text:
104 S.Ct. 3315
82 L.Ed.2d 556
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denies tax-exempt status under the
Internal Revenue Codeand hence eligibility to receive charitable
contributions deductible from income taxes under the Codeto racially
discriminatory private schools, and has established guidelines and
procedures for determining whether a particular school is in fact racially
nondiscriminatory. Respondents, parents of black children who were
attending public schools in seven States in school districts undergoing
desegregation, brought a nationwide class action in Federal District Court
against petitioner Government officials (petitioner Allen, the head of a
private school identified in the complaint, intervened as a defendant),
alleging that the IRS has not adopted sufficient standards and procedures
to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools and has thereby harmed respondents directly and interfered
with their children's opportunity to receive an education in desegregated
public schools. Respondents also alleged that many racially segregated
private schools were created or expanded in their communities at the time
the public schools were undergoing desegregation, and had received tax
exemptions despite the IRS policy and guidelines; and that these unlawful
tax exemptions harmed respondents in that they constituted tangible
financial aid for racially segregated educational institutions and
encouraged the organization and expansion of institutions that provided
Parents of black public school children allege in this nation-wide class action
that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has not adopted sufficient standards
and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools. They assert that the IRS thereby harms them
directly and interferes with the ability of their children to receive an education
in desegregated public schools. The issue before us is whether plaintiffs have
standing to bring this suit. We hold that they do not.
* The IRS denies tax-exempt status under 501(a) and (c)(3) of the Internal
* The IRS denies tax-exempt status under 501(a) and (c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 501(a) and (c)(3)and hence eligibility to receive
charitable contributions deductible from income taxes under 170(a)(1) and
(c)(2) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. 170(a)(1) and (c)(2)to racially
discriminatory private schools. Rev.Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum.Bull. 230.1 The
IRS policy requires that a school applying for tax-exempt status show that it
"admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and
activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school and
that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its
educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and
athletic and other school-administered programs." Ibid. To carry out this policy,
the IRS has established guidelines and procedures for determining whether a
particular school is in fact racially nondiscriminatory. Rev.Proc. 75-50, 1975-2
Cum.Bull. 587.2 Failure to comply with the guidelines "will ordinarily result in
the proposed revocation of" tax-exempt status. Id., 4.08, p. 589.
The guidelines provide that "[a] school must show affirmatively both that it has
adopted a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students that is made known
to the general public and that since the adoption of that policy it has operated in
a bona fide manner in accordance therewith." Id., 2.02.3 The school must state
its nondiscrimination policy in its organizational charter, id., 4.01, pp. 587588, and in all of its brochures, catalogs, and other advertisements to
prospective students, id., 4.02, p. 588. The school must make its
nondiscrimination policy known to the entire community served by the school
and must publicly disavow any contrary representations made on its behalf once
it becomes aware of them. Id., 4.03.4 The school must have nondiscriminatory
policies concerning all programs and facilities, id., 4.04, p. 589, including
scholarships and loans, id., 4.05,5 and the school must annually certify, under
penalty of perjury, compliance with these requirements, id., 4.07.6
The IRS rules require a school applying for tax-exempt status to give a
breakdown along racial lines of its student body and its faculty and
administrative staff, id., 5.01-1, as well as of scholarships and loans awarded,
id., 5.01-2. They also require the applicant school to state the year of its
organization, id., 5.01-5, and to list "incorporators, founders, board members,
and donors of land or buildings," id., 5.01-3, and state whether any of the
organizations among these have an objective of maintaining segregated public
or private school education, id., 5.01-4. The rules further provide that, once
given an exemption, a school must keep specified records to document the
extent of compliance with the IRS guidelines. Id., 7, p. 590.7 Finally, the rules
announce that any information concerning discrimination at a tax-exempt
school is officially welcomed. Id., 6.8
Respondents allege that the challenged Government conduct harms them in two
ways. The challenged conduct
"(a) constitutes tangible federal financial aid and other support for racially
segregated educational institutions, and
Thus, respondents do not allege that their children have been the victims of
discriminatory exclusion from the schools whose tax exemptions they
challenge as unlawful. Indeed, they have not alleged at any stage of this
litigation that their children have ever applied or would ever apply to any
private school. See Wright v. Regan, 211 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 238, 656 F.2d
820, 827 (1981) ("Plaintiffs . . . maintain they have no interest whatever in
enrolling their children in a private school"). Rather, respondents claim a direct
injury from the mere fact of the challenged Government conduct and, as
indicated by the restriction of the plaintiff class to parents of children in
desegregating school districts, injury to their children's opportunity to receive a
desegregated education.13 The latter injury is traceable to the IRS grant of tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory schools, respondents allege, chiefly
because contributions to such schools are deductible from income taxes under
170(a)(1) and (c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code and the "deductions
facilitate the raising of funds to organize new schools and expand existing
schools in order to accommodate white students avoiding attendance in
desegregating public school districts." App. 24.14
Respondents request only prospective relief. Id., at 40-41. They ask for a
declaratory judgment that the challenged IRS tax-exemption practices are
unlawful. They also ask for an injunction requiring the IRS to deny tax
exemptions to a considerably broader class of private schools than the class of
racially discriminatory private schools. Under the requested injunction, the IRS
would have to deny tax-exempt status to all private schools
"(1) were established or expanded at or about the time the public school
districts in which they are located or which they serve were desegregating;
Finally, respondents ask for an order directing the IRS to replace its 1975
guidelines with standards consistent with the requested injunction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed, concluding that respondents have standing to maintain this lawsuit.
The court acknowledged that Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), "suggests that litigation
concerning tax liability is a matter between taxpayer and IRS, with the door
barely ajar for third party challenges." 211 U.S.App.D.C., at 239, 656 F.2d, at
828. The court concluded, however, that the Simon case is inapposite because
respondents claim no injury dependent on taxpayers' actions: "[t]hey claim
indifference as to the course private schools would take." Id., at 240, 656 F.2d,
at 829. 17 Instead, the court observed, "[t]he sole injury [respondents] claim is
the denigration they suffer as black parents and schoolchildren when their
government graces with tax-exempt status educational institutions in their
communities that treat members of their race as persons of lesser worth." Id., at
238, 656 F.2d, at 827. The court held this denigration injury enough to give
respondents standing since it was this injury which supported standing in Coit
v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 564, 30 L.Ed.2d 550 (1971), summarily aff'g
Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (DC); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973); and Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 94 S.Ct. 2416, 41 L.Ed.2d 304 (1974). 211
U.S.App.D.C., at 239-243, 656 F.2d, at 828-832. The Court of Appeals also
held that the 1979 congressional actions were not intended to preclude judicial
remedies and that the relief requested by respondents could be fashioned
"without large scale judicial intervention in the administrative process," id., at
248, 656 F.2d, at 837.18 The court accordingly remanded the case to the District
Court for further proceedings, enjoining the defendants meanwhile from
granting tax-exempt status to any racially discriminatory school, App. 81-84.
Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual
"cases" and "controversies." As the Court explained in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 471-476, 102 S.Ct. 752, 757-761, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), the "case or
controversy" requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of
separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded. The several
doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are "founded in
concern about the properand properly limitedrole of the courts in a
democratic society." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205,
45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
"All of the doctrines that cluster about Article IIInot only standing but
mootness, ripeness, political question, and the likerelate in part, and in
different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition
but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and
prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our
kind of government." Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 226 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 26-27, 699
F.2d 1166, 1178-1179 (1983) (Bork, J., concurring).
The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have "standing" to invoke the
power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines. "In
essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the
court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin,
supra, 422 U.S., at 498, 95 S.Ct., at 2205. Standing doctrine embraces several
judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the
general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in
the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. See Valley Forge,
supra, 454 U.S., at 474-475, 102 S.Ct., at 759-760. The requirement of
standing, however, has a core component derived directly from the
Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief. 454 U.S., at 472, 102 S.Ct., at 758.
In the Court of Appeals, respondents apparently relied on the first injury. Thus,
the court below asserted that "[t]he sole injury [respondents] claim is the
denigration they suffer" as a result of the tax exemptions. 211 U.S.App.D.C., at
238, 656 F.2d, at 827. In this Court, respondents have not focused on this claim
of injury. Here they stress the effect of the tax exemptions on their "equal
educational opportunities," see, e.g., Brief for Respondents 12, 14, renewing
reliance on the second injury described in their complaint.
This Court has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government
act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer
jurisdiction on a federal court. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974), for example, the
Court rejected a claim of citizen standing to challenge Armed Forces Reserve
commissions held by Members of Congress as violating the Incompatibility
Clause of Art. I, 6, of the Constitution. As citizens, the Court held, plaintiffs
alleged nothing but "the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution. . .
." Id., at 223, n. 13, 94 S.Ct., at 2933 n. 13. More recently, in Valley Forge,
supra, we rejected a claim of standing to challenge a Government conveyance
of property to a religious institution. Insofar as the plaintiffs relied simply on "
'their shared individuated right' " to a Government that made no law respecting
an establishment of religion, id., 454 U.S., at 482, 102 S.Ct., at 764 (quoting
Americans United v. U.S. Dept. of HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 261 (CA3 1980)), we
held that plaintiffs had not alleged a judicially cognizable injury. "[A] ssertion
of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government
has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art.
