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Ginobili rises to the occasion, Spurs take 3-2 series leadJun 17, 2013 - 3:50 AM San Antonio, TX (Sports Network) - Manu Ginobili shook off a forgettable start to the NBA Finals and put in a vintage performance in Game 5 while leading the San Antonio Spurs to a 114-104 victory over the Miami Heat.
Ginobili, inserted into the starting lineup for the first time all season, totaled 24 points and 10 assists and has the Spurs one win away from their fifth championship since 1999.
"I needed to make a couple shots," said Ginobili, who had averaged just 7.5 points in the first four Finals games. "I felt like I wasn't helping the team much."
All five starters scored in double figures for the Spurs, who never trailed and ran the Heat out of AT&T Center with a high-paced style and a 60 percent shooting effort to take a 3-2 series lead.
Danny Green continued to shoot the lights out, as the up-and-coming gunner poured in 24 points and hit six more 3-pointers to set a Finals record with 25 already through the first five games.
"I can't believe he's still open at this moment of this series," Spurs point guard Tony Parker said of Green. "They are still trapping me and doubling Timmy (Duncan), and Danny is wide open. He's shooting the ball well. If you are going to leave Danny wide open, he's going to make threes."
Parker shook off a hamstring injury and put up 26 points, while Tim Duncan added a typical 17-point, 12-rebound showing.
Kawhi Leonard chipped in 16 points and eight boards and did another terrific job guarding league MVP LeBron James, who had 25 points but needed 22 shots to do so.
Dwyane Wade checked in with 25 points and 10 assists, and Chris Bosh logged 16 points for the Heat, who got little production from role players not named Ray Allen.
"Offensively we weren't very good tonight," Heat head coach Erik Spoelstra said. "There were times when we crawled back into it, but we were not very efficient.
"They absolutely outplayed us."
The defending champions host Game 6 on Tuesday with the knowledge they have not lost back-to-back games since January.
Like the previous three meetings, the game was close in the first half before turning into a laugher in the blink of an eye.
Miami pulled the trick in Game 4 en route to a 16-point victory, and the Spurs turned the table Sunday by answering every Heat run with one of their own.
Seven straight Miami points cut its deficit to 75-74 with three minutes left in the third quarter before Green drilled a 26-footer with Wade and Shane Battier in his face to spark a quarter-ending 12-1 spurt.
Ginobili was the storybook catalyst in perhaps his final game at AT&T Center with retirement somewhere on the horizon. He followed Green's triple with a baseline leaner while being fouled, then contorted his body for a one-handed floater going down the right side of the line for an unorthodox bucket.
After feeding Tiago Splitter inside for a reverse layup, Ginobili fittingly finished the frame by banking in a right-handed drive for a healthy 87-75 Spurs lead heading to the fourth.
San Antonio scored nine of the first 10 points in the final stanza to go ahead by 20, and a late Miami run made the final score closer than it appeared.
Allen scored 15 of his 21 points in the fourth and had the Heat within 109-98 with under three minutes to go with a 3-pointer. He made another from long range the next time down, but it was waived off when James was whistled for a moving pick.
A layup by Allen and a free throw from Wade made it a 109-101 affair, but a Parker scoop and another Green three sealed the Spurs' much-needed win.
"We felt like we could steal it, but they continued to make shots," Wade said.
Ginobili nearly topped his Finals average in the first five minutes with a deep jumper, two free throws and a 3-pointer that gave the Spurs a 15-10 lead.
James tied things at 17-17 with a 3-pointer, but the Heat missed their next seven shots during San Antonio's momentum-swinging 12-0 run, which was capped by a dunk from Leonard off a nice bounce pass by Boris Diaw.
Leonard's triple in the closing seconds finished off the Spurs' efficient 12- of-19 shooting effort in the opening period and gave them a 32-19 cushion.
Green connected three times from behind the arc in a two-minute span to extend San Antonio's lead to 45-28, but the Heat climbed back in it with a quick- hitting 14-2 flurry.
Allen's four-point play highlighted the push, but the Spurs held off the surge and went into the break up 61-52 thanks to Parker's coast-to-coast take to the rim.
Game Notes
The Spurs did not lose consecutive home games all season ... The Spurs won despite committing 19 turnovers. They have 68 giveaways in the last four games after tying a Finals record with four in the series opener ... Green has shot an improbable 25-of-38 (66 percent) from the perimeter this series ... The Heat allowed triple digits just once during the Eastern Conference playoffs but have done so twice already this series ... Allen previously held the Finals record of 22 3-pointers while with the Celtics in 2008 ... Heat point guard Mario Chalmers shot 2-of-10 from the floor for seven points, while Mike Miller went scoreless for the second straight game in Miami's starting lineup.
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Heat 104, Spurs 114 FinalJun 17 3:27 AM
Jun 16 10:54 PM
- KingHockeyMan Its over now! Spurs 3 games - Heat 2 games. Its Basketball WAR in Miami. South Beach will be packed all week long! GO SPURS! BEAT KING JAMES & CO.!!!
Heat 104, Spurs 114 4th - 0:50Jun 16 10:51 PM
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Heat 101, Spurs 109 4th - 1:37Jun 16 10:47 PM
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Heat 100, Spurs 109 4th - 2:02Jun 16 10:45 PM
- KingHockeyMan lol@236. Stick w/all sports other than baseball here ok. This game is over I predict. Too big of a lead at home. They are shooting 59% from the field. Too much & too late for Heat. In Miami it will be WAR!!! Cya,,,take care. ;-)
Heat 87, Spurs 102 4th - 5:46Jun 16 10:35 PM
- lrbell woot.... up by 12
Heat 75, Spurs 87 4th - 11:05Jun 16 10:14 PM
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Heat 71, Spurs 75 3rd - 3:53Jun 16 9:58 PM
- 236 And.. they're blowing it. Down to a 4 point game. Darn.
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Heat 71, Spurs 75 3rd - 3:53Jun 16 9:56 PM
- 236 71-67 Spurs. Hope they don;t blow the lead.
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1st Quarter - 11:41
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Heat vs. SpursJun 15 10:52 PM
- KingHockeyMan This will be a pivotal game on Fathers Day. I still feel the Spurs can beat the Heat in this Finals series. WAR is at HAND! Happy Fathers Day Boyz ;-)... .
Heat vs. SpursJun 15 8:30 PM
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- 236 This series has mainly been blowouts and no great OT basketball. But I'm seeing that'll change here.
