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An indictment against appellee under the Sherman Act and Conspiracy Act concerned matters about which he had previously testified before a congressional subcommittee. The District Court dismissed the indictment, upholding appellee's contention that prosecution was barred under the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, providing that no person shall be prosecuted on account of any matter concerning which he testifies "in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution" under the Sherman Act and other specified statutes. Held: Appellee's testimony before the congressional subcommittee did not immunize him from prosecution, the Act of February 25, 1903, as amended in 1906, confining immunity to persons who testify in judicial proceedings under oath and in response to a subpoena.
215 F. Supp. 656, reversed and remanded.
Irwin A. Seibel argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Orrick and Robert B. Hummel.
George H. Lewald argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Edward B. Hanify and Alan D. Hakes.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal presents the question of whether a person who has testified under subpoena before a congressional committee investigating the operation of the Antitrust Acts has testified in a "proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said Acts" thereby acquiring immunity from prosecution [377 U.S. 95, 96] under the Act of February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904. 1
The facts are undisputed. On September 6, 1962, appellee, along with other individuals and corporations, was indicted on charges of conspiring to fix milk prices and to defraud the United States, in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1, and the Conspiracy Act, 62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C. 371. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground, inter alia, that the prosecution was barred under the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, because he had previously testified before a subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Small Business concerning matters covered by the indictment. The Government opposed the motion to dismiss contending that the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, extends only to judicial proceedings and not to hearings before congressional committees. 2 The District Court for the District of Massachusetts, rejecting the Government's contention, dismissed the indictment against appellee. The Government appealed the dismissal directly to this Court pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, 62 Stat. 844, as amended, 18 U.S.C. 3731. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 375 U.S. 809 .
We hold, for the reasons stated below, that the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, applies only to persons testifying in judicial proceedings, not to persons testifying before committees or subcommittees of Congress.
The immunity provision in question was enacted as part of an appropriations act which declared:
In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 , decided only three years after the passage of the Act of February 25, 1903, this Court construed that Act in accordance with the plain meaning of its words as follows:
Appellee does not really dispute this. His basic contention, which is not accepted by any member of the Court, 5 is that the 1906 immunity statute 6 amended the Act of February 25, 1903, to extend immunity to persons who testified in nonjudicial as well as judicial proceedings. He does not contend that the 1906 statute, by its terms, so amended the 1903 Act. He offers the following interpretation of the events leading up to the enactment of the 1906 statute in support of the contention that the 1903 Act was amended by implication to extend to non-judicial proceedings. In the case of United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808, decided three years after the enactment of the 1903 Act, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that certain defendants had been immunized from prosecution under the Antitrust Laws by giving unsubpoenaed and unsworn testimony in a nonjudicial investigation conducted [377 U.S. 95, 100] by the Commissioner of Corporations, 7 an official of the Department of Commerce and Labor. 8 Congressional reaction to this decision was immediate and adverse, and within four months Congress enacted the 1906 immunity statute. 9 This statute specifically limited immunity under existing immunity statutes to persons testifying under oath and in obedience to subpoena. 10 Appellee contends that the purpose of Congress in enacting the 1906 statute was to remedy the objectionable features of the Armour decision, and that since the statute did not "remedy" the court's holding that immunity could be obtained by testifying in a nonjudicial proceeding, it follows that Congress did not regard that holding as objectionable. He asks us to conclude, therefore, that [377 U.S. 95, 101] "proceeding" as used in the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, must now be read to include nonjudicial as well as judicial proceedings.
This argument erroneously assumes that the Armour decision rested on a construction of "proceeding, suit, or prosecution" in the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903. A reading of that decision reveals, however, that it rested primarily on the Commerce and Labor Act, which contained a specific grant of immunity to persons who testified in investigations, admittedly nonjudicial, conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations. 11 In deciding the Armour case, the court felt it [377 U.S. 95, 102] "necessary to look into the purposes of Congress in passing the commerce and labor act in order that the court may determine what construction will best carry out the legislative intent." 142 F., at 819. After a detailed analysis of that statute and its history, the court concluded that the Commerce and Labor Act was dispositive of the case and that defendants were entitled to immunity thereunder. Following this conclusion, the judge added a brief paragraph in which he said, without analyzing (or even quoting) the language or history of the Act of February 25, 1903, that he was "of opinion" that the defendants would also be entitled to immunity under that Act as well. Id., at 826. 12 In the very next paragraph, [377 U.S. 95, 103] however, the judge again described the opinion as resting on "the construction here given to the commerce and labor law . . . ." Ibid.
The controversial feature of the Armour decision, and the only one which Congress was interested in remedying, was the holding that unsubpoenaed and unsworn testimony came within "the purposes of Congress in passing the commerce and labor act . . . ." 142 F., at 819. Congress wanted to be certain that persons anticipating indictment could not immunize themselves from prosecution by volunteering to give unsworn testimony. 13 There was nothing controversial about the court's holding that immunity could result from testimony given in an investigation conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations, since the Commerce and Labor Act specifically granted immunity for testimony given in such an investigation.
It is not at all significant, therefore, that Congress, while "remedying" the Armour holding that immunity could be obtained from testimony which was unsworn and voluntary, did not "remedy" the holding that immunity could result from testimony given in nonjudicial investigations conducted by the Commissioner of Corporations. [377 U.S. 95, 104]
Congress, in enacting the 1906 statute, did not manifest any intent to enlarge the reach of the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, to include nonjudicial proceedings. The purpose of the 1906 statute was not to define the type of proceeding in which immunity, under existing statutes, could be obtained. Its sole purpose was to define the type of testimony for which immunity, under existing statutes, could be obtained. This is all Congress was asked to do by President Theodore Roosevelt in his message recommending the legislation which became the 1906 statute. In his message the President said:
We conclude, therefore, that the 1906 statute did not, either expressly or implicitly, extend the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, to include non-judicial proceedings. The 1906 Act simply limited immunity to persons testifying under oath and in response to subpoena.
Our decision today is based solely on the language and legislative history of the relevant congressional enactments. Congress has extended immunity, with careful safeguards, to persons testifying before congressional committees in certain limited situations not here involved. 18 Where Congress, however, has limited immunity to persons testifying in judicial proceedings, as it has plainly done here, it is not for the courts to extend the scope of the immunity.
