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Petitioner and two others were summoned to testify before a congressional investigating committee. One of them refused to say whether he was or had been a member of the Communist Party, basing his refusal on "the first and fifth amendments," as well as "the first amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the fifth amendment." Petitioner adopted the other's statement as his own and refused to answer the same question. The committee did not ask him to state more specifically the ground for his refusal to answer and did not specifically overrule his objection or direct him to answer. Held: In his trial for contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. 192, the District Court should have entered a judgment of acquittal. Pp. 156-170.
David Scribner and Frank J. Donner argued the cause for petitioner. With them on the brief were Arthur Kinoy and Allan R. Rosenberg.
Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and John R. Wilkins.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted of contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. 192 in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Section 192 provides for the punishment of any witness before a congressional committee "who . . . refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry . . . ." 1 On appeal, the Court of Appeals [349 U.S. 155, 157] for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 2 Claiming that the Court of Appeals should have directed an acquittal, petitioner applied to this Court for certiorari. We granted the writ because of the fundamental and recurrent character of the questions presented. 3
Pursuant to subpoena, petitioner appeared on August 10, 1949, before a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives. Petitioner was then a member and field representative of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. Also subpoenaed to appear on that day were Thomas J. Fitzpatrick and Frank Panzino, two officers of the same union. At the outset of the hearings, counsel for the committee announced that the purpose of the investigation was to inquire into "the question of Communist affiliation or association of certain members" of the union and "the advisability of tightening present security requirements in industrial plants working on certain Government contracts." 4 All three witnesses were asked questions concerning alleged membership in the Communist Party. All three declined to answer.
Fitzpatrick was the first to be called to testify. He based his refusal to answer on "the first and fifth amendments" as well as "the first amendment to the [349 U.S. 155, 158] Constitution, supplemented by the fifth amendment." 5 Immediately following Fitzpatrick's testimony, Panzino was called to the stand. In response to the identical questions put to Fitzpatrick, Panzino specifically adopted as his own the grounds relied upon by Fitzpatrick. 6 In addition, at one point in his testimony, Panzino stated that "I think again, Mr. Chairman, under the fifth amendment, that is my own personal belief." 7 On the following day, petitioner, unaccompanied by counsel, was called to the stand and was also asked whether he had ever been a member of the Communist Party. Like Panzino before him, he declined to answer, specifically adopting as his own the grounds relied upon by Fitzpatrick. 8 [349 U.S. 155, 159]
On November 20, 1950, all three witnesses were indicted under 192 for their refusals to answer. 9 The three cases were tried before different judges, each sitting without a jury. Fitzpatrick and Panzino were acquitted. In Fitzpatrick's case, it was held that his references to "the first and fifth amendments" and "the first amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the fifth amendment" constituted an adequate means of invoking the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 10 Similarly, in Panzino's case, it was held that his reference to "the fifth amendment" was sufficient to plead the privilege. 11 In petitioner's case, however, the District Court held that a witness may not incorporate the position of another witness and rejected petitioner's defense based on the Self-Incrimination Clause. 12 Petitioner was accordingly convicted and sentenced to a term of six months in jail and a fine of $500. [349 U.S. 155, 160]
In reversing this conviction, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that "No formula or specific term or expression is required" in order to plead the privilege and that a witness may adopt as his own a plea made by a previous witness. 13 Thus the Court of Appeals viewed the principal issue in the case as "whether Fitzpatrick did or did not claim the privilege." 14 On this issue, a majority of the Court of Appeals expressed no view. They agreed that a reversal without more would be in order if they "were of clear opinion that Fitzpatrick, and therefore Quinn, did claim the privilege." But they were "not of that clear opinion." 15 The Court of Appeals therefore ordered a new trial for determination of the issue by the District Court. 16 The Court of Appeals also directed the District Court on retrial to determine whether petitioner "was aware of the intention of his inquirer that answers were required despite his objections." 17 In that regard, however, it rejected petitioner's contention that a witness cannot be convicted under 192 for a refusal to answer unless the committee overruled his objections and specifically directed him to answer. 18
It is from that decision that this Court granted certiorari.
There can be no doubt as to the power of Congress, by itself or through its committees, to investigate matters and conditions relating to contemplated legislation. This power, deeply rooted in American and English institutions, is indeed co-extensive with the power to legislate. Without the power to investigate - including of course the [349 U.S. 155, 161] authority to compel testimony, either through its own processes 19 or through judicial trial 20 - Congress could be seriously handicapped in its efforts to exercise its constitutional function wisely and effectively. 21
But the power to investigate, broad as it may be, is also subject to recognized limitations. It cannot be used to inquire into private affairs unrelated to a valid legislative purpose. 22 Nor does it extend to an area in which Congress is forbidden to legislate. 23 Similarly, the power to investigate must not be confused with any of the powers of law enforcement; those powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary. 24 Still further limitations on the power to investigate are found in the specific individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights, such as the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination which is in issue here. 25
The privilege against self-incrimination is a right that was hard-earned by our forefathers. The reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution - and the necessities for its preservation - are to be found in the lessons of history. 26 As early as 1650, remembrance of the horror of Star Chamber proceedings a decade before had firmly established the privilege in the common law of England. Transplanted to this country as part of our legal heritage, it soon made its way into various state constitutions and ultimately in 1791 into the federal Bill of Rights. The privilege, this Court has stated, "was generally regarded then, as now, [349 U.S. 155, 162] as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions." 27 Co-equally with our other constitutional guarantees, the Self-Incrimination Clause "must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure." 28 Such liberal construction is particularly warranted in a prosecution of a witness for a refusal to answer, since the respect normally accorded the privilege is then buttressed by the presumption of innocence accorded a defendant in a criminal trial. To apply the privilege narrowly or begrudgingly - to treat it as an historical relic, at most merely to be tolerated - is to ignore its development and purpose.
In the instant case petitioner was convicted for refusing to answer the committee's question as to his alleged membership in the Communist Party. Clearly an answer to the question might have tended to incriminate him. 29 As a consequence, petitioner was entitled to claim the privilege. The principal issue here is whether or not he did.
It is agreed by all that a claim of the privilege does not require any special combination of words. 30 Plainly a witness need not have the skill of a lawyer to invoke the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause. If an objection [349 U.S. 155, 163] to a question is made in any language that a committee may reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt to invoke the privilege, it must be respected both by the committee and by a court in a prosecution under 192.
Here petitioner, by adopting the grounds relied upon by Fitzpatrick, based his refusal to answer on "the first and fifth amendments" and "the first amendment to the Constitution, supplemented by the fifth amendment." The Government concedes - as we think it must - that a witness may invoke the privilege by stating "I refuse to testify on the ground of the Fifth Amendment." Surely, in popular parlance and even in legal literature, the term "Fifth Amendment" in the context of our time is commonly regarded as being synonymous with the privilege against self-incrimination. The Government argues, however, that the references to the Fifth Amendment in the instant case were inadequate to invoke the privilege because Fitzpatrick's statements are more reasonably understood as invoking rights under the First Amendment. We find the Government's argument untenable. The mere fact that Fitzpatrick and petitioner also relied on the First Amendment does not preclude their reliance on the Fifth Amendment as well. 31 If a witness urges two constitutional objections to a committee's line of questioning, he is not bound at his peril to choose between them. By pressing both objections, he does not lose a privilege which would have been valid if he had only relied on one.
The Government, moreover, apparently concedes that petitioner intended to invoke the privilege. In its brief the Government points out "the probability that petitioner's ambiguous references to the Fifth Amendment [349 U.S. 155, 164] . . . were phrased deliberately in such vague terms so as to enable petitioner . . . to obtain the benefit of the privilege without incurring the popular opprobrium which often attaches to its exercise." 32 But the fact that a witness expresses his intention in vague terms is immaterial so long as the claim is sufficiently definite to apprise the committee of his intention. As everyone agrees, no ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege. In the instant case, Quinn's references to the Fifth Amendment were clearly sufficient to put the committee on notice of an apparent claim of the privilege. It then became incumbent on the committee either to accept the claim or to ask petitioner whether he was in fact invoking the privilege. Particularly is this so if it is true, as the Government contends, that petitioner feared the stigma that might result from a forthright claim of his constitutional right to refuse to testify. It is precisely at such times - when the privilege is under attack by those who wrongly conceive of it as merely a shield for the guilty - that governmental bodies must be most scrupulous in protecting its exercise.