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About Le Meridien
With more than 100 Hotels & Resorts worldwide and the strongest, most globally diverse portfolio in its history, the Paris-born Le Méridien brand connects the curious and creative-minded traveller to unexpected and engaging experiences within their destination. With its brand promise of "Destination Unlocked," Le Méridien has transformed numerous guest touch points through global partnerships with creative minds such as illy, Johnny Iuzzini, Gray Malin, and Nouvelle Vague. Plans call for dynamic portfolio expansion within the next five years in some of the world's most exciting destinations, concentrating on markets in Asia-Pacific and the Americas.
Company History
The internationally renowned Le Méridien brand was established in 1972 by Air France "to provide a home away from home for its customers." The first Le Méridien property was a 1,000-room hotel in Paris — Le Méridien Etoile. Within two years of operation the group had 10 hotels in Europe and Africa. Within the first six years the number of hotels had risen to 21 hotels in Europe, Africa, the French West Indies, Canada, South America, the Middle East and Mauritius. The group continued to grow and, by 1991, the total number of Le Méridien properties had risen to 58.
Social Reach:
This web page does not constitute a franchise offering or an offer to sell a franchise. A franchise offering can be made by us only in a state if we are first registered, excluded, exempted or otherwise qualified to offer franchises in that state, and only if we provide you with an appropriate franchise disclosure document.
Le Meridien »
Le Méridien® (luxury and upscale full-service hotels, resorts and residences) is a European-inspired brand with a French accent.
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subset: commoncrawl


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Basic Grey Euphoria Paper - for the side strip
Basic Grey Green Grass (My idea of what this paper should be named) - for the green die cut leaves, cut on my cutting machine.
Colored Pencils - Rose Art Brand
Baby Oil - for blending - Many thanks to Casper for teaching me this wonderful technique!
Dark Green Stamp Pad for distressing - Michael's - presently where I am headed to do some needed shopping! - Got my coupon and Im ready to rock!
Embellies - EK Success Kay and Co.
Please feel free to critique me! I need all the help I can get! ****Big Grin!***
Entering this card in the following challenges:
IncyWincy Designs # 83 - Spring is in the Air
TotallyPaperCrafts #55 -Paper Piecing
Dream Valley Challenges - Challenge 1 - Anythng Goes
CES Challenges Crafty Emma - Flowers and Flutterbys
Crazy For Challenges - C4C76 - Flowers
Fairy Knoll Challenges - Feeling a little green
Guylous Inimitability - Anything Goes
Have a great day!


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MORE on The Snow Passes at AGM
OFSC "More On The Snow" September 17, 2016
By Phil Molto, Snow Goer Canada
Snow Goer Canada and Snowmobiler TV were in attendance at the 2016 OFSC convention in Mississauga. Over two days, the Ontario Federation of Snowmobile Clubs with the strong support of the 400+ delegates voted to plot a new aggressive course for the organization.
New directions are nothing new for Ontario snowmobilers. Many of us in the room remember the days of the 1970s and 1980s when snowmobiling in Ontario, was a mix of private clubs and organizations. Great progress has been made since those days when the OFSC, OTBA and private clubs united to make snowmobiling better for everyone. At this convention, the delegates voted over 70% in favor of moving forward once again for the betterment of the sport.
What does MOTS mean for Ontario snowmobilers? This initiative will help make more effective use of resources, especially groomers. The purchasing and operating costs of a groomer fleet are massive. The centralization of coordinating the groomers at the district level instead of club level will ensure the groomers are being used more effectively. This will result with you the sledder riding on better and more consistent trails. Once in place, this should help reduce the complaints we see online about trail condition differences at club boundaries. A centralized approach will ensure the grooming fleet is in the proper place and location to deliver quality trails in all areas and districts.
In Ontario the number of regions is also changing from 16 to 12. This again is an effort to reduce costs and improve efficiencies in the way your permit dollar is working on the snow.
In the end, the "More On The Snow" initiative is about building better trails for the OFSC members and trail riders.
Getting the districts more strategically aligned and grooming within those regions done with a wider view, will result in better trails and more effective use of the permit dollar.
We at Snow Goer Canada look forward to seeing the benefits of MOTS. Feel free to chat with us about it at the upcoming snowmobile shows and at the trails stops this winter.


text: I've had the experience of being attacked by mind flayers with this helmet on a multitude of times, yet none of thier intelligence drain attacks get through. I know this may not be unussual for short encounters, but this has happened dozens of times. Is this helmet special in that regard? Chessnuts 22:38, June 15, 2011 (UTC)


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Favre distributed the football to 10 players. He got good mileage out of TEs Donald Lee and Bubba Franks, who each had four catches, as well third-down back Vernand Morency, who turned three short passes into 33 yards. Morency's belated season debut, however, included one of three Green Bay fumbles on pass plays. Morency caught a break when the ball rolled out of bounds. Lee wasn't fortunate on a strip, as he fought for extra yardage inside the Vikings' 10. Ruvell Martin had a couple clutch downfield catches.
RUSHING OFFENSE: D -- Throw out a bail-out scramble by Favre, two kneel-downs by the quarterback and Jon Ryan's nifty first-down pickup on a fake punt, the Packers had just 16 designed run plays, amounting to 38 yards. Ryan Grant had the one and only significant run for the league's worst rushing offense, for 15 yards in a fourth-quarter touchdown drive when a rare hole presented itself off left tackle. DeShawn Wynn was no better in his first NFL start than fellow rookie Brandon Jackson as the starter in the previous three games. Wynn gained but 20 yards on 10 carries.
A shin injury kept Jackson out of the game, paving the way for Morency's return. He had only one carry in the situational role.
PASS DEFENSE: C -- SS Atari Bigby was the playmaking exception to the rule of a lackluster day by the secondary. Bigby forced an early fumble in the open field and was Johnny-on-the-spot to fly in and cradle a deflected football before it hit the ground for the win-clinching interception in Packers territory with about a minute to play.
CBs Charles Woodson and Al Harris were closely monitored for their aggressiveness in coverage, and each had the flag thrown at him twice for contact penalties. Woodson looked to have gotten away with interference on Bigby's interception before the ball was tipped. Harris, though, managed to disrupt three downfield passes to Troy Williamson despite fighting through back pain.
Nickel back Jarrett Bush lacked a fighting spirit defending Sidney Rice, who completed a one-sided matchup with a leaping 15-yard touchdown grab over Bush. The pass rush picked up in the second half, with Kabeer Gbaja-Biamila (two sacks) and Aaron Kampman (one) routinely winning their one-on-one battles on the outside.
