text:
The Moscow summit between the U.S. and USSR in Moscow, Russia. Wyeth family artwork being packed in boxes for a visit to the Soviet Union. Various paintings being packed up. In exchange, some Russian paintings and artwork seen that will be displayed in America. General Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev visits the United States during Glasnost efforts. People on the streets in what appears to be New York or possibly Washington DC are surprised when he exits his motorcade to shake hands directly with American citizens gathered on the sidewalks.The U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and his wife visiting Soviet Georgia and being greeted by Soviet citizens. Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan side by side at a summit in Washington DC. They stand together on the White House lawn as a band plays. Animation depicts the sharing of cultures between the two nations and the exchange of magazines. View of American rock star Billy Joel and his band performing at a concert in the Soviet Union on New Year's eve. A Moiseyev Dance Company folk troupe from Russia performing a dance in the United States. Cultural exchange between the two countries includes views of a piano performance by Vladimir Horowitz in Moscow and a ballet performance in the United States by the Bolshoi Ballet. Several Russian school children pose for pictures on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington DC. Soviet teenage children enjoy a elevated ropes course in an outdoor program. People sit in an amphitheater with officials at a Chautaqua Talk in 1987. A group of Soviet citizens view a touring "Information USA" exhibit in the Soviet Union that presents American culture. They view the program on an array of television monitors. A young Russian boy speaks in Russian about his interest in learning about American culture. People watch a science exhibition. Astronauts of the USA and Soviet Union in a spacecraft. The astronauts open a connecting hatch and shake hands. Narrator describes collaboration of the two nations to monitor and study the depleting ozone layer of the earth and how to protect it. A man is shown sunbathing. Officials of the America and the Soviet Union sign an agreement relating to sharing information about safety of nuclear power plants. Soviet representatives and George Shultz, the U.S. secretary of State, inaugurate a new communication system that communicates nuclear dangers between the two countries. A woman in the communication room. Food grain pouring from a harvester, part of what is supplied to the Soviets. Soviet Union tanks and soldiers in Afghanistan. Soviet soldiers walking on a street in Afghanistan in front of a shop. Arrested American journalist Nicholas Daniloff disembarks an aircraft after his release. View of the exterior of the American Embassy in Russia. U.S. marine Sgt. Clayton J. Lonetree being escorted under guard after having been accused of collaborating in a Soviet spy mission at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Scene inside a Voice of America radio broadcast studio. Sign indicates it is broadcasting in Russian. Close up of meter moving on a radio instrument during the broadcast. Dancers from the Dance Theatre of Harlem performing before their visit to the Soviet Union. A group of Soviet citizens including men, women and children walking outdoors. Mikhail Gorbachev with U.S. President Ronald Reagan at a ceremony on the White House grounds on December 8, 1987.
Postwar scenes in Moscow, Russia, after end of World War II. The population including civilians and soldiers mingle and enjoy peacetime activities. A young Soviet soldier walks with a young woman who carries a large bouquet of flowers. People stroll leisurely along the sidewalks. A motorist in a convertible coupe automobile, parked on Red Square, paints a picture of Saint Basil's Cathedral, which is seen clearly in background. Trams pass behind him. View of huge storage tanks.Bricklayers at work on top level of a building. Numerous government buildings. View of Moscow State University building from 1793 on Manezhnaya ploshchad (Square). Students emerging from the University.
The USA-USSR Moscow summit on perestroika in Moscow, Soviet Union. A boat sails in water in front of Red Square buildings in Moscow, Russia, Soviet Union. Traffic on road in Moscow. The expert speaks on the sluggish Soviet economy. Soviet Russian people walk on the streets in a Soviet city (likely Moscow). Some are shopping; some are reading posted material on bulletin boards. Marshall Goldman, a Soviet economist, speaks during a world net telecast. More views of Russian people in front of the shops and on the streets in the 1980s. The U.S. president Ronald Wilson Reagan and General Secretary of the communist party of Soviet Union Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev sign a pact limiting nuclear weapons. Mikhail Gorbachev waves to the people. The people hold balloons as they stand to greet him. Soviet Officials including Gorbachev stand at Kremlin in Red Square during a military parade. Flashback scene during the formation of the Solidarit Labor Union in Poland. Lech Wałęsa, Polish Solidarity leader, speaking to a crowd in the early 1980s. Crowd protests on streets in Poland during time of formation of Solidarity movement. Final scenes of clip show rally in Red Square Soviet Union as balloons rise during celebration or parade, and view of large banner of famous deceased Soviet leaders is seen hanging from buildings.
A film titled ' Our Russian front. It shows Soviet Russia's state of preparedness and national mobilization at the time of the German invasion (Operation Barbarossa) in 1941, during World War 2. Soviet troops on parade in Red Square, Moscow, carrying Tokarev SVT-40 semi-automatic assault rifles, with curved magazines and fixed bayonets. Glimpse of a Soviet heavy gun (possibly 152mm howitzer). A Soviet Navy gunboat speeding toward the camera. A formation of Polikarpov I-16 aircraft inflight overhead. Several views of soviet forces, including units composed entirely of women; Closeups of troops, some holding Russian RPD 7.62 cal m44 light machine guns. A Soviet T-26 speeding in Red Square with flag flying, during a parade. View from the rear of a line of Soviet Zvezda BT-7 light tanks being deployed along a dirt road. Russian civilians, most of them women, work digging hillside fortifications. Closeup of woman with small boy in her arms. Views of destroyed buildings and dead civilians in a Russian town Aerial view of bombs bursting on Russian city. Smoke rising from resulting fires. Several views of light flashes from artillery firing at night. American envoy, W. Averell Harriman, participant in the U.S.-British military mission to Moscow, broadcasts about Soviet determination to defend against the Nazi invasion, at all costs. He refers to Soviet mechanics assembling American aircraft (Provided under "Lend Lease"). Narrator identifies Harriman as Chairman of the Board of Union Pacific Railroad. View of Russian airplanes in formation, flying high above the State Museum building in Red Square, Moscow. An American Government aircraft (C-47 /DC-3) aircraft lands at Moscow Airport. View of the aircraft parked and surrounded by a large crowd of military and diplomatic attendees. Harriman steps from the plane. Next he is seen with British Lord Beaverbrook and Soviet diplomat, Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky. Another view of Russian aircraft flying over the State museum in Red Square. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (unseen) is heard in the background extolling the Russian efforts against the Nazis. Soviet Tupolev SB bombers in formation overhead. Flags waving Aerial view of a formation of Polikarpov I-16 aircraft in flight. A Komintern Artillery Tractor,carrying Soviet soldiers, tows a 152mm field howitzer. A formation of army vehicles carrying Russian troops along paths already formed in the dirt by prior tracked vehicles. Seen are Komintern Artillery Tractors and ordinary army trucks.
Animated map on globe of world shows extent of the USSR from East to west and North to South (9 million Square miles). Miners extracting her natural resource minerals. 110 million
acres of forests and timber being felled. Coal on a conveyer belt. A "forest" of oil derricks in a Soviet field. Oil tank cars moving on a railroad. Iron and steel mills. 370 million acres of farmland. Farms being worked. Tea, tobacco, and cotton crops. Herds of ranch animals. Corn,oats,hops,rye and wheat being harvested by machinery. Huge parades of people parading in Red Square, Moscow, Russia. Dancers on floats in the parade. Cossacks from the Don River Valley demonstrate horsemanship. Map showing Ukraine, Russia,Hungary, Rumania,and other adjoining areas. Musicians playing balalaikas accompany dancers. Ukranians,Moldovians and Beserabians in local costume. Map of the Caucasuses between the Caspian and Black Seas. People from that region dancing and playing instruments. Armenians,and people riding on horseback from tribes of the Caucasian mountains. Uzbeks blowing long horns. Turkmen with horses. Mongols playing stringed instruments. Views of people from further East and North approaching Siberia. Some hunting with rifles. Views of Moscow. Moscovites walking on a summer day. Man riding in a horse-drawn carriage. Cars driving on a street. All kinds of vehicular traffic in Moscow city, including trams. Outside views of Soviet factories. Soviet soldiers. Soviet bricklayer, traffic cop, and sailor are shown. A riveter at work. Soviet school children. An old fireman.Nurse in a hospital. Civil engineer with transit. A window washer. A sales girl. Housewives. A Postal clerk. A radio announcer. A stewardess on an airliner. A chemist in a laboratory. A typist at work. A harpist playing and a ballerina dancing as an orchestra plays. Soviet citizens walking across a field. Narrator refers to their love for the soil. Animated map sums up Russia's size and characteristics. (World War II period).
The US-USSR Moscow Summit on Human rights in Moscow, Soviet Union. U.S. president Ronald Reagan speaks on issues relating to Human rights. Other officials seated in front. He speaks about the right to immigrate and travel. View of the Kremlin in Moscow. U.S. Secretory of State George Pratt Shultz speaks about strategic arms reductions in light of the weapons race. The White house press secretary Marlin Fitzwater at a press conference. The board reads 'Department of State'. Exteriors of the building. View of protesters permitted to demonstrate in the Soviet Union indicating some improvement in conditions. In Washington DC, citizens march on streets demonstrating for the freedom of Soviet Jews. The soviet scholar Peter Reddaway speaks about the reforms and highlights reforms and changing Soviet policy on open-ended internment of mental health patients. People pray inside a church in the Soviet Union. George Weigel, the president of the James Madison Foundation, speaks of importance of religious freedom in the Soviet union on a news panel. Weigel states that religious freedom is a key test of Glasnost and Perestroika. Exterior view of the Ukrainian Catholic National Shrine of the Holy Family under construction in Washington DC, built by Ukrainian American Catholics. People in the Soviet Union protest, marching on a street and holding signs and pickets. A large military parade in the Soviet Union in Red Square.


