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Principal The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis
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The Political Philosophy of Hobbes The Political Philosophy of Hobbes Its Basis and Its Genesis By Leo Strauss Translated from the Germrm Ml11lUiCript By Elsa M. Sinclair . THE Phoenix Books UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO & CHICAGO LON DON . PRES\ TO MY WIFE PREFACE HE intention of the present study is to prepare an analysis Tof the principles of Hobbes's political philosophy and of that of his successors. A new analysis of those principles has become necessary as a consequence of the deepened knowledge, which has been gained during the last decades, of the tradition of political thought. The time is now past when one could safely without any further qualifications characterize the seven teenth and eighteenth centuries as the hey-day of natural law "theories. This characterization was tacitly based on a com parison of the political theories of the age of rationalism with those of the nineteenth century, and within the limits of such a comparison it still holds true; but it can no longer be main tained when the medieval and classical tradition is duly taken into account. The effect of this change of orientation on the �terpretation of Hobbes's political philosophy is obvious. J. Laird in his recent book on Hobbes could try to establish the view that in ethical and �olitical theory Ho.bhcs�_� a.nd hands are both mediae��'J Though this statement is hardly Justdied, It clearly proves that the older opinion, accord ing to which Hobbes's originality was beyond question, is some what shaken and now needs some qualifications which were not required at an earlier stage of research. Generally speaking, if theories of natural law, far from being a feature peculiar to the age of rationalism, are almost a matter of course in the medieval and classical tradition, we cannot avoid asking why the seven teenth and eighteenth centuries gained the reputation of being the period par excellence of natural law theories. And, to exclude from the outset the inadequate answer that for well-known political rea; sons the practical bearing of natural law theories .,as greater during that period than in any other age, we must faise the more precise question, whether there is not a difference of principle between the modern and the traditionaJ.. view of "natural law. Such a difference docs in fact exist.\,/traditional natural law is primarily and mainly an objective 'rule and measure', a binding order prior to, and independent of, tl1& human will, while modern natural law is, or tends to be, ' I • PREFACE VIlI primarily and mainly a series 9£. 'rights', of subjective claims, originating in the human will.\ : ave tried to establish this view in the present study b c mparing the political doctrine of Hobbes, as the founder q.f oder.n. P2IiticaLp-hilosoiilti.: witlJ. that of Plato and Aristotle, as the founders of traditional political philosopW Essentially the same result is reached if ·one compares the doctrines of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rous seau with those of, e.g., Hooker, Suarez, and Grotius. Even Leibniz's doctrine, which at first sight seems to be the most important exception to the afore-mention<:.d .rule, confirms that rule, as is seen if one takes into account not only the content but also the form-the conditional character-which he attri butes to the propositions of natural law.l However. although Hobbes att.af. fu!� ormen'�fha!1. .9.o �osLe�E�!!�n.t�:of natural law, th.e essence ·of. mod�r.Il_��t�_r�l. la�. and all it!? es!!e.l!tia.l . impJi��ns a� no where more clearly seen than in his doctrine!tJ! o;,Atobbes obviouSly starts,· did, from natural 'law', i.e. from an objective order, but from natural 'right', i .e. from an absolutely justified subjective claim which, far from being dependent on any previous law, order. or obligation, is , itself the origin of all law, order, or obligati0 t is by this conception of 'right' as the principle of morals·· and politics that the originality of Hobbes's political philosophy (which in'eludes his moral philosophy) is least ambiguously evinced. For. by _st�fr0I!l 'right' and thus denying the primacy of . ·'law' (w, what amounts-runaamentally to the same, of 'virfue'); Hobbes makes a stand against the idealistic tradition.vOn the other hand, by basing morals and politics on 'right'. and not on purely natural inclinations or appetites, Hobbes makes a stand against the naturalistic tradition. That is to say. the principle of 'right' stands �idwayJ�.��ll....§!!:!£!!Y. m9L�lprin £i'p'!es(SUch �qh,q.�e .9f tl:!-,e_�!:I,l_d!t.�q!laJ_n�t,:!r�Lla�t£!l: ..!.��_one I.!!.�����·n�rp!-g:ely- natur(ll.prin�j�le§.'(��<;h.�!! p!��.��!"�.J.�PR�tite. �� �v�n ��ili�y) on. the .othe9.�', we may say, is a specifi. Q(I __ I It is because of this view orLeibniz, which was held by Hobbes before Leibniz, that Kant's doctrine of the categorical imperative as distinguished from hypothetical imperatives became necessary. The rules of traditional r:atural law doubtless were, and were understood to be, categorical imperatives. IX cally juridical conception. Some of the assumptio'ns the philosophical application of that conception are indicated in the last chapter of the present study. A full analysis of. the significance of that philosophical application had, however, to be postponed; for before such an analysis could be made, it was necessary to remove the obstacles which stand in the way of even a mere recognition of the obvious fact that l:!obbes's e2!itical p'!!gosoPEI st�rt§ fr_QIIl na!ul;"JlI 'right�_a.s_.distinguished �nd natura�.i�.. fHQ�l��.l!_. bo!h. , These obstacles are mainly due to the fact tha 0 tb.�jded to base_�is p_<?�����! .E!t_ ThJ:...�£t�!���. �o . �!.��!ti«?f!.�l J)1�ral a!1�. politi�. based on traditional metaphysic&.. traditionaC' metaphysics �ex:e. replaced by modern natural �"ci�nce: to 'base the new mor.al and political phiIQsopJ1-Y. �����c.i����U.�ro.p!s . oLthis kind coule! .n� djJ:iollaL metapJ.!Y-&j.cs w<;!.�,,-!9.. .l:I.!!� . the lang�ag�, qf . SUc�!���!:s, .'lI:f!..�h.�<?E��9rp'�is�ic' and, therefore, a pJ;"op�r ba�i� f.QL!l p.hijQ!?�.4y., of. things , human; I,llodern science, on th� ot!l�r..ha!1g,. whi�h. t��e, .. 'an!h�o.£Q. all cQnceptions .of purpos«c:.. !i.2.!1! ���l�.! _th.e.r::efoJ;'"e, .to SllY the .1e!lst,. c(;mtr�g�t_e.. the understa,nding 9f things human, to.the foufi(�I!!ion.of morals a9�·po.Ht{£i phi!o�()ph , y fundament�lfiiff�re�c�. between natural 'righ��. ,and n,atu�al ap'petii:� ..codfd not . canee-' of)I<?bQ�.�'s.principle of 'righf was. to J)e du . d e real pa!!i,s' efqrl!, first to be shown thaq .!" h� , -, _ ! � ���.s ��J�l�",��. hi s�je!1c�1J;o show this, is,.t:ae particular object of the present study. ._!.:As G. C;. g,?_����?n <?b��ryed in.4is H.o���S,. 't����_�qf (H��!?c:s�s) p�li�ical doctrine ... doubtless had irs 1main lines fixed when he was still a mere ooserver of men ind-'manners: '�nd- ��t yet'"�' �echanical phiios�'p"her' (p� 57). 1r��;�th�I.:ef()f¢;' oiily natural fo attempt ,a cC?h�f��t expo�ition ofJI<?bp�.!I,'s hi�. original view, not.yet distorted by.scientific'explanations', � i� . . .. (!P . . x PREFACE of human life. I hope to have shown by the present study that such an exposition is possible, and even necessary, if we desire any coherent understanding of Hobbes's thought. Such an uILderstanding is not so easy to gain as it seems at first sight. -It is true that every reader of Hobbes is struck by the clarity, ' ur: and aecisio';-of his thought. But every student of , Hobbcs is also am�zed by the numerous contradictions whicl; I occur in his 'writings: I, T�ere are but few of his most important and most characteristic l!ssertions which are not contradicted, eithcr directly or by the d�nial of their obvious consequences, somewhere in his works" , In_o�to find 0lIt wh.ich oLthe contradictorv statements express his real opinion, \\�,have to ur and ....wUliof his h �' to our first i�press�on or�� thought. For thatimpre��!�� s_ not�}nS' "othe.!. �han the per-' ception of ����s's f.���_m? ! J:aJ"yie.w- hlJ�U 1jfe, and ihal1 view is not contradictory, but one and indivisible. c-4t�js! view, and not modern science, whkh-�real ----basis - of his� --politel P ilosophy. That view has its...Q!j.&i,�_not §�muchjn an.JLkarne or scientific preo�cupati0l1> but in, act\!aLe�perkru;..el of h� men behav� in ��ily life,,�n(U��lll!blic conversationj The expenence, underlying Hobbes's view of human life, must, in its turn, be traced back to a specific moral attitude which compels its holder to experience and see man in Hobbes's particular waf.i\ Thus that view might find an adequate ex pression, e.g. i""maxims and reflections, in the style of Hobbes's contemporary La Rochefoucauld (whose opinions about the importance of amour-propre are, by the way, very much akin to Hobbes's opinions about the importance of 'glory' or 'pride'), rather than in a philosophic system. And in Hobbes's works t��re are important parts which arl written in such a style. However. Hobbes's in�t�?_� is_I!9.tol.!ly to expo!,l.!!<!.�is �:'!�v of �uman life as the e�'pression o£....hi!. own_,�xp�rien�e-,,'p!!!: a��. to justify this view as the_J2!!!y_�rue aI�d_ un!yers�Uy valid view. It is by starting from this intention that we can grasp the cltimate reason for the �ontradictions which are to be found in his writings. For, as he has at his disposal no method suitable to the demands of such a view of human life a� he holds, he has no choice but to borrow the methods and conceptions supplied either by the philosophical tradition or nio ? dlill \ ' G PREFACE XI by modern science.\But neither corresponds to those demands. 'tlietraditional � t?ttceptions are not appropriate to a funda mentally untraditional view, and the conceptions provided by modern science are not congenial to a view of human life originating in a moral attitude. T"he basic difference between flobbes's original view of human life on the one hand,_ and the conceptions provided by tradition or modern science on the other, explains all the contradictions�f anr-conJi..�CI-�m:� whlclt_occur in his works. The establi;bment of this fact is the necessary condition not only for any coherent interpreta tion of, Hobbes's political philosophy, but e\'en, as I have already indicated, for recognition of the principle of that philosophy. fiE order t�:.:._�h.at H_Qb. b_ e bo�!� �f.!E.�d�tion an?: I?od<:En �cien£e, we must study th� g�.!!esis of his moral"and .politicat ig£as. 'For b5'-stud)'iiii·-1l'9Q.pes's :arry 11iCj!i.itti, \ye ;u:e e.nabled ��)perc��ve th.a! his or:igin�.L�on �tiqn, of_hurna" life wa.s present in his .miI1� befOl:e h�.}\:.as p..<:'l!:!.a,in��d with 1l1Oqt;.rl). scien. !..4.!l.t. that .conception is independent of modern scien£e; and_by �yjl1g.,h.is )�t,<,!r dev�l�pmel).t \y� can <Irrive at a further cgr roboration of that finding, for there we witness the actual con "'fli£D?�,i'Y�,�n. ,his .original 'view' and the demands of modern ,F:ience.lOn the Q!.ll�Lhand, by studying Hobbes's dc\,clopmentas � ���ble, which is a gradual emancipation from tradition, we are enabled to realize that at least the presuppositions and con sequences of his original view became clearer to him, the more.. he freed himself from the shackles of tradition, and thus to show that his origi�a. tconce. ption, -"mderstood . in its full mean in..&..i.§J,19.Lonl¥-indcpendent of tradition,.but even contpl.�J.Q it., Now, while it is one and the same reason-an interest in I:rot,bes's original view of human life-which leads us to study his development with regard both to the (in the main) in creasing influence of modern sciencc and to thc (in thc main) decreasing power of tradition, thc method to be followed in the two cases is different. In th�-fi;�t 'case, we are pai-tic�larly i'iiterestea.in ,II9bbes'Sear!y thought, in the views' .h.�. hfM before he studied exact science. In the second case, we pae tiCularry'-��'ant to see the working of the tcndency, which 'is xii PREFACE !���!