III without draining those requirements of meaning." 454 U.S., at 483, 102
S.Ct., at 764. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct.
2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33
L.Ed.2d 154 (1972); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 58 S.Ct. 1, 82 L.Ed. 493
(1937). Respondents here have no standing to complain simply that their
Government is violating the law.
Neither do they have standing to litigate their claims based on the stigmatizing
injury often caused by racial discrimination. There can be no doubt that this sort
of noneconomic injury is one of the most serious consequences of
discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some circumstances to
support standing. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-740, 104 S.Ct.
1387, 1395-1396, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984). Our cases make clear, however, that
such injury accords a basis for standing only to "those persons who are
personally denied equal treatment" by the challenged discriminatory conduct,
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627
(1972), the Court held that the plaintiff had no standing to challenge a club's
racially discriminatory membership policies because he had never applied for
membership. Id., at 166-167, 92 S.Ct. at 1968-1969. In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), the Court held that the
plaintiffs had no standing to challenge racial discrimination in the
administration of their city's criminal justice system because they had not
alleged that they had been or would likely be subject to the challenged
practices. The Court denied standing on similar facts in Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). In each of those cases, the
plaintiffs alleged official racial discrimination comparable to that alleged by
respondents here. Yet standing was denied in each case because the plaintiffs
were not personally subject to the challenged discrimination. Insofar as their
first claim of injury is concerned, respondents are in exactly the same position:
unlike the appellee in Heckler v. Mathews, supra, 465 U.S., at 740-741, n. 9,
104 S.Ct., at 1396, n. 9, they do not allege a stigmatic injury suffered as a direct
result of having personally been denied equal treatment.
The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why
our cases preclude the conclusion that respondents' alleged injury "fairly can be
traced to the challenged action" of the IRS. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., supra, at 41, 96 S.Ct., at 1926. That conclusion would pave the
way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government
violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out
their legal obligations. Such suits, even when premised on allegations of several
instances of violations of law, are rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court
"Carried to its logical end, [respondents'] approach would have the federal
courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of
Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its
committees and the 'power of the purse'; it is not the role of the judiciary,
absent actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful
governmental action." Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S., at 15, 92 S.Ct., at 2326.
See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 2447, 37 L.Ed.2d
407 (1973) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).
The same concern for the proper role of the federal courts is reflected in cases
like O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974),
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), and Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). In all
three cases plaintiffs sought injunctive relief directed at certain systemwide law
enforcement practices.25 The Court held in each case that, absent an allegation
of a specific threat of being subject to the challenged practices, plaintiffs had no
standing to ask for an injunction. Animating this Court's holdings was the
principle that "[a] federal court . . . is not the proper forum to press" general
complaints about the way in which government goes about its business. Id., at
112, 103 S.Ct., at 1670.
When transported into the Art. III context, that principle, grounded as it is in
the idea of separation of powers, counsels against recognizing standing in a
case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a
direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the
Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to
the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. Const., Art. II, 3. We could not
recognize respondents' standing in this case without running afoul of that
structural principle.26
The Court of Appeals relied for its contrary conclusion on Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 94 S.Ct. 2416, 41 L.Ed.2d 304 (1974), on
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973), and
on Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 564, 30 L.Ed.2d 550 (1971),
summarily aff'g Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (DC). Respondents in
this Court, though stressing a different injury from the one emphasized by the
Court of Appeals, see supra, at 752-753, place principal reliance on those cases
as well. None of the cases, however, requires that we find standing in this
In Gilmore, however, the Court identified the basis for standing in Norwood:
"The plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order and the
relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury they suffered." 417
U.S., at 571, n. 10, 94 S.Ct., at 2425, n. 10. Through the school-desegregation
decree, the plaintiffs had acquired a right to have the State "steer clear" of any
perpetuation of the racially dual school system that it had once sponsored. 413
U.S., at 467, 93 S.Ct., at 2812. The interest acquired was judicially cognizable
because it was a personal interest, created by law, in having the State refrain
from taking specific actions. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S., at 500, 95 S.Ct., at
2205 (standing may exist by virtue of legal rights created by statute). The
plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the State directly injured that interest by aiding
racially discriminatory private schools. Respondents in this lawsuit, of course,
have no injunctive rights against the IRS that are allegedly being harmed by the
challenged IRS action.
Unlike Gilmore and Norwood, Coit v. Green, supra, cannot easily be seen to
have based standing on an injury different in kind from any asserted by
respondents here. The plaintiffs in Coit, parents of black schoolchildren in
Mississippi, sued to enjoin the IRS grant of tax exemptions to racially
discriminatory private schools in the State. Nevertheless, Coit in no way
mandates the conclusion that respondents have standing.
First, the decision has little weight as a precedent on the law of standing. This
Court's decision in Coit was merely a summary affirmance; for that reason
alone it could hardly establish principles contrary to those set out in opinions
issued after full briefing and argument. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379,
392, 95 S.Ct. 533, 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 521 (1975) (BURGER, C.J., concurring);
see also Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74, 97 S.Ct. 219, 223, 50 L.Ed.2d
227 (1976). Moreover, when the case reached this Court, the plaintiffs and the
IRS were no longer adverse parties; and the ruling that was summarily
affirmed, Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (DC 1971), did not include a
ruling on the issue of standing, which had been briefly considered in a prior
ruling of the District Court, Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127, 1132 (DC),
appeal dism'd sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956, 90 S.Ct. 2169, 26
L.Ed.2d 539 (1970). Thus, "the Court's affirmance in Green lacks the
precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary controversy." Bob
Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740, n. 11, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 2047, n.
11, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974).
In any event, the facts in the Coit case are sufficiently different from those
presented in this lawsuit that the absence of standing here is unaffected by the
possible propriety of standing there. In particular, the suit in Coit was limited to
the public schools of one State. Moreover, the District Court found, based on
extensive evidence before it as well as on the findings in Coffey v. State
Educational Finance Comm'n, 296 F.Supp. 1389 (SD Miss.1969), that large
numbers of segregated private schools had been established in the State for the
purpose of avoiding a unitary public school system, 309 F.Supp., at 1133-1134;
that the tax exemptions were critically important to the ability of such schools
to succeed, id., at 1134-1136; and that the connection between the grant of tax
exemptions to discriminatory schools and desegregation of the public schools in
the particular State was close enough to warrant the conclusion that irreparable
injury to the interest in desegregated education was threatened if the tax
exemptions continued, id., at 1138-1139.29 What made possible those findings
was the fact that, when the Mississippi plaintiffs filed their suit, the IRS had a
policy of granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools;
thus, the suit was initially brought, not simply to reform Executive Branch
enforcement procedures, but to challenge a fundamental IRS policy decision,
which affected numerous identifiable schools in the State of Mississippi. See
id., at 1130.30
asserted desegregation injury and the challenged IRS conduct direct enough to
overcome the substantial separation of powers barriers to a suit seeking an
injunction to reform administrative procedures.
"The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial power stand to
profit in some personal interest remains an Art. III requirement." Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 39, 96 S.Ct., at 1925.
Respondents have not met this fundamental requirement. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the injunction issued by that
court is vacated.
It is so ordered.
Once again, the Court "uses 'standing to slam the courthouse door against
plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits.' "
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490, 102 S.Ct. 752, 768, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982)
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178, 90
S.Ct. 832, 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result and
dissenting)). And once again, the Court does so by "wax[ing] eloquent" on
considerations that provide little justification for the decision at hand. See 454
U.S., at 491, 102 S.Ct., at 768. This time, however, the Court focuses on "the
idea of separation of powers," ante, at 750, 752, 759, 761, as if the mere
incantation of that phrase provides an obvious solution to the difficult questions
presented by these cases.
One could hardly dispute the proposition that Art. III of the Constitution, by
limiting the judicial power to "Cases" or "Controversies," embodies the notion
that each branch of our National Government must confine its actions to those
that are consistent with our scheme of separated powers. But simply stating that
unremarkable truism provides little, if any, illumination of the standing inquiry
that must be undertaken by a federal court faced with a particular action filed by
particular plaintiffs. "The question whether a particular person is a proper party
to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of powers
problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other
branches of the Federal Government." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100, 88
S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).
The Court's attempt to obscure the standing question must be seen, therefore, as
no more than a cover for its failure to recognize the nature of the specific
claims raised by the respondents in these cases. By relying on generalities
concerning our tripartite system of government, the Court is able to conclude
that the respondents lack standing to maintain this action without
acknowledging the precise nature of the injuries they have alleged. In so doing,
the Court displays a startling insensitivity to the historical role played by the
federal courts in eradicating race discrimination from our Nation's schoolsa
role that has played a prominent part in this Court's decisions from Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), through
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76
L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). Because I cannot join in such misguided decisionmaking, I
* The respondents, suing individually and on behalf of their minor children, are
parents of black children attending public schools in various school districts
across the Nation. Each of these school districts, the respondents allege,1 was
once segregated and is now in the process of desegregating pursuant to court
order, federal regulations or guidelines, state law, or voluntary agreement.