text:
The Charleston
Gazette's Editorial Response
to the Vietnam War, 1963-1965
By Craig Houston
In January 22, 1963, Charleston Gazette editorial writers Harry Hoffman and L. T. Anderson brought to their readers' attention a little-known country fighting a less-understood war in Southeast Asia. The South Vietnamese government, with American aid, was attempting to stem the tide of communist aggression within its boundaries. Hoffman and Anderson were skeptical about America's role; while American "advisers" were dying in combat in South Vietnam, Americans at home were "being denied clear-cut explanations of what is happening in foreign policy in Vietnam."1 Their skepticism soon evolved into opposition to American foreign policy in Vietnam, a policy Anderson later characterized as a "military adventure [that] was a calamitous extension of an anti-communist policy so obsessive and inflexible that it eliminated all hope of peaceful resolution."2 By 1965 the piecemeal steps United States policy was taking were cause for alarm to Hoffman and Anderson. After all, they asked, "could a little escalation be not unlike the unfortunate miss who found herself a little pregnant?"3
An examination of the initial years of the Gazette's editorial position on the Vietnam War reveals its early opposition to United States involvement in South Vietnam. Furthermore, because Hoffman and Anderson hoped to influence West Virginia's congressional delegation, a careful reading of their anti-Vietnam War editorials unveils several themes, among them that South Vietnam was not vital to United States security and that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were pursuing policies of war rather than of peace.
In early January 1961, Gazette editors Hoffman and Anderson criticized American foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, Laos suffered from political unrest and civil war until December 1960, when a pro-American government secured power. According to Hoffman and Anderson, the United States Department of State had "done everything within its melodramatic imagination to circumvent the Geneva agreement." The consequence had been "dangerous profits" including "possibly the loss of Laos to the Communists, or the intervention of American and Chinese troops in a hopeless jungle war."4
Criticism of the Laotian situation continued into 1961, as a March Gazette editorial foreshadowed later opinions about the Vietnam War. When President Kennedy sought to establish a neutralist government in Laos to end the civil war, the Soviet-backed Pathet Lao refused to negotiate. Consequently, Kennedy announced his intention to increase American military aid to the Royal Laotian Army. In response to these developments, editors Hoffman and Anderson identified the Laotian civil war as a dispute between "conflicting personalities and rival politicians whose personal fortunes are at stake." The Charleston editors pointed out that in terms of "vital national interests and clashing ideologies," the war was "meaningless." Furthermore, they believed "selfish policies alone on the part of world powers have kept a brush-fire smoldering which [can] at any moment become a conflagration."5
In 1962 Hoffman and Anderson commented again on "clashing" ideologies in Southeast Asia. They stressed that battles between democracy and communism needed to be waged with ideas, not weapons. The Gazette editors insisted that "corruption and inept governments will not in this age of revolution be long endured by those they govern and no amount of outside pressure or assistance can maintain a government in power which has lost popular support."6
In January 1963, they focused their attention on South Vietnam when events there rocked United States policy. The Vietcong defeated South Vietnamese troops at Ap Bac, shooting down five American helicopters and killing three American advisers. New York Times correspondent David Halberstam reported that "in the opinion of observers [in Saigon] the defeat was the worst that the Government troops had suffered in more than a year."7 Subsequently, Hoffman and Anderson called for a State Department White Paper to explain to the American people "the value of the presence of American troops in this Far Eastern nightmare."8 One week later the editors attacked the Kennedy administration for acquiescing to the "prerogatives of the [South Vietnamese] ruling class" instead of seeking to implement vital social, economic, and political reforms. "Until there is a change," they asserted, "South Viet Nam will continue to be a costly, worthless experiment in foreign policy."9
The Gazette's assessment of the dilemma appeared accurate throughout the following months when South Vietnamese Buddhists protested against the repressive measures of Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. Police in Hue killed several people in May 1963 when they fired into a peaceful gathering of Buddhists. Diem blamed the incident on the Vietcong. But when the Buddhists demanded punishment for the officials responsible for the killings, he ignored their pleas for justice. Diem also refused American Ambassador Frederick Nolting's attempt to persuade him to rectify the situation. Diem's sister-in- law Madame Nhu aggravated the controversy when she declared that the United States was manipulating the Buddhists. William Trueheart, Nolting's deputy, rebuked Diem and implied that he would lose United States support if the Buddhist repression continued. Diem then created a "cosmetic committee" to investigate the Hue incident.10 To no one's surprise, the committee concluded that the Vietcong were responsible for the killings. Polarization between Diem and the Buddhists grew worse on June 11, 1963, when an elderly monk named Quang Duc, who had alerted an Associated Press correspondent to his intentions, immolated himself in protest against the Diem regime. Despite the subsequent outcry, Diem remained intractable, and Madam Nhu applauded the monk "`barbecues' and offered to furnish the gasoline and matches for more."11
In July, the Gazette editors, in their response to these events, castigated American foreign policy. They were pessimistic about Diem's future success and labelled him a "tyrant, a despot, the kind of puppet historically repugnant to Americans. . . . [But] he is our creature, inspected and condemned by much of the civilized world." Hoffman and Anderson predicted that the United States had "allied itself with the cruelty, the repressions and the police state methods of Diem. In so doing, it is sowing the wind. It must reap the whirlwind."12
Four months later, in November, this prediction came true. In late August, Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's brother, had ordered his American-trained Special Forces to attack Buddhist temples. Anti-Diemists within the Kennedy administration urged the president to exert maximum pressure on Diem to reform and remove his brother from power or "`face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved'."13 Events, messages, and misunderstandings escalated until, on November 1, several South Vietnamese generals, with the CIA's encouragement and Kennedy's quiet blessing, kidnapped and later, unbeknownst to the president, murdered Diem and Nhu.
Following Diem's overthrow, the Gazette editors continued to view with pessimism America's future in Vietnam, and even suggested the possibility of United States complicity in the coup. They wrote:
"Whether the war against the Viet Cong will henceforth be prosecuted with more vigor remains to be seen. The odds don't look particularly attractive that it will be, because there is much to suggest that the Vietnamese are far more interested in the material benefits being supplied to them by the United States than in prosecuting an ideological war. . . .
"Victory wasn't coming to the Diem government. Nor is victory closer today, as a result of the coup, than it was last week, the week prior, or when the whole nasty business started. . . .
"[A new administration in power] doesn't mean the same populace will be disposed to fight and die for democracy -- a way of life as alien as it is incomprehensible to the happy-go-lucky Viet Nam mass."14
Fighting to preserve democracy in South Vietnam seemed illogical to the Gazette editors because of South Vietnamese ignorance regarding democracy and its privileges.
In January 1964, another South Vietnamese military faction toppled the junta that had ousted Diem. The coup met with Hoffman and Anderson's quick ire. The editors believed events in Vietnam had become unmanageable and surmised that "regardless of what the Johnson administration does, it has on its hands a mammoth headache unlikely to disappear of its own accord. The administration has inherited a mess, which becomes messier and messier with each passing month." However, despite their avowal that the United States was "engaged in a guerrilla action it can't win under existing conditions," Hoffman and Anderson did not counsel withdrawal or suggest how the United States could turn the tide. They insisted the "risks involved in stepping up American activity and troop and supply are probably greater than any attainable objective," and thus revealed their fear that the United States might escalate its involvement in Vietnam.15
Ten days later Hoffman and Anderson clarified their position and urged President Johnson to end the war through peace negotiations. They concluded that unless the United States wanted to "risk another Korea with the Chinese," the alternative to negotiations -- escalating the war to produce victory -- was unacceptable. For the first time, they implied further American escalation could cause China to enter the war on the side of North Vietnam. They insisted "a reasonable compromise could be reached" with the Vietcong, concluding that "in light of the huge expenses to date, American casualties, the dubious cause, and the dismal lack of success, negotiation is clearly the logical next step."16 Hoffman and Anderson questioned American involvement in Southeast Asia, linking this "dubious cause" to the probable increased cost in American lives. The Gazette editors opined the price was too high to pay.
Later in February 1964, Newsweek correspondent Robert Karr McCabe, writing in The New Leader, offered the status quo as an alternative to both escalation and neutralization. The Gazette editors rejected his solution and criticized his failure to suggest diplomatic action as an alternative to maintaining the status quo: "Efforts toward a diplomatic accommodation shouldn't be summarily dismissed." Hoffman and Anderson reasoned that negotiations could shorten what McCabe called the "long, long war."17
Twice during March 1964, Hoffman and Anderson challenged the reasoning behind America's foreign policy commitment to Vietnam: to stop communist aggression establish a viable, democratic government -- the "dubious cause" they had written of in the previous month. The Gazette editors observed that "none of this nation's allies and friends excepting Nationalist China, sees the threat of communism in the same light as does our State Department." American policymakers had to become more realistic in their analysis of the global situation instead of attributing every "threat" to the "red menace." Hoffman and Anderson even suggested that the United States should "be prepared to accept with good grace Castro and Viet Nam."18
Later that month the Charleston editors published a bitter editorial reflecting the horrors of war and identified obstinate pride and insincere admissions that "mistakes" had been made as justifications for America's continued involvement in South Vietnam.
"Simple Mistakes Won't Deter War
"The United States and South Viet Nam have expressed regret over the attack on a Cambodian village which saw men, women and children die horribly in a rain of flaming napalm.
