text:
Error messages seem like an unimportant and incredibly boring part of crafting a user experience. But the tonality of error messages can swing the experience around from an almost certain abandonment to a conversion.
Some years ago, while checking in at the airport in Stockholm on my way to the U.S., I asked the woman at the counter if it would be possible to get an upgrade to business class. Her response: "I'm sorry, but that's not possible. You would have to pay extra for that." Checking in for the return flight, I tried the same thing again, but this time the answer was: "Of course, sir! How would you like to pay for that?"
So even though the seat availability and possibility for an upgrade was the same, I got two completely different answers: one "yes" and one "no."
The reason this happened is partly due to the general American "yes we can" attitude and sales-oriented business culture. I'm also pretty certain that it didn't happen by chance. Airlines put great effort into training their staffs to give customers positive service experiences. Part of this training is dedicated to the handling of exceptions—what happens if the customer asks for this, complains about that, refuses to do this, etc.
As a result, over the past few decades, airlines and other large service-oriented organizations have accumulated a huge body of knowledge dedicated to handling customer service exceptions. But then these organizations shifted more and more of their services to digital touchpoints, and all this customer service knowledge went into the trash bin.
Instead of ensuring the transition of great customer experiences from the physical world into digital interfaces, the service pros left it to the IT people to figure out. And those IT people seemed to have spent 99% of their effort on what happens when everything goes as planned. Some intern was given the task of writing error messages in the unlikely event that something would go wrong.
Let's look at some examples:
If I forget to fill out the departure date field when booking a trip on BA.com, I get this:
If I try to log into FedEx.com without providing a username, it tells me:
And when I go to Merrill Lynch's website, I get this message when I arrive:
The commonality among these three examples is they start with a very negative word: "Error," "Incorrect," and "Incompatible". This is the equivalent of the "no" I got from the Swedish airline agent when I asked her about upgrading. It's basically a slap to the user's face.
How to Write Error Messages that Say "Yes!"
Writing error messages that carry a positive tone isn't rocket science. Just follow a few simple rules:
- First, get rid of tech lingo such as "incompatible." Most users won't know what this means. Speak to them in their own language and not the language of your developers. For example, "incompatible" translates to "does not work together" in plain English.
- Don't use negative words like the ones I've pointed out.
- Clearly identify the error so the user knows what to correct.
- Give the user a hint of how the problem can be solved.
- Put the blame on yourself, not on the user.
The examples earlier in this article each break most of these rules.
For example, both BA and FedEx failed to accurately tell me what went wrong. They told me that the format and data that I entered was incorrect, but the real problem was that I didn't enter any data.
Budget.com, on the other hand, does a great job with error messages. I entered "Londdon" as my pickup location and got this error message:
First they told me what I did wrong: "You entered Londdon…" Then they put the blame on themselves: "We are not sure what location you are searching for…" Finally, they gave me a list of ideas for what I could try instead.
What BA, FedEx and Merrill Lynch Should Have Done
Now that you're armed with some new ideas, let's try rewriting the bad error messages.
"Oops, you didn't enter a departure date. Please use the calendar to select a date for your departure flight."
Note: If you want to live by rule #5 (take the blame), then a something like "We couldn't figure out the departure date" would be better than "you didn't enter a departure date," but in this case it would be misleading and give the user the idea they actually did input something. In this case I would prefer giving an accurate error description over taking the blame.
"Oops, you didn't enter a username. Please fill in your username, or click here if you've forgotten your username."
Merrill Lynch
"Our site works best with browsers other than the one you're using. You can download a different web browser here. You can continue using this browser, but be aware that some features might not be available. We apologize for this inconvenience."
Use a Customer Service Number as a Final Point of Recovery
When we reviewed the error messages of one of my clients, we found there were some errors that could not be recovered from online. The user would have to get in contact with the call center to find a way out.
Most of the messages for these errors made no mention of that. Some did, but the reference to customer service was general and vague: "Please contact our customer service," for example.
The revised messages we develop had a call-to-action and the call center telephone number explicitly stated in the message: "Sorry, but we're unable complete this request. Please call 1-800-XXXXXX immediately and we will do our very best to help you."
Getting Great Error Messages In Place
I believe the shortcomings in this area are largely an effect of the "Digital Divide" between sales/marketing and IT. Sales and marketing have no insight into how, when, or where these messages occur. IT doesn't understand the importance of shaping them correctly.
So in order to get it straight, sales and marketing must start taking an interest in the issue. A good starting point is for them to "take their own medicine." I usually tell all my clients to fill out all their own forms on a regular basis with all kinds of stupid inputs just to see what happens. Put yourself in the shoes of your visitor and ask, "Would this seem friendly and relevant to me at this point?"
As well, IT must let sales and marketing into the game and understand that they can have very valuable input into crafting a positive customer experience.
So get together, and get on the road to giving your users positive and useful messages when something goes wrong. Because things do go wrong, no matter how hard you and your users try.


text:
- Pharmacy
- Prescription Services
- New Prescription
- Refill Prescription
- Transfer Prescription
- Diabetic Supplies
- Over the Counter
- Home Medical
- Pets
IMPORTANT: HOW TO USE THIS INFORMATION: This is a summary and does NOT have all possible information about this product. This information does not assure that this product is safe, effective, or appropriate for you. This information is not individual medical advice and does not substitute for the advice of your health care professional. Always ask your health care professional for complete information about this product and your specific health needs.
