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Principal Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction
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Left and Right The Significance of a Political Distinction Norberto Bobbio Translated and Introduced by Allan Cameron The University of Chicago Press NORBERTO BOBBIO is Emeritus Professor of Legal and Political Philosophy at the University of Turin and the author of Tlwmas Hobbes and the Natural Law Tradition, published by this Press in 1993. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 Polity Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom This translation copyright © Polity Press 1996. First published in Italy as Destra e Sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica Copyright © Donzelli editore, Rome (first edition) 1994, (second edition) 1995. All rights reserved. Printed in Great Britain 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 1 2 3 4 5 ISBN: 0 226-06245 7 (cloth) ISBN: 0 226 06246-5 (pbk) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bobbio, Norberto, 1909[Destra e sinistra. English] Left and right I Norberto Bobbio : translated and introduced by Allan Cameron. cm. p. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0 226-06245 7 (alk. paper). ISBN 0 226-06246-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Right and left (Political science) 3. Political science JA83.B6413 320 5-c20 Philosophy. 1996 96 26392 This book is printed on acid free paper 2. Political sociology. I. Title. CONTENTS Introduction Preface to the Firs t Italian Edition 1 A C hallenge to the Distinction vi xxii 1 2 Extremists and Moderates 18 3 The Left/Right Distinction Survives 29 4 In Search of the Criterion which Governs the Distinction 38 5 Other Criteria 45 6 Equality and Inequality 60 7 Freedom and Authoritarianism 72 8 The Pole Star 80 A Reply to the Critics (1995) Notes 87 102 Intro duction When this book was published in Italy j ust before the 1 9 94 elections which brought Berlusconi' s short-lived right-wing alliance to p ower , it took the country by storm , s elling over 20 0,0 00 copies in a yea r , m aking it the overall bestseller in Italy . It remained the bestseller in the non-fiction category for; m any months thereafter . As Norberto Bobbio himself points out , if Italians were lqpking for assistance on how to vote in Italy' s dramatically changed political landscape , they would have been sorely disappointed: the b o ok i s purely concerned with an analytical di§iinction, a n d its relevance goes far beyond Italy and its political vicissitudes . The paradox which the author points out is tha t , while the left/right distinction is increasingly being challenged in Italy , the Italian parliamentary s cene has s hifted from a spectrum of parties dominated by the centre to a more polarized system in which two coalitions face each o ther , a stark choice between left and right . Such a situation is , of course , familiar in English-speaking countries which have a marked preference for the first-past-the-post electoral system (Italy abandoned proportional representation in favour of this system before the last elections ) . In many ways , Italy has acted as a barometer for Western Europe in INTRODUCTION vii the post-war period , reflecting general trends in a more acute form. When the Marxist left ' s star was rising in the late sixties and early seventies , it seemed to rise higher in Italy ; and when apathy and a general disorientation on the left took over in the eighties , Italy seemed to outperform other countries in its cynicism and its contempt for a political system whose corruption was becoming increasing ly clear . While the left has been weak in America for some time , this trend towards the s uppression of the left/right distinction through an atrophy of the left is a more recent development in Europe. The eighties witnessed Republican control of the White House and C onservative dominance in Britain ; and in 1982 Helmut Kohl became chancellor of West Germany, a position he still holds . As a leading economist commented on the British situation : ' Conservatism was not only hege monic , . ; . it seemed the only game in town anywhere.Ol Even where the . left retained the reins of power, it was not in a radical mood , and where it was in opposition , its socialism was increasingly muted. Everywhere the right appeared to have taken the initiative , and when the decade culminated with the dramatic demise of communism , it was perhaps not altogether surprising that some people began to talk with euphoria of ' the end of history' and the final victory of a particular form of state - namely, the capitalist 'liberal' democracy . This trend continues, and today we see the left alliance in Italy , which is dominated by the ex-communists , being led by an ex-Christian Democrat technocrat and university lecturer, with a pro gramme of cuts in public spending, privatizations and greater flexibility in the work-force . Norberto Bobbio sets out in this book , first to refute the idea that the left/right distinction is in any way a thing of viii INTRODUCTION the p a s t , and then to argue for his own definition of that distinction . The challenge t o the left/right distinction and its survival In times when the left and the right appear evenly balanced with a more or les s equal possibility of holding the allegi ance of large sections of society and therefore attaining power. the question of whether the distinction is relevant does not really arise . But when either the left or the right becomes so powerful that it seems to be 'the only game in town ' , then both have their reasons to connive in the destruction of the left/right distinctio n . The dominant side clearly has an interest in arguing that ' there is no real alternative' . Less obviously , the weaker side also has an inte� est in rejecting or at least playing down the difference. as can be seen from the tactics currently being adopted by some p arties of the left . If it feels that its traditional policies have attracted so much public opprobrip m , it may decide to recycle itself as something totally new, s omething which goes beyond the traditional distinction (neither left nor right , or combining the positive values of both sides to produce a modern , innovative movement) . While it is clearly the right which has been in the as cendant in the eighties and nineties , Bobbio emphasizes that there have been periods in history when it was the right that wished to dis solve itself in order to surviv e . After the fall of Fascism , there was a wave of s upport for collectivist ideals. p articularly in those coun t ries which had experienced Nazi occupation . In order to become a powerful force in p olitics , such traditionalist p arties a s the Italian Christian Democrats had to cast INTRODUCTION ix themselves as neither left nor right , and p ay at least lip service to such values as social cohesion . The fact that all these claims to have superseded the left/right distinction fail to materialize once the parties in question move from the realm of rhetoric to that of practi cal politics begs the question of why the distinction has proved so enduring . The first and most important point here is that 'left ' and ' righ t ' are not absolute terms, as Bobbio discusse s at length in chapter 5. There is a clear example of this fundamental characteristic in British p oliti cal history: Chartism is rightly considered a left-wing move ment of the first half of the last century , but fifty years after its demise, its demand for universal manhood s uffrage would have been les s than radical in light of the incipient suffragette movement, and would now appear downright reactionary . The simple fac t is that what is left or right in one period is not necess arily so in another. This is proof not of their emptiness as political term s , but simply of their relativity . Left and right do not represent two s ets of fixed ideas , but rather an axis which shifts considerably from one generation to the next. All words change their meaning slightly over time , but while socialism , fo r instance , is anchored to some form of common ownership , the left/right distinction existed before socialism became a maj or force in European politics , and continued to exist in countries which claimed to have adopted s ocialism as the basis for their economic systems . The distinction has also proved enduring because politics is by its nature antithetical , and the development of demo cracy has assisted the formation of parties and the growth of bipartisan systems , or at least the polarization around two main political block s . B obbio often refers to the distinction x INTRODUCTION as a dyad , by which he means a distinction covering the whole of the political universe (everything in politics must be either left or right) whose twin components are antithe tical (nothing in p olitics can be both left and right at the s ame time) . The left/right metaphor originated in the French National Assembly of 1789, and proved extremely appropriat e . Left and right represent a spatial dyad with which we are all familiar (an object must be either on our left or on our right , and cannot be both ; furthermore , there is an area directly in front of us where it is not very clear whether the obj ec t in question is on the left or the right , and this can be equated with the centre) ; but there is no reason to believe that history could not have come up with an alternative metaphor, and indeed the relative po sitions of the French deputies in relation to the president were only chance (although the position of mo re conservative nohles to the right was perhaps a reflection of their dwindling privilege s ) . Clearly the s uccess of left and right is due not to the felicity of the metaphor, whatever its forcefulnes!" hut to the fun damental n ature of the p olitical distin�tion which it has come to express . The nature of the distinction Having defended the distinction, Bobhio then moves on to argue that the left tends towards equality and the right tends toward s inequality . This theory has caused consider able debate in the Italian press , and the alternative propo sals are disc ussed in detail in Bobhio ' s ' Reply to the Critics' at the end of the hook . A more recent example will suffice INT R ODUCTION xi to demonstrate the simplicity and effec tivenes s of Bob bio ' s suggested criterion for the dis tinction. When Ales sandro Pizzorno , a university professor, was interviewed in February 199 5, he expres sed his disagreement with the equality/inequality criterion, and suggested inclu sion/exclusion in its place .2 T he attraction of such a distinc tion in a world of increasing economic p olariz ation is cle a r . The e ssential ques tion for Piz zorno is membership o f a collective identity , but Bobbio ' s response was that although inclusion/exclusion is a valid distinctio n , it is only partial , and i s in any case entirely covered by the equality/in equality distinction . Awarding full citizen ' s rights to immi grants could be seen as an example of inclusion , but it also means that society no longer perceive s a difference of na tionality as j ustifying a different allocation of citizens ' rights , and is therefore also egalitarian.3 Inclusion/exclu sion c overs discrimination between discrete groups , but cannot deal with more graduated distinctions . Free health care is clearly an egalitarian policy , because it gives those with lower incomes access to an essential service , but it is not inclusion. Pizzorno put forward his criterion because of a p articularly pres sing problem in the late twentieth cen tury , but practically accepted the limitations of his own argument when he admitted that ' historically B obbio is right ' . Few political philosophers who have dealt with this s ub ject h ave failed to note the close association between equality and the fundamental concept of justic e . Bobbio argues that j ustice relates to two principles : legality ( a d herence to the law) and equality (treating like as like) . While j ustice is a n ideal , equality is a reality. I n the seven ties he wrote : xii INTRODUCTION It is not in itself either j ust or unj ust that two billiard b alls are perfectly the same [uguali]. The realm of the applica tion of justice , or rather socially and politically significant equ alities, is to be found in social relations between individuals and other indivi duals, groups and other groups, or in dividuals and the group, according to the traditional distinction which goes back to Aris totle, between retributive justice (which involves relations between the parts) and distributive j ustice (which involves relations between the whole and the parts or vice versa). 