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Muslims today comprise the Russian Federation's second largest confessional group, numbering 20 to 21 million souls, or roughly 14 percent of the country's overall population of approximately 146 million.1 It is also a group in ideological and societal transition. Although Islamic institutions were largely destroyed and believers forced underground under Soviet rule, Islam has experienced a quick and vibrant, if still ill-defined, revival since the collapse of the USSR, with various ideological tendencies competing for the support of society and state. Among Russia's Muslims, the explosion of ethno-nationalism sparked by the USSR's implosion in the late 1980s and early 1990s has given way to religious identification and the rise of faith-based politics.
Nevertheless, to date, only a small portion of Russia's Muslims has manifested Islamist tendencies, and just a fraction of those have been drawn into violence—either within Russia itself or abroad. However, Russia's ongoing involvement in the Syrian civil war, the rise of exclusionary, ultranationalist identity politics under the government of President Vladimir Putin, and expanding repression and discrimination on the part of the Kremlin have all contributed to disenfranchisement and radicalization among Russia's Muslims. The result is a dangerous distance between the Russian government and the country's Muslim minority—a dynamic that extreme Islamist organizations such as the Islamic State have begun to exploit.
The Caucasus Emirate
The primary Islamist terrorist group in Russia is known as the Caucasus Emirate (CE), or Imarat Kavkaz. Encompassing a network of terrorist cells spread across the North Caucasus, the organization is an outgrowth of the radicalization of the Chechen national separatist movement that took place in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The CE evolved from the Chechen separatist movement that emerged amid the Soviet collapse of the early 1990s. Before then, although some radical political Islamic elements existed within Chechen society—and the region's first president, Dzhokar Dudaev, did implement elements of sharia law—the Chechen movement was predominantly nationalist in character. This state of affairs persisted through the first Russo-Chechen war (1994-1996), but following the 1996 Khasavyurt peace agreement signed between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Dudaev's successor, Aslan Maskhadov, the quasi-independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) devolved into a state of permanent chaos, criminality, and civil strife. The resulting political vacuum was used by a small number of local Islamists, as well foreign extremist elements (including al-Qaeda), to establish a beachhead in the area.
As early as 1996, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then al-Qaeda's second-in-command, attempted to visit incognito and establish a presence in Russia, but he was discovered and deported.2 In a subsequently published book, he targeted Russia for violent jihad and the establishment of an expansive southern Eurasian caliphate.3 At about the same time, Shamil Basaev, then a Chechen field commander, visited Afghanistan and received training there.4 Omar Abu Ibn al-Khattab, an al-Qaeda operative, was in Chechnya then as well and, amid the inter-war lawlessness, established camps where perhaps as many as several hundred foreign fighters, as well as local militants, trained in terrorist tactics.5 These units subsequently spearheaded the August 1999 invasion of neighboring Dagestan, which was organized jointly by Basaev and Khattab and aimed at creating an Islamist enclave there. It was this offensive that set off the second Chechen war.6
As during the first Chechen war, Russia deployed a brutal military response, and by 2002 had defeated the militants in conventional war, driving the bulk of the ChRI government and parliament into foreign exile, with many finding refuge in places like Washington, London, Istanbul, Baku, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The more dedicated extremist elements retreated into the mountain forests in southern Chechnya and neighboring Georgia, where they began a classic guerilla insurgency campaign punctuated by occasional large-scale attacks. With national separatist forces isolated abroad, Islamists gradually consolidated power over the movement throughout the next five years.
In the summer of 2002, following the death of Khattab at the hands of Russian security forces, an expanded emergency meeting of the underground remnants of the ChRI government and armed forces convened in the mountains of Chechnya. The meeting served as a coup d'etat of sorts; as a result of the gathering, a sharia-based order was adopted, with the goal of expanding the insurgency across the North Caucasus.7 Thereafter, Basaev began to travel across the Caucasus seeking out young radicals and establishing a network of combat cells in Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachaevo-Cherkessia.8 The results produced a series of terrorist incidents in subsequent years, including the October 2002 Dubrovka Theater hostage-taking, a rash of suicide attacks in Moscow in 2003,9 and the September 2004 seizure of School No. 1 in Beslan in early September—a terrorist incident in which 333 people, including 186 children, were killed. Subsequently, between 2006 and 2010, terrorist activity in Russia saw a significant uptick, rising from just 3 major terrorist attacks in 2006 to 22 in 2010.10
This radical activism has continued. The CE has been responsible for scores of high-profile attacks on Russian targets in the North Caucasus and beyond in recent years, including the March 2010 attack on the Moscow subway, the December 2013 bombing of the train station in Volgograd, near the site of the 2014 Olympic Games, and a coordinated December 2014 assault on historic landmarks in Chechnya's capital of Grozny that left at least 20 dead.11
More recently, the number of terrorist attacks carried out by the CE and its affiliates in Russia has dipped noticeably—something that Russian officials have been quick to attribute to the Kremlin's robust counterterrorism policies.12 However, this characterization is deeply misleading, because it discounts the extensive mobilization that has taken place among Russia's Islamist cadres since the Kremlin's military intervention into the Syrian civil war in September 2015. Today, it is estimated that one-quarter of all foreign fighters that have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria are from the territory of the former Soviet Union,13 and Russian is the third most frequently spoken language among fighters of the Islamic State.14 Rather than combatting this outflow of militants, Russian authorities appear to be doing the opposite, with government agencies essentially facilitating the departure of terrorists.15 This, however, appears to be only a temporary solution, and Islamist violence in Russia can be expected to surge anew with the return of these militants from the Middle East in the years ahead.
The CE functions as a decentralized network, consisting of local combat cells loosely tied together and subordinate to sectors, which are in turn subordinated to the CE's "provinces," referred to by the fighters as veliyats. Subordination is indicated by the taking of the Islamic loyalty oath (bayat). The CE includes five known veliyats: Veliyat Nokchicho (Chechnya); Veliyat Gyalgyaiche (Ingushetia and Ossetia); Veliyat Dagestan; the United Veliyat of Kabardia, Balkaria, and Karachai (the KBR, the KChR, and probably Adygeya); and Veliyat of the Nogai Steppe (Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai). An emir who has made bayat to the CE controls each veliyat. The CE's military structure includes: the Caucasus, Dagestan, Volga, and Urals fronts. Combat cells are permitted to design and undertake small-scale operations independently, but larger operations require approval from a higher-ranking emir.16
The CE is composed of members from each of the Muslim ethnic groups in Russia, as well as members of non-Muslim ethnic groups. Chechens, Ingush and various Dagestani (Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Nogais, Tabasarans, etc.) predominate, but the Muslim Alans (Karachais and Balkars) and Circassians (Kabards, Cherkess, and Adygs) are also well represented.17 In short, the CE puts into practice the extremist principle that Islam is universal.