COMMON BRAND NAME(S): Zebeta
WARNING: Do not stop taking this medication without consulting your doctor. Some conditions may become worse when you suddenly stop this drug. Some people who have suddenly stopped taking similar drugs have had chest pain, heart attack, and irregular heartbeat. If your doctor decides you should no longer use this drug, he or she may direct you to gradually decrease your dose over 1 to 2 weeks. When gradually stopping this medication, it is recommended that you temporarily limit physical activity to decrease strain on the heart. Seek immediate medical attention if you develop chest pain/tightness/pressure, chest pain spreading to the jaw/neck/arm, unusual sweating, trouble breathing, or fast/irregular heartbeat.
USES: Bisoprolol is used with or without other medications to treat high blood pressure (hypertension). Lowering high blood pressure helps prevent strokes, heart attacks, and kidney problems. This medication belongs to a class of drugs known as beta blockers. It works by blocking the action of certain natural chemicals in your body such as epinephrine on the heart and blood vessels. This effect lowers the heart rate, blood pressure, and strain on the heart.
OTHER USES: This section contains uses of this drug that are not listed in the approved professional labeling for the drug but that may be prescribed by your health care professional. Use this drug for a condition that is listed in this section only if it has been so prescribed by your health care professional. This drug may also be used to treat mild to moderate heart failure.
HOW TO USE: See also Warning section. Take this medication by mouth with or without food, usually once a day or as directed by your doctor. Dosage is based on your medical condition and response to treatment. Use this medication regularly to get the most benefit from it. To help you remember, take it at the same time each day. For the treatment of high blood pressure, it may take several weeks before you get the full benefit of this drug. It is important to continue taking this medication even if you feel well. Most people with high blood pressure do not feel sick. Tell your doctor if your condition does not improve or if it worsens (for example, your blood pressure readings remain high or increase).
SIDE EFFECTS: See also Warning and Precautions sections. Tiredness, slow heartbeat, and dizziness may occur. If any of these effects persist or worsen, tell your doctor or pharmacist promptly. To lower your risk of dizziness and lightheadedness, get up slowly when rising from a sitting or lying position. This drug may reduce blood flow to your hands and feet, causing them to feel cold. Smoking may worsen this effect. Dress warmly and avoid tobacco use. Remember that your doctor has prescribed this medication because he or she has judged that the benefit to you is greater than the risk of side effects. Many people using this medication do not have serious side effects. Tell your doctor immediately if any of these unlikely but serious side effects occur: very slow heartbeat, severe dizziness, fainting, blue fingers/toes, trouble breathing, mental/mood changes (such as confusion, mood swings, depression). Although this medication may be used to treat heart failure, some people may rarely develop new or worsening symptoms of heart failure. Tell your doctor immediately if you experience any of these unlikely but serious side effects: swelling ankles/feet, severe tiredness, shortness of breath, unexplained/sudden weight gain. A very serious allergic reaction to this drug is rare. However, seek immediate medical attention if you notice any symptoms of a serious allergic reaction, including: rash, itching/swelling (especially of the face/tongue/throat), severe dizziness, trouble breathing. This is not a complete list of possible side effects. If you notice other effects not listed above, contact your doctor or pharmacist. In the US - Call your doctor for medical advice about side effects. You may report side effects to FDA at 1-800-FDA-1088. In Canada - Call your doctor for medical advice about side effects. You may report side effects to Health Canada at 1-866-234-2345.
PRECAUTIONS: Before taking bisoprolol, tell your doctor or pharmacist if you are allergic to it; or if you have any other allergies. This product may contain inactive ingredients, which can cause allergic reactions or other problems. Talk to your pharmacist for more details. This medication should not be used if you have certain medical conditions. Before using this medicine, consult your doctor or pharmacist if you have: certain types of heart rhythm problems (such as a slow heartbeat, second- or third-degree atrioventricular block), severe heart failure. Before using this medication, tell your doctor or pharmacist your medical history, especially of: breathing problems (such as asthma, chronic bronchitis, emphysema), kidney disease, liver disease, overactive thyroid disease (hyperthyroidism), serious allergic reactions including those needing treatment with epinephrine, blood circulation problems (such as Raynaud's disease, peripheral vascular disease), mental/mood disorders (such as depression), a certain muscle disease (myasthenia gravis). If you have diabetes, this product may prevent the fast/pounding heartbeat you would usually feel when your blood sugar level falls too low (hypoglycemia). Other symptoms of a low blood sugar level, such as dizziness and sweating, are unaffected by this drug. This product may also make it harder to control your blood sugar levels. Check your blood sugar levels regularly as directed by your doctor. Tell your doctor immediately if you have symptoms of high blood sugar such as increased thirst/urination. Your diabetes medication or diet may need to be adjusted. Before having surgery, tell your doctor or dentist that you are taking this medication. This drug may make you dizzy. Do not drive, use machinery, or do any activity that requires alertness until you are sure you can perform such activities safely. Limit alcoholic beverages. During pregnancy, this medication should be used only when clearly needed. It may harm an unborn baby. Discuss the risks and benefits with your doctor. It is unknown if this medication passes into breast milk or if it may harm a nursing infant. Discuss the risks and benefits with your doctor before breast-feeding.
DRUG INTERACTIONS: See also Precautions section. Your doctor or pharmacist may already be aware of any possible drug interactions and may be monitoring you for them. Do not start, stop, or change the dosage of any medicine before checking with your doctor or pharmacist first. Before using this medication, tell your doctor or pharmacist of all prescription and nonprescription/herbal products you may use, especially of: fingolimod. Check the labels on all your medicines (such as cough-and-cold products, diet aids, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs-NSAIDs such as ibuprofen for pain/fever reduction) because they may contain ingredients that could increase your blood pressure or heart rate. Ask your pharmacist about using those products safely. This document does not contain all possible interactions. Therefore, before using this product, tell your doctor or pharmacist of all the products you use. Keep a list of all your medications with you, and share the list with your doctor and pharmacist.