Moreover, each contains one or more private schools that discriminate against
black schoolchildren and that operate with the assistance of tax exemptions
unlawfully granted to them by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). See
Complaint &Par; 24-48, App. 26-38.
"(a) were established or expanded at or about the time the public school
districts in which they are located or which they serve were desegregating;
Persons seeking judicial relief from an Art. III court must have standing to
maintain their cause of action. At a minimum, the standing requirement is not
met unless the plaintiff has "such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends. . . ." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Under the
Court's cases, this "personal stake" requirement is satisfied if the person
seeking redress has suffered, or is threatened with, some "distinct and palpable
injury," Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d
343 (1975), and if there is some causal connection between the asserted injury
and the conduct being challenged, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). See
Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 1394, 79 L.Ed.2d 646
(1984); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376, 102 S.Ct. 1114,
1123, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982); Valley Forge, 454 U.S., at 472, 102 S.Ct., at 758.
In these cases, the respondents have alleged at least one type of injury that
satisfies the constitutional requirement of "distinct and palpable injury."3 In
particular, they claim that the IRS's grant of tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools directly injures their children's opportunity and
ability to receive a desegregated education. As the complaint specifically
alleges, the IRS action being challenged
There is, of course, no rational basis on which to treat children who seek to be
educated in desegregated school districts any differently for purposes of
standing than residents who seek to live in integrated housing communities.
Indeed, if anything, discriminatory practices by private schools, which "exer[t]
a pervasive influence on the entire educational process," Norwood, supra, 413
U.S., at 469, 93 S.Ct., at 2812 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, supra, and
quoted in Bob Jones University, supra, 461 U.S., at 595, 103 S.Ct., at 2030),
have been more readily recognized to constitute injury redressable in the federal
courts. It is therefore beyond peradventure that the denial of the benefits of an
integrated education alleged by the respondents in these cases constitutes
"distinct and palpable injury."
Fully explicating the injury alleged helps to explain why it is fairly traceable to
the governmental conduct challenged by the respondents. As the respondents
specifically allege in their complaint:
Viewed in light of the injuries they claim, the respondents have alleged a direct
causal relationship between the Government action they challenge and the
injury they suffer: their inability to receive an education in a racially integrated
school is directly and adversely affected by the tax-exempt status granted by
the IRS to racially discriminatory schools in their respective school districts.
Common sense alone would recognize that the elimination of tax-exempt status
for racially discriminatory private schools would serve to lessen the impact that
those institutions have in defeating efforts to desegregate the public schools.
Moreover, the Court has previously recognized the existence, and constitutional
significance, of such direct relationships between unlawfully segregated school
districts and government support for racially discriminatory private schools in
those districts. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37
"The District Court laid great stress on the absence of a showing by appellants
that 'any child enrolled in private school, if deprived of free textbooks, would
withdraw from private school and subsequently enroll in the public schools.' . . .
We do not agree with the District Court in its analysis of the legal consequences
of this uncertainty, for the Constitution does not permit the State to aid
discrimination even when there is no precise causal relationship between state
financial aid to a private school and the continued well-being of that school. A
State may not grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if that aid
has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private
discrimination." Id., at 465-466, 93 S.Ct., at 2811 (citations omitted) (emphasis
Thus, Norwood explicitly stands for the proposition that governmental aid to
racially discriminatory schools is a direct impediment to school desegregation.
The Court purports to distinguish Norwood from the present litigation because
" '[t]he plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order' "
and therefore "had acquired a right to have the State 'steer clear' of any
perpetuation of the racially dual school system that it had once sponsored,"
ante, at 763 (quoting Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S., at 571, n. 10,
94 S.Ct., at 2425, n. 10, and Norwood, supra, 413 U.S., at 467, 93 S.Ct., at
2811), whereas the "[r]espondents in this lawsuit . . . have no injunctive rights
against the IRS that are allegedly being harmed," ante, at 763. There is nothing
to suggest, however, that the relevant injunction in Norwood was anything
more than an order to desegregate the schools in Tunica County, Miss.7 Given
that many of the school districts identified in the respondents' complaint have
also been the subject of court-ordered integration, the standing inquiry in these
cases should not differ. And, although the respondents do not specifically
allege that they are named parties to any outstanding desegregation orders, that
is undoubtedly due to the passage of time since the orders were issued, and not
to any difference in the harm they suffer.
Similarly, although entitled to less weight than a decision after full briefing and
oral argument on the merits, see Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74, 97 S.Ct.
219. 223, 50 L.Ed.2d 227 (1976), our summary affirmance in Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 564, 30 L.Ed.2d 550 (1971), summarily aff'g Green v.
Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (DC), is directly relevant to the standing of the
respondents in this litigation. The plaintiffs in Coit v. Green were black parents
of minor children attending public schools in desegregating school districts.
Like the respondents in these cases, the plaintiffs charged that the IRS had
failed to confine tax-exempt status to private schools that were not racially
discriminatory. And like the present respondents, they sought new IRS
procedures as their exclusive remedy.
The three-judge District Court expressly concluded that the plaintiffs had
standing to maintain their action:
judge District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in Coffey v. State
Educational Finance Commission, 296 F.Supp. 1389 (1969)." Green v.
Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127, 1132 (DC), appeal dism'd sub nom. Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956, 90 S.Ct. 2169, 26 L.Ed.2d 539 (1970).
When the case was properly appealed to this Court, the standing issue was
expressly raised in the jurisdictional statement filed by intervenor Coit, on
behalf of a class of parents and children who supported or attended all-white
private schools. Juris. Statement, O.T.1971, No. 71-425, p. 11. See Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S., at 63, and n. 11, 96 S.Ct., at
1936, and n. 11 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Nonetheless, the
Court summarily affirmed, Coit v. Green, supra, thereby indicating our
agreement with the District Court's conclusion.9 See also Griffin v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 224, 84 S.Ct. 1226,
1229, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964).
Given these precedents, the Court is forced to place primary reliance on our
decision in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra. In that case,
the Court denied standing to plaintiffs who challenged an IRS Revenue Ruling
that granted charitable status to hospitals even though they failed to operate to
the extent of their financial ability when refusing medical services for indigent
patients. The Court found that the injury alleged was not one "that fairly can be
traced to the challenged action of the defendant." Id., at 41, 96 S.Ct., at 1926. In
particular, it was "purely speculative" whether the denial of access to hospital
services alleged by the plaintiffs fairly could be traced to the Government's
grant of tax-exempt status to the relevant hospitals, primarily because the
hospitals were likely making their service decisions without regard to the tax
implications. Id., at 42-43, 96 S.Ct., at 1926-1927.
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, 426 U.S., at 42, 96 S.Ct., at 1926.
Indeed, as I have previously explained, supra, at 773-778, the Court's
conclusion to the contrary is based on a unjustifiably narrow reading of the
respondents' complaint and an indefensibly limited interpretation of our holding
in Norwood. By interposing its own version of pleading formalities between the
respondents and the federal courts, the Court not only has denied access to
litigants who properly seek vindication of their constitutional rights, but also
has ignored the important historical role that the courts have played in the
Nation's efforts to eliminate racial discrimination from our schools.
More than one commentator has noted that the causation component of the
Court's standing inquiry is no more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of
the merits of the underlying claims.10 The Court today does nothing to avoid
that criticism. What is most disturbing about today's decision, therefore, is not
the standing analysis applied, but the indifference evidenced by the Court to the
detrimental effects that racially segregated schools, supported by tax-exempt
status from the Federal Government, have on the respondents' attempt to obtain
an education in a racially integrated school system. I cannot join such
indifference, and would give the respondents a chance to prove their case on the
Three propositions are clear to me: (1) respondents have adequately alleged
"injury in fact"; (2) their injury is fairly traceable to the conduct that they claim
to be unlawful; and (3) the "separation of powers" principle does not create a
jurisdictional obstacle to the consideration of the merits of their claim.
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 [103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157]
(1983), one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal system." Ante,
at 756.
In final analysis, the wrong respondents allege that the Government has
committed is to subsidize the exodus of white children from schools that would
otherwise be racially integrated. The critical question in these cases, therefore,
is whether respondents have alleged that the Government has created that kind
of subsidy.
"Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is
administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same
effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to
pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the
amount of a portion of the individual's contributions." Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 2000, 76
L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (footnote omitted).