This ruling by no means leaves a congressional committee defenseless at the hands of a scheming witness intent on deception. When a witness declines to answer a question because of constitutional objections and the language used is not free from doubt, the way is always open for the committee to inquire into the nature of the claim before making a ruling. If the witness unequivocally and intelligently waives any objection based on the Self-Incrimination Clause, or if the witness refuses a committee request to state whether he relies on the Self-Incrimination Clause, he cannot later invoke its protection [349 U.S. 155, 165] in a prosecution for contempt for refusing to answer that question. Here the committee made no attempt to have petitioner particularize his objection. Under these circumstances, we must hold that petitioner's references to the Fifth Amendment were sufficient to invoke the privilege and that the court below erred in failing to direct a judgment of acquittal.
There is yet a second ground for our decision.
Section 192, like the ordinary federal criminal statute, requires a criminal intent - in this instance, a deliberate, intentional refusal to answer. 33 This element of the offense, like any other, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner contends that such proof was not, and cannot be, made in this case.
Clearly not every refusal to answer a question propounded by a congressional committee subjects a witness to prosecution under 192. Thus if he raises an objection to a certain question - for example, lack of pertinency or the privilege against self-incrimination - the committee may sustain the objection and abandon the question, even though the objection might actually be without merit. In such an instance, the witness' refusal to answer is not contumacious, for there is lacking the requisite criminal intent. Or the committee may disallow the objection and thus give the witness the choice of answering or not. Given such a choice, the witness may recede from his position and answer the question. And if he does not then answer, it may fairly be said that the foundation has been laid for a finding of criminal [349 U.S. 155, 166] intent to violate 192. In short, unless the witness is clearly apprised that the committee demands his answer notwithstanding his objections, there can be no conviction under 192 for refusal to answer that question. 34
Was petitioner so apprised here? At no time did the committee specifically overrule his objection based on the Fifth Amendment; nor did the committee indicate its overruling of the objection by specifically directing petitioner to answer. In the absence of such committee action, petitioner was never confronted with a clear-cut choice between compliance and noncompliance, between answering the question and risking prosecution for contempt. At best he was left to guess whether or not the committee had accepted his objection.
This ambiguity in the committee's position is apparent from the transcript of the hearing. 35 Immediately after petitioner stated that he was adopting Fitzpatrick's objection, the committee chairman asked petitioner: ". . . will you now answer the question whether you are now or ever have been a member of the Communist Party, or do you decline to answer?" In response to this, petitioner stated for the first time that he would not answer. [349 U.S. 155, 167] He said: "I decline to discuss with the committee questions of that nature." Committee counsel thereupon stated that further questioning "relating to those matters" was "not necessary" and proceeded upon a new line of inquiry. There is nothing in this colloquy from which petitioner could have determined with a reasonable degree of certainty that the committee demanded his answer despite his objection. Rather, the colloquy is wholly consistent with the hypothesis that the committee had in fact acquiesced in his objection.
Our view that a clear disposition of the witness' objection is a prerequisite to prosecution for contempt is supported by long-standing tradition here and in other English-speaking nations. 36 In this country the tradition [349 U.S. 155, 168] has been uniformly recognized in the procedure of both state and federal courts. 37 It is further reflected in the practice of congressional committees prior to the enactment of 192 in 1857; a specific direction to answer was the means then used to apprise a witness of the overruling of his objection. 38 Against this background 192 became [349 U.S. 155, 169] law. 39 No relaxation of the safeguards afforded a witness was contemplated by its sponsors. In explaining the bill in the House, Congressman Davis expressly stated that committee powers were not increased, that no added burden was placed upon the witness, and that a "mere substitution" of a judicial proceeding for punishment at the bar of Congress was intended. 40 The reason for enacting 192 went to the punishment and not the offense. It was recognized that the power of Congress to deal with a contemnor by its own processes did not extend beyond the life of any session. 41 By making contempt of Congress a crime, a fixed term of imprisonment was substituted for variable periods of congressional custody dependent upon the fortuity of whether the contemnor had been called to testify near the beginning or the end of a session. 42 But there is nothing to indicate that this change in the mode of punishment affected in any way the well-established elements of contempt of Congress. Since the enactment of 192, the practice of specifically directing a recalcitrant witness to answer has continued to prevail. 43 In fact, the very committee involved here, the [349 U.S. 155, 170] House Un-American Activities Committee, originally followed this practice 44 and recently resumed it. 45
Giving a witness a fair apprisal of the committee's ruling on an objection recognizes the legitimate interests of both the witness and the committee. Just as the witness need not use any particular form of words to present his objection, so also the committee is not required to resort to any fixed verbal formula to indicate its disposition of the objection. So long as the witness is not forced to guess the committee's ruling, he has no cause to complain. And adherence to this traditional practice can neither inflict hardship upon the committee nor abridge the proper scope of legislative investigation.
Petitioner also attacks his conviction on grounds involving novel constitutional issues. He contends that the House Resolution authorizing the committee's operations is invalid under the First Amendment. In addition, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying a hearing on the alleged bias of the indicting grand jury. Our disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to pass on these issues.
The judgment below is reversed and the case remanded to the District Court with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal.
[ Footnote 2 ] 91 U.S. App. D.C. 344, 203 F.2d 20.
[ Footnote 3 ] 347 U.S. 1008 .
[ Footnote 4 ] Hearings before House Committee on Un-American Activities Regarding Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, 541-542.
[ Footnote 5 ] Id., at 602, 604.
[ Footnote 6 ] Id., at 608.
[ Footnote 7 ] Id., at 609.
[ Footnote 8 ] Id., at 634-635: "Mr. QUINN. I would like to make a statement along the lines that Mr. Fitzpatrick made yesterday in regard to a question of that nature. I feel that the political beliefs, opinions, and associations of the American people can be held secret if they so desire. "Mr. WOOD. And for those reasons do you decline to answer that question? "Mr. QUINN. I didn't say I was declining to answer the question. Before I do answer the question I should like to say that I support the position taken by Brother Fitzpatrick yesterday. "Mr. WOOD. Did you hear his statement yesterday? "Mr. QUINN. Yes; I did. "Mr. WOOD. Do you support it in its entirety? "Mr. QUINN. In its entirety. "Mr. WOOD. Is there anything else you want to add to it? "Mr. QUINN. No; I don't. "Mr. WOOD. Will you accept it as the expression of your views, then? "Mr. QUINN. You may. I may add I feel I have no other choice in this matter, because the defense of the Constitution, I hold sacred. I don't feel I am hiding behind the Constitution, but in this case I am standing before it, defending it, as small as I am. "Mr. WOOD. Having made that statement and subscribed to the sentiments expressed by the witness yesterday to whom you referred, [349 U.S. 155, 159] will you now answer the question whether you are now or have ever been a member of the Communist Party? "Mr. QUINN. I hold that the Constitution holds sacred the rights of people - "Mr. WOOD. You have stated your position. Having enunciated your sentiments and your position, will you now answer the question whether you are now or ever have been a member of the Communist Party, or do you decline to answer? "Mr. QUINN. I decline to discuss with the committee questions of that nature. "Mr. WOOD. Proceed, Mr. Tavenner. "Mr. TAVENNER. I believe in the light of that answer it is not necessary to ask you any further questions relating to those matters, so I will ask you this: Do you know Mr. James J. Matles? "Mr. QUINN. Yes."
[ Footnote 9 ] Petitioner's motion to dismiss the indictment were denied sub nom. United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (D. D.C.).
[ Footnote 10 ] United States v. Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D. D.C.).
[ Footnote 11 ] United States v. Panzino, unreported, Criminal No. 1747-50 (D. D.C.).
[ Footnote 12 ] United States v. Quinn, unreported, Criminal No. 1744-50 (D. D.C.).
[ Footnote 13 ] 91 U.S. App. D.C. 344, 347, 203 F.2d 20, 23.
[ Footnote 14 ] Id., at 347, 203 F.2d, at 23.
[ Footnote 15 ] Id., at 348, 203 F.2d, at 24.
[ Footnote 16 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 17 ] Id., at 349, 203 F.2d, at 25.
[ Footnote 18 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 19 ] Cf. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.
[ Footnote 20 ] In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 .
[ Footnote 21 ] See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 .
[ Footnote 22 ] Id., at 173-174; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 .
[ Footnote 23 ] Compare United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 .
[ Footnote 24 ] Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 -193.
[ Footnote 25 ] The Amendment provides in pertinent part that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."
[ Footnote 26 ] See Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today, 2-7.
[ Footnote 27 ] Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 . See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 -632.
[ Footnote 28 ] Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 . Cf. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 .
[ Footnote 29 ] Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 , specifically holding that such a question is protected by the privilege; Brunner v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 , reversing 190 F.2d 167 (C. A. 9th Cir.). See also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 .