OVERDOSE: If overdose is suspected, contact your local poison control center or emergency room immediately. US residents can call the US National Poison Hotline at 1-800-222-1222. Canada residents can call a provincial poison control center. Symptoms of overdose may include: very slow heartbeat, severe dizziness, severe weakness, fainting, trouble breathing.
NOTES: Do not share this medication with others. Talk with your doctor about making changes to your lifestyle that may help this medication work better (such as stress reduction programs, exercise, and dietary changes). Have your blood pressure and pulse (heart rate) checked regularly while taking this medication. Learn how to check your own blood pressure and pulse at home, and share the results with your doctor. Laboratory and/or medical tests should be performed periodically to monitor your progress or check for side effects. Consult your doctor for more details.
MISSED DOSE: If you miss a dose, take it as soon as you remember. If it is near the time of the next dose, skip the missed dose and resume your usual dosing schedule. Do not double the dose to catch up.
STORAGE: Store at room temperature between 68-77 degrees F (20-25 degrees C) away from light and moisture. Do not store in the bathroom. Keep all medicines away from children and pets. Do not flush medications down the toilet or pour them into a drain unless instructed to do so. Properly discard this product when it is expired or no longer needed. Consult your pharmacist or local waste disposal company for more details about how to safely discard your product.
MEDICAL ALERT: Your condition can cause complications in a medical emergency. For information about enrolling in MedicAlert, call 1-800-854-1166 (USA) or 1-800-668-1507 (Canada).
Information last revised August 2012. Copyright(c) 2012 First Databank, Inc.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Product Description
This is a DOWNLOAD product.
A police car speeds by with its siren wailing, and we can't help but wonder: what kind of criminal is it dashing off in pursuit of? We are intrigued by crime and fascinated with the work of the police as they track down the transgressors.
This anthology of post-World War II crime radio drama presents fictionalized crime, dramatizations of actual crimes, and programs that presented on-the-spot recordings of real police investigations. Radio Spirits is proud to present twenty adventures from fifteen of the best (and most unusual) programs broadcast in the last dozen or so years of commercial network dramatic radio. Series include Gang Busters, The Line Up, Broadway's My Beat, Man From Homicide, Night Watch, and more!
Includes performances by Raymond Burr, Bela Lugosi, Mike Wallace, Dan Duryea, William Conrad, Raymond Edward Johnson, Louis Nye, Larry Thor, and more!
Includes a Program Guide by radio historian and voice recognition expert William Nadel.
Episodes Include: Broadway's My Beat: The Stacy Parker Murder Case 07-05-52, The John Rand Murder Case 07-04-53; Crime Does Not Pay: Gasoline Cocktail 12-12-49; Crime On The Waterfront: Audition Show 02-24-49; Gang Busters: The Case of the Inside Track 06-10-50, The Case of the Temperate Thief 09-30-50; The Line-Up: The Mad Bomber Case 01-11-51, The Lapinish Lighter-Upper Case (a.k.a. The Elsner Case) 03-27-51; The Man From Homicide: Don Shelberger Murder 07-09-51, Old Man Kelso 07-16-51; Night Watch: Glass Breaker 05-03-54, Hammer 211 07-10-54; Official Detective: Butcher Shop Murder 02-23-56; Police Blotter: Homicide by Hurricane 1956; Somebody Knows: The Black Dahlia 08-24-50; Squad Room: Body Found in a Plastic Bag 1955; Treasury Agent: The Case of the Faithful Wife 08-11-47; Twenty-First Precinct: Abandoned Baby 06-28-56; Under Arrest: Mrs. Mollison's Handbag 05-08-49; Unit 99: First Call - Attempted Suicide 11-01-57.
Download Collection: 20 Episodes
Running Time: Approx. 9 Hours
Item D45254


text:
An enhanced approach to capturing changes on the Earth's surface via satellite could provide a more accurate account of how ice sheets, river basins and other geographic areas are changing as a result of natural and human factors. In a first application, the technique revealed sharper-than-ever details about Greenland's massive ice sheet, including that the rate at which it is melting might be accelerating more slowly than predicted.
Princeton University researchers developed a mathematical framework and a computer code to accurately capture ground-level conditions collected on particular geographic regions by the GRACE satellites (Gravity Recovery And Climate Experiment), according to a report in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. A joint project of NASA and the German Aerospace Center, GRACE measures gravity to depict how mass such as ice or water is distributed over the Earth's surface. A change in GRACE data can signify a change in mass, such as a receding glacier.
Typically, GRACE data are recorded for the whole globe and processed to remove large regional differences, said lead author Christopher Harig, a postdoctoral research associate in Princeton's Department of Geosciences. The result is a coarse image that can provide a general sense of mass change, but not details such as various mass fluctuations within an area.
With their method, Harig and co-author Frederik Simons, an assistant professor of geosciences, can clean up data "noise" — the signal variations and distortions that can obscure satellite readings — and then recover the finer surface details hidden within. From this, they can configure regional information into a high-resolution map that depicts the specific areas where mass change is happening and to what degree.
"We try to do very little processing to the data and stay closer to the real signal," Simons said. "GRACE data contain a lot of signals and a lot of noise. Our technique learns enough about the noise to effectively recover the signal, and at much finer spatial scales than was possible before. We can 'see through' the noise and recover the 'true' geophysical information contained in these data. We can now revisit GRACE data related to areas such as river basins and irrigation and soil moisture, not just ice sheets."