100 The purpose of this scheme, like the purpose of any subsidy, is to promote the
activity subsidized; the statutes "seek to achieve the same basic goal of
106 Second, the Court could be saying that it will require a more direct causal
connection when it is troubled by the separation of powers implications of the
case before it. That approach confuses the standing doctrine with the
justiciability of the issues that respondents seek to raise. The purpose of the
standing inquiry is to measure the plaintiff's stake in the outcome, not whether a
court has the authority to provide it with the outcome it seeks:
107 "[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federalcourt jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on
his behalf." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204-2205,
45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (emphasis in original) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). 8
108 Thus, the " 'fundamental aspect of standing' is that it focuses primarily on the
party seeking to get his complaint before the federal court rather than 'on the
issues he wishes to have adjudicated,' " United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 174, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 2945, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Flast, 392 U.S., at 99, 88 S.Ct., at 1952). The strength of the plaintiff's
interest in the outcome has nothing to do with whether the relief it seeks would
intrude upon the prerogatives of other branches of government; the possibility
that the relief might be inappropriate does not lessen the plaintiff's stake in
obtaining that relief. If a plaintiff presents a nonjusticiable issue, or seeks relief
that a court may not award, then its complaint should be dismissed for those
reasons, and not because the plaintiff lacks a stake in obtaining that relief and
hence has no standing.9 Imposing an undefined but clearly more rigorous
standard for redressability for reasons unrelated to the causal nexus between the
injury and the challenged conduct can only encourage undisciplined, ad hoc
litigation, a result that would be avoided if the Court straight-forwardly
considered the justiciability of the issues respondents seek to raise, rather than
using those issues to obfuscate standing analysis.10
109 Third, the Court could be saying that it will not treat as legally cognizable
injuries that stem from an administrative decision concerning how enforcement
resources will be allocated. This surely is an important point. Respondents do
seek to restructure the IRS's mechanisms for enforcing the legal requirement
that discriminatory institutions not receive tax-exempt status. Such restructuring
would dramatically affect the way in which the IRS exercises its prosecutorial
discretion. The Executive requires latitude to decide how best to enforce the
law, and in general the Court may well be correct that the exercise of that
discretion, especially in the tax context, is unchallengeable.
110 However, as the Court also recognizes, this principle does not apply when suit
is brought "to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct
harm," ante, at 761. For example, despite the fact that they were challenging
the methods used by the Executive to enforce the law, citizens were accorded
standing to challenge a pattern of police misconduct that violated the
constitutional constraints on law enforcement activities in Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974).11 Here, respondents
contend that the IRS is violating a specific constitutional limitation on its
enforcement discretion. There is a solid basis for that contention. In Norwood,
we wrote:
111 "A State's constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of
operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving
significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious
discrimination." 413 U.S., at 467, 93 S.Ct., at 2812.
Gilmore echoed this theme:
112 "[A]ny tangible State assistance, outside the generalized services government
might provide to private segregated schools in common with other schools, and
with all citizens, is constitutionally prohibited if it has 'a significant tendency to
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.' Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 466 [93 S.Ct. 2804, 2811, 37 L.Ed.2d 723] (1973). The
constitutional obligation of the State 'requires it to steer clear, not only of
operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving
significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious
discrimination.' Id., at 467 [93 S.Ct., at 2812]." 417 U.S., at 568-569, 94 S.Ct.,
at 2425.
113 Respondents contend that these cases limit the enforcement discretion enjoyed
by the IRS. They establish, respondents argue, that the IRS cannot provide
"cash grants" to discriminatory schools through preferential tax treatment
without running afoul of a constitutional duty to refrain from "giving significant
aid" to these institutions. Similarly, respondents claim that the Internal Revenue
Code itself, as construed in Bob Jones, constrains enforcement discretion.12 It
has been clear since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), that
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." Id., at 177. Deciding whether the Treasury has violated a
specific legal limitation on its enforcement discretion does not intrude upon the
prerogatives of the Executive, for in so deciding we are merely saying "what
the law is." Surely the question whether the Constitution or the Code limits
enforcement discretion is one within the Judiciary's competence, and I do not
believe that the question whether the law, as enunciated in Gilmore, Norwood,
and Bob Jones, imposes such an obligation upon the IRS is so insubstantial that
respondents' attempt to raise it should be defeated for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on the ground that it infringes the Executive's prerogatives.13
114 In short, I would deal with the question of the legal limitations on the IRS's
enforcement discretion on its merits, rather than by making the untenable
assumption that the granting of preferential tax treatment to segregated schools
does not make those schools more attractive to white students and hence does
not inhibit the process of desegregation. I respectfully dissent.
As the Court explained last Term in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 579, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2022, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), the IRS
announced this policy in 1970 and formally adopted it in 1971. Rev.Rul. 71447, 1971-2 Cum.Bull. 230. This change in prior policy was prompted by
litigation over tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools in the
State of Mississippi, litigation that resulted in the entry of an injunction against
the IRS largely if not entirely coextensive with the position the IRS had
voluntarily adopted. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.Supp. 1127 (DC) (entering
preliminary injunction), appeal dism'd sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S.
956, 90 S.Ct. 2169, 26 L.Ed.2d 539 (1970); Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp.
1150 (DC) (entering permanent injunction), summarily aff'd sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 564, 30 L.Ed.2d 550 (1971).
The 1975 guidelines replaced guidelines issued for the same purpose in 1972.
Rev.Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 Cum.Bull. 834.
Scholarships and loans must generally be available without regard to race, and
this fact must be known in the community served by the school. An exception
is made, however, consistent with 3.02 of Rev.Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 Cum.Bull.
587, see n. 3, supra, for financial assistance programs favoring minority
students that are designed to promote the school's nondiscriminatory policy. A
second exception is made for financial assistance programs "favoring members
of one or more racial groups that do not significantly derogate from the school's
racially nondiscriminatory policy. . . ." Rev.Proc. 75-50, 4.05, 1975-2
Cum.Bull. 589.
Records must be kept, and preserved for three years, concerning the racial
composition of the student body, the faculty and administrative staff, and the
group of students receiving financial assistance. Copies of brochures, catalogs,
and advertising must also be kept. Id., 7.01, p. 590. Although the method of
figuring racial composition must be described in the records compiled by the
school, the school need not require students, applicants, or staff to furnish
information not otherwise required, and the school generally need not release
personally identifiable records. Id., 7.02. Cf. id., 5.02, pp. 589-590
(information furnished by applicant for tax-exempt status subject to similar
qualifications). Reports containing the required information, if filed in
accordance with law with a Government agency, may satisfy the recordkeeping requirement if the information is current and the school maintains
copies of the reports. Id., 7.03, p. 590. Failure to maintain the required records
gives rise to a presumption of noncompliance with the guidelines. Id., 7.04.
The Revenue Procedure expressly notes, id., 8, that its provisions are
superseded by, to the extent they differ from, the injunction concerning
Mississippi schools issued in Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp. 1150 (DC),
summarily aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 564, 30
L.Ed.2d 550 (1971).
Shortly before respondents filed this action, the plaintiffs in the Green
litigation, concerning the tax-exempt status of private schools in Mississippi,
ibid, moved to reopen that suit, making allegations comparable to those in
respondents' complaint. See Wright v. Regan, 211 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 236, 656
F.2d 820, 825 (1981). In 1977, the Mississippi litigation was consolidated with
this suit. Ibid. The Green litigation was not consolidated with this lawsuit on
appeal, however, and it is not before this Court.
Hereafter, references to a private school's tax exemption embrace both taxexempt status of the school and tax-exempt status of an "umbrella"
organization. We assume, without deciding, that a grant of tax-exempt status to
an "umbrella" organization of the sort respondents have in mind is subject to
the same legal constraints as a grant of tax-exempt status directly to a school.
The complaint generally uses the phrase "racially segregated school" to mean
simply that no or few minority students attend the school, irrespective of the
school's maintenance of racially discriminatory policies or practices. Although
the complaint, on its face, alleges that granting tax-exempt status to any
"racially segregated" school in a desegregating public school district is
unlawful, App. 39, it is clear that respondents premise their allegation of
illegality on discrimination, not on segregation alone.
The nub of respondents' complaint is that current IRS guidelines and
procedures are inadequate to detect false certifications of nondiscrimination
policies. See id., at 17-18, 25. This allegation would be superfluous if
respondents were claiming that racial segregation even without racial
discrimination made the grant of tax-exempt status unlawful. Moreover,
respondents have noticeably refrained from asserting that the IRS violates the
law when it grants a tax exemption to a nondiscriminatory private school that
happens to have few minority students. Indeed, respondents' brief in this Court
makes a point of noting that their complaint alleges not only segregation but
discrimination, see Brief for Respondents 10, n. 8, and it repeatedly states that
the challenged Government conduct is the granting of tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory private schools, see, e.g., id., at 9-10 ("Respondents
alleged that the federal petitioners are continuing to grant tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools . . ."); id., at 13-14.
Since respondents' entire argument is built on the assertion that their rights are
violated by IRS grants of tax-exempt status to some number of unidentified
racially discriminatory private schools in desegregating districts, we resolve the
ambiguity in respondents' complaint by reading it as making that assertion.
Contrary to Justice BRENNAN's statement, post, at 768, the complaint does not
allege that each desegregating district in which they reside contains one or more
racially discriminatory private schools unlawfully receiving a tax exemption.
The complaint alleges that the challenged IRS conduct violates several laws:
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3); Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et
seq.; Rev.Stat. 1977, 42 U.S.C. 1981; and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Last Term, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct.