RUSH DEFENSE: D -- Green Bay defenders weren't complaining when Vikings coach Brad Childress inexplicably kept Adrian Peterson off the field for long stretches in the second half. The rookie wunderkind probably would have gashed a misaligned defense for 200 yards. As it was, the Packers surrendered 112 yards on only 12 Peterson carries, none bigger than a 55-yard burst on which Bigby was frozen on a big-time juke, and FS Nick Collins was briefly lost to a knee injury after bringing down Peterson. Chester Taylor averaged a healthy 5 yards on eight rushes. Linemen and linebackers were guilty of straying from their lane assignments.
SPECIAL TEAMS: B-minus -- Ryan might be a nice fallback for the horrendous running game. He was hung out to dry after bringing the ball down in punt formation in the third quarter and heading to the right, but he exhibited some great footwork by eluding two would-be tacklers and cutting back to the middle of the field for a 7-yard pickup on fourth-and-4. The play led to a 44-yard field goal by Mason Crosby in a series that consumed almost nine minutes.
Crosby excelled indoors, connecting on all three field-goal attempts and having two touchbacks. Bush made up for his defensive lapses by popping Bobby Wade for a loss on a punt return.
Although Ryan had big averages of 49 yards gross and 44.3 net, he shanked a second-quarter punt for 33 yards.
Peterson also hurt the Packers as a kickoff returner, splitting the coverage for 51 yards in the fourth quarter.
COACHING: B -- Mike McCarthy stayed true to throwing the football at will in the persistent absence of a rushing threat, a decision that remains in the best interests of his unbeaten team. He also found a way to keep a defense honest even when it knows what's coming by going with a deep throw on the first play from scrimmage.
McCarthy and special teams coordinator Mike Stock took a calculated gamble on the fake punt at midfield with a four-point lead in hand, and they have Ryan to thank for making them look like shrewd play callers.
McCarthy's decision to not take a knee on second down inside of two minutes and the Vikings out of timeouts almost resulted in a whale of a collapse, had Minnesota taken advantage of a fumbled exchange between Favre and Grant on the play. Sure, the Packers couldn't have run out the clock in three downs, but they were in Vikings territory and ahead by seven, so a punt would have put Minnesota further back from near midfield, where it started after the turnover.


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- Clara Tucker
- 2 years ago
- Views:
1 IstheLiarSentenceBothTrueandFalse? Hartry Field New York University "Will no one rid me of this accursed Priest?" Henry II 1 Dialetheism There are many reasons why one might be tempted to reject certain instances of the law of excluded middle. And it is initially natural to take reject to mean deny, that is, assert the negation of. But if we assert the negation of a disjunction, we certainly ought to assert the negation of each disjunct (since the disjunction is weaker 1 than the disjuncts). So asserting (A A) should lead us to assert both A and A. But to assert both a sentence ( A) and its negation is, in at least one sense of the phrase, to assert a contradiction. Accepting contradictions would be intolerable if contradictions implied everything: we would be logically committed to every imaginable absurdity. But there are "paraconsistent logics" where contradictions in the above sense (pairs consisting of B and B, forsomeb) don t entail everything. It is not especially controversial that paraconsistent logics might be useful for certain purposes, e.g. analyzing certain notions of "relevant implication" and/or "what a possibly inconsistent theory should be taken as directly committed to". But I m interested in the issue of a particular kind of use, the one motivated above: a use of paraconsistent logic to license the simultaneous literal belief in both B and B, in full knowledge that we believe both, and where such knowledge gives no pressure to revise one of the beliefs. In short, where the beliefs, though "contradicting" each other, are not in any serious sense in conflict. I will adapt Graham Priest s term dialetheism for the doctrine that we should fully accept certain sentences while also accepting their negations. This is not quite Priest s usage, as we ll see. Nonetheless, Priest is an advocate of dialetheism in this sense; in fact, its most prominent advocate. The argument with which I began shows that if we want to disbelieve instances of excluded middle (in the sense of, believe their negations) then we should be dialetheists (not merely that we should accept paraconsistent logics for some purposes). And as Priest has often urged (e.g. [12]), the most familiar arguments against the coherence of dialetheism are seriously faulty, a result of a refusal to take the doctrine seriously. 1 Not necessarily strictly. 1
2 I have two terminological quibbles with Priest. The more minor one concerns the use of the term contradiction. Priest revels in saying that we should accept contradictions. Here contradiction is used either in the sense indicated above (a pair of a sentence and its negation) or in the sense of a sentence of form B B; since Priest and I both advocate the use of logics in which any two sentences imply their conjunction and in which a conjunction implies each conjunct, there is no interesting distinction between accepting a contradiction in one of these senses and accepting it in the other, so I will henceforth not bother to make this distinction. Talk of accepting contradictions shows a ßair for the dramatic, but I think it tends to put people off for bad reasons. Given the kind of logic Priest advocates, I think a better use of the term contradiction would be: sentence that implies every other. On this alternative usage, the way to put Priest s view is that sentences of form B B (or pairs {B, B}) aren tingeneral contradictory: they don t imply everything. The issue of course is purely verbal; but because of the possibility of confusion, I will from now on avoid the term contradiction. A somewhat more important terminological issue concerns the term dialetheism. Priest explains dialetheism as the doctrine (D) Certain sentences are both true and false; where false means has a true negation. There is no doubt that a dialetheist should accept (D); nonetheless, (D) seems to me an unfortunate way to deþne the term. To see why, let me anticipate what is to follow, by saying that one of the main prima facie beneþts of dialetheism in my sense is that it allows us, despite the semantic paradoxes, to maintain the complete intersubstitutivity of True(hAi) with A (in contexts not involving quotation marks, propositional attitudes, etc.). Since False(hAi) means True(h Ai), thismeansthatfalse(hai) will be completely intersubstitutable with A, and hence with True(hAi). If we agree to these properties of True, then acceptance of A A should be equivalent to the acceptance of True(hAi) False(hAi). So if Priest were to have put dialetheism as the view that we should fully accept of some sentences that they are both true and false, I could have no complaint: it would be effectively the same as my own true -free formulation. But a problem with deþning dialetheism as the doctrine (D) that certain sentences are both true and false is that while a dialetheist should certainly assert (i) True(hAi False(hAi) for certain A (e.g. the Liar sentence), he should deny this as well. For the dialetheist asserts both True(hAi) and False(hAi). ButfromFalse(hAi) we get True(hAi), by the italicized claim in the last paragraph; so (ii) False(hAi) True(hAi, which surely entails the negation of (i). If we assume that A entails A (as nearly everyone would, including Priest), then from True(hAi) we get True(hAi), which yields False(hAi) bythesameitalicizedprinciple;sowealsoget (iii) True(hAi False(hAi) 2