The District Court erred, therefore, in holding that appellee's testimony before a congressional subcommittee had immunized him from prosecution. The judgment dismissing the indictment is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] The Government concedes that the testimony given before the subcommittee related to matters charged in the indictment.
[ Footnote 3 ] Congressional hearings are generally conducted under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, under the rules or regulations of either House, or, as in the present case, under a special resolution. H. Res. 51, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 Cong. Rec. 1785.
[ Footnote 4 ] This Act, as codified, appears at 15 U.S.C. 32. The codification, which has not been enacted into positive law, eliminates the appropriation provision of the Act which by its terms was of no effect after June 30, 1904. The codification makes no other change. 61 Stat. 638, 1 U.S.C. 204 (a), declares that the United States Code establishes "prima facie the laws of the United States, general and permanent in their nature . . . Provided, however, That whenever titles of such Code shall have been enacted into positive law the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein contained, in all the courts . . . ." This Court, in construing that statute has said that "the very meaning of `prima facie' is that the Code cannot prevail over the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent." Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 . Even where Congress [377 U.S. 95, 99] has enacted a codification into positive law, this Court has said that the
[ Footnote 5 ] See dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, post, at 113, note 11.
[ Footnote 6 ] The text of the 1906 statute is set forth infra, note 9.
[ Footnote 7 ] This conclusion was reached after the taking of testimony. Accordingly, the Government could not appeal the trial court's directed verdict of acquittal.
[ Footnote 8 ] The Armour case arose before the creation of independent Departments of Labor and of Commerce.
[ Footnote 9 ] The full text of the 1906 Act is as follows.
[ Footnote 10 ] See discussion of these events in United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 428 -429.
[ Footnote 11 ] "An Act to establish the Department of Commerce and Labor" provided in relevant part:
[ Footnote 12 ] Although Congressman Littlefield referred to this dictum in the debate on the House version of the bill, 40 Cong. Rec. 8738, he did not intimate that the 1903 Act was applicable to congressional investigations or that the purpose of the 1906 Act was to make it so applicable. On the contrary, Congressman Littlefield stated that the sole purpose of the Act was to limit immunity to subpoenaed and sworn testimony. He specifically said, moreover, that the 1906 Act and the Acts which it amended were intended to apply only to a "criminal prosecution . . . [and to investigations conducted by] the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . or by the Commissioner of Corporations . . .," and that the 1906 Act was intended to assure that no "person shall have the power to offer immunity to a witness except the Government of the United States or some officer acting in behalf thereof." Id., at 8739. This language, in its context, would not seem to include members or Committees of Congress. See also H. R. Rep. No. 3797, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. Furthermore, even if we were to assume arguendo that the Armour decision was based on a construction of the Act of February 25, 1903, we would be hesitant to accept appellee's argument that the failure of Congress to overrule that construction resulted in an amendment by implication. Amendments by implication, like repeals by implication, are not favored. See 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.) 365-366 (citing cases). As this Court said in Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524, 534 : "We do not expect Congress to make an affirmative move every time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation. In short, the original legislative language speaks louder than such judicial action."
[ Footnote 13 ] See United States v. Monia, supra, at 429.
[ Footnote 14 ] The Senate version of the bill prevailed in conference and was adopted. See H. R. Rep. No. 5049, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
[ Footnote 15 ] Senator Daniel's supposition that the 1906 Act "applies" to congressional committees was probably based on the erroneous assumption that the 1906 Act, in addition to amending the Acts to which it made specific reference, see note 9, supra, also amended 12 Stat. 333 which provided that: "the testimony of a witness examined and testifying before either House of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, shall not be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding against such witness in any court of justice . . . ." This statute was superseded in 1954 by 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C. 3486.
[ Footnote 16 ] Although the 1906 amendment referred to the Act of February 25, 1903, along with other immunity statutes, in limiting immunity to persons testifying under oath and in response to subpoena, Senator Knox was correct in suggesting that the Amendment would have little, if any, application to judicial testimony which is commonly sworn and subpoenaed.
[ Footnote 17 ] In Monia, which involved a grand jury investigation, the appropriate "Government officials" were the Attorney General and his subordinates. In Armour the appropriate government official was the Commissioner of Corporations. Congress may of course designate its own members as appropriate officials, as it has in fact done in certain limited situations not here involved, see note 18, infra.
It is true that the Monia opinion, with regard to the issue raised in that case, considered the 1903 Act as having the same effect as the Interstate Commerce Act. The issue in that case was whether a witness was required to claim his privilege against self-incrimination as a condition of obtaining immunity. It is undisputed that the 1906 Act standardized the rules relating to the types of testimony which would be privileged under the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commerce and Labor Act, and the Act of February 25, 1903. The 1906 Act did not, however, standardize (or alter) the types of proceedings in which immunity could be obtained.
[ Footnote 18 ] See Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C. 3486.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting.