[ Footnote 30 ] Compare Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 , where the Court characterized a witness' statement "I want to claim privilege as to anything that I say" (p. 142) as a "definite claim of general privilege against self-incrimination" (p. 151).
[ Footnote 31 ] As to the close relationship between the First Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination, see Griswold, supra, note 26, at 8-9.
[ Footnote 32 ] Brief for United States, p. 33. The Government makes the same contention as to the petitioner in No. 9, Emspak v. United States, post, p. 190.
[ Footnote 33 ] Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 . See also In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 , in which the Court, while upholding the constitutionality of the statute, recognized deliberateness as an element of the offense.
[ Footnote 34 ] See United States v. Kamp, 102 F. Supp. 757, 759 (D. D.C.): "Committees of Congress must conduct examinations in such a manner that it is clear to the witness that the Committee recognizes him as being in default, and anything short of a clear cut default on the part of the witness will not sustain a conviction for contempt of Congress. The transcript of the defendant Kamp's testimony fails to disclose such a clear cut default. The witness is not required to enter into a guessing game when called upon to appear before a committee. The burden is upon the presiding member to make clear the directions of the committee, to consider any reasonable explanations given by the witness, and then to rule on the witness' response." The defendant was accordingly acquitted. On similar grounds, an acquittal was directed in United States v. Browder, unreported, Criminal No. 1784-50 (D. D.C.).
[ Footnote 35 ] See note 8, supra.
[ Footnote 36 ] While of course not binding on Congress or its committees, the practice in the States and other English-speaking jurisdictions is at least worthy of note. For examples relating to recalcitrant witnesses before state legislative committees, see Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395, 398; People v. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463, 471, 2 N. E. 615, 617; Lowe v. Summers, 69 Mo. App. 637, 645. Recalcitrant witnesses before investigating committees of the British House of Commons have traditionally been apprised of the disposition of their objections and given subsequent opportunity to respond before being subjected to the contempt power of the legislature. The practice has been as follows: The committee reports the failure to answer to the House. The witness is questioned about the cause of the refusal to answer before the Bar of the House. The House then votes on the validity of the objection. If the claim is rejected, the witness is specifically directed to answer. Only after a subsequent refusal is punishment imposed. See 88 Journals of the House of Commons 212, 218 (Case of Elizabeth Robinson before Select Committee on Liverpool Bribery, 1833); 90 Journals of the House of Commons 501, 504, and 29 Hans. Deb., 3d Ser., 1249, 1279-1288 (Case of William Prentice before Select Committee on Great Yarmouth Bribery, 1835); 90 Journals of the House of Commons, 564, 571, 575 (Case of Lieutenant Colonel Fairman before Select Committee on the Orange Lodges, 1835); 152 Journals of the House of Commons 361, [349 U.S. 155, 168] 365 (Case of John Kirkwood before Select Committee on Money Lending, 1897). For Canadian practice, see the case of W. T. R. Preston before the Committee on Public Accounts, the Committee on Agriculture and Colonization, and the House of Commons. 41 Journals of the House of Commons, Canada, 298, 316, 323; 41 id., Appendix No. 2, 324-327; 41 id., Appendix No. 3, 250-251; 76 Debates, House of Commons, Canada, Session 1906, Vol. III, 4451-4535.
[ Footnote 37 ] See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 : "It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified . . . and to require him to answer if `it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.'" See also Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, at 40, No. 14,692e: "When a question is propounded, it belongs to the court to consider and to decide whether any direct answer to it can implicate the witness." The cases, both federal and state, are collected in Wigmore, Evidence, 2271. See, e. g., Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 214 (C. A. 1st Cir.), and Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 405-406, 82 A. 2d 773, 784-785.
[ Footnote 38 ] See, e. g., the resolution introduced by Congressman Orr proposing that one J. W. Simonton be haled before the bar of the House of Representatives for refusing to answer a question put to him by a duly-authorized committee of that body. Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 403-404 (1857). The resolution states in part: "The committee were impressed with the materiality of the testimony withheld by the witness, as it embraced the letter and spirit of the inquiry directed by the House to be made, but were anxious to avoid any controversy with the witness. They consequently waived the interrogatory that day, to give the witness time for reflection on the consequences of his refusal, and to afford him an opportunity to look into the law and the practice of the House in such cases, notifying him that he would, on some subsequent day, be recalled. This was the 15th of January instant. On Tuesday, the 20th instant, the said J. W. Simonton was recalled, and the identical [349 U.S. 155, 169] question first referred to was again propounded, after due notice to him that if he declined the committee would feel constrained to report his declination to the House, and ask that body to enforce all its powers in the premises to compel a full and complete response." Id., at 403. See also id., 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1716 (1850).
[ Footnote 39 ] Act of Jan. 24, 1857, c. 19, 1, 11 Stat. 155.
[ Footnote 40 ] Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 427.
[ Footnote 41 ] Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 230-231.
[ Footnote 42 ] Cong. Globe, supra, note 40, at 405 et seq.
[ Footnote 43 ] See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 771-772 (1869); id., 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1873); 4 Cong. Rec. 1705 et seq. (1876) (citation of Hallet Kilbourn, involved in Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, note 22); 26 Cong. Rec. 6143 et seq. (1894) (citation of Elverton R. Chapman, involved in In re Chapman, supra, note 20); 65 Cong. Rec. 4785 et seq. (1924) (citation of Harry F. Sinclair, involved in Sinclair v. United States, supra, note 33); 69 Cong. Rec. 2439, 5286, [349 U.S. 155, 170] 5353, 7239 (1928); 78 Cong. Rec. 1902, 1911-1914 (1934); 86 Cong. Rec. 3856 (1940); 90 Cong. Rec. 8163 (1944); 97 Cong. Rec. 499 et seq. (1951).
[ Footnote 44 ] See, e. g., the contempt citation of George Powers at 86 Cong. Rec. 3856-3857. See also the citation of James H. Dolsen, id., at 3694-3695.
[ Footnote 45 ] See contempt citation of Saul Grossman, 98 Cong. Rec. 8634-8637. [349 U.S. 155, 171]
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the Court in this case. But I must dissent from the holding made in part II of the majority opinion. The reasons for my position are stated in part II of my dissenting opinion in the Emspak case, decided herewith, post, p. 203, at p. 213. I consider those reasons equally applicable to what is shown by the record in this case.
MR. JUSTICE REED, dissenting. *
The Court in these two cases refuses to punish petitioners, witnesses before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives, for refusal to answer certain pertinent questions. Such refusal is declared to be a misdemeanor by 2 U.S.C. 192.
The separate opinions are based on the conclusion that the petitioners each properly claimed for himself the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The Court holds that questions concerning association with known communists or membership in the Party asked witnesses holding prominent positions in a local union, under investigation for communist infiltration directed at national security, might reasonably be feared as incriminatory by the witnesses. 1 For these cases I make that assumption, too. In both the cases, the Court directs remand to the trial court with directions to acquit. This disposition of the charges excludes any factual issues for decision by the trial court as to whether the witnesses did or did not claim their [349 U.S. 155, 172] privilege. It decides that, as a matter of law, the petitioners claimed their privilege by the words used by them in answer to the questions propounded by the Committee. Since the indictments contained numerous counts covering many questions asked and the evidence showed varying reasons for not answering, the conclusion that privilege was claimed blankets all questions. Since the sentences were less than the maximum penalty for one count, if the Court's determination is wrong as to any one question, its present judgments are wrong. 2 Normally the issue as to whether a claim of privilege was made would be a matter of fact for the trial court if reasonable men might reach either conclusion. See the discussion below in the opinion of Judge Prettyman in Quinn v. United States, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 344, 348, 203 F.2d 20, 24, and of Judge Bazelon, id., at 350 and 361-362, 203 F.2d, at 26 and 38. None of the judges of the Court of Appeals suggested approval of such action as this Court now takes in directing acquittal. See also Emspak v. United States, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 378, 203 F.2d 54, dissent, id., at 384, 203 F.2d ___, at 60. This Court at least should have followed that course here.
These sweeping decisions affect the conduct of all congressional inquiries and all courts, for from the opinions there emerges a legally enforceable rule for handling hearings or prosecutions when questions raise for the witness a problem of self-incrimination. The Court, Quinn opinion, p. 164, requires the interrogator, once the witness' claim though "vague . . . is sufficiently definite to apprise the committee of his intention" to claim his privilege, "either to accept the claim or to ask petitioner whether he was in fact invoking the privilege." Although this phrasing, particularly the last clause, carries for me probabilities of uncertainties in future applications that former decisions [349 U.S. 155, 173] avoided, 3 it is accepted for this case as the governing rule. My conclusion is that neither petitioner here apprised the Committee that he was claiming his privilege. As shown by the cases just cited, the privilege is personal to the witness. The reach of questions into matters that might lead to his prosecution for crime may be known only to him. Therefore the witness has the burden of doing something more than suggesting a question might incriminate him. At least, in the words of the Court, he must "apprise the committee of his intention" to claim his privilege.