4 Before exammmg Bobbio ' s criterion any further , it is necessary to clarify the meanings of 'equality ' and 'in equality ' , and , as we are dealing with a translation, to be sensitive to the original Italian and how this may differ from the English. While in Italian there is nothing strange in stating that billiard-balls are uguali, in English to say that they are equal is nonsensical . An Italian dictionary will give the first meaning of uguale as 'identical' or the same ness of two or more obj ects , while an English one will start with ' of the s ame value or amount� . This ambivalence has informed much of the debate over the nature of equality , and poses the important quest� on of whether the opposite of equality is 'inequality' or ' difference' . 5 Trans lation h a s spre a d debates , terms and ambivalences from one language to another , particularly in the field of political philos ophy , and ' difference' is now proposed as an opposite to 'equality' in English , principally as an anti- or post-so cialist value . The confusion surrounding these terms , whereby equality , as the supposed opposite of difference , is identified with uniformity and a single world-view , has become the justification for the 'post-modernist' equation of the left with totalitarianism . This has been countered by arguments that equality and difference are entirely com patible .6 INTRODUCTION xiii The question of whether the opposite of ' equality ' i s ' difference' o r 'inequality ' i s essentially a matter o f how you define 'equality ' . Bobbio makes clear that only in dogmatic utopian theories does equality ever mean ' e qu ality for everyone in everything' , an imposed or regimented ' sameness ' across society , which appears to be something similar to ' simple equality' as defined by Michael Walzer . In fact, just as Bobbio argues that 'equality for everyone in everything' is so impractical as to be meaningless, s o Walzer states that 'equality literally understood is an idea ripe for betrayal' .7 "Bobbio has invented the word egualitarista for the advocate of this rigid formal equality , and t have translated this as ' egalitarianist', which seemed the logical parallel neologism in English. E galitarianism can therefore be divided into a kind of utopian regimentation and a more pragmatic appro ach which asks three fundamental questions : Between whom ? In what? On what basis? All social organization involves ele ments of equality and inequality , and the difference be tween left and right is a question of degree within a particular cultural and historical context . While in equality may be considered the opposite of this pragmatic equality , difference could be considered the opposite of regimented equality. Difference is a positive quality , par ticularly in the affluent West , because it implie s the free dom of each individual to develop his or her particular nature. Norberto Bobbio is at pains to point out that feminism is not about difference , but is in fact a classic example of an egalitarian s truggle. Women won the right to vote bec ause society acknowledged that there was no difference between men and women in the fields of politics and citizens hip xiv INTRODUCTION which could j ustify their disqualification from voting rights . Other forms of disqualification have gradually been removed , a n d , leaving aside the question of how much remains to be done , most people would agree that this egalitarian s truggle has given women m ore freedom to de velop their own individual natures than in the past. Thus egalitarianism too could fairly claim to create c onditions for individual choice. B obbio quotes Massimo C acciari , a leading Italian philosopher, who argues precisely this : 'Equality is a part of our quality of life , like income , the environment and public services . . . . Equality makes diversity possible, and makes it possible for every one to count as a person , quite unlike that abs tract totalitarian idea of equality which means the elimination of those who are not the s ame. '8 Freedom is about the individual and the individual ' s ability to be different or autonomous within clearly defined limits which fall s hort of the state of nature . While equality is a s ocial good, freedom is an individmll good, as Bobbio convincingly argues ( ' I am free' is an intelligible statement , while ' I am equal' is not). Freedom may be claimed by both left and right , but one of the central arguments of this book is that freedom does not belong exclusively to either . The other distinction Bobbio divides the political universe along two fundamental axes : the previously discussed distinction between equality and inequality , as expres sed by the terms 'left ' and ' right' , and the distinction between liberty and authoritarianism. INTRODUCTION xv The ideal of liberty is the other great ideal which has guided Europe since the Enlightenment . 9 Liberty , in the modern sense , represents a complete break with the p as t and with the organic concept of the state , the Aristotelian model whereby the whole is more important than the p arts. Bobbio is unusual on the left in perceiving individualism not as a negative value , but as a product of the m odern state , the rej ection of the organic concept of the state and the development , however imperfect , of human rights . Without going into all the c ategories of human rights which Bobbio has defined elsewhere ,t° it will be sufficient for this argument to state that the two p rincipal c ategories are libertarian rights and social rights , which to some extent are in conflict with each other . The left , which is generally associated with s ocial rights , has long a ccused the right of breaking up the community through its over-emphasis on the individual's libertarian rights a t the expen se of the community's wider interests ; while the right has accused the left of the s ame thing, on the grounds that it is suppo sed to have undermined religion and traditional v alues, which bind society together . This latter argument is rather weak because, as B obbio points out , there are plenty of right-wing atheists and left-wing believers ; the ass ociation of the right with traditionalis m is understandable , but often misleading. More recently , the right has come up with the more coher ent argument that the implementation of social rights in the modern welfare state has undermined the sense of com munity by removing an individual's personal responsibilit y for his family and community . Leaving aside the question able c oncept of a previous golden age in which the c o m munity cared for all its weaker member s , it is certainly true that the welfare state tends to treat each citizen as an xvi INTRODUCTION individual . It raises taxes from the individual at national level, and distributes benefits to the individual, usually in accordance with clearly defined national criteria . According to Bobbio , increasing individualism relates to the abandon ment of the o rganic concept of the state and the rise of human rights and democracy , wherein the individual citizen exercises his political power in the total isolation and pri vacy of the polling b ooth . The rise of individualism there fore relates not to the left/right distinction , but to the -distinction between liberty and authoritarianism . Once re ligious freedom had been accepted in the wake of the religious wars following the Reformation , the wholly organic state and the homogeneous community it governed ceased to exist in their purest forms . The process has continued since then , and b�th the left and the right feel an undoubted sense of loss , the former because of a weakening in social cohe sion , the latter because of a weakening in s ocial hierarchy . In spite of that shared sense of loss , neither the moderate left nor the moderate right would wish to. return to a truly organic concept of the state. In any case, community in its more positive sense is a purely cultural phenomenon, and it is difficult to see how it could ever be imposed (at best it can be encouraged) . It is thus an essential aspect of Bobbio ' s thought that the modern political universe is made up of two entirely separ ate axes : left/right and liberty/authoritarianism . The rise of liberty in its current , individualistic sense is the great achievement of the modern era , and although it is not part of the left/right distinction , it is its cause , because through the establishment of the rules for a democratic political contest , it has allowed the alternation of government be tween the left and the right . INTRODUCTION xvii Moderates and extremists In Bobbio ' s theory , the two axes in politics combine to produce four c atego ries : the extreme right, the . moderate right , the moderate left and the extreme left . The extremists are authoritarian , and do not accept the rules of demo cracy, and although the moderate left and moderate right disagree over the question of equality , they accept the same rules for the political game. Obviously the political spectrum could be further fra g mented , especially if the centre is taken into account. How ever, these are B obbio ' s main categories , and he makes clear his distrust of the centre , which wields disproportion ate influence by holding the balance of power , and is often opportunist. On this point , he recently cited the example of the Italian Socialist Party , an indeterminate political force which allied itself with the right at national level and the left at local level where this would give them political offic;e . The equation of extremis m with authoritarianism is prob ably the most contentious aspect of Bobbio ' s model. B y shifting between extremism i n the sens e o f autho ritarianism and extremism in the sense of extreme policies , he implies that an extreme egalitarian or inegalitarian position neces sarily involves contempt for the rules of democracy . He takes several historical examples of extreme egalitarian views , particularly in relation to private property ; and according to his model, the proponents of these views must also have been authoritarian . Yet one of them at least was a thorough going democrat : Winstanley coupled his extreme egalita rianism with a belief in universal suffrage , yearly parliaments and absolute religious freedom , while Cromwell xviii INTRODUCTION had more moderate views on the left/right axis , but never believed in u niversal suffrage or religious freedom, and ended up a dictator. Part of the p roblem may he the application of the model to a historical period in which democracy as we now understand it was itself a revolution ary demand . However, in defence of Bobbio ' s model, it could be argued that Winstanley was more democratic be cause he did not enj oy political power , and that if he had had the opportunity to impose his ideal society , he could only have done so by force . Although he was an enlightened revolutionary in that he did not believe that you could force men to be free, he did dedicate The Law of Freedom to C romwell with the words : 'You have the power . . . to act for common freedom if you will: I have no power . 