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Regulatory Practice in the European Telecommunications Sector Normative Justification and Practical Application
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1 ISSN X Regulatory Practice in the European Telecommunications Sector Normative Justification and Practical Application Margit A. Vanberg, Gordon J. Klein Dokumentation Nr
2 Regulatory Practice in the European Telecommunications Sector Normative Justification and Practical Application Margit A. Vanberg, Gordon J. Klein Dokumentation Nr Laden Sie diese ZEW Dokumentation von unserem ftp-server: ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/docus/dokumentation0802.pdf Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH (ZEW), Mannheim
3 Regulatory Practice in the European Telecommunications Sector Normative Justification and Practical Application Margit A. Vanberg and Gordon J. Klein Mannheim, May 2008 Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Centre for European Economic Research
4 ISSN X Contact: Margit A. Vanberg Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Centre for European Economic Research Research Group Information and Communication Technologies L 7, Mannheim Germany Phone: Fax: ZEW 2008
5 Non- technical summary The objective of this study is to provide a basis for a comparison of regulatory practice and the justification of regulation in different network sectors. The present documentation focuses on the telecommunications sector. The analysis consists of three parts. The first part discusses the general characteristics of the telecommunications sector. The second part introduces two regulatory approaches that are of particular relevance for regulation in this sector. The analysis of these approaches is used to derive normative conclusions for regulation of telecommunications infrastructure. Finally, the European regulatory framework for the regulation of electronic communications markets is evaluated. The telecommunications sector is characterized by short- and long-run entry barriers both on the cost side as well as on the demand side. It is therefore susceptible to monopolization and the abuse of market power. The normative analysis evaluates the need for sector-specific regulation in the telecommunications sector. It is shown that regulation may have difficulties reconciling static and dynamic efficiency goals. The conflict is especially strong in dynamic markets such as the telecommunications market. If regulation is applied too liberally, with a focus on static efficiency, it can stifle dynamic efficiency. The analysis concludes that the disaggregated regulatory approach, which limits regulatory intervention to network areas with stable network-specific market power, is best at reducing the risks of overregulation while adequately addressing market power abuse. The comparison of the normative conclusions on regulation and the European regulatory framework for electronic communications markets comes to the conclusion that in many respects, the framework is based on economic theory and that it could principally be used to pursue the objective of minimal regulation. In practice, however, especially the criteria for the assessment of SMP (significant market power) are applied too liberally, such that overregulation results.
6 Zusammenfassung Das Wichtigste in Kürze Das Ziel der vorliegenden Studie ist es eine Basis für den Vergleich der Regulierungspraxis und der unterschiedlichen Rechtfertigungsansätze für Regulierung in Netzwerksektoren zu schaffen. Im Fokus der vorliegenden Arbeit steht der Telekommunikationssektor. Die Analyse geht in drei Schritten vor. Zunächst werden die grundsätzlichen Eigenschaften des Telekommunikationssektors dargestellt. Danach werden zwei für den Telekommunikationssektor besonders relevante Regulierungsansätze diskutiert und normative Schlussfolgerungen für die Regulierung dieses Sektors hergeleitet. Anhand des normativen Gerüsts wird zuletzt die europäische Regulierung analysiert. Der Telekommunikationssektor ist zum einen durch seine Kostenstruktur und zum anderen durch seine Einflüsse auf der Nachfrageseite durch kurz- und langfristige Markteintrittsbarrieren gekennzeichnet, so dass auf Telekommunikationsmärkten strukturbedingt eine Gefahr von Monopolisierung und Marktmachtmissbrauch gegeben ist. Die normative Analyse zeigt den konkreten Regulierungsbedarf im Telekommunikationssektor auf. Zur Bestimmung dieses Bedarfs werden sowohl statische als auch dynamische Effizienzkriterien herangezogen. Es zeigt sich, dass zwischen diesen Kriterien ein Zielkonflikt entstehen kann. Aufgrund des dynamischen Charakters des Telekommunikationssektors besteht die Gefahr, dass durch einen zu großen Fokus auf statische Effizienz eine zu weitgehende Regulierung zu Lasten der dynamischen Effizienz erfolgt. Es wird gezeigt, dass diesem Risiko am ehesten mit dem disaggregierten Regulierungsansatz Rechnung getragen werden kann. Dieser Ansatz basiert auf einem stabilen Kriterium zur Lokalisierung von netzspezifischer Marktmacht und beschränkt regulatorische Eingriffe auf solche Teilbereiche von Netzsektoren, in denen stabile Marktmacht vorliegt. Der Vergleich der Schlussfolgerungen der normativen Analyse mit dem europäischen Regulierungsrahmen für den Telekommunikationssektor zeigt, dass die europäische Regulierung weitestgehend ökonomisch begründet wird und die Gesetzestexte für das Ziel einer minimalen Regulierung eingesetzt werden könnten. In der Praxis werden aber vor allem die Kriterien zur Bestimmung von SMP (significant market power) so umfangreich ausgelegt, dass eine Überregulierung erfolgt.