�S eman cipatIOn from tradition. It is, however, irp.possible to separate thoserwolines· ohesearch'c'ompletelY,. For as the early writings of Hobbes are very sparse, we have in some cases to complete the insufficient materials by construing Hobbes's early view as the hypothetical starting-point of his later development, which in itself is clearly evinced. This point must be stressed because the interdependence of the two lines of investigation justifies the otherwise hardly defensible composition of the present study. The term 'early writings' has in Hobbes's case a somewhat unusual meaning. If we understand by early writings all those which he composed befere his first systematic treatment of political philosophy (The Elements of Law, finished in 1640), they comprise all he had written up to the time he was fifty. In this sense, the 'early writings' are: ( I ) his introduction to his translation of Thucydides (not later than 1628); (2) the poem De mirabilibus Pecci (c. 1627); (3) the little treatise dis covered and edited by Tonnies, called by its editor A Short Tract on First Principles (perhaps 1630); (4) two English digests of Aristotle's Rhetoric (c. 1635). The second and the third of the writings mentioned are of no great interest for our purpose. On the other hand, one must add the autobiographical and biographical accounts of Hobbes's early period, as well as some letters from and to Hobbes. This very sparse material does not permit of a definite answer to the question of Hobbes's early thought in all its aspects. The case would be different if a Chatsworth MS., not indeed belonging to the Hobbes papers, but, as far as I can judge, written in Hobbes's hand, could be used as a source for Hobbes's early thought. There is reason for assuming that if this manuscript is not the earliest writing of Hobbes himself, his was the decisive influence in its composition. 1 ��_�'?�t cle_lI:�ly ��}:I:o�E.��' I The manuscript in question is entitled 'Essayes' and was composed by W. Cavendish, who dedicated it to his father as 'this dayes present'. As Mr. S. C. Roberts has pointed out to me, the 'Essayes' are the earlier and much shorter manuscript version of Horae subsecivae, anonymously pub lished in 1 620. As the 'Essayes' and the Horae subsecivae are based on some e&1lays of Bacon's which were not published before 1612, they must both have been composed between 1 6 1 2 and 1 620. Horae subsecivae was tra- PREFACE XIII With the exceptions immediately to be mentioned, I have followed the edition of Hobbes's writings by Molesworth (quoted as English Works or Opera latina). For the Elements of Law and Behemoth, I have used Tonnies's editions, and for the Leviathan the edition by A. D. Lindsay. I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to His Grace the Duke of Devonshire for his generosity in permitting me to examine the Hobbes papers at Chatsworth, and to quote some passages from them. I am also very much indebted to Mr. Francis Thompson, Librarian at Chatsworth, whose help and advice were invaluable to me when I was studying the Hobbes papers . I have to thank Professor Ernest Barker, who read the manu script of the present study and made very helpful suggestions, and to whose kindness and interest it is primarily due that I was able to continue my work. I wish further to express my gratitude to Professor R. H. Tawney, to the Master of BaHiol, to Professor N. F. Hall, and to Mr. E. J. Passant for the help and encouragement they have given me. ditionally attributed to 'Lord Chandos' or to 'Lord Candish, after Earle of Devonshire'. The latter attribution is borne out by the discovery of the manuscript version signed by W. Cavendish, and the former may well be derived from a misreading of 'Candish' as 'Chandos'. W. Cavendish might stand, of course, for any Earl of Devonshire, since they were all named William ; but the possibilities are limited by the date of composition of the 'Essayes' and the Horae subsecivae (between 1612 and 1 620) in such a way that only the 1st Earl of Devonshire or his son, afterwards 2nd Earl of Devonshire, could claim the authorship of those writings. The authorship of the 1st Earl is out of the question, for the 'Essayes' are dedicated by W. Cavendish to his father, then living, and the 1st Earl's father died in I SS? Thus the (nominal or actual) author of the 'Essayes' and very probably also of the Horae subsecivae can be nobody else but W. Cavendish, after wards 2nd Earl of Devonshire. Now, this W. Cavendish was Hobbes's pupil and friend. Hobbes lived with him as his tutor and secretary from 1 608 until 1 628, therefore also during the whole period within which the 'Essayes' and the Horae subsecivae can have been written. There were personal connexions between Bacon and W. Cavendish, afterwards 2nd Earl, and between Bacon and Hobbes ; these connexions help to explain the literary relation which exists between Bacon's Essays and the Cavendish 'Essayes'. In spite of the considerable borrowings from Bacon's Essays in the 'Essayes', there are, however, no less significant differences of view between the model and the imitation-differences which correspond to the differente between Bacon's thought and that of Hobbes. XIV PREFACE I am very much indebted to the Rockefeller Foundation, the Academic Assistance C ouncil, and the Master and Governing Body of Sidney Sussex College for financial help. Finally, I wish to thank Mrs. E. M. Sinclair, who generously undertook the difficult task of translating the present study. L. S . PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION OR various reasons this study is here reissued in its original form. F It is, no doubt, in need of considerable revision. But it still seems to me that the way in which I approached Hobbes is prefer able to the available alternatives. I:!?.�bes.. �ppeared to me as the o nator of modem political philosop.!ly. This was an error: not Ho es, but Machiavelli, deserves this honor. But I still prefer that easily corrected error, or rather its characteristic premises, to the � more generally accepted views which I was forced to oppose and which are less easily corrected. I had seen that the modem mind had lost its self-confidence or its certainty of hal'ing made decisive progress beyond pre-modem thought; and I saw that it was turning into nihilism, or what is in practice the same thing, fanatical obscurantism. I concluded that the case of the moderns against the ancients must be reopened, with out any regard to cherished opinions or convictions, silll' im et studio. I concludcd in other words that we must Icarn to consider seriously, i.e. detachedly, the possibility that Swift was right when he compared the modem world to Lilliput and the ancient world to Brobdingnag. I assumed that political philosophy as quest for the final truth regarding the political fundamentals is possible and neel'S sary: I regarded Hobbes as a political philosopher and not as an ideologist or mythologist. I assumed that political philosophy,. as an essentially non-historieaT pursuit;-is today in necd of a critical study of1£8 history; that such a critical history pre&upposes that one understand the great thinkers of the past as they understood tnemselves; that the history of political philosophy requires an aaequate ruvision into perio�s; and that only such a division can be consldereoadequate as corresponds to the sclf-consciousness of the actori, I.e. of the great political philosophers. I concluded that HCi1iOeswas the founder of modern political philosophy because he _ had expressed the conviction that hc had effected, in his capacity as a political philosopher, a radical break ,\ ith all earlier politi<;il philosophy much more clearly than Zeno of Citium, l\1arsilius of XVI PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION Padua, Machiavelli, Bodin, and even Bacon had done. I was con firmed in this view by the judgment of competent men, of Bayle and Rousseau. The immediate and perhaps sufficient cause of my error was in adequate reflection on the opening of Machiavelli's Discorsi. I had learned from Spinoza to appreciate the clarion call of the Fifteenth Chapter of the Principe. But I had been told by all authorities that the magnum opus of Machiavelli is not the Principe but the Discorsi; and the Discors; present themselves at first glance as an attempt to restore something lost or forgotten rather than as an attempt to open an entirely new vista. I did not consider the possibility that Machiavelli still exercised a kind of reserve which Hobbes dis dained to exercise: that the difference in degree to which Machia veHi's and Hobbes' claims to originality are audible is due to a dif ference in degree not of clarity of thought but of outspokenne�s. The reason for this failure was that I was nOt'Sufficientlyattentive to the question whether wisdom can be divorced from moderation or to the sacrifices which we must make so that our minds maybe free. L.S.. CONTENTS � INTRODUCTION I . tI. THE MORAL_ BASIS -- /. III. ARISTOTELIANISM • IV. ARISTOCRATIC VIRTUE • 6 30 ./" 44 V. THE STATE AND RE IGION ./, l-- S9 79 VI. HISTORY VII. THE NEW MORALITY VIII. THE NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE INDEX . . . • 108 129 I INTRODUCTION �BES'S political philosoph�is the first peculiarly modern �empt to give a coherent and exhaustive answer to the' question of man's right life, which is at the s!!!!l-e ti111e the question ofJhenght orderof SoCie�� There is perhaps no efement of Hobbes's teaching which cannot be traced back to .ne _or other of his predecessors; and it may be that one or ther of them was in some respects less bound by - tradition � than was Hobbev But such elements as had emerged separately before his time find their specifi,caIly modern unity only in Hobbes; and none of Hobbes's forerunners attempted that , definite' break "ith tradition in its entirety"hich the _modern answer to the question of man's right lIfe implies. .!.�obbes was the first who felt the necessity of seeking, and succeeded in fipdin , a ..!!."0�scienza of � and Sta!� On this new doctrine a a er mora and political thought is e>..pressly or indicate its political importance one might . tacitly 'stress t:b&-flret'that the! ideal of ci,'ilization in its modern form, the.- ideal both of the bol.!!&eois-c<l,pitalist de, �1.Qpmeiit�d of . ---.--- ---:""'T'" fQund�d a�d b)� H�bb� the socialis.t �Q�!!l was �'\:'poun�ed f.� -with aoepth, cI�.L.and _�l.!�erLty ne'y�_ riy,alleq -SlnCe1 To give an indication. of its philosophical bearing one ililglit pf>int out that . t11 moral �ilosophv, llQ!....n!�rely of , but also.cff R�e.au, Kllnt, el teenth-centu "'��-!!s, been-possibl�_ without Hobbes's would not h J§rk.. B above all as a fundamental ans\\ er to the question of man's right life .s's e,olitical phIlosophY is of suprc!!le �p�Biiici :r.:ot only for political�.Qfl.h'y as such, i.e. for one branch of knowledge among others, .b.JJ!...!9! m..0��r.n EhifOsopny altoget if the discussion and elucidation of the ideal of life is indee<!..-th� PJimaxy and deci�ive task of pjlil,oso ; .J(I! ls_�l!ll�t universall.x. admitted that, Hobbes marks an ep.och�n the hi&-tory of natural law and of thc theory or tn& Stat'e.l1'11a't the importance of };is achievement IS tar greater, � " - --- -- - -- --- - -- ".- '6as�.ftR; --- __ � � ( � " 2 INTRODUCTION that it is truly universal, is usually not even considered. This lac,k of recognition is partly due-par��al as it may sound �to the influence of Hobbes himself-according. �2 �n s�t�m��, his ac4!�Y:���!!Lin po�iti.Caf:Pliil?s?,ph���e pos�1�� the application 0� R. new methoq,.,�h� me�hC?d)�y . wlilch Ga1il��L_raised physics�to-the . ra�� '�f ,a, scien<:,e,1 }n conformity with this method, whic� i �led ..th� 'r�tlY.e. comjjosiiive '(The' given politica�!.� (ihe disputable justice or InJustice orany particutar action, or the current conception of justice in general, or the State itself, which as the primary con dition of justice is the political fact par excellence) !lre analys�d, J'ed���d to their elements (��e 'in4iyiduaL,�iJ.l!'\')�, anl;t �h.en,. �erso 'z1iiiere-;-s�arthrg from those elemen�s.) P.9_SSi,�il,ity of a 'collective will' is d, nexione, �y a compIet�ly lucid 'd� .'t�92.� �n,a. what.was at,first I Ian 'irra�iC?lfal' wh�le is 'ration�lise' "([fwould thus seem that , the absolute priority of the individual to the State, the con- ' ceptions of the individual as asocial, of the relation between ' the state of nature and the State as an absolute antithesis, and finally of the State itself as Leyj an-is determined by and, as it were, implied in the methQg.':,.As ,this method, however, jwas applied only subsequently, only in imitation of Galileo's Ifounding of the new physics, Hobbes's achievement, from this point of view, however great it may be,j.§. nevertheless of the second order-secondary in comparison with the founding ofmod.e , rn :�!,!l� !!I}iversal iI!!p'ort!!!1�� of Hobbes's �litical PQjJosop--hy cann'Of'but remain unrecognized so long as,l in �.ccordance with Hobbes's own"Statements;-theffiethodis-c�insidered t�Lbe the decisivf�..J�at�!.