'll Win stanley was c ertainly aware of the army ' s political import anc e , and it is a matter of p ure historical speculation what he would have s aid or done , had the diggers become a serious political force . It certainly seems logical to suppose that the further one ' s political po sition�oves to the left or the right of the general consensus over the right mix of equalities and inequalities in any given age or s ociety , the more difficult it would become for that po sition to be enacted through the democratic proces s . On the o ther han d , a distinction h a s t o be drawn between a political thinker who describes an ideal society, although he knows that there is little chance of it becoming reality in the immediate future , and the revolutionary who wishes to impose his ideal s ociety tomorrow , whether or not society agrees with him . The question of consensus is clearly pivotal when it comes to democracy . One could quite reasonably s upport the collectivization of agriculture , while abhorring the brutal way in which Stalin went about it. During the Second World INTR ODUCTION xix War and after it , many countries took the quite extreme egalitarian measure of rationing staple products; but while undoubtedly an irritant , this was not perceived as op pressive, because it enj oyed consensus . One last note of caution in judging the possible extremism of an egalitarian measure concerns the question of scarcity in an economy (as in the case of rationing) . Most people would recoil at the idea of a society in which everyone had to wear the s ame clothes , the egalitarian measure which most deprives citizens of their individuality (a common feature in literary utopias and anti-utopias ) . However, in an extremely impoverished country , even this Draconian measure, which smacks of prison and army barracks , could find some j ustification in that where res ources are scarce , they h ave to be distributed rationally and efficiently 80 that all citizens can acquire such an essential commodity as clothing , however drab . As a society becomes more affluent, equality can shift from being an equal lack of choice to a n equal freedom of choice . This takes us back to C acciari ' s c ontention that equality engenders freedom and to Walzer' s concept of ' complex equality ' . Clearly , inequality alters too in the shift from economic s cardty to affluence . The relevance of Bobbio 's left and right It would be impos sible in a short introduction like this to do justice to the complexity of Bobbio ' s views on human rights , democracy, equality and liberty . This book deals primarily with the last two , but the first two are never far below the surface . Liberty can only survive where there are both xx INTRODUCTION democracy and human rights , and the latter must be posi tive rights recognized in law and preferably upheld by a constitution . If equality is perceived on a global scale , its task has barely begun , and that view parallels the view on human rights expressed by Bobbio in The Age of Rights . In the twentieth century , and perhaps for much longer , the history of Western Europe has involved a general trend towards equality , which continues to this day . Of cours e , there have been set-back s , periods of rapid change and periods of c omplacency . It is even argued that equality or near equality has already been achieved in some indus trialized countrie s . However , Bobbio emphasizes in his con clusion that , apart from the persistence of clear inequalities in the West , particularly in the economic field, the widening gap between the Third World and the West continues to present the left/right dichotomy in its starkest form . The relevance of this book to the left in Europe could not be more apparent. In Britain, the strategy of ' New Labour' seems almost modelled on B obbio ' s definit�on of a third way based on submerging the left/right distinction and s omehow transcending it - an often repeated tactic which, according to Bobbio , can never actually be put into practice, whatever its efficacy as a means of s urvival when the other side appears to be particularly in the ascendant. However , sup pression of one ' s political identity is no guarantee of success at the polls : Alleanza Democratica , the left-of-centre coali tion in Italy presented a programme which included drastic cuts in public spending , privatization , federalism and direct elections for the executive , but lost an election it had previously been expected to win . The electoral advantages of dramatic policy shifts for tactical reasons have yet to be proved. INTRODUCTION xxi Left and Right is not a moral tract , but the defence of a pair of analytical categories and an investigation of the criteria on which it is based. Once that distinction has been reasserted , it is then possible to make an individual choice between the two , a choice that is primarily moral . This book also reasserts the belief that humanity has choices and the ability to create its own future ; while the oppo site argu ment , which claims that the left has been defeated defini tively or is simply obsolete , means that there is no real choice for the electorate , other than that between different groups of technoc rats whose efficiency and honesty may differ but whose fundamental approach is the s ame . De struction of the left/right distinction leads to alienation fro m the political system , a s c a n be seen i n the United S t ates , which tends more than Europe towards an indistinct bip a r tisan s ystem . Ultimately , it would also undermine the demo cratic systems and related human rights which, whatever their limitations , constitute the part of our often cruel and wasteful history that we , as Europeans , can be proud of. Allan Cameron Prefa ce to the Firs t Italian Edition Never has so much been written against the traditional distinction between left and right, which is now thought to have run its course and to be completely without meaning, always supposing it had one in the past. 1 At the time of writing this work j ust beforeJhe Italian general election , the political scene is witnessing an unprecedented polarization between two alliances which proclaim themselves to be on the left and the right , and are preparing to battle fiercely for government of the country under these two banners . S o do left and right still exist? And if they still exist and hold the field , how can it be said that they have lo st all their meaning? If they are still meaningful, then what is their meaning?2 For m any y e ars , I have been collecting material on this topic , which has fed an endless debate , and given rise to the most varied and contradictory theorie s . Yet I fully realize that this collection is like a few drops in an immense ocean . Many of the pages of this book were written s ome time a go and never p ublished , although the theories they put for ward have been p resented in seminars and public debate s .3 PREFACE TO THE FIR S T ITALIAN EDITION xxiii The current confusion has been added to by the fact that the significance of ' left' and ' right ' , the two keywords in this politic al debate , is continually being rej ected on the basis of varying arguments , yet we still do not seem to be able to do without them . Even today , these two words are so charged with emotional significance a s to inflame s pirits on both sides , and are used to laud one side or vilify the other. I felt therefore , that this was a favo urable moment to look over these idea s , put them in order, add a few notes and publish them . While performing this task, I have attempted to avoid the influence of changing opinions, which are often extem porized in newspaper or magazine articles . If you were to listen to these, you would run the risk of not understanding why the left/right distinction has survived in spite of s o many refutations o r , indee d , the loves and hates which continue. to keep it alive .4 I have examined success ive argu ments for and against advanced by the various adversa ries , the j us tifica tions which from time to time are used in favour of either the demise or the survival of the distinc tion ,- and the criteria invoked by those who have defended it . I have given particular attention to those writers who have de veloped a pers onal, well-documented analysis t o justify their criterion . A s a conclusion to t h e interpretations and ob s ervations gradually developed throughout the book , I have explained in the last two chapters5 what in my opinion is the irredu cible , inescapable core of the dichotomy , which is therefore constantly recurring, as well as being ideal, hist o rical and existential. I have examined things with a certain detach ment , and do not set about making a j udgement . I do not ask myself who is right and who is wrong, becau s e I see no xxiv PREFACE TO THE FIRST ITALIAN EDITION point in confusing a historical assessment with my personal opinions , although I make no secret of which side I feel closer to. N. B. Turin, February 1994 1 A Challenge to the Distinction 1 ' Left' a n d ' right' are two antithetical terms which for more than two centuries have been used habitually to sig nify the contrast between the ideologies and movements which divide the world of political thought and action . As antithetic al terms, they are mutually exclusive , and together they are exhaustive within that eminently conflict-riven universe . They are exclusive in the sense that no doct�ine or movement can be both left-wing and right-wing at the same time . They are exhaustive in the sense that a d octrine or movement can only be either left-wing or right-win g , at least as far as the more rigid application of the twin definition is concerne d , as we shall see later . The antithetical pair, left and right , can be put to descrip tive, axiological or historical use , as I have often said of what I call the 'great dichotomie s ' which divide up every field of knowledge . They are descriptive in that they can s ummarize two sides of a conflict , evaluative in that they can express a positive or negative value-j udgement of one side or the othe r , and historical in that they can indicate the passage from one phase to another in the p olitic al life of a 2 A C HALLENGE TO THE D I S TI NCTIO N nation . Their historical u s e can , in turn , b e either descrip tive or evaluative. The opposition between left and right represents a typi cally dyadic way of thinking, which has been variously explained in psychological , s ociological , historical and even biological terms . There are examples in all fields of thought ; the all-inclusive distinction or dyad dominates every disci pline . In s ociology it is s ociety/community , in economics market/planned , in law public/private , in aesthetics classi cal/romantic , and in philosophy transcendent/immanent . Left/right is not the only distinction in the political sphere , but it i s encountered everywhere . There are distinctions in which the two constituent terms are antithetic al, and others in which they are complemen tary. The former interpret a universe as a composition of divergent entities which opp o se each other , whereas the latter interpret a harmonious universe composed of conver gent entities which tend to'fuse into a superior whole . The left/right pair belongs to the first type . Given that triadic thought is often generated from dyadi!i thought or repre sents , as it were , a development from it , the transition from one to the other will differ according to whether the dyad one starts from consists of antithetical or complementary terms . I n the first case the transition occurs through a dialectical synthesis or negation of the negation , in the second case through composition . The following reflections arise from the assertion that there is no longer any relevance to the distinction between left and right which , over the two centuries since the French Revolution, has been used to divide the political universe into opposing c amps , an as sertion which has been made repeatedly in recent years , to the point of becoming a cliche . A C HALLENGE TO THE D I S TINCTION 3 It is now de rigueur to quote Sartre who , it appears , was one of the first to argue that left and right were empty vessels . They are no longer supposed to have any heuristic or classificatory value , and emphatically no evaluative ap plication. Often they are referred to with a cert ain irrita tio n , as though they represent one of the many linguistic traps which political debate can fall into. 2 There are various reasons for this opinion which is gaining increasing currency , and countless examples could be produced every day. Let us look at a few . The first doubts about whether the distinction h a d disap peared , or at least ceased to have the same descriptive force , arose from the so-called crisis of ideology , and therefore the pointlessness of contrasting the ideologies involved. The objection which can easily be raised is that ideologies have not disappeared at all, but are still very much with us . The ideologies of the past have merely been replaced by others which are new or claim to be new. The ideologic al tree is always green. Besides , it has been shown repeatedly- that there is nothing more ideological than declaring t he demise of ideologies . Then again 'left' and ' right' are not j ust ideologies . To reduce them to purely ideological expres sions would be an unj ustifiable simplification : they indicate oppos ing programmes in relation to many problems whose solution is part of everyday political activity . These contrasts c on cern not only ideas, but also interests and j udgements on which direction society should be moving in ; they exist in all societies, and it is not apparent how they could disappear. Naturally , one could reply that such contrasting positions exist , but they are not the same as those encountered when the distinction was created , and during the period of its 4 A CHALLENGE TO THE D I S TINCTION success these positions have changed so much as to make the old names anachronistic and therefore misleading. Recently