text:
WHY DO MORE OPEN ECONOMIES HAVE BIGGER GOVERNMENTS? Dani Rodrik. Harvard University
- Philip Stevenson
- 2 years ago
- Views:
1 Forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy WHY DO MORE OPEN ECONOMIES HAVE BIGGER GOVERNMENTS? Dani Rodrik Harvard University February 1996 Revised, March 1996 Revised April 1997 This revision, January 1998 Mailing address: John F. Kennedy School of Government, 79 Kennedy Street, Cambridge, MA Phone: (617) Fax: (617)
2 WHY DO MORE OPEN ECONOMIES HAVE BIGGER GOVERNMENTS? ABSTRACT There exists a positive correlation between an economy s exposure to international trade and the size of its government. The correlation holds for most measures of government spending, in lowas well as high-income samples, and is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls. One explanation is that government spending plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to significant amount of external risk. The paper provides a range of evidence consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, the relationship between openness and government size is strongest when terms-of-trade risk is highest. Dani Rodrik Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government 79 Kennedy Street Cambridge, MA 0138 (617) Fax: (617)
3 WHY DO MORE OPEN ECONOMIES HAVE BIGGER GOVERNMENTS? I. Introduction This paper documents a little-known empirical regularity and provides a plausible explanation for it. The regularity consists of a surprisingly strong and robust association between an economy's exposure to foreign trade and the size of its government. The explanation is that government expenditures are used to provide social insurance against external risk. The claim that there is a positive association between trade exposure and the scope of government is at first sight surprising. It is widely presumed that the effectiveness of government intervention is lower in economies that are highly integrated with the world economy. This would suggest a negative correlation between the volume of trade and the scope of government. Yet the small, highly open economies of central and northern Europe (e.g., Austria, Netherlands, Norway) have some of the world's highest shares of government spending in GDP. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the European pattern is not an exception. There is a positive and robust partial correlation between openness, as measured by the share of trade in GDP, and the scope of government, as measured by the share of government expenditure in GDP. The correlation is robust in the sense that: (a) it is unaffected by the inclusion of other control variables; (b) it exists for measures of government spending drawn from all available datasets; (c) it prevails for both low- and high-income countries; and (d) it is not an artifact created by outliers. In addition, openness in the early 1960s is a statistically significant predictor of the expansion of government consumption over the subsequent three decades. The explanation that best fits the evidence is one that focusses on the role of external risk. Societies seem to demand (and receive) an expanded government role as the price for accepting larger doses of external risk. In other words, government spending appears to provide social insurance in economies subject to external shocks. The central evidence in favor of this explanation comes from regressions in which openness is interacted with two measures of
4 external risk, volatility of the terms of trade and the product concentration of exports. In each case, the interaction term is strongly significant (and the fit of the regression improves) while the coefficient on openness per se becomes insignificant or negative. The same result is confirmed in panel regressions with fixed effects for time periods and countries. Hence, unlike other explanations for the correlation between openness and government size, this one receives considerable support. If the key argument advanced in this paper is valid, a number of ancillary hypotheses follow. First, increases in external risk must lead to greater volatility in domestic income and consumption. Second, a larger share of government purchases of goods and services in GDP must reduce income volatility. Third, the risk-mitigating role of government spending should be displayed most prominently in social security and welfare spending, particularly in the advanced countries that possess the requisite administrative capability to manage social welfare systems. Fourth, causality should run from exposure to external risk to government spending. I provide evidence in favor of each of these propositions. I also provide a simple general-equilibrium model that clarifies how government consumption can alleviate exposure to external risk under certain plausible conditions. An important precursor to this paper is a study by David Cameron published in 1978 (Cameron 1978). Cameron showed that the best single predictor of the increase in an OECD government's tax revenue (as a share of GDP) between 1960 and 1975 was the economy's openness in 1960 (exports plus imports divided by GDP), with a correlation coefficient of By way of explanation, Cameron argued that more open economies have higher rates of industrial concentration, which tend to foster higher unionization, greater scope for collective bargaining, and stronger labor confederations. These in turn result in larger demands for government transfers--social security, pensions, unemployment insurance, job training, etc-- which mitigate external risk.
5 Cameron's study was limited to 18 OECD countries, and his explanation for the finding is probably too specific to be relevant to our 100-plus country sample. In particular, it may not be plausible to attach such importance to the role of labor organizations in most developing countries. Further, the empirical relationship between openness and government spending holds for government consumption as well, and not just for transfers on which Cameron based his argument. Nonetheless, the hypothesis advanced here is consistent with the idea, considered also by Cameron, that public spending is a risk-reducing instrument on which there is greater reliance in more open economies (see also Bates, Brock, and Tiefenthaler 1991). The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II demonstrates the close association between openness and various measures of government spending. Focussing on government consumption, section III analyzes the robustness of the association, as well as testing for (and dismissing) some alternative explanations for the association. Section IV discusses the analytics of the central hypothesis of the paper, and provides evidence on both the central and ancillary hypotheses mentioned above. Section V concludes. II. The evidence Figure 1 shows the simple relationship between openness and government spending in a sample of 3 OECD countries. The vertical axis represents government spending as a share of GDP, excluding interest payments, averaged over the period. Along the horizontal axis is shown the share of exports plus imports in GDP, averaged over the decade Data are from the World Bank's World Data 1995 for government spending, and from Penn World Tables 5.6 for openness. The figure reveals an unmistakable positive association between openness and size of government. A semi-logarithmic regression equation fits the data extremely well, explaining 44 percent of the cross-country variance in government expenditures. The United States and Japan are at one end of the distribution with the lowest trade shares in GDP and (along with Turkey and
6 4 Canada) the lowest shares of government spending. Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands are at the other end with very high degrees of openness and large government. Aside from Cameron (1978), earlier studies that have found a correlation between openness and the size of the public sector for the OECD countries include Schmidt (1983) and OECD (1985). Figure 1 shows that the correlation continued to hold as of the early 1990s. Could the association between openness and the scope of government be a spurious one? The OECD evidence is in fact fragile against alternative hypotheses, such as the following: (a) small countries have larger government shares and are at the same time more open; or (b) European countries have large government sectors (for social and cultural reasons) and are also more open due to the presence of a common market among members of the European Union. The small size of the OECD sample rules out testing these various hypotheses meaningfully against each other. When population and a dummy for European countries is added to the regression for the OECD sample, the coefficient on openness remains significant only at the 90 percent level. We now turn to a broader sample of countries, for which the sample size should be less constraining. My preferred measure of government for the larger sample is real government consumption from the Penn World Tables. These data have a couple of advantages. They are available for a much larger group of countries than the World Bank data. In addition, they are free of biases arising from cross-country differences in the relative price of government purchases. Two countries with identical levels of real government purchases will appear to have very different shares of government in GDP if the price index for such purchases relative to the GDP deflator differs. The disadvantage is that this measure of government includes only 1 consumption, and excludes income transfers and public investment. I show results for public investment as well in passing, for comparison purposes. Results for more disaggregated levels of government spending will be shown later.