�. .Q.��·E...0� \t'l'ow it is obvious'that the method is not its only and even not"hs most important charac teristic. Precisely on the assumptions of the 'resolutive-com positive' methoa+and by n means on the assumptions of Aristotle's 'gen�c' method \: question of the aim and quality�f the fndividual will 0 man's will in the state sr __ __ � I � � 4!!!. I Compare in this connexion particularly E. Cassirer, Die Philosophie der LJ.ujkliirung (Tiibingen, 1932), pp. 339 ff. • De due, Praefatio and Epistula dedicatoriai De corpore, cap. 6, art. 7. l INTRODUCTION 3 'n ture becomes decisive for the concrete develo ment of n e answer to t IS eClSlve question is i ea 0 j the tate. not uneqUivoca y traced out in advance by the method. �s' F:.0usseau's..e���.��c.�ga . .iIl§..t !!!JnaiIJ.§Uh.e....antitQ.���. be��e.et:l �he as.s.�rtions ��U!�<?Rg,l��rc: a<::c\lrately� inno.ce�t) . and t4atI:te. is by Ila�(�. �H..(ra'p��.i?�: Hobbes's adoptioW,'of the latter view, without which his political philosophy woulQ lose all its character, must therefore have an origin other than the method, and as a result pis p�tical phiI�_l}y mu..n.�Y��_IllQre .iJ!1"'Tqle.c!i!!!�,.and �!:.e!�2!:!gilJ. .than.1he...metho.d� .:w.:h��� i� �hls_�jg�-the origin not of the method, of the form, but"'.of the. material . of Hobbes's ' 'hy:-::t o b o soughti i cal p p' !� h ·· � t.i P.Q!i ._ has up to the present given two :To this question research 'different answers. ,The obvious answer, forced upon us by the structure of Hobbes's-political philosophy itself, is that Hobbes "draws the �onc!'�t.f!. - fhQ!.<)gJ. LI!�!Y.Ldual 'Yi!l frJ.�..!E-e.Inechanistlc.psY n his This psychology provides as sy�.��m. i olit!c. � J p-hilo. s 9ph;¥ � data on the..!l��.tiy� .side the denial of freedom of will, on the positive the asset:t�,?n that'man is under all <;o�ditions deter . mined by his sense-impressions and by his automatic reactions to those impressions (his desires and passions) rather than by reaSOll. Now it is not difficult to see that this psychology is by no means the_ .necessary assumption for Hobbes's political philosophy 't Hobbes's characteristic the�rie��the denial that 'altruis ' is'iiatUriir;-the--.th��es . of ni�n:� .r:.�p;J.ci.Qus n:ifure,-oftTi w'ar'oT'e\[ery'one'against every one as the nat.u.r� coiiOitlon' or' mankind, of the essent�al. impotence of reas9� Car;- �lso 'be maintained on ' the i�determ'fnist assumptions.:. In addition, this .)?c:.s.�jmistic;'. vi.e'V .Q( l1!lman nature !s__ m�r!�ed' 'in Hobbes before he hask9.r could have the least conception of a �;iianrstic-psycliolo� .'Theseaii.d "k"indred considerations'ied W:- UiUhey to seek tift origin of the material of Hobbes's political plll.losophy, not in modern scientific psychology but in tradition( According to Dilthey, modern science decided only 'the form-'which anthropology now took on (sc. for Hobbes among others), while as far as material was concerned it had ita basis in the descriptions, classifications, and explanations of the -'----.---' , ' , - . . __ INTRODUCTION 4 previous age'.1 Dil,!-bey then traced this material back to sources in classical antiquit� He attached particular importance to the proof that for the fundamental part of his political philosophy, the theory of the passions, ljobbes is greatly indebted to the 8toa.2 We cannot here discuss in detail Ddthey's analysis of thesources. One point must, however, be raised. Dilthey takes his bearings from the theory of the passions in De homine, which is, indeed, influenced by the 8toa. He makes no mention of the theory of the passions as developed in the Elements of Lmv, a theory which betrays no Stoic influence at all, and which in addition is worked out in much greater detail than the corresponding passage in De h011line. As a matter of prin ciple, it must be remarked that Dilthey never investigated whether the traditional theories which recur in Hobbes's writings are really integral elements of his political philosophy or whether they are not rather mere residues of a tradition which Hobbes had in the main rejected, but from which he could not always free himself and never completely cast off. Dilthey never asked himself this question because he did not take Hobbes's express and systematic opposition to the whole tradition-including the Stoa and Epicureanism-seriously enough. Had he compared the material of Hobbes's political philosophy with the material of traditional political philosophy -the investigation of sources which he began is the basis, but only the basis of such a comparison-he would have seen that the traditional theses and concepts take on an entirely untra ditional meaning in Hobbes's work.l To keep to the example already quoted-the Stoic conception of passion must be basi cally modified when it is taken over by a philosopher who I Gesammeile Schriflell, vol. ii. p. 452. Loc. cit., pp. 293 fT. 3 Completely independent of Dilthey, in one sense in opposition to him. J. Laird (Hobbes, London. 1934) has recently investigated the relation of Hobbes's political philosophy to tradition. He asserts that Hobbes, who introduces the new mechanistic doctrine into metaphysics, even though by means of medieval 'technique' . is completely medic\·al in his ethics and politics (p. 57). For Laird. the essential difference between Hobbes and his medieval forerunners accordingly lies in Hobbes's 'logical vigour Ilnd �uthlessncss' (p. 58) or in the proof of the traditional theories by the methods �nd principles of modern science (cf. p. 90 and p. 181). The same objection must be raised to this attempt as above to Dilthey's. 2 INTRODUCTION 5 systematically denies the possibility of beatitudo, and for whom the contrary of passion is no longer a state of repose. � If Ho.Qbes's _importance is_to be duly recognized and ugd�!".::.-' stO(;d, thene-cessary-conditionisth-ustnaT, tne- fundamental .. difference between the 'material' of Hobbes's--pofiiical philo ,sophy, i.e. the characteristic moral attitude which determines Hobbes's way of thinking, on the one hand, and the classical well as the Christian attitude on the other, should be grasped. , he m�ral attitude' wh�c�pderIL��<.?b�:�<?1i�iml_E.h.�O op -fT���P_t:9_. en�. of. tP,t; .fu).l.!l�a��on_ of.�9de!"E.. sci��_ce l!!!� iff l�s_�,_!E.._!J1ilt:'sense--'p!"e:sc�I}tifk'. _Itis 3,t the .same ti ru.e in�li13ed to s�y that it is the decpe�t §P.�G.i_fi_c:�lly_���erI.!;i'Q stratum of the modern minc;J.d( found its fulle�cereSt��i:?E��io� in Hobbes's pollticaI' philosophY' For, from the ':.�!y, �eginning, it has been covered over by c1assi�ar_--�d Christian tradition, but, .generally speaking, more co�p-!e.t�!y Fe{9�e ,Hobbes than after him, and after him particul��!y ,by meehanis�ic p�ychology, to \vhich H_���_<:.� ._hiqls�l.�o door, �!lg finallx by socio!£gy: Hobbe�however, philosophi�ed in the.fut;ile.mmnent when the claSsical and th�ologicaliiacrrt�on 'Y1I:�.�lr�ady 'shaken, ,and a tr'a4ition of moder.1! science not y�t 'futmea: and establisheUTffiiS"'iime he and he onIY.po _ sed the 'ftf�da��irtarqUeStWn- of ;nan\i-- ��gh"t'· ii'k �nd qf J.h�_. J:ight Ord� 'Of society. This moment was decisive for the whqle age 'to·come;init the foundation was laid, on whicl�.!he modern develo,lLnie?J...af nglitisal-;phiJ.Dsgp,hx is WnQJry-basc.d ...a!;lAi� i§ t.!;c:.J>_oi!lt from �y�ish every .I!-ttempt at a thQrQ�h.. und�r= s�!..xg:. . :.(his fou!!.dat�o�. 1 has s the . he structure which never agam heen v. Hobbes, led by the inspiration of that - �nt, began to raise, hid the foundatio as lo ng as the structure stood, i.e. as long as its stabilitv was believed in. _ ,. . n II THE MORAL BASIS OLITICAL philosophy, as that branch of knowledge which Pconsists of moral philosophy on the one hand, and politics in the narrower sense on the other,I was treated systematically and exhaustively by Hobbes three times 1 in the Elements of Law (1640), in the second and third p/rts of the Elementa philosophiae (Section II, De homine, x658; Section III, De cive, x64 2), and in the Leviathan (1651). IE- all three presentatio.!!s this political philosophy is based in method and material on natural science. The method is Galileo's 'resolutive-composi tive' method. The material is borrowed from the mechanistic explanation of the passions and pre�usly of sense-perception. It is therefore understandable that .�ost every one who has written about Hobbes has interpreted his political philosophy as dependent on natural science, for either mate�ial or method or for both. This interpretation, which at a first glance seems to be merely the recognition of an obvious f�ct, proves on closer examination to be extremely questionabl� The attempt to work out poiitical philosophy as a part or annexe of natural science by means of scientific method is constantly questioned in Hobbes's work, because he was aware of the fundamental differences between the two disciplines in material and method. On this awareness is based his convic tion that political philosophy is essentially independent of natural science� / He was therefore able to write and publish De cive, the third part of his system, many years before the two systematically earlier parts. In justification of the premature publication of this book, he expressly says in the preface ' . . . factum est ut quae ordine ultima (pars) esset, tempore tamen prior prodierit; praesertim cum earn principiis propriis expe rientiil cognitis innixam, praecedentibus indigere non viderem'.z ' De corpore, cap. I, art 9; De homine, Ep. ded. • It follows from the dedicatIOn to De homlne that what is said in the preface to De ave of pohtlcs In the narrower sense holds also for the other part of political ph!1osophy, moral ph!1osophy. 1 I .r THE MORAL BASIS ? (�olitical philosophy is independent of natural science because 'tr-s principles are not borrowed from natural science, are not, indeed, borrowed from any science, but are provided by experi ence, by the experience which every one has of himself, or, to put it more accurately, are discovered by the efforts of self knowledge and the self-examination of every one.1 As a result, evidence in political philosophS is of quite a different kind from evidence in natural scienc;,;:'" On the one hand, it is much easier to understand: its subject and its concepts are not so remote from the average man as are the subject and concepts of mathematics which form the basis of natural science.z On the other hand, 'the politiques are the harder study of the two' ; by reason of their passions, men obscure the, in itself, clear and simple knowledge ?i-.the norms which political philo sophy builds up. Moreover,:man with his passions and his self seeking is the particular subject of political philosophy, and n 0 poses' by every kind of hypocrisy the self-knowledge on w,h' the proof of these norms rests.�:: '\ ����ng to Hopbes, .political philosophy is not only i�de pendent of natural science, but it is a main component of hum�n knowledge, . of which the other main component is natural science. The whole body of knowledg71s divided into natural science o� the one hand, and political philosophy on the other.4 Every classifi" the existent;/Hobbes's classification of the sciences is based on a classification of existing things into natural and artificial.6 But this classification does not fully correspond to his inten-' tion, for most things which are produced by art, in par 'ticular all machines, are the subject of natural science) It is not so much the artificially produced things that are basically � ' I De corpore, cap. 6, art. 7 ; Leviathan, Introduction. De homine, Ep. ded. ; Leviatha1l, ch. 31 (p. 197) and Conclusion (p. 38s). 3 Leviathan, ch. 30 (pp. 180 and 187) and Introduction i Elements of Law, Ep. ded. i English Works, vol. vii, p. 399. 4 The immediate source for this classification may well be Marius Nizolius, De veris p,-incipiis et vera ratione plzilosophandi (Panna, ISS3), lib. 3 , capp · 3-4· 5 De cive, Ep. ded. 6 De corpore, cap. I, art. 9 i De homine, Ep. ded.; Leviathan, Introduction. 7 De corpore, cap. I , art. 7 i De cive, Ep. ded. i Leviathan, Introductior.ll and ch. 9. 