"It was all a mistake.
"The attackers believed the border town was in South Viet Nam, not Cambodia, and the napalm was intended only for Vietnamese men, women and children who might (or might not) be kindly disposed toward the Viet Cong guerrillas.
"Mistakes do happen, but no doubt they will not deter the fearless forces that wave the banner of democracy from pressing on against the helpless peasants who don't understand that it is vitally necessary that the United States not lose face in Southeast Asia."19
In June 1964, the Gazette editors again rejected the official reason for American involvement in Vietnam. "It would be desirable for once," they wrote, "to know just what it is this nation is attempting to prove in the Far East, and please something a bit more precise than arresting communism." America's allies, Hoffman and Anderson observed, were unwilling to aid the United States in its war against communist aggression in Southeast Asia because they "have no sympathy" for American policy.20
On August 2, North Vietnamese patrol boats attacked the American destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. Two days later the Maddox, as well as the Turner Joy, reported that they were under attack. Despite the confusion as to whether the second attack actually occurred, President Johnson seized the opportunity. He retaliated by ordering American aircraft to bomb North Vietnam for the first time. Moreover, within a week after the North Vietnamese attack, Johnson ushered through Congress, by a vote of 88-2 in the Senate and unanimously in the House, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This gave the president unlimited power to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."21
Gazette editors Hoffman and Anderson viewed the activity in the Gulf with caution, and questioned the validity of the administration's assertion that the attack threatened American security. "Gunboats versus destroyers," they wrote, "hardly constitutes a threat to America's bristling war capacity in that part of the world." They warned their readers that the war would probably not be resolved on the battlefield without full-scale war or use of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, "the risks attendant upon either of these actions to stamp out guerrilla activity are as militaristically inadvisable as they are humanistically unthinkable." The only answer to the problem, according to the editors, was the international conference table. Several weeks later they referred to the nation's general acceptance of Johnson's actions as "rubberstamp approval" and rebuked the navy because its response "smacked of 19th century `gunboat policy'."22
Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Hoffman and Anderson's criticism of American involvement in Vietnam grew more severe. They believed the United States had "stumbled from one miserable failure to another," and again rejected the official reason for American presence in Vietnam. To stop "Communist aggression," they claimed, was a scapegoat policy, an "expression . . . used as a catch-all when we have marched boldly into a maze and haven't the foggiest notion of how to get out." Along with their criticism, the Gazette editors astutely pointed to a particular problem in the American effort. To the Vietnamese farmer in the Mekong Delta, "American military forces and propaganda surely don't represent peace and freedom. Indeed, it is more likely that the Viet Cong . . . is more tempting to the farmer if only because it is comprised of people from his own country and culture."23
Problems continued to mount for American-South Vietnamese forces in the fight against the Vietcong. In November 1964, the Vietcong attacked the Bienhoa airbase, destroying six B-57s, killing five Americans and two South Vietnamese, and wounding nearly one hundred more. Responding to the attack, the Charleston editors wrote that "in the enigmatic, nightmarish war against Communist guerrillas in South Viet Nam, the nebulous U. S. position has taken undreamed of turns for the worse." They pointed out that the Vietcong were growing in number, power, and territory because the majority of the Vietnamese people sympathized with the rebels. The inclusion of a New York Times map showing "The War in Vietnam -- Communist Progress in Two Years" reinforced their argument. Because of the limited success of the American objective, Hoffman and Anderson continued to tell their readers that the only solution, the "only realistic hope," was to negotiate.24
Negotiations appeared to be the key to opening the door to peace. The Gazette editors agreed with journalist Sidney Lens, whom they quoted:
"A vital step toward this goal [encouragement of an honest, democratically established government] is a willingness to negotiate with the Viet Cong, the Viet Minh, and -- if necessary -- the Chinese for an end to the senseless warfare that has reduced the Vietnamese people to mere pawns in a cold-war chess game of peace."25
Significantly, neither Hoffman and Anderson nor Lens mentioned anything about a Soviet role in the diplomatic process.
In February 1965, Hoffman and Anderson continued their editorial quest for peace and offered their readers "constructive and sensible" proposals to end the war. Senators George McGovern, Frank Church, and Ernst Gruening recommended a cease-fire with negotiations between North and South Vietnam, neutralization of both countries with a United Nations unit to supervise the peace, a resumption of trade between the two nations, and "co-operative economic projects designed to lift standards of living for the peoples of both nations." Hoffman and Anderson also agreed with syndicated columnist Walter Lippmann, one of the first "Establishment" figures to oppose the war publicly, that the United States could no longer be the "appointed policeman to the human race." They believed the senators' suggestions held more promise for the future than the current White House policies. However, the Gazette editors did not criticize the senators for their exclusion of the Vietcong from the negotiations.26
Like the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Vietcong attack at Pleiku in February 1965 marked a turning point in the war. Eight Americans died and ten United States aircraft were destroyed, while most of the attackers escaped. President Johnson ordered the second retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam which, excepting a few brief pauses, continued until 1968. Several weeks later Johnson dispatched United States Marines -- the first "combat" troops to enter the country -- to South Vietnam to protect the American airbase at Danang.27
The Gazette editors recognized that the Pleiku attack and American bombing would have long-term repercussions because a "definite shift in American policy has taken place." That shift meant the United States would respond to "aggressive acts" by the Vietcong on American installations with airstrikes on North Vietnamese strategic targets. Ironically, Hoffman and Anderson called the retaliatory bombing "unavoidable and necessary." In previous months they had wholeheartedly endorsed diplomacy, not military action, as a means to end the war. However, now they accepted the new military escalation, possibly waiting to see if it would produce positive results. They expressed moral disapproval of the bombing, protesting the fate of "illiterate, happy-go-lucky peasants. . . . [They] have no more idea why they're being blown to eternity by planes bearing stars and stripes on their wings than cattle understand the trip to an abattoir."28
However, bombing did not win friends in the South, and in March 1965, Hoffman and Anderson asserted that "to the majority of South Vietnamese the Viet Cong is looked upon as a friend, while the United States is regarded as a foe." To rectify this problem, they agreed with the suggestions of Major General Edward Lansdale, a veteran of guerrilla warfare in the Philippines. Lansdale argued that the United States had to "inculcate in the South Vietnamese an appreciation for liberty and an understanding of freedom." Recalling their criticism of the Kennedy administration's foreign policy in Laos, Hoffman and Anderson believed America had to fight an ideological war using the tenets of democracy against those of communism or else "our chances of winning this war will be nil." In essence, Lansdale believed a conventional war was useless against guerrillas supported by the local population. His alternative, which the Gazette editors supported, favored showing the peasant populace the wonders of democracy and thereby gaining their support for winning the war.29
A few days later the Gazette editors, in a sarcastic tone, created a hypothetical series of Johnson administration assumptions and then methodically attacked each one:
"The good guys -- that's the South Vietnamese -- are being overrun by a bunch of badies -- that's the North Vietnamese.
"The badies are controlled from Hanoi with a direct assist from Peking.
"If South Vietnam falls, oops there goes Asia.
"Ultimately, the United States must stand up to Mao Tse-tung's yellow hordes. Better to confront them in South Vietnam than in Honolulu or Walla Walla."30
Hoffman and Anderson rejected the first assumption, saying the conflict was essentially a civil war. They noted that the second theory was untenable because of the "1,000-year antipathy" between the peoples of China and Indochina. Ridiculing the administration's belief in the domino theory, the editors believed the third idea needed to be more explicit, that is, to whom would South Vietnam fall and "does China want South Viet Nam?" They asked of the fourth supposition: "Isn't it the height of overpreening ambition to suppose the United States can forever be the dominating force on a continent over 10,000 miles away?" Hoffman and Anderson insisted that the administration's belief in the truth of those assumptions underlay the White House's decision to escalate the war. The Gazette editors now opposed the bombing and were convinced that a little bombing and a few thousand Marines would lead to more intensive bombing and hundreds of thousands of Marines.31
At the conclusion of one month's bombing, Hoffman and Anderson contended the administration's policy had done little to bring the fighting nearer to an end. In an early April 1965 editorial, they wrote the Vietcong still controlled most of South Vietnam, "still whips South Vietnamese troops regularly, and still thumbs its nose at Saigon's supposedly impregnable, collaborating partner." A few days later they insisted that "there isn't a shred of evidence to suggest the guerrillas have been impressed [by the bombing] in the slightest."32
On April 7, at Baltimore's Johns Hopkins University, President Johnson delivered an important foreign policy speech on Vietnam. In it he compared the war to the American Revolution and asserted that freedom everywhere was at stake. The president offered North Vietnam economic, technological, educational, and medical assistance in exchange for peace. Most importantly, Johnson announced his conditions for peace in Southeast Asia:
"Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam -- securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others -- free from outside interference -- tied to no alliance -- a military base for no other country."33
Hoffman and Anderson supported President Johnson for the first time, calling his speech a "strong appeal to reason and a conscientious attempt to uncover a peaceful solution." However, they found fault with Johnson's "failure to provide for some immediate, concrete actions to reassure ally, foe and neutral of our bloodless objectives." They suggested a brief halt in the air raids over North Vietnam "to allow Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking to digest thoroughly his words and proposals." This was the editors' first inclusion of the Soviet Union in the diplomatic picture. Other than this lone exception, the editors believed the president's speech had been a "solid piece of diplomacy," something for which they had waited two years to hear.34
Several days following Johnson's speech, the North Vietnamese rejected his proposals. They insisted that peace talks could not be held until the United States halted its airstrikes on the North, and that any settlement had to include the Vietcong. Consequently, the Gazette editors again questioned the feasibility of the bombing campaign. Hoffman and Anderson argued that "extending the olive branch while escalating the war through bombing missions . . . gives other nations cause to doubt our sincerity in any peace move." They agreed with Senator William J. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who reasoned that a "suspension of the bombing . . . would test the sincerity of the North Vietnamese in their overtures for peace." Fulbright also believed that to continue the bombing might cause the North Vietnamese to "dig in" and prolong the war. Hoffman and Anderson agreed that a bombing suspension was worth attempting to start the diplomatic wheels turning again, especially since Hanoi's rejection had abruptly halted them.35
The Charleston Gazette's opposition to American participation in the Vietnam War was significant. As early as January 1963, Gazette editors Hoffman and Anderson questioned America's role in South Vietnam. As the months progressed, this skepticism of United States foreign policy matured into dissent. Their descriptions of American policy in Vietnam clearly revealed their opposition: "a costly, worthless experiment," a "mammoth headache," the "dubious cause," "enigmatic," the "nebulous United States position," "an unqualified disaster," and a "quagmire."36
In addition to their descriptions of American foreign policy in Vietnam, Hoffman and Anderson's editorial opposition to the war revolved around six themes: (1) foreign governments needed popular support to survive despite vast amounts of American influence and goods; (2) the war was a clash of ideologies and therefore was being fought incorrectly; (3) South Vietnam was not vital to United States security; (4) American pride and self-perceived world position were more important than calling a halt to hostilities; (5) the risks of escalating the war were far greater than any reward the United States could reap; (6) the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were ignoring alternatives to war.