The appellee was indicted for conspiracy 1 and violation of 1 of the Sherman Act 2 shortly after he had [377 U.S. 95, 108] appeared and testified about the alleged violation before a Committee of Congress in obedience to its subpoena. The District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the prosecution was barred by the Antitrust Immunity Act of February 25, 1903, 3 as amended in 1906. 4 The Immunity Act provides:
The Court appears to find much comfort for its holding in the Act's language appropriating funds to the Attorney General for the employment of special counsel and agents of the Department of Justice "to conduct proceedings, suits, and prosecutions under said [Interstate Commerce or Antitrust] Acts in the courts of the United [377 U.S. 95, 109] States." The Immunity Act itself was appended to the appropriation language following the word "Provided." But the appropriation provision was merely utilized as a legislative vehicle for passage of the substantive Immunity Act in the form of a proviso. The language after the word "Provided" is a separate and distinct immunity enactment, itself part of an immunity program enacted by Congress in 1903 in order to aid in the enforcement of the Antitrust Acts by compelling witnesses to testify upon this broad statutory promise of immunity by the Government. 6 This immunity provision of the 1903 enactment is complete in itself, independent of the appropriation provision. In fact, so independent is the immunity provision, that in the codification of the statute, 15 U.S.C. 32, the appropriation provision has been dropped altogether, making the majority's effort to limit the immunity provision's language by that of the appropriation provision even more strained. Therefore the 1903 Act, as amended in 1906, clearly - unless the meaning of its language is to be amended by judicial decree - stands as a lasting obligation upon the Government to give complete immunity to a witness who testifies "in obedience to a subpoena . . . under oath," not merely in a "suit, or prosecution under said Acts" but "in any proceeding . . . under said [Interstate Commerce or Antitrust] Acts." The word "proceeding," broad enough to include testimony before a grand jury, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 , is also broad enough to include testimony given under oath in obedience to a subpoena before any federal agency or legislative committee investigating antitrust violations. [377 U.S. 95, 110]
The historical setting of the 1903 Immunity Act shows, I think, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that the word "proceeding" was deliberately chosen in order to provide a grant of immunity for testimony concerning antitrust violations given before investigatory agencies that were wholly nonjudicial. During the month of February 1903, Congress also passed an Act, including provisions for immunity, which established the Department of Commerce and Labor and conferred upon the Commissioner of Corporations (an official of the Department of Commerce and Labor) the investigatory powers possessed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 32 Stat. 825, 828. See also 32 Stat. 847, 848. Soon after the 1903 legislation was passed, officers of Armour & Company testified voluntarily before the Commissioner of Corporations concerning antitrust violations. The company and the officers were later indicted by a federal grand jury for violation of the Sherman Act. United States District Judge Humphrey in 1905, in United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (D.C. N. D. Ill.), directed a verdict for the individual defendants on the ground that the Antitrust Immunity Act of February 25, 1903, gave individuals who testified before the Commissioner of Corporations complete immunity from prosecution. The district judge held that this immunity was granted both by that Act (the Act here in question) and by the Commerce and Labor Act of 1903, supra. As to the applicability of the Act before us, he said:
The subsequent legislative treatment of the Antitrust Immunity Act of 1903 supports Judge Humphrey's holding that the complete immunity which that Act granted was not limited to testimony given in judicial proceedings only. The part of Judge Humphrey's opinion that caused great concern to the Government was his holding that witnesses obtained complete immunity from prosecution based on their testimony even though they had not been subpoenaed or put under oath. This concern prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to send a message to Congress requesting that the law be amended in this respect. The President's message specifically showed that he did not want to take away the immunity of witnesses who testified or produced documentary evidence, but simply wanted the law to grant immunity only to witnesses who appeared under subpoena and testified under oath - that is, those who were compelled to testify. Showing that this was his only objection to Judge Humphrey's holding, the President in his message told the Congress:
From that day until this no one seems ever to have doubted that this reading of the 1903 Antitrust Immunity Act was correct. In fact, in 1942 this Court obviously read the statute the same way in United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 . Monia and another claimed complete immunity under that Act as amended in 1906 because they had testified before a federal grand jury inquiring into alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws. The Act [377 U.S. 95, 114] was fully considered in the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Not only was there in that case no intimation that the immunity provided in the Act was for testimony given before judicial agencies only, but both opinions went on a precisely opposite assumption. In holding that the Act gave immunity even to a witness who had not asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against being compelled to testify against himself, Mr. Justice Roberts speaking for the Court treated the 1903 Act before us as covering the same kinds of "proceedings" as the immunity provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended in 1893, 12 which gave a complete immunity for testimony given before the Commission. Moreover, in his detailed dissent Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred at length to the immunity provisions contained in various statutes establishing governmental agencies both before and after the passage of the 1903 Act, such as the Securities Act, 13 the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 14 the Motor Carrier Act, 15 the Fair Labor Standards Act, 16 and various others. 317 U.S. 424, 431 . Surely all these were not cited in the belief that the 1903 Act related to testimony given before judicial bodies only. It is plain beyond doubt that they were referred to on the assumption that the 1903 Act granted whatever immunity it did, not merely for testimony given before judicial bodies, but for testimony given before all the various governmental agencies that subpoena witnesses to give evidence before them on antitrust matters.
The Antitrust Immunity Act of 1903 was passed at a time when the fear of prosecution was making testimony [377 U.S. 95, 115] from witnesses often impossible to obtain and thereby impeding enforcement of the antitrust laws. It was passed by a Congress friendly to those laws, not to frustrate but to help enforce them. 17 Whether it was a wise or, in the case of an unwilling witness, constitutionally legitimate 18 means for Congress to use in seeking that goal is not the issue in this case. Wise or unwise, it was a solemn promise made by Congress which I think the Government should keep, just as I thought that the Government should have been compelled to keep a solemn promise of immunity made by the Secretary of the Treasury in Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 367 (dissenting opinion). The very fact that the Court must labor so long and hard to reach its result is in my judgment strong evidence that that result should not have been reached, for I think that when the Government makes an obligation in broad terms on which individuals have a reasonable right to rely, it should not seek to have all doubts resolved in its own favor against the private citizens who have taken it at its word. Important as I believe the antitrust laws to be, I believe it is more important still that there should be no room for anyone to doubt that when the Government makes a promise, it keeps it. Cf. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 124 (dissenting opinion).
I would affirm the judgment.
[ Footnote 1 ] 62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C. 371.
[ Footnote 2 ] 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1.
[ Footnote 3 ] 32 Stat. 854, 904, 15 U.S.C. 32.
[ Footnote 4 ] 34 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. 33.
[ Footnote 5 ] The Acts with respect to which immunity from prosecution was given are the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 1-27, 41-43, 301-327, the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1-7, and the antitrust provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, 73-76, 28 Stat. 509, 570, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 8-11.
[ Footnote 6 ] See also the identical immunity provisions in the Commerce and Labor Act of February 14, 1903, 6, 32 Stat. 825, 828, incorporating by reference Compulsory Testimony Amendment of 1893 to the Interstate Commerce Act, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C. 46, and in the Elkins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, Act of February 19, 1903, 3, 32 Stat. 847, 848, 49 U.S.C. 41-43.
[ Footnote 7 ] 142 F., at 826.
[ Footnote 8 ] Message of the President, H. R. Doc. No. 706, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2.
[ Footnote 9 ] 40 Cong. Rec. 8738.
[ Footnote 10 ] 40 Cong. Rec. 7657 (emphasis supplied).
[ Footnote 11 ] I agree with the Court that Congress in the 1906 statute did not "manifest any intent to enlarge the reach of the immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, to include nonjudicial proceedings." Ante, p. 104. But the Act of 1903, as pointed out above, clearly applied to nonjudicial proceedings without any enlargement; it was never limited to judicial "proceedings," but granted complete immunity to witnesses who testified before governmental agencies other than those that could be called judicial.
[ Footnote 12 ] 27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C. 46.
[ Footnote 13 ] 48 Stat. 74, 87, 15 U.S.C. 77v (c).
