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A general court-martial found petitioner Loving, an Army private, guilty of both premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. Section(s) 918(1), (4). Finding three aggravating factors-(1) that the premeditated murder was committed during a robbery, Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) the premeditated murder, had committed a second murder, also proved at his single trial, RCM 1004(c)(7)(J)-the court-martial sentenced Loving to death. The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence. The United States Army Court of Military Review and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed, rejecting Loving's attack on the promulgation by Executive Order of the aggravating factors in RCM 1004. He contends that the Eighth Amendment and the separation-of-powers doctrine require that Congress, not the President, make the fundamental policy determination respecting the factors that warrant the death penalty.
1. On the assumption that Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 , and subsequent cases apply to this crime and sentence, the Constitution requires the aggravating factors that Loving challenges. Under the Eighth Amendment, the military capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the accused compared to others found guilty of murder, see, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 . That narrowing is not achieved in the statute. Article 118 authorizes the death penalty for but two of the four types of murder therein specified, premeditated and felony murder, Section(s) 918(1), (4), whereas intentional murder without premeditation and murder resulting from wanton and dangerous conduct are not punishable by death, Section(s) 918(2), (3). Moreover, Article 118(4) by its terms permits the death penalty for felony murder even if the accused had no intent to kill and did not do the killing himself. Because the Eighth Amendment does not permit death to be imposed in those circumstances, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 , additional aggravating factors establishing a higher culpability are necessary to Article 118's constitutional validity, see, e.g., Lowenfield, supra, at 244. Pp. 5-6.
2. The President's prescription of the challenged aggravating factors did not violate the separation-of-powers principle. Pp. 6-25.
(a) The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine, a strand of this Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence, is that the lawmaking function belongs to Congress, U. S. Const., Art. I, Section(s) 1, and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity, Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692. This principle does not mean, however, that only Congress can make a rule of prospective force. Although it may not delegate the power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, Congress may delegate to others the authority or discretion to execute the law under and in pursuance of its terms. Id., at 693-694. Pp. 6-10.
(b) The Court rejects Loving's argument that Congress lacks power to delegate to the President the authority to prescribe aggravating factors in capital murder cases. An analysis of English constitutional history and of the historical necessities and events that instructed the Framers demonstrates that U. S. Const., Art. I, Section(s) 8, cl. 14-which empowers Congress "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces"-does not grant an exclusive, nondelegable power to determine military punishments, but gives Congress such flexibility to exercise or share power as the times might demand. And it would be contrary to the respect owed the President as Commander in Chief to hold that he may not be given wide discretion and authority. Thus, in the circumstances presented here, Congress may delegate authority to the President to define the aggravating factors that permit imposition of a statutory penalty, with the regulations providing the narrowing of the death-eligible class that the Eighth Amendment requires. Pp. 10-19.
delegate to the President the authority to prescribe aggravating factors, Congress did not do so by implicit or explicit action in this instance. In fact, Congress exercised that power of delegation in 1950, when it enacted Articles 18, 56, and 36(a) of the UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. Section(s) 818 (A court-martial "may, under such limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by [the UCMJ], including the penalty of death when specifically authorized"), 856 ("The punishment which a court-martial may direct . . . may not exceed such limits as the President may prescribe for that offense"), and 836(a) (which empowers the President to make procedural rules for courtsmartial, and was identified by Congress in 1985 as a source of Presidential authority to provide capital aggravating factors). Together, these Articles give clear authority to the President to promulgate RCM 1004. Pp. 20-22.
(d) Loving's final assertion-that even if Articles 18, 56, and 36 can be construed as delegations, they lack an intelligible principle to guide the President's discretion-is also rejected. Had the delegations here called for the exercise of judgment or discretion that lies beyond the President's traditional authority, this argument might have more weight. However, because the President's duties as Commander in Chief require him to take responsible and continuing action to superintend the military, including the courts-martial, the delegated duty to prescribe aggravating factors for capital cases is interlinked with duties already assigned to him by the Constitution's express terms. The same limitations on delegation do not apply where the entity exercising the delegated authority possesses independent authority over the subject matter. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556 -557. Pp. 22-25.
41 M. J. 213, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in all but Part IV-A of which O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which O'Connor, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
[End of Syllabus]
After a trial, an eight-member general court-martial found Loving guilty of, among other offenses, premeditated murder and felony murder under Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. Section(s) 918(1), (4). In the sentencing phase of the trial, the court-martial found three aggravating factors: (1) that the premeditated murder of the second driver was committed during the course of a robbery, Rule for Courts-Martial (RCM) 1004(c)(7)(B); (2) that Loving acted as the triggerman in the felony murder of the first driver, premeditated murder, had committed a second murder, also proven at the death. The commander who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sentence. Cf. 10 U. S. C. Section(s) 860. The United States Army Court of Military Review and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (formerly the United States Court of Military Appeals (CMA)) affirmed, relying on United States v. Curtis, 32 M. J. 252 (CMA), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991), to reject Loving's claims that the President lacked authority to promulgate the aggravating factors that enabled the court-martial to sentence him to death. We granted certiorari. 515 U. S. ___ (1995).
Over the next two centuries, Congress expanded court-martial jurisdiction. In 1863, concerned that civil courts could not function in all places during hostilities, Congress granted courts-martial jurisdiction of common-law capital crimes and the authority to impose the death penalty in wartime. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, Section(s) 30, 12 Stat. 736, Rev. Stat. Section(s) 1342, Art. 58 (1875); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 514 (1879). In 1916, Congress granted to the military courts a general jurisdiction over common-law felonies committed by service members, except for murder and rape committed within the continental United States during peacetime. Articles of War of 1916, ch. 418, Section(s) 3, Arts. 92-93, 39 Stat. 664. Persons accused of the latter two crimes were to be turned over to the civilian authorities. Art. 74, 39 Stat. 662. In 1950, with the passage of the UCMJ, Congress lifted even this restriction. Article 118 of the UCMJ describes four types of murder subject to court-martial jurisdiction, two of which are punishable by death:
The President responded to Matthews in 1984 with an Executive Order promulgating RCM 1004. In conformity with 10 U. S. C. Section(s) 852(a)(1), the Rule, as amended, requires a unanimous finding that the accused was guilty of a capital offense before a death sentence may be imposed, RCM 1004(a)(2). The Rule also requires unanimous findings (1) that at least one aggravating factor is present and (2) that any extenuating or mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by any admissible aggravating circumstances, 1004(b). RCM 1004(c) enumerates 11 categories of aggravating factors sufficient for imposition of the death penalty. The Rule also provides that the accused is to have "broad latitude to present evidence in extenuation and mitigation," 1004(b)(3), and is entitled to have the members of the court-martial instructed to consider all such evidence before deciding upon a death sentence, 1004(b)(6).
This is the scheme Loving attacks as unconstitutional. He contends that the Eighth Amendment and the doctrine of separation of powers require that Congress, and not the President, make the fundamental policy determination respecting the factors that warrant the death penalty.
Although the Government suggests the contrary, Brief for United States 11, n. 6, we agree with Loving, on the assumption that Furman applies to this case, that aggravating factors are necessary to the constitutional validity of the military capital-punishment scheme as now enacted. Article 118 authorizes the death penalty for but two of the four types of murder specified: premeditated and felony murder are punishable by death, 10 U. S. C. Section(s) 918(1), (4), whereas intentional murder without premeditation and murder resulting from wanton and dangerous conduct are not, Section(s) 918(2), (3). The statute's selection of the two types of murder for the death penalty, however, does not narrow the death-eligible class in a way consistent with our cases. Article 118(4) by its terms permits death to be imposed for felony murder even if the accused had no intent to kill and even if he did not do the killing himself. The Eighth Amendment does not permit the death penalty to be imposed in those circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). As a result, additional aggravating factors establishing a higher culpability are necessary to save Article 118. We turn to the question whether it violated the principle of separation of powers for the President to prescribe the aggravating factors required by the Eighth Amendment.
Deterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical rule is not the sole reason for dispersing the federal power among three branches, however. By allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both effective and accountable. Article I's precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking. See Chadha, supra, at 951. Ill suited to that task are the Presidency, designed for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers, and the Judiciary, a branch with tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control. The clear assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance.