Hoffman and Anderson recognized Southeast Asia as a region of political instability due in large measure to the Cold War's extension into the area. They wrote initially about Laos but soon focused their attention on its neighbor, South Vietnam. Political corruption and ineptitude, rule by tyranny, and lack of popular support for the South Vietnamese government contributed to a foreboding sense in Gazette editorials that no amount of American influence, political or material, could prevent a communist victory. Throughout their editorials Hoffman and Anderson understood the conflict to be a guerrilla war. For that reason, they believed American military policy would fail because "as Mao Tse-tung, one of the world's foremost authorities on the subject, has pointed out, guerrilla warfare presupposes a friendly population."37 In addition, they hinted in several editorials to a sense of American imperialism, implying that the Vietnamese masses resented the presence of the United States in the country while many others tolerated it because of its material benefits to them.
Because the Vietnam War was a war of ideas, according to Hoffman and Anderson, it had to be waged in a non-traditional manner. Writing only in generalities, they urged American leaders to show the Vietnamese democracy's privileges as compared to communism's oppression. Education, then, was the key to winning the war because democracy as a "way of life" was "alien" and "incomprehensible" to the Vietnamese populace. The Gazette editors never outlined in any detail how to educate the Vietnamese. Nor did they explain how the Vietnamese people, completely lacking an understanding of democracy, were cognizant of the workings of communism. Did the majority of Vietnamese peasants live day-to-day somewhere between these two philosophical poles without questioning the degree of their freedom? Or were they just "happy-go-lucky," as Hoffman and Anderson twice characterized them?
South Vietnam was not vital to United States regional and international security according to Hoffman and Anderson. They repeatedly attacked and ridiculed the American foreign policy goal of stopping communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Early in 1964 they argued that no justifiable grounds existed to support any increased American presence in South Vietnam. More importantly, they urged negotiating at this early date, even with the Vietcong.38 To buttress their argument, they pointed to America's allies who, with the exception of Nationalist China, did not view this as communist aggression in Southeast Asia. The Gazette editors insisted that American foreign policy officials were shackled to the rigid anti-communist policies of the past. Instead, they advocated more sophisticated analyses and policies for the ever-changing present. The old policy of policing the world had to be discarded.
The fourth theme present in Hoffman and Anderson's anti-Vietnam War editorials was that American pride and a fear for America's reputation in the international community had entrapped the United States. These attitudes prevented American officials from admitting either that mistakes had been made or that United States policy was misguided or even wrong. They also prevented policymakers from pursuing anything other than a hard-line approach to North Vietnam. To accept offers of negotiations or of peace on any conditions other than those established by the United States was tantamount to weakness or being soft on communism.
Hoffman and Anderson consistently maintained that the risks of escalating the war to achieve victory were far greater than any positive returns the United States could expect. What was a "smoldering" "brush-fire" in Laos in 1961 had, by 1965, become a "conflagration" in South Vietnam. The Gazette editors argued that American escalation could cause the Chinese to enter the war, despite the traditional hostility between China and Vietnam. Then, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Hoffman and Anderson feared that full-scale war or the use of nuclear weapons were real options American officials were willing to consider. But such responses, they wrote, were as "militaristically inadvisable as they are humanistically unthinkable." Yet by April 1965, they realized that full-scale war was now American policy in South Vietnam.
Their fifth theme was linked to the final theme found in the Gazette's editorial response to the early years of the Vietnam War: the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were ignoring the alternatives to war. According to Hoffman and Anderson, solutions to American problems in Vietnam could be found at the international conference table. At one point, they even urged negotiations with the Vietcong, a suggestion the Johnson administration rejected whenever raised. The Gazette could not suggest American withdrawal because, according to Anderson, "a diplomatic solution was suggested in the hope such a course would be effective and in the certain knowledge that withdrawal would be too fearful a step to urge upon the West Virginia congressional delegation the Gazette was trying to influence."39
The Gazette editors' criticism and opposition came during a period when few Americans, according to Gallup polls, opposed United States involvement in Vietnam. When compared to the editorial positions of other West Virginia newspapers toward three key events of this period (Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem's overthrow, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and President Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins University in early April 1965), the Gazette was representative of that minority opinion.40
Eleven of the seventeen newspapers examined made no comment about Diem's overthrow and assassination in early November 1963. Three others, the Sunday Clarksburg Exponent-Telegram, the Huntington Herald-Dispatch, and the Logan Banner, believed Diem's overthrow would result in more effective prosecution of the war.41 The Charleston Daily Mail implied that the United States Department of State had been covertly involved in the coup. Moreover, Daily Mail editors wrote that despite South Vietnam's lukewarm commitment to United States involvement, American withdrawal was impossible because Southeast Asia would then fall to the Communists.42 The Wheeling Intelligencer was the only other newspaper whose editors insisted that if the new government did not perform better than its predecessor, the United States "might as well bring our men and our money home and give up the project of stopping Communism there as a lost cause."43
Nine months later, when the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred, only four of the seventeen newspapers remained silent.44 The Grant County Press "doubted" the Johnson administration's "will to win." Its editor argued that Johnson's "haste in reassuring our enemies that we plan no wider war has received our suspicion that he is committed to a purely defensive policy which can be no more successful in Vietnam than it was in Laos."45 The Morgantown Post now joined the Gazette in opposition to America's Vietnam policy. "The time is coming," its editors wrote, "when we must have the gumption to recognize that we are embarked on an unprofitable adventure from which we should retire as soon and definitely as we can gracefully manage."46 The Intelligencer retreated from its November 1963 position to join ten other newspapers whose editors believed the White House's retaliatory action was proper and just. Representative of this stance were the Fairmont West Virginian, the Huntington Advertiser, and the Raleigh Register. The West Virginian's editor wrote that the United States would not be "pushed around" any longer.47 The Advertiser's editor called for national unity, insisting no room for dissent existed.48 The Raleigh Register's editor recalled historical precedent to remind readers that the appeasement policies of the past had been failures. Now, thanks to America's strong response to the Gulf attacks, "if a meeting is what the Communists want, it will be at our leisure."49
The third key event of the period was President Johnson's peace speech in early April 1965 at Johns Hopkins University. The Grant County Press and the Clarksburg Telegram did not comment, but three others, both Morgantown papers and the Calhoun Chronicle, dissented with America's Vietnam policy. The Dominion-News called the domino theory "rubbish pure and simple unadulterated rubbish,"50 while the Post again called for the United States to "attend to its own affairs."51 The Chronicle echoed past Gazette editorials:
"There are many indications that the majority of people in South Vietnam support the Vietcong, and that the government we presently support is not popular. . . .
"And there is a good question whether the people of South Vietnam understand democracy, or would be capable of sustaining a genuine democratic government.
"This is not to say that we must suddenly surrender or to argue that Communism is good enough for the peoples of Asia, because it kills individual freedom. But we should face the facts, if we are to understand what we are up against in this part of the world, where American boys are dying each day, for American policy and interests."52
The remaining twelve newspapers supported the president's speech and American policy. Each agreed that Johnson's speech had been a "clear reaffirmation of this country's determination to abide by our commitment to defend the physical and political integrity of South Viet Nam," as the Exponent's editor wrote.53 The editor of the Fairmont Times believed Johnson had "made no concession to tyranny. He has reiterated the American policy of insuring self- determination to the people of Viet Nam."54 Finally, each paper agreed with Spencer's Time-Record: "We are in and must stay to impress North Viet Nam, China, and even Russia that we will not permit Southeast Asia to be taken over by the reds."55
Editors Hoffman and Anderson were early opponents of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia and the Gazette was a minority voice among West Virginia newspapers. Their criticism remained consistent, wavering only when they believed a variation in United States policy could bring the war nearer to an end. But, when the policy revealed itself to be no change at all, Hoffman and Anderson continued to assail, sometimes in vitriolic fashion, America's participation in the Vietnam War. In exhorting American officials to negotiate an end to the war, their dissent developed into a crusade. In 1963- 64, Hoffman and Anderson wrote 22 editorials about the Vietnam War. In 1965 they wrote 63, and in the following two years, respectively, they wrote 86 and 126 anti-Vietnam War editorials.