Publicly available information detailing CE's financial sources is limited. It remains likely that Arab and other foreign Islamic governments, businesses, and philanthropists still provide funds, despite the efforts of Russian authorities to prevent it. The local population is known to provide limited financial support in the form of the Islamic zakat (charitable contributions), as well as considerable logistical and other material support, such as weapons, safe houses, and food provisions.18 Support is also generated through criminal activity; during the first Russo-Chechen war and in the period thereafter, the ChRI received funding from elements of the Chechen mafia, narcotics trafficking, illicit oil exports, and the lucrative hostage-taking industry run by Chechen field commander and Moscow mafia chief, Khozh-Akhmed Nukhaev.19 While these sources were mostly cut off in the years that followed as a result of the displacement of the ChRI leadership and more aggressive international and Russian efforts to combat terrorist financing, there are indications that the organization still generates revenue via illicit means.20
The size of the CE's network is extremely difficult to estimate. Extremist sources are silent on the subject, except to refute the accuracy of official Russian estimates, which have tended to downplay the number of active members affiliated with the group.21 A review of the available literature suggests that it reasonable to assume that there may be more than 1,000 CE fighters, and thousands of additional facilitators.22 These figures have been affected by the Syrian civil war, which has drawn Russian Islamists to its cause in significant numbers. In the Fall of 2014, Russian security officials estimated that some 800 militants from the North Caucasus had traveled to Syria to take up arms against the Assad regime.23 By September 2015, that number had swelled to an estimated 2,400—a threefold increase in less than a year.24 It is unclear what percentage of these mobilized Islamists is made up of CE cadres, but the organization is believed to be heavily represented within the Islamic State.25
While the CE has long been a prominent part of the global jihadist movement, it has traditionally served as an affiliate of the Bin Laden network, having formally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda back in April of 2009. However, in 2015, elements of the group broke ranks and formally pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Emirs in Dagestan were the first to formally pledge allegiance to IS,26 followed by the CE's leading military commander, and Chechnya's emir, Aslan Buytukaev, who declared allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on behalf of all Chechen fighters that summer. Other CE veliyats followed soon after. The move created a rift within the organization, with a minority of veliyat remaining loyal to the CE (and therefore al-Qaeda). Those that joined the Islamic State, however, were incorporated into an ISIS "governate" encompassing Russia's restive majority-Muslim regions of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia.27 ISIS emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi subsequently named Abu Muhammad al-Kadari (Rustam Asilderov) leader of the newly declared Islamic State province, known as the Velayat Qawqaz.28
The Islamic State has made a point of targeting Russia, if not for its treatment of Muslims internally then certainly for its activities in Syria. October of 2015 saw the downing of a Russian commercial airliner flight from Sharm el-Sheikh to St. Petersburg in an attack orchestrated by the Islamic State.29 The first IS attack on Russian soil took place in August of 2016, when two men attacked police with a gun and axes. Both were killed as a result, and days later, in the equivalent of a claim of responsibility, IS published a video of their pledges of allegiance to al-Baghdadi.30 IS has even threatened Russian President Vladimir Putin directly. A video that surfaced in August of 2016 shows masked men in a car calling for IS affiliates to murder Russians and Vladimir Putin himself.31 In late 2016, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested seven IS conspirators in possession of grenades, munitions, and materiel for improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The militants were allegedly planning to attack targets in Moscow and St. Petersburg.32
Other Islamists
In the past, suspected al-Qaeda operatives such as Omar Abu Ibn al-Khattab have joined the ChRI/CE, but there is no open source evidence indicating that al-Qaeda or other foreign jihadist groups operate in Russia independently from the CE. Russian law enforcement occasionally claims that al-Qaeda operatives number among killed and captured CE fighters, but such claims are never documented. Moreover, al-Qaeda's position in Russia (and elsewhere in the "post-Soviet space") has been largely supplanted over the past couple of years by the Islamic State.33
The only other Islamic extremist organization reported to be active in Russia is the Uighur-Bulgar Jamaat (UBJ). The group was established between 2006 and 2008 in Bashkortostan by Pavel Dorokhov, an ethnic Russian converted and trained by Taliban camps in Afghanistan.34 It has sporadically engaged in militancy in Russia's Volga region (encompassing the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan). In 2010, no fewer than 20 members of the UBJ attempted to blow up a gas line in Bashkortostan's Birsk district, and were subsequently killed in a shootout with Bashkir police.35 In 2012, the group disrupted the long-time peace between religious groups in Tatarstan when they severely injured the region's Grand Mufti, Ilduz Fayzov, and killed his deputy, Valliulla Yakupov.36 The UBJ also makes up part of the contingent of foreign fighters in Syria, and as of 2013 numbered around 200 in that theater.37 The UBJ may or may not be one and the same organization as the apparently ethnic Tatar Bulgar Jamaat, which fought in Afghanistan around 2009.38
Despite being banned in Russia, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) maintains a presence in the country as well. Many alleged HuT members are arrested annually, mostly in the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. By 2012, HuT and other Islamists had penetrated many autonomous mosques and official Islamic institutions in Tatarstan, carried out public demonstrations in tandem with nationalist groups, and organized several automobile caravans flying the HuT flag.39 According to Memorial, a Russian human rights watchdog, HuT has become a non-violent organization in recent years.40 Memorial considers 23 of the Muslims arrested in 2016 on charges associated with Hizb ut-Tahrir to be "political prisoners," a term it uses to refer to those who have been wrongfully arrested to meet political ends.41
Other domestic groups
Several small Tatar groups have Islamist tendencies but are at least equally or predominantly national separatist in nature, confining their activity to the republic of Tatarstan and, to a lesser degree, Bashkortostan. They include: Azatlyk, Ittifak, Mille Mejlis, and elements within the All-Tatar Public Center.42 These organizations, have historically confined themselves to occasional declarations, conferences, and small demonstrations, but now increasingly engage in those activities in partnership with Islamist elements such as HuT. Some of their official statements and documents are sent to North Caucasus terrorist websites.43 None, however, are at present believed to constitute a significant threat to the Russian state.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Islam has undergone a revival among its traditionally Muslim ethnic groups. According to Russia's leading mufti, Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia (CMR) Ravil Gainutdin, the number of mosques in Russia grew from 150 in 1991 to some six thousand by October 2005.44 From 2000 to 2015, mosque construction averaged just over one per day, according to expert estimates.45
This explosive growth has been propelled by the size of Russia's Muslim minority itself. While Russia's Muslims remain a distinct minority in Russia, differences in communal behavior—including fewer divorces, less alcoholism and a greater rate of reproduction—have given them a more robust demographic profile than their ethnic Russian counterparts.46 Thus, according to the United Nations, the fertility of Russia's Muslims, at 2.3, is significantly higher than the overall Russian national fertility rate of 1.7.47 Other estimates peg the reproductive rate of Russia's Muslims higher still.48 As a result, a variety of projections have suggested that Russia's Muslims will account for a fifth of the country's total population by the end of this decade, and may make up a majority of Russians by as early as mid-century.49
Moreover, migrants (the majority of them Muslim) continue to enter the Russian Federation in search of employment and economic opportunity. In 2013, the total number of migrant workers present on Russian soil was estimated to be 11 million, more than 7 percent of the country's total population.50 This second cohort helps to augment the size and political reach of Russia's indigenous Muslim community.
Russia's Muslims are divided by geography, history, ethnicity, and divergent confessional movements (Sufis, Sunnis, and Shi'ites) and legal schools (maskhabs). The overwhelming majority of Russia's Muslims are Sunni. Shi'a are predominantly located in the southern North Caucasus, particularly among Dagestan's rather small ethnic Lezgin population. Sufism predominates in the North Caucasus, consisting mostly of Naqshbandi and Qadiri tariqats (brotherhoods or orders). Each Islamic school of jurisprudence, or maskhab, is represented in Russia, but almost all of Russia's Muslims adhere to the Hanafi interpretation. There is, however, a significant Shafi presence in the North Caucasus. Tatarstan's Muslims and the Tatar internal diaspora, meanwhile, are experiencing a revival of the Islamic reformist or jadidist school of Islamic thought.
Although Muslim communities can be found all across the length and breadth of the vast federation, the largest concentrations of ethnic Muslims (ethnic groups that traditionally have adhered in overwhelming numbers to the Islamic faith) are found in the North Caucasus's Muslim republics—Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR), and Karachaevo-Cherkessia (KChR)—and in the Volga and Urals republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. There are also large Muslim populations in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but these are more Russified, urbanized, and secularized than those in other regions, especially the North Caucasus. The Muslims of the North Caucasus remain largely rural, traditionally religious, and indigenously ethnic or clan-oriented.
Russia's other main ethnic Muslim groups, Tatars and Bashkirs, are concentrated to a great extent in the Tatarstan and Bashkortostan Republics. As of the 2010 Russian census, Tatars make up a slim majority in Tatarstan, while ethnic Russians outnumber Bashkirs in Bashkortostan (Bashkiria). Both Tatars and Bashkirs are better integrated into Russian life than are the North Caucasians. Some historically non-Muslim ethnic groups are seeing some of their members convert to Islam, including ethnic Russians.51
In terms of political ideology, Russia's Muslims, much like ethnic Slavs, are divided among democrats, conservatives, Eurasianist and Islamist reactionaries. Since, under Russian law, political parties based on any communal identification are forbidden from participating in elections, it is difficult to attain a detailed picture of Muslims' distribution on Russia's political spectrum. Political Islam, however, is in evidence at both the official and unofficial levels. Media controlled by official Islamic structures carry numerous articles on introducing elements of sharia law in Russia, including the introduction of Islamic banking and insurance.52 Also, there are strong anti-American, anti-Western, anti-Israeli, and even anti-Semitic tendencies, not just among Russia's Islamists but among Russia's traditional Muslims as well.53
Generally, however, there is only limited support for violent Islamism in both Russia's Muslim and non-Muslim populations. The country's Islamic clergy feels threatened and virulently opposes manifestations of political Islam, and Islamists have found limited support in the Muslim community. That said, many young Muslims are increasingly fascinated by—and sympathetic toward—radical trends, including Islamism as represented by the charismatic fighters of the Caucasus Emirate and, more recently, by the Islamic State.
The Russian government is ill-equipped to deal with this trend. In recent years, the Kremlin has done precious little of substance to address the needs of the country's growing Muslim minority. To the contrary, the ultranationalist identity erected by the government of Vladimir Putin over the past decade has systematically shut Russia's Muslims out of contemporary politics and society, leaving them vulnerable to the lure of alternative ideologies—Islamism chief among them.54
Russia's Freedom of Religion Law of 1997 establishes Islam, along with Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, and Judaism, as one of the four "traditional" faiths.55 As of the 2010 Russian census, Muslims make up the second largest group of these (after Orthodox Christianity).