Another strand of our separation-of-powers jurisprudence, the delegation doctrine, has developed to prevent Congress from forsaking its duties. Loving invokes this doctrine to question the authority of the President to promulgate RCM 1004. The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine is that the lawmaking function belongs to Congress, U. S. Const., Art. I, Section(s) 1, and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692 (1892). This principle does not mean, however, that only Congress can make a rule of prospective force. To burden Congress with all federal rulemaking would divert that branch from more pressing issues, and defeat the Framers' design of a workable National Government. Thomas Jefferson observed, "Nothing is so embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great assembly as the details of execution." 5 Works of Thomas Jefferson 319 (P. Ford ed. 1904) (Letter to E. Carrington, Aug. 4, 1787). See also A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 529-530 (1935) (recognizing "the necessity of adapting legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly"). This Court established long ago that Congress must be permitted to delegate to others at least some authority that it could exercise itself. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42 (1825).
We have undertaken before, in resolving other issues, the difficult task of interpreting Clause 14 by drawing upon English constitutional history. See, e.g., Reid, supra, at 23-30; O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 268 -272 (1969) (determining that courts-martial only had jurisdiction of service-connected crimes); Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 442 -446 (1987) (overruling O'Callahan and taking issue with its historical analysis). Doing so here, we find that, although there is a grain of truth in Loving's historical arguments, the struggle of Parliament to control military tribunals and the lessons the Framers drew from it are more complex than he suggests. The history does not require us to read Clause 14 as granting to Congress an exclusive, nondelegable power to determine military punishments. If anything, it appears that England found security in divided authority, with Parliament at times ceding to the Crown the task of fixing military punishments. From the English experience the Framers understood the necessity of balancing efficient military discipline, popular control of a standing army, and the rights of soldiers; they perceived the risks inherent in assigning the task to one part of the government to the exclusion of another; and they knew the resulting parliamentary practice of delegation. The Framers' choice in Clause 14 was to give Congress the same flexibility to exercise or share power as times might demand.
In England after the Norman Conquest, military justice was a matter of royal prerogative. The rudiments of law in English military justice can first be seen in the written orders issued by the King for various expeditions. Winthrop 17-18. For example, in 1190 Richard I issued an ordinance outlining six offenses to which the crusaders would be subject, including two punishable by death: "Whoever shall slay a man on ship-board, he shall be bound to the dead man and thrown into the sea. If he shall slay him on land he shall be bound to the dead man and buried in the earth." Ordinance of Richard I-A.D. 1190, reprinted in id., at 903. The first comprehensive articles of war were those declared by Richard II at Durham in 1385 and Henry V at Mantes in 1419, which decreed capital offenses that not only served military discipline but also protected foreign noncombatants from the ravages of war. T. Meron, Henry's Wars and Shakespeare's Laws: Perspectives on the Law of War in the Later Middle Ages 91-93 (1993). Articles of War, sometimes issued by military commanders acting under royal commission in the ensuing centuries, Winthrop 19, were not fixed codes, at least through the 17th century; rather, "each war, each expedition, had its own edict," which lost force after the cessation of hostilities and the disbanding of the army that had been formed. J. Pipon & J. Collier, Manual of Military Law 14 (3d rev. ed. 1863).
Thus, royal ordinances governed the conduct of war, but the common law did not countenance the enforcement of military law in times of peace "when the king's courts [were] open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land." 1 Blackstone's Commentaries *413. See also M. Hale, History of the Common Law of England 25-27 (C. Gray ed. 1971) (describing efforts of Parliament and the common law courts to limit the jurisdiction of the military Courts of the Constable and the Marshal).
The triumph of civil jurisdiction was not absolute, however. The political disorders of the 17th century ushered in periods of harsh military justice, with soldiers and at times civilian rebels punished, even put to death, under the summary decrees of courts-martial. See C. Clode, Administration of Justice Under Military and Martial Law 20-42 (1872) (hereinafter Clode). Cf. Petition of Right of 1627, 3 Car. I, ch. 1 (protesting court-martial abuses). Military justice was brought under the rule of parliamentary law in 1689, when William and Mary accepted the Bill of Rights requiring Parliament's consent to the raising and keeping of armies. In the Mutiny Act of 1689, Parliament declared the general principle that "noe Man may be forejudged of Life or Limbe or subjected to any kinde of punishment by Martiall Law or in any other manner then by the Judgment of his Peeres and according to the knowne and Established Laws of this Realme," but decreed that "Soldiers who shall Mutiny or stirr up Sedition or shall desert Their Majestyes Service be brought to a more Exemplary and speedy Punishment than the usuall Forms of Law will allow," and "shall suffer Death or such other Punishment as by a Court-Martiall shall be Inflicted." 1 Wm. Mary, ch. 5.
In one sense, as Loving wants to suggest, the Mutiny Act was a sparing exercise of parliamentary authority, since only the most serious domestic offenses of soldiers were made capital, and the militia was exempted. See Solorio, supra, at 442. He misunderstands the Mutiny Act of 1689, however, in arguing that it bespeaks a special solicitude for the rights of soldiers and a desire of Parliament to exclude Executive power over military capital punishment.
The Mutiny Act, as its name suggests, came on the heels of the mutiny of Scottish troops loyal to James II. 3 Macaulay 45-49. The mutiny occurred at a watershed time. Menaced by great continental powers, England had come to a grudging recognition that a standing army, long decried as an instrument of despotism, had to be maintained on its soil. The mutiny cast in high relief the dangers to the polity of a standing army turned bad. Macaulay describes the sentiment of the time:
Popular suspicion of the standing army persisted, 5 Macaulay 253-273, 393, and Parliament authorized the Mutiny Acts only for periods of six months and then a year, 3 id., at 51-53. But renewed they were time and again, and Parliament would alter the power of courts-martial to impose the death penalty for peacetime offenses throughout the next century. It withdrew the power altogether in 1713, 12 Anne, ch. 13, Section(s) 1, only to regret the absence of the penalty during the rebellion of 1715, Clode 49. The third of the Mutiny Acts of 1715 subjected the soldier to capital punishment for a wide array of peacetime offenses related to political disorder and troop discipline. Id., at 50. And, for a short time in the 18th century, Parliament allowed the Crown to invest courts-martial with a general criminal jurisdiction over soldiers even at home, placing no substantive limit on the penalties that could be imposed; until 1718, that jurisdiction was superior to civil courts. Id., at 52-53. The propriety of that general jurisdiction within the kingdom was questioned, and the jurisdiction was withdrawn in 1749. Id., at 53. Nevertheless, even as it continued to adjust the scope of military jurisdiction at home, Parliament entrusted broad powers to the Crown to define and punish military crimes abroad. In 1713, it gave statutory sanction to the Crown's longstanding practice of issuing Articles of War without limiting the kind of punishments that might be imposed; and, in the same Act, it delegated the power to "erect and constitute Courts Martial with Power to try hear and determine any Crime or Offence by such Articles of War and inflict Penalties by Sentence or Judgement in any of Her Majesties Dominions beyond the Seas or elsewhere beyond the Seas (except in the Kingdom of Ireland) . . . as might have been done by Her Majesties Authority beyond the Seas in Time of War." 12 Anne, ch. 13, Section(s) 43; Winthrop 20. Cf. Duke & Vogel, supra, at 444 (noting that Parliament in 1803 gave statutory authority to the Crown to promulgate Articles of War applicable to troops stationed in England as well). See Solorio, 483 U.S., at 442 (discussing a provision in the British Articles of War of 1774 providing court-martial jurisdiction of civilian offenses by soldiers).
As Loving contends, and as we have explained elsewhere, the Framers well knew this history, and had encountered firsthand the abuses of military law in the colonies. See Reid, 354 U.S., at 27 -28. As many were themselves veterans of the Revolutionary War, however, they also knew the imperatives of military discipline. What they distrusted were not courts-martial per se, but military justice dispensed by a commander unchecked by the civil power in proceedings so summary as to be lawless. The latter was the evil that caused Blackstone to declare that "martial law" -- by which he, not observing the modern distinction between military and martial law, meant decrees of courts-martial disciplining soldiers in wartime -- "is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, [and] is, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law." 1 Blackstone's Commentaries *413. See also Hale, History of the Common Law of England, at 26-27; Clode 21 (military law in early seventeenth century England amounted to "the arbitrary right to punish or destroy, without legal trial, any assumed delinquent"). The partial security Englishmen won against such abuse in 1689 was to give Parliament, preeminent guardian of the British constitution, primacy in matters of military law. This fact does not suggest, however, that a legislature's power must be exclusive. It was for Parliament, as it did in the various Mutiny Acts, to designate as the times required what peacetime offenses by soldiers deserved the punishment of death; and it was for Parliament, as it did in 1713, to delegate the authority to define wartime offenses and devise their punishments, including death. The Crown received the delegated power and the concomitant responsibility for its prudent exercise. The lesson from the English constitutional experience was that Parliament must have the primary power to regulate the armed forces and to determine the punishments that could be imposed upon soldiers by courts-martial. That was not inconsistent, however, with the further power to divide authority between it and the Crown as conditions might warrant.