7 Regulatory practice in the European telecommunications sector 1 Normative justification and practical application Margit A. Vanberg 2 Gordon J. Klein 3 May 2008 Abstract The telecommunications sector is characterized by economies of scale and scope, high sunk costs, and strong network effects. This combination may facilitate monopolization and abuse of market power. The present study evaluates the need for sector-specific regulation in this sector. It is shown that there is a conflict between static and dynamic efficiency goals. A comparison of two prominent regulatory approaches for the telecommunications sector shows that the disaggregated approach takes account of this conflict most adequately, as it is committed to minimal regulation. The European regulatory framework for electronic communications markets is based on economic theory, and could principally be used to limit regulation to network areas in which stable networkspecific market power is localized. However, especially the criteria for the assessment of significant market power (SMP) are applied too liberally, such that, in practice, overregulation has resulted. 1 Sections 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.4, 5.2 and 5.3 of this documentation correspond to a large degree to text passages in Vanberg, Margit (2008), Competition and Cooperation among Internet Service Providers: A Network Economic Analysis, University Dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany 2 Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Research Group Information and Telecommunication Technologies, 3 Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Research Group Information and Telecommunication Technologies, 1
8 1 Introduction The objective of this study is to provide a basis for a comparison of regulatory practice and the justification of regulation in different network sectors. Such a comparison can clarify whether there is potential for aligning the criteria applied to determine when regulation is justified and also the instruments that are used in the regulation of network sectors. The present study focuses on the telecommunications sector. In the past decades the telecommunications sector in Europe has changed immensely. The progressive abolishment of legal entry barriers opened the door for a fast and dynamic development in this market. This was accompanied by a process of deregulation and re-regulation. In addition to these legal changes, telecommunications technology also experienced fundamental changes. Most importantly, packet-switching technology facilitated the development of the Internet which has lead to new dimensions in product and service variety in the telecommunications sector. This development is facilitating the convergence of telecommunications, Internet and broadcasting networks. Operators are currently migrating their voice services onto packet-switched networks. In the near future, a single core network will be used to transport data from multiple services. Current regulatory practice in traditional telecommunications policy will need to adapt to these changes. This study wants to provide an overview of the special characteristics of telecommunications markets and the implications for competition and regulation in this market. Chapter 2 briefly explains why network sectors are considered different to other sectors of the economy. The telecommunications sector is introduced and the special competition policy issues arising in the telecommunications sector are explained. Chapter 3 discusses in general when economic theory provides a justification for government intervention into markets by sectorspecific regulation. Chapter 4 introduces different approaches which have been suggested for the regulation of the telecommunications sector. These approaches are contrasted to theoretical criteria for when regulation may be considered to improve efficiency in a market. The chapter comes to normative conclusions for sector-specific regulation in telecommunications. The current regulatory framework for communications markets in the EU is presented in Chapter 5. This framework is compared to the normative criteria for telecommunications market regulation that were developed in chapter 4. Chapter 6 concludes the study. 2
9 2 The telecommunications sector as a network sector 2.1 Typical characteristics of network industries Network industries such as telecommunications, electricity and transportation have in common that the production of their services is based on a network infrastructure. Networks are typically made up of various transmission lines and network nodes at which these transmission lines are interconnected. Generally, a user of a network service requires an exclusive point-to-point interconnection between its location and the nearest point of presence of the network at which transmission signals can be entered into the network. Up to this point, several lines of geographically close users can share a common ductwork. On the next network level, the transmission signals transported over the separate local lines can be multiplexed onto a single transmission line such that from there on the transmission signals of several users are transported via one line. Network sectors are therefore characterized by significant bundling advantages, especially in higher network levels. Because of these bundling advantages, network infrastructures are associated with economies of scale. The unit average costs of production decrease with an increase in output. If in any given area investment in network inputs takes place, the overall capacity rises more than proportional. Services based on network infrastructures are often also associated with economics of scope, because different applications can share a common infrastructure, such that it is more efficient for a single firm to provide the market with multiple products than for several firms to separately provide these products. Substantial economies of scale and scope can be an indication of natural monopoly characteristics of a market. A market is considered a natural monopoly when a single firm can produce the market output at lower costs than several firms. A second notable characteristic of many network industries is that demand is characterized by network effects. Network effects are a special kind of externality. Positive network effects in consumption are present whenever the consumption of a good or a service is valued more, the higher the number of other users of this good or service. In communications networks especially, a user s utility is positively related to the number of other users on the network since the possibilities for interaction are increased with more users on a network. The addition of a new user increases the willingness to pay of existing users in the network. However, when there is no price attached to 3
10 the external effect, then market processes will not necessarily lead to an efficient consumption level of the network service. In the absence of network interconnection the benefits from network effects will be higher on larger networks as compared to smaller networks. 2.2 Specific characteristics of the telecommunications sector The telecommunications sector is characterized by large specific investments into a network structure. This leads to significant economics of scale and economics of scope. Moreover, a significant part of the investments costs is sunk. An idealised telecommunications network (focused on the fixed transmission of data and voice) consists of three hierarchy levels (Merkt 1998: 29-30). Figure 1 provides an overview of these hierarchies. The first level comprises the connection of the consumers to the network. This connection is called the local loop. The local loops jointly use the local ductworks that are connected to the local switching ports. From there they are connected to the second hierarchy level, the long distance network. On this level, traffic can be further bundled and connected to international gateways. From an international gateway, international networks can be accessed. Figure 1: Schematic telecommunications network International network International gateway Long distance network Cable interconnection Local switching Local switching Local network Jointly ductwork used End-user: telephone, computer, fax Source: Based on Gabelmann (2003: 31). 4