Did Gazette editorials change public opinion toward the Vietnam War? Such a question may never have a definitive answer; but with a circulation of sixty to sixty-five thousand between 1960 and 1965, the Gazette reached many readers across West Virginia. Moreover, Hoffman and Anderson's editorials in opposition to the war challenged readers to question America's involvement in Southeast Asia.
More important was the Gazette's opposition to United States foreign policy in Vietnam. During the first years of the war, few Americans questioned the country's near-hegemony in world affairs nor did they dispute the anti- communist policy so preponderant in foreign policy since World War II. Also, it must be remembered that mainstream opposition to the Vietnam War developed for pragmatic reasons -- death tolls, inflation, civil rights, and other domestic problems -- rather than a rejection of America's anti-communist Vietnam policy. Hoffman and Anderson must be placed within this context to understand that they were questioning national policies, as well as national attitudes, that heretofore had received the loyalty and unchallenged acceptance of most Americans. "Could a little escalation be not unlike the unfortunate miss who found herself a little pregnant?"57 With hindsight, yes; Harry Hoffman and L. T Anderson and the Charleston Gazette were accurate and correct to give their readers this warning.
1. Charleston Gazette, 22 January 1963.
2. L. T. Anderson to the author, 29 April 1986.
3. Gazette, 10 March 1965.
4. Ibid., 16 January 1961.
5. Ibid., 23 March 1961.
6. Ibid., 11 April 1962.
7. New York Times, 3 January 1963. For a fine, detailed analysis of the battle of Ap Bac and its influence on American policy, see Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), book 3, "The Battle of Ap Bac."
8. Gazette, 22 January 1963.
9. Ibid., 28 February 1963.
10. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 280.
11. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 96.
12. Gazette, 11 July 1963.
13. Herring, America's Longest War, 97.
14. Gazette, 4 November 1963.
15. Ibid., 3 February 1964. See also Herring, America's Longest War, 111, and Karnow, Vietnam, 335.
16. Gazette, 13 February 1964.
17. Ibid., 20 February 1964; see also Robert Karr McCabe, "Vietnam's Impossible Alternatives," The New Leader 47(3 February 1964): 3-5.
18. Gazette, 7 March 1964.
19. Ibid., 24 March 1964; see also New York Times, 22 March 1964.
20. Gazette, 27 June 1964.
21. New York Times, 6 August 1964.
22. Gazette, 12 August and 5 September 1964.
23. Ibid., I September 1964.
24. Ibid., 17 November 1964; see also New York Times, 8 November 1964.
25. Ibid.; see also Sidney Lens, "The Only Hope," The Progressive 28(November 1964): 22-27.
26. Gazette, 6 February 1965.
27. For more information on the Pleiku attack see Karnow, Vietnam, 411-12. For an excellent analysis of the Johnson administration's decision to begin sustained bombing of North Vietnam and to commit American combat forces to the war, see Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), chapter 3, "The Decisions of Early 1965: Laying the Foundation for a Major Commitment," and George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1986), chapter 11, "The Decision for Sustained Bombing," and chapter 12, "The Call for U. S. Ground Forces."
28. Gazette, 12 February 1965.
29. Ibid., 1 March 1965; see also Major General Edward Lansdale, "Vietnam: Do We Understand Revolution?" Foreign Affairs 43(October 1964): 75 -86.
30. Gazette, 10 March 1965.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 1 and 6 April 1965.
33. New York Times, 8 April 1965.
34. Gazette, 9 April 1965.
35. Ibid., 20 April 1965.
36. Ibid., 5 and 26 May 1965.
37. Ibid., 13 February 1964.
38. See notes 15 and 24 above.
39. Anderson to the author, 29 April 1986.
40. The author examined the following papers: Calhoun Chronicle, Charleston Daily Mail, Fairmont Times, Fairmont West Virginian, Grant County Press, Huntington Advertiser, Huntington Herald-Dispatch, Logan Banner, Martinsburg Journal, Morgantown Dominion-News, Morgantown Post, Raleigh Register, Spencer Times-Record, Wheeling Intelligencer, and Williamson Daily News. For national public opinion toward the Vietnam War see Dr. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, vol. 3: 1959-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), 1896-97, 1921, 1934-35.
41. Clarksburg (Sunday) Exponent-Telegram, 10 November 1963; Huntington Herald-Dispatch, 4 November 1963; Logan Banner, 8 November 1963.
42. Charleston Daily Mail, 6 November 1963.
43. Wheeling Intelligencer, 5 November 1963.
44. Calhoun Chronicle, Spencer Times-Record, Morgantown Dominion-News, and the Charleston Daily Mail.
45. Grant County Press, 19 August 1964.
46. Morgantown Post, 5 August 1964.
47. Fairmont West Virginian, 6 August 1964.
48. Huntington Advertiser, 4 August 1964.
49. Raleigh Register, 12 August 1964.
50. Morgantown Dominion-News, 5 April 1965.
51. Morgantown Post, 8 April 1965.
52. Calhoun Chronicle, 1 July 1965.
53. Clarksburg Exponent, 13 April 1965.
54. Fairmont Times, 13 April 1965.
55. Spencer Times-Record, 13 May 1965.
56. Craig Houston, "Four West Virginia Newspapers and War, 1963-1968" (Master's thesis, Marshall University, 1985), 192.
57. Gazette, 22 January 1963.
Volume 51
West Virginia History Journal
West Virginia History Center

subset: commoncrawl


text:
A better understanding of animal emotion is an important goal in disciplines ranging from neuroscience to animal welfare science. The conscious experience of emotion cannot be assessed directly, but neural, behavioural and physiological indicators of emotion can be measured. Researchers have used these measures to characterize how animals respond to situations assumed to induce discrete emotional states (e.g. fear). While advancing our understanding of specific emotions, this discrete emotion approach lacks an overarching framework that can incorporate and integrate the wide range of possible emotional states. Dimensional approaches that conceptualize emotions in terms of universal core affective characteristics (e.g. valence (positivity versus negativity) and arousal) can provide such a framework. Here, we bring together discrete and dimensional approaches to: (i) offer a structure for integrating different discrete emotions that provides a functional perspective on the adaptive value of emotional states, (ii) suggest how long-term mood states arise from short-term discrete emotions, how they also influence these discrete emotions through a bi-directional relationship and how they may function to guide decision-making, and (iii) generate novel hypothesis-driven measures of animal emotion and mood.
1. Introduction
A better understanding of animal emotion is highly desirable in disciplines including neuroscience, psychopharmacology, pain research and animal welfare science. To date, much animal emotion research, like Darwin's (1872/2009) pioneering writings on the subject, has focused on 'discrete' emotions. Researchers have investigated how animals respond to situations assumed to induce specific emotional states. For example, there is a whole industry devoted to the study of fear and anxiety, largely based on the development of tests designed to induce these states. This approach has yielded detailed information on candidate behavioural and physiological indicators of discrete emotions (e.g. Boissy 1995; Ramos & Mormede 1998; Forkman et al. 2007), and on their putative neural and neurochemical substrates (e.g. LeDoux 1996; Panksepp 1998; Berridge 2003; Dalgleish 2004).
Furthermore, it has been argued that, at least in mammals, there are 'basic' discrete emotional systems (e.g. fear, rage, panic, play) rooted in the neural circuitry of particular brain areas, serving specific adaptive functions, and representing the fundamental building blocks of all emotional reactions (Ekman 1992; Panksepp 1998). For example, Panksepp (1998) argues that an evolutionarily ancient 'fear system', linking the amygdala and periaqueductal grey (PAG) of the midbrain, coordinates coherent fear responses to challenging situations, and is also the source of subjective feelings of fear. Other systems may have distinct or overlapping neurophysiological substrates, and each is thought to play a causal role in generating discrete and adaptive emotional responses to specific challenges, facilitating survival of the animal.
The discrete emotions approach, however, has inevitably been piecemeal, leaving some emotional states, including positive ones (Boissy et al. 2007), under-studied. It also lacks an overarching framework or 'structure of emotion' that can integrate the wide range of possible emotional states, and provide a priori predictions, applicable across species, for how these states are manifest, and hence how they can be measured. Such a framework could be offered by 'dimensional' theories that have become increasingly prominent in the study of human emotion (Russell & Barrett 1999; Watson et al. 1999; Carver 2001; Russell 2003). These are largely based on reports of subjective emotional experiences and the temporal relationships between different reported states, and suggest that these states can be represented as locations in two- or three-dimensional space (figure 1). Different theories propose slightly different dimensional axes, but a 'valence' dimension or dimensions (positivity/negativity) is central to all. Some theorists argue that these dimensions, and not basic emotions, are the core building blocks of all emotional experience, are underpinned by specific brain systems and serve important adaptive functions such as the control of approach and avoidance behaviour (e.g. Watson et al. 1999; Carver 2001; Posner et al. 2005; Barrett 2006; Barrett et al. 2007).
There is ongoing debate between proponents of the discrete/basic and dimensional views of emotion (e.g. Ortony & Turner 1990; Ekman 1992; Barrett 2006; Izard 2007; Panksepp 2007). It is not our aim to argue in support of one or other. Rather, we believe that they can be brought together to provide a conceptual framework for studying animal emotions that: (i) offers a structure for integrating disparate discrete emotions, providing a functional perspective on the adaptive value of different emotional states, (ii) suggests how 'free-floating' mood states arise from short-term emotional responses to events, and how they may function to guide decision-making, and (iii) yields novel hypothesis-driven measures of animal emotion.