7 5 Previous studies on the determinants of government spending in large cross-sections of countries have focussed on a number of explanatory variables. According to Wagner's law, for example, the demand for government services is income elastic, so that the share of government consumption in GDP is expected to rise with income. Other variables typically considered are demographic and structural indicators. See for example Tait and Heller (198), Ram (1987), and Heller and Diamond (1990). In light of these studies, our benchmark regression includes the following explanatory variables in addition to openness: per-capita GDP (GDPSH5xx); the dependency ratio in the population (DEPEND90); the urbanization rate (URBAN90); a dummy for socialist countries (SOC); a dummy for OECD members (OECD); and dummies for geographical regions (LAAM, ASIAE, SAFRICA for Latin America, East Asia, and sub-saharan Africa, respectively). These variables were selected after some experimentation to achieve the best overall fit for the regression (but without regard for the significance of the coefficient on openness), within the constraints of data availability. In addition to the variables just discussed, the regressions also include a measure of openness (OPENAVGxxyy), which is the ratio of trade (sum of imports and exports) to GDP, averaged over the prior decade. Aside from the Penn World Tables, Barro and Lee (1994) and the World Bank's World Data 1995 are the main sources for the data. More detail on the sources is provided in the appendix. The dependent variable in most of these regressions is a three- or five-year average of real government consumption (as a share of GDP) expressed in international prices (CGAVGxxyy). The sample consists of all countries included in the Penn World Tables (version 5.6a) for which the requisite data exist. I have excluded observations for which the openness ratio exceeds 00 percent. This cutoff has very little significance for the actual results as it leads to the exclusion of only one observation, that for Hong Kong in the regressions. Table 1 displays the benchmark results. The first two columns relate shares of government consumption in GDP to the previous decade s openness during two periods, 1990-
8 9 and I present results for the period alongside those for because the sample size is larger than in the later period (15 versus 103 countries). The fit of the regressions is generally good, with an adjusted R of Contrary to Wagner s law, per- capita income enters with a negative sign as a determinant of government consumption in both 6 periods, but is only statistically significant at the 90 percent level for The dependency ratio enters positively and is statistically significant at the 99 percent for both periods. Urbanization enters negatively and is significant at the 95 percent level in and at the 90 percent level in The dummy for socialist countries has a positive coefficient, but is not significant at conventional levels. Neither is the dummy for OECD countries. The regional dummies are all statistically significant at the 95 percent level in , but not in We are mainly interested in the estimated coefficient on openness. This coefficient turns out to be positive and highly significant in both cases--at the 99.9 percent level of confidence! The estimated elasticity is a bit larger than 0., implying that a share of total trade (exports plus imports) in GDP that is larger by 10 percent is associated with a share of government consumption in GDP that is higher by percent. Perhaps a better sense of the quantitative significance of this elasticity can be obtained from the following calculation. The median shares of government consumption and openness in our sample are around 18 percent and 60 percent, respectively. A country whose openness is 80 percent (a difference of 33.3% from the median, corresponding to an increase in the share of imports by 10% of GDP), would be expected to have a level government consumption which is larger than the median by 1. percent of GDP (0.333x0.x0.18)--an increase from 18 to 19. percent of GDP. Whether this is a large or modest effect can be debated, but it is relatively tightly estimated. A 95 percent confidence interval from the regression would place the true elasticity between and The next two columns show regressions where the dependent variable is now government investment (as a share of GDP). The same set of independent variables as before
9 7 is used, and results are reported for both and The data, which come from the World Data 1995 of the World Bank are available for a smaller group of countries and have the relative-price problem noted before. Nonetheless the results are interesting, and provide a useful complement to those for government consumption. The estimated coefficients on openness are positive and statistically significant as before. Moreover, they are quite a bit larger in magnitude and 0.83 respectively. In column (5) of Table 1 we see that openness during the early 1960s can also explain the subsequent increase in government consumption. The dependent variable here is the ratio of the government consumption share in GDP in to that in For most countries, this ratio is greater than one, indicating an expansion of government in the last three decades. The independent variables include the initial share of government consumption as well as initial openness (in ). The adjusted R of the regression is quite respectable at The estimated coefficient on initial government is strongly negative, implying a (conditional) convergence effect on government spending. More importantly from our perspective, the estimated coefficient on initial openness is positive and significant at the 99 percent level. Hence, not only is openness an important determinant of government consumption levels across countries, openness in the early 1960s turns out to be a significant predictor of the expansion of government consumption in the subsequent three decades. The final column of Table 1 repeats the previous regression replacing the increase in government consumption with the increase in openness as the dependent variable. The point of this exercise is to check whether the previous regressions may have been capturing the effect of government spending on openness, rather than vice versa. However, it turns out that the level of government consumption in has no predictive power for the increase in openness over the following three decades. The estimated coefficient on government consumption in is actually negative (but far from significant). It seems that it is openness early on that
10 8 determines subsequent size of government, not the other way around. Using World Bank data, Table shows the relationship between openness and disaggregated categories of government spending. The evidence shows that openness has a statistically significant association with most types of government spending, including general public services, education, health, housing and community amenities, and economic affairs and services. The estimated coefficients are generally significant at the 99 percent level of confidence. Openness does not enter significantly in the regression for social security and welfare spending, but it does so in the regression (not shown). The only major spending item which does not exhibit a statistically significant correlation with openness in either period is interest payments on the public debt. More detail on the disaggregated data is provided in Rodrik (1997a). Finally, we note that the association between openness and government size apparently exists in all available data sets. These include the Penn World Tables and the World Bank's World Data 1995, as noted above. In addition, UNESCO data on government spending on education exhibit a strong positive correlation with openness. The same is true for IMF data on government revenue as well: more open economies have larger tax/gdp ratios, holding other characteristics constant (see also Tanzi 199). Government employment (as a share of the labor force) is also positively correlated with openness See Rodrik (1997a and 1997b) for studies that cover these additional data sources. III. Probing deeper: some hypotheses and checks of robustness One aspect of robustness has already been discussed: the correlation betwen exposure to trade and scope of government spans a wide range of data sets and exists for different measures of government size. In this section we will experiment with various versions of the benchmark regressions reported in Table 1, and in doing so also check for the validity of some
11 9 possible explanations for the association. Table 3 reports the results of various experiments with the benchmark specification. We use the equation for government consumption, as this covers the largest number of countries (15). The first column of Table 3 reproduces the coefficient estimate on the openness variable from column () of Table 1, for purposes of comparison with later columns. Note that these regressions include the complete set of independent variables considered in Table 1, but the estimated coefficients for the other independent variables are not shown in the table to avoid clutter. The next two columns of the table show the results of splitting the sample into two subsamples of roughly equal size according to level of income, using $500 in 1985 dollars as the cutoff. The coefficient on openness is virtually identical for the two income groups, and it remains statistically significant at the 99 percent level for both sub-samples. Hence the relationship between openness and government consumption exists for both the lower- and higher-income halves of the sample. The remaining columns check whether the coefficient on openness remains stable and statistically significant when additional candidate explanatory variables are included in the regression. We first consider the possible influence of country size. Columns (4) and (5) experiment with two different measures of country size: land area (AREA) and population (POP85). (Note that since all variables are included in logs, and per-capita income is already a regressor, there is no point in including total GDP once population has already been added.) The idea behind including these variables is to test whether the observed correlation between openness and government size is due to the following possibility: Assume that the provision of public services is subject to significant indivisibilities--e.g., every country, regardless of size, needs one parliament. Then government size as a share of GDP will be negatively correlated with country size (see, for example, Alesina and Wacziarg 1997). Since openness is negatively
12 10 correlated with country size as well, the observed association between openness and government spending could be spurious and due to the omission of a size variable. However, there is no evidence that something like this is at work here. Both of the size variables enter with a positive sign, and the estimated coefficient on land area is actually highly significant. But in both cases the coefficient on openness remains statistically significant. With land area included, the openness coefficient actually increases in magnitude significantly (to 0.34). Column (6) checks for the possibility that openness increases government spending by enhancing the economy's ability to borrow from external sources. If the penalty to be suffered by a sovereign debtor (from trade sanctions, say) increases with the economy's dependence on trade, which seems plausible, external credit rationing will tend to be less binding in more open economies. In such economies, the government can borrow more and spend more, assuming that it views spending as inherently desirable. To control for this possibility, the debt-gnp ratio is included as an independent variable (DETGNP85). The estimated coefficient on the debt-gnp ratio is positive and significant at the 90 percent level, so there is some support for the theoretical prediction. However, the coefficient on openness remains unchanged and highly significant. Another hypothesis is that more open economies have lower inflation and, because of that, a larger tax base. Under high inflation conditions, the government's tax base erodes both as a result of delays in tax payments in unindexed systems (the Olivera-Tanzi effect) and as a consequence of the shrinkage of the formal sector at the expense of the informal sector. The regression in column (7) includes the average inflation rate during on the right-hand side to check for this possibility. The estimated coefficient on inflation turns out to be insignificant, while the coefficient on openness remains unaffected. Next we consider that trade itself may be a convenient tax handle for governments in poor countries which have difficulty raising taxes from other sources. Openness may then allow
13 11 for higher levels of government spending by allowing higher level of tax revenues. Restricting the sample now to developing countries, for which the hypothesis is primarily relevant, we check whether openness exerts an effect on government consumption, once the level of trade taxes is controlled for. Column (8) shows the result of including trade tax revenues (as a share of GDP) as an additional independent variable (INTL8688). This variable covers all revenue from trade sources, including import duties and export taxes. The estimated coefficient on it turns out to be negative (and statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level). The coefficient on openness increases in magnitude and remains highly significant. While the sign on trade taxes may be surprising, what seems to be going on is the following: governments that raise a lot of revenue from trade (even after controlling for per-capita income) tend to have very few other tax handles, and therefore their ability to spend tends to be severely restricted. Further evidence for this interpretation comes from column (9), which includes the share of trade taxes in all tax revenues on the right-hand side (INTL8688/TOTAL8688). The estimated coefficient on this variable is negative and significant at the 99 percent level. Including this particular variable in the regression also results in raising the t-statistic on the openness elasticity to above 5! A related version of the previous argument is that large trade volumes may help governments collect higher revenues from indirect taxes such as sales taxes and VAT. In many poor countries, such taxes are collected disproportionately at the border. To check for this possibility I control for indirect tax revenues including VAT (both as a share of GDP and as a share of total tax revenues) in columns (10) and (11). The estimated coefficient on openness remains unaffected. I also check for the possibility that the correlation is due to resource rents or other revenue derived by the government from export activities. Columns (1) and (13) introduce the share of primary products in total exports (PRIMSHR85) and a dummy for oil exporting countries (OIL), and in neither case is the coefficient on openness affected. I have also used a direct