3 and (iv) True(hAi False(hAi), each of which also entails the negation of (i). The situation for the existential generalization (D) is a bit more complicated, but here too I think Priest needs to deny it as well as assert it; hence, given the equivalence, regard it as false as well as true. Of course, it is a consequence of dialetheism that some sentences are both true and false, and there s no particular problem in the fact that the particularsentence(d)isamongthem. Butwhatisoddistotakeasthe doctrine that defines dialetheism something that the dialetheist holds to be false as well as true. And it is misleading to characterize the dialetheist s attitude toward, say, the Liar sentence as the view (i) that it is both true and false, when one could equally well have characterized it as the view (iv) that it is neither true nor false, or as the view (ii) that it is false and not true, or the view (iii) that it is true and not false. On the alternative characterization of dialetheism in terms of acceptance, there are no such oddities: no dialetheist (in either Priest s sense or mine) has any reason to deny that we should accept both A and A, for the relevant A. Priest could resist my complaint, on the grounds that he himself does not accept the full intersubstitutivity of True(hAi) with A: hetakesthemnot to be intersubstitutable in negation contexts ([11], secs. 4.9 and 5.4), and that destroys the equivalence between false and not true. Nonetheless, I don t think he ought to resist: the alternative characterization I have suggested ought to be acceptable to him, and has the advantage of not requiring the nonintersubstitutability of True(hAi) with A. Moreover, one of the advantages of dialetheism, in either sense, is that it makes possible the full intersubstitutivity of True(hAi) with A; it would be a shame to adopt a deþnition of dialetheism that is badly behaved when this possibility is realized. Enough of terminological quibbles, and on to more serious issues. 2 Rejection I ve mentioned that we have a compelling motivation for dialetheism as long as we have a compelling motivation to deny instances of excluded middle. There is however an oddity here. For though accepting [A A] leads to accepting both A and A, that in turn leads to accepting A A. Indeed, the inference is immediate: A surely implies A A. ( A implies it too, in any logic where A implies A; and the logics that Priest and I are interested in mostly have this feature. Indeed, in the future I will for simplicity assume that A is equivalent to A.) So if to reject B is to have an attitude that precludes accepting it, then denying instances of excluded middle is not a way of rejecting them, and indeed is incompatible with rejecting them! If we want to reject a given instance of excluded middle, we had better not deny it. (I have not ruled out rejecting some instances without denying them, and denying others without rejecting them. But we can t reject and deny the same instance.) How should we understand rejection? As a propositional attitude, on par 3
4 with acceptance. To a Þrst approximation anyway, accepting A is having a high degree of belief in it; say a degree of belief over a certain threshold T,whichmay depend on context but must be greater than 1 2.(Degreesofbeliefareassumed to be real numbers in the interval [0, 1].)Tothesamedegreeofapproximation, rejecting A is having a low degree of belief in it: one lower than the co-threshold 1 T. This has the desired result that rejection precludes acceptance. (And it allows, as of course we should, for sentences that we are uncertain enough about to neither accept nor reject.) Now, if degrees of belief obeyed the laws of classical probability, then rejecting A would have to be the same as accepting its negation. For in classical probability theory, P (A)+P ( A) is always 1; so P (A) < 1 T (rejection) iff 1 P ( A) < 1 T iff P ( A) > T(acceptance of negation). But if P (A)+P ( A) could be greater than 1, then we could accept the negation of A without rejecting it; indeed if it could be sufficiently greater than 1, we could accept both A and A and therefore reject neither. And if P (A)+P ( A) could be less than 1, we could reject A without accepting its negation; if it could be sufficiently less than 1, we could reject both A and A. It s clear that a dialetheist ought to allow that P (A) +P ( A) can be signiþcantly greater than 1 (perhaps as high as 2): if you accept A and accept A, you give both high probabilities (perhaps as high as 1); and you do not reject either since rejection precludes acceptance. Similarly, someone who rejects an instance A A of excluded middle (not necessarily a dialetheist) will reject both A and A, hence for that person P (A)+P ( A) will be substantially less than 1 (perhaps as low as 0). The upshot is that there is no problem distinguishing rejection from acceptance of the negation, in nonclassical logics that either don t include certain instances of excluded middle or include the negations of certain instances of it. Where there may be a difficulty for dialetheism, though, is in conducting debates about what to reject. Suppose I reject the existence of God, and offer to my theistic friend compelling arguments against it. I expect my friend to try to rebut my arguments, or at least be worried about them (or, more optimistically, to recant his belief); but to my chagrin my friend turns out to be a dialetheist, and though he accepts my arguments and agrees with me about the nonexistence of God, he also believes in the existence of God. What I really want to do is alter his attitudes: get him to reject the existence of God, not merely disbelieve it. How can I proceed? Well, perhaps I can show him that the existence of God together with other things he accepts entails some other claim Q that I assume he ll reject; say, one for which I already know he accepts its negation. But if he s willing to carry his dialetheism far enough, he may be "dialetheist with respect to Q" as well as "dialetheist with respect to the existence of God": he may accept Q along with its negation. Perhaps there are certain sentences that he truly rejects, rather than merely accepts their negations; but these may not provide a sufficient basis to allow any argument that he should reject the existence of God, even when he can be convinced to accept the non-existence of God. The worry, then, is that if the acceptance of A doesn t suffice for the rejection of A, it is unobvious how debates about rejection are to be conducted. 4