Far from attempting to replicate the English system, of course, the Framers separated the powers of the Federal Government into three branches to avoid dangers they thought latent or inevitable in the parliamentary structure. The historical necessities and events of the English constitutional experience, though, were familiar to them and inform our understanding of the purpose and meaning of constitutional provisions. As we have observed before, with this experience to consult they elected not to "freeze court-martial usage at a particular time" for all ages following, Solorio, 483 U.S., at 446 , nor did they deprive Congress of the services of the Executive in establishing rules for the governance of the military, including rules for capital punishment. In the words of Alexander Hamilton, the power to regulate the armed forces, like other powers related to the common defense, was given to Congress
Under Clause 14, Congress, like Parliament, exercises a power of precedence over, not exclusion of, Executive authority. Cf. United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291, 301 (1842) ("The power of the executive to establish rules and regulations for the government of the army, is undoubted"). This power is no less plenary than other Article I powers, Solorio, supra, at 441, and we discern no reasons why Congress should have less capacity to make measured and appropriate delegations of this power than of any other, see Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 220 -221 (1989) (Congress may delegate authority under the taxing power); cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948) (general rule is that "[a] constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes") (emphasis deleted). Indeed, it would be contrary to precedent and tradition for us to impose a special limitation on this particular Article I power, for we give Congress the highest deference in ordering military affairs. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 -65 (1981). And it would be contrary to the respect owed the President as Commander in Chief to hold that he may not be given wide discretion and authority. We decline to import into Clause 14 a restrictive nondelegation principle that the Framers left out.
There is no absolute rule, furthermore, against Congress' delegation of authority to define criminal punishments. We have upheld delegations whereby the Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct will be criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations "confin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute." United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 518 (1911). See also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). The exercise of a delegated authority to define crimes may be sufficient in certain circumstances to supply the notice to defendants the Constitution requires. See M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 622 (1946). In the circumstances presented here, so too may Congress delegate authority to the President to define the aggravating factors that permit imposition of a statutory penalty, with the regulations providing the narrowing of the death-eligible class that the Eighth Amendment requires.
In 1950, Congress confronted the problem of what criminal jurisdiction would be appropriate for armed forces of colossal size, stationed on bases that in many instances were small societies unto themselves. Congress, confident in the procedural protections of the UCMJ, gave to courts-martial jurisdiction of the crime of murder. Cf. Solorio, supra, at 450-451 (Congress may extend court-martial jurisdiction to any criminal offense committed by a service member during his period of service). It further declared the law that service members who commit premeditated and felony murder may be sentenced to death by a court-martial. There is nothing in the constitutional scheme or our traditions to prohibit Congress from delegating the prudent and proper implementation of the capital murder statute to the President acting as Commander in Chief.
There is yet a third provision of the UCMJ indicative of congressional intent to delegate this authority to the President. Article 36 of the UCMJ, which gives the President the power to make procedural rules for courts-martial, provides:
Loving points out that the three Articles were enacted as part of the UCMJ in 1950, well before the need for eliminating absolute discretion in capital sentencing was established in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and the cases that followed. (Slight amendments to the Articles have been made since but are not relevant here.) In 1950, he argues, Congress could not have understood that it was giving the President the authority to bring an otherwise invalid capital murder statute in line with Eighth Amendment strictures. Perhaps so, but Furman did not somehow undo the prior delegation. What would have been an act of leniency by the President prior to Furman may have become a constitutional necessity thereafter, see supra, at 5-6, but the fact remains the power to prescribe aggravating circumstances has resided with the President since 1950.
In United States v. Curtis, the Court of Military Appeals discerned a principle limiting the President's discretion to define aggravating factors for capital crimes in Article 36: namely, the directive that regulations the President prescribes must "apply the principles of law . . . generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter," 10 U. S. C. Section(s) 836(a). We think, however, that the question to be asked is not whether there was any explicit principle telling the President how to select aggravating factors, but whether any such guidance was needed, given the nature of the delegation and the officer who is to exercise the delegated authority. First, the delegation is set within boundaries the President may not exceed. Second, the delegation here was to the President in his role as Commander in Chief. Perhaps more explicit guidance as to how to select aggravating factors would be necessary if delegation were made to a newly created entity without independent authority in the area. Cf. Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 374 -379 (upholding delegation to the United States Sentencing Commission because of detailed congressional directives channeling agency discretion). The President's duties as Commander in Chief, however, require him to take responsible and continuing action to superintend the military, including the courts-martial. The delegated duty, then, is interlinked with duties already assigned to the President by express terms of the Constitution, and the same limitations on delegation do not apply "where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter," United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556 -557 (1975). See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319-322 (1936). Cf. Swaim v. United States, 165 U. S. 553, 557-558 (1897) (President has inherent authority to convene courts-martial). Like the Court of Military Appeals, Curtis, 32 M. J., at 263, n. 9, we need not decide whether the President would have inherent power as Commander in Chief to prescribe aggravating factors in capital cases. Once delegated that power by Congress, the President, acting in his constitutional office of Commander in Chief, had undoubted competency to prescribe those factors without further guidance. "The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian," Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953), and the President can be entrusted to determine what limitations and conditions on punishments are best suited to preserve that special discipline.
It is hard to deem lawless a delegation giving the President broad discretion to prescribe rules on this subject. From the early days of the Republic, the President has had congressional authorization to intervene in cases where courts-martial decreed death. American Articles of War of 1806, Art. 65, reprinted in Winthrop 976, 982. It would be contradictory to say that Congress cannot further empower him to limit by prospective regulation the circumstances in which courtsmartial can impose a death sentence. Specific authority to make rules for the limitation of capital punishment contributes more towards principled and uniform military sentencing regimes than does case-by-case intervention, and it provides greater opportunity for congressional oversight and revision.
Separation-of-powers principles are vindicated, not disserved, by measured cooperation between the two political branches of the Government, each contributing to a lawful objective through its own processes. The delegation to the President as Commander in Chief of the authority to prescribe aggravating factors was in all respects consistent with these precepts, and the promulgation of RCM 1004 was well within the delegated authority. Loving's sentence was lawful, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, concurring.
As Justice Scalia correctly points out, petitioner has not challenged the power of the tribunal to try him for a capital offense. Post, at 1. It is important to add to this observation that petitioner's first victim was a member of the Armed Forces on active duty and that the second was a retired serviceman who gave petitioner a ride from the barracks on the same night as the first killing. Brief for United States 5. On these facts, this does not appear to be a case in which petitioner could appropriately have raised the question whether the holding in Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987), should be extended to reach the imposition of the death penalty for an offense that did not have the "service connection" required prior to the change in the law effected in that case. Id., at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
The question whether a "service connection" requirement should obtain in capital cases is an open one both because Solorio was not a capital case, and because Solorio's review of the historical materials would seem to undermine any contention that a military tribunal's power to try capital offenses must be as broad as its power to try non-capital ones. See id., at 442-446. Moreover, the question is a substantial one because, when the punishment may be death, there are particular reasons to ensure that the men and women of the Armed Forces do not by reason of serving their country receive less protection than the Constitution provides for civilians.
As a consequence of my conclusion that the "service connection" requirement has been satisfied here, I join not only the Court's analysis of the delegation issue, but also its disposition of the case. By joining in the Court's opinion, however, I do not thereby accept the proposition that our decision in Solorio must be understood to apply to capital offenses. Nor do I understand the Court's decision to do so. That question, as I have explained, remains to be decided.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join the Court's opinion, except that with respect to Part IV thereof I join only subparts B and C.
The discussion of English history that features so prominently in the Court's discussion of Congress's power to grant the authority at issue to the President is in my view irrelevant. To be sure, there is ample precedent in our cases for looking to the history of English courts-martial -- but not where the question is of the sort before us today. We have surveyed that history for the purpose of establishing the permissible scope of the jurisdiction of military tribunals over certain classes of defendants and offenses, see, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 442 -446 (1987); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 232 (1959); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23 -27 (1957) (plurality); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 745 (1974). This case does not present such a question. Petitioner does not assert that tradition establishes his offense to be, in its nature, beyond the jurisdiction of military courts, or that courts-martial are historically incapable of adjudicating capital offenses. His arguments are altogether different: that Congress cannot authorize the President to establish "aggravating factors" designed to carry out the narrowing function that (we assume) is necessary for imposition of a capital sentence; and that, even if Congress can give the President authority to perform this function, such authorization has not been effected by the statutes upon which the Government relies.