14 1 measure of export tax revenues (not shown), with similar results. Finally, what about the possibility of outliers? Figure displays the partial relationship between openness and government consumption--partial in the sense that other determinants of government consumption are controlled for--generated by the regression in column (4) of Table 3. There are 115 countries in this figure, and some of them have been identified by country codes to give the reader a sense of where different countries stand. The figure is a good way of summing up what we have so learned so far: there is a tight and robust empirical association between openness to trade and government consumption (as a share of GDP) in a large crosssection of countries. Further, the figure makes clear that the result is not driven by the presence of outliers: the 115-country sample covers practically the full range of our measures of openness and government consumption. IV. A possible explanation: social Insurance against external risk Hence the statistical association between openness and government spending appears to be a robust one. It is not a spurious relationship generated by omitted variables. Nor is it an artifact of the sample of countries selected or of a specific data source. The question is why this relationship exists. One plausible answer, which I will show below is consistent with the evidence, is the following. More open economies have greater exposure to the risks emanating from turbulence in world markets. We can view larger government spending in such economies as performing an insulation function, insofar as the government sector is the "safe" sector (in terms of employment and purchases from the rest of the economy) relative to other activities, and especially compared to tradables. Hence in countries significantly affected by external shocks the government can mitigate risk by taking command of a larger share of the economy's resources. To fix ideas, consider the following framework. Divide the economy into three sectors:
15 13 private tradables, private non-tradables, and the government sector. Think of a representative extended household in this economy as having claims on income streams from each of these three types of activities. The larger the share of government consumption in the economy, the larger the share of the household's total income that derives from the government sector. Can a (permanently) higher share of government consumption mitigate the representative household's exposure to external risk in such an economy? And when will it be optimal for the government to reduce risk in this fashion? Assume that the government sector is the "safe" sector in a sense that will be made more precise empirically later on. Suppose, in the extreme, that employment and incomes in the government sector are stable and uncorrelated with any of the shocks to which the economy is subjected. Under these circumstances, some of the riskiness in the household's income due to external shocks can be mitigated by having a larger government sector. And if the government acts as the agent of households which dislike risk, it will choose to consume a greater share of the society's resources in economies that are subject to greater amounts of external risk. I will illustrate this argument with a simple model below. In principle, external risk should be diversifiable for small countries through participation in international capital markets. In practice, this does not appear to be the case. Karen Lewis summarizes the literature on international portfolio diversification thus (1995, 1914): "recent evidence shows that domestic investors continue to hold almost all of their wealth in domestic assets." For the majority of the countries in our sample, the reason may be that full capital market openness conflicts with other objectives of government policy, or that incentive and sovereign-risk problems restrict the range and extent of financial instruments available to them. For others, the apparent incompleteness of international portfolio diversification remains a puzzle--indeed a central puzzle in the theory of international finance (Lewis 1995). The empirical implications of perfect international consumption risk-sharing--that consumption growth rates
16 14 should be unaffected by country-specific shocks--are usually rejected by the data even for the advanced industrial countries with completely liberalized financial markets (Obstfeld 1995; Lewis 1995). One might also object that the government's risk-reducing role would be best played through the establishment of a safety net, in which case it would show up mainly in government spending on social security and welfare, and not in government consumption. I will show below that this prediction is borne out in the case of the more advanced countries, which do have the administrative capacity to manage social welfare systems. In these countries, government consumption is uncorrelated with exposure to external risk, while spending on social security and welfare is strongly correlated. But governments in the developing countries which predominate in our cross section appear to rely on a broader set of instrumentalities--including, notably, public employment--to achieve risk reduction. Even accepting that full diversification through participation in international capital markets is realistically not possible, the story outlined above makes two leaps of faith. One is that economies subject to greater amounts of external risk necessarily experience more risk in total income as well, the latter being what really matters to the representative household. The second is that the government sector is "safe" in the sense that an expansion in it would reduce aggregate income risk. Neither of these propositions is obvious, but I will present evidence below that suggests they are both empirically valid. A. A simple model Consider an economy with a fixed supply x of an export good, and which produces two additional goods: a publicly-provided good and a private good. The economy also has a labor endowment normalized to unity, with 8 employed in the public sector and 1-8 in the private sector. Let B denote the (stochastic) price of the export good in terms of the import good (i.e.,
17 15 the terms of trade). We assume that the export good is not consumed at home, and that the import good is not produced domestically. Trade is balanced continuously, so the home economy purchases Bx quantity of imports. We treat imports as intermediate goods and assume that they increase the productivity of private production domestically. We take the production function for the private good to be linear in labor, and write it as Bx(1-8). Note that by making domestic productivity a function of the level of imports, we have captured one plausible channel through which trade risk spills over to the domestic economy. There is strong evidence of such spillovers in the data, as we shall see later (section IV.D). (Expressing private production as a linearly homogeneous production function f(bx, 1-8) would not alter any of the qualitative results below, but would add several terms to the algebra.) Finally, the supply of the publicly-provided good is given by h(8), with h'> 0 and h''<0. The government determines the size of the public sector (8) before the specific realization of B is known. We can view this as the optimal determination of the size of the public sector in view of the underlying variability of the terms of trade. For simplicity, let the publicly-provided good and the private good be perfect substitutes in consumption. The government's problem is the following: Max 8 V(8) / E[u(h(8) % Bx(1&8))] where u(.) stands for the utility function of the representative household, with u'(.) > 0 and u''(.) < 0. Let B be distributed with mean B m and variance F. Taking a second-order Taylor approximation to u(h(8) + Bx(1-8)) around B, and taking expectations, we can express V(8) as m follows: V(8). u(h(8) % B m x(1&8)) % 1 u)) (h(8) % B m x(1&8)) (1&8) x F
18 Expected utility is decreasing in the variance of the terms of trade. Define R = xf as our measure of exposure to external risk. The associated first-order condition is: 16 [u ) (.) % 1 u))) (.) (1&8) R ] (h ) (8) & B m x) & 1 u)) (.) R ' 0. A sufficient condition for the first term in square brackets to be positive is that the representative household exhibit "prudence" in consumption (i.e., that u'''(.) > 0), which we assume. A direct implication is that exposure to external risk (R > 0) results in the optimal level of 8 to be larger. Hence consider two economies A and B, with R A = 0 and R B > 0, but identical in all other respects. The first-order condition for the A-economy simplifies to h'(8 A ) = Bmx. For the B- economy, h'(8 ) < B x. Since h''(.) < 0, we have 8 > 8. B m B A Standard portfolio arguments suggest that an increase in the riskiness of exports calls for a reallocation of the economy's resources towards the safe activity (government), even when the 3 return to government activities lies below the (mean) return to other activities. I have shown this result in a model with a fixed supply of exports. In a model in which export supply is variable, and exports compete for resources with the government sector, the risk-reducing effect of government consumption would be even more direct and immediate. B. Empirical tests of the central hypothesis A test of our central hypothesis can be carried out by checking whether the relationship between openness and government consumption is stronger in economies which are exposed to greater amounts of external risk. For this we need empirical proxies for exposure to external risk. There are two such measures which I use here. One is terms-of trade risk, which is the measure used in the model above. In an economy with no market imperfections, a measure of the volatility of the streams of income
19 17 associated with fluctuations in the external terms of trade would not only be the theoretically appropriate measure of external risk, it would be the only relevant measure of such risk. More formally, let x, m, and y stand for volumes of exports, imports and GDP, respectively. Let B be the natural logarithm of the price of exports relative to imports (the terms of trade). Let the log of the terms of trade follow a random walk, possibly with drift (a hypothesis which cannot be rejected for most countries). The unanticipated component of the income effects of a terms of trade change can then be expressed (as a percentage of GDP) as ½[(x+m)/y][dB - "], where " is the trend growth rate in the terms of trade. The standard deviation of this is ½[(x+m)/y] x st.dev.(db). Hence, interacting our measure of openness ([x+m]/y) with the standard deviation of the first (log) differences in the terms of trade gives us (twice) the appropriate measure of external risk. The second measure I use is a quantity-based measure, and it is an index of the product concentration of exports. More specifically, it is a Gini-Hirschman index of concentration defined over 39 three-digit SITC categories of exports, as calculated by UNCTAD. Countries which export only a few commodities are presumably more exposed to external risk than countries with a diversified set of exports, in a way that need not necessarily show in fluctuations in the terms of trade. So the second measure of external risk is generated by interacting openness with this concentration index. In practice, however, the two measures turn out to be very closely related (with a correlation coefficient close to 0.8). The basic strategy in the next set of regressions, then, is to interact with openness (a) the terms-of-trade variability, and (b) the product concentration of exports to see whether the inclusion of these additional variables results in statistically significant coefficients and improves the fit of the regressions. Table 4 shows the results for the sample. The first column of the table displays the benchmark regression for government consumption, to facilitate comparison with the new regressions in the rest of the table. (Note that OPENAVG8089 is not in
20 18 logs in this version of the benchmark, to allow for the inclusion of the new variables both on their own and in interaction with openness.) Column () of the table displays the results when the export concentration index (CI90) is added to the regression, both individually and interacted with openness. We note that the adjusted R rises somewhat, and as predicted by the risk-mitigating hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Equally important, the coefficient on openness (entered alone) has now become completely insignificant. Hence we have rather clear confirmation that the effect of openness on government consumption is strongest in countries with more concentrated exports. The results with terms-of-trade risk (TOTDLOGSTD) are even more striking (column 3). When this variable is included, the improvement in the fit of the regression is sizable (with the adjusted R rising from to 0.445). The interaction term is significant at the 99 percent level, while the estimated coefficient on openness now turns negative. These results are particularly encouraging in light of the fact that, as discussed above, this particular interaction term is the theoretically appropriate measure of external risk for an open economy. In fact when the terms of trade and export concentration measures of risk are included simultaneously in the regression (column 4), it is terms-of-trade risk that does all the work--despite the high correlation between the two. Results using the sample (not shown) are, if anything, stronger: both measures of external risk are statistically significant at the 99 percent level; and once again there is strong indication that it is terms-of-trade risk which is the operative channel. The remaining two columns of Table 4 check for the possibility that our measures of external risk may be proxying for low income or for greater revenue extraction when exports are made up of predominantly primary resources. Terms-of-trade instability and export concentration are negatively correlated with per-capita income and positively correlated with the primarycommodity share of exports. Our interaction terms could be capturing a non-linearity in income,
Life Cycle Asset Allocation A Suitable Approach for Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Life Cycle Asset Allocation A Suitable Approach for Defined Contribution Pension Plans Challenges for defined contribution plans While Eastern Europe is a prominent example of the importance of definedMore information
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Fiscal Policy and Management in East Asia, NBER-EASE, Volume 16 Volume Author/Editor: TakatoshiMore information
Stock market booms and real economic activity: Is this time different?
International Review of Economics and Finance 9 (2000) 387 415 Stock market booms and real economic activity: Is this time different? Mathias Binswanger* Institute for Economics and the Environment, UniversityMore information
Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence
Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income: Deviations from Certainty Equivalence Zeldes, QJE 1989 Background (Not in Paper) Income Uncertainty dates back to even earlier years, with the seminal work ofMore information
Is the Forward Exchange Rate a Useful Indicator of the Future Exchange Rate?