Russia's Muslims are not strongly self-organized. Rather, they are well organized "from above" by the Islamic clergy and the Russian state. Muslim communities must be registered with the government, and each is then incorporated into a regional Muslim Spiritual Administration (MSA), every one of which in turn is included under one of the three main Muslim umbrella organizations: the Council of Muslims of Russia (CMR), the Central Muslim Spiritual Administration (CMSA), and the Coordinating Council of the Muslims of the North Caucasus (CCMNC). The CMR at present is the most influential of the umbrella organizations, with its leader, the ethnic Tatar mufti Ravil Gainutdin, on good terms with the Kremlin. Two smaller umbrella organizations—the MSA of the European part of Russia and the MSA of the Asian part of Russia—are subordinated to two of the abovementioned. In all, there are known to be approximately 60 regional MSAs, all of which are included under one or another of the umbrella organizations.56 These various structures help organize the travel of Muslims to the hajj and to study abroad, support Islamic schools and universities in Russia, and recruit and train Islamic clergy. The various Muslim spiritual councils (Dukhovnyie Upravlenii Musulman, or DUM in Russian) receive state funding for muftis' salaries, university and school development, and the building of mosques. Independent Muslim communities and mosques persist but are illegal and are usually discovered by the authorities and incorporated into the official administrations. Typically, these have manifested Islamist tendencies, and some have produced terrorist organizations, leaders, and cadres.57
Both the Russian state and official Islamic clergy are strongly opposed to and greatly fear any manifestation of Islamism. As a result, the state has banned political parties based on religion (as well as on ethnicity and gender), and the Islamic clergy cooperates closely with the state apparatus in combating independent Islamic or Islamist groups and supporting reformist, Euro-Islamic, and other more secularized Islamic trends as an antidote to Islamism. Ravil Gainutdin, as well as the leadership of the Republic of Tatarstan, has led in this effort.58
Past experience has taught Russian authorities to treat Islamists severely, and they move quickly and often illegally to imprison them for long terms. Arrests of Islamists belonging to non-violent but illegal organizations such as HuT and Tablighi Jamaat are often accompanied by official charges of conspiracy to commit terrorist attacks and claims that searches produced not only extremist literature but also weapons and explosives.59
The extent to which these policies and practices lead to significant violations of Muslims' civil, political, and human rights, in turn, creates a catalyst for extremist recruitment. Putin-era amendments to Russia's laws "On Extremism" and "On Combating Terrorism" give the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Justice Ministry, and General Prosecutor's Office broad leeway in holding suspects and determining what constitutes "extremist literature." Searches are frequently conducted on questionable pretexts, detention can often result in torture, and some convictions are based on exaggerated charges. These practices are more prevalent in the North Caucasus, especially in Chechnya under region president Ramzan Kadyrov, where authorities have even carried out extra-judicial retribution against the families of suspected and actual terrorists, including the abductions of relatives and the burning of homes. Some of this extra-legal law enforcement activity, especially in Chechnya, is carried out by special battalions comprised of former separatist fighters and is driven by local Caucasus customs of blood revenge.
Federal counterterrorism policy has in recent years increasingly focused on "soft power" approaches. Moscow has increased federal contributions to the budgets of republics hardest hit by the CE. As of 2014, the Russian central government was still funding the majority of the budget for the North Caucasus in return for the loyalty of local officials and businessmen.60 In 2016, some of those youth programs came in the form of media schools that taught students how to promote Russian interests and "standards in journalism."61
These efforts have been supplemented by increasingly broad federal authorities to curb perceived terrorist activities. In 2016, Russia passed a series of laws, cumulatively referred to as the "Yarovaya Packet," which expand the definition of "extremism," allowing the criminalization of a highly subjective range of acts and authorizing the prosecution of any person or financier of an act that harms Russians worldwide.62 The law further tightens the aforementioned organizational structure, requiring official permits for religious activities, including praying, that take place outside of officially recognized religious buildings. It targets outreach and missionary work, confining it to churches and other specific areas, and usually requiring permits. The "Yarovaya Packet" defines "failure to report crime" as a criminal act and sets the accountable age at 14 years for this and other "extremism" charges.63
Perhaps most notably, the "Packet" provides the Kremlin with broad oversight over the Internet domain. Under the law's provisions, individuals can now be charged for inciting or justifying terrorism, as well as proselytizing on social media and in emails. "Yarovaya" likewise grants security agencies full access to private communications, as well as requiring telecommunications companies to store all data for at least six months, including conversations and text messages. Meanwhile, "organizers of information distribution" are required to store data for one year and help decrypt information, if necessary.64
These "soft power" efforts have been mirrored by a more concrete organizational reconfiguration. In 2016, Russia created a new super-security service known as the National Guard, ostensibly to help the Kremlin better fight terrorism and organized crime.65 This body encompasses the country's riot police (OMON) and SWAT teams (SOBR), as well as other relevant units, and will work "in close cooperation" with the country's Ministry of Interior Affairs.66 However, experts note that this new, militarized structure will likely have little actual role fighting terrorism, because its forces are predominantly public security forces, trained to control and deter.67
Each of the North Caucasus Muslim republics has carried out its own, and often very different, policies to counter violent Islamism. While Chechnya's Kadyrov has carried out a more brutal policy, Ingushetia's President, Yunus bek Yevkurov, has pioneered a continuous amnesty or "adaptation" policy that seeks to draw fighters out of the forest and back to their families and civilian life by offering reduced or suspended sentences and educational and work opportunities.68 In 2010, Dagestan established an adaptation commission, which engages in the same work, and in 2011 Kabardino-Balkariya followed suit. In 2012, in an effort to isolate, divide, and rule radical Muslims, Dagestan's authorities helped establish a dialogue between the official Sufi-oriented Muslim Spiritual Administration of Dagestan and the republic's growing Salafi community, the main recruiting pool for the CE. These local policies are aimed at blunting the recruitment efforts of the CE and other radicals.
Nevertheless, recent years have seen a marked uptick in the radicalization and mobilization of elements of Russia's Muslim minority. This is attributable to a number of factors, ranging from a lack of economic integration and opportunity to rising state xenophobia to the growing prevalence of Islamist groups and ideas within the Russian Federation.69 This mobilization has been exacerbated by the Russian intervention into the Syrian civil war, which has made the country itself the target of various extremist groups. Al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (now rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), has called for terrorist attacks within Russia as a retaliatory measure.70 So, too, has the Islamic State; in November of 2015, the group released a video through its various social media feeds that warned "[w]e will take through battle the lands of yours we wish," and predicted that "[the] Kremlin will be ours."71 These threats have been followed by concrete incidents of terrorist violence within Russia (detailed above).
These statements highlight the risks inherent in Russia's current foreign policy. By wading into the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime, Russia's government has effectively exacerbated the mobilization—and the radicalization—of its own Muslims. The result could well be a surge of Islamism within, and against, the Russian Federation in the years ahead.
[1] The last official census of the Russian population was taken in 2010, and it tallied the national population at 142.9 million. See Vserosiiskii Perepis Naselenie 2010, http://www.perepis-2010.ru/. Since then, various numbers have been floated for the overall size of the Russian population – as well as the proportional size of its Muslim minority. The figures cited above are estimates deemed credible by the authors, but are subject to revision. On Russia's overall population (including the recently-annexed Crimean Peninsula), see Marlene Laruelle, "How Islam Will Change Russia," in Jamestown Foundation, Russia in Decline (forthcoming 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/marlene-laruelle-how-islam-will-change-russia/. The estimated size of Russia's Muslim minority is drawn from the authors' conversations with Russian officials in Washington, DC in the Fall of 2015.
[2] Andrew Higgins and Alan Cullison, "A Terrorist's Odyssey," Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2002; See also Yurii Tyssovskiy, "Terrorist No. 2 Al-Zawahiri spent time in Makhachkalinsky Prison," VEK, July 19, 2002.
[3] Faisal Devji, Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality, and Modernity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 130-131; Dore Gold, Hatred's Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2003), 137; and Gordon M. Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 36-37.
[4] Michael Reynolds, "False Comfort on Afghanistan," Middle East Strategy at Harvard, August 31, 2009; Mike Bowker, "Western Views Of The Chechen Conflict," in Richard Sakwa, ed., Chechnya: From Past to Future (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 235.
[5] Declassified DIA report NC 3095345, October 16, 1998. http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/102/dia.pdf; See also Lorenzo Vidino, Al-Qaeda in Europe (Prometheus Books, 2006).
[6] Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, 37-39 and 104-110.
[7] "Aslan Maskhadov: 'My sozdadim polnotsennoe Islamskoe Gosudarstvo," Kavkaz-Tsentr, March 8, 2010, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/03/08/71101.shtml; See also "Prezident ChRI Sheik Abdul-Khalim. Kto On?" Kavkaz-Tsentr, March 12, 2005, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2005/03/12/31285.shtml; "Abdallakh Shamil Abu-Idris: 'My oderzhali strategicheskuyu pobedu,'" Kavkaz-Tsentr, January 9, 2006, www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2006/01/09/40869.shtml; Paul Murphy, The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism (Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 2004), 171-75.
[8] Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, 43, 158; Vadim Rechkalov, "'Pochemu spetssluzhby ne mogut poimat' Shamilya Basaeva," Izvestiya (Moscow), December 6-10, 2004; "Shamil Basaev: 'Segodnya voyuet ves chechenskii narod,'" Kavkaz-Tsentr, August 17, 2005, www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2005/08/17/36759.shtml; Aleksandra Larintseva, Timur Samedov, and Olga Allenova, "Koltso kavkazskoi natsionalnosti," Kommersant-Vlast (Moscow), September 29-October 5 2003, 20; Valerii Khatazhukov, "Kabardino-Balkariya Crackdown on Islamists," IWPR'S Caucasus Reporting Service no. 199, August 2003; Mayrbek Vachagaev, "Evolution of the Chechen Jamaat," Jamestown Foundation Chechnya Weekly VI, iss. 14, April 6, 2005; Timur Samedov, "Podozrevaemyie iz 'Yarmuka'," Kommersant Daily (Moscow), December 15, 2004, 4.