11 The bundling advantages of telecommunications networks therefore arise in several parts of the network. Firstly, whenever transmission lines jointly use a ductwork. Secondly, whenever the transmission signals of several lines are bundled in switching and interconnection facilities and thereafter transmitted via one single line (Gabelmann, 2003: 30ff.). Up to the capacity limit of a ductwork, a transmission line or a switch, the joint use of these facilities by the different consumer connections, leads to sinking average production costs (ibid.). On the demand side, the telecommunications market is characterized by strong network effects. The network effects in telecommunications services are direct as well as indirect. The direct effects derive from the benefit a consumer obtains from interacting with other users (i.e. a user derives utility from being able to exchange telephone calls with other network users). The indirect effect derives from the fact that users benefit from the number of other users on the network by additional complementary goods, which are made available depending on the overall number of users on a network (i.e. the more Internet users exist the more Internet services are offered). 3 Competition policy concerns in network sectors 3.1 Efficiency and market structure The typical characteristics of network sectors, natural monopoly on the cost side, as well as network externalities on the demand side, are traditionally viewed as sources of market failure (Viscusi et al., 2000: 314). In monopoly markets there is a conflict between productive and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency requires that the resources devoted to producing a given output are minimized. In a natural monopoly, productive efficiency is generally achieved because there is a single producer in the market. Allocative efficiency requires that all resources are allocated to their most productive usage. Allocative efficiency is generally associated with competitive markets because prices which conform to marginal costs of production result in resource allocation according to productive usage. In monopolies, however, the competitive pressures which drive prices towards marginal costs often do not exist. 4 4 Only in the case of a contestable natural monopoly is the monopolist under competitive pressure and cannot realize above-competitive profits over an extended time period. 5
12 Network externalities are viewed as a source of market failure because new entrants to the market need to gather a minimum number of users on their network in order to be able to offer the network benefits necessary to attract customers. The need to reach this so-called critical mass may constitute a barrier to entry in this market. Therefore, it might happen that an entrant providing a new network that is technically superior to the incumbents network, or available at lower cost, cannot grant consumers an offer that compensates them for the missing network benefits. The consumers willingness to pay for the new network might be low or possibly zero. This can prevent market entry (Gabelmann 2002: 33f.). Another concern resulting from network effects is the waste of surplus that could occur in fragmented industries, which hinder consumers to exploit the benefits of larger networks (Gabelmann 2002: 34). The reason is that if there are several networks, which are not interconnected, then consumers do not derive utility from being able to communicate with the consumers on the other networks. A consumer does not take these costs and benefits into account when he decides on his level of consumption. Therefore, he will choose either a too high or a too low level of consumption compared to the socially optimal level. Productive and allocative efficiency are static efficiency concepts. They neglect the objective of dynamic efficiency, a concept which focuses on the inter-temporal efficiency of markets. From a static perspective, perfect competition may be welfare maximizing. However, from the perspective of dynamic efficiency, in a perfectly competitive equilibrium, with zero economic profits, innovation and investment incentives may be too low. The competition policy evaluation of market structures should make allowance for inter-temporal welfare considerations by regarding competition in a market not as a static state but rather as a dynamic process (Kirzner, 1973: 88ff.). Hayek (1968) describes competition as a discovery process in which new and better solutions are continuously sought and found. This continuous process entails that market structure is constantly in flux and can temporarily also exhibit high concentration (Evans et al., 2005). Schumpeter (1943) was the first scholar to develop a dynamic theory of competition and innovation. His idea of creative destruction postulates that competition is a process of continuous innovation. Innovations can grant temporary monopoly status. The supra-normal profits which are made by a monopolist, however, attract new investments into the market and the monopolist may be replaced by a new temporary monopolist. 6
13 There exist a multitude of theoretical models and empirical studies on the question of how market concentration relates to innovation and investment. 5 There are models that support the Schumpeterian idea that monopolies are more likely to innovate (i.e. Gilbert et. al., 1982) and others that negate a straightforward relationship (Vickers, 1985). In opposition to Schumpeter s theory Hicks has, for instance, argued that the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life (Hicks, 1935: 8). A quiet life, with low competitive pressure, will result in a low level of innovation (Gilbert 2006: 179f.). Aghion et al. (2005) find evidence that the relationship between competition and innovation has the shape of an inverted U. At first, innovation increases with a move from strong competition to less competition in a market. However, a maximum of innovation is reached well before the monopoly case. When competitive forces are restricted because of market failures, competition policy may be called for to modify market conditions such that welfare is improved. However, the conflict between static and dynamic efficiency properties of markets complicates attaining a clear position on when competition policy intervention may be beneficial in a market. 3.2 General competition policy vs. sector-specific regulation If government intervention into markets is deemed necessary the implementation of two general instruments to promote economic efficiency, is possible. On the one hand, there is sector-specific regulation. On the other hand, there are general competition law interventions. These instruments differ in several aspects. General competition law applies to all sectors of the economy. It is concerned with the supervision of mergers and acquisitions, with monopolization and with cartelization of markets. In single dominance (monopolization) or collective dominance (cartelization) cases the competition authority investigates claims of anti-competitive behavior, such as tying, predatory pricing, or refusals to deal. Competition authorities have the authority to reject or approve mergers, to impose fines and to prohibit particular behavior by dominant firms. Market intervention based on general competition law is always decided on a case-by-case basis. Competition authorities can, in theory, use several market characteristics to approximate market dominance. In practice, the criterion most often applied to measure market dominance is the 5 See Gilbert (2006). 7
14 relative market share in the relevant product market. Further criteria used are the existence of barriers to expansion and entry and the market position of buyers in the market. 6 Generally, antitrust is applied ex-post when abuse of market power has been established (at least according to the competition authority). Only in merger policy a decision needs to be taken ex-ante, before the consequences for the market can be directly observed. In contrast to general competition law, sector-specific regulations are designed for a particular industry. Regulation is far more intrusive than antitrust action because the intervention pertains to ongoing activities of the regulated firm. Regulation can, for instance, be applied to restrict the price-setting freedom of the regulated firm or to mandate access to its industrial or intellectual property. A further fundamental difference to general competition policy is the fact that sectorspecific regulation is generally instated ex-ante to prevent abuse of market power, which has not yet occurred. Lastly, since regulation is generally ongoing, the potential for phasing-out of regulation needs to be reviewed explicitly. As antitrust decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis they do not need to be reviewed again. When should which instrument be applied? To justify sector-specific regulation, stable market power must be identified ex-ante. This instrument can only be used when a restrictive definition of market power comes to a clear assessment. The definition must relate to market structure as market behaviour can only be observed ex-post. When regulation can thus be justified, then its advantages as compared to general competition policy are: it is quicker to respond to market failures. Also, as a regulatory agency is often responsible for a market over a longer period, it can continuously collect data and will therefore be able to complement qualitative analyses by quantitative evidence. Antitrust agencies have more limited access to data and are often restricted to qualitative analysis. However, since uncertainty reduces over time, antitrust can avoid mistakes, which might occur in regulation. 6 Traditionally, competition authorities were quick to equate large market shares with market power (Spulber, 1989: 501). Competition authorities have increasingly recognized the shortcomings of this simplified approach and are striving to enrich their definition of market dominance by adding more criteria (see, for instance, a speech which Neelie Kroes, member of the European Commission in charge of competition policy gave before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute on 23rd September 2005, entitled Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82. ) 8