The researchers tested their method on GRACE data for Greenland recorded from 2003 to 2010 and brought the complexities of the island's glaciers into clearer focus. While overall ice loss on Greenland consistently increased between 2003 and 2010, Harig and Simons found that it was in fact very patchy from region to region.
In addition, the enhanced detail of where and how much ice melted allowed the researchers to estimate that the annual acceleration in ice loss is much lower than previous research has suggested, roughly increasing by 8 billion tons every year. Previous estimates were as high as 30 billion tons more per year.
Douglas MacAyeal, a geophysical sciences professor at the University of Chicago, said that the research provides a standardized and accurate method for translating GRACE data, particularly for ice sheets. The sprawling, incomplete nature of the satellite's information has spawned a myriad of approaches to interpreting it, some unique to specific scientists, he said.
"GRACE data is notoriously noisy and spatially spread out, and this has resulted in 'ad hoc' methods for processing mass changes of Earth's ice sheets that have wildly different values," said MacAyeal, who is familiar with the Princeton work but had no role in it.
"In other words, each particular investigator ends up getting a different individual number for the net change in mass," he said. "What this research does is figure out a way to be more thoughtful and purposeful about exactly how to deal with GRACE's notorieties. This method would allow researchers to standardize a bit more and also to understand more precisely where they are, and where they are not, able to resolve ice changes."
Simons compared the noise that previously obscured a precise view of Greenland's glaciers to fog on a window. For a small area such as Greenland, the GRACE signal can be easily overwhelmed by noise, which has numerous causes such as the satellite's orbital position or even the type of mathematics researchers use to interpret data, Simons said.
"Other researchers used less than perfect tools to wipe off the window more or less indiscriminately and quite literally left streaks on the data. They were thus less able to put the continent into the proper focus," he said.
"We effectively modeled then removed noise to get the ice-loss signal out of the data," Simons said. "We then recovered relatively tiny variations in ice mass that to others might have looked like noise, but that to us were shown to be signal."
The Princeton researchers found that Greenland lost roughly 200 billion tons of ice each year during the seven-year period studied, which falls within the range reported by other studies. The amount of ice lost annually could stack up on all of Manhattan to nearly 12,000 feet, or more than eight times taller than the Empire State Building, Harig said.
As expected, ice loss occurred in the lower, warmer coastal areas — as opposed to the higher and colder interior, which gained ice mass — but the melt was concentrated on the southeast and northwest coasts for most of the period studied. Indeed, many coastal areas showed no ice-mass loss, while the ice sheet on the southwest coast actually thickened slightly from 2003 to 2006.
But these trends were more complex when Harig and Simons got into the details. Surprisingly, the location of the greatest melt activity migrated around the island, shifting from the southeast to the northwest coast in just a few years. Ice loss on the southeast coast built up starting in 2003 and hit a highpoint in 2007. In 2008, loss on this coast began to recede and shift toward the northwest coast; by 2010, the southeast coast displayed only minor ice loss, while nearly the entire western coast exhibited the most severe melt. During this transition, melt also receded then picked up again on the northeastern coast with seemingly little overlap with activity elsewhere.
Details such as these can help scientists better understand the interplay between Greenland's glaciers and factors that influence melt such as ocean temperature, daily sunshine and cloud coverage, Harig said. That understanding can in turn help researchers determine how the Greenland ice sheet responds to climate change — and how much more ice loss to expect. At current melt rates, the Greenland ice sheet would take about 13,000 years to melt completely, which would result in a global sea-level rise of more than 21 feet (6.5 meters), Harig said.
"Scientists are not totally sure what the driving force of the melt on Greenland is on short, yearly timescales," Harig said. "There is no certainty about which outside factor is the most important or if all of them contribute. Being able to compare what is happening regionally to field observations from other researchers of what a glacier is doing helps us figure out what is causing all this melt."
Michael Oppenheimer, Princeton's Albert G. Milbank Professor of Geosciences and International Affairs, said that the new level of detail Harig and Simons provide on Greenland's glaciers not only gives insight into what is causing the glaciers to melt, but what could possibly happen if they do.
Unlike water in a bathtub, sea-level rise is not uniform, said Oppenheimer, who is familiar with the research but had no role in it. Higher waters in certain locations may depend on which part of an ice sheet melts, he said. And determining which part of an ice sheet is melting the most requires precise details of ice loss and gain for specific glaciers — details that have largely been unavailable, Oppenheimer said.
"Nobody has really been able to take a look at an individual ice sheet and determine the influence that ice loss from different parts of that ice sheet could have on sea levels," Oppenheimer said.
"The details matter. Being able to pinpoint where and how much ice gain and loss there is tells you something about the driving forces behind it, and therefore how much we can expect in the future," he said. "A synoptic view at a high resolution is what GRACE always promised, and now this research has helped realize that potential. It's time to finally milk the data for as much detail as possible."
Harig is adapting the computer code — which is available online — to study GRACE data on ice loss in Antarctica and water accumulation in the Amazon River basin.
The paper, "Mapping Greenland's mass loss in space and time," was published online Nov. 19 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. It was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.


text:
From the LCROSS Flight Director (Paul Tompkins) Blog. Reposted from https://blogs.nasa.gov/lcrossfdblog/2009/12/16/post_1260990722929/
Kimberly Ennico Note: I contributed the information in Mark Shirley's addition to this entry in Paul Tompkins (Mission Operations Manager) LCROSS blog series about what was happening on the LCROSS payload during impact night. Mark was sitting in the MOCR/Mission Operations Control Room while I was in the SOC./Science Operations Control across the hallway.