Is the Forward Exchange Rate a Useful Indicator of the Future Exchange Rate? Emily Polito, Trinity College In the past two decades, there have been many empirical studies both in support of and opposingMore information
Trade and the Demand for Social Insurance
4 Trade and the Demand for Social Insurance If increased international economic integration has constituted a key aspect of the postwar experience, a second striking feature has been the growth of government.More information
External Debt and Growth
External Debt and Growth Catherine Pattillo, Hélène Poirson and Luca Ricci Reasonable levels of external debt that help finance productive investment may be expected to enhance growth, but beyond certainMore information
The Elasticity of Taxable Income: A Non-Technical Summary
The Elasticity of Taxable Income: A Non-Technical Summary John Creedy The University of Melbourne Abstract This paper provides a non-technical summary of the concept of the elasticity of taxable income,More information
Inflation. Chapter 8. 8.1 Money Supply and Demand
Chapter 8 Inflation This chapter examines the causes and consequences of inflation. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 relate inflation to money supply and demand. Although the presentation differs somewhat from thatMore information
FDI as a source of finance in imperfect capital markets Firm-Level Evidence from Argentina
FDI as a source of finance in imperfect capital markets Firm-Level Evidence from Argentina Paula Bustos CREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra September 2007 Abstract In this paper I analyze the financing andMore information
Abstract THE IMPACT OF MACROECONOMIC FACTORS ON NON-PERFORMING LOANS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA Dorina CLICHICI 44 Tatiana COLESNICOVA 45 The purpose of this research is to estimate the impact of severalMore information
How Much Equity Does the Government Hold?
How Much Equity Does the Government Hold? Alan J. Auerbach University of California, Berkeley and NBER January 2004 This paper was presented at the 2004 Meetings of the American Economic Association. IMore information
3. WHY DOES DOMESTIC SAVING MATTER FOR TURKEY? 26 23. The analysis so far suggests that saving rates plunged in the 2000s, mainly due to the drop in household saving. It also established that saving inMore information
A Primer on Forecasting Business Performance
A Primer on Forecasting Business Performance There are two common approaches to forecasting: qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative forecasting methods are important when historical data is not available.More information
Do Commodity Price Spikes Cause Long-Term Inflation?
No. 11-1 Do Commodity Price Spikes Cause Long-Term Inflation? Geoffrey M.B. Tootell Abstract: This public policy brief examines the relationship between trend inflation and commodity price increases andMore information
DOES A STRONG DOLLAR INCREASE DEMAND FOR BOTH DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED GOODS? John J. Heim, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, USA
DOES A STRONG DOLLAR INCREASE DEMAND FOR BOTH DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED GOODS? John J. Heim, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, USA ABSTRACT Rising exchange rates strengthen the dollar and lowerMore information
ECON20310 LECTURE SYNOPSIS REAL BUSINESS CYCLE YUAN TIAN This synopsis is designed merely for keep a record of the materials covered in lectures. Please refer to your own lecture notes for all proofs.More information
Do Tax Cuts Boost the Economy?
Do Tax Cuts Boost the Economy? David Rosnick and Dean Baker September 2011 Center for Economic and Policy Research 1611 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20009 202-293-5380 www.cepr.netMore information
11.2 Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
518 Chapter 11 INFLATION AND MONETARY POLICY Thus, the monetary policy that is consistent with a permanent drop in inflation is a sudden upward jump in the money supply, followed by low growth. And, inMore information
SUMMARY CURRENCY-HEDGED INTERNATIONAL FIXED INCOME INVESTMENT In recent years, the management of risk in internationally diversified bond portfolios held by U.S. investors has been guided by the followingMore information
Response to Critiques of Mortgage Discrimination and FHA Loan Performance
A Response to Comments Response to Critiques of Mortgage Discrimination and FHA Loan Performance James A. Berkovec Glenn B. Canner Stuart A. Gabriel Timothy H. Hannan Abstract This response discusses theMore information
Yao Zheng University of New Orleans. Eric Osmer University of New Orleans
ABSTRACT The pricing of China Region ETFs - an empirical analysis Yao Zheng University of New Orleans Eric Osmer University of New Orleans Using a sample of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) that focus on investingMore information
Mette Aagaard Knudsen, DTU Transport, email@example.com ELASTICITY OF LONG DISTANCE TRAVELLING ABSTRACT With data from the Danish expenditure survey for 12 years 1996 through 2007, this study analysesMore information
The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share. by Michael Elsby (University of Edinburgh), Bart Hobijn (FRB SF), and Aysegul Sahin (FRB NY)
The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share by Michael Elsby (University of Edinburgh), Bart Hobijn (FRB SF), and Aysegul Sahin (FRB NY) Comments by: Brent Neiman University of Chicago Prepared for: BrookingsMore information
On the relationship between defense and non-defense spending in the U.S. during the world wars
Economics Letters 95 (2007) 415 421 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase On the relationship between defense and non-defense spending in the U.S. during the world wars Roel M.W.J. Beetsma a,, Alex CukiermanMore information
Insurance and the Macroeconomic Environment
Insurance and the Macroeconomic Environment Casper Christophersen and Petr Jakubik 1 Abstract Insurance companies play an important role in the financial sector and the availability of insurance productsMore information
Economic Growth and Government Size. Mark Pingle Professor of Economics University of Nevada, Reno. and
Economic Growth and Government Size By Mark Pingle Professor of Economics University of Nevada, Reno and Mina Mahmoudi PhD Candidate University of Nevada, Reno Short Summary There is good reason to expectMore information
Export Pricing and Credit Constraints: Theory and Evidence from Greek Firms. Online Data Appendix (not intended for publication) Elias Dinopoulos
Export Pricing and Credit Constraints: Theory and Evidence from Greek Firms Online Data Appendix (not intended for publication) Elias Dinopoulos University of Florida Sarantis Kalyvitis Athens UniversityMore information
Trade, Finance, Specialization and Synchronization: Sensitivity Analysis
Trade, Finance, Specialization and Synchronization: Sensitivity Analysis Jean Imbs London Business School and CEPR September 2003 Abstract This note contains sensitivity analyses for the results describedMore information
Practice Problems on Current Account
Practice Problems on Current Account 1- List de categories of credit items and debit items that appear in a country s current account. What is the current account balance? What is the relationship betweenMore information
Commentary: What Do Budget Deficits Do?
Commentary: What Do Budget Deficits Do? Allan H. Meltzer The title of Ball and Mankiw s paper asks: What Do Budget Deficits Do? One answer to that question is a restatement on the pure theory of debt-financedMore information
A Short review of steel demand forecasting methods
A Short review of steel demand forecasting methods Fujio John M. Tanaka This paper undertakes the present and past review of steel demand forecasting to study what methods should be used in any futureMore information
Comments on \Do We Really Know that Oil Caused the Great Stag ation? A Monetary Alternative", by Robert Barsky and Lutz Kilian
Comments on \Do We Really Know that Oil Caused the Great Stag ation? A Monetary Alternative", by Robert Barsky and Lutz Kilian Olivier Blanchard July 2001 Revisionist history is always fun. But it is notMore information
Social Security Eligibility and the Labor Supply of Elderly Immigrants. George J. Borjas Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research
Social Security Eligibility and the Labor Supply of Elderly Immigrants George J. Borjas Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research Updated for the 9th Annual Joint Conference of the RetirementMore information
Intro to Data Analysis, Economic Statistics and Econometrics
Intro to Data Analysis, Economic Statistics and Econometrics Statistics deals with the techniques for collecting and analyzing data that arise in many different contexts. Econometrics involves the developmentMore information
Gains from Trade: The Role of Composition
Gains from Trade: The Role of Composition Wyatt Brooks University of Notre Dame Pau Pujolas McMaster University February, 2015 Abstract In this paper we use production and trade data to measure gains fromMore information
Economic Development and Gains from Trade
Economics Education and Research Consortium Working Paper Series Economic Development and Gains from Trade Georgi Trofimov Working Paper No 98/06 This project (No 96-161) was supported by the EconomicsMore information
An Analysis of the Effect of Income on Life Insurance. Justin Bryan Austin Proctor Kathryn Stoklosa
An Analysis of the Effect of Income on Life Insurance Justin Bryan Austin Proctor Kathryn Stoklosa 1 Abstract This paper aims to analyze the relationship between the gross national income per capita andMore information
Do R&D or Capital Expenditures Impact Wage Inequality? Evidence from the IT Industry in Taiwan ROC
Lai, Journal of International and Global Economic Studies, 6(1), June 2013, 48-53 48 Do R&D or Capital Expenditures Impact Wage Inequality? Evidence from the IT Industry in Taiwan ROC Yu-Cheng Lai * ShihMore information
Active Versus Passive Low-Volatility Investing
Active Versus Passive Low-Volatility Investing Introduction ISSUE 3 October 013 Danny Meidan, Ph.D. (561) 775.1100 Low-volatility equity investing has gained quite a lot of interest and assets over theMore information
Money and Public Finance
Money and Public Finance By Mr. Letlet August 1 In this anxious market environment, people lose their rationality with some even spreading false information to create trading opportunities. The tales aboutMore information
1 CHAPTER 11. AN OVEVIEW OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND QUARTERLY MODEL OF THE (BEQM) This model is the main tool in the suite of models employed by the staff and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in the constructionMore information
Do Taxes Really Affect the Consumption of Cigarettes?
Do Taxes Really Affect the Consumption of Cigarettes? Patrick C. Gallagher, Elon College The issue of smoking has recently been under close scrutiny by the government. Tobacco companies have been blamedMore information
Universidad de Montevideo Macroeconomia II. The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model
Universidad de Montevideo Macroeconomia II Danilo R. Trupkin Class Notes (very preliminar) The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model 1 Introduction One shortcoming of the Solow model is that the saving rate is exogenousMore information
I. Basic concepts: Buoyancy and Elasticity II. Estimating Tax Elasticity III. From Mechanical Projection to Forecast
Elements of Revenue Forecasting II: the Elasticity Approach and Projections of Revenue Components Fiscal Analysis and Forecasting Workshop Bangkok, Thailand June 16 27, 2014 Joshua Greene Consultant IMF-TAOLAMMore information
Marketing Mix Modelling and Big Data P. M Cain
1) Introduction Marketing Mix Modelling and Big Data P. M Cain Big data is generally defined in terms of the volume and variety of structured and unstructured information. Whereas structured data is storedMore information
3) The excess supply curve of a product we (H) import from foreign countries (F) increases as B) excess demand of country F increases.