2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), the Court concluded that racially discriminatory
private schools do not qualify for a tax exemption under 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code.
Respondents did not allege in their 1976 complaint that their children were
currently attending racially segregated schools. In 1979, during argument
before the District Court, counsel for respondents stated that his clients'
children "do go to desegregated schools. . . ." App. 62.
The first proposal was made on August 22, 1978. 43 Fed.Reg. 37296. It placed
the burden of proving good faith operation on a nondiscriminatory basis,
evaluated according to specified factors, on any private school that had an
insignificant number of minority students and that had been formed or
substantially expanded at a time the public schools in its community were
undergoing desegregation. The second proposal was made on February 13,
1979, after public comment and hearings. 44 Fed.Reg. 9451. It afforded private
schools "greater flexibility" in proving nondiscriminatory operation, permitting
satisfaction of this proof requirement by a showing that the school has
Indeed, the Court of Appeals observed that respondents "do not dispute that it is
'speculative,' within the Eastern Kentucky frame, whether any private school
would welcome blacks in order to retain tax exemption or would relinquish
exemption to retain current practices." 211 U.S.App.D.C., at 240, 656 F.2d, at
829 (footnotes omitted).
Judge Tamm dissented from the holding of the Court of Appeals. He concluded
that standing in the three cases relied on by the majority was based on injury to
rights under a court decree and that respondents in this case asserted nothing
more than the abstract interest in securing enforcement of the law against the
Government. Id., at 249-259, 656 F.2d, at 838-848.
We assume, arguendo, that the asserted stigmatic injury may be caused by the
Government's grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools even if
the Government is granting those exemptions without knowing or believing
that the schools in fact discriminate. That is, we assume, without deciding, that
the challenged Government tax exemptions are the equivalent of Government
Respondents' stigmatic injury, though not sufficient for standing in the abstract
form in which their complaint asserts it, is judicially cognizable to the extent
that respondents are personally subject to discriminatory treatment. See Heckler
v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-740, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 1395-1396, 79 L.Ed.2d
646 (1984). The stigmatic injury thus requires identification of some concrete
interest with respect to which respondents are personally subject to
discriminatory treatment. That interest must independently satisfy the causation
requirement of standing doctrine.
In Heckler v. Mathews, for example, the named plaintiff (appellee) was being
denied monetary benefits allegedly on a discriminatory basis. We specifically
pointed out that the causation component of standing doctrine was satisfied with
respect to the claimed benefits. In distinguishing the case from Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d
450 (1976), we said: "there can be no doubt about the direct causal relationship
between the Government's alleged deprivation of appellee's right to equal
protection and the personal injury appellee has suffereddenial of Social
Security benefits solely on the basis of his gender." 465 U.S., at 741, n. 9, 104
S.Ct., at 1396, n. 9.
In this litigation, respondents identify only one interest that they allege is being
discriminatorily impairedtheir interest in desegregated public school
education. Respondents' asserted stigmatic injury, therefore, is sufficient to
support their standing in this litigation only if their school-desegregation injury
independently meets the causation requirement of standing doctrine.
Indeed, contrary to the suggestion of Justice BRENNAN's dissent, post, at 774775, and n. 5, of the schools identified in respondents' complaint, none of those
alleged to be directly receiving a tax exemption is alleged to be racially
discriminatory, and only four schoolsDelta Christian Academy and Tallulah
Academy in Madison Parish, La.; River Oaks School in Monroe, La.; and
Bowman Academy in Orangeburg, S.C.are alleged to have discriminatory
policies that deprive them of direct tax exemptions yet operate under the
umbrella of a tax-exempt organization. These allegations constitute an
insufficient basis for the only claim made by respondentsa claim for a
change in the IRS regulations and practices. Cf. Wright v. Miller, 480 F.Supp.
790, 796 (DC 1979) ("it is purely speculative whether, in the final analysis, any
fewer schools would be granted tax exemptions under plaintiffs' system than
under the current IRS system").
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, framed its standing
discussion in terms of the redressability of the alleged injury. The relief
requested by the plaintiffs, however, was simply the cessation of the allegedly
illegal conduct. In those circumstances, as the opinion for the Court in Simon
itself illustrates, see id., 426 U.S., at 40-46, 96 S.Ct., at 1925-1928, the
"redressability" analysis is identical to the "fairly traceable" analysis. See n. 19,
On the merits, the Court found that permitting such exclusive use by school
groups was unlawful, because it violated the city's constitutional obligation,
spelled out in an outstanding school-desegregation order, to take no action that
would impede the integration of the public schools. Exclusive availability of
the public parks "significantly enhanced the attractiveness of segregated private
schools . . . by enabling them to offer complete athletic programs." 417 U.S., at
569, 94 S.Ct., at 2424.
The relatively simple either-or nature of the challenged decision affects the
extent to which the initial complaint implicated separation of powers concerns.
When the IRS altered its policy concerning the grant of tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory schools, see Green v. Connally, 330 F.Supp., at 1156,
the plaintiffs were left with an action more closely resembling this lawsuit. We
have no occasion to consider here the effect on a plaintiff's standing of a
defendant's partial cessation of challenged conduct when that partial cessation
leaves the plaintiff with a complaint presenting substantially greater uncertainty
about standing than the initial complaint did.
Because the District Court granted a motion to dismiss, see Wright v. Miller,
480 F.Supp. 790, 793 (DC 1979), we must " 'accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint, and . . . construe the complaint in favor of the
complaining party.' " Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
109, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1612, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). See 441 U.S., at
112, 99 S.Ct., at 1614. Cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99,
101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
the complaint filed by the respondents. In particular, the respondents have not
simply alleged that, as blacks, they have suffered the denigration injury
"suffered by all members of a racial group when the Government discriminates
on the basis of race." Ante, at 754. Rather, the complaint, fairly read, limits the
claim of stigmatic injury from illegal governmental action to black children
attending public schools in districts that are currently desegregating yet contain
discriminatory private schools benefiting from illegal tax exemptions. Cf.
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S., at 377, 102 S.Ct., at 1123 (injury
from racial steering practices confined to "relatively compact
neighborhood[s]"). Thus, the Court's "parade of horribles" concerning black
plaintiffs from Hawaii challenging tax exemptions granted to schools in Maine,
see ante, at 756, is completely irrelevant for purposes of Art. III standing in this
action. Indeed, even if relevant, that criticism would go to the scope of the class
certified or the relief granted in the lawsuit, issues that were not reached by the
District Court or the Court of Appeals and are not now before this Court.
The Court's confusion is evident from note 23 of its opinion, ante, at 758. The
Court claims that "none of [the schools] alleged to be directly receiving a tax
exemption is alleged to be racially discriminatory." This is directly contradicted
not only by the plain language of the complaint, see Complaint &Par; 2, 22,
App. 17-18, 25, but also by the Court's earlier concession that the respondents'
complaint alleges "grants of tax-exempt status to . . . racially discriminatory
private schools in desegregating districts," ante, at 745, n. 11.
Even if the Court were correct in its conclusion that there is an insufficient
The question whether respondents have adequately alleged their standing must
be separated from the question whether they can prove what has been alleged. It
may be that questions concerning the racial policies of given schools, and the
impact of their tax treatment on enrollment, vary widely from school to school,
making inappropriate the nationwide class described in respondents' complaint.
A case in which it was proved that a segregated private school opened just as a
nearby public school system began desegregating pursuant to court order, that
the IRS knew the school did not admit blacks, and that the school prospered
only as a result of favorable tax treatment, might be very different from one in
which the plaintiff attempted to prove a nationwide policy and its effect.
However, as Justice BRENNAN observes, ante, at 770-771, n. 3, 780-781, n. 9,
that goes to whether respondents can prove the nationwide policy they have
alleged, and whether the factual issues they raise are sufficiently national in
scope to justify the certification of a nationwide class. I rather doubt that a
nationwide class would be appropriate, but at this stage respondents' allegations
of injury must be taken as true, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct.
2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), and hence we must assume that
respondents can prove the existence of a nationwide policy and its alleged
umbrella of organizations which have received, applied for, or will apply for,
federal tax exemptions. Moreover, many additional public school districts will
in the future begin desegregating pursuant to court order or [government]
regulations and guidelines, under state law or voluntarily. Additional racially
segregated private schools may be organized or expanded, many of which will
be operated by organizations which have received, applied for, or will apply for
federal tax exemptions. As in the case of those representative organizations and
private schools described in paragraphs 39-48, supra, such organizations and
schools provide, or will provide, white children with a racially segregated
alternative to desegregating public schools. By recognizing these organizations
as exempt from federal taxation, defendants facilitate their development,
operation and expansion and the provision of racially segregated educational
opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public
school systems. Defendants thereby also interfere with the efforts of federal
courts, [the Federal Government] and local school authorities to eliminate
racially dual school systems." App. 38 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, like Justice BRENNAN, ante, at 774-775, I do not understand why the
Court states that the complaint contains no allegation that the tax benefits
received by private segregated schools "make an appreciable difference in
public school integration," ante, at 758, unless the Court requires "intricacies of
pleading that would have gladdened the heart of Baron Parke." Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1281, 1305 (1976).