15 3.3 Market failures as justification for sector-specific regulation The conditions under which market failures are so severe as to warrant sector-specific regulation are a matter of controversy among scholars. Not only is it difficult to formulate the proper policy objectives for network sectors. Once policy objectives are decided on it is also very difficult for policy makers to assess when the market constellations are such that market outcomes deviate so strongly from aspired policy objectives as to justify market intervention. Any decision in favor of government intervention needs to bear in mind the trade-off between costs and gains from policy intervention. The costs of government intervention into market processes are not only the administrative costs of implementing regulation. There are also inefficiencies in any political process, which need to be taken into account. These result from the unintended consequences of regulation (i.e. Averch and Johnson, 1962) but also from the fact that a regulator does not necessarily have the interest of the general public in mind but is rather susceptible to rent-seeking by parties interested in the regulatory outcome (Stigler, 1971). Given the institutional and informational constraints under which government interventions into market processes take place, a non-intervention market outcome may well be closer to the ideal norm than an intervention outcome, even when market failure is apparent. This holds even more, the less severe the market failure which is to be corrected and also the more dynamic the market, in which the market failure is observed, because market conditions in these markets change rapidly. A formal depiction of the trade-off that needs to be considered in implementing any competition policy is the distinction of Type-1 and Type-2 errors (Knieps, 2006: 70). A Type-1 error is committed when competition authorities intervene in a market even though competition is effective (false positive). A Type-2 error is committed when competition policy is not applied, even though market power is inhibiting effective competition (false negative). Most industrialized democracies are committed to free markets and fear a weakening of the market process in their countries. When free market processes are to remain the norm, and also when considering the limitations of regulation, then it is better to err on the side of committing a Type-2 error as compared to the side of committing a Type-1 error. Market intervention should therefore be made difficult by placing strong demands on the justification of sector-specific regulation. The likelihood of committing a Type-1 error (false positive) is larger in sector-specific regulation than in antitrust policy. The most important reason for this is that regulation is implemented before abuse of market power has occurred. It is therefore based on less reliable conjectures of what 9
16 might have happened had market processes run their course. Furthermore, sector-specific regulation requires more information on the industry to fine-tune regulatory intervention than antitrust actions, which generally only prohibit particular actions, afford. This information is difficult to impossible for regulators to obtain. Lastly, regulation is far more intrusive with respect to the freedoms of the regulated firm than general competition policy. For all of these reasons, sector-specific regulation is likely to commit a Type-1 error. As a consequence, regulation should be based on an even stronger justification for market intervention than general competition law (Knieps, 2006: 49). A robust definition of market power is needed which can make it plausible that the market outcome can be improved by the application of regulation. Market entry barriers as justification for market intervention A robust definition of market power must be capable of differentiating between the typical characteristics of network industries which promote a market structure of only few large firms and stable market power which allows incumbent firms to make above competitive profits over an extended time period without inducing market entry. To assess competition in a network market, the regulator needs to understand when competitive forces are sufficient to restrain market power. This can be approached by analyzing the possibilities of market entry for the particular market. There are different traditions in economic theory on market entry barriers. The traditional industrial economic theory on entry barriers is represented by Bain (1956). Embedded in the structural approach, which explains market outcomes by a given market structure, Bain formulated a broad theory of market entry barriers that includes variations of economies of scale, product differentiation advantages of incumbents, and capital requirements (Schmalensee, 1989: 968). In essence, Bain considers all market characteristics that lend cost advantages to an incumbent firm to be barriers to entry, even if these cost advantages are only temporary. For example, if economies of scale allow the installed firm to produce a higher level of output at lower average costs of production, then, according to Bain, this must be looked at as a barrier to market entry. Potential entrants would initially produce less output at higher costs. Also, when product differentiation by the incumbent forces potential entrants to spend more on advertising than the incumbent is currently spending, then this is considered a barrier to market entry. A far more narrow definition of barriers to entry was formulated by Stigler, a representative of the Chicago School. Stigler defines: A barrier to entry [...] as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by 10
17 firms already in the industry (Stigler, 1968: 67). This definition focuses on long-run cost asymmetries between an incumbent firm and firms willing to enter the industry. The foremost reason for long-term cost advantages held by incumbents is the irreversibility of investments necessary for production. When the incumbent has already made these investments, their costs are no longer decision-relevant to him. They are, however, relevant to a firm contemplating entering the industry. Other reasons for asymmetric cost advantages can be that the incumbent, for some reason, has access to a more efficient production technology or lower input prices than potential entrants, for instance, due to control over natural resources. 4 Approaches for regulation in the telecommunications sector The general justification for sector-specific regulation in network sectors was illustrated above. This chapter will focus on the justification of regulation in the telecommunications sector. It introduces two normative approaches for the design and the implementation of regulation in telecommunications. These approaches are prominent examples for the fundamental principles that are being discussed in theory as well as in regulatory practice of telecommunications markets. These approaches also demonstrate very nicely how important the theories of market entry barriers are in the justification of regulation. 4.1 The disaggregated regulatory approach A reference model, which was designed explicitly to localize stable market power in network industries is the bottleneck theory (Knieps, 1997). This theory is based on a strict application of Stigler s definition of entry barriers in the context of network industries. It states that only network areas which combine the characteristics of a sustainable natural monopoly with irreversible investments have entry barriers that lend stable market power to incumbent firms. The formal definition of these network areas, so-called monopolistic bottlenecks, is given as (Knieps, 2006: 53): - The incumbent controls a facility which is necessary for reaching consumers and no second or third such facility exists such that there is no active substitute for the facility in the market. This is the case when, due to economies of scale and economies of scope, it is less costly to have only one supplier of this facility in the market (natural monopoly situation). 11