I do not see how consideration of those arguments profits from analysis of the historical sharing of power between Parliament and the English throne. William and Mary's acceptance of the Bill of Rights, and Parliament's enactment of the Mutiny Act of 1689, see ante, at 13-16, are presumably significant occurrences for students of the unwritten English constitution. Our written Constitution does not require us to trace out that history; it provides, in straightforward fashion, that "The Congress shall have Power . . . To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces," U. S. Const., Art. I, Section(s) 8, cl. 14, and as the Court notes, see ante, at 18, it does not set forth any special limitation on Congress's assigning to the President the task of implementing the laws enacted pursuant to that power. And it would be extraordinary simply to infer such a special limitation upon tasks given to the President as Commander in Chief, where his inherent powers are clearly extensive.
In drafting the Constitution, the Framers were not seeking to replicate in America the government of England; indeed, they set their plan of government out in writing in part to make clear the ways in which it was different from the one it replaced. The Court acknowledges this, see ante, at 17, but nonetheless goes on to treat the form of English government as relevant to determining the limitations upon Clause 14's grant of power to Congress. I would leave this historical discussion aside. While it is true, as the Court demonstrates, that the scheme of assigned responsibility here conforms to English practices, that is so not because Clause 14 requires such conformity, but simply because what seemed like a good arrangement to Parliament has seemed like a good arrangement to Congress as well.
I have one point of definition or conceptualization, which applies to those portions of the opinion that I have joined. While it has become the practice in our opinions to refer to "unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority" versus "lawful delegations of legislative authority," in fact the latter category does not exist. Legislative power is nondelegable. Congress can no more "delegate" some of its Article I power to the Executive than it could "delegate" some to one of its committees. What Congress does is to assign responsibilities to the Executive; and when the Executive undertakes those assigned responsibilities it acts, not as the "delegate" of Congress, but as the agent of the People. At some point the responsibilities assigned can become so extensive and so unconstrained that Congress has in effect delegated its legislative power; but until that point of excess is reached there exists, not a "lawful" delegation, but no delegation at all.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
It is not clear to me that the extensive rules we have developed under the Eighth Amendment for the prosecution of civilian capital cases, including the requirement of proof of aggravating factors, necessarily apply to capital prosecutions in the military, cf. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 -302 (1983), and this Court has never so held, see Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1974). 1 I am therefore not certain that this case even raises a delegation question, for if Loving can constitutionally be sentenced to death without proof of aggravating factors, he surely cannot claim that the President violated the Constitution by promulgating aggravating factors that afforded more protection than that to which Loving is constitutionally entitled.
Like the majority, I conclude that the Government prevails even if we assume, without deciding, that aggravating factors are required in this context. There is abundant authority for according Congress and the President sufficient deference in the regulation of military affairs to uphold the delegation here, and I see no need to resort to our nonmilitary separation-of-powers and "delegation doctrine" cases in reaching this conclusion. I write separately to explain that by concurring in the judgment in this case, I take no position with respect to Congress' power to delegate authority or otherwise alter the traditional separation of powers outside the military context.
In light of Congress' express constitutional authority to regulate the Armed Forces, see U. S. Const., Art. I, Section(s) 8, cl. 14, and the unique nature of the military's mission, we have afforded an unparalleled degree of deference to congressional action governing the military. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 -65 (1981). "[I]t is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise," United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955), and this Court has recognized the limits on its own competence in advancing this core national interest, see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). Mindful of the factors that "differentiate military society from civilian society," we have concluded that the Constitution permits Congress "to legislate both with greater breadth and with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the former shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for the latter." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974). This heightened deference extends not only to congressional action but also to executive action by the President, who by virtue of his constitutional role as Commander in Chief, see U. S. Const, Art. II, Section(s) 2, cl. 1, possesses shared authority over military discipline. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) ("The responsibility for determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend to th[e] business [of fighting or preparing to fight wars] rests with Congress and with the President") (citations omitted). See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980) ("Both Congress and this Court have found that the special character of the military requires civilian authorities to accord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with matters that affect internal discipline and morale. In construing a statute that touches on such matters, therefore, courts must be careful not to `circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never intended by Congress'") (citations omitted). Under these and many similar cases reviewing legislative and executive control of the military, the sentencing scheme at issue in this case, and the manner in which it was created, are constitutionally unassailable.
On a separate point, I agree with Justice Scalia that the majority's extended analysis of the division of authority between the English Parliament and the Crown with regard to regulation of the military, see ante, at 10-17, has no relevance to this case. It is true that we frequently consult English history and common law in attempting to determine the content of constitutional provisions, but the majority fails to cite a single separation-of-powers case in which we have relied on the structure of the English Government in attempting to understand the governmental structure erected by the Framers of the Constitution. Nor does the majority cite any historical evidence, whether from the constitutional debates, the Federalist Papers, or some other source, that demonstrates that the Framers sought to embrace, or at least actively considered, the English system of shared power over the military. If the majority pointed to some basis for conducting the inquiry that it does, I might be willing to accept its analysis. Instead, the majority repeatedly substitutes ipse dixit for historical evidence. See, e.g., ante, at 11 ("From the English experience the Framers . . . knew the . . . parliamentary practice of delegation" and "[t]he Framers' choice in Clause 14 was to give Congress the same flexibility to exercise or share power"); ante, at 16 ("the Framers well knew this history"); ante, at 17 ("The historical necessities and events of the English constitutional experience . . . were familiar to [the Framers] and inform our understanding of the purpose and meaning of constitutional provisions"). I have no doubt that the Framers were well versed in English history. But it is too simplistic for purposes of constitutional analysis to draw conclusions about the allocation of constitutional author-ity among the branches of the United States Government from mere speculation about the Framers' familiarity with English military history and the significance that they attached to it.
[ Footnote 1 ] Although the applicability of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and its progeny to the military is an open question, the United States surprisingly makes no argument that the military is exempt from the byzantine rules that we have imposed upon the States in their administration of the death penalty.
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Citation: 517 U.S. 748
Docket No: No. 94-1966
Argued: January 09, 1996
Decided: June 03, 1996
Court: United States Supreme Court
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NEW YORK (AP) ? No one knows what led a Florida neighborhood watch captain to shoot Trayvon Martin, a teenager carrying no weapon.
But a new study raises an intriguing question: Could the watch captain have been fooled into thinking the youth was armed in part because he himself was holding a gun?
In the study, volunteers who held a toy gun and glimpsed fleeting images of people holding an object were biased toward thinking the object was a gun.
It's another indication that the brain shapes what we perceive in the world beyond the information that comes in through our eyes, said James Brockmole of the University of Notre Dame, who did the work with psychologist Jessica Witt at Purdue University.
In a telephone interview, Brockmole stressed he had no inside information on the Feb. 26 shooting of 17-year-old Martin, who was shot and killed in a gated community in Sanford, a suburb of Orlando. The neighborhood watch captain, George Zimmerman, said he shot the teen in self-defense because the youth attacked him. The case has drawn outrage and protests, and the federal Department of Justice said Monday it will investigate.
Brockmole said it's possible that Zimmerman's perception might have been skewed by being armed.
Race may have also played a role. Martin is black; Zimmerman's family says he is Hispanic. Past research suggests that people can be more likely to perceive a poorly seen object as a gun if it's held by a black person than by a white person, experts say.
Zimmerman has not spoken publicly. The police report does not mention whether he thought Martin had a firearm. But during his patrol of the neighborhood in his SUV, Zimmerman called 911 and told a police dispatcher that he was following Martin. "We've had some break-ins my neighborhood. …There is a really suspicious guy."
Then a bit later, he said the youth was approaching and "he's got something in his hands."
In the study which was carried out well before the shooting, undergraduates at Notre Dame and Purdue glimpsed scenes of people holding objects and had to decide quickly whether the object was a gun. The results showed they were biased toward thinking so if they themselves were holding a toy gun, rather than a plastic ball. Just having a gun nearby didn't make a difference, researchers found.
Why is that? Brockmole said people are primed to act in the world rather than just passively see it. So their minds have to contain information both about what they see and what they might do in response. Evidently, each kind of information can influence the other, he said.
He said the work is not intended to support gun control, but it suggests that people should know that when they hold a gun "that might change how you're going to interpret what's around you."
Brockmole's findings make sense, said Evan Risko, who studies perception and attention at Arizona State University. "Our perception is influenced by a number of different factors, and that can have important consequences," he said.
Dennis Proffitt, who studies visual perception at the University of Virginia, said there are many reasons why one person might think another is armed, such as if he is worried about his own safety or if he thinks the other person is a robber. The effect of holding a gun oneself "could be part of the story" in Florida, he said.
Associated Press writer Mike Schneider in Sanford, Fla., contributed to this report.