The purpose of having witnesses is to furnish to proper interrogators, subject to objections for materiality or the use of coercion, the actual facts they seek. Legislation can best be drafted and cases tried most fairly only when all pertinent facts are made available to those charged with legislation or maintenance of the peace. However, the Congress in the first series of Amendments to the Constitution wrote an exception to this duty in the instance where an answer would compel a person to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. In that situation, on a valid claim of privilege against self-incrimination, the witness may be excused from answering. 4 That exception should neither be shriveled nor bloated. It is designed to excuse the guilty and the innocent alike from testifying when prosecution may reasonably be feared from compelled disclosures. The importance of preserving the right to require evidence, except when a witness definitely apprises the interrogating body of a valid claim of privilege, leads us to dissent. [349 U.S. 155, 174]
During an active period of national rearmament this Committee was investigating subversive and security situations in the sensitive electronic industry with a view to possible legislation. 5 The recalcitrant witnesses held important positions in the field. Mr. Quinn was a field organizer of the International Union of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers. Mr. Emspak was its General Secretary. The third witness, who is not a petitioner but whose testimony is hereafter referred to, was Mr. Fitzpatrick, chief steward of the Westinghouse Corporation local. There is nothing to indicate that the witnesses had mentalities of a quality less than one would expect from experienced officials holding such responsible positions.
It will be observed from their testimony, however, that in avoiding direct answers to specific questions each one engaged in exercises in dialectics that always fell short of advising the Committee of any intention to claim his privilege. In view of the ease with which a claim can be made by any layman, the availability of personal lawyers for these witnesses and the careful avoidance of any such statement as, "I decline to answer on the ground of possible self-incrimination," I cannot hold that these [349 U.S. 155, 175] witnesses evidenced by their testimony an intention to claim privilege. The fact that a claim of privilege would subject the witnesses to criticism in some quarters, of course, has no bearing upon the necessity to assert one's rights. This is emphasized by the fact that long ago this Court declared that no moral turpitude is involved in refusing to answer under the protection of the privilege. 6
While the trial and appellate courts each had only a printed record of the testimony, one group, the subcommittees themselves, had the best opportunity to appraise disinterestedly the fact of whether Messrs. Quinn and Emspak claimed the privilege. The questions and answers were both asked by the counsel and answered by the witnesses in the hearing of the Committee. In citations of Quinn and Emspak to the House for contempt, the Committee certified that the refusal of each "to answer the aforesaid questions deprived your committee of necessary and pertinent testimony . . . ." 7 It can hardly be contended that the Committee did not know a claim of privilege against answering incriminating questions would have excused the witnesses from answering.
In view of the basis of the Court's decision made on its own examination and appraisal of the record, I must necessarily set out for discussion much of the testimony to determine whether the witnesses claimed the privilege. 8 The pertinent evidence follows.
After testifying at some length, the petitioner was asked: "Mr. Emspak, are you acquainted with Joseph [349 U.S. 155, 176] Persily?" Petitioner did not answer the question but made the following statement:
As the Emspak case offers for me a clear example of failure to claim his privilege, I think it better not to encumber this opinion unnecessarily with quotations from the Quinn case.
In the Quinn case, the witness adopted in its entirety the testimony of a former witness, Mr. Thomas J. Fitzpatrick, chief steward of Local No. 601, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. Mr. Quinn's testimony establishing his reliance on Mr. Fitzpatrick's evidence will be found in this Court's opinion in the Quinn case, n. 8, ante, p. 158. The hearing opened with a declaration by Mr. Fitzpatrick of minority rights to secrecy as follows:
From these vague statements of Messrs. Quinn and Emspak the Court draws the conclusion that they were sufficient to apprise the Committee of the witnesses' intention to claim the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court finds support for its theory of "intention" to claim privilege from a statement in the Government's brief in the Quinn case set out below. 9 With all respect, [349 U.S. 155, 183] I fail to see any concession by the Government of evidence that should apprise the Committee of a claim of privilege against self-incrimination. The first sentence of the quotation from the brief emphatically denies the Court's assumption.
What the records show to me is a calculated effort by Messrs. Quinn, Emspak and Fitzpatrick to hinder and delay a congressional committee in its effort to bring out facts in order to determine whether or not to undertake legislation. Such quibbling evades the basis for an understanding of the attitude of the witness as to privilege. It does not apprise the Committee of the claim of privilege and should not be held permissible. Factual testimony is the means for the ascertainment of truth in legally organized inquiries. Silence brings the proceedings to a dead end. The burden is on the witness to advise his interrogators of a claim to privilege in understandable terms. 10 In the context of this testimony, the adoption by Mr. Quinn of Mr. Fitzpatrick's reference to the First and Fifth Amendments smacks strongly of a "due process" Fifth Amendment claim. Mr. Fitzpatrick had been speaking of his right of privacy, speech and association, not of the privilege against self-incrimination. He then added:
The Court suggests that this should not be construed as a waiver of the claim and cites Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 151 . I do not think the Smith case apposite. In that case there had been a clear claim of privilege for immunity. We held that required a definite, unambiguous waiver. Here there was, in my view, no claim of privilege.
The opinion of the trial court, printed only in the record, pp. 224-227, holds "The defendant failed to assert [the privilege]." Six of the nine members of the Court of Appeals held that Emspak had not claimed. Three did not reach that issue.
I concur with the Court in its assertions of the value of the self-incrimination clause - that it may be used as a shield by guilty and innocent alike - and that it should be construed liberally as it has been to cover more than the literal reading of the phrase "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" would suggest. 11 This sympathetic attitude toward the clause should not lead us to intrude our ideas of propriety into the conduct of congressional hearings. [349 U.S. 155, 185] The rule laid down by the Court today merely adds another means for interference and delay in investigations and trials, without adding to the protection of the constitutional right of freedom from self-incrimination. This is contrary to the policy of Congress to get information from witnesses even with a claim of immunity, through the Compulsory Testimony Act of August 20, 1954, 68 Stat. 745.
The Court must admit, as it does, Quinn opinion, p. 162, that no particular form of words is required. On the other hand, I must admit that a witness must be clearly apprised that his claim of the freedom from an obligation to answer is not accepted by the interrogator. 12 I agree that the offense punishable under the statute is a deliberate, intentional refusal - not an inadvertence, accident or [349 U.S. 155, 186] misunderstanding. 13 Good faith in refusing to answer, however, is no defense so long as the refusal is intentional, deliberate. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 , points out that:
While the Court held in Sinclair that deliberate refusal was all that was required to consummate the offense under 2 U.S.C. 192, at the same time we were at pains to point out "There was no misapprehension" on the part of the witness "as to what was called for." P. 299. It is because the refusal must be intentional, that the witness [349 U.S. 155, 187] must know that his excuses for not answering have not been accepted by the Committee. When a witness interposes objections to testifying which are not frivolous, it is difficult to say he intentionally refused to answer when the interrogation continues without pause to some other question. I agree that the Committee cannot, in fairness to the witness, lull him into thinking that his refusal to answer is acceptable and then cite him for contempt. Refusal under such circumstances would not be deliberate. However, specific direction to answer is not necessary; only intentional refusal is.
The Court suggests, n. 36, Quinn case, that congressional committees follow the practice of other legislative bodies and determine first the validity of the witness' reason for failure to answer and then direct him to answer. The defect in that analogy is that the Court seems to assume in its note a formal vote and a specific direction to answer. I think such a specific direction is inconsistent with its page 170 admission that no ritualistic formula is required. No provision of the statute, nor of any rule of Congress is cited by the Court to support a requirement of specific direction. The Court of Appeals held direction to answer unnecessary so long as the witness knew that the Committee had not acceded to his refusal. 14 As I stated above, in my view it is sufficient if the witness knows his excuses are not acceptable to the Committee and that he is required to answer. Whether or not the witnesses knew this in these two cases is the question on this second point.
The Court holds that the witnesses did plead the privilege and were not advised that the Committee refused to accept their pleas. I disagree. After Mr. Quinn had adopted Mr. Fitzpatrick's words as his own method of [349 U.S. 155, 188] refusing to answer the question as heretofore discussed, it will be seen that Mr. Wood, a Committee member, said to Mr. Quinn:
I think, too, that Mr. Emspak was advised his answer was not accepted and that he was required to proceed. When he was asked repeatedly as to whether he was acquainted with Joseph Persily, he said again:
The Court directs acquittal of both petitioners on the grounds of claim of privilege and failure to specifically overrule their objections or direct them to answer. I disagree with both grounds. Confining expression of my views to those issues, I dissent.