[ Footnote 14 ] 49 Stat. 803, 832, 15 U.S.C. 79r.
[ Footnote 15 ] 49 Stat. 543, 550, 49 U.S.C. 305 (d).
[ Footnote 16 ] 52 Stat. 1060, 1065, 29 U.S.C. 209.
[ Footnote 17 ] See 36 Cong. Rec. 411-419. The provision was not debated in the Senate. See id., 989-990.
[ Footnote 18 ] Compare Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (dissenting opinion).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs, dissenting.
I am inclined to construe this Immunity Act more in harmony with its literal language than is the Court; [377 U.S. 95, 116] and the reasons I do so are in part those stated by Mr. JUSTICE BLACK and in part the nature of the modern congressional committee. The trial-nature of the modern investigating committee argues strongly for a construction of this Act that gives immunity to one subjected to scrutiny and probing under the full glare of today's hearing methods.
Congressional investigations as they have evolved, are in practice "proceedings" of a grave nature so far as individual liberties are concerned. Not all committee hearings are "trials" of the witness; not all committee hearings are televised or broadcast; and so far as appears this witness was not subjected to any such ordeal. 1 But the problem with which we deal concerns not a particular committee nor a particular hearing but the generalized meaning of "proceeding" as used in the Act of February 25, 1903.
Courts cannot enjoin a committee from questioning a witness anymore than they can enjoin passage of a palpably unconstitutional bill. See Nelson v. United States, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 208 F.2d 505. But courts, knowing the manner in which committees often operate, are properly alert either in denying legal effect to what has been done or in taking other steps protective of the rights of the accused. 2 See Nelson v. United States, 93 U.S. App. D.C., at 22, 208 F.2d, at 513. That is one reason why I would not import any ambiguities into this Immunity Act to the disadvantage of the accused.
The present investigation was in my view a "proceeding, suit, or prosecution" under the antitrust laws within [377 U.S. 95, 117] the meaning of the Act of February 25, 1903. The House Committee before which Welden testified was trenching on the same ground as the present antitrust prosecution. Its power to proceed derived of course from the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, the Rules and Regulations of the House, or a Special Resolution. The power to investigate extends to the manner in which laws are being administered and to the need for new laws. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 . The questions put by the House Committee were allowable, as they clearly were, only because they pertained to the manner in which the antitrust laws were operating or to the need for more effective laws. They were therefore "under" the antitrust laws.
We have repeatedly said that a congressional investigation which exposes for exposure's sake or which is "conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to `punish' those investigated is indefensible." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S., at 187 . Congress is not a law enforcement agency; that power is entrusted to the Executive. Congress is not a trial agency; that power is entrusted to the Judiciary. Some elements of a "fair" hearing are provided by Committee Rules (Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 ); some by constitutional requirements. By reason of the First Amendment Congress, being unable to abridge freedom of speech or freedom of the press, may not probe into what a witness reads (cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 ), or why a publisher chose one editorial policy rather than another. Since by reason of the First Amendment Congress may make no law "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, it may not enter the field through investigation and probe the minds of witnesses as to whether they go to church or to the confessional regularly, why they chose this church rather than that one, etc. By reason of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, witnesses [377 U.S. 95, 118] may refuse to answer certain questions. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 ; Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 ; Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 .
There are other limitations. "The Senate, for instance, could not compel a witness to testify in a Senate investigation whose sole and avowed purpose was to determine whether a particular federal official should be impeached, since only the House can impeach. The House could not force a witness to testify in a House investigation whose sole and avowed purpose was to decide the guilt of a person already impeached, or to determine whether or not a treaty should be ratified, since the Constitution entrusts these functions to the Senate. Neither House could conduct an investigation for the sole and avowed purpose of determining whether an official of the State of New York should be impeached, since that determination is reserved to the Legislature of that State." Snee, Televising Congressional Hearings, 42 Geo. L. J. 1, 9 (1953).
In these and other related ways, congressional committees are fenced in. Yet in the view of some of us the tendency has been to trench on First Amendment rights. See Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 ; Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 ; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 . There was a time when a committee, knowing that a witness would not answer a question by reason of the Fifth Amendment, would not put the question to him. Today, witnesses who invoke the Fifth Amendment at the threshold have been minutely examined, apparently to see how many times they can be forced to invoke it. 3 Hearings have indeed often become a spectacle, 4 [377 U.S. 95, 119] some of the reasons being succinctly stated by the experienced Chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, and head of the Permanent Committee on Investigations, Senator McClellan of Arkansas:
Some may see wisdom in this modern kind of "trial by committee," so to speak, with committees and prosecutors competing for victims. But the more I see of the awesome power of government to ruin people, to drive them from public life, to brand them forever as undesirable, the deeper I feel that protective measures are needed. I speak now not of constitutional power, but of the manner in which a statute should be read. I therefore incline to construe the Immunity Act freely to hold that he who runs the gantlet of a committee cannot be "tried" again.
[ Footnote 1 ] Respondent's testimony before the Committee appears in Hearings, Special Subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pursuant to H. Res. 51, Pt. IV, pp. 665-700.
[ Footnote 2 ] For analogous instances of the alertness of the Court to protect an accused against the effect of pretrial publicity, see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 ; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 .
[ Footnote 3 ] See Hearings before Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on Financial or Business Interests of Officers or Employees of the Senate, 88th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pp. 1337-1363 (Robert G. Baker); Hearings before Senate Select Committee on Improper [377 U.S. 95, 119] Activities in the Labor or Management Field, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1511-1578, 1654-1684, 2038-2047, 2374-2405 (Dave Beck); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 583 -587 (dissenting opinion).
[ Footnote 4 ] Barth, Government by Investigation (1955), p. 81; Rogge, The First and the Fifth (1960), p. 204; American Bar Association, Report on Congressional Investigations (1954).
[ Footnote 5 ] Metropolitan Broadcasting, "Opinion in the Capital," Interview with Senator John McClellan, March 1, 1964. For a like defense of televised hearings see Senator Kefauver, 97 Cong. Rec. 9777 et seq.
[ Footnote 6 ] Snee, Televising Congressional Hearings, 42 Geo. L. J. 1, 2-3 (1953).
[ Footnote 7 ] White House Press Release, as quoted by Chicago Daily News, June 27, 1951, p. 49, col. 5, and quoted in Snee, supra, note 6, at 2.