Malcolm Ritter can be followed at http://www.twitter.com/malcolmritter

subset: commoncrawl


text: Run o wild Run 'o Wild - For decades I've spent most northern winters chasing storms through the U.S and Wyoming has long been a favourite destination. I love the wildlife, so different to Australia, and the thrill of seeing wild creatures adapted to these incredible beautiful yet harsh conditions. I was driving along the road, fortunately with my camera on my lap, when this herd of deer startled and fled creating a poetic blur against the snow Limited Edition


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Mobility News
The 10 Coolest Smartphones Of 2012 (So Far)
Kristin Bent
They Just Keep Getting Smarter, Don't They?
Remember when it was considered a major feat just to be able to check email on your phone? Well, things have changed, technology has advanced, and now smartphones can seemingly do everything short of walk or drive a car ... at least not yet, that is.
The smartphone market in the first half of 2012 alone has seen a number of newcomers that are raising the bar even higher, delivering new features like pocket-sized projectors or coming in new ultra-thin form factors that take the concept of portability to whole new heights.
From handset makers ranging from Samsung to Nokia to HTC, here's a look at the 10 coolest smartphones to launch so far this year.
Learn More: coolest smartphones | best smartphones | new smartphones | smartphones in 2012 | samsung galaxy s III | samsung galaxy S3 | nokia lumia | Mobility | Smart phones


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The Well-Tempered Clavier II BWV 870-893 - Bach, Johann Sebastian
The Well-Tempered Clavier, Book II (48 Praludien und Fugen in allen Dur- und Molltonarten. Band 2). Composed by Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750). Edited by Alfred Durr. For solo piano. This edition: Paperback, Urtext edition. Paperback. Baroque. SMP Level 10 (Advanced). Collection. Thematic index, performance notes and introductory text. BWV 870-893. 163 pages. Published by Baerenreiter Verlag (BA.BA5192).
ISBN 9790006498727. With thematic index, performance notes and introductory text. Baroque. 9x12 inches.
The Barenreiter Well-Tempered Clavier is masterpiece of keyboard literature, a unique URTEXT edition reproducing the musical text of the New Bach Edition. The Barenreiter edition presents the musical text as it is found in the sources. J S Bach was the first to conquer the entire breadth of tonality in his Das Wohltemperierte Clavier (The Well Tempered Clavier) by composing a collection of preludes and fugues in all major and minor keys - a truly revolutionary achievement.
A detailed German/English preface by the editor Alfred Duerr included with each volume discusses the source material as well as the performance practice, including the execution of ornaments.
Barenreiter editorial guidelines keep differing manuscript traditions and versions of the Well-Tempered Clavier separate. In many other publishers' editions, there is a mixture of the various manuscript traditions and versions, creating a work different from the original sources.
In particular, the source for Volume 2 of the Well-Tempered Clavier is complicated as a "definite version" of this work by Bach has never been determined; the work survives in two distinct manuscript traditions which both go back to Bach himself. Until now, all printed editions have combined these two traditions into a single hybrid edition. The Barenreiter Well-Tempered Clavier II keeps the two traditions separate and presents each piece in the version containing the largest number of Bach's subsequent changes; significant variants from the other version are added as alternatives so that they can be performed.
About SMP Level 10 (Advanced)
Very advanced level, very difficult note reading, frequent time signature changes, virtuosic level technical facility needed.


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The Colorado-based private company, which is headed by former National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) engineer Sandy Butterfield, is designing a radically different architecture that could substantially reduce generating costs.
Financing came from venture capital firm New Enterprise Associates (NEA) and from James Maguire, an individual investor focused on early-stage funding of what he sees as breakthrough renewables technologies. NEA, with some $11 million in committed capital, previously provided early-stage funding to Boulder when it was founded in 2009.
The $8 million will be used to complete development, testing and commercialisation of Boulder's technology, says Butterfield, formerly chief engineer of NREL's National Wind Technology Centre, near Boulder, Colorado. The design, which has already been tested in a 750kW medium-speed generator application for the oil and gas industry, will now be tested in a multi-megawatt wind turbine application.
Boulder has the industry's only direct drive that has no need for iron in the core, as it uses "air core" axial flux. Iron cores tend to "cog" or vibrate, says Butterfield, which makes them rougher and noisier. They also lose energy and need more structural support because of magnetic attraction. Boulder's design uses printed circuit boards in the stator, so manufacturing is less expensive and more reliable.
The company claims its technology can reduce the cost of generating energy to 30% below current best-in-class designs. "Achieving cost parity (with fossil fuels) will create a disruptive shift in the sector and position Boulder Wind Power very well to capture a meaningful share of the $50 billion global market for wind turbines," says NEA general partner Harry Weller.
Meanwhile, additional investor interest in Boulder could potentially come with the hiring of Tim Connor as vice-president of business strategy and chief financial officer.
Connor was previously with venture capital firm Sequel Venture Partners.


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The TWU Archives was informally established in 1982, on the strength of grant funding acquired by Library Director David Twiest, who began to accummulate school records, as well as the archival records of Robert N. Thompson; in 1982-1983 he hired a contract archivist to begin to manage these materials.
For some years, very little work was accomplished, owing to a lack of funding.
In 1988, Ted Goshulak accepted the position of reference librarian; his responsibilities included general oversight of the archives department, which was by now established as part of the library.
In 1994 Ms Stopforth was hired to work on a part-time basis as reference librarian and archivist. Between 1995 and 2014, Stopforth successfully applied for over $47,000 in provincial and federal grant funding, which was applied to salaries, shelving, supplies, and computer hardware and software. Student assistants were hired with funding from the Work Studies Program, a provincial program that was cut ca. 2002. Stopforth resigned from this position in 2019. In February 2019, Ms. Krause succeeded as University Archivist and Assistant Librarian.
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This Collection consists of maps of the Fraser Valley, Langley Municipality, and the property on which Trinity Western University is located; most are photocopies
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November 05, 2005
May 22, 2009
Saturday, November 05, 2005 11:34:25 AM by SylviaS


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Summary: A look back at 9-11. What have we learned? What were the important responses to 9-11? How should we see this event in the context of America's history? At the end are links to other useful articles about 9-11 and al Qaeda.
America is flooded today with emotional commemoratives about 9-11. For that I recommend reading "Let's Cancel 9/11 – Bury the War State's Blank Check at Sea" by Tom Engelhardt — as usual for Engelhardt, it's brilliant and well-written. But the FM website provides something different: a cold focus on the facts necessary for survival. In that light there are two essential things to know about 9-11:
- It was the one of the (perhaps the) most effective single military operation in the history of the world.
- It was exploited by both western governments and jihadists, operating in an almost symbiotic manner.
Both of these have been described extensively since 9-11, both on the FM website and elsewhere. This post gives a summary.
- 9/11 was the most effective single military operation, ever
- About our lost civil liberties
- About al Qaeda and our jihadist foes
(1) 9/11 was the most effective single military operation, ever
This was posed as a question here on 11 June 2008. Three years later the answer is clear, as the Obama Administration has institutionalized the course changes made by Bush Jr in the evolution of America: militarization of foreign policy, cancerous growth of the US internal security, intelligence, and miliary apparatus. Massive erosion of civil liberties. They are now bipartisan policies. In our system that makes them almost impossible to change.
With a single strike al Qaeda changed the course of the world's hegemon, by many measures the most powerful nation (relative to its time) that the world has ever seen. Al Qaeda did this at a negligible cost in money and manpower. As RJH said in the comments: "The purpose of an action is the reaction."
Never have so few changed the life of so many with so little effort. Our counter-strikes have damaged or crippled al Qaeda (perhaps even destroyed it), but its leaders may see al Qaeda as the vanguard of their movement, not its body — and hence expendable (we do not know their calculations). The entire organization may have deliberately or by miscalculation acted as a kamikaze.
Al Qaeda manipulated America as a matador does with a bull, waving a cape to so that the bull charges into position for the thrust of the sword. 9/11 changed the course of America in terms of both internal and external policy, changing both in ways almost certainly inimical to our long-term strength and prosperity. Our liberties curtailed (see this ACLU study), the government police, security, intelligence, and military services have expanded like cancers — draining resources from the overall society.
9-11 was not a decisive battle in the traditional form, where thousands fight to determine the fate of nations. A dozen guys with box cutters deliberately set out to change the course of a nation – and succeeded. The multiple of force to effect is astonishing, beyond anything I can think of in history.