MR. JUSTICE MINTON joins in so much of this opinion as applies to Emspak v. United States, post, p. 190.
[ Footnote * ] [This dissenting opinion applies also to Emspak v. United States, post, p. 190.]
[ Footnote 1 ] Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 ; Emspak v. United States, post, p. 190, at p. 199; see the Court's opinion in Quinn v. United States, supra, at p. 162.
[ Footnote 2 ] Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (7).
[ Footnote 3 ] Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103, 113 ; United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 , dissent 439; Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 ; cf. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 .
[ Footnote 4 ] See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 ; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 .
[ Footnote 5 ] Hearings before House Committee on Un-American Activities Regarding Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions, Part 1, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 541.
[ Footnote 6 ] Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 .
[ Footnote 7 ] Proceedings against Julius Emspak, H. R. Rep. No. 2847, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10; same against Thomas Quinn, H. R. Rep. No. 2857, p. 3.
[ Footnote 8 ] Any person who desires to see the complete essential testimony may consult the Proceedings, cited in the preceding note. See also H. R. Rep. No. 2856.
[ Footnote 9 ] "Under these circumstances, we contend that petitioner did not adequately inform the Committee that he was claiming the protection of the privilege. "Moreover, we feel bound to point out the probability that petitioner's ambiguous references to the Fifth Amendment (and those of the petitioner Emspak in No. 9), which he now contends constituted a claim of privilege, were phrased deliberately in such vague terms so as to enable petitioner (and Emspak) to obtain the benefit of the privilege without incurring the popular opprobrium which often attaches to its exercise. This suggestion is not based merely upon the obvious fact that it would have been extremely easy for petitioner to have informed the Committee that answers to its questions might incriminate or endanger him. It is also based upon facts of record, and matters appropriate for judicial notice, which reveal that petitioner (and Fitzpatrick and Emspak) had compelling [349 U.S. 155, 183] and immediate reasons to refrain from making any public statements from which it might be inferred, properly or not, that they were Communists or Communist sympathizers." Govt. br., 33-34.
[ Footnote 10 ] See note 3, supra.
[ Footnote 11 ] See, for example, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 ; Blau v. United States (two cases), 340 U.S. 159 and 332 (privilege available at grand jury proceedings); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 , "The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceedings in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant" (proceedings in bankruptcy); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 , and see also Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (administrative proceedings); see also Wood v. United States, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 274, 128 F.2d 265 (preliminary hearings).
[ Footnote 12 ] Fields v. United States, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 354, 164 F.2d 97, 100; Bart v. United States, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 370, 372-373, 203 F.2d 45, 48; Emspak v. United States, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 378, 380-381, 203 F.2d 54, 56.
[ Footnote 13 ] Townsend v. United States, 68 App. D.C. 223, 229, 95 F.2d 352, 358; Fields v. United States, 82 U.S. App. D.C. 354, 357, 164 F.2d 97, 100.
[ Footnote 14 ] The instant case and the Emspak and Bart cases all deal at length with this question. 91 U.S. App. D.C., at 349, 380-381, 374-375, 203 F.2d, at 25, 56, 50. See also, comments, 40 Geo. L. J. 137; 41 Geo. L. J. 433. [349 U.S. 155, 190]
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San Gimignano is a small walled medieval hill town in the province of Siena in the Tuscany region.
Known as the Town of Fine Towers, San Gimignano is famous for its medieval architecture, unique in the preservation of about a dozen of its tower houses,which, with its hilltop setting and encircling walls, form "an unforgettable skyline". Within the walls, the well-preserved buildings include notable examples of both Romanesque and Gothic architecture, with outstanding examples of secular buildings as well as churches. The Palazzo Comunale, the Collegiate Church and Church of Sant' Agostino contain frescos, including cycles dating from the 14th and 15th centuries.[2] The "Historic Centre of San Gimignano" is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The town also is known for saffron, the Golden Ham, and its white wine, Vernaccia di San Gimignano, produced from the ancient variety of Vernaccia grape which is grown on the sandstone hillsides of the area.

subset: commoncrawl


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Sunday, September 22, 2013
Graphic Novels (Comics) = Literature #NerdyCast
Here is a new #NerdyCast where I talk about the importance of Graphic Novels (Comics) in the classroom. I even give some suggestions on great books to start with if you are interested in learning more. Thanks for watching and I hope you subscribe so you can see some of the fun stuff I have planned for down the road.
4 comments:
These are some great thoughts! I love the idea of using graphic novels in the classrooms.ReplyDelete
There is a great Marvel Series called Marvel Illustrated that has comic versions of classic stories.ReplyDelete
some great ideas!ReplyDelete
Just started Max Axiom graphic novels in my 5th grade Science class. My reluctant readers and English Language Learners really like them.ReplyDelete
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Apple is launching its iPhone 4 in China this Saturday, Sept. 25, in what is part of the company's latest push to expand its presence in the Chinese market.
The release of the device, which was announced on Monday, coincides with the opening of two new Apple Stores in China. The stores will be located in Beijing and Shanghai, where Apple already has two retail shops, and will bring to four the total number of Apple stores on the mainland.
China Unicom, the mobile carrier for the device, began accepting pre-orders for the phone on Friday. On the first day, China Unicom reported 50,000 users had signed up for an iPhone 4, a much higher amount than the initial 5,000 devices sold in the first few days after the the iPhone 3GS went on sale in China last year.
Apple currently holds 7.1 percent of the Chinese smartphone market according to Beijing-research firm Analysys International, ranking the company fifth, behind Nokia, Samsung, Motorola and Sony Ericsson.
The launch of the iPhone 4 comes hot on the heels of the Chinese launch of the iPad, which went on sale on Friday. Chinese consumers, however, have already been able to buy the iPhone 4 and the iPad through China's gray market, where overseas versions of the devices have been imported by local vendors.
The price for the iPhone 4 without a contract is higher than its cost in the U.S. Apple has put the suggested retail price at 4,999 yuan (US$744) for the 16GB model and 5,999 yuan (US$893) for the 32GB model.
The iPhone 4 will go on sale at 8:00 a.m. in the company's Apple Stores in China. China Unicom will also be selling the device in its retail stores starting Saturday.


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Most of us are familiar with the old fable by Hans Christian Andersen titled, The Emperor's New Clothes. The story is about two tailors who pretend to make an Emperor a new suit of clothes that they convincingly argue is invisible only to incompetent fools. When the Emperor parades before his subjects in his "new suit of clothes," no one dares to say that he is naked for fear of being deemed a fool. Finally, a child declares what everyone else is thinking but is too scared to say, "The Emperor has no clothes!"
The story is a lesson in speaking your convictions even in the face of public ridicule. At the risk of being seen as a fool, you must tell the plain truth. Even if it goes against popular opinion or the common norms of a society one must be willing to speak out against that which seems clearly wrong. That is much easier said than done.