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 74-78, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630-2633, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 678, 687-689, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2411, 2415-2417, 37
L.Ed.2d 254 (1973); see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 832, 25
L.Ed.2d 192 (1970).
This causation analysis explains the holding in the case on which the Court
chiefly relies, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). There, the plaintiffsindigent
persons in need of free medical carealleged that they were harmed by the
Secretary of the Treasury's decision to permit hospitals to retain charitable
status while offering a reduced level of free care. However, while here the
source of the causal nexus is the price that white parents must pay to obtain a
segregated education, which is inextricably intertwined with the school's tax
status, in Simon the plaintiffs were seeking free care, which hospitals could
decide not to provide for any number of reasons unrelated to their tax status.
See id., at 42-43, and n. 23, 96 S.Ct., at 1926-1927 and n. 23. Moreover, in
Simon, the hospitals had to spend money in order to obtain charitable status.
Therefore, they had an economic incentive to forgo preferential treatment. As
the Court observed:
"It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the Court's remedial
powers in this suit would result in the availability to respondents of such
services. So far as the complaint sheds light, it is just as plausible that the
hospitals to which respondents may apply for service would elect to forgo
favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain of an increase
in the level of uncompensated services. . . . [C]onflicting evidence supports the
commonsense proposition that the dependence upon special tax benefits may
vary from hospital to hospital." Id., at 43, 96 S.Ct., at 1926-1927.
In contrast, the tax benefits private schools receive here involve no "financial
drain" since the schools need not provide "uncompensated services" in order to
obtain preferential tax treatment. Thus, the economic effect of the challenged
tax treatment in these cases is not "speculative," as the Court concluded it was
in Simon. Here the financial incentives run in only one direction.
See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S., at 498, 95 S.Ct., at 2204; Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2932,
41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974).
See also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 16641665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S., at 72, 98 S.Ct., at 2629; Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S., at 38, 96 S.Ct., at 1924;
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop the War, 418 U.S., at 220-221, 94
S.Ct., at 2931-2932; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179, 94 S.Ct.
2940, 2947, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 674-675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 123, 93 S.Ct. 705, 711, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 731-732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364-1365, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).
The danger of the Court's approach is illustrated by its failure to provide any
standards to guide courts in determining when it is appropriate to require a
more rigorous redressability showing because of separation of powers concerns,
or how redressability can be demonstrated in a case raising separation of power
concerns. The only guidance the Court offers is that the separation of powers
counsels against recognizing standing when the plaintiff "seek[s] a
restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its
legal duties." Ante, at 761. That cannot be an appropriate test; the separation of
powers tolerates quite a bit of "restructuring" in order to eliminate the effects of
racial segregation. For example, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct.
693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), we held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
Executive from maintaining a dual school system. We have subsequently made
it clear that the courts have authority to restructure both school attendance
patterns and curriculum when necessary to eliminate the effects of a dual
school system. See, e.g., Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449, 99 S.Ct. 2941, 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). At the same
time, standing doctrine has never stood as a barrier to such "restructuring." In
the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663
(1962), the Court accorded voters standing to challenge population variations
between electoral districts despite the fact that the legislative reapportionment
sought would and eventually did have dramatic "restructuring" effects. Only
two Terms ago, in Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U.S.
151, 160-162, 102 S.Ct. 205, 212-213, 70 L.Ed.2d 309 (1981), the Court
accorded California standing to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's
methods for accepting bids on oil and gas rights, despite the fact that this would
affect the manner in which the Executive Branch discharged "[its] duty to 'take
Care that the Laws are faithfully executed,' " ante, at 761.
See also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, n. 4, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763, n. 4,
80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984).
In Bob Jones we clearly indicated that the Internal Revenue Code not only
permits but in fact requires the denial of tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools:
"Few social or political issues in our history have been more vigorously debated
and more extensively ventilated than the issue of racial discrimination,
particularly in education. Given the stress and anguish of the history of efforts
to escape from the shackles of the 'separate but equal' doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896), it cannot be said
that educational institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial
It has long been the rule that unless a claim is wholly insubstantial, it may not
be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946).


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According to "Interim Measures for the supervision and administration of private equity investment funds" in the fourth chapter of the fourteenth provisions: "Private equity fund managers, private equity fund sales institutions are not allowed to raise funds from other institutions and individuals (except for qualified investors), and not allowed to propagate and recommend to non-specific objects through newspapers, radio, television, Internet and other media or the public lectures, report, analysis and notices, flyers, mobile phone SMS, WeChat, blog and email."
JQ capital would like to comply with the provisions of "Interim Measures for the supervision and administration of private equity investment funds", and only promote the relevant private equity investment fund products to specific qualified investors.
If you intend to invest in private equity funds, please confirm that you meet the requirements of the standard regulations of the "qualified investors", which have the appropriate risk identification and risk tolerance capability, the investment amount in single private equity funds is not less than 1 million yuan, and the personal financial assets is not less than 3 million yuan or the average annual personal income in last three years is not less than 500 thousand yuan, and have a certain understanding of private equity investment fund.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Purchase this article with an account.
F.Y. Demirci, B.W. Rigatti, M.B. Gorin; Retinal Alternative RNA Splicing of Murine Homologs of the Human Genes That Are Implicated in Retinal Degenerations . Invest. Ophthalmol. Vis. Sci. 2005;46(13):3115.
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© ARVO (1962-2015); The Authors (2016-present)
Abstract: :
Purpose:Alternative splicing (AS) is a significant factor that expands the proteomic diversity and functional complexity. AS can generate functionally diverse isoforms or provide a regulatory mechanism by modifying the elements that control RNA stability, localization, or translation. AS is regulated in a tissue–specific and developmental stage–specific manner. The retina is among the top 3 tissues with the highest levels of tissue–specific AS and a number of human retinal disease genes are known to undergo AS. The objective of this study has been to explore the murine retinal RNA splicing of a set of genes that have been implicated in human retinal degenerations. Methods: Various human and mouse databases have been used to specify the known and/or predicted AS events concerning a set of retinal disease genes. Initially, five genes (UNC119, RGR, NR2E3, NRL, CRB1) were evaluated. Total RNA was isolated from retinal tissues of 10–12 week–old inbred mice. The brain and spleen total RNA samples were also obtained in order to determine the tissue–specificity of AS events for those genes that also show non–retinal expression. RT/PCR was performed to amplify the transcript fragments that are known or predicted to undergo AS. The PCR fragments were gel–purified and directly sequenced in an automated sequencer. Results: Our analyses have identified some previously unreported murine retinal AS and alternative termination events in the initial set of the transcripts that we have investigated. The observed AS events included exon skipping, alternative exon inclusion, different splice site usage, and intron retention. Some of the murine variants were found to be different than the currently known human variants, while the others were confirmatory for the corresponding human forms. Conclusions: AS appears to occur in the retinal transcriptome more frequently and in a wider spectrum than previously thought. According to recent genome–wide analyses, ∼75% of human and ∼60% of mouse multi–exon genes are predicted to be alternatively spliced. Identification and characterization of splice variants of retinal transcripts will guide further studies toward understanding the functional diversity created by these variants and/or their contribution to regulatory mechanisms, their effect on retinal disease, and factors regulating retinal alternative RNA processing.
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Hand picked juicy strawberries are dipped in gourmet dark chocolate. This is greatest combination for your loved ones and specially for children's.
A sweet gift for all occasions. We offer a variety of assorted fruits dipped in chocolates to satisfy any sweet tooth.
Includes: 12-Strawberries dipped in a gourmet chocolate. Box may vary.