2 THE MORAL BASIS 8 different from all natural things as the production, the human activity itself, i .e. man as an essentially productive being, especially as the being who by his art produces from his own nature the citizen or the State, who, by working on himself, makes himself into a citizen. In so far as man works on him self, influencing and changing his nature, so that he becomes a citizen, a part of that artificial being called the State, he is not a natural being : 'Homo ... non modo corpus naturale est, sed etiam civitatis, id est (ut ita loquar) corporis politici pars.'l 'lVlanners of men' are something different from 'natural causes'.1The basic classification of existing things which in truth under lies Hobbes's classification of the sciences is classification under nature on the one side, and under man as productive and active being on the other.3 The question whether Hobbes understood political philo sophy as a part or annexe of natural science or as a fully inde pendent branch of knowledge, in other words (whether his ' political philosophy is intended to be naturalistiC-or anthro pological,. thus bears not only on the method but above all on the matte The significance of the antithesis between natural istic and anthropological political philosophy for the matter becomes fully apparent if one grasps that this antithesis is only the abstract form of a concrete antithesis in the interpretation of and judgement on human nature which extends throughout the whole of Hobbes's work. Hobbes eliminated the latter cpntradiction as little as the former. \[Iobb� §..§ummed!:lI? his th�9n:_�[!?�1! !.!�ure as..i t under lies his political philosophy in �ttatn postulates of hum�ature'. The firsFI)Ostufate.is'that oT'niltural appetite .,:quaquisqi:ie rerum communium usum postulat sibi p roprium'.4 As a result of the scientific explanation, this appetite is taken as havi� its roots in man's sensuousnes� in his animal nature'. Man is an iiiimal like all other animals, a� �Cpercipienfbeing cO!l�.!antly exposed to ma!lifQld i�p-re_s_���s which automatic ally call forth desires and aversions, so that his life;'-1ilrethat of r) ). -" - De homille, Ep. ded. 2 Euglish Works, \"01. i\', p. 445; cf. Leviatha7l, ch. 37 (p. 238). 3 Elcl1lC1!ls of Late.', Ep. ded. ; Levial/za7I, ch. 9; De corpore, cap. I, art. 9 j De rive, Ep. ded. • De cit'e, Ep. ded. THE MORAL BASIS 9 aIr other animals, is constant l!l0v_�'!!�!!.t. There is, however, %ne important difference : the- specific difference b�tw.een-1Dan_ and all other animals)s reason. Thus man is much less at the c... - - th<:. mercy of !!!omenta!:y sensc.::impr�ions, he can envisage future much better than can animals ; for-this very re�son he is not like animals }!Ungry onlY::"ith-ihe hunger of the �o���t-,. but also with future h�nger, and thUlth� is th.f! most predatorY... the p.l.Qst cun�ng, the strongest, and !!l_os.�_�an�_er��� 3.!JlmaV. H!;!man appetIte is thus not 10 itself different from animal appc. tite, but only by th " act that in the case of man appetite has reason at its service. ,This view of human appetit��l;:JLat first sight seems to e t�� spe��fi�ally Hobbian vie\� is, how e.ve�, contra�i�!!!d i!1 Ho�iLes.'s writin� by his repeate� !!ond emphatic stat�m.ent that hU!!l�D, ap'p!!tite is...infi.Il:it� i!!.jts�li,illld nO't as if result offli"� -infi.J�he numbeU1L�xternal i!!!p-r�sions.2 , �uT'i(1b1UitI£� �. J.l�e.0..hen"'iluITl:iiii �ppet�e. is 'ess'entially 'dis-� tinguished from animal appetite in that the latter is nothing but reaction to external impressions, and, therefore, the animal · desires only finite objects as such, while man sgontaneously desires infinitely. There can be no dou'l5t that only this latt�r vi"eW"of Iiumani.pp�!ite corresponds to the intention of Hobbes's political philosophy o_c_o_ nceptions of human appetite differ not only in \The ��_ :;-" substance as mechanis·ticana vItalistic -conceptions: They <!!.ffer als�The mechanistic-coiicij?tloniS"-6-ased on the meChaIiTstfC- explanation of perception a�d thcre\\;lth on the general theory of motlQ!!.j on tlie-Ofli�-FianQ�.jb�_-�pp!!�ently vitalistic conce tion is based not O!L.l!ny general scientific theo , ut on insight into human nature, deepened and sub �tantiatedlJySelf-knowledge anaserf-exa��ationi In_ sPi�of me.thods.--.the�:!LCct�!CeptioIlLor their opp�({ matter anL human appetite have, however-below the surface-something � - - --- i �J - , De homine. cap. 1 0 , art. 3 . 2 Elements of Law, Pt. I , ch. 7. § 7 ; Leriathmr, ch. I I (p. 49) ; De /romine, cap. I I , art. I S . In all three passages Hobbes bases the proposition that life is limitless appetite mechanistically on the assumption that appetite is only an automatic consequence of perception, but also on the incompatible assumption that appetite is essentially spontaneous. On closer investigation it is seen that the mechanistic argument is not sufficient proof of the propo sition, and that therefore the proposition itself cannot possibly owe the sel't evidence, which it has for Hobbes, to the mechanistic argument. - ._---_._-------- 10 BASIS in common, which allows us to characterize both of them as naturalistic. T�rest and m��t.perfect e�pression for the naturalistic co�ep!i_?_n:-of human appetite is the proposition thatman desires power and ever greater po�er, spontaneously and <:01}": tlnuously, in one jet of appetite, ana not by reason of a sum mation of innumerable isolated desires 'caused by innumerable isoTitfed perceptions : ' . . . in the first place, I put for a generall inClination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of power after power, that ceaseth only . in Death.'I 1\�s ndamentapy equi appareutly perfectly clear pro ositi vocal, f�!-.!!£1ioun ess stnvlI�g �fter powe.£}s itself equivocal. Hobbes continues : 'And the_cause of this, is not ruwaye.s that a maIl ho.E:.s for a mor� intensiy�-=9.jH�!l. than h�_has already attained to ;-or that he cannot be contcnLwith - iIllOaerate power : �.�JjJ_e.cause he�nnot aSsuie--the�p.9we�;�e .!!!eans to live well!, �yhich....he._ha!h present, without the acquisition of more.' The JrriWng-..after...p. ower. !!!�y thusberatwnaI as-well as--u:ratio�TIn.ly lhe irrati.QnaI...s.�rivlrigafter power, which is founq_'!!!QE�Jreq�ently than the rational striving; is to be taken as n.!llI_tl!J hurp.an appetite. For the rational sttiving after power rests on already rational reflection and is for that very -reason . not natural, i.e. not innate, not in existence prior to all external motivations, to all experience and education.2. The only natural striving after power, and thus man's natural appetite, is de scribed by Hobbes as follows: 'men from their very birth, and naturally, scramble for everything they covet, and would have all the world, if they could, to fear and obey them.'3 It depends on impressions from without and thus on perception that the child 'desires' that particular thing which he sees and not another thing, of whose existence he knows nothing ; but that he 'would have all the world . . . to fear and obey (him) ,-that, on the occasion of a particular desire which was awakened and caused by sense-perception, he 'desires' absolute rule over the whole world-cannot originate in the impression of things perTIlE MORAL __ J • ch. I I (p. 49). For Hobbes's concept of 'natural', see especially De cive, cap. I, art. Leviathan, Uhnot. I . . 3 Er'glish Works, vol. vii, p. 73 . 2, THE MORAL BASIS ceived, for animals who also perceive and desire do not aspire to absolute dominion. In the case of man, animal desire is taken up and transformed by a spontaneous infinite and abso lute desire which arises out of the depths of man himself. We find a more detailed definition of the irrational striving after power, the natural appetite of man as man, in the following differentiation between irrational and therefore unpermissible striving after power, and rational and therefore permissible striving : 'because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires ; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him . ' l We here clearly see that rational permissible striving after power is in itself finite. The man guided by it would remain \vithin modest bounds', Would' 'be content with a moderate power'. Unly-· the .unpermissible, irrational, lustful strivir;g after �power is infinite. Now irrational striving after power, man's natural appetite , has its basis in the pleasure which man takes in the consideration of his own power, i .e. in vanity. The origin of man's natural appetite is, therefore, not perception but van\'!y . .. .. . . . . . . . . ' . '. . "". (In four different arguments, Hobbes does not tire of desig n ating the characteristic difference between man: and animal as the striving aft'er honour and positions of' honour, after precedence over others and recognition of this precedence by others, ambition, pride, and the passion for fame.2. Because man's natural appetite is nothing other than a striving after precedence over others and recognition"Of this precedence by others, the particularities of natural appetite, the passions, are nothing other than particular ways of striving after precedence and recognition : 'all joy and grief of mind (consists) in a .. . -.- I , ..". .- - - , ... . _, - .. Leviathan. ch. 1 3 (p. 64)' Elements of Law, Pt. I, ch. 19. § 5 ; De cive. cap. s. art. 5 ; Leviatiza", ch. 17 (pp. 88-9). 2 12 THE MORAL BASIS contention f�r precedence to them with whom they compare themselves.:� i And as 'to have stronger, and more violent Passions for 'anything, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call Madnesse', madness must show with particular clearness the nature of the passions. Speaking of the cause of madness, Hobbes says : 'The Passion, whose .violence, or con tinuance maketh Madnesse, is either great vaine-glory ; which is commonly called Pride, and selfe-conceipt ; or great Dejection of mind.'2 All passions and all forms of madness are modifications of conceit or of a sense of inferiority, or in principle, of the striving after precedence and recognition of that precedence. According to Hobbes's view, the motive of this striving is man's wish to take pleasure in himself by considering his own superiority, his OWl1 recognized superiority, i.e. vanity.3 The same conclusion is reached if one analyses and compares the arguments by which tHobbe� in the three presentations of his political philosophy\ proves his assertion that the war of every one against every ohe arises of necessity from man's very nature /Every man is for that very reason the enemy of every other man, because each d�res to surpass every other and thereby offends every other. } The astonishing discrepancies between the three presentatio J s, the still more astonishing ob scurities, even the logical defects of the individual presentations show that Hobbes himself never completed the proofs of his fundamental assertion, and, as is seen on closer study, did not complete them simply because he could not make up his mind explicitly to take as his point of departure the reduction of man's natural appetite to vanity. We cannot here produce the proofs for this assertion.4 Instead we would remind the reader of one fact, which, although it is so obvious, has, so far as we know, always been overlooked-the reason which caused Hobbes to call his most detailed exposition of political philosophy the I Elements of Law, Pt. I I , ch. 8, § 3 ; cf. Elements, Pt. I , ch. 8, § 8, and ch. 9 ; also De cive, cap. I , art. 2. 3 Leviathatl, ch. 8 (p. 36) ; cE. Elements, Pt. I, ch. 10, §§ 9-1 1 . 3 'Gloria . . . sive bene opinari d e se ipso . . . ' De cive, cap. I , art. 2 ; cf. Elements, Pt. I , ch. 9 , § I ; De cive, cap. 4 , art. 9 ; De homine, cap. 12, art. 6. Cf. pp. 133 and 135, notc I , below. I" The author hopes to prescnt these proofs in the near future within the framework of an exposition of Hobbes's political philosophy. 13 THE MORAL BASIS Leviathan. At the end of the most important part of this work, he says : 'Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride andl other passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Govern ment ;) together with the great Power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the last two verses of the one and fortieth of Job ; where God h aving set forth the great power of Leviathan, called him ing of the .....J. � !,'O'!,.d." It is not mighty power as such which is the tertium compara tiollis between Leviathan and the State, but the mighty power which subdues the proud."'The State is compared to Leviathan, because it and it especially 1S11i.e-- �King of all the children-of pOi-ide':--Only the ·State is capable of keeping pride down in the longfun, indeed it has no other raison d'h/"e except that man's natural appetite is pride, ambition, and vanity. It is with this thought in mind that Hobbes says of his book Leviathan that it is 'Justitiae mensura, atquc ambition is elenchus'.:? • Why could Hobbes not make up his mind to treat the view which is in reality conclusive for him, that man's natural appetite is vanity, unequivocally as the basis of his political philosophy ? If this conception of natural appetite is right, if man by nature finds his pleasure in triumphing over all others, then man is by nature evil. But he did not dare to uphold this consequence or assumption of his theory . For this reason, in the enumera tion of the causes which lead to the war of every man against every man, in the final presentation (in the Leviathall) he puts vanity at the end.3• That it was the above-mentioned reason4 which determined Hobbes may be seen from a passage in the preface to De cl-ve. The objection had been raised that, accord ing to Hobbes's theory, man is by nature evil. He replies : 'Quamquam . . . a natura, hoc est, ab ipsa nativitate, ex eo quod nascantur, allimalia hoc habeant, ut statim omnia quae sibi placent, cupiant faciantquc quantum possunt, ut quae impendent mala, aut metu fugiant, aut ira repeHant, non tamen ob earn causam mala 3 Compare the (pp. 63-4) on the cap. • -- • Opera [aliI/a, \"01. i, p. xciv. different order of the argument in Le'l.'ialhan, ch. 1 3 one hand, in E.'e11le1lls, Pt. I , c h . 