Back when I served on staff in a Reformed Southern Baptist Founders church and still affirmed Calvinism, I do recall several moments where I felt the TULIP systematic "had no clothes on," so to speak. But I was not about to put myself out there as "the fool who is just too stupid to see it." I knew all the pat answers and could quote all the right verses when any question was raised, but deep down I knew there was no rational answer against the charge of divine culpability for moral evil if Calvinism's claims were true. Calvin himself admitted as much when he wrote:
"How it was ordained by the foreknowledge and decree of God what man's future was without God being implicated as associate in the fault as the author or approver of transgression, is clearly a secret so much excelling the insight of the human mind, that I am not ashamed to confess ignorance…. I daily so meditate on these mysteries of his judgments that curiosity to know anything more does not attract me." (there are quotes from Piper, MacArthur and Sproul appealing to this same mystery)
It is as if Calvin is saying, "I see the naked Emperor but I've grown so troubled by looking at him that I've chosen to advert my eyes instead of just admitting the obvious truth of what I see." I suppose that approach works for some, as it did for me…at least for a while. (Read more on this inconsistency in Calvinism HERE)
Others deal with "the Emperor's nakedness" by appealing to the uniqueness of God and His ways. They might argue something like, "God's judgement, love and goodness looks different than ours because His ways are simply higher and cannot be understood." In response to this approach, C. S. Lewis answered:
"If God's moral judgement differs from ours so that our "black" may be His "white", we can mean nothing by calling Him good; for to say "God is good," while asserting that His goodness is wholly other than ours, is really only to say "God is we know not what." And an utterly unknown quality in God cannot give us moral grounds for loving or obeying Him. If He is not (in our sense) "good" we shall obey, if at all, only through fear – and should be equally ready to obey an omnipotent Fiend. The doctrine of Total Depravity – when the consequence is drawn that, since we are totally depraved, our idea of good is worth simply nothing – may thus turn Christianity into a form of devil-worship. –The Problem of Pain, pg. 29
And the founder of Methodism, the esteemed John Wesley, wrote even more boldly:
"[Calvinism] destroys all [God's] attributes at once: It overturns both his justice, mercy, and truth; yea, it represents the most holy God as worse than the devil, as both more false, more cruel, and more unjust. More false; because the devil, liar as he is, hath never said, "He willeth all men to be saved:" More unjust; because the devil cannot, if he would, be guilty of such injustice as you ascribe to God, when you say that God condemned millions of souls to everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels, for continuing in sin, which, for want of that grace he will not give them, they cannot avoid: And more cruel; because that unhappy spirit "seeketh rest and findeth none;" so that his own restless misery is a kind of temptation to him to tempt others. But God resteth in his high and holy place; so that to suppose him, of his own mere motion, of his pure will and pleasure, happy as he is, to doom his creatures, whether they will or no, to endless misery, is to impute such cruelty to him as we cannot impute even to the great enemy of God and man. It is to represent the high God (he that hath ears to hear let him hear!) as more cruel, false, and unjust than the devil!" http://www.umcmission.org/Find-Resources/John-Wesley-Sermons/Sermon-128-Free-Grace
These two men clearly saw a naked Emperor when they looked at Calvinism's claims and they were not afraid to say so. It should be noted that both Lewis and Wesley, at other times in their ministry, tempered such boldness with gentler remarks toward their Calvinistic brethren. And I am not referencing these quotes to bring a charge of "devil worship" against those who affirm the TULIP systematic.
I know full well that Calvinists see "a beautiful suit of clothes on the Emperor" and their intentions are sincere, but it does not change the fact that many believers (if not most) simply see a naked Emperor rather than a beautiful suit. (Read this great article by Austin Fischer for more on the beauty that Calvinists see in relation to others)
So, why am I writing this article?
Many of you know I debated the very seasoned apologist, Dr. James White, over the soteriological perspective represented in Romans 9 earlier this year. From the first day I engaged with Dr. White over this issue he has treated me as "the fool" who simply cannot see "the emperor's new clothes." Given that I once claimed to see the suit and declared it to be beautiful only fuels the fire of ridicule. After all, if you ever really did see the emperor's suit then you would not be saying he is naked today. If you were ever really smart enough to see the suit then you would know better than to question it.
In a recent exchange over social media, Dr. White wrote:
"Last night I listened to some portion of a dialogue he had on YouTube, and was once again astounded at the horrific eisegesis that marks his entire system. But in noting someone's reply to him just now, I saw this statement: 'are you talking about the filthy rags you determined to do or that God determined you to do? :-)' Notice the contradiction he attempts to create that the Bible will have none of: he seems to think that one action has to be EITHER "determined" by man or by God, but it cannot be BOTH. Now, again, Flowers claims to have once been a Calvinist, but as normal, his recollection of what that means seems to have gotten pretty hazy. For he surely should know that there are a number of very, very important texts in which the Bible itself makes it plain that you have BOTH God and man acting in the very same action. That is EXACTLY what you have in Genesis 50:20 without question. The same is true in Isaiah 10, and in Acts 4 in reference to the crucifixion of Jesus in the sovereign plan of God. So, the Bible's answer to Flower's false quandary is, 'both, I, to my shame and destruction, and God, to His glory and fame.' And if Leighton's system is so shallow and paltry as to not be able to withstand the pressure of that Biblical revelation, then he needs to dump it and get one that is actually worth professing!"
Let's unpack this a bit:
1. He defers to the old tactic, "instead of responding to the actual arguments I'll just say he doesn't do proper exegesis." This approach might work if I were not standing on the shoulders of much more seasoned exegetes of scripture than myself. It is not as if I am making up my interpretation as I go along. (See the article titled "Debate Over Exegesis" for my response to this tactic)
2. He argues for "both/and" versus "either/or" in regard to who is making "determinations." He writes, "[Flowers] seems to think that one action has to be EITHER 'determined' by man or by God, but it cannot be BOTH."
I think if one were given the opportunity to press Dr. White on this point he would admit that God's determination is the one that controls the man's 'determination,' thus making this qualification nothing more than a semantical difference without a distinction. Also, Dr. White seems to forget that we do affirm the doctrine of Judicial Hardening and God's sinless use of sinful means to accomplish SOME divine purposes throughout redemptive history. We simply deny the heinous assumption that the example of God using man's free moral choices to bring about the redemption of sin on Calvary is somehow proof that God meticulously determined all the heinous sin that Christ died for at Calvary. It seems irrational for God to work in the same manner to redeem sin as He supposedly does to cause the sin He is redeeming.
3. Again, he questions my claims of once being a Calvinist on the basis that I no longer interpret passages like Genesis 50:20 in the same way he does. I suppose anyone who claims to have once been an Arminian (or a Traditional Southern Baptist) cannot change their interpretations or question the positions they formerly held? This double standard is apparently a blind spot for White because I am quite certain he does not call out the former Arminians for daring to oppose the doctrines they have now recanted.
(For those interested in going deeper than these surface level accusations, I do present our view of passages like Gen. 50 in the article referenced above. And I discuss why non-Calvinists will always be accused of misrepresenting Calvinists no matter what we say or how we say it in this article.)
4. White wrote, "So, the Bible's answer to Flower's false quandary is, 'both, I, to my shame and destruction, and God, to His glory and fame.'" So, let's apply White's theology to the real world and see how it plays out:
Question: Why did Jeffery Dahmer determine to rape and eat a child?
Answer: Dahmer determined to do it to his shame and destruction and God determined for Dahmer to do it to His own glory and fame."
I'm sorry, but I'm simply not willing to teach that our perfectly Righteous, Pure and Holy God determined a man to rape, torture and eat children for His own glory and fame. Instead, I must say, "The Emperor has no clothes!"
Here is a PODCAST where we discuss God's sovereignty over evil.


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The LG MOBILE WORLDCUP, held yesterday in New York at Gotham Hall, saw a new world record set. "LG wants to highlight how modern mobile phones are helping enrich people's lives and LG MOBILE WORLDCUP allows us to do that and have fun at the same time," said Dr. Skott Ahn, President and CEO of LG Electronics Mobile Communications Company. "Today, mobile phones are much more than just communication tools. Customers today are buying mobile phones not just to communicate but also to be entertained."
13 countries sent teams to the World Championship of Texing. Participating countries include USA, Canada, Indonesia, Portugal, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Korea, Spain, Australia, and New Zealand. The competition requires contestants to type phrases in their native language on their LG handsets. Texts must be correct, with no typos or abbreviations. The winners are determined on time and accuracy.
The grand prize went to South Korea's team, the US took second, and the new World Record holder is from Portugal; Pedro Matias typed 264 characters in just 1 minute 59 seconds.
I tried to see how many characters I can type in 1 minute 59 seconds. Unfortunately I was no where close to Pedro (I typed 151 characters); so I guess I will need to practice!
Try the same test and let us know how many characters you can time in less than 2 minutes. Maybe you can represent your country in the next World Championship of Texting!
Text this paragraph and see if you can do it too! Good luck all! I want to win the LG MOBILE WORLD CUP! Contestants in the LG MOBILE WORLD CUP contest should be careful they don't get carpal tunnel syndrome from texting too much! Could you text two-hundred and sixty-four characters in one minute and fifty-nine seconds?
-Kelly B.


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10 minutes later it changed back to the gate we just came from, so we headed back. 5 minutes later our flight was delayed by 2 hours. 10 minutes later we heard "Sorry, your flight has been delayed until 6am tomorrow morning - we won't be giving any vouchers for hotels since this was caused by Mother Nature." Which was fine with us since we just drove home, but everyone else was not a happy camper!
We get home, check the status on-line and it now said we were leaving at 7am. So we go to bed, get up and check again - now we are leaving at 7:56. We get there early just in case and guess what? At 7:15 the time changed again on the status board and they announced "we are now boarding all passengers and will be pulling out from the gate at 7:35." Geez! I'm glad we were there early because several people missed their flight! But, I digress - we arrived in PA, spent the night with the pups and left yesterday morning at 6am for the drive home.
They did well... Max kept himself busy trying to work on his tan.
Spike just slept a lot and was fairly quiet, except for the couple of dream-induced little barks. He is over 17 years old now!