it has been argued that , since the concept of a left wing has been so drastically emptied of its descriptive powers as to be one of the leas t informative expressions in political usage , the time has come to replace the old pair of terms with a more appropriate one : that of progressives and conserv atives. l But s ome have taken a more radical stance , rej ecting any residual dichotomy in their vision, and ar guing that this last dichotomy is one of those 'follies ' of political j argon, which we must free ourselves from in order to form new groupings , based not on positions , but on problems .2 3 Secondly , it is argued that the division into two distinct and opposing political camps has become inappropriate , and the resulting p olitical spectrum insufficient , in the increasingly complex political world of large-scale societies , particularly large-s cale democratic societies which tolerate and indeed presuppose the existence of a multitude of ' pressure groups and interest groups which compete with each other ( and which on occasion opp o se each othe r , and on other occasions make common cause with each other ; they converge on some p oints and diverge on others , like dancers j oining together and then turning their backs in an elaborate choreography) . Basically , the objection is that in a multi-faceted democratic society , in which many forces are at play , which agree on some points and not on others , and permit a great v ariety of alliances , problems cannot be posed in antithetical form as one thing or another : either left or right , and if it is not left�wing, it must be right-wing, or vice vers a . A CHALLENGE T O THE DISTINCTI ON 5 This obj ection strikes home, but it is not decisive. The dis tinction between left and right does not at all preclude, even in everyday language, the existence of a c ontinuous spectrum which j oins the left and the right, or of intermedi ate po sitions where the left meets the right. Thes e positions make up a central area between the extremes which is well known as the 'centre' . If one wanted to flirt a little with the terminology of logic, one could say that while the dyadic concept of politics can be defined as the excluded middle, according to which politics is divided into just two parts, which are mutually exclusive , with nothing in between them, a triadic concept can be defined as the 'included middle ', according to which there is an intermediate space between the left and the right which is neither one nor the other. In the first case, the two terms, which have an ' either .. . or .. . ' relationship, are contradictory; whereas in the second case, in· which the intermediate area can be expressed as 'neither .. . nor . . . ', they are opposite s . No prohlem then : black and white are divided by grey, and day and night are divided by dus k . Grey takes nothing away from the distinc tion between black and white, and dus k takes nothing away from the distinction between day and night. 4 The fact that in many democratic s ystems with high levels of pluralism the 'included middle ' can become so a11embracing as to relegate the left and the right to the extreme margins of the political system does not in any way invali date the original antithesis . As the centre is defined as neither left-wing nor right-wing and cannot be defined in any other way, its very existence and raison d'etre are based on this antithesis. The duration of dusk v a ries ac cording to the season and the latitude, but its duration in 6 A CHALLENGE TO THE DISTI NCTION no way affects the fact that its definition depends on the definition of day and night .3 Identification of this intermediate space allows for a more graduated interpretation of the political system , as the centre which is closer to the left , the centre-left , can be distinguished from the centre which is closer to the right, the centre-right. E qually , on the left , one c an distinguish between a moderate left which tends towards the centre and an extreme left which is opposed to the centre , and on the right , a right wing which is attracted towards the centre and a right wing which distances itself so much from the centre as to be equally opposed to the centre as to the left . If it is then c onsidered that whatever way the centre is divided up there is still a centre which remains intact and could be defined as the centre of the centre , a spectrum emerges with a range of positions . It need hardly be said that fragmentation of the political sys tem is assisted by the adoption of proportional repre sentation . This fragmentation c an he clearly seen in a chamber of dep uties shaped like an a .p,phitheatre, in which the v arious positions are represented, moving from the extreme right to the extreme left . However, the distinction which divides the elected representatives in each sector i s still b etween left and right . While i n the British parliament, one has to sit either on the left or on the right, reflecting the great left/right antithesis , representatives in a parliament like the Italian Montecitorio are graded from right to left (or vice vers a ) . However , the nostalgia for a first-past-the post electoral system (whether based on one or two ballots) which has arisen in recent years and has led to repeated attempts at reform and a referendum, reflects a desire to return to a bipolar politic al system. This campaign , which A C HALLENGE TO THE D I S TINCTION 7 has finally achieved success through an act of parliament , is proof enough that a dichotomous interpretation of politics persists even in a fra gmented s ystem , whatever views might be expressed , and leaving aside all doctrinal a rguments . Besides , what better proof could there be of the persistence of this dichotomy than the presenc e , even where there is pluralism , of a left wing which tends to perceive the centre as the right wing in disguise and a right wing which tends to perceive the same centre as a cover for the left which does not wish to show its true colours . 5 Allow me another digression: the 'included middle ' is not the same as the 'inclusive middle ' . The 'included middle ' attempts to find its own space between two opposites , and although it inserts itself between them , it does not eliminate them , but draws them apart, prevents them from coming into contact and brawling, and dispenses with the s tark choice between left and right by providing an alternative . T h e 'inclusive middle ' tends to go beyond the two opposites , incorporating them in a higher synthesis , and therefore cancelling them out . In other word s , left and right cease to be two mutually exclusive totalities like two side s of a coin which cannot both b e seen at the same time ; they become two parts of a whole , a dialectic totality . This can be distinguished from a mechanical totality , which consists of a combination of compatible parts that j oin together pre cisely because they are compatible , and from an organic totality , in which the individual parts are a function of the whole , and therefore not antithetical but convergent in relation to the centre . Dialectical unity , on the o t her hand, entails a synthesis of two opposing parts , one of which is the assertion or thesis and the other is the negation or 8 A C HALLENGE TO THE DISTINCTION antithesis . This synthesis is not a compound , and represents something entirely new . While the 'included middle' could be expressed by the formula ' neither . . . nor . . . ' , the 'inclusive middle ' could be abbreviated to 'both . . . and . . . ' . In political deb ate the 'inclusive middle' is us ually presented as an attempt at a third way - that is to say, as something which transcends the politics of left and right , unlike the centre , which is simply in between the left and the right. In p ractice , the third way is in the centre ; but in theory , it claims not to be a compromise between two extremes , but to supersede them both , and therefore it accepts and suppresses them at the same time (in contrast to the 'included middle ' , which rej ects and separate s ) . It is not, then , a mediated third, but a transcended third , where the first and second entities are brought together in their interdepe ndence and suppres sed as unilateral assertions , rather th an being separated and left to survive in opposition to each other. Every middle entity p ence of the other two entities , but the 'included middle' realizes its own es sence by driving the Ijl, out , and the 'inclu sive middle ' by feeding off them. The 'included middle' is essentially p ractical politics without a doctrine , whereas the 'inclusive middle' is essentially a doctrine in search of a practical politics , and as s oon a s this is achieved , it reveals itself as centrist . The history o f political thought - o r perhaps I should say, political fantasy - can produce thousands of examples of such third ways . I have insisted on this point , perhaps more than necessary , because the c risis of the left has led to the recent success of the ideal of liberal socialism, which is a typical expression of 'inclusive middle ' thought. A triadic combination is always the product of a crisis , and hence a A C HALLENGE TO THE D I S TINCTION 9 fear that an antithesis has exhausted its historic al vitality . Every form of synthetic thought is somewhat paradoxical , because it attempts to bring together two opposing sets of ideas , which have always proved to be incompatible , and therefore alternatives . The paradox is justified by the fact that all forms of synthetic thought always prove to be fruitless once they are put into practice unilaterally . Another example of this synthesis of opposites occurred on the right , in an equally serious period of crisis . This was the ideology of the conservative revolution which followed the First World War as a response by the right to the subversive revolution which had brought the left to power in one vast country , and threatened to spread elsewhere .4 For the purposes of our argument here concerning the opposition between left and right and its pos sible dis appear ance, the theory of the 'inclusive middle ' can be interpreted as the synthesis of opposing positions with the intention in practice of saving whatever can be saved of one ' s own position by drawing in the opposing position and thus neutralizing it . 6 A third reason for rej ecting the traditional opposition between left and right and claiming its demise is the view that it has lost a great deal of its descriptive valu e , because the continuous development of society and the creation of new p olitical problems (political in the sense that they require solutions through the traditional instruments of political activity - that is to say , activity aimed at collective decisions which, once they are taken , become binding on the entire community) have produced movements which cannot be categorized in terms of the traditional opposition between left and right , as claimed by the movements 10 A C HALLENGE T O THE D I S TINCTION themselves . The most interesting current example is that of the Greens . Are the Greens on the left or the right? If we use the criteria usually adopted for making this distinction , it appears that sometimes they are on the left and sometimes on the right , or that they are neither left-wing nor right wing. The G reens could be defined as a transversal move ment , which has become a political buzz-word , albeit a pej orative used in another context . This is because green issues run through all the enemy camp s , and pas s effort lessly from one camp to another , thus proving that in practice there is a third way of subverting the dyad , in addition to being in the middle ( the centre) and going beyond ( synthesis ) . This moving through the spectrum en tails a reduction in the authority of the dyad , rather than its rej ection or obsolescence . The best proof of the ubiquity of the green movement is the fact that all parties have adopted the ecological theme without c hanging any of their traditional political baggage . They have perhaps merely added to i t . No one today would dare to challenge the rights of nature , which are perhaps an unconscious anthropomorphization of the natural world . These are the rights which nature should expect of hu manity , and this relationship implies duties which humanity must accord to nature (without entering into the a rgument of whether a right p recedes an obligation , or vice versa) . There are various explanations for this radical s hift in attitude to nature (particularly in the West) from a percep tion of nature as something purely to be dominated and as a passive instrument of human needs to the idea of nature (even inanimate nature) as a subject, or at least an obj ect which should not be used arbitrarily , but within the dictates of reaso n . According to a somewhat metaphysical or reli- A CHALLENGE TO THE DISTINCTION 11 gious interpretation , nature belongs to the world not cre ated by man , and , like man , is a free agent within it , a c ting alongside other free agents . A more p ragmatic and utilita rian p oint of view asserts that since man is obliged to live in a finite universe whose av ailable resources for survival are limited, these resources should be used with due c onsidera tion to their eventual exhaustion . Given these different philosophies based on opposing value systems a n d c oncepts of the worl d , it i s quite possible that the spread of ecologic a l movements will not make the traditional left/right split anachronisti c , but tha t , instead, this split will be repro duced within the various ecological movements , which are already troubled by internal divisions , despite their recent appearance. It is a question of whether human b eings h ave a duty to other beings besides themselves , or to other human heings , in particular to future generatio n s ; or, in other words , whether these restrictions are impo sed on humanity from outside or are imposed by humanity on itself. This ques tion will introduce a distinctio n between right-wing greens and left-wing greens, and h a s in ' p art already done s o . 