14, §§ 3-5 and De cive, I Levialha7l, ch. 28, ill fil/e. . I , art. 4-6 on the other. Cf. p. 169, note 2, below. Cf. p. 33, I. 23. • THE MORAL BASIS censeri solent : nam affectus animi qui a natura aTlimali proficis cuntur, mali non sunt ipsi, sed actiones inde provenientes . . . con fitendum est, posse homines a natura cupiditatem, caeterosque affectus habere anima/es, ut tamen mali metum, iram, facti a natura non sint . ' mecause man is by nature animal, therefore he is not by nature �il, therefore he is as innocent as the animals j thus vanity cannot characterize his natural app�tite. It is indicative that Hobbes in -ibis, defence against the re proach that ac�ording to his theory man is by nature evil does not mention vanity at all. Natural vanity �isappears in the caeteros affectus.1 It must vanish into them, it must be hidden by them, if man'� natural innocence is to be asserted, if human wickedness'� to be under 1 stood as the innocent 'wickedness' of the brutes.:1In""Iaying the foundations of his political philosophy, Hobbes puts vanity " more and more into the background in favour of innocent com petition, innocent striving after power, innocent animal appe- tite, because the definition of man's naty �l appetite in terfl.1s of vanity is intended as a moral judgemenY, But he is no better able than any other to make us forget that man does not happen to be an innocent animal. Not only is he finally obliged to attribute to the judges the wickedness which he disallows in the case of the guilty, the criminals jZ he betrays particularly ' I With consistent naturalism Hobbes tries to derive vanity from animal nature (cf. Element,(, Pt. I, ch. 8, §§ 3-5 and Leviathan, ch. 10). Thus he can conclude the description of the social pleasures, which according to his presentation, are nothing other than the pleasures of vanity, with the following words : 'Atque hae verse sunt deliciae societatis, ad quas natura, id est, ab affectibus omni animanti insitis ferimur . . .' (De ci'lJe, cap. I, art. 2). The precise comparison of animal and human nature, according to which vanity is never present in animals, contradicts this indication of the animal character of vanity ; cf. De ci'lJe, cap. 5 , art. 5 , and the parallel passages in the Elements and the Leviathall. • ' . . . it seems the Bishop takes blame, not for the dispraise of a thing, but for a pretext and colour of malice and revenge against him he blameth . . . we do as much blame (fire for burning cities and poison for destroying men) as we do men. For we say fire hath done hurt, and the poison hath killed a man, as well as we say that the man hath done unjustly ; but we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of poison, because we cannot make them to ask forgiveness, as we would make men to do when they hurt us. So that the blaming of the one and the other, that is, the declaring of hurt ·.:vil action done by them, is the same in both ; but the malice of man is only against man.' English W�T�S. vol. v, pp. 53-4. That desire for revenge BASIS IS in his description of the striving after power itself, that the innocence, neutrality, and moral indifference of that striving is only apparent. The striving after power, as human striving after power, is always either good and permissible or evil and unpermissible. The apparent moral indifference arises simply and solely through abstraction of the necessary moral differ ence, which Hobbes himself immediately stresses. !Hobbes'S political philosophy rests not on the illusion of aif--amora1 niorality;· but on a Ile,!, moral.i_t.Yz.... or, to speak according to Hobbes'� intention, on a new grounding of the one eternal m.orality. t:::rhe second of the 'two most certain postulates of human nature' which Hobbes takes as basis of his political philosophy, along with the 'postulate of natural appetite', is 'the postulate qf. natural rea�o�.' 'qua quisque mortem . violentam tanquam summum naturae malum studet evitare'.! In accordance with naturalistic reasoning this postulate is reduced to the principle of self-preservation : since the preservation of life is the con dition sine qua lIOn for the satisfaction of any appetite, it is 'the primary good'. I�As a logical conclusion of this thought, Hobbes attempts to delluce natural right, natural law, and all the virtues-the four Plalonic cardinal virtues-from the principle of self-preservation.� ) v It is st!iking�that Hobbes prefers the �egative expression 'avoiding death' to the positive expression 'preserving life'. It is not difficult to discover the reason. That prJiServation 'of life is the primary good is affirmed by reasen and by reason only. On the other hand, that death is the primary evil is affirmed by passion, the passion of fear of death. And as reason itself is powerless, man would not be minded to think of the preserva tion of life as the primary and most urgent good, if the passion of fear of death did not compel him to do SO.3, A further reason, which is closely connected with the one _aJready men tioned, recommends the negative expression. �cording to Hobbes, the preservation of life is the primary good, an THE MORAL ) } • / arises from vanity is said by Hobbes in Elements, Pt. I, ch. 16, § 10, and ch. 9, § 6. I De homine, cap. I X , art. 6. 2 See particularly De cive, cap. 3 , art. 32. 3 Cf. Elements, Pt. I, ch. 14, § 6 with the Ep. ded. to this work. 16 THE MORAL BASIS unhindered progress to ever further goals, a 'continuall prosper..mg'-in a word, happiness is the g1'eatest good, but there is no supreme good, in the sense o (� good in the enjoyment of which the spirit might find repose!...l 0 n the other hand, death is the prima1J1 as well as the greatest and supreme evitz For death is not only the negation of the primary good, but is therewith the negation of all goods, including the greatest good ; and at the same time, death-being the summum malum, while there is ' no summllm bonum-is the only absolute standard by reference to which man may coherently order his life. While in the order of goods there is no real limit, and while, in addition, the' primary and the greatest good are completely different, the primary and greatest and supreme evil are one and the same, and it is thus only in consideration of evil that a limit to desiring, a coherent orientation of human life, is possible. Only through death has man an aim, because only through death has he one compelling aim-the aim which is forced upon him by the sight of death-the aim of avoiding death. For this reason Hobbes prefers the negative expression 'avoiding death' to the positive expression 'preserving life' : because we feel death and not life ; because we fear death immediately and directly, while we desire life only because rational reflection (tells us that it is the condition of our happiness ; because we tear death infinitely more than we desire life. But Hobbes cannot after all acquiesce in the assertion that death is the primary and greatest and supreme evil. For he knows that a miserable tortured life can be a greater evil than death. Thus it is not death in- itself which is the greatest and supreme evil, but an agonizing death or, what seems at first to mean the same thing, a violent death.3 But if Hobbes had really considered an agonizing death as the supreme and greatest evil, he would have attributed an even greater importance to medicine than did Descartes· or Spinoza.s This is so little the , De homine, cap. 1 1 , art. I S ; Elements, Pt. I, ch. 7, § 7 ; Leviathan, ch. 6 (p. 30) and I I in prine. De homitre, cap. I I , art. 6 ; De cive, Ep. ded. and cap. I , art. ,. 3 De homilre, ca p . I I , art. 6 ; cf. Elements, Pt. I, ch. 14, § 6: De cive, Ep. ded. ; ibid . , cap. 3, art. I2 and cap. 6, art. 1 3 . • Discollrs de la methode, in fine. , TI"actatlls de intellectus elllendatione, ed. Bruder, § I S. 2 THE MOR.'\L BASIS case that he actually forgets medicine : 'Calamitates autem omnes, quae humana industria evitari possunt a bello oriuntur, praecipue vero a bello civili ; hinc enim caedes, solitudo, in opiaque rerum omnium derivatur.'I Not an agonizing death in itself, but a violent death which threatens a man at the hand of other men, is the only one which Hobbes considers worthy of mention. When he says of an agonizing death that it is the greatest evil, he thinks exclusively of violent death at the hand of other men. The 'postulate of natural reason' expresses this thought in the formula '(unusquisque) mortem violentam tan �quam summum naturae malum studet evitare·. I' �tJb� rational and th!,!refore alway� uncertain2 knowledge : taat;death is the greatest and supreme evtl, but the fear of death, i.e. -�motional and inevitable, and therefore necessary and certain, aversion from death is the origin of law and the State.J This fear is a mutual fear, i.e. it is the fear each man has of every other man as his potential murderer.4 This fear of a violent death, pre-rational in its origin, but rational in its effect, and not the rational principle of self-preservation, is, according _ I De corpore, cap. I , art. 7. It must further be pointed out that in almost all the passages in which Hobbes treats of the utility of natural science, he does not mention medicine at all. Compare the following passages : Elements, Pt. I, ch. 1 3 , § 3 ; De ci'Ve, Ep. ded. and cap. 17, art. 1 2 ; Leviathan, ch. 1 3 �pp. 64-5) and ch. 46 i n prine. ; De corpore, cap. I , art. 7 . • Speaking o f the laws o f nature, Hobbes says : '(the dictates o f reason) are but theorems, tending to peace, and those uncertain, as being but con clusions of particular men, and therefore not properly laws.' E"glish Works, vol. iv, p. 285. Cf. De cif-'c, cap. 2, art. I , annot., and Leviathan, ch. 26 (p. 141). 3 'Fertur enim unusquisque ad appetitum ejus quod sibi bonum, et ad fugam ejus quod sibi malum est, maxime autem maximi malorum naturalium, quae est mors ; idque necessitate quadam naturae non minore, quam qua fertur lapis deorsum. Non igitur absurdum neque reprchendendum, neque contra rectam rationem est, si quis omnem operam det, ut a morte et doloribus proprium corpus et membra defendat conservetque . . . . Itaque Juris naturalis fundamentum primum est, ut quisque vitam et membra sua quantum potest tueatur.' De cif-'e, cap. I, art. 7. That necessitas is not here to be understood in the naturalistic-determinist sense is shown by parallel passages, such as the following : 'You that make it so heinous a crime for a man to save himself from violent death, by alorced submission to a usurper, should have considered what crime it was to submit voluntarily to the usurping Parliament . . . he (Hobbes) justified their submission by their former obedience, and present ne.::essity . . .' English Works, vol . iv, pp.. � � 4 De cive, cap. I, art. 2-3 . THE MORAL BASIS ' Hobbes, the root of all right and therewith of all morality. " He drew all his logical conclusions from this : he finally denie;'if the moral value of all virtues which do not contribute to the making of the State, to consolidating peace, to protecting man against the danger of violent death, or, more exactly ex pressed, of all virtues which do not proceed from fear of violent death : ' Sunt enim tum fortitudo, tum prudentia, vis animi potius quam bonitas morom ; et temperantia privatio potius vitiorum quae oriuntur ab ingeniis cupidis . . . quam virtus ��ralis.'I he antithesis from which Hobbes's political philosophy starts is thus the antithesis between vanjty as the root of natural appetite on the one hand, and on the other, fear of violent death as the passion which brings man to reason More accu rately expressed : because Hobbes reduces man's natural appe tite to vanity, he cannot but recognize the fear Of a violent death-not the fear of a painful death, and certainly not the striving after self-preservation-as the principle of morality. For if man's natural appetite is vanity, this means that man by nature strives to surpass all his fellows and to have his superiority recognized by all others, in order that he may take pleasure in himself; that he naturally wishes the whole world to fear and obey him. The ever-greater triumph over others this, and not the ever-increasing, but rationally increasing, power-is the aim and happiness of natural man : 'Continually to out-go the next before, is felicity.' Man's life may be com pared to a race : 'but this race we must suppose to have no other goal, nor other garland, but being foremost.'z Absorbed in the race after the happiness of triumph, man cannot be 18 I ._ ...10 Q:' ) I De lromine, cap. 1 3 , art. 9. In De cive, cap. 3, art. 32., Hobbes had still recognized the Platonic cardinal virtues ; in the Leviathan, ch. IS (po 81), he mentions only temperance besides justice. It must further be pointed out that in the Leviathan, ch. 6 (p. 2.6), courage is characterized as a passion, and that as early as the Elements (Pt. I, ch. 1 7, § 14) a clear distinction is drawn between justice, equity, gratitude, temperance, prudence, which 8re always virtues, on the one hand, and on the other, courage, liberality, &c., which can be virtues, but also vices. See also pp. 50 and 1 I3-15 below. Cf. Voltaire, Dictionnaire philosophique, art. 