They did much better than I did though as I'm really feeling it today - I drove (again!!) the entire 15 and 1/2 hour drive - we had several stops mind you, so the pups could have a drink and do their business. Let the settling in finally commence!
I wonder if some of you are wondering about a certain black creature that has not been heard from?
Miss Kitty grew quite attached to Jeff's Mom and decided to protest about riding in the car for 15 hours with the dogs, so she gets to stay in her happy little quiet new home!
Needless to say, after that and then having to go to the market to replenish the pantry, I was not in the mood to do anything but veg out. However, I was also not interested in starving, so I did throw together this Winter Wheat Berry Salad for dinner tonight. Chewy and filling, the only thing you need to do with wheat berries is throw them in a pot with boiling water and leave 'em be until they are tender - woo!
While they were cooling down, I whisked together a snazzy fall-flavored dressing from bright lemon juice, canola oil, maple syrup and a pinch of our favorite Vietnamese cinnamon. For some lively color and crunchy texture, a shredded carrot and sliced Granny Smith apples are tossed with a couple sliced green onions and the cooked wheat berries. Once dressed, the salad is adorned on a bed of fresh tender baby spinach to serve followed by sprinkling of chopped dried apricots for a sweet finish. Light and fairly effortless, I was a little surprised by how much we both enjoyed the cinnamon and sweet maple syrup in the dressing - just different enough to get your taste buds jumping!
Winter Wheat Berry Salad


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Ludwig Lachmann and the free market as a leveling process in the distribution of wealth (1956)
Found in Capital, Expectations, and the Market Process
In an article he wrote in 1956 the Austrian school economist Ludwig M. Lachmann (1906 - 1990) observed that the free market created a "leveling process" in the distribution of wealth because wealth did not stay in any particular person's hands for long unless they they had the skill to successfully satisfy the demands of consumers in the face of constantly changing conditions:
The market process is thus seen to be a leveling process. In a market economy a process of redistribution of wealth is taking place all the time before which those outwardly similar processes which modern politicians are in the habit of instituting, pale into comparative insignificance, if for no other reason than that the market gives wealth to those who can hold it, while politicians give it to their constituents who, as a rule, cannot.
This process of redistribution of wealth is not prompted by a concatenation of hazards. Those who participate in it are not playing a game of chance, but a game of skill. This process, like all real dynamic processes, reflects the transmission of knowledge from mind to mind. It is possible only because some people have knowledge that others have not yet acquired, because knowledge of change and its implications spread gradually and unevenly throughout society.
In this essay the Austrian school economist Ludwig Lachmann (who was in fact born in Berlin so hence German not Austrian) examines the social implications of the Austrian idea of the market as a process for disseminating economic information in a constantly changing world. Since there is constant change in people's preferences for goods and services, in the supply of those goods and services, and thus their prices, there can be no "equilibrium" state which is ever reached in an economy, only the constant shifting of resources from one activity to another. He concludes from this two things; firstly, that there is a "leveling process" at work governing the distribution of wealth because wealth did not stay in any particular person's hands for long unless they they had the skill to successfully satisfy the demands of consumers in the face of ever changing conditions. Secondly, drawing upon the class analysis of the Italian liberal Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) who developed the idea of the "circulation of elites", there was also a constant "circulation of economic elites" or entrepreneurs and capitalists as "(w)ealth is unlikely to stay for long in the same hands. It passes from hand to hand as unforeseen change confers value, now on this, now on that specific resource, engendering capital gains and losses. The owners of wealth, we might say with Schumpeter, are like the guests at a hotel or the passengers in a train: They are always there but are never for long the same people." Lachmann prefers this kind of inbuilt economic "redistribution of wealth" in the free market to the politicized "redistribution of wealth" advocated by politicians and their supporters.


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Portman Is GOPs Point Man in Ohio
Sen. Rob Portman is working aggressively to help Republicans take back Ohio from President Barack Obama in 2012, and in the process developing connections with top GOP contenders who could put him on the short list for the vice-presidential nomination.
Portman will remain neutral in the GOP presidential primary, choosing instead to help all the eventual candidates make inroads with Ohio voters and Republican donors in preparation for competing in a state that could determine the winner of the general election. Mentioned four years ago as a potential vice presidential pick for Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Portman brushed aside speculation that he might be considered again but declined to directly rule it out.
"I just spent 22 months running a campaign to get to represent Ohio in the Senate and I'm really excited about that, and that's my total focus," Portman told Roll Call. "I'm just focused on jobs, the economy and the fiscal problems as they relate to Ohio. And that's a full-time job — that's a 24/7 job right now."
Fresh off of an 18-point Senate victory that saw him win 82 of 88 counties and 15 of 18 Congressional districts, including that of two-time presidential candidate and liberal Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D), Portman boasts a statewide grass-roots network that he has continued to cultivate since the midterm elections.
Portman is based in Cincinnati, the hub of Ohio's nationally sought-after GOP fundraising community. He has simultaneously established relationships with business-minded Republicans and campaign donors, state GOP officials and tea party activists — threading a needle of support in a key White House battleground that has been difficult for high-profile Republicans in other regions of the country.
A handful of potential Republican presidential candidates headlined fundraisers for Portman during his 2010 Senate campaign, including Indiana Gov. Mitch Daniels, former Speaker Newt Gingrich (Ga.), former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee, former Minnesota Gov. Tim Pawlenty, former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney and Senate Republican Policy Committee Chairman John Thune (S.D.), who has since decided against a White House bid.
Portman returned the favor by personally introducing them to his campaign donors and activist supporters — and later by delivering introductory speeches when the contenders spoke to Ohio GOP groups. Buckeye State Republican organizations are using Portman as a conduit to invite potential presidential candidates to appear before them. Portman said he helped arrange for candidates to speak at a "few" upcoming Lincoln Day dinners in Ohio, although he declined to name the candidates involved.
"I think all roads to the White House lead through Ohio and maybe a couple other states," Portman said. "What I'm trying to do is being sure that they're understanding the importance of Ohio and that I'm introducing candidates to Republican activists, grass-roots activists and others who can be helpful in the campaign. It's been exciting for Ohio activists to have that kind of access. It's not like New Hampshire where you get to meet them three or four times personally."
The winner of the past 10 presidential elections won Ohio, with the state proving particularly crucial to victory in the past three contests. Portman has varying relationships with some of the Republicans weighing 2012 bids.
The Senator worked closely with Pawlenty on McCain's 2008 campaign. The two get along well and talk on occasion. Portman described Romney as a friend — although the relationship appears less developed than what he and Pawlenty enjoy — and he served with Gingrich in the House during the 1990s. Daniels preceded Portman as director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Bush administration, and the Ohio Republican said the Indiana governor offered him helpful advice when he was promoted to the job from U.S. trade representative.
Republican operatives for a few of the likely GOP presidential candidates said Portman could be a helpful supporter to have in any general election campaign, with one dubbing the Senator "a go-to kind of guy if you want to get around Ohio."
"Gov. Pawlenty campaigned hard for Rob Portman last year and returned to Ohio last month to join the Senator at a great Republican gathering in the Cincinnati area," Pawlenty spokesman Alex Conant said. He called Portman a "strong leader" but wouldn't offer any hints about whether Pawlenty would put Portman on his dream short list. "We still don't know who all is going to run for president, so obviously it's way too premature to also start speculating about vice president," Conant said.
But one Republican operative stated the obvious: "Portman would be on any short list."
Portman has been a Senator for only 10 weeks but is not viewed as a typical freshman. He arrived in the chamber with an extensive résumé and reputation for explaining complex economic issues in understandable terms, and he has been given wide latitude by Senate Republicans leaders to drive the debate.
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), during a Monday news conference with Portman and Finance ranking member Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), told reporters about the Ohio Republican: "We are fortunate to have a genuine trade expert in our Conference."
Portman pointedly did not rule out running for a Republican Conference leadership slot in the next Congress, when slots will be open. But the Senator, who while serving in the House in the early 2000s was the designated liaison between House Republicans and the Bush administration, said he would do so only if he "thought it would help Ohio. I was in leadership in the House and it wasn't all it was cracked up to be."
Although the soft-spoken Portman is sometimes described as overly cautious, he is credited with understanding the role politics plays in shaping policy.
To that end, Portman last cycle transferred $335,000 in Senate campaign funds to fellow Ohio Republicans, including a $250,000 donation to the state GOP. Additionally, he raised $1.1 million for the Ohio Republican Party, $650,000 for the National Republican Senatorial Committee and $100,000 for the National Republican Congressional Committee.