The LCROSS mission was ultimately focused on the final four minutes of flight, starting at the time of the Centaur impact, and ending with the impact of the Shepherding Spacecraft. During that time, the Payload Engineer and the Science Team took operational center stage. Once the science payload was powered on, the team's job was to confirm the full functionality of the instruments, and then to adjust instrument settings to make sure the data we received was the best it could possibly be. For Impact, there were no second chances – the Shepherding Spacecraft was to be destroyed as a forgone outcome of its observation of the Centaur lunar collision.
In this post, I've invited Payload Engineer Mark Shirley to provide his perspective of impact night. Mark was the Payload Software Lead, in charge of the design and implementation of onboard instrument command sequences and other onboard software components, as well as a large fraction of the science-related data processing software used on the ground. During flight, Mark sat in the Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR) with the rest of the Flight Operations team. On the final day, his job was to assess and maintain the engineering functionality of the science payload in those minutes before impact.
In the impact video sequence, from the public's perspective, there were a lot of things that happened operationally that were probably difficult to understand. Mark will explain the plan for gathering data from the impact and also describe what actually happened in flight. On a lighter note, Mark was one half of our now famous (or notorious) "high-five malfunction" that created such a buzz on the social media circuit after impact. He'll explain that as well. I'll let Mark take it from here. Enjoy!
I'd like to describe our plan for collecting data about the Centaur impact from the shepherding spacecraft (S-S/C), how actual events differed from the plan, and what that says about the process of developing and flying spacecraft. In particular, I'll cover why some of the pictures were fuzzy and some were white and why we were sending commands during the last minutes. I won't touch on the scientific interpretation of the data, only the process of gathering it. This story contains some hard work, a few mistakes, a little nail biting tension, and finally, success.
Central to the story is the type of mission LCROSS was: a cost-capped, fixed-schedule mission. That meant if LCROSS had been late, LRO would have flown with a dead or inactive LCROSS. If the project had run out of money, whatever hadn't been done wouldn't have gotten done. Within the LCROSS project, the instruments were in a similar position. The original idea was to observe the Centaur impact from Earth only. Onboard instruments were soon added to the design but with a total instrument budget of approximately $2 million. That's much less than single instruments on many other missions.
Two things made success possible. First, project managers kept a tight focus on using the barest minimum hardware and testing required to perform the science, and went beyond that, only as the budget allowed, to increase the likelihood of success. Second, everyone stayed on budget. The payload team had no choice, but if any other part of the project had overrun by a lot, the payload might have been eliminated or flown only partially ready.
The LCROSS Instruments
LCROSS carried nine instruments. Five were cameras to take pictures over a large range of wavelengths, that is, colors. One was for visible light that our eyes can see. Two near-infrared cameras captured mineralogy and water signatures, and two mid-infrared cameras captured thermal signatures from -60C to +500C). LCROSS carried three spectrometers to measure color very precisely. One covered ultra-violet and visible wavelengths and two covered near-infrared wavelengths. The latter spectrometers were the best at searching for water, and one looked down toward the Centaur impact the vapor cloud it kicked up and the other looked to the side as LCROSS passed through that cloud. Finally, LCROSS carried a high-speed photometer to measure the brightness of the impact flash.
The instruments are described in detail here. Data from all nine instruments had to share LCROSS' one Mbps (one megabit or million bits per second) radio link to the ground. At that rate, it takes 2 seconds to transmit a typical cell phone picture. This was the maximum data rate available for the LCROSS mission and used only twice: lunar swingby on June 22nd and impact on October 9th. All other instrument activities that took place during the 112 day mission used speeds less than 256 kbps (kilobits or thousand bits per second), which was sufficient for collecting data to calibrate the instruments.
The Observation Plan
The two components of the LCROSS mission, the Centaur and the Shepherding Spacecraft (S-S/C), separated about 10 hours before they reached the moon. At the moment the Centaur impacted, the S-S/C was still 600 kilometers above the surface. Falling at 2.5 kilometers per second, the S-S/C reached the surface 4 minutes later. Observations of the Centaur impact event made during those 4 minutes were the purpose of the mission. Unlike orbital missions that can usually try multiple times to collect data, we had just one shot.
The diagram below shows the plan for observing from the S-S/C, starting one minute before Centaur impact, at the beginning of what we called "Sequence 2" in the NASA TV video. The diagram plots our intended schedule of instrument observations against time: each row represents one of the instruments (instrument abbreviations appear below each row of data), and each tick mark along a row represents one observation, either an image or a spectrum. Over some intervals, the observations are spaced so closely that the plot looks like a solid bar.
Figure 1 The LCROSS impact observation plan: These timelines indicate when each image and spectra was planned to occur during the final four minutes of the mission. The horizontal axis represents time. Each row represents an instrument, and each tick mark represents the timing of a sample (an image or spectrum) from that instrument.
The last four minutes were divided into three periods, called FLASH, CURTAIN and CRATER. Each period focused on a different aspect of the expected impact event and emphasized data collection from different instruments.
FLASH started one minute before the Centaur impact and focused on the very short burst of light generated by the Centaur impact itself. Starting from the top of the diagram, the plan was to stop both the Visible Light Camera (VIS) and the Near-Infrared Camera #2 (NIR2). This would allow us to focus on NIR1 images which we felt had the best chance of catching the location of the impact flash which we expected to be visible for less than one second. These three cameras shared a common input to our payload computer, called the Data Handling Unit (DHU), and could not be used simultaneously. By stopping VIS and NIR2, we could run NIR1 at a faster rate (see the segment labeled 'A'), increasing the odds it would image the flash. The planned sequence also increased the NIR1 exposure time to capture the flash signature even if it was very faint. We knew this would produce a badly overexposed image of the illuminated lunar surface, but our goal was to locate the impact. We'd have plenty of other pictures of the surface. This sort of shifting attention between cameras accounts for the periods where one camera image would stop updating for a while.