[9] A detailed discussion of the 2003 suicide bombing campaign can be found in Yossef Bodansky, Chechen Jihad: Al Qaeda's Training Ground and the Next Wave of Terror (New York: Harper, 2007).
[10] See Robert Johnston, "Terrorist Attacks in Russia." May 22, 2015.http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/terr-russia.html
[11] Andrew E. Kramer and Neil McFarquhar, "Fierce Attack by Islamist Militants in Chechen Capital Kills at Least 20," New York Times, December 4, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/world/europe/grozny-chechnya-attack.html?_r=0.
[12] Daria Garmonenko, "FSB Sbila v Rossii Terroristichiskoyu Activnost (The FSB has Diminished Terrorist Activity in Russia)," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), November 11, 2015, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2015-11-11/100_fsbter.html.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Interview with Evgenia Albats, Ekho Moskvy, November 17, 2015, http://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/1659708-echo/.
[15] Michael Weiss, "Russia is Sending Jihadis to Join ISIS," The Daily Beast, August 23, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/23/russia-s-playing-a-double-game-with-islamic-terror0.html.
[16] Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, 63-64.
[17] Gordon Hahn, The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia's North Caucasus and Beyond. (McFarland and Company, Inc., 2014).
[18] "Khazbiev: chinovniki Ingushetii soderzhat boevikov," Kavkaz uzel, July 24, 2009, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/157053; Alexei Malashenko, "The Kremlin's Violent Underbelly," The Moscow Times, July 29, 2009.
[19] Pavel Khlebnikov, Razgovor s Varvarom: Besedy s chechenskim polevym komandirom Khozh-Akhmedom Nukhaevym o banditizme i islame (Moscow: Detektiv-Press, 2004); Paul Klebnikov, Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2001); A. Khinshtein, Berezovskii i Abramovich: Oligarkhi s bol'shoi dorogi (Moscow: Lora, 2007).
[20] Gordon Hahn, Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. August 2011), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110930_Hahn_GettingCaucasusEmirateRt_Web.pdf.
[21] "MVD RF: na Severnom Kavkaze deistvuyut okolo 500 boevikov," Kavkaz uzel, March 26, 2010,www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/167037/; "Yedelev: v Chechnye deistvuyut do 500 boevikov," Kavkaz uzel, January 21, 2009, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/148344; "MVD: v Chechnye deistvuyut ne menee 400 boevikov," Kavkaz uzel, February 6, 2008, www.kavkaz-uzel.ru; and "IMARAT KAVKAZ. Moskva pereschitala modzhakhedov. Ikh okazyvaetsya 1500 boitsov," Kavkaz-Tsentr, May 20, 2009, www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2009/05/20/65749.shtml.
[22] Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, 67-68.
[23] "Russia Calls for Joint Effort With U.S. to Fight Islamic State," The Moscow Times, September 29, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article.php?id=507990.
[24] "Moscow Says About 2,400 Russians Fighting With Islamic State: RIA," Reuters, September 18, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/moscow-says-2-400-russians-fighting-islamic-state-...
[25] Ivan Petrov, "MVD: Up to 3,500 Russians are fighting for the terrorists in Syria and Iraq," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 17, 2016. https://rg.ru/2016/03/17/mvd-na-storone-terroristov-v-sirii-i-irake-voiuiut-do-35-tys-rossiian.html.
[26] Ekaterina Sokirianskaya, "Russia's North Caucasus Insurgency Widens as ISIS Foothold Grows," World Politics Review, April 12, 2016, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18466/russia-s-north-caucasus-insurgency-widens-as-isis-foothold-grows.
[27] "Islamic State Declares Foothold in Russia's North Caucasus," The Moscow Times, June 24, 2015, https://themoscowtimes.com/news/islamic-state-declares-foothold-in-russias-north-caucasus-47666.
[28] "Треугольник Имарат Кавказ, Исламское Государство, аш-Шишани," МКРУ Дагестан, July 27, 2016, http://mkala.mk.ru/articles/2016/07/27/treugolnik-imarat-kavkaz-islamskoe-gosudarstvo-ashshishani.html.
[29] Lizzie Dearden, "ISIS Plane Attack," Independent (London), February 24, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-plane-attack-egypt-terrorists-downed-russian-metrojet-flight-from-sharm-el-sheikh-islamic-state-a6893181.html.
[30] Lizzie Dearden, "Isis claims responsibility for first terror attack in Russia after men try to kill police with gun and axes near Moscow," Independent (London). August 19, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-terror-attacks-news-latest-russia-moscow-balashikha-police-gun-axe-allegiance-video-chechen-a7198731.html.
[31] Dmitri Trenin, "Is Russia Safe From Extremist Attacks Like Those In Europe?" Newsweek, August 12, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/russia-really-safe-deadly-attacks-isis-france-belgium-germany-488262.
[32] Russian Federal Security Service, "Press Release: Russian FSB and MVD disrupt plans of IS conspirators in Dagestan," December 29, 2016. http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm%21id%3D10438055%40fsbMessage.html.
[33] Jonah Goldberg. "Al-Qaeda's out. ISIS is in!" National Review, June 12, 2015, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419657/al-qaedas-out-isis-jonah-goldberg.
[34] "Member of Extremist Organization, Uyghur-Bulgar Jamaat was Sentenced to 15 Years in a Camp." Kommersant (Moscow), July 20, 2009, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1207571.
[35] Vladislav Maltsev, "Bashkirian Jihad," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), September 1, 2010, http://www.ng.ru/society/2010-09-01/4_jihad.html.
[36] Leon Aron, "Russia is New Front for Militant Islam," Washington Post, November 13, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russias/2015/11/13/3f456156-887c-11e5-9a07-453018f9a0ec_story.html?utm_term=.c9f678c640bf.
[37] "Separatists in Tatarstan announce support of Islamist fighters in Syria," Regnum, June 13, 2013, https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1670767.html.
[38] "Special Agents of the FSB try to fight the UBJ," Komsolmoskaya Pravda, October 26, 2012, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1351234020. And for the Bulgar Jamaat's Russian-language website, see http://tawba.info orhttp://jamaatbulgar.narod.ru.
[39] See Gordon M. Hahn, Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia Report Nos. 43, 45, 47, 48, 58 and 60, available at https://csis.org/node/33013/publication. On the HuT's penetration of official Islamic structures, demonstrations, and automobile caravans in 2012 see, for example, Rais Suleimanov, "Al'yans vakhkhabizma n national-separtizma v Tatarstane i 'russkii vopros' v regione," RISI, May 2, 2012, http://www.gumilev-center.ru/alyans-vakhkhabizma-i-nacional-separatizma-v-tatarstane-i-russkijj-vopros-v-regione/ and Rais Suleimanov, "Islamskii terrorizm v sovremennom Tatarstane: vakhkhabizm na praktike," Agentsvo politicheskikh novostei, July 25, 2012, www.apn.ru/publications/article26923.htm; See also "V Kazani islamisty proekhali avtokolonnoi s razvernutymi flagami," Regnum.ru, October 26, 2012, www.regnum.ru/news/fd-volga/1586886.html.
[40] Memorial, "Persecution of Hizb ut-Tahrir," October 13, 2015, http://memohrc.org/special-projects/presledovanie-organizacii-hizb-ut-tahrir.
[41] Memorial, "Memorial recognizes 23 Muslims from Bashkotostan as political prisoners," April 26, 2016. http://memohrc.org/news/memorial-priznal-23-h-musulman-iz-bashkortostana-politzaklyuchennymi.
[42] Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, 213-214.
[43] For such contacts before 2005, see Hahn, Russia's Islamic Threat, 205-206.
[44] Neil Buckley, "Russia's Islamic Rebirth Adds Tension," Financial Times, October 28, 2005.
[45] Paul Goble, "7500 Mosques Have Been Erected Since Putin Became President," The Interpreter, December 4, 2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/7500-mosques-have-been-erected-in-russia-since-putin-became-president/.
[46] Abdullah Rinat Mukhametov, "Russian Muslims Face Challenges of Demography and Migration," New Eastern Europe, August 14, 2015, http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1690-russian-muslims-face-challenges-of-demography-and-migration.
[47] Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, "The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections for 2010–2030," January 27, 2011, http://www.pewforum.org/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-russia.aspx.
[48] "Muslim Birthrate Worries Russia," Washington Times, November 20, 2006, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/20/20061120-115904-9135r/?page=all.
[49] Jonah Hull, "Russia Sees Muslim Population Boom," Al-Jazeera (Doha), January 13, 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2007/01/2008525144630794963.html; "Cherez polveka Musulmani v Rossii Mogut Stat Bolshenstvom - Posol MID RF [In Half a Century, Muslims in Russia Could Become the Majority - Russia's OIC Ambassador]," Interfax (Moscow), October 10, 2007, http://www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/print.php?act=news&id=20767.
[50] "Russia Has 2nd Biggest Migrant Populace After U.S.," The Moscow Times, September 13, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-has-2nd-biggest-migrant-populace-after-us/485966.html.