5 I take it to be an important challenge to dialetheism to answer this, but I don t meantosaythatitisobviousthatthedialetheistcan tmeetthechallenge; indeed, I increasingly incline to the view that he can. 2 3 Truth Paradoxes (I) But is there any serious motivation for adopting a dialetheist position and therefore having to meet the challenge just mentioned? I m skeptical. Obviously there s no way of completely ruling out in advance that there might be some problem solvable better by dialetheist means than by non-dialetheist, but I don t think there is any reason whatever to believe that this will be the case. Indeed, I think it very likely that any problem that can be solved by dialetheism can be solved without it, and when the best solutions of each sort are set side-byside the non-dialetheic solution will always seem more attractive; in which case dialetheism is a position that we do not need. I m going to spend the rest of this paper illustrating this conjecture with a single example, but it is the example widely viewed as the dialetheist s best case: the semantic paradoxes. The naive theory of truth presupposes a background syntactic theory, which can be formalized in arithmetic. In addition to this, it has at least two components. The Þrst is the Tarski axioms: (T ): True(hAi) if and only if A. The second is the principle mentioned already: True(hAi) should be everywhere intersubstitutable for A (in a language free of quotational contexts, intentional contexts, and so forth); that is, if B and C are two sentences alike except that one has True(hAi) inoneormoreplaceswheretheotherhasa,thenb implies C and conversely. It may seem redundant to list these components separately, for they are equivalent in classical logic. But as we ll see, there are non-classical logics in which they are not equivalent. (Either direction of implication might fail.) Myself, I m interested mostly in logics "classical enough" for the equivalence to hold; but we need to bear in mind the possibility of logics that aren t "classical enough". In classical logic itself, each component of naive truth theory is inconsistent, given the background syntactic theory. For the syntactic theory allows us to construct a Liar sentence Q 0 whichisinterderivablewith True(hQ 0 i); sothe second component of the naive theory would make Q 0 interderivable with Q 0. That would make Q 0 and Q 0 each inconsistent, so their disjunction would be 2 To be fair, the person who advocates restricting the law of excluded middle faces a somewhat analogous challenge: for on such a view we should sometimes reject A without accepting A, and an account is needed of how to carry out debates about when this is to be done. In this case the question is how to deal with a view that rejects both there is a God and its negation, perhaps on veriþcationist grounds, because it refuses to accept the corresponding instance of excluded middle. For another observation on behalf of the dialetheist, see note 19. 5
6 inconsistent; but their disjunction is an instance of excluded middle and hence classically valid. So the second component of the naive theory is classically inconsistent; and since the Þrst component is classically equivalent to it, it is classically inconsistent as well. Kripke ([8]) shows that we can consistently retain one component of the naive theory of truth, by weakening classical logic to the logic K 3 obtained from the strong Kleene 3-valued truth tables by taking only the "highest" of the three values as "designated". More exactly, let the three semantic values be 1, 1 2,and 0, thinking of 1 as "best" and 0 as "worst". Let an assignment function s be a function that assigns objects to variables, and let a valuation be a function that assigns semantic values to pairs of atomic formulas and assignment functions. Extend the valuation to complex formulas by the "strong Kleene rules" A s =1 A s A B s = min{ A s, B s } A B s = max{ A s, B s } A B s = max{1 A s, B s } xa s = min{ A s s is just like s except possibly in what it assigns to x} xa s = max{ A s s is just like s except possibly in what it assigns to x}. Finally, regard an inference as valid iff in every valuation in which the premises all get value 1, so does the conclusion; and regard a sentence as valid iff in all valuations it gets value 1. Clearly the inference from {A, A} to any sentence B is valid; similarly for the inference from (A A) to anything. So this is not a logic for dialetheists, or, virtually equivalently, for deniers of excluded middle; butitisalogicthatallowsrejecting excluded middle, since excluded middle is not valid. 3 (Of course, no inference that isn t classically valid can be K 3 -valid.) It is natural to take a logic to include not only a set of validities, but to include rules for establishing some validities from others (relevant for when one expands the logic). One such rule, correct under the strong Kleene semantics, is disjunction elimination: if A implies C and B implies C, thena B implies C. I will henceforth understand K 3 to include this meta-rule (and the analogous rule of -elimination). Kripke s "Þxed point argument" shows that if we weaken classical logic to K 3, then it is consistent to assume the second component of the naive truth theory: the intersubstitutivity of True(hAi) with A. 4 But we do not get either direction of the Tarski schema (taking if...then to be represented by, which 3 Indeed, no sentence (as opposed to inference) is valid in the logic as it stands. However, we will soon consider extensions of the logic in which this is not so. 4 Indeed we get what I ll call "strong consistency": roughly speaking, it is "consistent with any starting model that has standard syntax". 6
7 seems the only remotely reasonable way to interpret it in K 3 ): for given the intersubstitutivity property of True, each direction of the Tarski schema is equivalent to A A, but that is not valid in K 3 (itisequivalenttoaninstance of excluded middle). Truth theory in K 3 is not a very satisfactory theory. 5 Not only do we not get the full naive theory of truth, the logic is in many ways simply too weak to comfortably reason in. (The absence of a conditional obeying the law if A then A is a symptom of this.) And this fact could seem a motivation for dialetheism. For there is a minor variant of the logic Priest s LP that can easily seem more satisfactory. As a semantics for LP we can assign semantic values in justthesamewayasfork 3 ;wesimplyredeþne validity. (And we include the disjunction-elimination and -elimination metarules, as before.) In particular, we take an inference to be valid just in case in all valuations where the premises all get values other than 0, so does the conclusion; and we take a sentence to be valid just in case it doesn t get value 0 in any valuation. The Kripke Þxed point proof then shows that it is consistent to assume the intersubstitutivity property in this logic too; and this logic does validate A A, so the truth schema is validated as well. We have the naive theory of truth in its entirety; the only cost is dialetheism, for the Liar sentence and its negation will both be consequences of the truth theory. But I do not think this is really much of an improvement over the situation with K 3. 6 For the main problem with K 3 wasn t the inability to get the Tarski schema, it was the fact that the logic is too weak to reason with in a natural way, as indicated by the absence of a reasonable conditional. That is true for LP as well: is in some ways even worse as a candidate for the conditional in LP than it is in K 3, because it doesn t even validate Modus Ponens. So far, then, we don t have a satisfactory resolution of the paradoxes, either non-dialetheic or dialetheic. 4 Truth Paradoxes (II) A natural response to the difficulties with using K 3 and LP as the logic for truth theory is to try to supplement one of them with a new conditional. Doing so requires great care: it is not easy to Þnd a set of laws for the conditional that have reasonable strength and don t themselves lead to paradox given naive truth theory. For instance, the Curry paradox shows that (assuming naive truth theory), if our conditional satisþes Modus Ponens then it can t validate any of the following inferences: 5 Indeed, it isn t completely clear that Kripke s own discussion of a truth theory based on the strong Kleene tables is intended to motivate a theory based on the logic K 3 :itmightbe intended to motivate a theory, later formalized by Feferman ([1]), based entirely on classical logic. Of course, since it is based on classical logic, the "Kripke-Feferman theory" does not satisfy either component of the naive truth theory. (In particular, in the Kripke-Feferman theory we can assert that the Liar sentence is not true; hence we can assert the Liar sentence, but cannot assert that it is true.) 6 Here I retract an ill-thought-out suggestion in [2], p