In developing this framework, we aim to bring together and build upon the ideas of many other researchers of human and animal emotions (e.g. Lang et al. 1990; Cabanac 1992; Gray 1994; Panksepp 1998; Cacioppo et al. 1999; Russell & Barrett 1999; Watson et al. 1999; Nesse 2000, 2004, 2005; Carver 2001; Ellsworth & Scherer 2003; Rolls 2005; Nesse & Ellsworth 2009). We start by outlining the dimensional approach, which has received limited attention in animal emotion research (but see Gray 1994), then briefly summarize some disagreements between discrete and dimensional theorists before suggesting how the two approaches may be brought together. We end by considering implications for the assessment of animal emotion, including the development of new measures that may be particularly useful for assessing long-term mood states.
2. A dimensional view of the structure of emotion: core affect
(a) Core affect and subjective emotional experience
Emotions interest us because of their distinctive conscious manifestation—the feelings of joy, relief, anxiety or depression. The conscious subjective experience of emotions is what we are ultimately concerned about when we consider human and animal welfare, and it is these subjective experiences that define the field of emotion research. In humans, the 'gold standard', albeit indirect, method for measuring these experiences is linguistic self-report. Statistical analyses of these reports suggest that emotions can be defined in terms of two fundamental underlying dimensions (e.g. Stanley & Meyer 2009). Emotional experiences are valenced—they are perceived as positive or negative, rewarding or punishing, pleasant or unpleasant—neutral states are not emotional states. Emotional experiences also vary in reported activation or arousal. For example, the states of elation and contentment are both positively valenced, but the former involves a higher degree of arousal than the latter.
Subjective experiences that can be characterized in terms of these valence and arousal dimensions have been labelled core affect (Russell 2003; Barrett et al. 2007). They can be represented in two-dimensional space as shown in figure 1. Positive affective states lie in the right half of this space (quadrants Q1 and Q2), and negative affective states in the left half (Q3 and Q4). Core affect can thus be conceptualized as the fundamental subjectively reportable manifestation of any emotion or mood state, and core affect space provides us with a way of conceptualizing the structure of subjective emotional experiences. Discrete emotions such as fear, sadness and happiness are located somewhere in this space, although their location per se does not fully encapsulate their subjective qualities. For example, a highly aroused negatively valenced state (Q4) accompanied by an urge to flee may characterize fear while a state of the same valence and arousal accompanied by an urge to attack may characterize anger.
The core affect concept is rooted in an understanding of the subjective experience of emotion. While this may lie at the heart of our interests in animal emotion, it raises challenges given that direct measurement of subjective states in another human, let alone another species, is not currently possible. However, the reported subjective experiences of core affect in humans are accompanied by neural, behavioural, physiological and cognitive changes, such as alterations in brain activity, facial expressions, heart rate and attention to threat. These changes can be measured objectively. Together with subjective experience, they make up the components of emotional or affective states. Researchers can study these measurable components of animal emotions, and attempt to identify those components that are reliably associated with particular locations in core affect space.
Of course, even if we can use measurable components of emotional responses to locate an animal's position in core affect space, we cannot be certain that they experience the conscious component too. Whether or not, and to what extent, different species experience conscious affective states remains an area of intense and unresolved debate (e.g. Wemelsfelder 1997; Macphail 1998; Baars 2001; Rolls 2005). For the purposes and scope of this paper, however, we must leave this to one side, discussing animal emotions as states that may or may not be experienced consciously.
(b) Acquiring rewards and avoiding punishment: a functional view of core affect
Could animals have states that equate to core affect (regardless of whether these are consciously experienced)? We think this is plausible because of the likely evolutionary advantage of systems that can represent the organism's overall experience of reward and punishment. Emotional states occur in response to stimuli or situations that are actually, or potentially, rewarding or punishing. Reward and punishment thus lie at the heart of all emotional states and determine emotional valence (e.g. Lang et al. 1990; Gray 1994; Cacioppo et al. 1999; Watson et al. 1999; Carver 2001; Rolls 2005; Barrett et al. 2007; Nesse & Ellsworth 2009). Inherently rewarding or punishing stimuli include those that enhance fitness (rewards—food, water, shelter, mates, etc.) and those that threaten fitness (punishers—predator attack, thermal damage, etc.). The affective responses of different animal species to these stimuli are thought to have developed over evolutionary time, and to act as proximate mechanisms guiding and coordinating the organism to achieve two principal survival goals: maximizing acquisition of fitness-enhancing rewards and minimizing exposure to fitness-threatening punishers (e.g. Rolls 2005; Burgdorf & Panksepp 2006; Nesse & Ellsworth 2009).
Position in core affect space is widely believed to reflect this functionality. Theoretical and empirical studies suggest that positive high arousal affective states in quadrant Q1 (e.g. excitement, happiness) are associated with appetitive motivational states, and function to facilitate seeking and obtaining rewards (Cabanac 1992; Carver 2001; Custers & Aarts 2005; Rolls 2005; Burgdorf & Panksepp 2006). In contrast, negative low arousal states in Q3 (e.g. sadness, depression) are associated with experiences of loss or lack of reward, and may promote low activity and conservation of energy in conditions where resources are lacking (Nesse 2000). Thus, affective states along the Q3–Q1 axis appear to be related primarily to acquiring fitness-enhancing rewards, and the success or otherwise of this endeavour (figure 1). Several researchers propose that an individual's position along this axis may be associated with the activity of underlying, perhaps primitive, biobehavioural systems ('positive activation', 'behavioural activation' (BAS) or 'approach process' systems; Gray 1994; Watson et al. 1999; Carver 2001) concerned with the control of approach behaviour and resource acquisition. The mesolimbic dopaminergic system and its role in appetitive and 'wanting' behaviours may be an important neural substrate of such systems (Berridge 1996, 2007; Panksepp 1998; McNaughton & Corr 2008). In humans, activation of left anterior cortical areas may also reflect enhanced activity of these systems (Davidson 1998; Davidson & Irwin 1999).
Negative high-arousal affective states in quadrant Q4 (e.g. fear) are thought to be principally associated with, and to coordinate appropriate responses to, the presence of threat or danger (Gray 1994; Carver 2001; Rolls 2005; Burgdorf & Panksepp 2006). In contrast, positive low-arousal affective states in Q2 (e.g. calm, relaxed) are associated with experience of low levels of threat (Carver 2001), perhaps facilitating the expression of maintenance, consolidation and recovery activities. Affective states along the Q2–Q4 axis thus appear to be primarily related to the need to avoid fitness-threatening punishers (figure 1). An individual's position on the Q2–Q4 axis is principally determined by the perceived presence of danger or threat, and has been associated with the activation of underlying biobehavioural systems ('negative activation', 'fight flight flee system' (FFFS), 'avoidance process'; Gray 1994; Watson et al. 1999; Carver 2001) that have evolved to facilitate the avoidance of punishment. Gray (1994) also suggests that a 'behavioural inhibition system' (BIS) underpins anxiety states in conditions of conflicting threat/reward; see McNaughton & Corr 2008). Brain structures including the PAG, amygdala, anterior cingulate and ventral prefrontal cortex may form the neural substrate of such systems (McNaughton & Corr 2008). In humans, activation of the right anterior cortical areas may also reflect enhanced activity of these systems (Davidson 1998; Davidson & Irwin 1999).
In summary, position in core affect space appears to be functionally related to the experience of success or failure in acquiring rewards and avoiding punishment, and biobehavioural systems have evolved to serve these two fundamentally important activities. It is worth mentioning that some states (e.g. severe depression) may sometimes be the result of brain pathologies unrelated to experience or, while reflecting the organism's experiences, may be so extreme as to have limited functional value to the organism (i.e. represent a non-adaptive side effect of the proximate mechanisms involved). The border between functionality and pathology in states such as severe depression remains a topic of much debate (Nesse 2000).
3. Integrating discrete and dimensional approaches
A major disagreement between proponents of discrete and dimensional approaches relates to the relative primacy of discrete emotional systems or dimensional core affect systems in generating felt emotional states. Core affect theorists propose that ongoing core affective state (valence and arousal) is combined with evaluations or appraisals of current context/environmental conditions to generate a subjective state that can be described in discrete emotion terms (e.g. Barrett 2006). The experience of specific emotions is thus a product of core affect and not vice versa. Discrete/basic emotion theorists take the opposite view and argue that core affect emerges as a cognitive 'distillation' of the overall affective impact of the experience of specific emotions (e.g. Panksepp 2007; see also Tellegen et al. 1999). Given that there is psychological, neural and behavioural evidence for both types of system, an alternative view is to hypothesize that both systems may be present in humans and many animals, that they interact in some way and that they serve different functions. Such a synthesis has been proposed by, among others, Panksepp (2007) and Izard (2007) and we develop it further here.
We first briefly consider the causes and functions of discrete emotions. We then suggest that: (i) core affective components of discrete emotions and other affective states provide a 'common currency' that may function to prioritize actions, (ii) discrete emotions, generated by events, influence position in core affect space, (iii) cumulative experience of location in core affect space underlies longer term mood, and (iv) core affect mood states can, in turn, influence decision-making and discrete emotions. Thus, a bi-directional relationship between discrete emotion and core affect systems is proposed.