18 - The facility cannot be duplicated by a potential entrant in an economically feasible way. Hence, there is no potential substitute for the facility. This is the case when the costs of the facility are irreversible. Both conditions need to be fulfilled if an incumbent is to have stable market power. A natural monopoly alone is not sufficient to substantiate network-specific market power because it is not established that potential competition will not effectively discipline the incumbent. 7 Further, irreversible investments alone are not sufficient to deter market entry as long as several active firms can operate in a market. Only when an incumbent natural monopolist has made irreversible investments does this give him an asymmetric cost-advantage over potential competitors in the sense of Stigler s definition of entry barriers. The irreversible investments are no longer decisionrelevant to the incumbent, but are part of the calculation made by entrants contemplating market entry. The credible threat that the incumbent will lower its prices to the level of variable costs prevents potential entrants from entering the market. Potential competition is therefore not effective when large sunk costs are associated with market entry. Network industries are particularly vulnerable to this type of market power because large infrastructure investments create scale advantages and are often to a large degree sunk. 8 There exists a regulatory approach which uses the bottleneck theory to identify network-specific market power as a justification for regulation. According to this disaggregated regulatory approach (Knieps, 1997 and 2006) the task of regulation is to design a system for guaranteeing access to monopolistic bottlenecks (Knieps and Zenhäusern, 2007: 9). 9 The disaggregated approach uses a layered model of network industries and examines the separable elements of the value chain in a disaggregated manner (Knieps, 2006: 53). It can thereby identify on the lowest specifiable level those market segments that are competitive and those market segments that are That natural monopoly alone does not lend market power to an incumbent is the central proposition of the contestable markets theory by Baumol et. al (1982). This theory can be seen as a precursor of the bottleneck theory (Knieps, 2006: 55). The aim of the contestable markets theory is to expand the traditional reference scenario of perfect competition to an alternative and more general reference scenario, compatible also with natural monopolies (Mantzavinos, 1994: 56). It derives the precise market conditions which guarantee market entry into markets with above competitive profits. The bottleneck theory focuses on the opposite viewpoint. It seeks to define market characteristics that lend stable market power to incumbent firms. It derives those market conditions that discourage market entry, even when above competitive profits are being made. Von Weizsäcker points out that when economies of scale are present, very often the incumbent firm will own plant and equipment dedicated to the particular industry, such that the theoretical and empirical work on economies of scale as a barrier to entry may have misjudged the actual cause of the entry barrier (v. Weizsäcker, 1980: 401). The design of access regulation within the disaggregated regulatory framework will be introduced in more detail in Chapter 9. 12
19 characterized by monopolistic bottlenecks. Access regulation is only to be applied to those network elements which conform to the definition of monopolistic bottlenecks. 10 Figure 2 illustrates the disaggregated regulatory framework. All network areas that do not show natural monopoly characteristics are characterized by active competition (quadrants 3 and 4). According to the framework there is no need for sector-specific regulation in these network areas. Those network areas showing natural monopoly characteristics, but no substantial sunk investments, are considered contestable (quadrant 2). Only when natural monopoly characteristics are combined with substantial sunk costs (quadrant 1) should ex-ante regulation be considered. Figure 2: The localization of monopolistic bottlenecks Network area w/ sunk costs w/o sunk costs natural monopoly no natural monopoly monopolistic bottleneck (1) activ e competition (3) contestable market (2) activ e competition (4) Source: Based on Knieps, 2000: 96. Knieps (2001) employs the disaggregated approach to localize network-specific market power in the telecommunications sector. He differentiates between telecommunications services and telecommunications infrastructure. Telecommunications services must be considered at least contestable, if not competitive. Even when these markets may be characterized by economies of scale and scope, there are no sunk investments which need to be undertaken in order to be able to 10 Laffont and Tirole (2000: 98) also distinguish between bottleneck segments and potentially competitive segments of network industries. They also argue for access regulation to bottlenecks in order to preserve competition in 13
20 become active on the services market. Suppliers of value-added services can replace inefficient suppliers of telecommunications services since legal entry barriers have been abolished and since non-discriminatory access to underlying telecommunications infrastructure should be guaranteed by regulation whenever there are monopolistic bottlenecks. There is therefore no need for regulatory intervention in services markets. Telecommunications infrastructure can be further differentiated into long-distance networks and local-access networks (Knieps, 2005). The market for long-distance network capacity is characterized by active and potential competition. Since telecommunications markets liberalization a number of firms have invested extensively into long-distance network capacity, especially at the time of the sharp increase in capacity demand during the Internet-boom of the late 1990s. There are therefore no monopolistic bottleneck network areas in long-distance network capacity. For a long time it was assumed that local-access telecommunications networks constitute monopolistic bottlenecks (Woroch, 2002). Technological advances have made available alternative infrastructures for local telecommunications services and are challenging this view. Wireless networks, Cable-TV networks and satellite technology are increasingly being employed to transmit telecommunications data between the end-user site and the long-distance networks. The localization of monopolistic bottlenecks in local access networks therefore needs to take existing technological variety and the possibility of future infrastructure-platform competition into account. Whenever there is no active or potential infrastructure competition equal-access regulation to local access infrastructure continues to be necessary. Generally it can be said that local access networks have lost their monopolistic bottleneck character in densely populated areas while in rural regions the incumbent telecommunications carrier retains a monopoly position. The development of competition in telecommunications infrastructure ever since market liberalization shows that monopolistic bottlenecks are not stable over time. The advance of new technologies or a change in demand can change the extent of the monopolistic bottleneck network area. Blankart et al. (2007) demonstrate how technological advances in telecommunications access technologies have resulted in a shrinking of the monopolistic bottleneck over time (see Figure 3). In traditional Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN) the monopolistic bottleneck network area is made up of the ducts and ductworks in which the local loop is installed, of the copper local potentially competitive market segments. 14
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text:
For your education and a custom pillow-pleasing design style, we've put together some examples of stylish ways to add throw pillows to your current home design style.
The key element to choosing the right Ikat throw pillows is to know that using the right colors and patterns is essential. This can be the difference between fabulous and tragic:
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text:
It is no surprise that Metro is still in the red. Funding is still a huge problem and it doesn't look like we subway commuters are going to get any reprieve anytime this year. It seems after reading commentary after commentary on the upcoming WMATA fare hikes, that they all revolve around Metro not having enough funding. They have already said the 10 cent fare hike did not work, blaming the weeklong snowpocalpse for the lost revenue. Now a new 50 cent fare hike is being proposed to make up for the budget shortfall.
Looking at purely a fares standpoint, we have lots of subway systems to compare fares to. Our rates are between $1.70-$5.00.
NYC MTA – $2.25 fixed
Chicago CTA – $2.25 fixed
San Francisco BART – $1.75 – $7.05
Boston T Subway – $1.70 fixed
For international comparison:
Tokyo Subway – 160-230 yen ($1.70-$2.90 USD)
Taiwan MRT Subway – 15-50 NT$ (~$0.30-$1.60 USD)
London Underground – 4 Lb – 4.50 Lb ($5.90-$6.80 USD)
Paris Metropolitain – 1.60 Euro fixed ($2.03 USD)
Moscow Subway – 26 rubles fixed ($0.86 USD)
There are some considerations we should add in as well. In the case of the Moscow subway, the economy drives the price to be what we would consider unfathomably (is that a word?) low, but may still be equally as taxing proportionately to what the average rider makes annually. The New York, London, and Tokyo subway systems are different than ours because the vast majority of people use the subway as their primary form of transportation (or other public transit). DC seems to be a combination of the BART system and Boston's T – where we service the suburbs of the metropolitain area at stations that are surrounded by commuter parking, but still have adequate transportation for people who live in the district-proper.