8 Importation: A (B C) ` A B C -Introduction: From A ` B, infer` A B Contraction: A (A B) ` A B. (In the case of Importation, this requires the inference from A A C to A C, but I take it that that inference is totally uncontroversial.) 7 Moreover, there seems to be no low-cost restriction of Modus Ponens that would improve the situation. For instance, it might initially seem that we could obtain a satisfactory logic by restricting the Modus Ponens rule A, A B ` B to the case where A does not itself contain an ; that would block the derivation of the Contraction form of the Curry paradox in the previous note. 8 Aminordifficulty is that such a restricted Modus Ponens would be awkward to employ: we d need to keep track of which sentences that we re representing with sentence letters have an hidden inside them. A more serious difficulty is that since the goal is to keep the equivalence of True(hAi) to A, we dneedtoalsoruleoutapplying Modus Ponens when A contains a predication of True to a sentence with an. And we d need to rule out application of the rule when the premise applies True to all members of a class that may contain sentences with an, e.g. All sentences on the blackboard are true. Not only would it be a bit tricky to formulate the rule with all these added restrictions, but the resulting rule would be so restricted that our reasoning would be crippled. So the only serious recourse, given that we want the naive theory of truth, is to adopt a logic that does not validate either Importation, -Introduction, or Contraction. Most people Þnd the loss of Contraction surprising, but in fact 7 First version of Curry paradox: For any sentence B, nomatterhowabsurd,letc B say "True(hC B i) B". We now "prove" B, using Modus Ponens, Contraction, and naive truth theory, as follows. (I also use -elimination, but this could be avoided simply by replacing each Tarski axiom in biconditional form by two conditionals.) 1. True(hC B i) (True(hC B i) B) (Tarski axiom for C B ) 2. True(hC B i) (True(hC B i) B) (1, defn of, and -elimination) 3. True(hC B i) B (2, Contraction) 4. (True(hC B i) B) True(hC B i) (1, defn of, and -elimination) 5. True(hC B i) (3, 4, Modus Ponens) 6. B (3, 5, Modus Ponens) That establishes the claim for Contraction. As noted later in the text, this implies the claim for Importation and for a slightly stronger form of -Introduction, viz. the inference from Γ,A` B to Γ ` A B. A second (and more famous) proof of the Curry paradox works even for the weaker form of -Introduction. (But unlike the proof for the stronger form of -Introduction, this one assumes that Modus Ponens can be used even in hypothetical arguments; that is, this one assumes the full rule A, A B ` B, rather than the weaker rule used in the Þrst proof that from ` A and ` A B we can infer ` B). The proof: 1. True(hC B i) ` True(hC B i) B [Intersubstitutivity property of True ] 2. True(hC B i), True(hC B i) B ` B [Modus Ponens] 3. True(hC B i) ` B [1,2] 4. ` True(hC B i) B [3, -Introduction] 5. True(hC B i) B ` True(hC B i) [Intersubstitutivity property of True ] 6. ` True(hC B i) [4,5] 7. ` B [3,6] 8 A further restriction to block the use of Modus Ponens in hypothetical proofs would block the second derivation; alternatively, someone might be tempted by the view that we should give up -Introduction but not Contraction, making only the Þrst derivation threatening. 8
9 the only obvious arguments for Contraction presuppose one of the other two principles. For instance, Importation would get us from A (A C) to A A C; from there, the further inference to A C is totally compelling. Alternatively, we might note that from A (A C) and A, wecaninfer C by two applications of Modus Ponens; so with a slightly stronger version of -Introduction (allowing a side premise), we can get from A (A C) to A C. Ithinkthatthesereßections on the assumptions underlying the obvious arguments for Contraction make it less surprising that Contraction might be given up. 9 There is in fact a well-known logic in which Importation, -Introduction and Contraction all fail: "fuzzy logic", aka Lukasiewicz continuum-valued logic (with 1 as sole designated value). It s an extension of K 3, and it s commonly taken as a good logic for reasoning with vague concepts, so it does seem to meet the criterion of usability. Unfortunately, it will not do for naive truth theory: although it evades many of the paradoxical arguments, naive truth theory is still inconsistent in it. (See [7].) 10 But a few years ago I began thinking seriously about the program of extending Kleene logic with a new conditional that does allow for the naive theory of truth (including substitutivity of True(hAi) with A even within the scope of the new conditional), and have obtained some positive results. The Þrst attempt ([3]) was actually a rather mixed success: though naive truth theory is consistent in it (indeed, "strongly consistent" in it, in the sense of note 3), still the of the logic does not reduce to the ordinary when excluded middle is assumed for the antecedent and consequent; this leads to some counterintuitive results. My second attempt ([5]) solved these problems: I called the logic LCC. I m not sure it is the best possible logic for saving naive truth theory, but it seems more than adequate. Let me clarify something: when I speak of a logic "for naive truth theory", I don t mean to suggest that we use a different logic here than elsewhere. My view is that LCC is a good candidate for our basic, all-purpose logic. Might regarding LCC as a general logic cripple our reasoning in physics, mathematics, etc.? No: we can add all instances of excluded middle in the language of pure mathematics and pure physics as non-logical axioms. We might want to resist adding excluded middle when some of the terms are vague: that s a separate issue I don t want to get into here. (Let me just say that as far as I can see, LCC handles vague notions at least as well as "fuzzy logic" does.) And of course if one thinks that certain parts of the language of basic physics or even basic mathematics (such as quantiþcation over all ordinals) are vague, then abandoning excluded middle for vague terms will lead to abandoning it for those parts of physics and 9 The term Contraction is sometimes used for a structural rule: giving up contraction in that sense would involve supposing that a sentence B might be "a consequence of A taken twice" without being a consequence of A simpliciter. I hope it is clear that I am not giving up contraction as a structural rule. (Doing so would seem to me to do serious violence to any normal notion of consequence.) 10 Restall [13] obtained an earlier result, slightly short of this but enough to show that this logic will not do for truth theory. 9