[51] Although there are no exact figures on the number of converts, it is clear that a Russian/Slavic Islamic community is emerging. According to one report, almost 50 thousand people, mostly ethnic Russians and young women, converted to Islam in the city of Moscow alone from January 2002 to October 2004. This figure comes from a posting on a Qatar-based website IslamOnLine citing an anonymous source from the Council of Muftis of Russia cited in "S 2002 Islam v Moskve prinyali pochti 50 tys. chelovek," Islam.ru, October 7, 2004, www.islam.ru/press/rus/2004/10/07/. An ethnic Russian Muslim community emerged in Omsk in 2004. Aleksei Malashenko, "Shadow of Islam over Europe," International Affairs (Moscow) 50, no. 5 (September-October 2004), 70.
[52] See, for example, Rinat Bekkin, "Esly by ne krizis… R. Bekkin o roste interesa k islamskim finansam v Rossii," Islam.ru, n.d., www.islam.ru/pressclub/gost/esbikaznu/. Islam.ru is affiliated with the MSA of Dagestan and frequently carries articles and interviews on the subject, in particular those of a key lobbyist for the introduction of Islamic financing in Russia, Rinat Bekkin.
[53] Gordon M. Hahn, "Anti-Americanism, Anti-Westernism, and Anti-Semitism Among Russia's Muslims," Demokratizatsiya 16, no. 1 (Winter 2008), 49-60.
[54] David M. Herszenhorn, "Russia Sees a Threat in Its Converts to Islam," New York Times, July 1, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/world/russia-sees-a-threat-in-its-converts-to-islam.html.
[55] Russian Federation, Federal Law on Freedom of Religion and Religious Unity. 1997. http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102049359.
[56] Shireen Hunter, Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 54-55.
[57] A. Zhukov, "Kabardino-Balkariya: Na puti k katastrofe," Kavkaz-uzel, n.d., www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/analyticstext/analytics/id/1231255.html.
[58] Ravil Gainutdin, Islam v sovremennoi Rossii (Moscow: Fair Press, 2004), 264-297; Hahn,Russia's Islamic Threat, 183-186.
[59] "Rodnym obvinyaemykh v chlenstve v 'Khizb ut-takhrir' prishlos' proryvat'sya v zal suda," Islam.ru, February 27, 2009, www.islam.ru/rus/2009-02-27/; "V Chelyabinskoi oblasti predstanut pered sudom 5 'khizb ut-takhrirovtsev,'" Islam.ru, August 17, 2009, www.islam.ru/rus/2009-08-17/#27984.
[60] Valery Dzutsati. "Russian Expert Warns North Caucasus Faces Economic Recession." Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor 12, iss. 6, January 12, 2015, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-expert-warns-north-caucasus-faces-economic-recession-2/.
[61] Orysia Lutsevych, "The Long Arm of Russian "Soft" Power," The Atlantic Council, May 4, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-long-arm-of-russian-soft-power.
[62] "The Yarovaya Packet has been accepted into law," Meduza News. June 24, 2016, https://meduza.io/feature/2016/06/24/paket-yarovoy-prinyat-i-eto-ochen-ploho.
[63] Russian Federation, Federal Law #1039101-6 on Changing the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Criminal Procedural Code of the Russian Federation and Establishing Extra Counter-Terrorism Measures and Public Safety Guarantees, March 6, 2016.
[64] Russian Federation, Federal Law #1039149-6 on Changing Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and Establishing Extra Counter-Terrorism Measures and Public Safety Guarantees, March 6, 2016.
[65] Russian Federation, Federal Order on Questions of Federal Service of a National Guard, April 5, 2016.http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/51648
[66] Mark Galiotti, "Putin's New National Guard," In Moscow's Shadows, April 5, 2016, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2016/04/05/putins-new-national-guard-what-does-it-say-when-you-need-your-own-personal-army/.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Robert Coalson, Terrorist Wave Raises Doubts About Moscow's North Caucasus Strategy," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 16, 2011, http://www.rferl.org/a/doubts_about_moscow_north_caucasus_strategy/2311376.html.
[69] See generally Ilan Berman, Implosion: The End of Russia and What it Means for America (Regnery Publishing, 2013).
[70] Martin Chulov, "Syrian War's Al-Qaida Affiliate Calls for Terror Attacks in Russia," Guardian (London), October 13, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/syria-al-qaida-group-jabhat-al-nusra-terror-attacks-russia.
[71] Malia Zimmerman, "ISIS Coming for the Kremlin, New Video Warns," Fox News, November 12, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/11/12/new-isis-video-says-jihadis-coming-for-kremlin/.


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HSY for Kids and Parents
We are the only resource online dedicated to Higher Self Yoga practices to help children connect to their heart and their Wise Being within.
Our goal is to inform parents and caretakers on how to help children become one with the finer qualities such as joy, inner peace, beauty, patience and kindness. Ultimately, we believe this will help keep children focused and calm during times of adversity, and helps them be open to change. It frees them from emotions that block them from moving forward.
We believe when the Higher Self is activated, creativity, inspiration, intuition, and expression ignite. Connecting to the heart facilitates the connection to the Wise Being within. When we speak about connecting to the heart, we are not referring to the physical heart, but the heart chakra that contains inspiration, joy and wisdom. This section offers practices that will help children achieve such connections.
Please join us in this exploration. We welcome your comments, questions, reviews.
— Petal Steele, HSY Parents & Kids Editor

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Buyer (Lima)
Good morning,
Graduated with a Masters in International Purchases, I am looking for a job position in the Purchasing function in Lima.
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February 2018
UBS confirmed as one of the world's most sustainable companiesAfter being named leader in the diversified financials industry group of the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI) for thethird year running, UBS receives Gold Class Sustainability Award 2018 in RobecoSAM's 2018 Sustainability Yearbook.
November 2017
UBS recognized for leadership on climate actionUBS strengthened its status as a global business leader in the response to climate change after its position on the Climate A List was confirmed for the second year running by CDP, the non-profit global environmental disclosure platform.
September 2017
July 2017
April 2017
UBS joins global call for improved climate-related risk disclosureUBS joins the Alliance of CEO Climate Leaders, including heads of major global businesses in their call on G20 governments to act on the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board's (FSB) Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. The World Economic Forum has been supporting the TCFD process since it was established in 2015 and as a follow up the Forum is now mobilizing interested companies in the Alliance of CEO Climate Leaders.
Launch of the Social Investment ToolkitUBS and Ashoka have launched a Social Investment Toolkit, as part of our commitment to develop the growing social investment market. The Toolkit presents a series of modules that guide social entrepreneurs along the path of raising social investment and forms an integral part of the program's accelerator. It presents social entrepreneurs with key finance concepts, tips on what social investors are looking for, key items of information that social investors need in order to make an informed decision and tools and resources to produce items such as impact metrics, term sheets and financial models.
UBS pilots new Drought Stress Test ToolThe new Drought Stress Test Tool is a crucial step toward improved environmental risk management in the financial sector. The open-source tool, which is being launched at the Environmental Finance Conference in London today, is a major innovation that allows lenders to analyze drought risks for the first time. UBS partnered with financial institutions and environmental experts worldwide on the pilot project.
January 2017
UBS commits to help mobilize private wealth for public goodIn its white paper for the World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting in Davos, UBS unveils a blueprint for channelling private wealth towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) – one aspect of the WEF's Annual Meeting theme "responsive and responsible leadership".
November 2016
October 2016
UBS International Infrastructure Funds achieve top rankings in 2016 GRESB Infrastructure AssessmentUBS Asset Management's Infrastructure & Private Equity (I&PE) investment area has achieved recognition for two funds and three investee companies in the first GRESB Infrastructure Assessment.
UBS crowns APAC winner of UBS Social Innovators 2016UBS Social Innovators is UBS' signature global program that seeks to select high-potential social enterprises that are delivering innovative solutions to society's most pressing challenges and, over the course of a year, support them to scale up their operations and impact
September 2016
July 2016
UBS launches international search for trailblazing social innovatorsUBS Social Innovators will select high-potential social enterprises that address some of society's most pressing challenges and, over the course of a year, support them to scale up their operations and impact
June 2016
May 2016
April 2016
UBS raises record $471m for Oncology impact fundWorld's largest global wealth manager concludes fundraising for innovative impact investing fund aimed at developing cancer treatments


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Downey's Eleven:
1. Most embarrassing Bears vs. Cowboys statistic--go ahead, your choice:
Anthony Thomas, three carries, no yards.
Alex Brown, one tackle, no assists.
Downey's Eleven:
1. Most embarrassing Bears vs. Cowboys statistic--go ahead, your choice:
Anthony Thomas, three carries, no yards.
Alex Brown, one tackle, no assists.
Teams 3-for-27 on third down!
Paul Edinger, the first Dallas opponent since Nov. 23, 2003, to miss a field goal (30 in a row).
Adewale Ogunleye, one tackle, one assist.
Longest Bears drive: five plays, 29 yards.
Longest Bears possession: 3 minutes 50 seconds (6 plays, 14 yards, punt).
Bears' rushing average per carry: 2.5.
Bears' rushing totals for fourth quarter: 0-for-0. No attempts, no yards.
Number of passes caught by Bears wide receivers (David Terrell, Bobby Wade and Bernard Berrian): five.
Bears' red-zone efficiency: 0-for-0 (0 percent).