(1.a) Ahead of the pack (as usual) in seeing this, Tom Engelhardt discusses al Qaeda's triumph in "Kiss American Security Goodbye: 15 Numbers That Add Up to an Age of Insecurity, 15 May 2008. Excerpt:
The principle behind Tai Chi stayed with me — that you could multiply the force of an act by giving way before the force of others; that a smaller person could use the strength of a bigger one against him. Now, jump to September 11, 2001 and its aftermath — and you know the Tai Chi version of history from there. Think of it as a grim cosmic joke — that the 9/11 attacks, as apocalyptic as they looked, were anything but. The true disasters followed and the wounds were largely self-inflicted, as the most militarily powerful nation on the planet used its own force to disable itself.
Before that fateful day, the Bush administration had considered terrorism, Osama bin Laden, and al-Qaeda subjects for suckers and wusses. What they were intent on was pouring money into developing an elaborate boondoggle of a missile defense system against future nuclear attacks by rogue states. Those Cold War high frontiersmen (and women) couldn't get enough of the idea of missiling up. That, after all, was where the money and the fun seemed to be. Nuclear was where the big boys — the nation states — played. "Bin Laden determined to strike in U.S….," the CIA told the President that August. Yawn.
After 9/11, of course, George W. Bush and his top advisors almost instantly launched their crusade against Islam and then their various wars, all under the rubric of the Global War on Terror. (As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pungently put the matter that September, "We have a choice — either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to change the way that they live; and we chose the latter.")
By then, they were already heading out to "drain the swamp" of evil doers, 60 countries worth of them, if necessary. Meanwhile, they moved quickly to fight the last battle at home, the one just over, by squandering vast sums on an American Maginot Line of security. The porous new Department of Homeland Security, the NSA, the FBI, and other acronymic agencies were to lock down, surveil, and listen in on America. All this to prevent "the next 9/11."
In the process, they would treat bin Laden's scattered al-Qaeda network as if it were the Nazi or Soviet war machine (even comically dubbing his followers "Islamofascists"). In the blinking of an eye, and in the rubble of two enormous buildings in downtown Manhattan, bin Laden and his cronies had morphed from nobodies into supermen, a veritable Legion of Doom. (There was a curious parallel to this transformation in World War II. Before Pearl Harbor, American experts had considered the Japanese — as historian John Dower so vividly documented in his book War Without Mercy — bucktoothed, near-sighted military incompetents whose war planes were barely capable of flight. On December 8, 1941, they suddenly became a race of invincible supermen without, in the American imagination, ever passing through a human incarnation.)
When, in October 2001, Congress passed the Patriot Act, and an Office of Homeland Security (which, in 2002, became a "department") was established, it was welcome to the era of homeland insecurity. From then on, every major building, landmark, amusement park, petting zoo, flea market, popcorn stand, and toll booth anywhere in the country would be touted as a potential target for terrorists and in need of protection. Every police department from Arkansas to Ohio would be in desperate need of anti-terror funding. And why not, when the terrorists loomed so monstrously large, were so apocalyptically capable, and wanted so very badly to destroy our way of life? No wonder that, in the 2006 National Asset Database, compiled by the Department of Homeland Security, the state of Indiana, "with 8,591 potential terrorist targets, had 50% more listed sites than New York (5,687) and more than twice as many as California (3,212), ranking the state the most target-rich place in the nation."
(1.b) For more information about 9-11
- Important: Al Qaeda's bases in Afghanistan has little to do with 9-11, 10 August 2009 — About one of the big lies supporting the Long War
- "How 9/11 Should Be Remembered – The Extraordinary Achievements of Ordinary People", By Rebecca Solnit, TomDispatch, 11 September 2009
- "The Lies They Told", New York Times, 15 November 2009 — Review of The Ground Truth – The Untold Story of America Under Attack on 9/11 by John Farmer.
- About the strategic significance of bin Laden's execution, and the road not taken, 5 May 2011
- Perhaps the most valuable perspective about 9-11: "Orwell, 9/11, Emmanuel Goldstein and WikiLeaks", Glenn Greenwals, Salon, 10 September 2011
- About our cowardly domestic response to 9-11 (esp compared to other nations): "We refuse to live in fear!", Glenn Greenwald, Salon, 12 September 2011 — The title is ironic.
- "The meaning of political rituals like 9/11 Day", Glenn Greenwald, Salon, 13 September 2011
(1.c) Other articles explaining that AQ is winning, in an important sense
- "Why al-Qaeda is winning", Pepe Escobar, Asia Times, 11 September 2011
- "The Long War's Long Tail", Foreign Policy, 30 August 2011 — "Daveed Gartenstein-Ross's new book, Bin Laden's Legacy, wonders which side actually is winning the war on terror. " As an American geopolitical expert, G-R's works to hype threats. Even so, his analysis of AQ's goals for 9/11 make sense.
(2) About our lost civil liberties
(2.a) How we have changed during the past 30 years: "Daniel Ellsberg: All the crimes Richard Nixon committed against me are now legal", CNN, 7 June 2011 — We're now a domesticated people. Excerpt:
Richard Nixon, if he were alive today, would feel vindicated that all the crimes he committed against me – which forced his resignation facing impeachment – are now legal. … That includes burglarizing my former psychoanalyst's office (for material to blackmail me into silence), warrantless wiretapping, using the CIA against an American citizen in the US, and authorizing a White House hit squad to "incapacitate me totally" (on the steps of the Capitol on 3 May 1971). All the above were to prevent me from exposing guilty secrets of his own administration that went beyond the Pentagon Papers. But under George W. Bush and Barack Obama,with the PATRIOT Act, the FISA Amendment Act, and (for the hit squad) President Obama's executive orders. they have all become legal.
There is no further need for present or future presidents to commit obstructions of justice (like Nixon's bribes to potential witnesses) to conceal such acts. Under the new laws, Nixon would have stayed in office, and the Vietnam War would have continued at least several more years.
Likewise, where Nixon was the first president in history to use the 54-year-old Espionage Act to indict an American (me) for unauthorized disclosures to the American people (it had previously been used, as intended, exclusively against spies), he would be impressed to see that President Obama has now brought five such indictments against leaks, almost twice as many as all previous presidents put together (three).
He could only admire Obama's boldness in using the same Espionage Act provisions used against me–almost surely unconstitutional used against disclosures to the American press and public in my day, less surely under the current Supreme Court–to indict Thomas Drake, a classic whistleblower who exposed illegality and waste in the NSA.
(2.b) "A Call to Courage: Reclaiming Our Liberties Ten Years After 9/11", American Civil Liberties Union, 7 September 2011 — Opening:
An ACLU report release to coincide with the 10th anniversary of 9/11 warns that a decade after the attacks, the United States is at risk of enshrining a permanent state of emergency in which core values must be subordinated to ever-expanding claims of national security. {it} explores how sacrificing America's values – including justice, individual liberty, and the rule of law – ultimately undermines safety.
The report begins with an examination of the contention that the U.S. is engaged in a "war on terror" that takes place everywhere and will last forever, and that therefore counterterrorism measures cannot be balanced against any other considerations such as maintaining civil liberties. The report states that the United States has become an international legal outlier in invoking the right to use lethal force and indefinite military detention outside battle zones, and that these policies have hampered the international fight against terrorism by straining relations with allies and handing a propaganda tool to enemies.
(2.c) "Post-9/11, NSA 'enemies' include us", James Bamford, Politico, 8 September 2011 — Blamford wrote The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America. Excerpt:
Within weeks of the attacks, the giant ears of the National Security Agency, always pointed outward toward potential enemies, turned inward on the American public itself. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, established 23 years before to ensure that only suspected foreign agents and terrorists were targeted by the NSA, would be bypassed. Telecom companies, required by law to keep the computerized phone records of their customers confidential unless presented with a warrant, would secretly turn them over in bulk to the NSA without ever asking for a warrant.
… On Aug. 17, 1975, as America was enjoying a lazy summer watching "Jaws" and "The Exorcist" at the movies, Idaho Sen. Frank Church took his seat on "Meet the Press." For months, as the first chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Church had been conducting the first in-depth investigation of America's growing intelligence community.
When he looked into the NSA, he came away shocked by its potential for abuse. Without mentioning the agency's name — almost forbidden at the time — he nonetheless offered an unsolicited but grave warning:
"That capability at any time could be turned around on the American people and no American would have any privacy left, such [is] the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter," Church said. "There would be no place to hide. If this government ever became a tyrant, if a dictator ever took charge in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the government to know. Such is the capability of this technology.
"I don't want to see this country ever go across the bridge. I know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision so that we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return."