7 Huma n ity ' s dramatically increased ability n o t only to exploit nature and subject it to its own needs , but als o to manipulate it and deflect it from its normal course , has created moral and legal problems (such as bio - ethics) which will increasingly require political decisions (as pre viously defined) ; and as these will be completely different from any decisions taken in the past, it appe ars that, whatever their true nature , they will not fall into the tradi tional categories of left and right , which arose when these problem s were unknown to political movements . As these 12 A C HALLENGE TO THE DIS TINCTION problems are eminently moral , responses to them have reflected either laxity or severity , a distinction which gener ally divides the moral worl d . However, this dis tinction does not fit well with the distinction between left and right . Is laxity left-wing or right-wing? Is s everity left-wing or right wing? There is severity on the left and laxity on the right , and also vice versa . The two dichotomies c annot be superim posed . The most problematic example of this cro�s-over is the question of abortion . In general , the abolition of abor tion is part of the right-wing political programmes, and the left is prevalently pro-abortion . It has been p ointed out to me that this attitude appears to contrast with one of the general definitions of the left : that the left defends the wea k . It could b e argued that of the mother and t h e foetus , the foetus is the weaker of the two . In reply , it can be argued that it is undoubtedly weaker than the mother , but that the mother is weaker than the father , who , in most cases, has forced her to become pregnant . It is no coincidence that the p ro-abortion campaign was strengthened enormously by the spread of feminism , which has been favoured by left-wing partie s . 8 B u t these are all secondary arguments . T h e p rincipal reason for challenging the left/right distinction is much more imp ortant from a historical and political p oint of view . The two tet:ms of an antithetical distinction support each other: if t here were no right wing, then there would be no left win g , and vice vers a. In other words , the right exists because there is a left , and the left exists because there is a righ t . C o nsequently , proving the irrelevance of this distinc tion does not require proof of its inappropriateness (i . e . A C HALLENGE TO THE DIS TINCTION 13 there is no point in dividing the political world on the b a sis of opposing ideologies if there are no more ideologies ) , its deficiency (i .e. it is insufficient to divide the political world into two poles when it has been shown that there is a middle entity - whether it is intermediate or at a higher level does not matter) , or its anachronism (i . e . new political pro grammes , problems and movements have entered the p oliti cal scene since the distinction was created , fulfilling a u seful role ) . It is quite sufficient to diminish the authority of one of the terms and cease to recognize its existence : if all is left-wing, then there is no right win g , and conversely , if all is right-wing, then there is no left wing. Two terms in a n antithesis do not always have equal force ; nor i s it necessarily the case that one is always stronger than the other . Their respective force c a n change according to the point of view and according to the criteria used to measure, it. There are pairs in which the stronger term remains the s ame : in the distinction between war and peac e , i t is w a r which, s o far , h a s remained the stronger term , and the proof is that peace has traditionally been defined as non-war , as something that c o mes after a war (as in Gro tius ' s De Jure Belli ac Pacis or Tolstoy ' s War and Peace) ; and i n the distinction between order and dis order , the stronger term is order. In the antithesis between left and right, which is restricted to the political sphere , the respect ive force of the two terms is not established once and for all ; it depends on the period and the circumstances , unlike in biology , followed by religion and ethic s , where right is considered the s tronger term. In Italian history , the right was predominant after Unification ; but this was followed by a period in which the left was p redominant . The two parts continue to exist , and base their raison d 'etre on the 14 A C HALLENGE TO THE DIS TINCTION existence of the oth e r , even when one prevails over the other , and the scales tip more and more in fav our of one or the other . When Fascism, which was considered a right wing movement , came crashing down (and rightly so for the maj ority of world opinion) , the star of the left rose so high that the right seemed to have dis appeared , or at least to have lost so much of its standing as to put into question its s urvival . In a situation of that kind , it is not at all surprising that s ome of the minority groups and movements which , according to established political terminology , would have been defined as right-wing , started to argue that the tradi tional left/right distinction no longer had any useful func tio n , that it had become obsolete , and that the political struggle had to go beyond left and right. It should be noted that this alleged obsolescence of the left/right distinction was presented as its total repudiation and distortion , rather than as a synthesis which incorporated two opposites and , by incorporating them , hrought out the truth of each. It is clear that in a situation in whI ch one becomes s o predominant a s to leave little room for th e other to b e taken seriously as a political force , undermining the left/right distinction becomes an obvious expedient for hiding one ' s own weakness. ' Has the right heen defeated?' 'But what is the point of posing the question in these terms ' , asks the defeated side , 'if the distinction between left and right has run its course ? ' In a universe in which the two opposing p arts are interdependent , in the sense that existence of one presupposes the existence of the other , the only w a y to invalidate the adversary is to invalidate oneself. Where the whole has become what was previously a part , the distinction has completed its tas k ; everything A C HALLEN GE TO THE D I S TINCTION 15 must be started anew, and the distinction mus t be tran scended . 9 Every day we are now fin ding evidence that the strong and weak parts have been inverted in the left/right distinc tion, following the dramatic events of recent years which have dissolved the c ommunist regimes (for many y ears they were held up as the relentless advance of the left in the world , or were considered by those who had fought a gainst them as the most radical expres sion of the left and the most extensive historical implementation of the ideas and cam paigns of the left) . The left is on the way down , and the right is on the way up . Now the argument that the old distinc tion should be put in the attic is mainly being put b y groups and movements which claimed to be left-wing when the wind of history appeared to be blowing in their direction , and which were considered , j udge d , condemned and slandered as such by their adversaries . Until not so long ago , you could still ask the question : Is there still a right wing? After the fall of the communist regimes , the same malicious ques tion c an be heard in an inverted form : Is there s till a left wing? I don't think anyone would be able to list all the con ferences and public debates that have taken place in recent years in response to this question , such as : ' The C risis of the Left' , ' Doubts on the Left and About the Left ' , ' The Left in Difficulty ' , or ' The Death Throes of the Left ' . The problem can best be summed up by the English title of a conference held in Turin in December 1 9 92 , which used the pun ' What is left? ' The responses varied from the radically n egative opinion that 'The left no longer exist s ' or 'The left has been buried under the ruins of the S oviet E mpire ' to the 16 A CHALLE N G E TO TH E DISTINCTION hopeful , positive conviction that ' If the left is understood in its o riginal meaning, then the collapse of the Bolshevik system is a triumph for the left which will reopen the possibilities b uried under a tyrannical system in 1 9 17 . ' 5 The collapse of the S oviet system did not b ring about the end of the left , but simply the end of a left-wing movement over a specific historic period. This much-debated aspect begs the question of the many varieties of left-wing or, for that matter, right-wing . 6 Clearly the argument that there are many varieties of left wing supports the traditional left/right distinction , and the dyad will survive its current crisis . It has been correctly pointed out that the first democratic elections in Eastern Europe occurred without the competing parties dividing into parties of the left and the right . But even those who have used this argument as clear proof of the disappearance of the left/right distinction , hav� had to recognize the anomalous ness of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy , and admit that when the democratic institutions are more establishe d , it is quite probable that the p arties will again group around the traditional pole s . 7 1 0 Finally , the las t , and perhaps most decisive , reason for rejecting the left/right distinction does not refer to two conflicting p arts of a whole which stand or fall together (if there is no right wing, then there is no left wing) . It is the claim that the two labels have become purely fictitious , and that the left-wing and right-wing movements , faced with the complexity and novelty of current problems , say more or less the s am e things , formulate more or less the same programmes for consumption by their electorates , and pro pose the same immediate ends . According to this argument , A CHALLENGE TO THE DISTINCTION 17 left and right n o longer have any reason t o exi s t , not because at a certain stage one has excluded the o ther , but because there are no longer the (alleged) differences which would merit the distinction of different names . These names therefore end up engendering a false belief in a distinction which in reality no longer exists , and provoking artificial and misleading disputes. This is particularly true of the political conflict in Italy , where one increasingly hears the opinion from observers not involved in the fray that there is little reason for s uch persistent animosity , because the opposing sides are a rguing for the same things ; or, rather , that the left i s in such difficulty that it has adopted the ideas of the right in order to revamp itself, thus invalidating the traditional differentiation.8 As c ould be shown by other accounts , this confusion on the left and denial of their own existence does n o t en tirely correspond to reality . For a definitive response , I refer the reader to the final chapters in which I attempt to resolve these doubts . 