We also designed the FLASH strategy for the spectrometers around our expectation of a dim, short duration flash event. Near Infrared Spectrometer #1 (NSP1), the main water-detection instrument, was put into a high-speed, low resolution mode (represented by the yellow bar). The Visible and Ultraviolet light Spectrometer (VSP) was commanded to take long exposures, and Total Luminescence Photometer (TLP) was powered early enough to reach equilibrium and be at its most sensitive for the flash event.
The second phase, CURTAIN, started just after the Centaur impact and ran for three minutes. Its purpose was to take spectra and images of the expanding vapor and dust clouds thrown up by the impact. CURTAIN was the most important period and also the simplest. All instruments ran in their default modes, as follows. The DHU shifted between the three analog cameras in a stuttering pattern – VIS, VIS, NIR1, NIR2 – repeating. Both thermal cameras monitored the plume shape and temperature. The two downward-facing spectrometers (NSP1 and VSP) looked for water and other chemicals. The side-looking spectrometer (NSP2) also looked for water and other compounds, but from sunlight scattered or absorbed by the dust and vapor cloud. The TLP continued to take data during this period, but it's primarily function was during FLASH.
The goal of CRATER, the final period, was to image the crater made by the Centaur impact to get its precise location and, more importantly, its size. From its size and their detailed models of crater formation, the LCROSS Science Team can potentially tell us how the crater evolved over the few seconds of its formation and how much material was excavated. The primary instruments in this period were the two thermal cameras, MIR1 and MIR2. Their sample rates were increased relative to those for CURTAIN. To image the crater in a second frequency band, NIR2, the more sensitive near infrared camera, was commanded to its most sensitive setting. NIR1 and VIS would not be used during this period because neither was sensitive enough to see anything in the permanently shadowed area. All spectrometers would continue running to look for light reflected off of any plume or vapor cloud. At the end of this phase, the S-S/C would fall below the rim of Cabeus Crater, cutting off radio transmission to Earth, and then impact the surface a couple of seconds later.
There were three keys to making this plan work:
- Downlink Bandwidth: the data collected had to fit within the 1 megabit radio downlink. We did a lot of testing before launch to work out a data collection plan that was further confirmed and refined based on on-orbit performance. We gave priority to data from the most important instrument, the near-infrared spectrometers, to provide robustness to the design. The best scheme was pre-programmed and ready to go in case we were unable to command the spacecraft in the final hour.
- Camera Exposure: We had to change camera exposure settings during the descent to reflect the changing brightness of the impact event and the surrounding scene. Defaults were pre-programmed based on the latest lighting models for impact morning from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.
- Command Timing: In the instrument command sequences governing FLASH, CURTAIN and CRATER periods, we had to orchestrate changes in instrument configuration as they were needed to focus on different aspects of the impact event. Sometimes these changes had to be interleaved with instrument data collection in a way that was vulnerable to small timing changes.
So What Actually Happened?
Well, as reflected in the recent LCROSS press briefing, we collected a very rich and interesting data set that met the needs of our science objectives. However, we had challenges in all three areas – bandwidth, exposure settings and timing – although all ultimately proved minor. However, in some ways, it was a close call. This diagram shows what data was actually collected during the final four minutes of the mission.
Figure 2 Actual performance of the LCROSS payload: These timelines indicate when the images and spectra were taken on the morning of the impact. The pattern gives clues about the performance of the hardware and software systems that collected the data.
First, the rows representing the spectrometers, NSP1, NSP2 and VSP, look almost exactly as they should. Except for one problem with the Visible and Ultraviolet light spectrometer (VSP), which I describe later, our plan for collecting spectra worked perfectly. This is very good, because the spectra carried most of the information we were trying to collect.
As for the cameras, several differences from the plan jump out. The most obvious is that the timing of observations along some timelines is irregular with many observations missing, e.g., the visible camera pointed to by note E. This occurred with all five cameras (the first five timelines) but not with the spectrometers (the next three timelines).
Scene Complexity and Bandwidth Limitations
Image compression is the process of finding and reducing redundancy in an image in order to transmit it more efficiently. On LCROSS, to fit within the 1 Mbps data rate limitation for our downlink, we used a lossy compression algorithm that typically reduced each image to 1/20th its original size. Lossy methods achieve greater compression than lossless methods by actually removing parts of each image. The algorithm tries to find subtle details whose removal the human eye won't notice. Being able to combine many different kinds of data into a single digital data stream is so useful that this approach has been standard practice for many years.
In flight, the irregularity of observations occurred because we underestimated the complexity of the lunar scene during ground testing. We had done much of our testing with a large reproduction of the moon's pole in front of the cameras, but it turned out this didn't mimic the high contrast and detail of the real scene. Scene complexity mattered because the images were highly compressed and changes in the moon scene changed the sizes of the compressed images by a factor of 4. We first observed this behavior during the lunar swingby LCROSS performed during the first week of its mission. Turning on the instruments during the swingby was intended as a learning experience, and it proved critically important. It provided the best operational practice we got for the impact as well as data to calibrate the instruments.
After the lunar swingby in June, I changed the thermal camera sampling rates in the instrument command sequences for the final hour. Unfortunately, the compression problem turned out to be about 20% worse during the final hour of the mission than during the lunar swingby. This forced us to change the thermal camera rates again in real-time, but we had practiced changing them during rehearsals, just in case. In the NASA TV impact video sequence, you can hear the Science Team requesting a change of MIR1 rates to 1 Hz, and MIR2 to 0.1 Hz. See note F in the figure. The rate for thermal camera #1 (MIR1) changes just before this note and changes for MIR2 just after it. Even though we'd practiced, this was still a very tense time as we were losing some data while the changes were being made. Changing the MIR rates felt like it took forever.