International Economics, 8e (Krugman) Chapter 8 The Instruments of Trade Policy 8.1 Basic Tariff Analysis 1) Specific tariffs are A) import taxes stated in specific legal statutes. B) import taxes calculatedMore information
The Contribution of Human capital to European Economic Growth: An empirical exploration from a panel data
The Contribution of Human capital to European Economic Growth: An empirical exploration from a panel data Menbere Workie Tiruneh 1 Marek Radvansky 2 Abstract The paper empirically investigates the extentMore information
Conditional guidance as a response to supply uncertainty
1 Conditional guidance as a response to supply uncertainty Appendix to the speech given by Ben Broadbent, External Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England At the London Business School,More information
National Tax Journal, June 2012, 65 (2), 247 282 FOREIGN TAXES AND THE GROWING SHARE OF U.S. MULTINATIONAL COMPANY INCOME ABROAD: PROFITS, NOT SALES, ARE BEING GLOBALIZED Harry Grubert The foreign shareMore information
Online appendix to paper Downside Market Risk of Carry Trades
Online appendix to paper Downside Market Risk of Carry Trades A1. SUB-SAMPLE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES I study a sub-sample of developed countries separately for two reasons. First, some of the emerging countriesMore information
Volatility, Productivity Correlations and Measures of. International Consumption Risk Sharing.
Volatility, Productivity Correlations and Measures of International Consumption Risk Sharing. Ergys Islamaj June 2014 Abstract This paper investigates how output volatility and productivity correlationsMore information
I.e., the return per dollar from investing in the shares from time 0 to time 1,
XVII. SECURITY PRICING AND SECURITY ANALYSIS IN AN EFFICIENT MARKET Consider the following somewhat simplified description of a typical analyst-investor's actions in making an investment decision. First,More information
Medium-term determinants of current accounts in industrial and developing countries: an empirical exploration
Journal of International Economics 59 (2003) 47 76 www.elsevier.com/ locate/ econbase Medium-term determinants of current accounts in industrial and developing countries: an empirical exploration a b,More information
Ghana South Korea United States. Real GDP per capita (2005 dollars) Per centage of 1960 real GDP per capita. 2009 real GDP per capita
Long-Run Economic Growth chapter: 24 9 ECONOMICS MACROECONOMICS 1. The accompanying table shows data from the Penn World Table, Version 7.0, for real GDP in 2005 U.S. dollars for Argentina, Ghana, SouthMore information
Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics, 4th ed. Chapter 15: Instrumental variables and two stage least squares
Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics, 4th ed. Chapter 15: Instrumental variables and two stage least squares Many economic models involve endogeneity: that is, a theoretical relationship does not fitMore information
. In this case the leakage effect of tax increases is mitigated because some of the reduction in disposable income would have otherwise been saved.
Chapter 4 Review Questions. Explain how an increase in government spending and an equal increase in lump sum taxes can generate an increase in equilibrium output. Under what conditions will a balancedMore information
Smith on Natural Wages and Profits (Chapters VIII and IX of The Wealth of Nations 1 ) Allin Cottrell
1 The background Smith on Natural Wages and Profits (Chapters VIII and IX of The Wealth of Nations 1 ) Allin Cottrell When Smith begins work on the specifics of natural wages and profits, he has alreadyMore information
Chapter 21: The Discounted Utility Model
Chapter 21: The Discounted Utility Model 21.1: Introduction This is an important chapter in that it introduces, and explores the implications of, an empirically relevant utility function representing intertemporalMore information
Book Title: Other People s Money: Debt Denomination and Financial Instability in. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London
Book Title: Other People s Money: Debt Denomination and Financial Instability in Emerging Market Economies Authors: Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo Hausmann Publisher: The University of Chicago Press, ChicagoMore information
Dualization and crisis. David Rueda
Dualization and crisis David Rueda The economic crises of the 20 th Century (from the Great Depression to the recessions of the 1970s) were met with significant increases in compensation and protectionMore information
A.2 The Prevalence of Transfer Pricing in International Trade
19. Transfer Prices A. The Transfer Price Problem A.1 What is a Transfer Price? 19.1 When there is a international transaction between say two divisions of a multinational enterprise that has establishmentsMore information
Determinants of Stock Market Performance in Pakistan
Determinants of Stock Market Performance in Pakistan Mehwish Zafar Sr. Lecturer Bahria University, Karachi campus Abstract Stock market performance, economic and political condition of a country is interrelatedMore information
Economic Growth. Chapter 11
Chapter 11 Economic Growth This chapter examines the determinants of economic growth. A startling fact about economic growth is the large variation in the growth experience of different countries in recentMore information
Integrated Resource Plan
Integrated Resource Plan March 19, 2004 PREPARED FOR KAUA I ISLAND UTILITY COOPERATIVE LCG Consulting 4962 El Camino Real, Suite 112 Los Altos, CA 94022 650-962-9670 1 IRP 1 ELECTRIC LOAD FORECASTING 1.1More information
Answers to Text Questions and Problems. Chapter 22. Answers to Review Questions
Answers to Text Questions and Problems Chapter 22 Answers to Review Questions 3. In general, producers of durable goods are affected most by recessions while producers of nondurables (like food) and servicesMore information
HANDOUTS Property Taxation Review Committee
HANDOUTS Property Taxation Review Committee Legislative Services Agency September 1, 2004 Criteria For Good Proposals for Property Tax Reform Dr. Thomas Pogue, University of Iowa DISCLAIMER The Iowa GeneralMore information
Penalized regression: Introduction
Penalized regression: Introduction Patrick Breheny August 30 Patrick Breheny BST 764: Applied Statistical Modeling 1/19 Maximum likelihood Much of 20th-century statistics dealt with maximum likelihoodMore information
Is Cost Cutting Evidence of X-inefficiency? Severin Borenstein and Joseph Farrell* X-inefficiency is surely among the most important topics in
Is Cost Cutting Evidence of X-inefficiency? Severin Borenstein and Joseph Farrell* X-inefficiency is surely among the most important topics in microeconomics. Yet, economists have found it difficult toMore information
Violent crime total. Problem Set 1
Problem Set 1 Note: this problem set is primarily intended to get you used to manipulating and presenting data using a spreadsheet program. While subsequent problem sets will be useful indicators of theMore information
Simple Linear Regression Inference
Simple Linear Regression Inference 1 Inference requirements The Normality assumption of the stochastic term e is needed for inference even if it is not a OLS requirement. Therefore we have: InterpretationMore information
Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment
Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment Written for the Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy (Princeton University Press) By Linda S. Goldberg 1 Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of NewMore information
APPENDIX D: COMMON LAW/CIVIL LAW ANALYSIS There is a great body of literature hypothesizing that differences in economic prosperity can be traced to the legal systems of countries. Some research has positedMore information
Chapter 4 Specific Factors and Income Distribution
Chapter 4 Specific Factors and Income Distribution Chapter Organization Introduction The Specific Factors Model International Trade in the Specific Factors Model Income Distribution and the Gains fromMore information
An Empirical Analysis of Insider Rates vs. Outsider Rates in Bank Lending
An Empirical Analysis of Insider Rates vs. Outsider Rates in Bank Lending Lamont Black* Indiana University Federal Reserve Board of Governors November 2006 ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes empirically theMore information
Project LINK Meeting New York, 20-22 October 2010. Country Report: Australia
Project LINK Meeting New York, - October 1 Country Report: Australia Prepared by Peter Brain: National Institute of Economic and Industry Research, and Duncan Ironmonger: Department of Economics, UniversityMore information
Introduction to Economics, ECON 100:11 & 13 Multiplier Model
Introduction to Economics, ECON 1:11 & 13 We will now rationalize the shape of the aggregate demand curve, based on the identity we have used previously, AE=C+I+G+(X-IM). We will in the process developMore information
The Impact of U.S. Economic Growth on the Rest of the World: How Much Does It Matter?
Journal of Economic Integration 21(1), March 2006; 21-39 The Impact of U.S. Economic Growth on the Rest of the World: How Much Does It Matter? Vivek Arora International Monetary Fund Athanasios VamvakidisMore information
Why a Floating Exchange Rate Regime Makes Sense for Canada
Remarks by Gordon Thiessen Governor of the Bank of Canada to the Chambre de commerce du Montréal métropolitain Montreal, Quebec 4 December 2000 Why a Floating Exchange Rate Regime Makes Sense for CanadaMore information
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Factors in Business Investment Volume Author/Editor: Robert Eisner Volume Publisher: NBERMore information
Retirement routes and economic incentives to retire: a cross-country estimation approach Martin Rasmussen
Retirement routes and economic incentives to retire: a cross-country estimation approach Martin Rasmussen Welfare systems and policies Working Paper 1:2005 Working Paper Socialforskningsinstituttet TheMore information
Demographic Structure and Private Savings: Some Evidence from Emerging Markets
Demographic Structure and Private Savings: Some Evidence from Emerging Markets Jehad Yasin* Professor of Economics Population Studies Center Fort Valley State University email@example.com Abstract This paperMore information
Should U.S. Investors Hold Foreign Stocks?