Congressman Magee said in 97 Cong. Rec. A1145: ". . . there is no more reason for televising crime investigations than there is in televising criminal trials. Of necessity, many of our criminal cases develop lurid and obscene testimony. Some of it is unfit to put in public print. Certainly it is unfit to go out over the air waves. Many witnesses would despair at the thought of testifying when they were being viewed by television. It is bad enough for a timid witness to face a small courtroom of spectators; but it would be far worse if that person knew that he or she was being spied upon by television addicts all over the Nation. Certainly it would not be conducive to clear thought or expression. I cannot feel that the courts will ever force witnesses to subject themselves to this needless procedure. To me the whole idea is inane and repulsive. It would bring the Congress to a new low level in public esteem. The dignity of the courtroom would become only a memory while its sacred portals became a testing ground for the future Faye Emersons and Jimmie Durantes." And see Gossett, Justice and TV, 38 A. B. A. J. 15 (1952); Yesawich, Televising & Broadcasting Trials, 37 Cornell L. Q. 701 (1952); Arnold, Mob Justice and Television, 12 Fed. Com. B. J. 4 (1951); Klots, Trial by Television, Harper's, October 1951, 90; Report of the Special Committee on Televising and Broadcasting, 77 Rep. A. B. A., p. 607 et seq. (1952).
Telecasting and broadcasting of committee hearings are banned by the House. See 98 Cong. Rec. 1334-1335, 1443, 1567-1571, 1689-1691, 1949-1952, 5394-5395, A1152-A1153, A1176, A1180, A1196, A1227; 108 Cong. Rec. 267-269.
[ Footnote 8 ] Op. cit., supra, note 4, at 82.
[ Footnote 9 ] Id., at 83.
[ Footnote 10 ] When Men Fear to Speak, Freedom Withers on the Vine, Address, Indiana B'nai B'rith Convention, Sept. 27, 1953. See Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113, where the Court of Appeals in setting aside a conviction said:
[ Footnote 11 ] 97 Cong. Rec. 9768. [377 U.S. 95, 124]
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Citation: 377 U.S. 95
Docket No: No. 235
Argued: February 27, 1964
Decided: April 20, 1964
Court: United States Supreme Court
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Welcome to our complete catalogue of reports and studies (which includes backgrounders, policy briefs, full-length research reports and books).
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Navigating the changing terrain of university finance
by Erika Shaker, David MacdonaldSeptember 11, 2013 | National Office
by Christine Saulnier, Kyle Buott, Judy HaivenAugust 28, 2013 | Nova Scotia Office
Spring/Summer 2013, Volume 16, Number 2
edited by Sarah Leavitt, Terra Poirier, Shannon DaubAugust 7, 2013 | BC Office
A Critical Analysis of Changes to Special Needs Assistance in Nova Scotia
by Sara Wuite, Christine Saulnier, Stella LordJuly 17, 2013 | Nova Scotia Office
Creative License: Education, Social Justice and the Arts
by Erika ShakerJuly 16, 2013 | National Office
by Peter Prebble, Ann CoxworthJuly 11, 2013 | Saskatchewan Office
Violence Against Women in Canada
by Kate McInturffJuly 11, 2013 | National Office
Employment Growth in the New Saskatchewan
by Erin WeirJune 25, 2013 | Saskatchewan Office
Presentation to the House of Commons Standing Committee on International Trade
by Scott SinclairJune 24, 2013 | National Office
by Rebecca Priegert Coulter, Ahnungoonhs/Brent DebassigeJune 21, 2013 | National Office
Indigenous children in Canada
by David Macdonald, Daniel WilsonJune 19, 2013 | National Office
The Impact of Taxation in the Higher Education Debates
by Hugh MackenzieJune 14, 2013 | National Office
The Case for Water Use Reporting in BC
by Ben ParfittJune 11, 2013 | BC Office
Canada's Submarine Program Springs a Leak
by Michael Byers, Stewart WebbJune 11, 2013 | National Office

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Night Broken
#1 New York Times bestselling author Patricia Briggs's Mercy Thompson series has been hailed as one of the best (Fiction Vixen). Now, Mercy must deal with an unwanted guest-one that brings a threat unlike anything she's ever known. An unexpected phone call heralds a new challenge for Mercy. Her mate Adam's ex-wife is in trouble, on the run from a stalker. Adam isn't the kind of man to turn away a person in need-and Mercy knows it. But with Christy holed up in Adam's house, Mercy can't shake the feeling that something about the situation isn't right. Soon, her suspicions are confirmed when she learns that Christy has the farthest thing from good intentions. She wants Adam back and she's willing to do whatever it takes to make it happen, including turning Adam's pack against Mercy. Mercy isn't about to step down without a fight, but there's a more dangerous threat circling. Christy's stalker is more than a bad man-in fact, he may not be human at all. As the bodies start piling up, Mercy must put her personal troubles aside to face a creature with the power to tear her whole world apart.


text:
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text:
|Maurice de Forest
She claims that she is a great-great-great-granddaughter of Queen Victoria. As the author of the book, Queen Victoria's Descendants, and Queen Victoria's Descendants: A Companion Volume, I do know a lot about Victoria's descendants. There are now more than 1100 descendants. Some of the descendants are illegitimate. I call them natural descendants. These are the descendants who have been acknowledged by their QVD parent.
I am also good at sniffing out the phony claims. It is one thing to claim you are a descendant of Victoria. It is another to prove it. Trust me: I have busted more than one phony-QVD balloon.
Victoria's eldest son, Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, was a ladies' man. He may have fathered a few children, but nearly all of his mistresses were married, and he never acknowledged any illegitimate children. He certainly never met Maurice Forest's mother.
Emmelie claims her grandfather, Count Maurice Arnold de Forest, was the the illegitimate son of King Edward VII (as Prince of Wales) and an Austrian princess, who was a member of the Habsburg family. [Distaff members are Archduchesses, not princesses.] The story has a certain amount of embellishment about it. De Forest's background was a bit sketchy, but I have two words to describe Emmelie's claim: bull dinkies!
Maurice Arnold de Forest was born on January 9, 1879 in Paris. One source states he was the second son of Ferdinand Raphael Bischoffsheim and his wife, Mary Paine. This is incorrect.