2 E xtremists and Mo derate s 1 Whether or not the arguments against the left/right dis tinction examined so fa r are correct , one eminently verifi able fact appears to corroborate them , and facts are always more stubborn than even the most s ubtle arguments . The fact we are faced with is the way that thinkers , who are held up as models to be lived 'by , and the .chosen few maitre a penser drift from right to left , or vice vers a , according to the wishes of their own disciples . It wil( be sufficient here to refer to the most spectacular examples. Nietzsche , who inspired Nazism (we are not concerned here with whether this inspiration derived from an incorrect interpretation o r , as I believe , one o f the pos sible interpretations ) , n o w often flanks Marx as a father of the new left . Carl Schmitt , who not only inspired but for a period provided theoretical guidance to the Nazi state , has been rediscovere d , at lea st in Italy , and honoured especially by left-wing scholars be cause of his opposition to Hans Kelsen, the maj o r demo cratic �heoretician in the great constitutional debate of the Weimar Republic . Heidegger's sympathies with Nazism have been thoroughly documented, even tho u gh his ad- EXTREMIS TS AND MODE RATES 19 mirers (on the left and the right) deny this or attempt to play it down ; yet he is now considered to be the interpreter of our time , not only in Italy , but also and especially in France by philosophers who claim to be on the left . As i s well known , there has been an attempt i n the opposite direction , by a few theoreticians of the neo-Fascist right , to appropriate the thought of Antonio Gramsci . Although this attempt proved to be somewhat elusive and short-lived , there was a current called ' right-wing Gramscism ' among those who tried to give the right a new image and a new dignity . C ontrasting interpretations of an author a re by no mean s new, although they a r e more evident i n this difficult period for the traditional ideologies and the subsequent doctrinal confusion. George Sorel is the most famous precedent, which can explain the apparent paradox . The author of Reflections on Violence played an inspirational role for left-wing movements , and this led to the creation of Italian revolutionary syndicalism which had a few - v ery few moments of glory in the history of our socialist movement . In latter years he became an admirer of both Mussolini and Lenin , and many of his followers in Italy became Fascist s . His greatest admirers in Italy were two honest conserva tives , Pareto and Croce , who have been given various labels , hut could never be defined as ' left-wingers ' . I have already referred to the conservative revolution, and Hitler defined himself in an article for Volkische Beobachter of 6 J une 1 9 3 6 a s ' the most conservative revolutionary in the world ' . Less well known is Alfredo Rocco' s speech to the Italian parliament in which he asked ' to be rec o gnized a s the antithetical conservative revolutionary ' (but the state ment shows that he was perfectly aware of the p a radox) . 20 EXTREM I S TS AND MODERATES The example of a revolutionary conservative like Sorel , and particularly the last two examples of conservative re volutionaries , allow us to question the way in which positions both of the left and the right (according to a declaration or interpretation mad e after the event) have been used to inflict another blow on the left/right distinctio n . We are now faced with a completely different p roblem , which needs to be considered , especially in view of the importance I give it in the final chapte r . What the revolution and the counter revolution have in common has nothing to do with their belonging to two opposing sides traditionally termed left and right . If this w e re the c a se , then people would be right to say that we s hould abandon terms which can no longer distinguish between antithetical cultural and political positions . What revolutionary and counter-revolutionary writers , and their respective movements , really have in common is that within the opposing sides they both belong to the extremist , rathe}':. than the moderate , wing. The distinction between extremism and moderation does not coincide with the left/right distinction ; in that it answers to a fundamental criterion which is entirely different . As s oon a s one considers the problem , it becomes immedi ately clear that the distinction between extremist and moderate has very little to do with the nature of the ideas professed , but rather concerns their radicalizatio n , and therefore different s trategies for their implementation in practice . This explains why revolutionaries (on the left) and counter-revolutionaries (on the right) can tap into the same writers , because they s hare them not as thinkers of the left ' or the right , but as extremist s of either the left or the right , who are thus distinguished from moderates of the left or the right . If the distinction between left and right is different EXTREMISTS AND MODERATES 21 from the distinction between extremists and moderates , this means that the opposing ideologies can have points of con tact and agreement at their extreme s , even though they are still quite distinct in terms of the political programmes and final objectives which define their position vis-a-vis the left/right distinction . Ludovico Geymonat, who c alled him self an extremist (of the left) on the occasion of the s o-called refoundation I of the Italian communist Party , entitle d a collection of his political writings Against Moderatism.2 In his opinion , the moderate parties which ",ere established after the Liberation represent the s o-called constitutional spectrum , which runs from the communists to the C hristian Democrats , and they renounce revolutionary change of the society inherited from Fascism and are happy with democ racy . The neo-Fascist Solinas wrote in the extreme right wing magazine Elementi: ' Our tragedy today is moderatism . Moderates are our principal enemy . Obviously the mo der ate is a democrat . ' These two quotations clearly demonstrate that a left-wing extremist and a right-wing extremist share a rej ec tion of democracy (they s hare an object of hate , if not one of love) . Their rej ection of democ racy brings them together , not because of their position on the political spectrum , but because they occupy the two extreme points of that s pec trum . The extremes meet. 3 2 The rejection of democracy is not the only point of contact between the 'opposing extremes ' . From a philo soph ical point of view - that is to say , a more general interpre tation of the wori d and history - there is a s tr ong anti-Enlightenment element in every form of political ex tremism. I refer not only to the anti-Enlightenment of 22 EXTREM I S TS AND MODERATES historicist origin , which found expression in a politically conserv ative current from Hegel to C roce and a politi cally revolutionary current within Marxism (Italian Marxism has always been historicist) , but also to an irra tionalist anti-Enlightenment current which is particularly s ignificant at the moment . This irrationalist , anti E nlightenment current c an be divided into a religious curren t , which includes such writers as De Maistre and Donoso C o rtes , who are often much respected today , and a vitalist current , which includes Nietzsche and S orel. It is this latter current , which combines best with the left , while the former , fideistic current , is cons ciously and irre ducibly traditionalist and reactionary, precisely because it o rigina ted as a ' reaction' to the breakdown in the s acred historical order thought to have been created and guided by an inscrutable Providence , and was a re evaluation noli altum sapere sed time ( ' do not know any thing but fear ' ) , as against Kant 's sapere aude ( ' know how to be b old ' ) .4 If we look at the question in terms of the philos ophy of history - that is , the forms and methods by which we interpret historical development (progress or retrogression? cyclical o r stationary movement?) - we find that moderat ism is gradualis t , and believes that action s hould be guided , metaphorically speaking, by growth of an organism from its embryo according to a pre-established order; whereas ex tremism has a catastrophic vision , whatever its obj ectives . Extremism interprets history as progres sing by sudden leaps forward and clean breaks , which leave room for human intelligence and forcefulness (in this sense it is les s determinist than moderatism) . The ' c atastrophe' of the October Revolution (an event produced by a conscious 23 EXTREM I S TS AND MODERATES collective will) could only b e remedied by the counter revolutionary 'catastrophe' (the warning signals of incipient ' action Italian Fascism were the squadre d 'azione squads ' ) : communism and Fascism feed into each othe r . The theory of opposing extremisms (which for moderates are not opposing but analogous) was substantiated on a small scale during the peri od of Italian terrorism , the so-called years of lead , during which Italian society was kept in a continuo us state of alarm by terrorist acts perpetrated by b oth ex tremes of the political spectrum . On the much grander scale of universal history , this theory of extremes is the b asis for the historical deb ate over the ' E uropean civil war' , in which , according to Nolte , a protagonist , Bolshevism and Fascism (or Nazism) are interlinked , the latter being an inversion of the former , the reaction which follows the action , the revolution in reverse , but still a revolution , the catastrophe which follows the catastrophe . - 3 Naturally there is no sense in asking oneself which of the two concepts of history is the true one : b o th are the product of historical 'prophec y ' (in the sense that they are based not on facts or conj e ctures , but on premonito ry signs and extrapolations over long periods) . This is histo ry whose metho d of evaluation is not the extent of the truth , but the extent of its power to engender action ; it thus has nothing to do with the history of historians , which teaches nothing. In o ther words , the more history is explanatory on the basis of data and hypotheses , the less it is instructive . At the very mos t , one can a dmit that various historic al interpretations are themselves historically determined . The history of last century was mainly peaceful, and during that period, Europe carried through the first industrial 24 EXTREMISTS AND MODERATES revolution, which was never a revolutio n in the true sense of the w ord , and never appeared to be catastrophic . Indus trializa tion was accompanied by and interdependent with an unprecedented development in the applied (or techno logically useful) sciences . The nineteenth century therefore favoured the idea of gradual progress , with various irre versible stages which had to be pas sed through , as ar gued by such diverse figures as Kant , Hegel, C omte and Marx , whatever form their prophetic history took in a century which produced countless examples of prophetic his tory . The twentieth century , however , p resents a very different picture : the first two total, world wars in the history of humanity and a third war without armies actually fighting (but still threateningly drawn up on the battlefield) , com munist revolutions in Rus sia and China , the violent creation of Fascist regimes and their equally violent demise , the rapid proce s s of decolonization following the Second World W a r , and the disintegration of the communist world , which was n o less rapid and unpredictable . �apere aude has now assumed a ' demonic face ' . This century has therefore en couraged the antithetical vision of historical upheaval , or catastrophe . which has even raised the fea r of an end to history , or, if not an end, then an irreparable degradation of beneficent nature (irreparable for human destiny) . This historical view, which is even shared by les s apocalyptic observers who wish to be impartial , is taken as evidence of the end of the modern era, which has been characterized by the idea of progress , and the birth of a new era which has for the moment been designated as 'post-modern ' , though one hopes that a more appropriate and meaningful name will eventually be coined. EXTREMISTS AND MODERATES 25 4 The extremists o n opposing sides also have much in common on moral questions and in their doctrines of virtue , and have similar reasons for opposing the moderate s : the heroic , warrior virtues of courage and boldnes s , as against the virtues of prudenc e , tolerance, calculating reason and patient mediation , which extremists consider dis taste fully commercial . However , the latter virtues a re essential in market relations and in that more wide-ranging market of ideas and conflicting interests which constitutes the es sence of democracy , given its reliance on compromis e . It is hardly surprising that extremists of both the left and the right despise democracy for the virtues it fosters and re quires for its survival . Their terminology agree s in defining democracy as 'mediocracy' , meaning government both by the middle classes and by mediocrities . Democ ratic medio crity was a typically Fascist theme , but it can be found in revolutionary radicalism of any form . Piero Gobetti ' s asser tion is a particularly good example : ' Outside government , a reason ably capable mediocracy , which decides in advance that it can assume the role of assisting the people , attempts to corrupt direct action with reforms and conciliation , and to deceive rebels with conciliatory proposals which retain their enlightened and educative role . ' 5 Mediocrity is thus associated with reformism , the peaceful resolution of con flict and , more generally , a pragmatic view of politics and political conflict. I happened to read an article hy a left-wing writer who spoke of ' the idiocies of contractual ism' (a s tatement which practically made me leap out of my chair) . This contrast between the wardor and the merchant in evitably leads to the j ustification of violence, or p o s sibly even its exaltation : for the revolutionary left , it is the 26 EXTREMISTS AND MODERATES purifying violence which finally resolves humanity ' s prob lems , acting as the 'midwife of history ' (Marx) , and for the reactionary right , violence is the ' only way to clean up the world' (Marinetti ) , to quote j ust one of countle s s , monoto nous examples . 