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE March 2002 Volume 8 Number 3 Should U.S. Investors Hold Foreign Stocks? Asani Sarkar and Kai Li U.S. investors have traditionally been reluctantMore information
DOES HOUSEHOLD DEBT HELP FORECAST CONSUMER SPENDING? Robert G. Murphy Department of Economics Boston College Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
DOES HOUSEHOLD DEBT HELP FORECAST CONSUMER SPENDING? By Robert G. Murphy Department of Economics Boston College Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.com Revised: December 2000 Keywords : HouseholdMore information
Panel Data. Tomohito Hata. In the present paper, I will examine the determinants of grant-loan allocation in Japanese ODA,
Loans versus Grants in Japanese Bilateral ODA - Evidence from Panel Data Tomohito Hata 1 Introduction In the present paper, I will examine the determinants of grant-loan allocation in Japanese ODA, focusingMore information
2. The European insurance sector 1
2. The European insurance sector 1 As discussed in Chapter 1, the economic conditions in European countries are still fragile, despite some improvements in the first half of 2013. 2.1. Market growth TheMore information
The Credit Card Report May 4 The Credit Card Report May 4 Contents Visa makes no representations or warranties about the accuracy or suitability of the information or advice provided. You use the informationMore information
Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets
Multinational Firms, FDI Flows and Imperfect Capital Markets Pol Antràs Mihir Desai C. Fritz Foley Harvard University and NBER Brown Economics December 2006 Motivation (1) Great interest in contractingMore information
Causes of Inflation in the Iranian Economy
Causes of Inflation in the Iranian Economy Hamed Armesh* and Abas Alavi Rad** It is clear that in the nearly last four decades inflation is one of the important problems of Iranian economy. In this study,More information
Moral Hazard. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Moral Hazard Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 1 Principal-Agent Problem Basic problem in corporate finance: separation of ownership and control: o The owners of the firm are typicallyMore information
NCSS Statistical Software Principal Components Regression. In ordinary least squares, the regression coefficients are estimated using the formula ( )
Chapter 340 Principal Components Regression Introduction is a technique for analyzing multiple regression data that suffer from multicollinearity. When multicollinearity occurs, least squares estimatesMore information
The Volatility Index Stefan Iacono University System of Maryland Foundation
1 The Volatility Index Stefan Iacono University System of Maryland Foundation 28 May, 2014 Mr. Joe Rinaldi 2 The Volatility Index Introduction The CBOE s VIX, often called the market fear gauge, measuresMore information
School of Economics and Management
School of Economics and Management TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF LISBON Department of Economics Carlos Pestana Barros & Nicolas Peypoch António Afonso & João Tovar Jalles A Comparative The cyclicality AnalysisMore information
FORECASTING DEPOSIT GROWTH: Forecasting BIF and SAIF Assessable and Insured Deposits
Technical Paper Series Congressional Budget Office Washington, DC FORECASTING DEPOSIT GROWTH: Forecasting BIF and SAIF Assessable and Insured Deposits Albert D. Metz Microeconomic and Financial StudiesMore information
From Saving to Investing: An Examination of Risk in Companies with Direct Stock Purchase Plans that Pay Dividends
From Saving to Investing: An Examination of Risk in Companies with Direct Stock Purchase Plans that Pay Dividends Raymond M. Johnson, Ph.D. Auburn University at Montgomery College of Business EconomicsMore information
Is there Information Content in Insider Trades in the Singapore Exchange?
Is there Information Content in Insider Trades in the Singapore Exchange? Wong Kie Ann a, John M. Sequeira a and Michael McAleer b a Department of Finance and Accounting, National University of SingaporeMore information
Discussion of Capital Injection, Monetary Policy, and Financial Accelerators
Discussion of Capital Injection, Monetary Policy, and Financial Accelerators Karl Walentin Sveriges Riksbank 1. Background This paper is part of the large literature that takes as its starting point theMore information
An introduction to Value-at-Risk Learning Curve September 2003
An introduction to Value-at-Risk Learning Curve September 2003 Value-at-Risk The introduction of Value-at-Risk (VaR) as an accepted methodology for quantifying market risk is part of the evolution of riskMore information
CEP 14-14 Employment Gains from Minimum-Wage Hikes under Perfect Competition: A Simple General-Equilibrium Analysis Richard A. Brecher and Till Gross Carleton University November 2014 CARLETON ECONOMICMore information
The Real Business Cycle model
The Real Business Cycle model Spring 2013 1 Historical introduction Modern business cycle theory really got started with Great Depression Keynes: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money KeynesianMore information


text:
What is JotForm?
JotForm is a free online form builder which helps you create online forms without writing a single line of code. No sign-up required.
At JotForm, we want to make sure that you're getting the online form builder help that you need. Our friendly customer support team is available 24/7.
We believe that if one user has a question, there could be more users who may have the same question. This is why many of our support forum threads are public and available to be searched and viewed. If you'd like help immediately, feel free to search for a similar question, or submit your question or concern.
Image Choice Question TypeAsked by laurahoots on June 10, 2013 at 04:13 PM
Hi! I was wondering if it was possible to create a question where the answers are images and they can only select one?
We're using this as a hiring tool and I've created badges for each role they can apply for. I'd love to feature the badges in a visual way, like the SurveyGizmo image choice single question type: http://ow.ly/lTvHN
Is that possible to do?
What you want to achieve is possible. Please follow this steps:
1. Add radio buttons to your form
2. Click Options button on its properties
3. Paste your HTML image code.
Example: <img alt="" src="https://www.jotform.com/image/yourimage.png" style="width: 41px; height:28px; " align="absmiddle"> Label
If you need further assistance, do let us know.
Thank you!

subset: commoncrawl


text:
The Motley NBA Finals Crew Officiating Heat - Mavericks Game 2
Tonight's officials are more prolific whistlers than the guy who painted this.
James Abbott McNeill Whistler
Of the three referees assigned to game two between the Heat and Mavericks, one was suspended in 2007 for challenging Tim Duncan to a fight, another spent five months in jail, and the third once ejected the Celtics' Paul Pierce for, well, no one really knows what. All three of them have a storied history of calling lots and lots of fouls.
Referee Ken Mauer, one of two felons on tonight's staff, had the particular distinction of calling five technical fouls in 10 seconds back in January, and was fined in April after being accused of calling a Phoenix player a "little bitch" and then booting two players for objecting. He was also convicted of felony tax evasion in 2000 after he, along with dozens of other NBA refs, was caught taking his league-issued first-class airline tickets, downgrading them to coach and keeping the difference. Oh, and then not paying more than $26,000 in taxes for it. He spent five months in jail.
Ed Malloy doesn't have Mauer's criminal pedigree, though there was someone named Edward Malloy was arrested here in Florida a few months ago. He was charged with domestic battery and illegal use of the people's eyebrow:
Not an NBA official
Volusia County Division of Corrections
Eyebrow or no, Malloy the referee certainly gave the Celtics a coronary when he, among other things, booted The Truth from the fourth quarter of game 1 in the playoff series against the Heat. The video offers little explanation, and neither does the actual explanation, but hey, he still has a right to vote in the United States, so at least he can hold that over Mauer if there's a debate.
Crew chief Joey Crawford, who was also implicated in the NBA ref ticket scandal, ejected Tim Duncan for a game while Duncan was sitting on the bench. Duncan then said Crawford had yelled "Do you want to fight?" earlier in the game, and Crawford was suspended. Though it's somehow fitting that the only active ref to work 2,000 games looks suspiciously like Mr. Magoo:
Game on.
Follow Miami New Times on Facebook and Twitter @MiamiNewTimes.
Get the ICYMI: Today's Top Stories Newsletter Our daily newsletter delivers quick clicks to keep you in the know
Catch up on the day's news and stay informed with our daily digest of the most popular news, music, food and arts stories in Miami, delivered to your inbox Monday through Friday.
Recommended for You
Powered by SailThru
Upcoming Events
Florida Atlantic University Owls Football vs. Navy Midshipmen Football
TicketsFri., Sep. 1, 8:00pm
Miami Dolphins vs. Tampa Bay Buccaneers
TicketsSun., Sep. 10, 1:00pm
UberTailGate: Hard Rock Stadium Dolphins v Buccaneers
TicketsSun., Sep. 10, 1:00pm
Comedian Bob Nelson
TicketsFri., Aug. 11, 8:00pmpowered by goldstar
Sponsor Content


text:
GivenchyTan Givenchy Distressed Leather Crossbody "Pepe Pandora Messenger" Bag
Originally released around 2013, the "Pepe Pandora" messenger bag is constructed of a gorgeous patinated and distressed leather and features a unique construction. With its single rolled top handle, flat cross body strap, and golden metallic hardware, this bag is a bold artful piece. Main zipped pocket at back. Large and small zipped compartments at front. Slouchy, yet structured body. Interior features a single zipped wall pocket, cinched open cell phone pocket, and a single open wall pouch. Comes with dust bag. Retails for $2,090. Serial: EF30413
Made in: Italy Color: Tan Brown and Gold Fabric Content: Leather. Lining: Textile. Condition: Pre-owned. This item is in good condition. Patina and distressing throughout is intentional. Hairline scratches and tiny nicks throughout hardware. Very light worn areas and faint scratching throughout exterior. Soft creasing at top handle. Light lint throughout interiors. No other visible signs of wear and tear.
Measurements & Sizing
- Total Height: 9.75"
- Total Length: 14.5"
- Depth: 7.75"
- Handle Length: 17"
- Handle Drop: 8.5"
- Strap Length: 33.25"
- Strap Drop: 23.5"
Returns & Shipping
Luxury Garage Sale guarantees that all items sold on our site are 100% authentic. All products we accept are inspected for brand-specific guidelines and are put through a rigorous authenticity test process.
LGS is not affiliated with Givenchy. We guarantee this Givenchy item to be authentic. Givenchy® is a registered trademark of Givenchy.
Item #: 140731


text:
We loved our weekend away. Almost everything was pefect. The drinks in the bar were not too badly priced when you consider that there were olives and other nibbles provided - as well as the splendour of the room and the theatrical performance behind the bar when cocktails were ordered. Sitting watching the sea was great, the jousting festival was watchable entertainment and the staff were helpful and polite. would go again. .
The bathroom and bedroom were fine but the separet toilet was minute - but not the end of the world
- Official Description (provided by the hotel):
- You will be captivated by the timeless charm of the Grand Hôtel Cabourg, immortalized by Marcel Proust. Its spacious rooms have sea views or overlook the gardens & flowers. The restaurant faces the promenade & offers exquisite Normandy cuisine & memorable snacks. Come for a family vacation or a weekend away with your partner; the Grand Hôtel Cabourg offers you undivided attention for an unforgettable stay, whatever the time of year. (MGallery collection). ... more less
- Reservation Options:
- TripAdvisor is proud to partner with Orbitz, ACCOR, Hotels.com, Priceline, Booking.com, Expedia, Travelocity, TripOnline SA, Hotwire, Cancelon and HotelQuickly so you can book your Le Grand Hotel Cabourg - MGallery Collection reservations with confidence. We help millions of travelers each month to find the perfect hotel for both vacation and business trips, always with the best discounts and special offers.