10 mathematics. But the point is that nothing in my account requires that it be abandoned outside of the special case of the use of True in "self-referential" contexts. I don t want to get into the details of how LCC works, but I ll say something to indicate it s general ßavor. As remarked, it is an extension of the Kleene logic K 3 (including the meta-rule of disjunction elimination). In my presentation of it in [5] I used only the three semantic values of K 3,viz. 1, 1 2 and0. Insuch apresentation, cannot be value-functional: the value of A B (relative to an assignment s) is not determined by the values of A and of B (relative to s). All we get is the following table of possible values: B =1 B = 1 2 B =0 1 A =1 1 2,0 0 A = , ,0 A = Which values we do get for given A and B is determined in the theory, but not just by the semantic values assigned to A and to B. There is, though, a way of subdividing the value 1 2 into inþnitely many distinct semantic values, in a way that will make all the connectives valuefunctional; indeed, the consistency proof offered in [5] could be rewritten in theseterms. Todescribethespaceofsuch"Þne-grained semantic values", consider any initial ordinal Π greater than ω, andletf Π be the set of functions from {α α <Π} into {1, 1 2, 0}. Call a member f of F Π cyclic if there is a ρ f such that 0 <ρ f < Π and for all β and σ, f(ρ f β + σ) =f(ρ f + σ) (when these are deþned, i.e. when ρ f β + σ<π). Call a member f of F Π regular if (i) it is cyclic and (ii) either it is a constant function or else f(0) = 1 2. (Note that given (i), (ii) implies that if f is not constantly 1 or constantly 0 then for some ρ f in the interval (0, Π), f assumes the value 1 2 at each right-multiple of ρ f. It is this consequence that gives (ii) its importance.) Let V Π be the set of regular members of F Π. For a sufficiently large Π, V Π will serve as the space of semantic values. V Π has a natural partial ordering: f ¹ g if and only if ( α <Π)(f(α) g(α)). The partial order has a largest element 1, viz. the function that assigns everything the value 1, and a smallest element 0, viz. the function that assigns everything 0. And the partial order is symmetric around a middle point 1 2, the function that assigns everything value 1 2 ; this will be the value of the Liar sentence. (If f has both the values 0 and 1 in its range it will be incomparable with 1 2 ; if its range includes 1 2 and 1 but not 0 it will be strictly between 1 2 and 1; and if it includes 1 2 and 0 but not 1 it will be strictly between 1 2 and 0. The earlier 3-valued semantics eliminated any distinctions among values that weren t 1 and 0, which is why the conditional could not be represented value-functionally within it.) For each of the sentential connectives I will now describe an operation on V Π. The operation f corresponding to conjunction is simply pointwise minimum: (f f g)(α) is min{f(α),g(α)}. Similarly for disjunction: (f g g)(α) is 10
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|Message view
|« Date » · « Thread »
|« Date » · « Thread »
|Joerg Heinicke <joerg.heini...@gmx.de>
|Re: Patch for NPE in ApplicationUtil (cocoon-auth-api)
|Tue, 09 Sep 2008 10:41:08 GMT
Benjamin Boksa <mailinglists <at> boksa.de> writes: > Hi, > > today I ran into a NPE when using ApplicationUtil.isUserInRole(…), > attached is a patch that allows the User instance passed to > isUserInRole(…) to be null. > > Hope it is OK to submit a patch like that - if there is a better way > to do it just let me know. Hi Benjamin, please file an issue in our bug-tracking system Jira [1]. This is especially for legal reasons since you have to grant license to ASF to actually allow us to use your patch in Cocoon. You will find this option I'm talking about when you attach the patch to the issue. Thanks, Joerg [1] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/COCOON
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Nu Styled Crystal Wine Stopper - Christmas Tree V&B
- Sold for: Start Free Trial or Sign In to see what it's worth.
- Item Category: Ceramics
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- Sold Date: Jun 13, 2008
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Published: 2008-01-18 06:05:00
Updated: 2011-10-17 10:16:36
Posted January 18, 2008
Updated October 17, 2011
Raleigh, N.C. — Anywhere from 1 to 3 inches of snow could fall in the Triangle Saturday, WRAL Chief Meteorologist Greg Fishel said Friday evening, with more accumulation likely in areas to the south and east of Raleigh.
The National Weather Service has issued a Winter Storm Warning is in effect for much of the Triangle and surrounding areas, including Orange, Durham, Wake, Wilson, Nash, Vance, Chatham, Lee and Johnston counties.
And a winter weather advisory is in effect for counties farther to the south and west, including Cumberland, Hoke, Harnett and Wayne, Sampson and Moore counties.
The combination of cold air from the north and an upper-level disturbance tapping into moisture from the Gulf of Mexico, though, will likely bring rain early Saturday morning, turn into snow by the late afternoon and continue falling until late Saturday night, according to WRAL's latest WeatherScope computer model.
But WeatherScope continued a trend Friday night of pushing the highest snowfall totals to the south and east, diminishing snowfall amounts in the Triangle area from 2 to 4 inches projected earlier Friday to 1 to 3 inches.
"If that trend were to continue, then Raleigh could end up not getting a whole lot," Fishel said. "But I really think we're going to get at least an inch or two of snow in the Triangle, no matter how this turns out."
Temperatures Saturday are forecast to reach the mid- to upper 30s and are expected fall below freezing as evening approaches and fall into the low to mid-20s before daybreak Sunday.
After initially melting, snow is forecast to begin to accumulate on most surfaces Saturday afternoon. Temperatures Sunday are not expected to warm much above freezing, which could mean slick spots on the roads through early Monday morning.
State Department of Transportation crews went out on major roads Friday to lay down salt brine that discourages ice formation on pavement, and crews checked their plowing equipment and made some runs to get familiar with roads they would be assigned to plow.
The threat of winter weather has already prompted some cancellations. The Wake County school system has canceled all athletic events, practices and games for Saturday. Also, Durham's Martin Luther King Parade, scheduled for Saturday, has been postponed until noon Feb. 2. Click here to view a complete listing of closings and delays.
WRAL meteorologists said they did not expect freezing rain or sleet with this storm, which means power outages, if any, should be isolated.
If forecast amounts materialize Saturday, it could be one of the significant snowfalls recorded at Raleigh-Durham International Airport since Feb. 15-17, 2004, when 2.7 inches fell.
If it snows Saturday, please send us your photos and file a report on conditions in your area.
WRAL News will have meteorologists tracking the storm all day Saturday and reporters in the field to bring you the latest updates on air and online.
This story is closed for comments.
I heard weatherscope was developed at NCSU, can anyone confirm this? (you have 17 minutes to post comments)
I'm actually one of your "northern transplants" and here are a few of my observations.
You are correct in regards to 4wd. It is exactly that 4WD not 4W Stop. Putting a vehicle in neutral will do wonders when a vehicle is sliding.