5 Although the radical rej ection of democracy a s a practice and a value system is not the only p oint of contact between extremists of left and right , it is certainly the most persist ent and significant. B efore Fascism came to power for the first time in Italy , as a response to Bolshevik threat , it first appeared as a radical ideology in France towards the end of the nineteenth century , and was itself partly a response to the Paris C ommune , a revolution which was not only threat ened , but attempted, altho ugh it was a general experiment in a revolution that could never be . In an impo rtant study of the history of French F a scism , Ni droite ni gauche ,6 the birth of this ideology , correctly defined as p re-Fascist , is typified by a fierce reaction against bourgeois democracy , which was equal and symmetrical to t h e same reaction by maximalist socialism . For both sides the scapegoat was s ocial democracy - or , in other words , the moderate version of the left , because it had accepted the rules of bourgeois democracy and had s ubsequently been corrupted by it. In spite of all these similarities , which j ustify the use of the same writers by both side s , and allow Barres to claim that ' S orel was the intellectual father of Fascism' , Fascism and communism still represent the great antithesis between right and left in this century . S trangely , not only have they failed to eliminate the distinction , they have made it even sharper. This is , I repeat , very strange . The only explanation , in my opinion, is that the criterion whereby one distinguishes EXTREM I S TS AND MODERATES 27 between left and right does not coincide with the one where by one distinguishes between left and ri ght within the two camps themselves - that is to say, between the extremist and moderate wings . The fact is that Fascism and communism are mutually exclusive , in spite of their common enemy , democracy , whose rules allow the left and the right to alternate in government . They are mutually exclusive be cause they reproduce in a specific form the p rincipal fea tures of what so far has typified the left and the right (which we will discuss later) . 6 Of the many third ways discussed , there has even been one proposed between socialism and liberalism , but no one has ever conceived of one b ridging communism and Fas cism, because it would be inconceivable . The one thing that they have in common , which is to intensify the principal features of their ideology and take them to their extreme conclusions , is precisely what makes them doctrinally irre concilable and in practice incompatible . An alliance between Fascists and conservatives , or the extreme right and the moderate right is possible , albeit in a situation of force majeure ; and Italian Fascism came to power as the result of just such an alliance . On the opposite side , a similar alliance between communism and socialism was only m o o ted in the popular democracies , and accomplished somewhat more fully in united action by Italian s ocialists and communists after the Liberation . An alliance between communists and Fascists would be a historical absurdity . The difference between extremism and moderatism mainly concerns method, whereas the antithesis between left and right mainly concerns values . The difference over values is stronger than the one over method s . This explains why in a 28 EXTREMISTS AND M ODERATES s erious historical crisis , an alliance between extremists and moderate right-wingers can have some succes s , as occurred with the Fascist regimes , where the moderate right felt obliged to accept the s upremacy of the extreme right. This kind of alliance would not be possible b etween right and left extremists , because they would disagree on values , not method s . Similar constraints explain why at the end of the S econd World War , the fear of a return to the pre-war sta tus q uo induced the socialists , at the cost of a painful and destructive split , to ally themselves with the communists that is to s ay , the extreme left . Of course , there was one spectacular example of an al liance between F a scism and communism : the non-aggression pact and p artition to the mutual advantage of Hitler ' s Germany and Stalin ' s S oviet Union , b u t i t w a s essentially a short-lived tactical alliance , which had no ideological conse quences other than the formation of a few small groups of Nazi Bolsheviks , who were 'lJOlitically insignificant . 7 3 The Left/Right Distinction S urvives 1 The terms 'left ' and ' right ' continue to be very much part of political terminology , in spite of all the arguments from various quarters which are used to challenge it ; and although the arguments have not changed , they are m o re frequent in these confused times . The people who use the words 'left' and ' right' do not appear to be u s ing words unthinkingly , because they understand e ach ,o ther perfectly . A great deal of the debate between political writers o ver the last few years has centred around the question : 'Where is the left going? ' D eb ates on ' the future of socialis m ' or ' the rebirth of the right ' have become so frequent as to be repetitive and tedious . The old left is constantly being reassessed in order to found a new left (but it is s till the 'left ' ) . Alongside the old defeated right has appeared a 'new right' which seeks vengeance . Democratic s ystems with sev eral parties are still perceived as semicircles r a n ging fro m right to left , or vice versa . Expressions such a s 'the right in parliament ' , 'the left in parliament' , ' right-wing govern ment' or ' left-wing government' have not lost a ny of their 30 THE LEFT/RI GHT DISTINCTION SURVIVE S meaning. Within the parties themselves , the currents which compete for the leadership in various periods and situations are still defined by the old names of 'left ' and ' right ' . W hen we discuss politicians , we have no hesitation in labelling them as left-wing or right-wing. For example , Occhetto is on the left and B erlusconi on the right. There has always been a Christian Democrat left . The leadership of the Movimento S ocialel has recently been taken over by a faction (led by Pino Rauti) which claimed that it wished to move to the left . E ven in such a minuscule , lifeless party as the Liberal Party ,2 the leaders have always been divided between a left and a right. The terms 'left ' and ' right' were little used , or used with great care , during the breakup of the Italian communist Party ; but this was due to the fact that only the word ' left ' h a d positive connotations within a p arty which assumed a leading role within the international left-wing movement . Neither of the factions contending for the leadership wo uld willingly have accepted being defined as the right of the party . It would in fact be difficult to e s iablish which faction was the left and which the right , be � ause the old guard which could be considered the right on the grounds that c onservatism is right-wing and change left-wing could at the s ame time be considered the left on the grounds of its greater commitment to the struggle against capitalism . On the other hand , the more innovative faction could claim to be the left of the party because it is more favourable to change , but its programme could be considered more right wing according to traditional criteria . We are faced with a paradox : at the same time a s this proliferation of writings which cast doubt on the left/right distinction , rej ect it or often ridicule it for the reasons THE L EFT/RIGHT D I S T INCTION SURVIVES 31 examined in the previous chapte r , this same dis tinction now has greater currency than ever before in Italian politi c s and culture . T h e reason for this i s the referendum which rej ected the electoral system which has until now obstructed the alternation of governments which is essen tial to good representative government , and a dopted the first-past-the-post system . It is now hoped that this reform will bring about a drastic reduction in the number of partie s , a definitive end to centrist governments, and the introduction of the much-hoped-for alternation between governments . But alternation between whom? Naturally, we are talking about alternation between left and right , o r , more specifically , between a n alliance formed around the Partito Democratico della Sinistra3 (which means the Demo cratic Party of the Left) and another alliance consisting of the Northern League , Alleanza Nazionale (ex-Movimento Sociale Italiano) and B erlusconi ' s Forza Italia .4 The former can only be defined as the left , and the latter as the right. The fact that not all those in the first alliance want to be labelled left-wing , and not all those in the second alliance want to be labelled right-wing (everyone choo s e s the label which brings in the most votes) does not in any way disprove the fact that Italy is moving towards a political system with a more well-defined division between left and right . 5 2 It is not at all surprising that a dyad, or dicho tomy , is the most common way of representing the political world , which is , by its very nature , antagonis tic and divided into oppos ing sides (partie s , interest group s , factions , and in interna tional relation s , peoples and nations) . We can e asily recall some famous historical examples : patrician s/plebeians , Guelphs/Ghibellines and Whigs/Tories. 32 THE LEFT/RIGHT DI STINCTION SURVIVES War , an essential dichotomy (mors tua vita mea) , is the most extreme manifestation of the ' friend/enemy ' distinc tion , which in turn is the most abstract way of representing politics as something antagonistic . There is no room for a third party in war , whether it is external or internal . A third pa rty can only appear as an intermediary to end hostilities and establish peac e . War , like a duel, can only have two contendents (it does not matter whether they have allies) , and one side must win , and one side must lose . A war in which there are neither winners nor losers is a war which has not fulfilled its purpose . T hird p a rties who do not get involved are defined as neutral, in that they do not s upport either side , and are not involved in the hostilities . From the moment they become involved in the conflict , they become allies of one side or the other. There can only ever be two sides to the conflict , however many the allies . Given the single great dichotomy between friend and foe , the inevitable reduction � f conflicts t o two opposing sides , or the attraction of various p otential contendents towards just two poles , which could be ternied bipolarization , is b ased on the principle that the friend of my enemy is m y enemy , whereas the enemy o f my enemy is m y friend . Where there are only two possible positions , and one must either b e a friend or an enemy (for this best expresses a polarized view of p olitics) , there are four pos sible combinations for polarizing more than two initial contendents: a friend can b e either the friend of a friend or the enemy of an enemy , and an enemy can be either the enemy of a friend or the friend of an enemy . Seemingly unnatural coalitions and alliances , both in international relations and between par ties within a single state , are in reality the natural conse quence of dichotomic logic . This dichotomy , which is clearly THE LEFTfRIGHT DISTINCTION SURVIVES 33 expressed in war , a n extreme example o f human relations , is also found in traditional religious and metaphysic al per ceptions , including those of the natural world (light/dark ness , order/chaos and ultimately , God/Devil) . 