Another GOP operative who worked on a 2008 campaign described the "formulaic" process for designating someone as a vice-presidential prospect. The media and campaigns follow the formula that the contender must hold a statewide office in a swing state, satisfy the party base, diversify the ticket and have a reputation for policy expertise.
"Portman's appeal is that he checks more than one box," this operative continued. "He is from an enormously important state, he is a solid conservative, and he is well-respected by both parties as someone who takes governing seriously."


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Microsoft is pushing to get more developers with MCAD and MCSD.NET titles to upgrade their certifications to the new-generation MCPD, by providing discounts on the MCPD upgrade exams.
The 25-percent discount apply to the following exams:
The promotion ends March 31, which means candidates must register and take the exam prior to that date. Exams are available worldwide at any exam testing center, according to information on the promotion page. To get the discount, register for the exam with this code: SQV554.
Microsoft Press does plan to post other book titles sometime between now and June 2007, so check the page periodically.
About the Author
Michael Domingo has held several positions at 1105 Media, and is currently the editor in chief of Visual Studio Magazine.
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Several years ago I helped organize a symposium titled "The Golden Age of PR: How public relations is contributing to success in business." We lined up great speakers who all made predictions to a full house. And because the skills of public relations people are perfectly suited to create a competitive advantage in the new media environment, the predictions came true. We are now entering a new Golden Age of Public Relations.
Consider the central tasks of marketing: understanding, predicting and influencing customers, delivered through four fundamental objectives:
- Informing customers of your firm's offerings
- Showing them the relevance of your brand
- Removing the barriers to transactions
- Nurturing a trustworthy relationship to assure repeat purchases
Now consider the brave new media world, an environment dependent on a new set of media classifications: paid, rented, owned and earned. While paid ads are often the cornerstone of marketing, the other three classifications are best executed from a relationship-building mindset. Relationships are critical for success in this new environment, and relationship-building is, of course, the fundamental expertise of PR practitioners.
In PRSA's new seminar, Strategic Integrated Communications, I will tie all of the above together and show you how these elements can work together for better results in today's new media environment. I will teach you how to harness PR power and align traditional media and social media to leverage your firm's investment with measurable results. You will learn about an effective integration model. So don't miss this opportunity to fully embrace ownership of this emerging competence and participate in the new Golden Age of Public Relations!
Tim McMahon founded and leads an award-winning marketing services firm, and was senior vice president of corporate communication and marketing for a Fortune 100 firm. He has also taught public relations and corporate communication in an award-winning master's degree program, and has spoken and presented on social media and organizational performance at international conferences.
Like many public relations practitioners, you have likely struggled with how to position social media with your traditional media strategies, and align them with your organization's overall business objectives. In "Strategic Integrated Communications: Align Social Media With Your Overall Marketing Objectives," March 18, New York, instructor Tim McMahon will draw from his years of marketing and social media experience to teach you how to construct a framework for achieving a balance between both.
Register now for this seminar with the code INTCM03, and gain free access to one PRSA on demand webinar!


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Last updated September 29, 2023
Trailer-dweller Linda Bronco (Sean Young) can't wait for her son, Michael (Tony Denman), to start college. But when her boy and his best friend, Lennie (Jacob Tierney), get arrested for stealing a six-pack of nonalcoholic brew, Michael's chances for higher education hit an all-time low. Short on intellect and other options, the family kicks off a crime spree to pay for the best lawyer in town (William Devane) -- who just happens to be an ex-con.
Details about Poor White Trash
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[214 U.S. 218, 219] Section 1307, Kentucky Statutes 1903, provides:
The Adams Express Company was proscuted in the circuit court of Hart county for a violation of that statute. The facts were agreed upon. It was a company engaged in the express business. W. G. Tharp was a resident of Hart county, Kentucky, who bought and paid for liquor in Nashville, Tennessee, and New Albany, Indiana. The sellers were licensed dealers in those places, and shipped the liquors to him, by the defendant, prepaying the express charges. Tharp was in the habit of becoming intoxicafed, and the defendant's agent in [214 U.S. 218, 220] Hart county knew of this fact when he delivered the liquors. On the trial the court ruled 'that the said transportation and delivery of said liquor to said Tharp by defendant did not constitute interstate commerce within the meaning of the clause of the Federal Constitution which gives to the Congress of the United States power to regulate commerce between the states, and that the defendant is guilty of knowingly furnishing liquor to an inebriate, as charged in the information herein.'
The defendant prayed an appeal to the court of appeals of Kentucky, which was and thereupon the case was brought here directly from the circuit court of Hart county, the highest court of the state in which a decision could be had. Ky. Stat. 1903, 950
Messrs. Lawerence Maxwell and Joseph S. Graydon for plaintiff in error. [214 U.S. 218, 221] No brief was filed for defendant in error.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:
The jurisdiction of this court is not open to dispute. Defendant contended that the Kentucky statute, as applied to [214 U.S. 218, 222] the transportation of liquor from state to state, was in conflict with the section of the Federal Constitution vesting jurisdiction in Congress over interstate commerce. This contention was denied by the state court, and thus a question arose under the Federal Constitution, decided adversely to the plaintiff in error. Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 , 51 L. ed. 520, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384.
Liquor, however obnoxious and hurtful it may be in the judgment of many, is a recognized article of commerce. License Cases, 5 How. 504, 577, 12 L. ed. 256, 289; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 -110, 34 L. ed. 128-132, 132, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681.
In Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. 170 U.S. 438, 444 , 42 S. L. ed. 1100, 1103, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 674, 676, Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
That the transportation is not complete until delivery to the consignee is also settled.
In Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 426 , 42 S. L. ed. 1088, 1096, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 664, 669, it was held that the Wilson act [26 Stat. at L. 313, chap. 728, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3177] 'was not intended to and did not cause the power of the state to attach to an interstate commerce shipment, whilst the merchandise was in transit under such shipment, and until its arrival at the point of destination, and delivery there to the consignee.'
This legislation is in the exercise of the police power,-a power which, generally speaking, belongs to the state,-and is an attempt, in virtue of that power, to directly regulate commerce; but, in case of conflict between the powers claimed by the state and those which belong exclusively to Congress, the former must yield, for the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof are 'the supreme law of the land.' [214 U.S. 218, 223] Section 5258 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3564) provides:
In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 334 , 52 S. L. ed. 230, 234, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121, 123, it was declared 'that any exercise of state authority, in whatever form manifested, which directly regulates interstate commerce, is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution.'
In Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U.S. 129, 135 , 51 S. L. ed. 987, 991, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606, 607, it was said:
Clearly, within the cases above cited, the statute before us, as applied to transportation from state to state, cannot be sustained.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Hart County, Kentucky, is reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissents.
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Perry told The Associated Press that he remains comfortable with the state's level of oversight following last week's massive blast in the rural farming town of West that killed 14 people and injured 200. Federal and state investigators say they have yet to identify the cause of the explosion.
Perry suggested that the majority of Texas residents agree with him.
"(People) through their elected officials clearly send the message of their comfort with the amount of oversight," Perry said Monday.
Perry was in Illinois on Monday on a trip intended to lure companies to relocate to Texas. Among his selling points: Texas' low regulatory climate that Perry says unburdens businesses and allows companies to create more jobs and wealth.
Bryan Shaw, chairman of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, said Monday he did not believe that more environmental regulations would have prevented the blast.
Shaw told AP that he believes the final investigation will show that anhydrous ammonia, which his agency regulates and the plant stored, was not responsible for the explosion.
Shaw's agency last inspected the fertilizer plant in 2006 after receiving a complaint about odor. Agency leaders have said investigators have not returned because they have not received any other complaints.
Yet over the years, the fertilizer company was fined and cited for violations by federal and state agencies. Last summer, the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration assessed a $10,000 fine against West Fertilizer for improperly labeling storage tanks and preparing to transfer chemicals without a security plan. The company paid $5,250 after reporting it had corrected the problems.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency also cited the plant for not having an up-to-date risk management plan. That problem was also resolved, and the company submitted a new plan in 2011.
Perry said Monday that "we follow regulations of the EPA."
Environmental groups are targeting several bills in the Republican-controlled Legislature that they say would further relax state oversight. Those proposals include one that would restrict the public's ability to research a company's environmental compliance history.
Another would significantly undermine the ability of groups to contest permits issued by state environmental regulators. A Senate committee cleared the proposal for a full chamber vote last week, but the results of the vote were posted Monday.
"If there are questions that we are still trying to answer now about what happened in West, it would seem like this would be the wrong time to be weakening environmental regulations and the ability of cities and communities to take part in the process," said David Weinberg, executive director for the Texas League of Conservation Voters.
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