text: Centre for Behaviour Change Harnessing expertise across disciplines to address societal challenges Research The Centre for Behaviour Change conducts cutting-edge theoretical and applied research, advancing our understanding of behaviour and how change it changes across varying settings, populations and behavioural domains. Consultancy The CBC offers evidence based consultancy on behaviour change in a range of domains, primarily health and sustainability at individual, organisational and population levels. Training We offer bespoke training workshops and courses to introduce principles of behaviour change and demonstrate how these can be applied to a range of practical problems, from supporting change amongst patients and health professionals to planning and supporting change in organisations and communities. We also offer advance training, including in our international week-long Summer Schools. Study Behaviour Change The CBC offers an MSc in Behaviour Change and a third year undergraduate introductory module to the topic that is open to students from any discipline. Our courses prepare you for a career in the growing field of behaviour change across sectors and industries. CBC Conference The CBC conference brings together people from academia, the public sector, policy, charities, and industry to learn about and discuss applications of the science of behaviour change. In addition to a programme showcasing cutting-edge scientific research and applications, the conference hosts activities to enable discussion and networking between academia and industry. Summer School The Summer School will give participants a greater understanding of the possibilities for applying behaviour change interventions to their own situations, providing tools and a practical framework for developing, implementing and evaluating these interventions to their areas of interest. Follow us Follow us on twitter @UCLBehaveChange What we provideWe provide the following to public, commercial and third sectors in the UK and internationally ConsultancyTrainingResearch collaborationsSeminar seriesTo make an enquiry, please complete this form:Enquiries and request form News & Events15th annual UKSBM scientific meeting, 16-17 January 2020, BathThe UK Society for Behavioural Medicine invites all behavioural and public health researchers, clinicians, practioners, epidemiologists, health and clinical psychologists, behavioural scientists, medical sociologists, health economists, nurses, pharmacists and all other colleagues interested in the field of behavioural medicine to participate in this two day meeting. The deadline for early bird registration and Early Career Award/ASM busaries is 28 October 2019. For more information visist the conference webpage.Climate change and public engagement: new reportA report for the Committee on Climate Change: Behaviour change, public engagement and Net Zero (published 10 October 2019)CBC Publications Links to other organisationsBEHAVIOURWORKS AUSTRALIA (BWA)A leading behaviour change research enterprise within the Monash Sustainable Development Institute at Monash University in Melbourne. BWA is Australia's largest applied behaviour change research unit, connecting leading behaviour change researchers with government and industry practitioners to translate evidence into practice. Visit: www.behaviourworksaustralia.orgCENTRE FOR IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH, OTTAWA HEALTH RESEARCH INSTITUTEThe Centre for Implementation Research (CIR) focuses on developing and applying Implementation Science in health-care settings to improve health-care and health. Visit: www.ohri.ca/cir/Tweets by UCLBehaveChange


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Currently leased for $295 per week this property presents an ideal opportunity to an investor or owner occupier.
Very well situated in the peaceful family friendly suburb of Forest Hill, this three bedroom brick veneer home is waiting to be snatched up by its next lucky owner! Located within close proximity to all amenities including the local supermarket, chemist, medical centre, newsagent & school, this home boasts three good sized rooms with built in storage, a tidy kitchen with separate dining area, neat bathroom with separate toilet as well as a functional floor plan and split system heating/cooling. Outside is complete with a single lock up garage with drive through access to the easy maintenance yard and a large 6×5.5m (Approx) shed.
|R&H Suburb Summary
|Number of sales
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|$355 p.w.
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|R&H Suburb Summary
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|$248 p.w.
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|15 %
7 Lyons Crescent, Forest Hill,
New South Wales, 2651


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2019 is off with a bang.
Jim Cramer tackled the news post-holidays on Thursday, Dec. 3.
Bristol-Myers Deal
The first major mergers & acquisitions (M&A) deal was announced Thursday morning when Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY - Get Report) announced its intent to buy Celgene (CELG - Get Report) for $74 billion.
TheStreet's Martin Baccardax reported on the deal, which was made public before the market opened Thursday.
According to Bristol-Myers, Celgene investors will receive a Bristol-Myers share and $50 for each Celgene holding that they have. Investors would also get a special rights issue that will pay off if the merged group meets certain business targets.
The deal values Celgene at $102.43 each, the companies said, a 53.7% premium to Wednesday's closing price. The combined group -- which will be 69% owned by Bristol-Myers -- would have a portfolio with nine drugs that generate more than $1 billion in sales, the companies said.
Cramer said that he was worried about the deal.
"Celgene has made so many bad acquisitions," Cramer said. "Bristol-Myers has made so many bad acquisitions. I mean, maybe this is the one."
Is Apple Rotting?
Apple (AAPL - Get Report) was another major headline that was making waves in the market as trading opened Thursday morning.
After the bell on Wednesday, Real Money's Stock of the Day, Apple, had an announcement made via CEO Tim Cook.
Baccardax reported that Cook said revenue for the three months ending in December would come in around $84 billion, notably shy of the Street consensus of around $91.5 billion and the company's own previous guidance of between $89 billion and $93 billion. Cook pinned the weaker iPhone demand in China on several factors, including a slowing economy worsened by "rising trade tensions with the United States" and cited high prices tied to the strength of the U.S. dollar, fewer carrier subsidies and customers taking advantage of reduced battery replacements in the softened demand for new iPhones.
TheStreet's tech columnist, Eric Jhonsa, gave his top takeaways from the Apple announcement.
- China Weighed Heavily on Results
- iPhone Sales Were Under Pressure Outside of China as Well
- Services and Wearables Remain Growth Engines
- iPads Also Outperformed
- The Installed Base Continues to Grow Meaningfully
- Stock Buybacks Remained Aggressive -- and Are Likely to Stay That Way
"I would be afraid to buy Apple if I lived [in China]. Because the communist party is all-seeing and all-knowing," Cramer said.
He also noted that he and his team had previously called that Apple would miss the quarter back in Action Alerts Plus's December monthly call, which you can find here.
Apple is a holding in Cramer's Action Alerts Plus.


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When your boyfriend neglects you, it is the worst! You can recapture his attention and rekindle the passion you shared by changing your appearance or behavior. Alternatively, you can catch his eye with a bit of spontaneity, some creativity, and perhaps an air of aloofness.
Method One of Four:
Making Noticeable Changes
1Be more bold. Instead of waiting around for him to notice you, take charge of your relationship, your desires, and your life. You can live boldly in several ways. Talk to your boyfriend and let him know what you want and need to feel satisfied with your relationship. Step up to the plate and show your boyfriend how you wish to be treated. Lastly, step away from the relationship if he can't fulfill your needs and focus on you.[1]
- Plan a surprise date for him.
- Pop-in on him at work or at home.
- Surprise him with a suggestive gift.
- Make plans with your girlfriends.
2Act confident. Confidence is extremely attractive. Work towards accepting that you are a strong, independent person. As you develop more confidence, feel free to take charge of your relationship.Tell him what you want to do and when you want to do it. You can develop confidence by:
- Working out—you will feel stronger a more self-assured
- Completing a project—you will feel accomplished
- Tackling a new skill—you will feel adventurous and intelligent
3Change your look. Drastically changing up your signature look is a surefire way to capture his attention. The change will catch him off guard and hopefully intrigue him enough to renew his interest in you. Options to consider include:
- Dying your hair a bold new color
- Opting for a natural look instead of wearing a lot of makeup
- Getting bangs
- Dressing in all black[2]
4Wear a new outfit. You'll certainly catch his eye in an outfit that accentuates your best features. While the outfit should be alluring, it doesn't have to be risque. Dressing in something that makes you feel attractive will also make you feel more confident. Remember, confidence is a very desirable trait and an excellent accessory too. Exchange your everyday clothes for something a little edgier and sexier:
- Swap your tennis shoes for heels
- Wear form fitting clothing
- Pull up your hair to draw attention to your neckline
- Show a sliver of skin or bare your midriff[3]
Method Two of Four:
Doing Something Special For Him
1Make his favorite dinner. Food, especially his favorite food, is an excellent way to capture your boyfriend's attention. Spend the afternoon making his favorite dinner from scratch. He will appreciate all of the time and effort you put into making a delicious meal for him.
- If you are not a cook, take your boyfriend out to his favorite restaurant and treat him to a decadent meal and dessert. Alternatively, you could sign up for a couple's cooking class or make the meal together at your house.[4]
2Express an interest in his favorite hobby. Does your boyfriend seem to devote more time to his hobbies than to your relationship? Instead of complaining about his interests, make the effort to join him in these activities. This will allow you to spend time together and to bond over an activity that he is passionate about.
- Play Pokemon Go! with your boyfriend
- Sit in the stands at his sporting events
- Attend his musical performances
- Learn his favorite board game or video game
- Volunteer with him at an organization he is passionate about[5]
3Be adventurous together. Invite your boyfriend to step outside of your comfort zone with you. Your desire to do something out of the ordinary, like skydiving, will capture his attention and return his focus to you. The thrill you'll share as you try something new and risky will rekindle your romance too.
- Ask him to go cliff jumping with you
- Invite him on a rustic camping trip
- Act out his romantic fantasy (or yours)[6]
Method Three of Four:
Asserting Your Independence
1Spend time on your own. Don't devote all of you energy to getting his attention. Step away from the phone and him for awhile and take some time for you.
- Stop contacting him. Eventually, he will notice that you've been contacting him less. If this concerns him, he will step up to the plate and start pursuing you. If he isn't bothered by your lack of attention, he might not be worth your time.
- Go on a trip without him. You don't need your boyfriend's permission (or company) to go on an adventure. Plan an adventure that doesn't include him. You could plan a girl's weekend or a family vacation. If you're feeling adventurous, take a trip by yourself. You absence will capture his attention.[7][8]
2Spend time with friends and family. If you prefer to spend your free time with others, turn to your friends and family members. Concentrate your energy on building a stronger relationship with these integral members of your support system. Instead of asking your boyfriend to hang out, ask your friends and family members to set aside some time for you.
- Invite your friends over for a movie night.
- Go to the spa with your mom.
- Ask you siblings to cook dinner with you.
- Take a day trip with your bestie.
- Rent a cottage with your extended friend group.