3 It was pure accident that the names given to the two political poles were ' left' and ' right' . As is well known , the use of these two words goes back to the French Revolution , at least as far as national politics are concerned. I t is an extremely banal spatial metaphor , whose origin w a s pure chance , and whose sole function was to name the dichotomy which has prevailed in politics for two centuries , and h a s prevailed because i t i s essential. T h e name could change , but the original, essential dichotomy would remain . The domination of the left/right distinction right up to the present day , in spite of repeated challenges , does not pre clude the existence of other spatial metaphors , which are less comprehensive and c oncern particular situations. A high/low distinction is used for the upper and lower houses of the British parliament , for the higher and lower clergy in the ecclesiastical hierarchy , and for an extremely u seful theory of government whereby p ower proceeds from bottom to top or from top to bottom . According to a hierarchical view of politics (which exists alongside the antagonistic one) , there is an in front/behind distinction. The princeps , a s suggested b y the original meaning of the w ord , c omes in the first row, and is followed by all the others , who are in fact called 'followers' o r the ' retinue ' . From the Leninis t view point , which is literally a princely concept of politic s (as in Gramsci's ' Mo dern Prince ' ) , the party is the vanguard of the proletariat , and 'vanguard' necessarily implies the ex istence of a rearguard. The distinction which concerns the 34 THE LEFT/RIGHT DISTINCTION SURVIVE S visibility of power and the way in which c ollective decisions are taken is between open and closed : the most relev ant his torical example is the contrast between the visible gov ernment of democratic states and the invisible government of a sovereign ' s secret cabinet which a dmitted only a few trusted friends , since the affairs of state had to be completely closed and inacces sible to the great mas s of subj ects . The most common metaphor in relation to the difference be tween p r ogrammes and positions held in any given political battle b e tween parties and movements is the near/far dis tinction , whereby the centre-right is close to the right , the centre-left close to the left , the left is further away from the right tha n from the centre , and so o n . In an extremely fragmented party system such as the Italian one has been up till now , the level of p olitical affinity becomes particularly important after an election , when shifts in voting patterns are as sessed, because shifts between parties which are closer to each other are eonsidered more probable . S ome of these metaphors , such as the high/low distinction , reflect a vertical universe , and some , su�h as the in front/be hind and near/far distinctions , a horiz � ntal universe . 4 The temporal metaphor , a s well a s the spatial one , holds an important position in political terminology . It make s it p o ssible to distinguish between innovators and conserva tives , progressives and traditionalists , and between those who look t o the rising sun of the future and those who are guided by the inextinguishable light of the past. There is nothing to prevent the spatial metaphor which gave ris e to the left/right distinction from corresponding to the temporal metaphor as far as one of its more frequent meanings is concerne d . THE LEFT/RIGHT D I STINCTION SURVIVES 35 O f course , it has to b e s aid straight away , i n order t o avoid pointless obj ections, that the prevailing use of the left/right pair to designate the principal antithesis which governs all the other political antitheses , does not mean that it is univocal, or indeed that it remains unchanged through tim e . Some conflicts become l e s s important , o r even dis appear, while others emerge . As long as there are conflicts , there will be polariz ation , although the principal antithesis may become secondary , and vice vers a , as time p asses and circumstances change . There is still polariz ation , even though the great historic changes of recent times might quite legitimately create the impression that much of the antagon ism has gone . One has only to think of the great antithesis between the North and the S outh which will increasingly dominate the political scene for the foreseeable future , although it is a simplification , like all distinctions applied to complex relations in human s ociety . 5 S o far I have limited myself to establishing the continued use of the distinction . I now wish to demonstrate that 'left ' and ' right ' have a descriptive meaning a n d an evaluative meaning, which , as with all other political term s , are n ot very precise , because o n the whole they are taken from everyday usage . The descriptive meaning , although vari able , is never so variable as to take on two meanings which are c ompletely contrary . Only under Big Brother do words have the opposite meaning to that in their common usage, but then the purpose of this distortion is to deceive the receiver of the message and make communication im possible. C onversely , words used in current political j argon can be ambiguou s , giving rise to different p ossihle interpre tations , and perhaps increasing the number of people who 36 THE LEFT/RIGHT D I STINCTION SURVIVES would find the mess age palatable , but never to the point of reversing the accepted meaning. As far a s the evaluative meaning is concerned, the positive c onnotation of the one must imply the negative connotation of the o ther , precisely because the two terms describe an antithesis . But which is axiologically positive and which axiologically negative depends not on the descriptive meaning, but on the two opposing value-j udgements which a re made of the things described. This h a s considerable c onsequences for the use of 'left' and ' right ' in p olitical and o ther terminologies , such as religious usage , where ' right ' always has a positive connotation and ' left ' a negative one . Not all dyads are axiologically reversible . The left/right pair clearly are not reversible in common usage , although they a re in politics . To be precise , a polarized view of a given universe implies that , taken together the two parts describe the whole of that universe , in the sense that every entity within that universe must belon g to o ne of the two parts , leaving no room for a third alternative ; but at the same time , the two parts are axiological opposites , because if you attribute a p ositive v alue to one of them , then the other necess a rily assumes a negative v alue . On the basis of this descriptive either/or , every entity within the universe belongs to one o r other part of the dya d . On the basis of the axiological either/o r , each part has the opposite sign to the other, b ut there is no obj ective reason why one should always represent good and the other always bad. The fact remains , howeve r , that as soon as one is raised up to represent good in a given contex t , the other necess arily comes to represent bad. The neutral observer , s uch as the historian or the s ocio logist , considers it his specific task to illustrate the descrip- THE LE FT/RIGHT DI STINCTI O N SURVIVES 37 tive meaning ; consequently , h e will demons trate which groups are considered by themselves o r others to be on the right or the left in a given situation. Activists , on the other hand , tend to attribute a po sitive value to their own p olitical programmes and a negative one to those of their opponents . This difference between the neutral observer and the activ ist means that repeated surveys of what is meant by left and right are not always reliable , and their usefulness is there fore somewhat doubtful . Precisely because the left/right distinction has very strong axiological connotations , p eople who belong to either side will tend to define their own side with words that are axiologically positive , and the other side with words that are axiologically negative . To give a straightforward and immediately understandable example , equality , which is a traditional element in the ideology of the left , is considered levelling down by s omeone on the righ t . Inequality, which for someone on the left is a statement of fact without ideological connotations , becomes hierarchical order for someone on the right. However , in spite of the caution with which we must treat these two term s , surveys confirm that the left/right distinc tion is still very much in use . 4 In S earch of the C riterion which Governs the Distinction 1 I f the distinction between left a n d right c ontinues to b e u s e d i n spite o f repeated challenges , the problem shifts from p roving its legitimacy �� an examination of the criteria p roposed for that legitimacy . In oth;er words , what is the reaso n , or what are the reasons , for .the distinction , given that ' left ' and ' right' are used to designate differences in thought and political activity? It should be remembered that the left/right distinction was first attacked because it was thought that the criteria that had been used until then were not clearly defined, or had become misleading as time had passed and circumstances change d . Luckily , there are not only detractor s , but also many more exponents than in the past , who have put forward their own answers to the question of the possible criterion or c riteria ; and as there is more consensus than dissent , the distinction is to some extent reinforced . Laponce , a professor at Toronto University , wrote the principal work on this s ubj ect in 1 9 8 1 . The book , Left and THE C RITERION WHICH GOVERNS THE D I S TINCTION 39 Right. The Topography of Political Perceptions ,l s um marizes previous analyses , and constitutes a basis for fur ther researc h . He makes some general , thought-provoking observations about the spatial metaphors used in political language , mainly distinguishing between the vertical spatial axis (higher/lower) and the horizontal one (left/right) . As I pointed out in the previous chapter , there are others , but for the moment we will limit ourselves to these two . Laponce considers the vertical axis to be more dominant than the horizontal one , which originated with the French Revolution , when the horizontal was supposed to replace the vertical . It should perhaps be observed that although in reality the names 'left ' and ' right' were c oined during the French Revolution , this was certainly not the o rigin of the horizontal concept of politics , if by this expression we mean the conflict between two opposing sides which is the essen tial and therefore persistent aspect of political strife or politics as strife . The vertical and horizontal dimensions of politics are separate , as they represent two different, inde pendent relationships in the political universe . Normally both dimensions coexis t , but either one can dis appear in extreme situations : the first can disappear in a civil war , and the second in a despotic system in which there is a s ingle power at the top and divisions are not permitted at the b as e . Laponce s tates only that the horizontal metaphor has never completely eliminated the vertical one . It should be added that it has never eliminated it for the simple rea son that it could never eliminate it . The two metaphors have different descriptive functions , and the total sphere of political rela tions is only represented by both together. Another curious and arguable notion is that the leftl right distinction is particularly important in a democracy , 40 T H E C RITER I O N WHICH GOVERNS THE DISTINCTIO N because elections divide t h e competing groups into two opposing camps . Leaving aside the consideration that it is only a p articular type of electoral system , rather than electoral systems in general , which fos ters the division into two opposing camp s , it is a much more universal principle than the electoral sys tem wh