There are some things I do like about our subway:
– Smarttrip card beats having to use a paper ticket
– Nextbus feature for catching a transfer
– standard directional train signage (orange line – vienna)
– extended reach to the suburbs
– escalators at all stations, but most appreciated at the deeper ones (Dupont)
– late night service (proposed to cut late night services by an hour, though) allows people an alternative to drunk driving
– free paper distribution at stations
– one less car on the road, one less car in traffic
My complaints of the subway:
– not enough stations throughout the city, hard to get to where you want to go if its not a tourist destination
– far overpriced for the service provided
– inefficient cars/seating (carpeting and p-leather seats not necessary)
– inefficient exits at stations (stairs should be in place of stations that have riders go up only one level)
– wasteful ventilation/air conditioning (more cubic feet to heat/cool in our high ceiling stations)
– unreliable service (expected arrival times fluctuate especially during rush hours)
– poor adaptability (do not appear to run enough trains during baseball games or other high-expected volume days)
– no express tracks (too late for the existing line, but potential for the new lines being built)
– poor customer service (there are plenty of examples of exceptions though)
(this list could go on a lot more, but I have to stop somewhere)
So a lot of people tell me that my complaints are things I should just "deal with" and that riders can't change what has happened in the past (ie the express tracks). I remind them that these are just complaints and not my expectations. I think we should be able to hold public subway transportation accountable for certain expectations (some of these are going to overlap recent metro news) – these are things I think are "fair" for the public to expect with their subway system.
Expectation: Safe Trains
The trains should be maintained to the standards of the national transportation safety board. Accountability for the maintenance of the trains should be paramount to ensure rider safety. This website, written by a former WMATA employee, has provided some eye opening and unsettling information concerning the subway. Maintenance is where a lot of the money should be going, to maintain the track sensors, the automatic train control system, and updating the train fleet as needed. safety training for the train drivers is necessary as well, not only for the riders safety, but the safety of other metro employees that may be working on the tracks. every rider should be able to expect every train to be safe. no exceptions. think about this the next time you're in a 1000 or 2000 series car (look at the first digit of the train number you're on posted at each end of every train car).
Expectation: Management that manages
It is easy to say "just fix it", but it is rarely that easy. The problems with metro appear to be the result of poor prior management aimed at keeping metro afloat and not improving it for the future. Now, the general manager has an incredible uphill battle which I'm not sure he will be able to come out of looking good. It may take many years to correct the previous leaders' mistakes and lack of foresight. The GM needs to be a strong advocate for the riders – and needs to be willing to be disliked. The GM faces tough critics like the union, oversight boards, and of course the riders. The new GM needs to hold people accountable for the responsibilities they are hired to do.
Expectation: Complaints should have follow-up and transparency. Riders complain about a lot of things, which is easy to do between the poor station managers, poor driver braking, and the always-breaking escalators. Complaints from riders should be reviewed and follow-up should be transparent so that the riders know they are being heard. If the riders know that their complaints or suggestions are being heard, and improvements are being made, the employees are probably going to be more willing to provide better service – creating a good upward trend towards customer satisfaction that would build upon itself.
These three areas are the primary reasons why I do not say the metro is a good system. it is a system that will get you to the station you need to go… eventually. odds are it will get you there safely… but the margin for possibility of an accident appears to be higher than other systems. the metro will pull through this fiscal shortfall. But it will be the on shoulders of the GM to see if things start to get better. In the coming year, I don't expect things to become fixed, but I expect it to heading in the right direction.
There are two great local blogs that give some insight into the dark side of the WMATA subway system. Definitely not the stuff WMATA wants you reading:


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Hey guys. So in sponsor chat a few days ago I mentioned that I would like to buy a police radar/laser detector so that I know when it's safe to speed without getting pulled over. . I was immediately ripped apart by a LOT of people who think that I am being reckless and putting other people in danger by driving quickly so let me first clear a few things up:
I am a cruise control driver. I like putting my foot down but I drive SO MUCH that it is in my best interest to find an opening in traffic and lock in the cruise control. I only drive fast if I need to pass a car, or group of cars that are a serious impedence (or swerving). I will also drive fast if it is late at night, or on a totally empty road. I will slow down as soon as I catch up to traffic.
It is my philosophy NOT TO BE THE FASTEST CAR on any stretch of road. I try to make sure there is a car going faster than I am, and if you drive on a freeway and still believe ANY mph over the speed limit is dangerous, you are part of the problem. Here are some other neat tips and tricks to stay safe and keep traffic moving,
Turn signals are on almost every car on earth, use them so that people behind you (and oncoming traffic) know if you're about to make a turning move.
Look in the direction you are turning or changing lanes. Hell, look both ways, go exorcist in your Kia. Seriously, a quick glance could save you from some hurt.
I know you want to swerve to avoid that pothole/object/damaged road, but sometimes you have to eat a pothole... like when there is ONCOMING TRAFFIC!!! It's ok, relax, slow down and suck it up. If the pothole is massive and devastating, stop entirely, and wait for the oncoming traffic to finish.
If you have the Right of way, and there are cars waiting, Please go. It's not a waiting game and it's in everyone's best interest if SOMEBODY gets it moving.
When you're passing another vehicle, please pass it quickly (ESPECIALLY TRUCKS)! The more time you spend alongside another car, the more opportunity for you to hit them, or them to hit you. Just pass em, or let them pass you.
Old people can be dangerous, there's really no way to tell if you're driving behind a blind elderly person but if you think a driver anywhere around you is dangerous, get away from them. This sometimes requires violating the speed limit. Occasionally a driver is too fast or dangerous to pass, if it's that bad, just hang back and hope they don't drive into oncoming traffic.
The left lane is not just for fast people, sometimes you need to exit left, but if people in the slower lanes are passing you, you should probably move over. This applies to any lane when traffic is open. If you are being passed on both sides you are in the wrong lane.
The police in America will not pull you over for speeding unless you are going 10+mph over the speed limit. This is because <9mph over the speed limit is not a primary stop and search offense. If you are going 65mph in a 60mph zone, and you get pulled over, the police are looking for something else.
Not wearing your seatbelt IS a primary stop and search offense, so buckle the fuck up.
There is a law in most states that you can go up to 15mph over the posted speed limit in order to pass a vehicle that is driving too slowly (under the speed limit). Check your local laws.