'Vertu' and 'Fausset� des vertus humaines,' and Kant, Fundamental Principles oj the Metaphysic oj Morals. first section (the paragraphs at the beginning). • Elements, Pt. I, ch. 9. § 2. 1 . THE MORAL BASIS 19 aware of his dependence on the insignificant primary good, the preservation of life and limb ; failing to recognize his bodily needs, man experiences only joys and sorrows of the mind, i.e. imaginary joys and sorrows. While it is in accordance with reason 'si quis omnem operam det, ut a morte et doloribus proprium corpus et membra defendat conservetque', it is of the r essence of natural, irrational appetite that 'omnis animi voluptas omnisque alacrit!!S in eo sita est . . . quod quis habeat, quibus cum conferens se possit magnifice sentire de'se ipso'. 1 Living in the world of his imagination, he need do nothing, in order to convince himself of his superiority to others, but simply think out his deeds for himself; in this world, in which indeed 'the whole world obeys him', everything is accomplished according to his wishes.z He can awaken from this dream-world and come to himself only when he feels in his own person-by I bodily hurt-the resistance of the real world. By damllorum ex- j perientia3 man becomes reasonable. But if experience of injury is to show him not only the limit of his physical powers, about which he does not greatly care, but the limit of his insight and intelligence-and he is primarily concerned with the "superiority of his intelIigence4-the injury must be unforeseen. Men have no other means to acknowledge their own Darknesse, but onely by reasoning from the unforeseen mischances, that befall them in their ways.'s This self-knowledge is especially brought about by the unforeseen perception of the greatest and supreme evil, death. Because man by nature lives in the dream of the happiness of triumph, of a glittering, imposing, apparent , good, he requires a no less imposing power to awaken him I from his dream : this imposing power is the imperious majesty of death. The ideal condition for self-knowledge is, therefore, un(o!e ���rtal �an.[er. Why and how does the natural vain man I De rive, cap. I, art. 5 and 7. Cf. also ibid., cap. I , art. 2, as well as the antithesis of 'corporeall hurt' and 'phantasticall hurt' (the latter=morti fied vanity) in the Leviathan, ch. 27 (p. 159). 2 Compare the description of vain-glory in Elementl, Pt. I, ch. 9, § I , and Leviathan, ch. 6 (p. 27). 3 De rive, Praefatio. 4 In ibid., cap. I, art. 5, vanity is bluntly characterized as 'Comparatio ingeniorum'. Cf. also Leviathan, ch. 1 3 (p. 63). • 5 Leviathan, ch. 44 (p. 331 ). 20 THE l\IORAL BASIS gain this experit!Ilce ? Only by the answer to this question does 'one grasp the real reason which caused Hobbes to recognize �he origin�f morality not i!l the fear of death itself but in the .fear of violent deatll:"":fhe vain man, who, in his imagination� believes himself superior to others, cannot convince himself of the rightness of his estimate of himself ; he requires the recog nition of his superiority by others. He therefore steps outside his imaginary world. He makes his claim to superiority and to recognition of his superiority : 'omnia licere sibi soli vult, et prae caeteris honorem sibi arrogat.' Now, either the others take his claim seriously and feel themselves slighted, or they do not take his claim seriously and he feels himself slighted. In either case, the making of the claim leads to contempt. But to be slighted is the greatest allimi nzolestia, and from the feeling of being slighted arises the greatest will to injure. I The one slighted longs for revenge. ;lIn order to avenge himself he attacks the other, indifferent whether he loses his life in so doing.2 Unconcerned as to the preservation of his own life, he desires, however, above all that the other should remain alive ; for 'revenge aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity and subjection of an enemy . . . revenge aimeth at triumph, which over the dead is not'. 3 The struggle which thus breaks out, in which, according to the opiiiion of both opponents, the object is not the killing but the subjection of the other, of necessity becomes serious, because it is a struggle between bodies, a real struggle. From the beginning of the conflict the two opponents have, without realizing and foreseeing it, completely left the imaginary world. At some point in the conflict, actual injury, or, more accurately, physical pain, arouses a fear for life. Fear moderates anger, puts the sense of being slighted into the background,4 and transforms the desire for revenge into hatred. The aim of the hater is no longer triumph over the enemy, but I De cive, cap. I, art. 4-5 ; Leviathan, ch. I J (p. 64). Cf. also Opera latilla, vo!' iv, p. 195. all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and contempt, 2 ' provoke in the highest degree to quarrel and battle (inasmuch as life itself, with the condition of enduring scorn, is not esteemed worth the enjoying . . . )' . Elelllellls, Pt. I , eh. 1 6, § I I . Cf. De cive, cap. J , art. 12. J Eleme1lts, Pt. I, eh. 9, § 6. • ' Ira . . . oritur quidem saepissime ab opinione contemptus . . . Iram . . . metus temperat.' De homil/e, cap. 12, art. 4 . • • • 21 THE MORAL BASIS his death. 1 The struggle for pre-eminence, about 'trifles', has become a life-and-death struggle. In this way natural man happens unforeseen upon the danger of death ; in this way h e comes t o know this primary and, greatest and supreme evil for the first time, to recognize death as the greatest and supreme evil in the moment of being irresistibly driven to fall back before death in order to struggle for his life. Only for a moment can he free himself from the danger of death by killing his enemy, for since every man is his. enemy, after the killing of the first enemy he is 'again in the like danger of another',Z indeed of all others. The killing of the enemy is thus the least far-sighted consequence of the withdrawal from death. 'In order to safeguard his life, not only for the moment, but in the long run, man needs companions, with whose help he C�l�, ,s1:ls:��ssfully defend rus life agamst-tEe ·others. panIons can be'giined in two ways, by force or by agreement,3 The fi'-rst' 'way is less far-sighted than the second ; it stands as it were midway between the killing of the enemy and agreement with him ; but for that very reason it is more 'natural', more congenial to natural man than the second. Fear for his life, which came upon the man in his struggle for triumph, moderates, even kills, the will to triumph, and makes him ready to submit, to leave triumph to the enemy, in order that he may save his own life. But then his enemy, who has reached his goal, the safeguarding of the recognition of his superiority, of his honour, cannot, for honour's sake, take his life ; for 'nothing but fear can justify the taking away of another's life. And because fear can hardly be made mani fest, but by some action dishonourable, that betrayeth the conscience of one's own weakness ; all men in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity have been predominated, have ab stained from cruelty . . . . In one word, therefore, the only law of actions in war is honour. '4 Thus arises the relationship of master and servant. The victor who has safeguarded his honour "(::o� -l .- - , --_.- 'To kill is the aim of them that hate, to rid themselves of fear.' Elements, Pt. I, ch. 9, § 6 . a Leviathan, ch. 13 (p. 63). 3 De cifJe, cap. 1 , art. 13-14 . .. Elements, Pt. I, ch. 19, § 2. Cf. De cifJe, cap. 5, art. 2, and Lef.';ath� ch. 17 (p. 87)· 22 THE MORAL BASIS becomes the master. The vanquished, who 'submitteth . . . f.pr fear of death', who admits his weakness and with that has forfeited his honour, becomes the servant. 1 The dominion o the master over the servant-despotic rule-is one form of the natural State ;Z and as the other form of the natural State, patriarchy, is construed by Hobbes entirely according to the pattern of despotic rule, we may even say : despotic rule is the natural State. - The artificial State, which is as such more perfect, arises when the two opponents are both seized with fear for their lives,3 overcome their vanity and shame of confessing their fear, and recognize as their real enemy not the rival, but 'that terrible enemy of nature, death' ,4 who, as their common enemy, forces them to mutual understanding, trust, and union, and thus procures them the possibility of completing the founding of the State for the purpose of providing safeguards for the longest possible term, against the common enemy. And while in the unforeseen life-and-death struggle, in which vanity comes to grief, the futility of vanity is shown, it is revealed in the concord of living, and of living in common, to which their pre rational fear of death leads them, that the fear of death is appropriate to human conditions, and that it is 'rational'. It is even shown that it is only on the basis of fear of death that life comes to concord and that the fear of death is the only 'postulate of natural reason'. A close connexion thus exists between the two 'postulates of human nature', on which Hobbes bases his political philosophy. : Vanity left to itself of necessity leads to mortal comb!t, and i since 'every man looketh that his companlonshouid value him , r . ._----- -- - - r.) , at the same rate he sets upon himselfe',5 the vanity of each of , necessity leads to the 'warre of every one against every one'. • And as man by nature lives first in the world of his imagination I Elements, Pt. II, ch. 3, § 2 ; De cive, cap. 8, art. I ; Leviathan, ch. 20 (p. 106). 2 Elements, Pt. I, ch. 19, § II ; De cive, cap. 5, art. 1 2 ; Leviathan, ch. 17, in fine. 3 men who choose their Soveraign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute.' Leviathan, ch. 20, in prine. 