His birth was registered in Paris. Records show that Maurice was the elder son of Edward de Forest (1848-1882) and Juliette Arnold (1860-1882), an American couple who worked in French circuses. He had a younger brother, Raymond (1880-1912). The family lived on the Rue Legendre in Paris. Edouard and Juliette were originally from New York. The source for the details about Maurice's parents is in Le Moïse des Amériques. Vies et œuvres du munificent baron de Hirsch by Dominique Frischer, which was published in 2002 by Paris-based publisher Grasset.
Edward and his wife were in Constantinople on tour, when they died in a typhoid epidemic in 1882. Their deaths were noted in church records in Constantinople. The two young boys were soon adopted by German-born Baron Moritz (Maurice) von Hirsch. He and his wife, Clara Bischoffsheim, the daughter of a Belgian Senator, lived in a very large home in Paris. It is suffice to say the Baron was a multi-millionaire.
What was the connection between the two young boys and the very rich Jewish Baron and his wife? Was Clara a very understanding woman, who made a home for two boys who may have been fathered by her husband? Although several sources, including contemporary sources, state that von Hirsch was the natural father of the two boys, French civil records list an American, Edouard (Edward) de Forest, as the father.
Baron von Hirsch and his son Lucien funded orphanages in Russia, Belgium and France. The two boys had been placed in the care of friends or an institution when their parents went on tour. Now as orphans, they needed a home, and Moritz and Clara adopted them.
Maurice and Raymond retained the de Forest surname, but added Bischoffsheim, which was Clara's maiden name. They did not receive the von Hirsch surname because they were not the Baron's sons. Nor were they Clara's nephews.
Baron von Hirsch amassed a huge fortune in banking, starting his career with the banking house of Bischoffsheim & Goldsmidt. He married Clara Bischoffscheim 1855.
The family had homes in Hungary and London, but their primary residence was in Paris. Both Moritz and Clara were known for their philanthropic works. On the occasion of Franz Joseph's 40th anniversary on the throne, Baron von Hirsch donated £500,000 to develop primary schools in Galicia and Bukowina. He also was a major supporter of providing financial relief for repatriating Russian Jews.
He parlayed his growing wealth with the development of the railroads in Austria, the Balkans and Turkey. His father, the banker to the King of Bavaria, was created a baron in 1869.
Young Maurice attended Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. In 1899, Austrian Emperor Franz Josef, created Maurice and Raymond as Baron von Forest. It is unlikely that the 20-year-old Maurice was ennobled by the Austrian emperor because he was the illegitimate son of the Prince of Wales. Both brothers were raised to the rank of baron. There are two schools of thought for the reason why Maurice and Raymond were ennobled. Baron von Hirsch had been successful in obtaining a Belgian baronial title for his legitimate son, Lucien, and may also have petitioned Franz Josef for titles for his two natural sons. But there is no concrete evidence to assume that the baron was the boys' father. The titles were not bestowed until after Moritz's death.
More likely they received the titles because of Baron and Baroness von Hirsch's numerous charitable bequests to Austro-Hungarian organizations.
This was noted in the Court Circular on March 6, 1899. "The Emperor of Austria has given the title of Baron De Forest to M. Arnold Forest and to his brother M. Raymond De Forest, both the adopted sons of Baroness de Hirsch and Gereuth, widow of the late Baron de Hirsch."
Von Hirsch died in Hungary at the age of 64 in 1896. His wife died three years later. Maurice inherited his adoptive father's Austrian residence, Schloss Eichhorn (now known as Veveri Castle, near Brno), and which he owned until 1925, when it was appropriated by the Czech government. De Forest received £100,000 from the Czech government.
Maurice and Raymond were the main beneficiaries of Baroness de Hirsch's estate. Maurice received 25,000,000 Francs, as well as her estates in Rossitz-Eichhorn, Austria. Baron Raymond received 20,000,000 francs and the Chateau de Beauregard in Paris. These legacies were held in trust until each man reached his 30th birthday. When he turned 35, Maurice inherited a further $10 million dollars from his adoptive mother's estate. One has to consider why Maurice and Raymond received the bulk of Clara's fortune? Moritz and Clara left millions to charities as well. Their only son, Lucien, was already deceased.
The brothers also inherited all of the Baroness' furniture, paintings, jewelery, "contained in her mains on the Rue de l'Elysée, Paris, as well as the two houses bearing the numbers 4 and 6 in the same street," reported Reuters.
Raymond died unmarried in 1912. It is likely that his older brother inherited his share of the von Hirsh fortune.
De Forest was naturalized as a British subject in 1900, and received by royal license the right to use his title in the United Kingdom. This was done by direct command of Queen Victoria. No reason for the grant was given. In the same year, she commanded that Baron Boxall, whose title was bestowed by the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, could use his title in Britain.
Queen Victoria did not grant de Forest the right to use his year-old-barony in the United Kingdom on the basis that Maurice was her grandson. He was not her grandson. He was not the first nor the last naturalized Briton with a foreign title to be granted the right to use the title in Britain.
So what was the connection to the Prince of Wales?
Baron von Hirsch was a financial adviser to the Prince of Wales (the future Edward VII). They were introduced by the Austrian Crown Prince, Archduke Rudolf. They first met sometime in the 1880s. One of Edward's biographers, Sir Philip Magnus states that the first meeting took place in 1886. Not long afterward, Bertie visited von Hirsch at his estate, St. Johann, in Hungary. Maurice was born in 1879. In other words, it would have been impossible for Bertie to be Maurice's natural father.
This is confirmed by one of Hirsch's biographers. Crown Prince Rudolf met von Hirsch at a shooting party in September 1886. It was in December 1886 that Hirsch "obtained an introduction to the Prince of Wales, from Rudolf in consideration of a loan of 100,000 gulden. After Rudolf's tragic death in 1889, it was said in Vienna that his debt was waived in return for nobility conferred on Hirsch's natural sons whom his widow had adopted."
Sir Philip also wrote: "after losing his only legitimate son in 1887, Hirsch announced that humanity would be his heir." This meant that Baron von Hirsch also had illegitimate issue, again leading to the possibility that he was the father of the two boys. Hirsch's Viennese obituaries noted that he had "lately had always been accompanied by two young boys, whose mother had been English, or American," according to Kurt Grünwald, the author of Türkenhirsch A Study of Baron Maurice de Hirsch. The boys' mother was American. So was their father.
Maurice de Forest certainly knew the Prince of Wales. In 1899, he was a guest at a shooting party at Sandringham. This connection was due not to fatherhood but to the Prince of Wales' friendship with Baron von Hirsch. The Baron also entertained King Edward and Queen Alexandra at Spencer House. It is very unlikely that Alexandra would have agreed to attend a dinner hosted by her husband's illegitimate son.
