-3000 ft. Given the jet within a 1000 ft of the surface and surface speeds easing, have included LLWS in the TAFs for late this evening into overnight. This should ease quickly during the pre-dawn hours as the jet translates east of the area. Westerly surface winds on Saturday will be less in speed than today`s winds, presenting the potential for lake breeze development Saturday afternoon. However, we expect enough of an offshore component in the wind to keep the lake breeze close to shore, thus not forecasting a wind shift at the TAF sites. MTF && .MARINE... 334 PM CST No significant marine concerns until next week. Southwest winds will increase to 15 to 25 kt tonight and then veer west and diminish Saturday following a weak cold front passage. Light winds favorable for lake breeze influence are favored for Sunday with high pressure ridging over the region. Winds will turn southeast synoptically Sunday night into Monday as the ridge shifts east and low pressure over the Plains lifts north-northeast. Southeast winds should increase to up to 25 kt Monday afternoon and then to 30 kt or so Monday night while shifting south. Very mild air over the lake should result in stable conditions and limit gustiness above sustained speeds. Winds will shift west and diminish on Tuesday following cold front passage. Another strong low pressure system will likely affect the region late next week with increasing winds. Castro && .LOT WATCHES/WARNINGS/ADVISORIES... IL...NONE. IN...NONE. LM...NONE. && $$ VISIT US AT HTTP://WEATHER.GOV/CHICAGO (ALL LOWERCASE) FOLLOW US ON FACEBOOK...TWITTER...AND YOUTUBE AT: WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/NWSCHICAGO WWW.TWITTER.COM/NWSCHICAGO WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/NWSCHICAGO

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Today, after spending 8 months and $11,000 on school, I was denied a job in my chosen career field. They told me they decided to go with someone with more experience. So who got the job? One of my classmates. This is her first job. EVER. FML
By alphafoxy21 / Thursday 5 May 2011 06:54 / United States
Top comments
should've tried for an internship.
Or she had better grades than you, a better interview, better personality, better connections, etc.
Shoulda fucked the boss! Oh wait... She beat you to that...
I don't get it..
shes prolly better looking than you ..
Dont work until you actually need to .... Fyl
Be a guy and sleep with your boss ;)
haha #43. you might have to go down to motivate the boss into hiring you
Wow, those are a couple of silly comments.
first off you have no picture have some common sense and get one before trying to make a point. Secondly, have you ever worked or for that matter, worked with someone who's never held a job before? Most people who've never held a job don't understand work ethics and a sense of urgency to get a job done. From the sounds of it if this is this girls first job ever then she's probably been babied her whole life while mommy and daddy paid for everything so she doesn't understand the value of a dollar and how hard it is to work for it. That clear up my "lack" of common sense or was that too hard for you to follow?
For one most people I know excel at their first job as they don't want to make a mistake and in this economy to have a job before like a real issuing job is understandable. Plus she probably just studied harder and got better grades than op. So really to say that she was babied is more than likely wrong. If she was babied she probably wouldn't be in college cause her grades were not adequate. So in final note don't judge someone you don't know. If you didnt understand then how bout this, just shut the fuck up.
and that was to you mitcha
Since you are just starting out, there will be a lot more rejections and disappointments. Get used to it and learn to move on. Just keep looking and I am sure that you will find a job that suits you.
By PokeMandee
8 months? I've been in college 4 years, and still have 2-3 years left, and I can't get a job. 8 months is nothing to cry about.
8 months are usually for technical and trade schools. And they do cost about $11,0000. OP probably went to Everest Institute. Most people would say $11,000 and 8 months of your life IS something to cry about.
do you prefer to wait 8 months or the 7 years to get a job in your field?
Your age and years in college do not seem to correlate.
16, obviously you're missing the big picture
Literally or figuratively?
both ;) lol
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Oxford American Handbook of Otolaryngology
By (author) Andrew Blitzer Jerome Schwartz Phillip Song
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State Snapshot: Visiting Pennsylvania's Colleges & Universities
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IP Strategies International Patent Attorneys
Attorney, Copyright, Trade Marks
Anything that you use to distinguish your business from other traders is in effect a trade mark. So why not register it? This is the quickest and most effective (and cost-effective) form of protection.
There is a new system of business name registration to be implemented in Australia by 28 May 2012. This is creating some concern about competing rights of business name registrants who until now have had registrations for the same name on different state registers. Under the new system there is only to be one Federal register, meaning that as a consequence those two or more different owners will be listed as proprietors of the same name. If you haven't already done so, you could try and reserve your exclusive rights to the use of the name as a trademark of your business by registering it as a trademark.
This could put you in the pound seat in regard to that name.
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To find out about your particular situation, why not give Kevin Ashby a call?
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