4 Elements, Pt. I, ch 14, § 6. • Leviathan, ch. 1 3 (p. 64). , • • • • THE MORAL BASIS 23 , and then in the opinion of others, he can originally experience the real world only by feeling it, all unforeseen, in a conflict �with others j he comes to know death, the primary and greatest and supreme evil, the only and absolute standard of human life, the beginning of all knowledge of the real world, origin/!lly only as violent death. If, by his reduction of natural human appetite to vanity, Hobbes attributes guilt to man, then the affirmation of the fear of death (which is opposed to vanity) must also have moral significance. That is, Hobbes must have systematically differen tiated between the fear of death, as the origin of all law and all morality, and all amoral or immoral motives. His contention that the State originates only in mutual fear and can only so orig!nate has thus moral, not merely technical, significance. lIobbes distinguishes no less precisely than any other moralist betWe;;n legality ·and�orality.'Not the legality of the action, 6uf'tlie--morality-ortlie purpose, makes the just man. That man is just who fulfils the law because it is law and not for fear of punishment or for the sake of reputation. I . Although Hobbes states that those are 'too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the First motions of the mind, (though checked with the fear of God) be Sinnes', he yet 'confesses' that 'it is safer to erre on that hand, than on the other'.:Z . In believing that the moral attitude, conscience, intention , is of more importance than the action, Hobbes is at one with Kant as with the Christian tradition.3 He differs from this tradition at first sight only by his denial of the possibility that just and unjust actions may be distinguished independently of human legislation. In the state of nature the distinction between just ' and unjust actions depends wholly on the judgement of the individual conscience. In the state of nature every action is in principle permitted whicn the conscience of the individual recognizes as necessary for self-preservation, and every action is in principle forbidden which according to the judgement of the individual conscience does not serve the purpose of selfI Elements, Pt. I , ch. 16, § 4 ; De cive, cap. 3, art. 5, and cap. 14, art. 18 . Leviathan, ch. IS (pp. 77 and 8z). � Leviathan, ch. z7, in prine. 3 See particularly De cive, cap. 4, art. Z I , and Leviathan, ch. 44 (p. 3481. � � THE MORAL BASIS preservation. ow, in tiI!! stat!! of nature every action can be judged to .De necessary for self-preservation. If, then, in the state of nature, any and every action is permitted, even in the state of nature not every intention is permitted, but only the iJ'tention of self-preservation. Thus the unequivocal dis tinction between just and unjust intentions holds even for the st;tte of nature and is, therefore, absolute. I ' '. : Hobbes might have left it at that, if there were a natural law hich obliged man unconditionally, and therefore obliged him even in the state of nature. But he expressly denies the existence of such a law These dictates of Reason (sc. the laws of nature), men use to ca by the name of Lawes ; but improperly : for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves ; whereas Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others.'� Law is obligation�I But obligation comes only on the basis of a covenant between formerly free and unbound men. Thus 'where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing . . . . But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is unjust : And the definition of Injustice, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant.'4 Originally the just attitude cannot be anything but earnest striving to keep one's given word ; the justice of this striving cannot, however, consist_of respect for the law as such, of obedience to the law as such, because there is no law in the true sense of the word. The just attitude is therefore so far from being obedience that it is, on the contrary, nothing else but proud self-reliance� 'That which gives to human Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallant nesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise.' ' . . . there are in mans nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen (the force of words). And those are either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their word ; or a Glory, � :J' I It is true that in the Leviathan, ch. 14 (p. 6S), Hobbes says in passing that in the state of nature 'nothi"g can be unjust', but he means by this 'no action can be unjust'. See Le·t'iathan, ch. IS, in princ. Compare particularly the passages indicated in note I, p. 23. • Ibid., ch. I S, in fine. Cf. further note 2, p. 17, and note I , p. 69 . 4 Ibid., ch. IS, in princ. . 3 Ibid., ch. 14 (p. 67). THE MORAL BASIS 2S or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it. '1 That this cannot be Hobbes's final word is already proved by the use of (the word 'pride'. As we have seen, the very title of the book Leviathan, in which the two passages just quoted occur, ex presses the opinion that pride, far from being the origin of the just attitude, is rather the only origin of the unjust attitude.2. The reduction of the jus.t intention to pride is a deviation from -' ' Hobbes's key-thought. Not pride, and still less obedience, but fear of violent death , is according to him the origin of the just intention. \Vhat man does from fear of death, in the conscious ness of his weakness at the hands of other men, when he honestly confesses to himself and to others his weakness and his fear of death , unconcerned about his hOllour, this alone is fundamentally just : 'Breviter, in statu naturae, Justum et In justum non ex actionibus, sed ex consilio et cOllscien(ia agentium aestimandum est. Quod necessario, quod studio pacis, quod sui conservandi causa fit, recte fit.'J Self-preservation and the striving after peace for the sake of self-preservation are 'neces sary', because man fears death with inescapable necessity.4 Hobbes's last word is the identification of conscience with the fear of death. However one may judge this identification, at all events it permits a systematic differentiation between justice and injus tice, between moral and immoral motives. This identification alone allows Hobbes to say : 'Ad natura/em hominum proclivi tatem ad se mutuo lacessendum, quam ab affectibus, prac sertim vero ab inani sui aestimatione derivant, si addas jam jus omnium in omnia, quo alter jure invadit, alter jure resistit . . ' ;s that is to say, to distinguish between man's natural appetite and his natural right. In particular it makes possible the distinction between the 'attitude of the unjust man who obeys the laws of the State for fear of punishment, i.e. without inner conviction, and the attitude of the just man, who for fear of death, and therefore from inner conviction, as it were once . Leviathan, ch. IS (p. 77) and ch. 14 (p. 73). That 'pride' is always used in the derogatory sense is indicated by Hobbes in Eleme1lts, Pt. I. ch. 9. § I . 3 De cive, cap. 3 . art. '2.7. annat. 4 Ibid cap. I. art. 7. • 5 Ibid cap. I. art. l'2.. Cf. Elements. Part I, ch. J4. § I I . J • .• .• THE MORAL BASIS more accomplishing in himself the founding of the State, obeys the laws of the State.\"'Fear of death and fear of punishment remain as different as far-sighted consistent fear, which deter mines life in its depth and its entirety, is frorti short-sighted momentary fear which sees only the next ste ./ Hobbes identifies conscience with the fear of death ; only through knowledge of mortal danger, knowledge which is at the same time a retreat from death, can man be radically liber ated from natural vanity, from the natural absorption in the world of his imagination. If this is the case, the fear of death, the fear of violent death, is the necessary condition not only of society but also of science .. Just as life in common is hindered by passion, science is hindered by prejudice_ And what holds with regard to the root of our passions is equally true of the basis of our prejudices ; they too are based on 'afalse opinion that (we) know already the truth of that which is called in question', that is to say, 'a false opinion of our own knowledge'. I The matter of the fundamental prejudices which bar the way to science are phantasmata of sight or hearing ; but that man assents to these phantasmata, that man believes in them, is the result of vanity. 'P\ 'To say (God) hath spoken to him in a Dream, is no more than to say he dreamed that God spake to him . . . such dreams as that (may proceed) from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a mans own godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary Revelation. . . . To say he speaks by supernaturall Inspiration, is to say that he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can alledge no naturall and sufficient reason.'Z Vanity is therefore the final reason of incapacity to learn, of prejudice and superstition, as well as of injustice. Vanity is concerned above all other superiorities with mental superiority, with superiority of intelligence. Vanity is therefore the reason I Elements, Pt. I , ch. 10, § 8. The section concludes with the proposition 'The immediate cause therefore of indocibility, is prejudice ; and of prejudice, false opinion of our own knowledge.' 2 Leviathan, ch. 32 (p. 200) how shall a man know his own Private spirit to be other than a beleef, grounded upon the Authority, and Argu ments of his Teachers ; or upon a Presumption of his own Gifts (in the Latin version : vel a spiritu arrogantiae) ?' Ibid., ch. 43 (p. 321). . • • • • :.�7'" why 'no man can conceive there is any greater degree of (Under': standing), than that which he already attained unto. And from hence it comes to passe, that men have no other means to acknowledge their own Darknesse, but onely by reasoning from the unforeseen mischances, that befall them in their ways'.1 The extreme case of unforeseen mischance is unforeseen mortal danger. Thus it is pre-eminently through unforeseen mortal danger and the irresistibly compelling fear of death which arises from it that we are enabled to free ourselves from the power of our fantasies and our prejudices. Science bears traces of this origin : its principles 'non modo speciosa non , (sunt), sed etiam humilia, arida, et pene deformia (videntur) .1. Science proceeds 'from most low and humble principles, evident even to the meanest capacity ; going on slowly, and with most scru pulous ratiocination'.3 Science stands in complete contrast to all dogmatic, rhetorical, and allegedly inspired pseudo-know ledge, which catches the eye and may, indeed, be 'suddenly'4 gained. Since man is by nature fast in his imaginary world, it is only by unforeseen mischance that he can attain to a knowledge of his own darkness and at the same time a modest and circum spect knowledge of the real world. That is to say : the world is originally revealed to man not by detachedly and spon taneously seeing its form, but by involuntary experience of its resistance. The least discriminating and detached sense is the sense of touch. This explains the place of honour which is tacitly granted to the sense of touch in Hobbes's physiology and psychology of perception ; all sense-perception, particularly that of the most discriminating and detached sense, the sense of sight, is interpreted by experience of the sense of touch. VThus not the naturalistic antithesis of morally indifferent animal appetite (or of morally indifferent human striving after power) on the one hand, and morally indifferent striving after self-preservation on the other'(but the moral and humanist antithesis of fundamentally unjust vanity and fundamentally just fear of violent death is t� basis of Hobbes's political THE MORAL BASIS I 3 4 2 De corpore, cap. I, art. Leviathan, ch. 44 (p. 331 ). • Elements, Pt. I, ch. 1 3, § 3 . D e cive, Ep. dt'd . : Leviathan, ('h. 4 3 (p. 324). • I• THE MORAL BASIS philosophy. It will be objected that this moral antithesis is to be found in Hobbes's political philosophy only because Hobbes had not yet completely freed himself from the influence of the Christian Biblical tradition) For what is the antithesis between vanity and fear of violent death, if not the 'secularized' form of the traditional antithesis between spiritual pride and fear of God (or humility), a secularized form which results from the Almighty God having been replaced by the over-mighty ene mies and then by the over-mighty State, 'the Mortall God' ?1 But even if this affiliation is right, it by no means follows that the moral antithesis in Hobbes's work which we are at pre sent discussing is simply the superfluous re�idue of a tradition which has in principle been cast aside.' On the contrary, this antithesis is an essential indispensable element, or, more accurately, the essential basis, of Hobbes's political philo sophy. Had Hobbes waived it, had he developed a naturalistic political philosophy, he would have renounced the possibility of distinguishing between 'the offensiveness of a man's nature' and 'the right of every man to every thing'.2 He would have had to recognize man's natural appetite, all his passions, and particularly vanity, as justified by nature in the same degree as is reason. In other word olitical philosophy deprived of its moral foundation is, indeea, Spinoza's political philosophy, but it is not Hobbes's political philosophy. Spinoza, indeed, and not Hobbes, made might equivalent to right.3 Naturalistic political philosophy necessarily leads to the annulment of the conception of justice as such. Thanks to the moral basis of his political philosophy and thanks to it alone, Hobbes kept the possibility of acknowledging Nstice as such and distin guishing between right and might. J) \,!he essential advantage which Hobbes's political philosophy has over Spinoza's is that by natural right Hobbes understands primarily right of man, whereas Spinoza's point of departure · is the natural right of all existing things, and he thus misses 28 sf.r' I Leviathan, ch. 17 (p. 89) ; cf. De cive, cap. 6, art. 1 3 ; and Leviathan, (pp. 180 fr.). 