- Host a DIY night[9]
3Find a new hobby. Taking up a new activity is not only an ideal distraction, but it is also a great way to build confidence and gain clarity. New activities push us out of our comfort zones and force us to grow. Whether you choose to take up sewing or swing dancing, use this activity to remind yourself that you have value outside of your relationship.
- Join a book club
- Learn a new language
- Join a yoga class
- Practice meditation every day
- Take on a new project at work.[10]
Method Four of Four:
Communicating with Your Boyfriend
1Present the issue to your boyfriend. Initiate the conversation with a statement that plainly describes the issue you are having. Do not attach any feelings, interpretation, or blame to the statement. State it as a fact, not a option.
- For example, "Mike, we haven't spent much time together lately" or "Rowan, we aren't connecting like we used to." [11]
Sarah Schewitz, PsyDLove & Relationship PsychologistSarah Schewitz, PsyD
Love & Relationship Psychologist
Consider possible reasons for why he's not giving you attention. Love and relationship psychologist Dr. Sarah Schewitz says: "It's not always a sign of trouble if your boyfriend isn't paying attention to you. Men tend to be single-focused, so if they're at work, they're at work. It may not occur to them to stop working to text you or pay attention to you. Women, on the other hand, tend to be more diffuse-focused, so they're paying attention to a lot of details at once."
2Use "I" statements to discuss your feelings. Expressing yourself with "I" statements allows you to take sole ownership for your feelings. Instead of saying "You make me feel ____," you're stating "I feel ____".
- For example, "Over the past month, I felt like I wasn't a priority to you" or "Since school started, I feel like you have focused more on football than on our relationship."[12]
3Ask him to change his behavior. Once you've explained the situation and how it's made you feel, it is time to ask him to take action. Think of what he needs to do to make you feel differently about the situation.
- For example, "Mike, I would really appreciate it if you would make time to hang out with me" or "Rowan, I know you are busy with practice and we can't see each other much during the week. Will you try to call me on your way home for practice everyday so we have a chance to catch up?"[13]
Community Q&A
QuestionHow to get my boyfriend's attention in a long distance relationship?
- Smile. Your smile is your best weapon, and gift.
- Flirt with him, even though you are already dating, flirting is still fun and cute and he'll love it.
- Have inside jokes with him. It is something more intimate and fun that you guys can bring up and laugh about to no end.
- Do something out of the ordinary.
About This Article
If you want to get your boyfriend's attention, be bold and take charge by planning a special date or surprise. For example, you can cook him his favorite dinner or set up an adventurous outing like a camping trip. When you do this, you're helping to rekindle your romance while also showing him how you want to be treated. As you wait for him to give you more of his attention, take the time to focus on yourself. You can go on a girls' trip, have a spa date with your mom, or invite your best friend over for a movie night. When you make other plans and assert your independence, he may see that he needs to make more of an effort to spend time with you.
- ↑ http://www.eioba.com/a/1bc1/10-fast-and-effective-ways-to-get-his-attention
- ↑ http://youqueen.com/love/relationships/10-crazy-ways-to-make-your-boyfriend-want-you-more/
- ↑ http://www.eioba.com/a/1bc1/10-fast-and-effective-ways-to-get-his-attention
- ↑ http://www.herinterest.com/how-to-get-your-boyfriends-attention/
- ↑ http://www.herinterest.com/how-to-get-your-boyfriends-attention/
- ↑ http://www.eioba.com/a/1bc1/10-fast-and-effective-ways-to-get-his-attention
- ↑ http://youqueen.com/love/relationships/10-crazy-ways-to-make-your-boyfriend-want-you-more/
- ↑ http://www.herinterest.com/how-to-get-your-boyfriends-attention/
- ↑ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/20/get-your-husbands-attention_n_6716382.html
- ↑ http://www.herinterest.com/how-to-get-your-boyfriends-attention/
- ↑ http://www.artofmanliness.com/2013/05/15/how-to-communicate-your-needs-in-a-relationship/
- ↑ http://www.artofmanliness.com/2013/05/15/how-to-communicate-your-needs-in-a-relationship/
- ↑ http://www.artofmanliness.com/2013/05/15/how-to-communicate-your-needs-in-a-relationship/


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Creativity Exercise: Look Down
This week's exercise is going to have you staring at your feet - literally.
It's time to put your camera to your face and point it down so that you can capture a bird's eye view. I find when I'm mentoring photographers, this is often a viewpoint that's missing from portfolios, which is too bad as it's an excellent way to tell a story.
Toss on a wider lens (I recommend 35mm or wider or you'll have to stand on a chair) and pay attention to what's happening on the floor. Think about how the light comes into your frame and how it casts shadows across your subjects and the floor (or the grass or the bed, etc).
A few things to keep in mind:
- You'll really need to pay attention to your aperture and where your focus is falling. Choose to focus on the floor and your subject's heads will be out of focus....choose to focus on the tops of heads and you probably won't have the toys in focus.
- Watch your feet! It's easy to miss your own feet sneaking into the frame, unless of course it's your intent to have your feet in there. If you're standing on a bed/couch, also be conscious of the lines your feet are making in the covers/fabric.
- Don't be afraid to stand on something, but make sure your safe (yes, I've fallen off a kid's chair before while doing this!), and watch the shadow that object might cast.
- If you have a flip out screen it's going to be your best friend here. Flip it out so that you can see it and then lift your camera high above your head.
- If shooting against floor boards, keep in mind what angle they are at in your frame. If you aren't shooting straight down and you're angled slightly, the floor boards will make it glaringly obvious.
- If you shoot your kids or clients like this regularly try mixing it up by shooting food, plants or other still life.
As always, have fun with it. Play around and see what you like and what you don't.
We'd love to see what you come up with! Jenny will be manning the @unscriptedmentoring account this week and would love to feature your images. Use #unscriptedmentoring so that we can find you!
- Kelly
P.S. want these exercises delivered straight to your inbox? Scroll down and sign up for the newsletter below. As a bonus for signing up we'll send you our exclusive guide of how to get the kids on your side when they want nothing to do with you (photographically speaking of course....getting them on your side parenting is whole different beast!)


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KUALA LUMPUR: The Kuala Lumpur City Hall (DBKL) has recovered a total of RM149 million through renegotiation of 16 of its 23 dubious land deals involving a total area of 104ha, said Federal Territories Minister Khalid Abdul Samad.
He said apart from that, another 5.04ha of land worth RM113.8 million had also been returned to DBKL.
"These were the result of renegotiations over 16 transactions, involving 21.84ha of land. The buyers agreed to pay according to market price."
He said the renegotiations were carried out by a special committee set up to probe the dubious land transactions carried out by the previous government that had allegedly sold the land below market price.
Khalid said apart from the 16 successfully renegotiated deals, three other transactions needed revaluation from the Valuation and Property Services Department (JPPH). Another three failed to reach an agreement and one more transaction would involve further discussions with lawyers.
In total, 97 dubious deals involving the sale of DBKL-owned land worth RM5.63 billion were investigated.
Of these, 23 were renegotiated, 10 were terminated, one land deal was brought to court and 43 deals will proceed.
Another 20 more land deals were submitted to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) for further investigation.
In another development, Khalid said 120 tahfiz centres had been registered under DBKL and the Federal Territory Islamic Religious Department (Jawi).
"We believe there are still others which have not registered and they have until Dec 31 to do so," he said.


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07 July 2017 |Holger Dambeck, Eva Horn, Philipp Löwe, Dominik Peters, Stefan Schultz and Ansgar Siemens | SPIEGEL Online
Hartmut Dudde was as good as his word. The chief in charge of the police operation at the Hamburg G-20, with some 15,000 officers at his disposal, had promised a rigorous approach to criminal demonstrators during the summit – and his men certainly delivered that on Thursday evening against the "Welcome to Hell" demo.
An escalation was virtually pre-ordained – from both sides. The organizers told the police in advance that the demo would remain peaceful as long as officers ignored the odd mask or firework. The fact that that it was impossible for the police to meet this condition seemed of no concern to them.
For their part, the police deployed such a massive force to surround the demo's starting point at Hamburg's Fischmarkt square that it was almost impossible to count the number of water cannon and reinforcement units stationed in the surrounding streets.
Masks against a martial force
Many G-20 protesters saw the massive police presence as a sign that officials didn't want the march to go ahead at all. The much-feared "black bloc" of leftist radicals appeared remarkably restrained at first – apart from the forbidden masks many were wearing. There were no fireworks, no flares.
But police blocked the black bloc-led march after only a few hundred meters along Hafenstrasse, which runs along the Elbe River. Many of the 10,000 demonstrators were still at the Fischmarkt, waiting to begin walking.
The police were within their rights to demand that demonstrators take off any face coverings before the march would be allowed to continue. And many did in fact follow the instruction – but not all, at which point it became clear that a lot of people had come to riot, as the rest of the evening and Friday morning showed.
But at that moment, shortly before 8 p.m. on Thursday evening, the radical leftists almost seemed willing to compromise. Not a single masked face could be seen at the front of the march. That could have been the moment when the police let the demo pass – even though not all the faces had been uncovered.
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