(a) Causes and functions of discrete emotions
Discrete emotions arise in response to anticipation or experience of rewarding or punishing events. They are thus event-focused (or object-focused) and usually short-lasting. Appraisal theorists suggest that a process of 'stimulus checks' of a number of key characteristics (e.g. valence, predictability, familiarity) of eliciting circumstances generates emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer 2003). For example, appraisal of a stimulus as intrinsically unpleasant (punishing), sudden, unpredictable and unfamiliar is likely to induce a 'fear' (Q4) emotion (Scherer 2001). In humans, situations may be appraised in numerous ways depending on, for example, the characteristics of the situation and the subject's previous experiences and current motivations. Consequently, appraisals may result in many different emotional states, including varied nuances of discrete emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer 2003). Human appraisals may involve cognitive processes such as memory (underpinning familiarity/novelty appraisals) and anticipation (underpinning appraisals of predictability), but they can also be simple, rapid and 'automatic' (subconscious; Zajonc 1980; Grandjean & Scherer 2008). It is thus conceivable that similar processes occur in animals (Desiré et al. 2002), and act to trigger discrete emotional states which engage specific neurobehavioural systems.
These discrete emotion systems probably function to organize short-term responses to the eliciting circumstances, recruiting appropriate physiological resources, motivating relevant behaviours and thus facilitating the organism's immediate survival (e.g. Frijda 1994; Rolls 2005). Different discrete emotion systems have evolved to deal with different types of challenge. For example, Panksepp (1998) postulates that a distinct 'panic'/'separation distress' system functions to maintain social bonds between separated individuals by triggering vocalization and search behaviour.
(b) Discrete emotions, sensations and motivations have core affective characteristics that may function as a common currency in decision-making
Discrete emotions have an underlying valenced structure—this is what characterizes them as part of the affective/emotional system—and can thus be located in core affective space. Other states such as sensations and motivations also share these characteristics. Physical sensations mediated by direct neural connections between the sensory apparatus (e.g. receptors for touch, taste, smell) and the brain can be inherently rewarding or punishing and hence also located in core affect space. For example, a taste may give rise to a positively valenced affective response of 'pleasure' that may be located at some point in the Q1 quadrant and function to influence subsequent wanting of the stimulus (Berridge 2007).
Wanting states—motivation for a specific reward—can also be located in core affect space. They are determined by internal changes reflecting current physiological need, and external stimuli that have become strongly associated with reward through the animal's developmental or evolutionary past, and, in humans, can be experienced as high-arousal positive states (Q1) associated with reward-seeking behaviour.
Location in core affect space thus represents a common currency (cf. McNamara & Houston 1986; Cabanac 1992; Spruijt et al. 2001) that may function to allow comparisons and trade-offs between disparate discrete emotions, sensations and motivations when behavioural decisions are being made. For example, a hungry and thirsty animal needs to be able to weigh up the relative reward values of searching to obtain food or water at any one time, and also to calculate when searching behaviour becomes too dangerous because of heightened threats from punishers such as predator attack. Emotions and motivations can only be made use of in such 'expected utility' type decisions if they incorporate the core affective feature of valence that can function as a common currency (cf. Cabanac 1992).
(c) Discrete emotions and other states influence location in core affect space
Following from the above, discrete emotions, sensations and motivations can be conceptualized as generating short-term changes in an animal's location in core affect space. For example, the onset of feeding motivation may involve the animal moving towards an aroused, positive, seeking state (Q1). Detection of a food item may then lead to a higher arousal state of excitement with successful capture of prey perhaps leading to a temporary state of elation (Q1), followed by a lower arousal consummatory state of sensory pleasure during eating and an even lower arousal post-consummatory positive state of contentment or satisfaction (Q2). On the other hand, failure to detect or obtain a food item may initially lead to a temporary high-arousal negative state of frustration (Q4), which may then subside to a lower arousal negative state of disappointment or sadness (Q3). These trajectories, related to the acquisition of fitness-enhancing rewards (one can imagine similar trajectories related to the search for mates, positive social interactions, etc.), are illustrated in figure 2. Although, as discussed earlier, they tend to inhabit the Q3–Q1 axis, it is clear that relative success or failure can lead to states in the Q2 and Q4 quadrants too.
The appearance of a fitness-threatening stimulus can intrude into these reward acquisition cycles at any time and rapidly shift the animal's position in core affect space into the Q4 quadrant of high-arousal negative fear and anxiety states (figure 2). These states are associated with appropriate responses to danger aimed at avoiding punishers. Successful responses will result in the removal of threat and a lower arousal positive state of relief or calm (Q2). Such trajectories, related to the avoidance of fitness reduction, thus primarily inhabit the Q2–Q4 axis and, owing to their potentially life-threatening sequelae, generally assume primacy over Q1–Q3 states associated with the acquisition of fitness-enhancing rewards (e.g. Haselton & Nettle 2006; cf. Dawkins & Krebs 1979).
In this view, movement through core affect space is driven by discrete emotions, sensations and motivations, and represents the organism's experiences of success and failure in acquiring rewards and avoiding punishers. We suggest that it forms the basis for longer term mood states.
(d) The causes of longer term core affect 'mood' states
In humans, core affective states do not only occur in response to specific events or stimuli. They also occur in the absence of, and without being directed at, any particular object. In this case, they are usually referred to as free-floating moods. Moods are typically longer lasting than discrete emotions, sensations or motivations, and are a relatively 'pure' form of core affect, lacking the action tendencies and appraisal-induced responses to emotion-eliciting situations that characterize discrete emotions. They include longer term states of 'happiness' or 'sadness' and, in their more extreme forms, states such as chronic anxiety (Q4) or depression (Q3) or mania (Q1). At any one time, an individual's core affective state can be conceptualized as a combination of their longer term background mood state and their reactions to current emotion-inducing events. Thus, a chronically anxious individual may experience temporary states of positive affect under certain circumstances (e.g. when eating a particularly delicious meal) despite their 'background' state of anxiety. Consequently, ongoing mood states may be most easily revealed when an individual is not currently exposed to strong emotion-inducing events (which may lead to 'ceiling-effect' responses that mask background mood state) or when novel or ambiguous events occur whose affective salience is not immediately apparent. They can be conceptualized as the background core affect state that the individual will revert to when specific emotion-inducing events are absent.
In our view, mood states probably reflect a cumulative function of the experience of shorter term emotional episodes (e.g. discrete emotions, sensations, motivations). For example, if an animal is in an environment in which it experiences frequent threatening events, and hence its emotional state is often in the Q4 quadrant, it may develop a longer term high-arousal negative mood state that mirrors this cumulative experience. If it is frequently successful at avoiding these events, or it is in a generally safe environment, a longer term low-arousal positive mood state (Q2: 'relaxed'/'calm') may result. On the other hand, if it is in a plentiful environment and successful at acquiring fitness-enhancing rewards, it is likely to exhibit a mood state that is centred on the Q1 quadrant, whereas a low-resource environment and failure to acquire rewards will lead to a predominantly Q3 mood (cf. Carver 2001).
In relation to the trajectories shown in figure 2, we propose that mood states can be likened to a 'running mean' of positions occupied within core affect space over a preceding time period, and thus continually (albeit slowly) change as the result of novel events and experiences. This view of mood states as representing past experience chimes with the findings that, for example, chronic anxiety and depression states usually arise from exposure to specific environmental and emotional circumstances (e.g. chronic stress, major life events; e.g. Eysenck et al. 2006; Young & Korszun 2009).
At a neural level, the above proposal requires that there is cross-talk between the activity of discrete emotional systems (e.g. sub-cortical structures such as the PAG) and those that become activated across a broad range of rewarding or punishing events (e.g. BAS/BIS/FFFS). Widely dispersed neuromodulatory systems (e.g. dopaminergic, serotonergic, noradrenergic, opioidergic) appear to be prime candidates for the latter reward/punishment systems (Gray 1994; Burgdorf & Panksepp 2006; Berridge 2007; Leknes & Tracey 2008), and it is possible that they, and higher cortical areas (e.g. anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex), somehow integrate or distil the activity of discrete emotion systems across time in terms of overall positive and negative experience (cf. Spruijt et al. 2001; Panksepp 2007). Differences in the sensitivity of such systems, whether determined by genetic or experiential factors, may underlie individual predispositions to particular mood states (Corr 2008).
(e) Functions of mood states: their influence on decision-making, appraisals and discrete emotions
We suggest that mood states provide information about the type of environment the organism is living in—the presence (or probability) of threats and reward opportunities—and how well it is coping (see also Carver 2001, 2003; Prinz 2004). This information plays an important role in guiding animals' decisions when appraising new situations or stimuli, especially if there is a degree of ambiguity in their potentially rewarding or punishing consequences (Davidson 1994; Mendl et al. 2009). For example, if an individual is living in an environment where it has experienced high levels of threat, its mood state has a greater likelihood of being in the Q4 quadrant. In such an environment where probability of danger is high, it would make adaptive sense to appraise ambiguous stimuli such as a rustle in the grass as more likely to predict a negative event (e.g. predator), and hence to take safety-first avoidant action, in comparison to an individual living in a low threat environment with a mood state in the Q2 quadrant for whom a negative judgement is likely to result in wasted time and energy (Nesse 2005).
Different responses to ambiguity may also be observed in individuals whose background mood state is predominantly in quadrant Q1 (resulting from experience of an environment with high probability of opportunity for gaining fitness-enhancing rewards) or Q3 (experience of low reward-opportunity environments). Those in Q1 are likely to benefit from judging ambiguous stimuli as indicating a positive event (e.g. prey), thus facilitating reward-seeking behaviour, relative to those in Q3 mood states who may benefit from inhibiting reward-seeking behaviour in order to conserve energy until environmental conditions change (Nesse 2000).