Nearest the Bears' offense came to red zone: Dallas 30, third quarter.
Nearest in fourth quarter: Dallas 49.
First-and-10 call from Cowboys' 40, last minute of first half: Jonathan Quinn is sacked, loss of 6.
First-and-10 from Cowboys' 41, two plays later: Quinn is sacked, fumbles. Marc Colombo recovers at Bears' 38.
Second-and-31: Colombo is penalized for false start.
Second-and-36: Quinn throws screen pass with 0:22 on clock. It is dropped . . . by Dexter Coakley, a Cowboy.
Third-and-36: Handoff to Thomas Jones, gain of 2.
Fourth-and-34: Brad Maynard makes his seventh punt of half.
I give up. That is about all I can bear.
2. As for those 1946 orange uniforms, I don't know if you remember "Willie Wonka and the Chocolate Factory," but to me the Bears looked like a bunch of Oompa Loompas.
3. One performance did stand out: "Lose My Breath" by Beyonce Knowles and Destiny's Child at halftime, with the singing group's fee donated to the Salvation Army's Red Kettle fund.
How did the Cowboys book the act? Maybe somebody knew somebody: Free safety Roy Williams is engaged to Destiny's Child's Kelly Rowland.
4. Ah, cruel irony.
Lovie Smith orders the Bears to lose weight before camp to get them fit, sharp, in the shape of their lives . . . then one by one, his top guys limp off the field or get driven off on a cart: Brian Urlacher, Rex Grossman, Mike Brown, Charles Tillman, Bobby Gray, Thomas Jones, Ruben Brown, Craig Krenzel, John Tait, Tommie Harris . . . this might be the NFL's most unfit team. I mean it. These are the Cubs in shoulder pads.
P.S.: Beyonce could be a Bear. At a recent concert, she hurt a hamstring.
5. At Tiki Bob's Cantina in the wee hours of Thanksgiving morn, Michael Olowokandi of the Minnesota Timberwolves was zapped twice with a stun gun by Indianapolis cops when he allegedly refused to leave. Man, when Tiki Bob says "last call," he means it.
6. At Poipu Bay on the isle of Kauai, Hawaii, meantime, golf's Phil Mickelson not only shot a 59 Wednesday . . . he missed a 9-foot putt for a 58.
I'm pleased for Mickelson. The closest I saw him get to a 59 at the Ryder Cup tournament near Detroit was when a tee shot of his nearly nailed a passing '59 Chevy.
7. As a practical joke, 28 football players from Florida Atlantic--all seniors--punked the coach by skipping practice. Hilarious! What scamps.
An unamused Howard Schnellenberger says all 28 must sit out Saturday's game. Darn it, that old skip-practice trick never works. Next time, the exploding cigar!
8. Yes, to all my old pals who went to USC, I have begged my newspaper to stop referring to you as "Southern Cal," but nobody listens.
Good luck against Notre Dame. If you don't win, you could end up being Michigan's opponent in the Rose Bowl instead of, you know, Northern Cal.
9. Piece of advice to Tyrone Willingham of the Fighting Irish: Do not try to motivate your guys Saturday by having the team wear orange.
10. A diamond worth $200,000 or more "the size of a shirt button," according to a Jaguar spokesman, was mounted in the nose cone of 20-year-old Christian Klien's car at the Monaco Grand Prix to plug the upcoming jewel-heist film "Ocean's Twelve."
Klien crashed his Jag into a barrier, and no one can find the 106-carat rock.
No similar stunt is currently under consideration for the upcoming name change of this column.
11. Utah Jazz loses to Chicago Bulls? Good thing its fans don't drink beer.


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Devin Zugic grew up in Riverside, IL and attended Riverside High School. During his high school career, Devin was an active athlete, and played on the Varsity Tennis and Varsity Basketball teams. Motivated to develop his career and pursue his goals, Devin began working as early as his junior year in high school, holding jobs in retail sales.
Devin's first position was with Sprint PCS in the winter of 1999 as a retail sales-person, selling digital plans and contracts directly to customers on the open floor. After holding the position for nearly a year, Devin left Sprint to enjoy his first summer off as a high school student during his summer before his senior year and spent his time traveling around the country to see the many beautiful landscapes of the United States. The following fall, Devin landed a position with WTTW Store of Knowledge in the Chicago area as a customer service representative. While there, Devin honed his skills working directly with customers and learning the basics of being an account sales-person and an account manager. It was here that he determined that his professional aspirations were to be in sales and consulting.
Though Devin had determined his career aspirations, he was unsure of how to go about achieving the goal. Though getting a college education was important to him and his family, Devin had always had a burning desire to join the military and serve his country. After graduating high school, Devin determined that he was going to go into the military, and upon his 19th birthday, Devin enlisted to serve in the Air Force, as his step father had done. Devin enlisted for a 6-year term.
After his term in the Air Force, Devin decided to pursue a college education, made infinitely cheaper through military education subsidization. While on active duty, Devin had already began taking classes at Ridgewood Community College in Illinois in 2005, and determined that he wanted to study accounting. In the Spring of 2008, after his tour of active duty had ended, Devin transferred to Illinois State University. However, he had determined that his course of study was not best achieved at Illinois State, and after a semester, set up to transfer out of the university. He transferred back to Ridgewood Community College, he started a company called Finest Promotions, a promotions company for the Chicago nigh life scene. He went on to finish his Associate Degree at Ridgewood and applied to DePaul University to get a Bachelors Degree. He was accepted, and began his study there in the Fall of 2010, where he received high marks for the remainder of his tenure. Devin graduated with a BA in Accounting in June 2012 and moved to San Diego, CA soon after to pursue his career as an accounting consultant.
Devin still resides in San Diego.


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Geauga County Probate/Juvenile Court Judge Timothy J. Grendell has been named as the new president of the Ohio Association of Juvenile Court Judges.
Of his new role, Grendell said, "My goal is to expand the association's public education efforts, which will help strengthen Ohioans' confidence in the juvenile justice system and highlight the dedication of all juvenile court judges across the state, to not only provide equal and fair justice, but to help the children and families who come before them every day."
The association consists of common pleas judges having juvenile court jurisdiction across the state of Ohio, and addresses issues affecting juvenile abuse, dependency and neglect; unruly juveniles (status offenders); and juvenile delinquency, as well as court administration aspects of these issues. The group works closely with the Ohio Judicial Conference Juvenile Law and Procedure Committee on legislative issues affecting juvenile courts.
Grendell also serves as the presiding judge of Geauga County Common Pleas Court, as secretary/historian of the Ohio Probate Judges Association, and as an executive board member of the Ohio Judicial Conference.
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Sharon Kennedy swore in Grendell Nov. 30 at the association's annual winter meeting in Columbus.


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UN defends Ban Ki-moon against rights 'cowardice' claim
The UN has defended its Secretary General Ban Ki-moon over accusations that he has failed to speak out over human rights issues.
Mr Ban has been singled out for harsh criticism by Human Rights Watch in its annual report.
The group said he had been "notably reluctant to put pressure on abusive governments".
Mr Ban's office denied this, saying he used both quiet diplomacy and public pressure to promote human rights.
But HRW says it wants its annual report to draw attention to "the failure of the expected champions of human rights" to defend those rights and stand up to abusive governments.
While there is "nothing inherently wrong with dialogue and cooperation to promote human rights", the group says, there was a danger that it could become "a charade designed more to appease critics of complacency than to secure change".
"Whether out of calculation or cowardice, many [UN Security] Council members promote dialogue and cooperation as a universal prescription without regard to whether a government has the political will to curtail its abusive behavior."
The BBC's Barbara Plett at the UN says Mr Ban's style has been more discreet than that of his predecessor Kofi Annan. He has often often opted to work behind the scenes to pressure governments on human rights issues.
But HRW says Mr Ban's "disinclination to speak out about serious human rights violators means he is often choosing to fight with one hand tied behind his back".
It says that while Mr Ban has made strong comments on human rights when visiting, for example, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, he has failed to do so with Chinese officials.
HRW also says Mr Ban appeared to have "placed undue faith in his professed ability to convince by private persuasion", citing his discussions with leaders including Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Burma's military leader Than Shwe and Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
Mr Ban's spokesman Farhan Haq defended the secretary general's record, saying he did speak publicly about human rights when he visited some of those countries named by HRW.
"In each case he makes a strategic decision on the most effective to way to secure respect for HR [human rights] and accountability," said Mr Haq.
"The record shows he has achieved results through both quiet diplomacy and public pressure."
Mr Haq cited the freeing of a jailed gay couple in Malawi as one example where quiet diplomacy had proved successful.
The EU also comes under fire in the report - HRW says it has "become particularly infatuated with the idea of dialogue and cooperation" and criticises foreign policy chief Baroness Ashton, "for repeatedly expressing a preference for 'quiet diplomacy' regardless of the circumstances".
Meanwhile US President Barack Obama is accused of lacking his "famed eloquence" when defending human rights in bilateral contexts with China, India and Indonesia, and of failing to ensure other areas of US government "convey strong human rights messages consistently".