(3) About al Qaeda and our jihadist foes
(3.a) "The Al-Qaeda Myth", Max Fisher, The Atlantic, 9 September 2011 — "Why are we so apt to see the terrorist group or its offshoots where they don't really exist?" Fisher carefully avoids mention of the US government's motive to exaggerate al Qaeda's strength, and their history of doing so since 9-11. Excerpt:
In the decade since September 11, al-Qaeda has become physically isolated, less capable of striking its enemies, and largely shunned by the worldwide Islamic community it had wanted to lead. But it has succeeded enormously in persuading many in the West of much the opposite. Al-Qaeda wants us to see them everywhere, to imagine the group as a global movement with bloodthirsty agents in every corner, waiting for the order to strike. And we have often obliged, slapping al-Qaeda's label on just about every militant group or homicidal fanatic that happens to observe Islam, the world's second most common religion. How we got here reveals as much about our own propensity for over-reaction as it does about al-Qaeda's one remaining great skill: branding.
… Such is the trend of al-Qaeda's supposed branches: local militant groups that have little interest in al-Qaeda's globally oriented ideology or mission nonetheless find it useful to claim they do. Often, whatever government is fighting that local group also finds it useful to claim an al-Qaeda connection, as Western governments tend to be willing to overlook abuses by and write lavish checks to a government that says it is at war with al-Qaeda.
… But the great al-Qaeda menace is not what they would have us believe. Look at the data: the wave of terrorist attacks against the West, which September 11 was supposed to inspire, never came: not from the real al-Qaeda, which paid dearly for their attack, and not from the so-called "franchises" that show little real interest in following al-Qaeda's suicidal mission.
(3.b) Making stuff up to fuel the Long War: "Shadowy Figure: Al Qaeda's Size Is Hard To Measure", Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2011 — Confident guessing and exaggeration as the foundation for America's grand strategy. Opening:
Ten years after al Qaeda carried out the Sept. 11 attacks on the U.S., the terrorist network's ranks have been under persistent assault. Yet it remains a credible threat, security analysts say, as demonstrated by intelligence suggesting al Qaeda militants were planning attacks around this weekend's anniversary. The U.S. government has pursued and killed key members, notably leader Osama bin Laden. But terrorism experts can't even agree on how to measure the group, let alone whether it has been growing.
The following sections link to more information about al Qaeda.
(3.c) See all posts on the FM website about al Qaeda here.
(3.d) Posts about bin Laden:
- Was 9/11 the most effective single military operation in the history of the world?, 11 June 2008
- Bin Laden wins by using the "Tactics of Mistake" against America, 6 February 2011
- A brief note about the death of bin Laden, 2 May 2011
- Important: About the strategic significance of bin Laden's execution, and the road not taken, 5 May 2011
(3.e) These posts about AQ remain relevant today:
- Important: Lessons Learned from the American Expedition to Iraq, 29 December 2005 — Is al Qaeda like Cobra, SPECTRE, and THRUSH?
- The enigma of Al Qaeda. Even in death, these unanswered questions remain important, 15 September 2008
- "Strategic Divergence: The War Against the Taliban and the War Against Al Qaeda" by George Friedman, 31 January 2009
- Can we defeat our almost imaginary enemies?, 10 December 2009
- "The Almanac of Al Qaeda" – about our foe, 16 June 2010
- Today's news about the Ak-Pak War, about al Qaeda's strength, 1 July 2010
- Important: Does al Qaeda still exist?, 31 March 2011
(3.f) For more information about our Islamic foes:
- Important: Are islamic extremists like the anarchists?, 14 December 2009
- Important: RAND explains How Terrorist Groups End, and gives Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida, 15 January 2010
- Stratfor's strategic analysis – "Jihadism in 2010: The Threat Continues", 17 March 2010
- Stratfor: "Jihadism: The Grassroots Paradox", 21 March 2010
- Stratfor: Setting the Record Straight on Grassroots Jihadism, 1 May 2010
- Hard (and disturbing) information about schools in Pakistan – the madāris , 1 May 2011


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ATLANTA (AP) – Coach Brian Gregory is about to begin the third season of his rebuilding job at Georgia Tech.
The first two years were all about setting standards defensively for the program, and last season's roster met Gregory's expectations to improve the offense by cutting down on turnovers and increasing assists.
Those modest accomplishments, though, weren't good enough to keep the Yellow Jackets from losing 12 games in the Atlantic Coast Conference for the second straight year.
This season figures to be even tougher now that the ACC totals 15 teams with the addition of national heavyweights Syracuse and Pittsburgh. Notre Dame, which has been to five of the last six NCAA tournaments, also has joined a league that's traditionally dominated by Duke and North Carolina.
"From where we were two years ago to where we are now, I think we are much different program and much different team," Gregory said. "The question is have we been able to take enough steps in order to be able to compete on a nightly basis with those other teams who have done that over the years."
Gregory is encouraged, though, as the Yellow Jackets return five of their six top scorers, and the arrival of point guard Trae Golden, a senior transfer from Tennessee, brings needed depth. It also should help that four starters are back.
But to become relevant nationally, Gregory says Georgia Tech must improve offensively by playing faster and smarter.
The Jackets will emphasize getting the ball inside to Robert Carter Jr. and Kammeon Holsey, a pair of 6-foot-8 forwards, and 6-11 center Daniel Miller in transition because Gregory says that's "the best time to score in the post."
Here are five things to watch during the upcoming Georgia Tech basketball season:
MAKE THE GAME EASIER: Gregory was pleased that the assist to turnover ratio improved last season, but the next step is increasing assist totals for the entire rotation. That means that Marcus Georges-Hunt and Carter, the two leading returning scorers, need to pass the ball effectively, and the same goes for Holsey and guard Chris Bolden. Regardless who wins the point guard job among Golden, Solomon Poole, Corey Heyward and Travis Jorgenson, Gregory might play as many as three at the position. The key will be to get a minimum average of three assists per game from each point guard.
GOLDEN PICKUP: After starting 24 games last season and 58 in his career, Golden left Tennessee to be closer to his father, who is sick and lives nearby. The NCAA said earlier this month that Golden was eligible to play his senior year for the Yellow Jackets without having to sit out a season. Golden averaged 12.1 points and 3.9 assists for the Volunteers as a junior.
NOT JUST POINT GUARD: Replacing former starting point guard Mfon Udofia won't be easy, but one reason Gregory wants to develop more point and shooting guards is to keep legs fresh in a conference that puts a premium on strong frontcourt play. Georgia Tech's lack of depth at both positions has factored strongly in its struggles the last two years. "If you don't have quality guards on the court – and that means multiple guys that can handle the ball, break down the defense, reverse the ball and make solid plays – you're in deep trouble," Gregory said.
CRASH THE OFFENSIVE BOARDS: Gregory knows the Jackets need to give themselves second, third and fourth chances on offense, so he's putting an emphasis on offensive rebounding. "Marcus Georges-Hunt, Jason Morris and Stacey Poole Jr. in that wing spot should be tremendous offensive rebounders," Gregory said. "We are really, really emphasizing that and having them understand how important that is."
KEEP IT IN THE FAMILY: Gregory plans tweet regularly to promote the program, but he doesn't want his players using Twitter during the season. Holsey said at the ACC media conference earlier this month that the coach sees no point in stirring up potentially tough topics, regardless of how the Jackets perform this season. "He doesn't think very highly of it," Holsey said. "Actually, I don't tweet. I'm not a Twitter person, so that's a good thing."


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McDONELL, TERESA, named Sainte-Thérèse, member of the Sisters of Charity of Bytown; b. 9 Feb. 1833 or 1835 in St Andrews, Upper Canada, daughter of Angus McDonell and Margaret McDonald; d. 4 Nov. 1917 in St Boniface, Man.
Teresa McDonell's mother died at her birth, and an aunt looked after her until she reached the age of her first communion. She was then sent to the convent of the Sisters of Charity of Bytown (Ottawa). When she had finished her secondary studies, the young girl confided to her father her great desire to become a nun. His cherished dreams for her shattered, he angrily cried: "You shall never hear from me again." Angus McDonell kept his word. Despite the deep pain inflicted on her by the father she loved dearly, Teresa remained faithful to her vocation. On 31 Jan. 1851 she joined the Sisters of Charity of Bytown, and on 19 March 1853 she took her vows; from then on she would be Sister Sainte-Thérèse.
Two years later the superior of the community, Élisabeth Bruyère*, agreed to assist the Grey Nuns who had been established at the Red River settlement since 1844 [see Marie-Louise Valade*]. The mission needed reinforcements, and Mother Bruyère offered to "lend" two of her nuns "for three years" and specifically Sister Sainte-Thérèse, who thus went to St Boniface in October 1855. She was put in charge of the pharmacy, but also taught in the classes that had been set up. Her great kindness and her remarkable ability to care for the sick, as well as to work in the field of education, won people's hearts. After classes she would travel widely over the broad prairies, often on foot, to bring relief and comfort. The local inhabitants had boundless confidence in her, the more so since she demonstrated an exceptional knowledge of the art of medicine. She was usually called "the kind mother of the poor, the good Lord's healer."