The bandwidth problem could have been avoided if in addition to changing camera sampling rates in the command sequences, we had also changed the stuttering pattern for the analog cameras mentioned above to eliminate one VIS image during each repetition. However, our instrument simulator didn't have the full set of instruments like the spacecraft, which made it impossible to adequately test this change on the ground. At one point, we discussed testing this change onboard before the impact, but lost the opportunity due to the fuel loss Paul described in his blog on October 4th (see "A Test of the Flight Team").
One other problem caused by the complex lunar scene was damaged images. After compression, some of the visible camera images were still too large to fit within a single data packet for transmission to Earth. Here's an example of the kind of damaged image that resulted. The shadowed area should be completely dark, but instead contains wispy bright areas. These compression-artifacts are intimately linked to the scene and need to be taken out with image post-processing.
Figure 3 Example of damage to downlinked images due to clipping in the telemetry packet formatting software.
What caused these compression artifacts? I didn't know it at the time, but the software for compressing these images had been written some years before to clip the compressed form of images to ensure they always fit within a single data packet (maximum size 65536 bytes). We used a wavelet-based compression algorithm, and clipping the compressed images removed some information needed to recreate the image accurately. The alternative would have been to split the images across multiple packets and reassemble them on the ground. This certainly could have been done in principle, but doing so would have introduced significant changes right at the heart of software that we had planned to reuse without change after its successful use on previous projects. With what we know now, changing this would have been justified, but it would also have been risky given how central image compression was to the overall design. With what we knew at the time, I believe we would have left it alone because of our short development schedule and all the other things that had to work.
November, November!
Most of the commanding we did from the ground was to adjust the exposure times of the near infrared cameras as the scene changed. The other cameras either controlled themselves (VIS) or had only one appropriate setting (the thermal cameras, MIR1 and MIR2). We controlled the exposure setting for the near infrared cameras explicitly because we were trying to image a relatively dim flash and ejecta curtain close to bright mountain peaks.
Near the beginning of the FLASH period, we discovered we didn't get this balance right. To image the dim centaur impact flash, we deliberately overexposed the sunlit peaks. This setting combined with the Cabeus scene overdid it. The sunlit areas electronically bled into nearby parts of the image. That occurs when electrons in overexposed pixels move across the image detector to other pixels. In this case, the shadowed area of Cabeus crater was completely covered, obscuring our view of the impact. That was why the only image that was updating just before the Centaur impact was white. We hadn't seen this level of bleeding earlier in the mission, or in almost any of our testing. However, after searching through our data archive, I realize now we did see it occur once, two years ago, in one flashlight test in a darkened room but did not fully comprehend the implications.
The FLASH period was designed to start 1 minute before the Centaur impact, so we had a little time to recover once we saw the problem. During this minute, our first priority was to confirm that the spectrometers (NSP1 and VSP) and photometer (TLP) were working properly. Once that was done, we focused on the NIR1. Since we still had commanding during this period, we tried to change the exposure setting (Payload Scientist Kim Ennico called out "Flight, this is Science, please change NIR1 to OPR 9, over."). We had less than 30 seconds to get this command sent up to the spacecraft. The command was actually sent but arrived a few seconds too late to capture the impact. In hindsight, this was a challenging stretch for the camera's range, due to the scene and the potential for bleeding. Our strategy – to aim for the most sensitive exposure setting followed by one attempt to back-off depending on the data-might have worked had we been looking at another region of the moon, that is, had, we launched (and impacted) on a different date, where the terrain and lighting would have been different. While all this was going on, the impact flash was captured by NSP1, so the key science measurement was made.
We intentionally caused the same issue later, during the CRATER period, but we had better success (see above figure at the segment labeled 'B'). Initially, the NIR2 camera images were badly overexposed for the same reason as during FLASH (hence the white images that appear in the NASA TV video just after entry to DV Mode). Kim Ennico, the Payload Scientist, made the call to reduce the exposure time slightly, from what we called OPR 15 to OPR 10. (Again, you can hear this request over the voice loop in the NASA TV video.) She was using live-information from the NSP1 spectrometer and checking those values in real time against a spreadsheet near her seat. You can see her checking and rechecking on the video before making the choice. We only had only one chance to choose the right one. The command was sent and received 30 seconds before the S-S/C's impact. Kim's call initially left the images overexposed, but as the lit peaks slid out of the field of view, her choice produced excellent images of the very dark crater floor, including the image that gave us our best estimate of the Centaur crater size. These images go all the way down to 2 seconds before S-S/C impact where the craft was 5 kilometers above the surface. The crater floor of Cabeus was indeed brighter than any of the predictions, at least in the infrared. That's another reminder of science and exploration. Sometimes you are surprised as you collect new data, especially data from areas never looked at before.
Figure 4 This image sequence was captured just before the end of the mission and shows the NIR2 camera going from badly overexposed to acceptably exposed as the lit peaks surrounding Cabeus leave the field of view.
How do we know that's the Centaur crater? Because it was also seen by the two thermal cameras (MIR1 and MIR2) while it was still warm, and we can overlay the images. The left figure below shows aligned images from NIR2 and MIR1, taken before the Centaur impact. The figure on the right shows aligned images from these cameras taken just before the S-S/C impacted and showing the Centaur impact crater (see inset). These images don't align perfectly because they were taken about a second and 2.5 kilometers apart. To obtain images of the Centaur crater using three different cameras was our goal, and we succeeded.