Buy a pair of those stick-on fish eye mirrors for your side view. New cars and all trucks have huge blind spots and these cheap little mirrors are going to be the best money you've ever spent on your car. Set up your large mirrors to give you a wider view, and tilt a little higher, and stick the fish eyes wherever is convenient (recommended bottom outside corner).
If the weather is legitimately dangerous, pull over or stop in a safe place as soon as possible. There are people who will drive 40mph in a 60mph zone because of a light rain. Whether you want to pass them or not is your call, but your car's performance in bad weather depends entirely on your TIRES! If the whole world is spinning around you, or it's raining so hard that you can't even see the nose of your car, just immediately find a place to stop.
If it's raining, foggy, snowing, or any other precipitation; turn your lights on. It's not for you. It's to HELP PEOPLE SEE YOU!
CARS ARE HUGE METAL MACHINES!!! They are extremely deadly and the speeds we drive them at can deliver a LOT of energy on impact. That's why even fender benders at high speeds do a lot of damage. Treat driving your car as if every other car is a gigantic scary monster truck, and you will be better off for it.
Edit 7/18: Police do NOT need a real reason to pull you over. Cops see minor offenses as excuses to stop and run your paperwork, and smell the inside of your car for alcohol or weed. If you've been pulled over for 'nothing' just pull over and be nice. They want to see if you're doing something they can actually arrest you for. Just give them your paperwork. If you give them too much shit for pulling you over for 'nothing,' it's only going to upset them. You can flirt, or joke, or chitchat with the cop that pulled you over; but try not to be mean, or give them a reason to dig deeper.
Drive safely everybody! Have fun though!
EDIT: Radar detectors are now fundamentally flawed because many cars have radar assisted features. Back-Up sensors, radar guided cruise control and lane assist/lane management systems WILL SET OFF RADAR DETECTORS.
Overall great purchase, worth every penny so far!
*Revised 7/18 - Even with the abundance of radar assisted vehicles, it's very easy to tell the difference between a Drug Mart electronic door (or a lexus with radar guided cruise) and a speed trap.


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If you are interested in traffic than feel free to contact one of our account managers and they will be glad to help you.
Mobile and Desktop inventory is available with several targeting options and with really good CPM.
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Let's do business together 😉
ClickPapa Team


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Seventeen-year-old Bianca Piper is cynical and loyal, and she doesn't think she's the prettiest of her friends by a long shot. She's also way too smart to fall for the charms of man-slut and slimy school hottie Wesley Rush. In fact, Bianca hates him. And when he nicknames her "the Duff," she throws her Coke in his face.
But things aren't so great at home right now, and Bianca is desperate for a distraction. She ends up kissing Wesley. Worse, she likes it. Eager for escape, Bianca throws herself into a closeted enemies-with-benefits relationship with him.Until it all goes horribly awry. It turns out Wesley isn't such a bad listener, and his life is pretty screwed up, too. Suddenly Bianca realizes with absolute horror that she's falling for the guy she thought she hated more than anyone.
Bianca is informed by her high school's man-slut that she is The DUFF--Designated Ugly Fat Friend. She doesn't take it very well. On top of being informed she's the ugly friend in her group her parents are having issues and all Bianca wants to do is escape.
This was a really quick read for me. Despite not agreeing with the way Bianca deals with the shit going on in her life I couldn't help but get wrapped up in the story. I really enjoyed Bianca's narration. She's got that won't put up with bullshit attitude with a big dollop of cynicism on top of that. I could relate with her thinking when it came to high school relationships. I was totally like that in high school only Bianca was straight forward and so not shy about it. I loved it, but I always wanted to shake some sense into the girl. I kept thinking to myself she could have found another way to distract herself from the issues presented in her life but at the same time I could sort of understand why she does what she does even if I didn't agree with it.
Wesley Rush is a really unlikeable character and yet I totally liked him, in fact by the end of this book I kind of sort of loved his character. I still don't quiet know how that happened when half the things he said made me want to shove a bar of soap in his mouth. But even though he said a lot of things that would have made me walk away in disgust in real life there was something about his being upfront that I liked. He didn't hide the fact he was a man-whore and he certainly did not sensor his thoughts when he definitely should have.
This book has a pretty good message despite containing a lot of not so good examples of dealing with stress. I think half of the population has felt like The DUFF. I know I have. I really liked that this book tackled the struggle of dealing with the thought of being the least attractive friend. Something like that can really get into your head and I thought that Kody Keplinger did a good job of writing it in a way that felt realistic to me.
Now if you have seen the movie and expect to find the same thing in this book you won't. They are completely different. They hold the same message only presented in completely different ways. I enjoyed both the movie and the book and would totally tell people to see the movie and read the book. Just don't expect to find the same story.
The DUFF was another hit and is getting 4 out of 5 birds from me. I would recommend this to anyone who likes a quick contemporary read. The subject might not be everyone's cup of tea but Bianca is a really great character and it's a really good read. I will definitely be reading more from this author.


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Start with stringer boards, attached to the house. After firmly attaching the stringer boards, attach the lowest riser to the board, and attach the steps. Repeat until the wood stair is complete.
Ensure that all measurements are accurate and complete. Many home centers sell stringer boards, which eases the difficulty of the process. Also, make sure to use pressure-treated boards to help with weathering.
Place a stringer board at each end, and every 16 inches between the two boards. Measure the width of the opening, and use a 2-by-4-inch board to anchor the stringer onto the house (making sure to take 3 inches off the board because of the thickness of the stringers). Remember, if drilling into brick, use pilot holes with a masonry bit and anchors for the screws.
After securing and leveling the stringers, nail a 1-by-8 to the lowest riser to the boards. Cut 5/4-by-6-inch boards, allowing for overhang on each end. Use two boards for each step, to alleviate possible bowing or cracking. Nail these boards into place as the steps. Use 1-by-8-inch boards as the remaining risers, and continue using two 5/4-by-6-inch boards as the steps.


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Many of you may have heard of Pack for a Purpose, an initiative that allows visitors from around the world to leave a 'heart print' on communities in their travel destinations. As a proud member of this incredible initiative, we are grateful to all of our guests who saved some space in their luggage to
Copyright © 2018 Arathusa Safari Lodge. All Rights Reserved.


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There are so many things in my life that I would like to change. I long to be more disciplined; to go to bed early, to get up super early, to be consistent and excellent in maintaining a clean and orderly home.