text:
In 1857, still stinging from both their defeat in the Mexican-American War, and their earlier loss of Central America in 1833, the Mexican government decided to take advantage of American distractions in the form of the First Asian War and the lingering aftermath of the tensions in the south.
Declaration and Start of Operations
War formally began on April 18th, 1857, when it was formally declared by the Mexican Parliament against the United Provinces. However, skirmishes had been occurring along the border since late January.
Primarily, the Mexican efforts were concentrated in the south, closer to their supply lines and centers of population, with the goal of seizing both Guatemala City, and the capital of Tegucigalpa, and then forcing a surrender. Mexican forces outnumbered the Central Americans, and were able to continually advance throughout the summer before their attack could be blunted.
Battle of Huehuetenango
Late August saw the Mexican Army arrive at the city of Huehuetenango, the first major city between the main population centers of the United Provinces and the border.
It was here, after retreating for months, that the Centrals' Army choose to make its stand. General José María Cañas, head of the armed forces in the region, knowing he and his men were outnumbered, scattered most of them into the wilderness surrounding the city, and he, along with the remainder of his troops, fortified the city, blocking off every entrance and blockading each and every house. His plan was to lure the Mexican Army into attacking his position, while his units in the wilderness harassed their supply lines. Once the Mexicans got thoroughly invested into the town, his forces outside would attack their weary forces from behind, as well as their camp. Hopefully, this would buy them time, if not drive the off outright.
The Mexican forces, under General José Mariano Salas, would, as expected, begin a drive into the town on August 28th. By the 30th, they had made great progress, controlling two thirds of Huehuetenango. It was here, after two days of fierce hand-to-hand fighting, that the forces outside launched their attack in the early morning. Achieving surprise, these forces were able, in concert with those forces holding out in the center of town, to defeat the forces in the town. However, they failed at their other objective, when a recently-arrived regiment of Mexican cavalry that had yet to be committed to the assault beat off their attack on the camp.
However, the attack accomplished its goal. General Salas was forced to pull his forces back twenty miles to the town of Colotenango, where he was forced to hold throughout the remainder of the year to get both reinforcements and more supplies.
For the Central Americans, while they had won the battle, it had been costly - most of Huehuetenango had been destroyed, and they had suffered nearly four thousand casualties, far more than they could afford. But, it did give them breathing room, and they preceded to further fortify their positions. Yet, even these positions, against a more-organized assault, would not last, and would only serve to slow them down.
Yet, other events further north would ensure that when the city did fall in June of 1858, it would be to an entirely different commander.
Battle of Flores
In the north, the Army of the United Provinces was led by General Juan Rafael Mora Porras. The Mexican Army, led by General Miguel Miramón, outnumbered them, as in the south, but here the numbers were much more equal in size.
Here, the Central Army was expected to hold its own, while most forces were directed to the south, where the main Mexican advance was. In the jungles, this was something that they could realistically achieve. However, they were not expecting to face a general with the skills of General Miramón.
General Porras set up his main command center at the frontier town of Flores, along with most of his defenses in the region - he, with good reason, wrote off the jungles near the northernmost borders as being indefensible. However, he also did the same in the region around Flores. So, while his defenses could not be taken, the same could not be said for the region in general.
General Miramón, however, did not see the jungle in nearly the same manner. He recognized that with the Central forces largely ignoring the jungle itself - and even the inhabitants of the jungles - that he could use both to his advantage. So, he formulated his battle plans, in lieu with his own personal methods, with both things in mind: he would use the jungle-dwellers as scouts, allowing him access to all of the more hidden trails in the area, and attack Poras' supply lines and outlying positions from inside the jungles.
On September 7th, mere days before hearing of the defeats further south, Miramón's forces struck. By the 10th, his forces had closed off the Central supply lines, and forced Poras to send out forces in an attempt to re-open them. The force sent was cut down in the jungles. Three times this occurred, before Miramón's forces began their main assault upon the defense works, on the 18th. The tired - attacks from the jungles were making the defenders constantly on edge - and hungry defenders proved themselves to be no match.
On the 19th, even Porras, inept as he was, could see the writing on the wall - his position now being untenable - and began to pull his forces out of the town towards the southeast, and safety. Poras and his forces would be harassed the entire way to the relative safety of the ruins of Machaquila, arriving on the 3rd of October.
Here, Miramón had to stop and allow for supplies to catch up with his forces. By the time he was ready to again resume his advance in early December, news of the battles to the south, and the response of the Prime Minister back in Mexico City, had arrived: General Miramón, having been overly successful where his counterpart to the south had failed, was to be moved there, and the disgraced General Salas would replace him on the northern front. While a good move in the south, this would also mean that the northern front would largely remain static for the rest of the war.
General Porras would be demoted, and sent to Nicaragua to keep an eye on British forces in their Mosquito territories.
Salvador Raid
The arrival of General Miramón at the Mexican camp northwest of Huehuetenango in mid-January signaled the end of the city. While General Cañas was a fairly good general at his style of warfare, and was able to best General Salas, Miramón was an entirely different animal.
As in the Battle of Flores, Miramón went after the Central supply lines. While not nearly so effective here, given that the terrain was more open, the tactics still caused many difficulties. The larger army he had only made this easier. When the assault on the defense works came about in June, it stood little chance. General Cañas was forced to pull his forces out of the area, retreating southwards through the mountains to the city of Quetzaltenango.
Here, his defensive position was even better than at Huehuetenango. As a result, General Miramón had to stop his advance to get more reinforcements and artillery.
However, that did not mean that he had to halt operations. While to defeat the United Provinces meant that the Mexican Army had to advance through the highlands and jungles, it was not the only area that they could be hurt.
The coastal regions were such an area. The Mexican Army had not occupied them, though they could have advanced had they chose to do so - the logic here was that, correctly, the Central Americans would attack the rear of the advancing troops and wipe them out. As a result, they were only being blockaded, after a fashion. Yet, they were sparsely defended - a perfect target for raiding.
General Miramón's plan was to take advantage of this. Assembling a few of his cavalry regiments, which in the mountains were of little use, he went west, and then south, from his headquarters, until they arrived at the coast.
After receiving supplies, he turned to the east. In communication, though slow, with his forces, he was able to both conduct his raid and keep an eye on preparations.
November found his units south of the entrance to the main pass that if he went north, would take him to Guatemala City. However, he found it to be extremely well defended - the Centrals had been worried about assaults by Mexican Marines, so they had ensured the city would be safe.
So, he continued to the east. January of 1859 saw them in the province of El Salvador, pillaging and looting. On January 26th, they arrived at a pass west of the Salvadoran capital, and found it only lightly defended. By February, he had arrived in San Salvador, and his forces had begun to pillage and loot the Salvadoran capital.
However, this was as far as he would go. Word of preparations nearing completion further west at his headquarters arrived at almost the same time as reports from his scouts to the north of the city that an army was almost there from the Central capital at Tegucigalpa. Within hours, he had his forces on the move southwards. In March, they would be picked up by vessels of the Mexican Navy, and carted back to the west, disembarking at Tapachula, and arriving back at headquarters in early May.
Battle of Quetzaltenango
After resting for a month, General Miramón launched his offensive on Quetzaltenango in mid-June. Given the area, he could not launch an attack as at Flores or the second battle of Huehuetenango - he had to launch a more conventional assault.
From his headquarters, and the main base camp, north of the town of San Francisco El Alto, Miramón launched a small attack. Here he also concentrated his artillery, for this was also the main area of Central defenses - and the entryway to both the city, and the road to Guatemala City itself laid behind them. However, he did not concentrate his attack here, as it was so heavily defended and he did not expect to break through them.
His main attack, with two prongs, was to the west. One prong went south from the town of San Carlos Sija, and the other east from the town of Ostuncalco. In this, his goal - outnumbering Central forces overall by about three to one - was to attack all at once, and remove their ability with interior lines to reinforce themselves to counter his moves. While his forces would suffer casualties, it was fairly obvious it would work.
Both prongs managed to achieve their objectives. Central reserves had to be held in reserve, largely, because of the importance of keeping the only roads out of the area capable of holding the army in any retreat - south of the main Mexican camp - under their control. By late July, the two prongs had met up in the center of Quetzaltenango, forcing a general retreat by Central troops. With this in mind, General Miramón launched an attack towards the town of Salcajá, aiming to cut off the retreating Central forces from their main avenue of retreat. With the defenses being weakened as they pulled out of the area, his forces began to make progress.
General Cañas, fighting an exceptionally skilled retreat, and his forces, were able to slow them down enough, however. By the time the Mexican Army took Salcajá, both the General and most of his army had made it through the bottleneck. Still, some two thousand Central troops were cut off from this route - all but two hundred or so were taken prisoner.
Unlike last time, however, Cañas was unable to get as good of a defense line established after the battle. The area was not as good defensively, and more open. His well-organized retreat around Lago de Atitlán kept the Mexicans to slow advances for months, into the spring of 1860 - buying enough time for both Central diplomats to do their jobs, and for events in Asia to start to come to a close.
American Intervention
By April of 1860, events in Asia had more or less come to a close - Peking would fall by the end of July. As a result, American attention could be focused elsewhere. At the same time, efforts by Central diplomats in Washington, and news of the progress of the Mexican Army towards Guatemala City brought the war in Central America to the attention of the Fremont Administration.
Given Mexican ambitions, and their bitterness over their loss in the Mexican-American War, Mexican domination of Central America was not something that the American government could tolerate. And if they took the city, that would likely mean they could secure half of the sub-continent. This could not be tolerated. But, of course, they would not intervene for nothing. That the intervention would ensure the survival of their fellow republic would also sit well.