Thus, we suggest that Q1 moods are associated with decisions appropriate to high reward-opportunity environments, reflecting a high 'expectation' of positive events, and Q2 moods with decisions reflecting low expectation of negative events. These can be termed 'optimistic' biases in decision-making (e.g. judging ambiguous stimuli positively). Conversely, Q3 moods are associated with low expectation of positive events and Q4 moods with high expectation of negative events ('pessimistic' biases). Clearly, environments may not be as simple as this. Some complexity can be added by considering combinations of environments with low, intermediate and high probabilities of opportunity and threat to generate a broader range of predictions linking experience of environment, mood and expectations/decision-making as indicated in table 1.
Consistent with these ideas, there is a large body of research with humans showing that background mood state does indeed appear to influence decision-making (e.g. Schwarz & Clore 1983; Bechara et al. 2000; Loewenstein et al. 2001), including in ways similar to those predicted. People in negative states tend to judge ambiguous stimuli negatively (e.g. MacLeod & Byrne 1996). They also more readily attend to threatening stimuli and recall negative memories than people in positive mood states (see Mineka et al. 1998; Mogg & Bradley 1998). Furthermore, there is evidence that people with a long-term tendency towards (trait) anxiety and/or current (state) anxiety (Q4) judge ambiguous stimuli as more likely to be negative, while people in states of sadness or depression (Q3) judge them as less likely to be positive in line with predictions outlined above (e.g. MacLeod et al. 1997; Stober 2000; MacLeod & Salaminiou 2001). There is also evidence that people in positive moods show optimistic forms of these so-called 'cognitive biases' (e.g. Nygren et al. 1996).
Mood state may thus act as a heuristic device influencing cognitive processes and facilitating appropriate decision-making behaviour. Because appraisals of situations/events may themselves involve cognitive processes, mood states can therefore also affect these appraisals and the resulting short-term emotional responses. The causal link between short-term discrete emotions and longer term core affect mood is thus bi-directional. It is possible to envisage positive feedback loops in which, for example, a Q4 mood state enhances anticipation of negative events and negative interpretation of ambiguity, and this leads to further negative short-term emotional experiences which, in turn, intensify the Q4 mood. Such processes are implicated in the aetiology of chronic anxiety and depression in humans (Beck 1967, 2008). In the natural environment, they may function to help animals escape from or cope with difficult or threatening conditions (Nesse 2000), until circumstances change and the experience of more positive events leads to a gradual alteration in mood state.
4. Implications for the measurement of animal emotion
Discrete emotion approaches rely on identifying situations or tests that are assumed to induce a particular emotional state and then measuring behavioural and physiological responses as putative indicators of that state. Such tests may be quick to carry out and, if they accurately identify naturalistic situations that reliably induce a particular state, they may be very useful and ecologically valid. However, there are also some disadvantages to this ad hoc approach. For example, different individuals may perceive (appraise) the same situation differently, and different situations thought to induce the same emotion may not do so. This will decrease the likelihood that consistent behavioural and physiological responses are detected. Indeed, in the extensive literature on fear testing, studies sometimes find good cross-test agreement in how they rank order individuals (i.e. in terms of 'fearfulness'), but disagreement is common (e.g. Ramos & Mormede 1998; Miller et al. 2006; Forkman et al. 2007) and behavioural and physiological responses often vary considerably across tests which are all ostensibly designed to measure fear (e.g. Forkman et al. 2007).
One potential solution to this problem is to develop a priori hypotheses, based on the conceptual framework outlined above, for the types of event or situation that will generate affective states in each of quadrants Q1–Q4. At a simple level, we can hypothesize that Q1 states occur when a reward is signalled or presented, Q4 states occur when a punisher is signalled or presented, Q3 states occur when a reward is removed or omitted and Q2 states occur when a punisher is removed or omitted (Rolls 2005). Thus, if we can accurately identify species-relevant rewarding and punishing stimuli, we can measure behavioural and physiological responses to their presentation or removal and identify those responses, or response profiles, that occur reliably and hence may be good indicators of the corresponding affective state (e.g. Reefmann et al. 2009).
Of particular relevance to the measurement of free-floating mood states that exist in the absence of specific situations or events, we can use the a priori predictions summarized in table 1 for how expectations of rewarding or punishing events, and related decision-making, are likely to be associated with an organism's position in core affect space. For example, we would predict that individuals that show enhanced expectation of negative events will be in a Q4 state, while individuals that show decreased expectation of positive events (a different type of pessimism) will be in a Q3 state. There is thus the potential to use objective and quantifiable measures of these affect-induced cognitive biases as indicators of the more elusive affective states that influence them. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, mood-dependent cognitive biases are likely to influence appraisals of emotion-inducing stimuli and hence the resulting short-term emotions (e.g. negative cognitive biases may underlie a negative appraisal of an event). Consequently, short-term emotional responses (e.g. behavioural and physiological changes identified as described in the preceding paragraph) may vary in animals exposed to the same event, but experiencing different background mood states, and hence themselves be a useful indicator of underlying mood.
We have recently developed assays of cognitive bias in animals and started to investigate whether manipulations designed to alter affective states (e.g. living in an unpredictable or threatening environment) are linked to cognitive bias in the ways predicted, and as in humans (Paul et al. 2005). Our 'judgement bias' task (first developed by Harding et al. 2004) involves training an animal to perform a particular response (e.g. press left lever) when presented with a particular stimulus (e.g. tone A) to obtain a positive outcome (e.g. food), and to perform a different response (e.g. press right lever) when presented with a different stimulus (e.g. tone C) to avoid a relatively negative outcome (e.g. no food; noise). The subject is then presented with intermediate, ambiguous stimuli (e.g. tone B), and we hypothesize that, for example, animals in a positive emotional state (Q1/Q2) will be more likely to judge these stimuli as predicting the better outcome (e.g. by pressing the left lever; an optimistic judgement bias), compared with animals in a negative state (Q3/Q4). Recent studies of species including rats (Harding et al. 2004; Burman et al. 2008, 2009; Enkel et al. 2010), sheep (Doyle et al. 2010), starlings (Bateson & Matheson 2007; Matheson et al. 2008), rhesus monkeys and dogs (see Mendl et al. 2009 for a review) have found evidence in support of these hypotheses, indicating that this new approach for assessing emotional state in animals holds promise.
To date, the studies have not systematically looked for differences in judgement bias that would discriminate between, for example, different types of positive (Q1 versus Q2) or negative (Q3 versus Q4) states, but the approach has the potential to do this. It adds to existing behavioural and physiological measures of animal emotion (e.g. open field; forced swim; sympathetic-adrenal or hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal activity) and addresses some of the problems with these, including: (i) that they may reflect arousal but not valence (e.g. heart rate and alertness/activity may increase in high-arousal positive and negative situations and hence fail to distinguish Q1 and Q4 states), (ii) a lack of theoretical frameworks and a priori hypotheses for many measures resulting in post hoc interpretations and presenting a barrier to easy transfer of measures between species, (iii) a lack of measures of positive affective states, and (iv) a lack of measures of free-floating mood state owing to a focus on object-based discrete emotions (Paul et al. 2005).
5. Conclusions
Does the conceptual framework outlined here help us to better understand and assess affective states in animals? We believe it does in a number of ways.
The framework is grounded in an understanding of the structure of core subjective affective states in humans. It thus links what we are ultimately interested in but cannot yet investigate directly—subjective affective experience—with biologically relevant and tractable phenomena and concepts. This allows predictions to be made about the behavioural, physiological and cognitive changes that may accompany particular affective states, and hence enables the development of novel measures of these states.
The framework attempts to integrate discrete and dimensional approaches to the study of emotion, providing hypotheses for how they interact in a reciprocal fashion. It illustrates how discrete emotions, sensations and motivations contribute to core affect, and how core affect in turn may influence decision-making, including discrete emotional responses.
The framework brings together all types of affective states. To date, the study of animal emotions has focused largely on Q4 affective states such as fear and anxiety, although there is a substantial literature on the neurobiology of reward processes that underpin Q1 states in particular, and interest in Q3 states such as depression. Q2 states have received very little attention and yet their role in recovery processes and the general well-being of animals may be significant (cf. Porges 2001). Moreover, these different states have generally been studied independently with little reference to each other, or to how they may interact. The framework encourages us to investigate them as a whole and to understand how the animal may move between states according to experience.
The framework emphasizes that affective states are strongly influenced by the organism's environment and its experiences within it. It suggests how environmental events can profoundly alter affective state.
By taking a functional perspective on the structure of core affective states (cf. Nesse 2000, 2004, 2005; Carver 2001), the framework allows us to make predictions about the types of situation that will lead to a particular affective state, and also the sorts of response that may be a good indicator of that affective state. In particular, the framework emphasizes the role of longer term mood states in decision-making processes. We believe that the links between affective and cognitive processes, which have been extensively studied in humans, have an important role to play in furthering our understanding of, and ability to assess, affective states in animals.
We thank Richard Parker for discussing these topics with us, Lorenz Gygax and another, anonymous, referee for their comments, and BBSRC and UFAW for supporting our work.
↵† Present address: Department of Biological Sciences, University of Lincoln, Riseholme Park, Lincoln, LN2 2LG, UK.
- Received February 12, 2010.
- Accepted May 7, 2010.
- © 2010 The Royal Society


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