Biggest thing I notice is tires. I have never seen so many vehicles with close to no tread as I have seen in NC.
Do any weather services show a map with the actual front lines? I would like to see them. There is always a classic pattern of those fronts when there is a "big one" around here.
Well I'am off to food lion ,oh way what did I do with my MVP CARD!!! @$&&*@#!!!!
And on the weekend Barry Manilow comes to town . . .hope he still gets here . . .
Quick...everyone to the grocery store for bread and milk!
A snow event is different down here than it is up north. Northerners laugh at Southerners driving in the snow, but I'll guarantee you that most of the cars you'll see in the ditch will be Northern transplants.
The snow melts at the surface during the day and refreezes into ice during the night. So when morning comes, what looks like fresh packed snow on the roads is actually snow on top of a sheet of ice. Bridges and overpasses will be especially icy.
It ain't the same as up north. And four wheel drive means you get to have 4 wheels spinning on ice instead of 2.
050462 I am not a weather expert but I believe I will be close with my feeling on this. RDU 1.5 fayetville 4 - 5 goldsboro 4 - 5 rockymount 4 - 5. We can compare tomorrow night.
i am a weather consultant,raleigh gets 2-4,fayetteville to goldsboro to rocky mount gets 4-8 inches.winter storm warnings for fayetteville Will be issued before dawn.
so u apparently think weather scope will be wrong and there will be more snow? I think it will be wrong and there will be less than it is saying now.


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Course Co-ordinator: Dr Emma Wild-Wood (email@example.com) with Dr Jesse Zink (email@example.com ) and Michelle Liebst (email@example.com)
Seminars will take place six times a term on Monday, 2-4 pm
Venue for Michaelmas term: Room 7, Faculty of Divinity
Venue for Lent tern: Centre of African Studies Meeting Room, Alison Richard Building
This option takes an historical and anthropological approach to Christianity in Africa and beyond, examining its complex relations with changing social and political contexts. Emphasis is placed upon Christianity's popular expression rather than formal theology. A number of themes predominate: 1) the relation between Christianity and other world religions, the increase in social and political scale, and the differentiation of power structures that accompanied colonialism; 2) Christianity's enduring concern with the search for power, prosperity and fertility; 3) the creation of alternative religious models of liberation achieved through prayer, healing, community-building and personal renewal; 4) Christianity as a source of political legitimacy and means of popular mobilization; 5) religious conversion as a route to modernity, particularly through new forms of knowledge, literacy and schooling; 6) the contribution of religious ideas, practices and texts to the formation of new identities of class, gender, ethnicity, nation and religious communities that extend beyond the nation-state.
The option will be taught by studying shifting debates about religious movements in Africa. In the 1960s-80s scholars were concerned with the relationship between religion and nationalism. They examined the role of Christian independency in resistance to colonial rule and its involvement in nationalist mobilization. In the 1990s and 2000s, the focus shifted to consider the contribution of Christian groups to the formation of civil society and the rise of a public sphere, examining it as a source of democratization, development and new rights-based discourse. Other scholars have viewed so-called fundamentalist movements, Born-again Christianity/Pentecostalism, as vehicles of conservative American influence, or sought to examine them rather as creative local deployments of trans-regional ideologies that address social problems in post-colonial Africa. Most contemporary commentators have observed the increasing salience of religious idioms and ideas in political discourses as African populations and political leaders seek out new sources of legitimacy.
Michaelmas Term:
Key Debates, Sources and Methods in the Study of Christianity in Africa
Seminar 1:10th October
Introduction: Approaches to the Study of Christianity – Emma Wild-Wood
Seminar 2: 17th October
Mission Archives outline: Word and Image (University of Southern California Mission Photography Archive and MUNDUS Gateway) – Michelle Liebst
Seminar 3: WEDNESDAY 26th October morning.
SOAS Archives: Official Missionary Archives – Michelle Liebst
Seminar 4: 31st October
Cambridge Centre for Christianity Worldwide (CCCW): Archives – Personal Missionary Papers – Jesse Zink
Seminar 5: 14th November
Debates about Conversion in Africa: Indigenous vs Alien Faiths – Emma Wild-Wood
Seminar 6: 28th November Debates about Religious Authenticity: Mission Christians vs Independents – Emma Wild-Wood
Lent Term:
Themes and Topics in the Study of Christianity in Africa
Seminar 1: 23th January
Christianity and Resistance Politics: Colonial states in Sub-Saharan Africa and popular Christian movements – Emma Wild-Wood
Seminar 2: 30th January
Missionary Science and Medicine: Knowledge formation and indigenous interlocutors – Michelle Liebst
Seminar 3: 13th February
Literacy and Christianity: Missionary translations, vernacular grammars and the formation of ethnic and national identities – Emma Wild-Wood
Seminar 4: 27th February
Transatlantic Christianities: The Ethiopian movement and AME church; early Pentecostal movements in Africa and emergence of 'spirit', 'praying' and healing churches – Jesse Zink
Seminar 5: 6nd March
Church and Decolonization in Africa: The creation of an indigenous clergy and conflicts between church and state – Emma Wild-Wood
Seminar 6: 13th March
Theology, Global Christianity in post-Colonial Africa: The role of Pentecostal Christianity in a post-independence and increasingly globalized African continent – Jesse Zink


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Oasis België
Working together so that everyone has the same choices and chances in our community
About us
Oasis Belgium is part of a worldwide family of organisations, working to help the most marginalised to find community, choice and hope. Oasis is a Christian organisation motivated by the belief everyone should be treated with respect and dignity.
Oasis around the world
Oasis works in ten countries; UK, Belgium, South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe, India, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan and USA. We work with street children, gang members, schools in underpriviledged areas, trafficked people and those who are HIV positive.
Find out more at www.oasisglobal.org
Our projects
In Belgium, Oasis has two projects, in one we work alongside Thai women in difficult situations, helping them to learn Dutch, and connect with opportunities in the Belgian system to find work. In the other project we work for the benefit of young children living on the streets, in squats or in difficult circumstances.


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Extraordinary pictures after major road collapse in Florence
A section of the enbankment of the River Arno in the city left dozens of cars under water or damaged.
The incident, which happened near the city's famous Uffizi Gallery and landmark Ponte Vecchio, occurred at about 6.30am this morning.
According to local reports, officials are blaming a burst water pipe for the collapse and while the damage is significant, there are thankfully no reports of any injuries.