An engagement between Maurice and Mathilde Madeleine Menier, nee Letellier, widow of Albert Menier, was announced in April 1901, and would "shortly take place." There are no further reports of the marriage, but it took place in Paris sometime in 1901. In June 1903, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported "a great sensation was caused this week in sport circles by the divorce of the Baronne de Forest. Though the differences had been discussed for some time, the actual proceeding was kept secret, until she came into court of Wednesday with the petition."
Madeleine was the daughter of Eugene Letellier, the owner of Le Journal, a French newspaper.
The Baroness was described as a "racing enthusiast" with many victories. Her estranged husband was said to be a "great votary of yachting, passing much time aboard his Nemesis."
Madeleine gave birth to a daughter, Mabel Béatrix Clara Mary Magdalen, on March 5, 1902. (De Forest had been raised Jewish, and converted to Catholicism before his first marriage. It seems unlikely that Bertie would have allowed for a child of his, even an illegitimate child, to be raised in the Jewish faith.) As Maurice's real parents' deaths were registered in a church, it seems likely that he and his brother were not Jewish from birth.
Madeleine died in 1952 at the age of 82.
Mabel was married three times. Her first marriage took place in 1923 to a French politician Edmond Marcel Barrachin (1900-1975). A second marriage to French tennis player Jean Barotra (1898-1994) took place in 1937. The third marriage to Andre Louis Mariotti occurred in 1956. I have no information on Mabel's death, but she did have three children by her first marriage and a son, Yves, by her second marriage.
At the time of her marriage to Barotra, Mabel was described as "fair and slim and a good tennis player." She met her second husband at the British embassy in Paris in 1931.
After his first marriage was was annulled, Maurice was free to remarry. On February 11, 1904, he wed the Hon. Ethel Catherine Hannah Gerard, daughter of the 2n Baron Gerard. The wedding took place at the Roman Catholic Church of St. Oswald, Garwood, Lancashire. According to the report in the Court Circular, the "church was decorated with flowers." The best man was Eric Chaplain, son of Mr. Chaplin, MP. The bride was given away by her brother, Lord Gerard, and she had seven bridesmaids: Lady Marjorie Erskine, Miss May and Miss Aline Beresford, Miss Winifred and Miss Eve Gerard, and Miss Violet de Trafford. Her train was carried by Miss Marjorie Lowther.
The reception was held at Garwood, and the couple's honeymoon was spent on the Continent. One of the wedding gifts was an "enamelled umbrella handle studded with pearls" from Prince Christian, husband of Princess Helena.
Maurice was a keen yachtsman, and owned several yachts. He also enjoyed horse racing and aviation. Before the first World War, the baron lived at Spencer House in London, leasing it for several years.
The couple had two sons, Alaric Frederick Maurice (1905-1973), and John Gerard (1907)
The couple separated in 1910, due to the Baroness' adultery with a young man, Lt. Frank Ashton. There were legal battles, including a slander case. In 1913, the newspapers reported that the couple had reconciled. They moved to the South of France, where they maintained a large estate.
Edith was said to find "life intolerable, owing to her husband's foreign ways and his inability to accustom himself to English ethics and prejudice, in spite of his having been educated at Eton and Oxford."
De Forest was a close friend of Winston Churchill and his wife Clementine. They made several visits to the baron's Austrian home, Schloss Eichhorn, including their honeymoon.
He became an active member of the Liberal Party, and ran for Parliament in Southport. He lost the election, despite the support from Churchill. Later in the year, he was elected to the London City Council, representing Kennington. He remained in this position until 1913.
A parliamentary by-election in West Ham North was held in July 1911. De Forest ran for this seat, and won. He held the seat until 1918. Largely due to his foreign title, de Forest was considered by many to be in sympathy with the enemy. He served with the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve and the Royal Naval Air Service Armoured Car Section.
In a letter to The Times in 1915, the baron's lawyers wrote in response to an article about a meeting where the baron was described as a "naturalized British subject of Austrian birth." The lawyers responded: "...these suggestions are absolutely untrue. Our client was not born, and has never been, of Austrian or German nationality."
On January 16, 1920, Maurice finally renounced his Austrian baronial title, and reverted to his birth surname de Forest. In 1932, he was granted Liechtenstein nationality, and the Prince of Liechtenstein gave him the title Count de Bendern. Bendern is a tiny village in Liechtenstein. He also tried to distant himself from the connections to the von Hirsch family, which the de Bendern family have acknowledged. Maurice's legitimate descendants are well aware of their father's ancestry, and the family tree does not include King Edward VII.
In 1924, Maurice sold his Georgian townhouse at 59 Grosvenor Street in Mayfair. Three years later, he applied for restitution for the loss of his Austrian estates, including Schloss Eichhorn, from the Anglo-Austrian Tribunal. A settlement was reached in early 1928, and de Forest received £100,000 for his Austrian estates, which were now located in Czechoslovakia.
Maurice became known as Count Maurice de Bendern, and his two sons, Alaric and John dropped de Forest and were styled as Counts de Bendern. After leaving England, Maurice settled in the south of France, in a mansion on Cap Martin. He had acquired an art collection, including Frans Hals' The Flute Player, which was stolen in 1967. He also maintained homes in England and in Switzerland.
The 88-year old count told The Times: "Two years ago this painting, with 20 other valuable pictures, was dispatched from my property at Prangins, Switzerland, into the custody of a Geneva bank where they remained until a few weeks ago.
"When, just before their removal from the bank to be taken elsewhere, their protective wrappings were taken off, it was found that a worthless object had been substituted for the Frans Hals.
"The Swiss police have made little progress in the case.
"The Frans Hals was one of a collection of old masters, mainly Dutch but including a Turner, reserved as donations to the Principality of Liechtenstein after my death."
He added: "I have undertaken to pay to charities any sum recovered from the insurance underwriters. But should the picture be retrieved it will be handed over immediately to Liechtenstein."
Alaric's death announcement was published in The Times on July 7, 1973. He died "suddenly" on July 4, 1973 at Biarritz, son of the late Count de Benders of Vaduz, Liechtenstein, brother of Mabel de Forest and John de Bendern. Alaric was 69 years old. He died unmarried.