I want to be a much better mom; to never yell or speak unkindly, to build amazingly close and sweet relationships with my growing kids, to discipline consistently and compassionately.
I'd like to be a way better wife; to only speak words that build Niall up, to be his biggest cheer leader and helper.
I want my house to be organized and decorated just-so, to look less like a random collection of hand me down furniture and messes, and more like a Real Simple magazine.
While we're discussing all of the things I'd like to change, I'll go ahead and admit that I wish I was one of those women who did her hair, wore make-up, and looked sharp every day. If I could just manage to always keep my nails painted {never chipping!] I would feel very put together.
There's the rub. In all my longing for self-improvement, so often I mistake a desire for a better version of myself as a desire for holiness. None of these desires are necessarily bad, but many {if not all} of them are infinitely less important than what my number one desire ought to be- knowing, glorifying, and mirroring Christ.
Painted nails and tidy homes and self-discipline are lovely things. They can certainly come from the overflow of a heart deeply in love with Christ. And I do believe that growth in grace leads to greater discipline, a greater capacity for working heartily, and greater faithfulness in all of these areas of our lives.
But having a heart that revels in the Gospel means that my identity and affirmation isn't found in how "put together" I am. My first pursuit isn't meant to be a more glorious version of myself. My first pursuit is meant to be intimacy with the Living God. No more, no less.
It's a New Year! That is so refreshing and exciting. I certainly have goals and areas of my life that I'd like to make improvements in. Perhaps you do too. In all the excitement and pursuit of these ideals, let's remember to seek first His Kingdom.
When you fall short of your lofty expectations, don't berate and belittle yourself. Remember that Christ has paid the penalty for all of your sins. He has clothed you in beautiful robes of His righteousness. You are accepted and welcome and beloved. Not because of who you are or what you've done, but because of who Jesus is and what He has done. You, sweet sister, on your bad day with your messy hair and your sweat pants and your disaster house. You are loved and welcomed.
When you are hitting every ball out of the park, and your house is sparkling and your family is living in sweet harmony and you managed to shower and put on make-up and your manicure is spot-on, rejoice! But don't rejoice in the glory of your great put-togetherness. Rejoice in the glory of knowing and being known by God. Rejoice that despite all of your filthy-rag "righteousness," you are accepted and welcomed simply because God has shown great mercy to you, a great sinner. Use all of that sweet put-togetherness to serve, build-up, and extend grace to others.
You can be very godly in the middle of a mess {financial, housekeeping, family, what have you}. You can be very ungodly in the midst of what appears to be great perfection. And vice versa. So whichever situation we find ourselves in today, let's check our hearts and make sure our eyes are on Christ and His glory, not ourselves and vainglory.
Let's pursue Christ together this year {and every year!}. Let's not measure our status by the externals, but keep our hearts grounded in the humbling security and life-giving freedom of the Gospel.
For good Gospel grounding and encouragement, these three books are at the top of my list.


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Quantum Physics
The Modern Day Viking
I have been a Rune Master and member of the Runes For Consciousness Society for over 25 years.
The Age of Aquarius that we have just entered brings us a new powerful paradigm for contacting and working with our ancestors and the Gods/Goddesses of the North.
In my meditations with Odin, I have been given the instructions to "Go within first, then without."
The Laws of Quantum Physics tell us that there exists an infinite Ocean of Thinking energy that responds to our thoughts.
Our Ancestors, the Runes and our Nordic/Germanic Gods/Goddesses exist there.
The message to first "Go within" means to set up a methodology where we can go into the Quantum Ocean which in reality is the Mind of God, and make contact with those we want.
This is the Secret of the New Paradigm of the 21st Century.
We are to go within, create with our minds and then watch our mental creations manifest on the physical plane.
To perform old Viking Rituals, old God/Goddess Rituals in the woods drinking mead and jumping over bon fires, is still good.
But the real power for the 21st century Viking lies in the individual, solitary meditations done in the privacy and safety of their homes.
All the writings, rituals, meditations we have been performing have been created by the MInds of those gone before us. It makes us part of their dreams, their reality.
We are not really in contact with the Runes, nor the Gods/Goddesses. We are in contact with the mental constructs and matrices built by others.
The new paradigm of the Law of Quantum Pysics tell us we can mentally enter the Quantum Ocean, where everything that ever was, is or will be exists, and make direct one-on-one contact with the Runes and our Ancestors and the Gods/Goddesses of the North.
No more middleman is needed. Using some one elses book, ritual, meditation etc, gives us a watered down weaker connection, than if we divise one ourselves.
As a modern day Viking and Northern European, you want to go directly to the source.
Mentally enter the Quantum Ocean, Mind of the Creator God and seek out your ancestors; seek out and bring into your life the power of the Runes.
The Runes are Universal Creative Energies that exist in the Quantum Ocean. Learn to touch these energies personally with your own direct one-on-one connection.
You will need to do some work to make thse connections.
I suggest that you spend at least 1/2 hour every morning thinking and meditating on the Runes and the Nordic/Germanic Gods/Goddesses.
The more you practice this, the more you will attract these energies out of the Quantum Ocean and into your Aura.
What you carry in your Aura you project into the physical world around you. Do this and you will be able to bring Odin, Thor, and Freya onto the Physical Plane. You will bring thier energies into your home, your Car, your work place, the malls every where.
You will start to make a very strong impact on Society. you will be seeding it 24/7 with the energies of the Runes and the Power and wisdom of the Gods/Goddesses of the North.
this is how we all can nurture and empower our Northern European culture and keep the runes and gods/goddesses alive.
I have written over 200 articles, blogs and knols giving instructions on how to do just this.
Remember the paradigm of the 21st Century is to go within First, make contact, then bring the contacts without.
Email me for free newsletter.
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Ragnar Storyteller (AKA Ellis Peterson is a Korean War Vet living with his wife Lory and dog Dixie in the boonies of the Pocono Mountains. He is a retired math professor and electronics engineer. He is the inventor of the simple radionics device called "The Nordic Ond Orgone Generator". He has written over 200 articles and booklets on runes, radionics, quantum physics, viking history, orgone generators and alternate healing methods. Ragnar is 70+ but looks 50's thanks to his inventions. You can see more of his works on his websites:
Visit my new SPIRITUAL QUANTUM PHYSICS Website:


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