However, the three years' "loan" quickly passed, and the community in Ottawa asked for the return of Sister Sainte-Thérèse and her companion. Despite protests from many of the settlers, the ox-cart that was taking her away moved off on 29 Aug. 1859. On the morning of the second day it was suddenly surrounded by a party of Métis and Indians led by Louis Riel* the elder. According to the annals of the community, Sister Sainte-Thérèse was enjoined "to get into the cart which was [carrying] Mlle Céleste Lagimodière, who returned to St Boniface with the prisoner." This unexpected incident forced the superiors to give in against their will; the "doctor sister" would never again leave Red River. Her attachment to the Riels never faltered, especially to Louis* the younger, who considered her "an angel of devotion and charity."
Sister Sainte-Thérèse taught at St Vital, St Norbert, and St François Xavier. In 1869 she helped found the Académie Sainte-Marie, a school for young English-speaking Catholics of Upper Fort Garry (Winnipeg). She often combined the roles of teacher and superior. For example, she was superior of the convent at St Norbert in 1872–77 and 1888–93, and of the one at St François Xavier in 1882–88 and 1897–1900; she was also on occasion superior of the one at St Vital.
A born nurse, Sister Sainte-Thérèse had remained active in the health field. In 1871 she set up a temporary hospital on the top floor of the laundry used by the nuns and their charges; it was the nucleus of the future St Boniface General Hospital, the first Catholic hospital in the west. During its initial year some 170 patients were admitted. In 1877 the Grey Nuns, knowing the cramped conditions, acquired a house 25 by 30 feet in size to which the patients were transferred. She was in charge of administering this establishment until 1880.
While tending her patients Sister Sainte-Thérèse twice contracted severe erysipelas. Though confined to the infirmary for the last 16 years of her life, she retained her customary cheerfulness and her spirit of service. After 62 dedicated years in the same region she died in St Boniface on 4 Nov. 1917.
Arch. des Sœurs de la Charité d'Ottawa, Chroniques de la maison mère, s.c.o., 1. Arch. des Sœurs Grises (Saint-Boniface, Man.), Annales, 16: 21–32; Chroniques de la maison vicariale de Saint-Boniface, I–IX; Dossier de Teresa McDonell. Marie Bonin, "The Grey Nuns and the Red River settlement," Manitoba Hist. (Winnipeg), no.11 (spring 1986): 12–14. Estelle Mitchell, Les Soeurs grises de Montréal à la Rivière-Rouge, 1844–1984 (Montréal, 1987). Élisabeth de Moissac, "Le soin des malades à la Rivière-Rouge et le premier hôpital de Saint-Boniface," Les Cloches de Saint-Boniface, 70 (1971): 82–87, 140–18. Louis Riel, The collected writings of Louis Riel, ed. G. F. G. Stanley (5v., Edmonton, 1985).
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Geneviève Rocan, "McDONELL, TERESA, Sainte-Thérèse," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 14, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed September 21, 2023, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/mcdonell_teresa_14E.html.
The citation above shows the format for footnotes and endnotes according to the Chicago manual of style (16th edition). Information to be used in other citation formats:
|Author of Article:
|Geneviève Rocan
|Title of Article:
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|Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 14
|University of Toronto/Université Laval
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|Access Date:
|September 21, 2023


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Chapter XXIII
Very quickly will there be an end of thee here; take heed therefore how it will be with thee in another world. Today man is, and to-morrow he will be seen no more. And being removed out of sight, quickly also he is out of mind. O the dulness and hardness of man's heart, which thinketh only of the present, and looketh not forward to the future. Thou oughtest in every deed and thought so to order thyself, as if thou wert to die this day. If thou hadst a good conscience thou wouldst not greatly fear death. It were better for thee to watch against sin, than to fly from death. If to-day thou art not ready, how shalt thou be ready to-morrow? To-morrow is an uncertain day; and how knowest thou that thou shalt have a to-morrow?
2. What doth it profit to live long, when we amend so little? Ah! long life doth not always amend, but often the more increaseth guilt. Oh that we might spend a single day in this world as it ought to be spent! Many there are who reckon the years since they were converted, and yet oftentimes how little is the fruit thereof. If it is a fearful thing to die, it may be perchance a yet more fearful thing to live long. Happy is the man who hath the hour of his death always before his eyes, and daily prepareth himself to die. If thou hast ever seen one die, consider that thou also shalt pass away by the same road.
3. When it is morning reflect that it may be thou shalt not see the evening, and at eventide dare not to boast thyself of the morrow. Always be thou prepared, and so live that death may never find thee unprepared. Many die suddenly and unexpectedly. For at such an hour as ye think not, the Son of Man cometh.(1) When that last hour shall come, thou wilt begin to think very differently of thy whole life past, and wilt mourn bitterly that thou hast been so negligent and slothful.
4. Happy and wise is he who now striveth to be such in life as he would fain be found in death! For a perfect contempt of the world, a fervent desire to excel in virtue, the love of discipline, the painfulness of repentance, readiness to obey, denial of self, submission to any adversity for love of Christ; these are the things which shall give great confidence of a happy death. Whilst thou art in health thou hast many opportunities of good works; but when thou are in sickness I know not how much thou wilt be able to do. Few are made better by infirmity: even as they who wander much abroad seldom become holy.
5. Trust not thy friends and kinsfolk, nor put off the work of thy salvation to the future, for men will forget thee sooner than thou thinkest. It is better for thee now to provide in time, and to send some good before thee, than to trust to the help of others. If thou art not anxious for thyself now, who, thinkest thou, will be anxious for thee afterwards? Now the time is most precious. Now is the accepted time, now is the day of salvation. But alas! that thou spendest not well this time, wherein thou mightest lay up treasure which should profit thee everlastingly. The hour will come when thou shalt desire one day, yea, one hour, for amendment of life, and I know not whether thou shalt obtain.
6. Oh, dearly beloved, from what danger thou mightest free thyself, from what great fear, if only thou wouldst always live in fear, and in expectation of death! Strive now to live in such wise that in the hour of death thou mayest rather rejoice than fear. Learn now to die to the world, so shalt thou begin to live with Christ. Learn now to contemn all earthly things, and then mayest thou freely go unto Christ. Keep under thy body by penitence, and then shalt thou be able to have a sure confidence.
7. Ah, foolish one! why thinkest thou that thou shalt live long, when thou art not sure of a single day? How many have been deceived, and suddenly have been snatched away from the body! How many times hast thou heard how one was slain by the sword, another was drowned, another falling from on high broke his neck, another died at the table, another whilst at play! One died by fire, another by the sword, another by the pestilence, another by the robber. Thus cometh death to all, and the life of men swiftly passeth away like a shadow.
8. Who will remember thee after thy death? And who will entreat for thee? Work, work now, oh dearly beloved, work all that thou canst. For thou knowest not when thou shalt die, not what shall happen unto thee after death. While thou hast time, lay up for thyself undying riches. Think of nought but of thy salvation; care only for the things of God. Make to thyself friends, by venerating the saints of God and walking in their steps, that when thou failest, thou mayest be received into everlasting habitations.(2)
9. Keep thyself as a stranger and a pilgrim upon the earth, to whom the things of the world appertain not. Keep thine heart free, and lifted up towards God, for here have we no continuing city.(3) To Him direct thy daily prayers with crying and tears, that thy spirit may be found worthy to pass happily after death unto its Lord. Amen.
(1) Matthew xxiv. 44. (2) Luke xvi. 9. (3) Hebrews xiii. 14.
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Francois-Rene Rideau authored
This restores the feature of do-first that was lost while refactoring ASDF to fix the timestamp propagation issue. The old asdf-bundle worked implicitly because of do-first: fasl-op DEPENDS-ON compile-op, and compile-op has a DO-FIRST on the load-op of dependencies, NOT a DEPENDS-ON, so if the compile-op is "done" (which did NOT check the timestamps of dependencies), then the dofirst is never consulted and load-op is never traversed. In our new ASDF, we want to always traverse the load-op of dependencies, so we can propagate their timestamps; however, we still want to only actually load them if they are needed. Therefore, visiting actions takes an additional flag "needed in this image", and each visited action can be planned or not planned yet, and a not planned yet action can be visited a second time to plan it after recursively visiting its dependencies with the "needed" flag set. Tests were fixed now to work now that this distinction exists.65be1c38