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Kacey Musgraves
Golden Hour LP
Vinyl Color:
Disc 1 Translucent Red/ Blue Split Color (Side A Red Center Label, Side B Blue Center Label)
Disc 2: Translucent Gold/Green Split Color (Side C Gold Center Label)
- Lacquers made by Lucky Lacquers
- Matte Gatefold Jacket with UV Spot
- Includes "Blind" the bonus track on the original pressing
- D Side Frog Etching
- New Gatefold artwork layout
- First time on vinyl in USA!
Third Pressing - SOLD OUT
180 Gram Translucent Blue w/ Blue Frog Center Label (LTD 1,500)
180 Gram Golden Yellow w/ Yellow Frog Center Label (LTD 2,500)
Second Pressing - SOLD OUT
180 Gram Clear Red &Orange w/ Red Orange Frog Center Label (LTD 1,000)
First Pressing - SOLD OUT
Neon Green (LTD 500)
180 Gram Black (LTD 500)
Clear (LTD 250, Subscription Exclusive)
Current pressing is on 180 Gram Yellow w/ Yellow Frog Center label, limited to 2,500 copies
Frogstomp is the debut album of Australian rock band Silverchair. It was released in Australia in early 1995, when the members were only 15 years of age, by Murmur Records and reached number one on the album charts. On 20 June 1995, Frogstomp was released by Epic Records in the U.S. and has been certified double platinum by the RIAA.
Requires a Spotify© account. This is an auto generated widget from Spotify© using this product's information. This is intended for reference only and does not represent the track listing or content of this product.


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Christ Church is very pleased to facilitate the taking of degrees by members of the House and looks forward to welcoming its graduands to celebrate this important achievement.
The academic arrangements, including formal submission of degree candidates to the University at the Sheldonian Theatre, are undertaken by the Censors of Degrees, who are currently Dr Ronald Truman and Professor Judith Pallot.
The organisational and hospitality arrangements are currently made through the Academic Administrator, Miss Sarah Hope, Censors' Office (tel.: 01865 286574, e-mail: email@example.com)
Booking a Degree Ceremony
Current Undergraduate and Postgraduate taught students will receive an email invitation in November of their final year inviting them to log into the eVision degree ceremonies booking system.
Research students granted leave to supplicate will receive an email invitation with information about booking a degree ceremony.
Students who have already completed their course (or wish to have their MA conferred in person) may request to be put on the waiting list for their preferred degree date. If you would like to receive a waiting list request form and further information about the dates Christ Church is presenting candidates at, please email Sarah Hope.
It is possible to be awarded a degree "in absentia" (i.e., without being present at the ceremony). If you wish to have a degree conferred in this manner, you must notify Sarah Hope, the Academic Administrator, a month before the date of the intended degree ceremony.
Please note that a candidate may be presented in person for only one degree at each ceremony. This will normally be the superior of the degrees for which he or she is eligible. A candidate may, however, be awarded other degrees in absentia at the same ceremony at which a degree is also awarded in person.
Once a candidate's name has been entered, he or she may not withdraw from the ceremony. If a candidate is unable to be present having been entered, the degree will be conferred in absentia.
Academic Dress
Graduands are required to wear academic dress with sub-fusc clothing.
Please note: the Vice-Chancellor and Proctors have recently informed all colleges that they intend to be strict about enforcing correct dress at degree ceremonies, even to the point of denying graduands entry to the Sheldonian Theatre if they are not correctly dressed. Hence, in order that the degree day of Christ Church graduands should not be marred (it would not be in the power of the Censors of degrees to make ad hoc relaxations), graduands are urged to follow the dress code below meticulously.
1. Dark suit
2. Dark socks
3. Black shoes
4. Plain white collared shirt
5. White bow tie
1. Dark skirt with black tights or stockings, or dark trousers with dark socks
2. Black shoes
3. White blouse or plain white collared shirt
4. Black ribbon or white bow tie
Although recent changes made by the university to sub-fusc regulations allow it, Christ Church would wish the wearing of black bow ties or black neck ties to be avoided.
Any queries about the dress code may be addressed to Sarah Hope.
The College will be pleased to arrange for the hire of any gowns you may require. A guide to the correct gowns for each degree can be found here.
For undergraduate degrees (BA, BFA, Undergraduate Masters) – upon entering the ceremony, graduands will be required to wear the commoner's or scholar's gown together with the academic cap and sub-fusc (as above). On conferment of the degree the BA/BFA gown and hood is assumed.
For higher degrees – upon entering the ceremony, graduands will be required to wear either the graduate gown or gown/and hood of their present Oxford degree status together with the academic cap and sub-fusc (as above). On conferment of the degree the appropriate gown/and hood is assumed.
For MA degrees – upon entering the ceremony, graduands will be required to wear the BA gown and hood together with the academic cap and sub-fusc (as above). On conferment of the degree the MA gown and hood is assumed.
Arrangements on the Day:
Spectators at the Ceremony
Relatives and friends may attend the ceremony but space is limited and tickets are required for all ceremonies. The number of spectator tickets available to each graduand is indicated on the table on the main Degree Days webpage.
The University advise that the ceremony is not suitable for children under the age of seven. Doors open about half an hour before the ceremony and it is advisable to arrive in good time. Guests will be directed by the Security staff on the door.
Gillman and Soame will be covering the degree days and will be taking photographs at Christ Church immediately after lunch.
After the Degree Ceremony in the Sheldonian Theatre, or Examination Schools, the pleasure of the company of new graduands is requested at luncheon on the invitation of the Governing Body. We hope that graduands will be able to stay for lunch. Guest places at lunch are, however, limited and priority is given to (up to three) guests of those having an undergraduate degree conferred. Occasionally a further guest place may be available. Also, whenever possible, the guests of other graduands are accommodated, though availability may not be known until a week or two in advance of the occasion. We shall do all we can to welcome as many guests as possible, subject always to the limits of space available.
Different arrangements apply to the large Christ Church specific degree day at the beginning of May when it is possible to offer hospitality to all graduands and their three guests in Hall.
Preliminary drinks are served from 1.00 pm, with luncheon following at 1.30 pm.
Data Protection
Graduands, guests, and staff attending should be aware that graduation ceremonies are regarded as public events. Names and degrees of graduands are published in the graduate programme. Audio and visual images of the ceremony are publicly available via the sale of personalised videos of the ceremony.
Degree Certificates
Once you have your degree conferred at a degree ceremony either in person or in absentia, you will automatically receive a Degree Certificate. This will be sent to you by recorded delivery. It is essential that you put the address to which you would like your certificate posted on your degree ceremony booking form.
If you have passed your examinations and have not had your degree conferred at a degree ceremony, or if you have attended a ceremony but require proof of your award to present to a third party, you can request a Degree Confirmation letter free of charge. This statement is on official University letter-headed paper. This will state that you have successfully completed your course at Oxford, the date when this happened, and show the classification you received (e.g. First, 2:1, 2:2, Third).
The name which you held during your course of study will be the name on the Degree Certificate and Confirmation of Degree statement. The only retrospective changes that can be made are where an administrative error has occurred or where we are required to make a retrospective change under the provisions of the Gender Recognition Act 2004.
If you have changed your name following completion of your course of study (for example, through marriage, or by Deed Poll) and wish to demonstrate to a prospective employer or education institution that your Degree Certificate belongs to you, supporting documentation showing the name change should accompany the Certificate.
For full details on degree certificates please see the Examination School website.
MA Degrees
BA and BFA graduands are entitled to proceed in due course to the MA degree, which may be taken seven years following original matriculation (in or after the 21st term from matriculation). Please note that this does not apply to those who take undergraduate Masters degrees (e.g. M.Eng, MMaths, M.PhysPhil, MChem, MBiochem, MPhys).
A £40 fee is payable. MAs are automatically members of the Convocation, conferring certain voting rights (e.g. in the election of the Chancellor of the University). Members of the House who are members of Convocation are also entitled to dine at High Table by implied invitation, and at their own request and modest expense, provided arrangements are made in advance with the Steward's Office.
Bookings for MA conferrals are made in the same way as all other degrees.


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Need an Exchange API from UK
Ngân sách $250-750 USD
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text:
NolaPro Free Web-Based Accounting
On this page
NolaPro v4.0 is a free web-based ERP, Accounting and Inventory Suite. It installs quickly on your own PC for secure access worldwide via the web. Also includes standard accounting modules as well as order entry, inventory tracking, full payroll services, and plug-ins such as POS, a business-to-business web portal, and an editable Ecom shopping cart. The robust, flexible interface provides user-customizable options for colors, icon sets, menu...
Read more
- Rate:
- License:Freeware
- Category:Miscellaneous
- Developer:Noguska LLC
- Downloads:134
- Size:32 Mb
- Price: Free
To free download a trial version of NolaPro Free Web-Based Accounting, click here
To visit developer homepage of NolaPro Free Web-Based Accounting, click here
Screen Shot
Click on a thumbnail for the larger image.
System Requirements
NolaPro Free Web-Based Accounting requires 2000 XP:Home XP:Pro.