So, by April, President Fremont was finally willing and able to do something about it. With Congressional backing, he authorized the State Department to begin negotiations with Central American diplomats.
Given the state of affairs, they were authorized to give up a lot of things. Luckily for them, the American government agreed to intervene easier than they had expected - they would use naval squadrons to break the Mexican blockade of the coastline of the United Provinces, and use that and diplomatic positioning - understood to mean that they would threaten war if the Mexicans to not do it - to make the Mexican government withdraw and agree to peace.
In return, they asked relatively few things, which was seen as an admission of their desire for a weaker Mexican state. Foremost among their demands was the right to build a canal in Nicaragua, and some degree of control over a territory stretching for six miles on either side of the canal. They would around ninety percent of the profits from the canal, until its construction was paid off, after which it would revert to a more even split. American interests would also be granted trading rights throughout the Republic.
These terms were agreeable, and far better than they had been expecting. Within days, they had agreed to them.
Battle of the Bay Islands
In the Pacific, the American Navy had little trouble removing the weak blockade - the secondary status of the Pacific had meant there was almost no vessels on that Ocean - which would not be the case in the future. Most of the Mexican Navy would flee to neutral or friendly ports and remain there.
However, in the Atlantic, it was more difficult. The American squadron assigned the task, under the adventurer William Walker because of his knowledge of the region and made a temporary commodore for the task, faced a more modern and larger group of vessels. The Mexican Navy grouped its ships together, in order to force a battle so they could maintain the blockade. A pair of surviving Central Navy vessels attached themselves to the American squadron.
On June 8th, 1860, the two squadrons met in battle near the British Bay Islands, of the coast of Honduras. South of the island of Guanaja, the Mexican Squadron laid itself out in a line on a north-south axis. The American Navy, with the attached Central vessels, sailed straight for them, cutting through their lines with their forward guns, and curling around them. In doing so, most were damaged, heavily a one case. Using their superior numbers, the American Squadron surrounded the Mexican vessels and blasted them into surrender. By late afternoon, the battle was over. A single Mexican ship had been sunk, three had managed to flee northwards, and the remainder were forced to surrender.
As soon as word of the battle reached Washington, they sent a message to Mexico City: cease fighting, and retreat back to Mexico, or we will declare war.
Knowing that they would have lost, the Mexicans had no choice but to comply. Another week, and they would have been in the outskirts of Guatemala City.
Treaty of Philadelphia
The Mexicans and Central Americans met, with American negotiators, in Philadelphia, in August. With the position of the Mexican government made clear, they were forced to accept the independence of the Central Americans, and make some financial restitution - though not anywhere near a back-breaking amount. In exchange, the Central Americans would drop their claims to the state of Chiapas.
These were - grudgingly - agreed to by both parties, who signed the Treaty of Philadelphia on September 11th, 1860.
In 1862, as per the agreement, the American government began construction on the Nicaraguan Canal. It would be completed in 1872, three years after the Suez Canal. Revenues from the Canal would switch to being fifty-fifty in 1894, when its costs were entirely paid off.
For Mexico, the war marked the final turn away from the Americans in international diplomacy, begun decades earlier with the loss of Texas. Prime Minister Almonte also got blamed for the loss, and a liberal government under Benito Juárez came to power as a result.
For the United Provinces, it marked the start of a relationship with the United States that would eventually turn into an alliance.


text:
Tennyson Studio - Ceramics Classes Gladesville
School hoilday workshops ,Introduction Classes, Art Classes for Children, Art Classes, Ceramics Course Gladesville | Sydney | Hunters Hill | Lane Cove | Ryde | Eastwood | Putney | Haberfield | Ashfield | Balmain
- (02) 9879 ####
113a Tennyson RdMap
Gladesville NSW 2111
- http://www.tennysonstudio.com.au
- Send email
- Tuesday to Thursday and Saturday 10.30am to 3pm Evening classes: Tuesday and Thursday 6.45pm-9.45pm Kids Art Class Wednesday 4.30pm - 6pm Birthday Parties and Bridal Shower: Saturday and Sunday (Appointment Only)
About Us
Tennyson Studio Sydney - Ceramic Art Classes Gladesville | Art Classes Gladesville | Birthday Parties | School Holiday Program Workshops | Corporate Team Building Workshops
Tennyson Studio offers art classes for kids and adults in Gladesville.
Birthday parties, school holiday program workshops, corporate team building workshops, greenware supplies, firing service to non students, ceramic paints, glazes and brush supplies, gift vouches, handpainted gifts, and made to orders are all available.
Enrol at Tennyson Studio today by calling (02) 9879 ####.
Ceramic Art classes Day and Evening for Adults
Our 3 hr classes with the help of experiences teachers will guide you through all the techniques needed to give you the confidence to create and paint with NO PAINTING or Drawing experience needed.
We have a 10 week beginners course, AND an all inclusive introduction class to try out before you get involved in the beginners course.
Childrens Classes and Activities:
Kids Birthday party: 4 different packages to suit all budgets and all inclusive of pieces, paints, firing, glazing, food, drinks, party games and dancing. All you need to bring is the cake.!
Kids Art Course: runs Wednesdays 4.30pm - 6pm. All materials included: Acrylics, watercolours, oil pastels and chalk pastels, mixed media.
Kids will learn techniques to create landscapes, still life, portraiture.
School Holiday Programs: we have 3 different programs running every end of school term, with hand building with clay, ceramic painting and acrylic workshop on canvas.
Tennyson Studio offers ceramic art classes and courses for adults and for children during the School Holidays in Gladesville.
If you're looking for ceramic art classes in North West Sydney, Tennyson Studio should definitely be at the top of your list.
They offer a range of ceramic courses at a range of skill levels for those who want to unleash their inner artist.
Tennyson Studio offer everything from introductory sessions to a regular evening class, with a large choice of plates, platters, bowls, jugs, vases, jewel boxes, teapots and mugs and more.
Kids Art Courses After School
Art Classes are a great way to build childrens' creativity and imagination. Art classes for children using Acrylics, Watercolours, Oil Pastel, charcoal for drawing techniques weekly after-school classes.
Tennyson Studio also offer 1, 2 or 3 day ceramic courses in the school holidays. What a great way to keep them occupied! And if that's not enough?
Treat your kids to a birthday party where they'll each make their own ceramic piece to take home after enjoying the food, drinks, lollies and dancing.
Hens/bridal Showers
The fun isn't just limited to the kids, though: there's plenty for adults to do, too.
What bride-to-be wouldn't treasure a dinner service hand-painted by her best friends as part of the hens celebrations?
With all-inclusive prices and plenty of designs traditional and modern to inspire those just starting out, Sydney's Tennyson Studio has course to suit all levels.
- Adults introduction classes, 4 and 10 week beginners classes, advanced classes, and casual classes.
- After school art classes and school holiday workshops
- Parties kids birthday parties, hens parties
For more information about their classes and packages call now (02) 9879 ####.
Payment Types Acceptedvisa, mc, cash
Ceramics Classes, Pottery Classes, Ceramics Courses, Pottery Courses,Kids Art Class, kids Art Course, Kids Birthday Party Packages,School holiday Programs, Corporate team Building, Bridal Showers, Ceramics, Craft Classes, Pots, Bowls, Plates, Art, Craft, greenware, firing service, Ceramic paints and Glazes and brushes.
Ceramic Classes Gladesville, Sydney, Hunters Hill, Lane Cove, North West Sydney, Meadowbank, East Ryde, North Ryde, Putney, Willoughby, Northbridge, Ryde, West Ryde, Denistone
- Expert Tuition from beginners up.
Ceramics & Pottery Teachers Arts & Crafts Art Schools & Colleges Ceramic Supplies Art Materials
Facebook Profile
There are no reviews for this business
Lippy's Furniture & Antiques
"I just happened to have some time and called in on Kevin at Lippys in Finley. Ended up purchasing a beautiful chinese water colour painting that is now hanging in my living room. It just jumped out at me...it is an intriguing place. You can also chat to Kevin who is a mine of information on all things antique and interesting."
Lippy's Furniture & Antiques
Lippy's Furniture & Antiques
Anakie Pottery
"November - December 2009 I visited Australia: Perth - Sydney - Canberra - Jerrabomberra - Adelaide - Perth and bought me some nice souvenirs, also a pottery gumnut with leaves. Today, in my hometown in Holland, in the second hand shop I found a lovely little milk jug, designed with gumnut and leaves, made by Anakie Pottery Australia, as I could read on the bottom of it.
I thought it would be nice to tell you this surprising story. Dreaming of and saving money for another visit to your (....!) country down under, I cherish my lovely little milk jug.
Many greetings from now hot and sunny Holland.
Mrs. Jeanneke Wagener
Altenastreek 33
9101 AX Dokkum
The Netherlands."
Illawarra Potters Inc
"hi as a fellow member of this group i have now started up pottery classes in this great studio space, my classes run every wednesday night at 7pm, covering everything from wheel word to hand building mould work & sculptural work
come & join in the fun
love to see you on a casual basis or fulltime
justine crouchley-crawford
justinesclayart pottery"
Chris Uren on 20th May 2014
Fiona Craig on 13th May 2014
Fi Craig on 11th May 2014
Jeanneke on 16th Jul 2010
justinesclayart on 21st Jan 2010


text:
Your shopping cart is empty!
Born for greatness and built to endure, the Iowa Hawkeyes define what it means to be a warrior. Modern, soft shell design, with cutting edge two-tone graphics. This eye-catching way to battle rain and wind features a zip-through cadet collar with chin guard, and adjustable cuffs for the perfect fit.
- 93/7 Poly/Spandex woven bonded to 100% Polyester knit lining with laminated film insert to repel water and wind
- 1000MM fabric waterproof rating
- 1000G/M2 fabric breathability rating
- Self-fabric adjustable tab cuffs with hook and loop closures
- Front zippered pockets
- Open hem