John de Bendern, a British golfer, was married at least three times. His first marriage was to Lady Patricia Douglas, daughter of the 11th Marquess of Queensbury. They were married at Brompton Oratory on January 27, 1938. They had two daughters, Caroline (1940) and Emma (1950) and a son, Simon Frederick (1947). This marriage ended in divorce in 1950 on the grounds of John's adultery.
Emma de Bendern was once described as having the "naughtiest" face in London. At age 17, she got involved with a petty criminal named Brian, and gave birth to his illegitimate daughter, Atalanta de Bendern, described in an article as Nigel Dempster's stepdaughter.
At age 21, she married the Daily Mail's gossip columnist Nigel Dempster. The marriage lasted about a year. Within six months of the marriage, Emma was off to the South of France for a brief fling with a married man.
They were married in 1971 and divorced in 1974.
In August 1975, Emma married married Giles Trentham. They had one daughter, Amber Mercedes Trentham, a writer and editor. Mercedes is the first name of Emma's late stepmother. This marriage ended in divorce
Emma's third husband was Prince Georg Galitzine, whom she married in 1986. They had one son, Dimitri George, born in 1986. This marriage was dissolved in 1992.
They remarried in 1998 only ten weeks before Giles' death from colon cancer at the age of 53.
The Emma de Bendern who is married to the sculptor, Neil Simmons, is more likely to be Emma Caroline de Bendern, daughter of Simon de Bendern. Emma and Neil live in Somerset with their two children, Prosper and Romilly, a promising show jumper.
There are several other de Benderns who are members of the family, but I am not sure whose children they are. Paul de Bendern, a former Reuters journalist and married to Pulitizer-prize winning war photographer Lynsey Addario. Paul has a BA degree in Politics and History from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. He speaks French, Spanish, English and Swedish.
Earlier this month, he became managing director of Veracity Worldwide, and is based in London.
Video of their wedding has been uploaded to YouTube with commentary by Caroline de Bendern. Guests at the wedding including members of the Douglas/Queensbury and Hornak families. Another guest was Samantha Grace de Bendern. Could she be Paul's sister?
Samantha de Bendern is a journalist, now based in India.
This leaves us with Sasha Emmanuelle Jurdant, whose mother's surname is de Bendern. He is also connected to Caroline de Bendern as is Michael de Bendern.
Simon de Bendern married Ethel von Horn in 1974. He also has a daughter, Emma Caroline de Bendern, born in 1970.
In 1953, John's engagement (described as the younger son of Count and Countess de Bendern of the Principality of Liechtenstein) to Mercedes, eldest daughter of Señor and Señor Gorina of Barcelona, was announced in the Times. They were married in a civil ceremony in London on November 12, 1952. Mercedes died at Neuilly-sur-Seine in June 1973. John died in 1997. John's last wife was named Barbara Hilda. They lived in Tunbridge Wells. Both died in Kent.
Ethel, Countess de Bendern died after a long illness on September 27, 1966 at Monte Carlo.
So where does Emmelie fit into the family tree? She is the daughter of Ingvar de Forest (1938-2010), said to be the natural son of Maurice de Forest and a Swedish woman, Irma Paula Margareta Engström. Ingvar 's birth was registered in Stockholm with the surname Engström. It was not until he was an adult when he began using the surname de Forest.
Maurice never married Margareta, and he did not have an active role in Ingvar's life. The de Bendern family have never made any claims to being descendants of Queen Victoria. It is unlikely that Emmelie has any documentation to support her statements, especially about Maurice being the son of Bertie and an Austrian princess. It is entirely possible that Ingvar concocted the story as an embellishment to his own birth. He has been married several times, as well. Charlotte has several older siblings or half-siblings, including Birgitta, Edward and Sophie de Forest. They are in contact with their aunt Caroline.
But there are records to prove that Maurice was born in Paris. His birth was registered in Paris with the parents of Edward de Forest and Julie Arnold, both of whom died in 1882. We also know that the boys were adopted and raised by Hirsch and his devoted wife, Clara, who left most of her fortune to Maurice and Raymond. As far back as the late 1890s, there were reports that Baron von Hirsch was the boys' natural father, and that the mother was either British or American. Julie Arnold was American. But the truth is another matter. The Baron and his wife adopted the two boys after the deaths of their American parents.
But Maurice Arnold de Forest was not the son of Edward VII. Bertie did not meet Baron von Hirsch until 1886, seven years after Maurice's birth. This is documented and acknowledged by serious historians and biographers.
In other words, Danish singer Emmelie Charlotte Victoria de Forest has Swedish and Finnish ancestry, as well as American roots. Her great-grandparents were -- gasp! AMERICANS!
But she is not a descendant of Queen Victoria. Period. Full Stop.


text:
But are they as warm as those
That Laylah's lover knows?
The North wind said to the firs:
I have my worshippers;
But are they as keen as hers?
The East wind said to the cedars:
My friends are no seceders;
But is their faith to me
As firm as his faith must be?
The West wind said to the yews:
My children are pure as dews;
But what of her lover's muse?
So to spite the summer weather
The four winds howled together.
But a great Voice from above
Cried: What do you know of love?
Do you think all nature worth
The littlest life upon earth?
I made the germ and the ant,
The tiger and elephant.
In the least of these there is more
Than your elemental war.
And the lovers whom ye slight
Are precious in my sight.
Peace to your mischief-brewing!
I love to watch their wooing.
Of all this Laylah heard
Never a word.
She lay beneath the trees
With her lover at her knees.
He sang of God above
And of love.
She lay at his side
Well satisfied,
And at set of sun
They were one.
Before they slept her pure smile curled;
'God bless all lovers in the World!'
And so say I the self-same word;
Nor doubt God heard.
But are they as warm as those


text:
We're going to use HTML5 here, no Flash. We'll need an audio element with both MP3 (WebKit, IE) and OGG (Firefox, Opera).
<audio controls preload="auto">
<source src="audio/beep.mp3" controls></source>
<source src="audio/beep.ogg" controls></source>
Your browser isn't invited for super fun audio time.
We're using jQuery in this demo to make selecting things and events easier, but the .play() function is native. You probably wouldn't show the audio element, that's for demo purposes only, just remove the control attribute to not show anything.
.play() won't force the audio clip to start over unless it's finished first, not very smooth.
.pause() ing first should stop it and then play new sound but it actually makes it worse somehow. Sounds get chopped off but not restarted.
Smoothest but not perfect.