NolaPro Free Web-Based Accounting Copyright
Shareware Junction periodically updates pricing and software information of NolaPro Free Web-Based Accounting full version from the publisher using pad file and submit from users. Software piracy is theft, Using crack, password, serial numbers, registration codes, key generators, cd key, hacks is illegal and prevent future development of NolaPro Free Web-Based Accounting Edition. Download links are directly from our publisher sites. Links NolaPro Free Web-Based Accounting from Bittorrent, mediafire.com, uploadfiles.com, hotfiles.com rapidshare.com, megaupload.com, netload.in, storage.to, depositfiles.com and other files hosting are not allowed. The download file is obtained directly from the publisher, not from any Peer to Peer file sharing applications such as Shareaza, Limewire, Kazaa, Imesh, eDonkey, eMule, Ares, BearShare, Overnet, Morpheus, BitTorrent Azureus and WinMX.
Review This Software
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I put my old "prom" (vanhojen tanssi) dress on and my boyfriend Asko took some pics of me. Here are a few pics below. Surprisingly the dress still suits me although it was tailored for me in Estonia when I was 16 or 17. Before our little photoshoot I did some violence to the dress and cut the cleavage lower :-o at age 30 you can allow yourself more cleavage than age 16 ;)
Askos website: www.askojonathan.com


text:
Positioned based on completeness of vision and ability to execute
Irvine, CA - February 7, 2013 - Alteryx, Inc., the leading provider of Strategic Analytics software, today announced it has been positioned within the 2013 Business Intelligence and Analytics Magic Quadrant* by Gartner Inc., the world's leading information technology research and advisory company.
"Placement in the Gartner BI and Analytics Platform Magic Quadrant affirms our charge to Humanize Big Data. We are delivering a platform that simplifies access to data and strategic analytics for line of business analysts and business leaders," said Dean Stoecker, CEO of Alteryx. "We believe our position is a reflection of the incredible work that the Data Artisans in our customers such as Experian, Time Warner Cable, Kaiser Permanente, and McDonalds' do every day."
A pioneer in Big Data analytics, Alteryx empowers analysts and Data Artisans to rapidly analyze any combination of type or source of data to create sophisticated analytics without needing to have a Ph.D., and then delivers analytic applications to business decision makers.
"This year Alteryx turned proprietary, black-box analytics on its head with the introduction of the Alteryx Analytics Gallery – the app store for Big Data – enabling strategic decision making reusable analytic applications," said George Mathew, president and COO of Alteryx. "We believe our trajectory and velocity in the Gartner BI and Analytics Platform Magic Quadrant is an indicator of how dramatically this market is being disrupted."
The annual Business Intelligence and Analytics Magic Quadrant by Gartner report presents a global view of Gartner's opinion of software vendors that should be considered by organizations seeking to use business intelligence (BI) and analytics platforms. The report evaluated 24 different software vendors and placed Alteryx in the quadrant based on its completeness of vision and ability to execute.
*Gartner, Inc., Magic Quadrant for Business Intelligence and Analytics Platforms, Kurt Schlegel, Rita L. Sallam, Daniel Yuen, and Joao Tapadinhas, February 5, 2013.
About Alteryx
Alteryx provides an indispensable and easy-to-use analytics platform for enterprise companies making critical decisions that drive their business strategy and growth. Alteryx Strategic Analytics runs analytic applications that empower executives to identify and seize market opportunities, outsmart their competitors, increase customer loyalty and drive more revenue. It Humanizes Big Data by enabling business analysts and Data Artisans to combine Big Data with market knowledge, location insight, and business intelligence; easily perform predictive and spatial analytics; and produce analytic apps that can be shared via the private cloud or the Alteryx Analytics Gallery public cloud. Customers like Experian Marketing Services and McDonald's rely on Alteryx daily. Headquartered in Irvine, California, and with offices in Boulder and Silicon Valley, Alteryx empowers 250+ customers and 200,000+ users worldwide. Visit Alteryx, the leader in Strategic Analytics, today at www.alteryx.com or call 1-888-836-4274.
About the Magic Quadrant
Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publications, and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner's research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.
Media Contact:
Brandy S. Baxter
Alteryx, Inc.
Office: 650-375-2907
Email: firstname.lastname@example.com
Twitter: @brandysbaxter


text:
The BarCloud asset tracking system was so user-friendly and easy to follow that we just gave it to end users and just asked them to start using it
San Jose, California (PRWEB) September 10, 2014
TelePacific Communications, the largest competitor to AT&T and Verizon in California and Nevada for small and medium-sized businesses, wanted to improve inventory and asset control. Specifically, they wanted a cloud-based solution that could track items in real time using barcodes. TelePacific now fully implemented ASAP Systems' BarCloud inventory and asset tracking system.
"BarCloud was so user-friendly and easy to follow that we just gave it to end users and just asked them to start using it," says Mukesh Tikarya, VP of Internal Audit at TelePacific Communications.
Using the BarCloud mobile app on smartphones, compared to a desktop inventory application, allowed TelePacific to take advantage of the user-friendly and easily configurable online system. The organization saved money by eliminating the need to purchase barcode-scanning equipment. Additionally, the company received further savings on employee training since the system was intuitive; it required no user training at all to begin tracking inventory.
BarCloud also minimized the risk of data entry errors and reduced internal inventory control gaps that Tikarya and his team had been experiencing. The new system made it easy to account for inventory throughout its lifecycle (purchase date to when it was moved to technician's trucks or was installed off-site for a client).
"The best things about BarCloud are that it is cloud-based and very fast. Plus, it is very user-friendly," added Tikarya, referring to the performance and the effortlessness of BarCloud.
About ASAP Systems
ASAP Systems is a market leader in inventory management and asset tracking systems that uses barcode and RFID technology with barcode scanners, smartphones, and tablets. We help improve profitability by eliminating manual data entry, paper files, and forms and by automating record keeping. With our online inventory and asset system, businesses know 24/7 how and where assets and inventory are received, stored, used and disposed of in the warehouse, in the field, and in the office.
About TelePacific Communications
Telepacific is a multiple award-winning network and communications service provider to more than 40,000 businesses nationwide. The company owns and operates extensive network assets including 50,000 fiber strand miles, a Juniper and Cisco-powered MPLS IP network, four datacenters and nearly 400 colocations in 273 wire centers throughout the Southwestern and Western United States.


text:
- 1 Indian Navy SSR Exam syllabus 2015
- 2 Indian Navy SSR Syllabus Exam Pattern 01/2016
- 3 Indian Navy SSR Exam Pattern 01/2016
- 4 Indian Navy SSR Physical Fitness Test (PFT)
- 5 Indian Navy SSR Medical Standards
- 6 Indian Navy SSR Visual Standards
- 7 Preparation Books for Indian Navy SSR Exam 01/2016 Batch
- 8 Related Posts
Indian Navy SSR Exam syllabus recruitment SSR 01/2016 Batch Indian Navy Sailor SSR Exam 2015 Syllabus, Sample Papers And Books www.nausena-bharti.nic.in
Name of Exam: Senior Secondary Recruits (SSR) Exam -01/2016 BATCH
Conducting Authority: Indian Navy (Nausena Bharti)
Selection Procedure :- Selection of recruits is based on the order of merit on their performance in Written Test, qualifying Physical Fitness Test (PFT) and fitness in the Medical Examinations.
1. Written Exam
2. PFT (Physical Fitness Test)
3. Medical Exam
The written exam shall be an objective type test having multiple choice based questions on the following main sections: The question paper will comprise of four sections i.e. English, Science,Mathematics and General Knowledge.
- Section I: English
- Section II: Science
- Section III: Mathematics and
- Section IV: General Knowledge
There will be three stages in the SSR exam as stated above to be qualified for all the candidates applying in the concerned entrance exam.
- The question paper will be bilingual (Hindi & English) and objective type.
- The question paper will comprise of four sections i.e. English, Science,Mathematics and General Knowledge.
- The standard of the question paper will be that of 10+2 and the syllabus for the examination is available on website www.joinindiannavy.gov.in.
- Duration of examination will be one hour.
- The candidates are required to pass in all sections and in aggregate.
- PFT will consist of 1.6 Km run to be completed in 7
- 20 squat ups (Uthak Baithak)
- 10Push-ups
- Candidates undergoing PFT will do so at their own risk
(a) Medical examination will be conducted by authorised military doctors as permedical standard prescribed in current regulations applicable to sailors on entry.
(b) Minimum height 157 cms. Weight and Chest should be proportionate. Minimum Chest expansion of 5 cms.
(c) The candidate must be in good physical and mental health, free from any defect likely to interfere with the efficient performance of duties both ashore and afloat under peace as well as war conditions as per Navy Order (Special) 01/2008.
(d) Initial Medical Examination for recruitment will be considered only "Provisionally fit subject to fitness in the final medical examination". Final Medical Examination of all selected candidate will be done at INS Chilka. Candidates who are found medically fit at final medical examination will be enrolled for training. No "Appeal" is permitted for review after the final enrolment medical examination at INS Chilka.
Note:- Candidates are advised to get their ears cleaned for wax and tartar removed from teeth prior to examination.
Without Glasses :-
- Better Eye – 6/6
- Worse Eye – 6/9
With Glasses :-
- Better Eye – 6/6
- Worse Eye – 6/9
- Indian Navy (SSR) Sailor Recruitment Exam Guide; Publisher: Ramesh
- Indian Navy (SSR) Sailor Recruitment Exam (Hindi) Guide; Publisher: Ramesh
Click Here to download Navy Sailors Syllabus SSR 01/2016


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