2 Ele11lellts, Pt. I, ch. 14, § I I . 3 For the fundamental difference betwel!h Hobbes's political philosophy a�d Spinoza's, cf. Strauss, Die Religions/rritik Spinozas, Berlin, 1 930, pp. ch. 30 222-30. THE MORAL BASIS the specifically human problem of right. Hobbes's political ehilosophy is re�lly, �s its originator claims, based o� a �no; ���<?Lm�n which is deepened and corroborated by the self knowledge and self-examination of the individual, and not on a: g�neral scientific or metaphysical theo]"y. And because i � is based on experience of human life, it can never, in spite of all the temptations of natural science, fall completely into tT!.e danger o abstraction from moral life and neglect of moral obbes's political philosophy has thus for that very d}fference reason a oral basis, because it is not derived from natural science out is founded on first-hand experience of human life. The contention that Hobbes's humanist moral motivation of his� political philosophy is more original than the naturalistic motivation, from which one must first disentangle it, would receive indirect corroboration, if it could be shown that either all or the most important points of that moral motivation were already establishe,9 before he had turned his attention to natural science. /That this is the case is probable from the outset. Hob�s was over forty when he 'discovered' Euclid's Elements, and not until after that did he begin to take a serious interest in natural science. The 'discovery' of Euclid was beyond doubt an epoch in his life; everything he thought and wrote after that is modified by this happening. But if one has once seen that his most original thoughts are hidden rather than shown forth by a form of proof borrowed from mathe matics and a psychology borrowed from natural science, and if one is not disposed to take for granted that he was asleep up to the age of forty, so that he needed the 'discovery' of Euclid to awaken him, one is inclined to suppose that what he wrote in his youth (before he was forty) and thus before he was influenced by mathematics and natural science, expresses his most original thoughts better than the work of his maturity. Whether this is the case, and to what extent, can be decided only after the sparse remnants of his youthful philosophy have been investigated. Only at the close of this investigation will it be possible definitely to answer the question whether and to what extent the 'discovery' of Euclid and the subsequent pursuit of natural science prejudiced his political philosophy .. or furthered it. � III ARISTOTELIANISM E shall begin by surveying the forces which exercised a Wdecisive influence on Hobbes before he turned to mathe matics and natural science. The primary place is occupied by humanism. From eight to fourteen (1596-1603) Hobbes was taught Latin and Greek at home, so successfully that he was able to translate Euripides' lkledea 'eleganter' into Latin verse.I From r603 to 1608 he studied at Oxford. During this time, dissatisfied with academic teaching, he turned again to the classical texts which he had already read at home.2 Afterwards, when he had given up all study for some years, he once more turned especially to the reading of classical writers, and read them with the interpretations of famous grammarians. His pur pose in this study was also to develop a clear, nervous Latin style.3 The continuation and conclusion of this study was the English translation of Thucydides, which gradually grew and was published in 1628.4 At Oxford Hobbes was introduced to scholastic philosophy. He himself recounts that he studied Aristotle's logic and physics.s He makes no mention of studying Aristotle's morals and politics. After about five years' study he graduated as Baccalaureus artium, i.e. he was admitted 'ad lectionem cujus libet libri logices'.6 According to the traditional curriculum, in the first part of University study, which led to the B.A. degree, the formal disciplines-grammar, rhetoric, and logic-were in the foreground. We may therefore assume that scholastic studies were for Hobbes in the main formal training, and that he acquired the more detailed knowledge of scholasticism, which he afterwards needed for polemic defence of his own Opera latina, vol. i, pp. xiii, xxii r., and Ixxxvi. Loc. cit., p. Ixxxvii. 3 Loc. cit., pp. xiii, xxiv, and Ixxxviii. • Loc. cit., pp. xiv and lxxxviii. The translation is entered in the 'Register of the Company of Stationers of London' on the 18th March 16z7 (i.e. 16z8). ". 5 Opera latilla, vol. i, pp. xiii and Ixxxvi r. 6 Lac. cit., p. xliv. I • ARISTOTELIANISM 31 theory. at a later date. as and when it was needed. At all events it was with reluctance that he followed the scholastic instruc tion. and as he had almost forgotten his beloved Greek and Latin in the years after taking his degree, 1 there is all the less reason for believing that he retained much of scholastic philo sophy, particularly as he did n" take up that study again as he did that of the humanities. It is perhaps permissible to point out in this connexion that the most detailed reference to scholastic theories are found in the Leviathan and not in the earlier writings. Hobbes's college was Magdalen Hall, where he was educated in the Puritan spirit.2 After taking his degree, he was for twenty years without a break first tutor, and then secretary, to William Cavendish, later the second Earl of Devonshire, and on a friendly footing with the Cavendish family. Intercourse with members of the aristocracy-the Cavendishes were not the only aristocrats he met-certainly countered the influence of his Puritan upbringing, and at this time, when his own point of view was not yet formed, the aristocratic point of view must have influenced him much more than it did later. Of the four influences mentioned-humanism, scholasticism, Puritanism, and aristocracy-humanism is in Hobbes's youth certainly the most decisive. He says of himself : 'Natura sua, et primis annis ferebatur ad lectionem historiarum et poe tarum. '3 Here, as the context shows, he means by primis annis the whole time up to the awakening of his mathematical and scientific interests, and, as similar statements of his show, by lectionem historiarum et poetarum he means reading of classical authors.4 So one is completely justified in calling the first period of his life (up to 1629) the 'humanist' period. Ascertaining this is, however, of no value if it does not lead to the question of the philosophical reasons of Hobbes's humanism. This question cannot be evaded in the case of a J Loc. cit., vol. i, p. xiii. Wood, Athenae Oxonienses, ed. Bliss, col. 1206. 3 Opera latina, vol. i, p. xx. 4 The following account by Aubrey probably refers to the reading of contemporary writers : 'Before Thucydides, he spent two yeares in reading romances and playes, which he haz often repeated and sayd that these tVIfP yeares were lost of him.' Brief Lives, ed. Clark, i. 361 . a 32 ARISTOTELIANISM philosopher of Hobbes's rank, even if it were unnecessary to ask it of any other humanist. With a philosopher of Hobbes's impor tance, we would assert that this is the central problem of his biography : How WfiS it possible, and what does it signify, that he turned away from philosophy, became a humanist, and re mained one for twenty years ? This question would certainly not appear paradoxical to R. Blackbourne, who writes in his Vitae Hobbianae allctarium : , . . . (Hobbes) magno Iitteraturae Academicae fastidio affici coepit. . . . Aliam itaque philosophandi rationem sibi ineundam ratus, lectioni veterum philosophorum, poetarum, historicorum, tum e Graecis tum Latinis, diligenter incubuit, et ex eo rum thesauris, quid in suos usus faeeret, accurate deprompsit.'l And if the objection is raised that Blackbourne probably means philosophari in a wider sense than the technical, we would reply that this wider sense is the true philosophic sense. As one may gather from the passage quoted from Black bourne, Hobbes, after the end of his University studies, read not only classical poets and historians but also classical philoso phers. Which philosophers ? Or-what is even more important -which philosopher did Hobbes accept as authority in his humanist period ? In the foreword to his translation of Thucy dides he says : 'It hath been noted by divers, that Homer in poesy, Aristotle in philosophy, Demosthenes in eloquence, and others of the ancients in other knowledge, do still maintain their primacy : none of them exceeded, some not approached, by any in these later ages. And in the number of these is justly ranked also our Thucydides ; a workman no less perfect in his work, than any of the former.'Z Hobbes has thus, even at the end of his humanist period, no objection to raise against the ruling opinion that Aristotle is '" the classical philosopher. In order not to under-estimate the importance of the observation qUl)ted one must compare it with Hobbes's later judgements. Mterwards he held not Aris totle, but Plato, to be 'the best of the ancient philosophers'.3 I Opera latina, vol. i, p. xxiv. En�lislz Works, vol. viii, p. vii. 3 Ibid., vol. vii, p. 346. cr. also Leviathan, ch. 46 (p. 365) and English �Vorhs, vol. vi, p. 100. _ 2 33 ARISTOTELIAN ISM We shall try later to analyse what is implied in this change of view. In the present connexion it is only of importance that Hobbes, who later considered Plato to be the best philosopher, not the best philosopher of all, but the best philosopher of antiquity, at the end of his humanist period repeats without raising any objection the ruling opinion according to which Aristotle is the highest authority in philosophy. The break with Aristotle was completed only in connexion 'with Hobbes's mathematical and scientific studies and even then by no means immediately in all rigour. The polemic against Aristotle in the Elements is not nearly so violent as in De cive or in the Leviathan. One fact o articular signifi cance must be emphasized at this point. As late as in the Elements, in his definition of the State, i.e. at a central point, Hobbes asserts the aim of the State to be, along with peace and defence, common benefit. With I this he tacitly admits Aristotle's distinction between the reason of the genesis of the State and the reason of its being (between 'fjv and EJ 'fjv)." On the other hand, in parallel passages in the later presentations, more faithful to his own intention, according to which the necessity and the possibility of the State are under stood only from fear of violent death, he leaves out common benefit and thus rejects the above-mentioned Aristotelian dis tinction.1 The break with scholasticism, which Hobbes made very early, if indeed he ever required to make it, does not, there fore, mean from the outset a break with Aristotle. But which Aristotle-which aspect of Aristotle-takes the place of the scholastic Aristotle ? The linkage of Aristotle with Homer, � I 'This union so made, is that which men call now-a-days a Body Politic or civil society ; and the Greeks call it '17&).'" that is to say, a city ; which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united as one person by a common power, for their common peace, defence, and benefit.' Elements, Pt. I, ch. 19, § 8. (Notice also the mention of the :IT.I).•• in the definition of the State.) 'Civitas ergo (ut earn definiamus) est persona una, cujus voluntas, ex pactis plurium hominum, pro voluntate habenda est ipsorum omnium ; ut singulorum viribus et facultatibus uti possit, ad pacem et defensionem communem.' De cit-e, cap. S, art. 9. '(Commonwealth) is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual CO\'enants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace an� common defence.' Let'iatilall, ch. 17 (p. 90). Cf. also below, p. 63. 34 ARISTOTELIANISM Demosthenes, and Thucydides provides the answer-Aristotle seen from the humanist point of view. What does this ambigu ous assertion mean in Hobbes's case ? Fundamentally it means a shifting of interest from Aristotle's physics and metaphysics to his morals and politics, to his philo sophy 7TEP� Tel avfJpciJ7Ttva. "In other words, it means th