Figure 5 The bottom image shows the Centaur impact crater in both near-infrared and mid-infrared images. The top image overlays images taken before the impact by the same two cameras.
Kim's call of "NIR2 to OPR 10″ yielded a great image of the Centaur crater, but it also caused some confusion. The name for Near-Infrared Camera #2 (NIR2) was too similar to the name of Mid-Infrared Camera #2 (MIR2). We had practiced this interaction over our voice communication loops, but we hadn't practiced it enough to do it quickly and perfectly under time pressure. Kim had to repeat her call using the phonetic term 'November' for the 'N' at the beginning of NIR2 (during CURTAIN phase in the NASA TV video, you can hear the Flight Controller, Jim Strong, ask "is that 'November' or 'Mike'?", referring to NIR2 or MIR2, ). We didn't realize when we picked the obvious names for these cameras three years ago that the names could cause confusion when spoken over the voice loops connecting our mission control rooms. Back then, our plan avoided real-time commanding completely, but as we learned through our practice sessions before launch and actual experience after launch, we realized we needed the flexibility. We retrofitted a process for proposing and confirming real-time commands into our mission operations architecture as best we could given the facility and time constraints. Note that we didn't consider doing this for maneuvering the spacecraft or for the most critical science instruments, only the secondary instruments.
Command Timing
The commanding side of the automatic sequence ran almost perfectly. We did have one problem with the Visible and Ultraviolet Spectrometer during the CURTAIN period, though. Because the instrument data handling unit (DHU) was at its maximum data throughput capacity during the first part of CURTAIN, one command to change exposure time was delayed and sent during a period when the instrument wasn't listening. That command was ignored. This resulted in capturing fewer spectra with longer-than-planned exposure times. Luckily, the longer exposure times turned out to be a blessing, since the ejecta curtain was much fainter than some models predicted. The loss of more frequent sampling due to the longer exposures did not affect the science measurement.
High Five Fail
Yes, I should have. After the end of the mission, I missed a high five that was captured on camera. I was teased about it by my colleagues that morning and by my kids that night. The other operator involved, our Telemetry Data Manager, known as "Data" over the voice loop, is both a good colleague and a friend. I didn't intend to embarrass him and have since apologized. We had been told to avoid high fives to prevent exactly the sort of mistake I made, but once the hand went up, I should have responded. So, here it is, for the record:
Why didn't I respond? I honestly don't remember the moment clearly, but I did have two things on my mind. First, my job at that point was to move to the Science Operations Center (SOC) to prepare for the post-impact press conference. We had two hours to make sure we'd gotten the data we expected, to prepare presentation charts and to look for anything obvious. I was concerned about that because I had missed seeing the plume we had hoped for like most everyone else.
More importantly, I was really stressed out. The DHU, the computer that processed all instrument data, was struggling with the very large packet sizes of visible camera images, and the DHU almost crashed a number of times during that final hour. We had developed and practiced a procedure to recover from such a crash to prevent a substantial loss of science data. Flying a spacecraft is a group effort with lots of cross-checking, and as the Payload Software Lead, I felt especially responsible.
During payload development testing, we found and fixed several problems that would have been problematic for the payload. This problem which led to potential crashes of the DHU was known and was the most difficult software problem we saw. The root of the problem was a small chip that controlled the data bus connecting the video capture and compression chips to each other and to the main processor within the DHU. Under certain circumstances this bus controller chip would stop responding, and the DHU software would crash. Since we didn't have access to the chip's design to understand why it would stop, and we didn't have time to replace it, our approach was to create a method for quickly recovering on orbit. This method had two parts. The first part was a software patch we developed that reset the bus controller when the DHU's main processor noticed it had stopped responding. The second part was a procedure for quickly rebooting the whole DHU from the ground if the software patch didn't catch the problem.
We developed and tested the software patch just a few weeks before the payload was shipped to Southern California for integration with the rest of the spacecraft. From that point on, through the rest of our testing on the ground and in orbit, we didn't see this problem again. That is, we didn't see it until the morning of the impact. That morning, the patch needed to reset the bus controller two dozen times. The vertical green lines in this figure show when.
Figure 6 During the final hour of the mission, Data Handling Unit (DHU) software detected and corrected an anomalous condition on a bus controller chip multiple times. The green lines show when these events occurred. The right end of this figure, starting at the label 'I' (the time of Centaur impact) corresponds to the time spans of the planned (Figure 1) and actual (Figure 2) performance plots. Earlier events happened while monitoring payload performance in the 56 minutes prior to Centaur impact.
Once these events started, I was prepared, on a hair trigger, to start the process of rebooting the DHU if the patch didn't work. I was constantly checking and rechecking the fault response procedure I had developed for our payload. The details of this procedure varied over time. As the on-board sequence progressed and we got closer and closer to the Centaur impact, we had different decisions to make to recover if something went wrong. This strategizing was being done over another voice loop with Kim and Tony Colaprete, the LCROSS Principal Investigator, in the Science Operations Center (SOC) which was not audible to the audience watching on NASA TV. We had to keep track of a lot of independent data threads and contingencies simultaneously. Our actual trigger for starting this recovery, a gap in numeric sequence of the data coming from the instruments, even occurred once, but it was unrelated and didn't need a response. In the end, our defenses worked. The software patch performed exactly as intended and no crash occurred. After the S-S/C impact, I breathed a sigh of relief and moved to the next room to start preparing for the press conference.
Final Thoughts
As I said above, we had challenges in all three areas critical to making our plan work: downlink bandwidth, camera exposure, and command timing. Ultimately, all of the problems we had proved minor, and we collected the data we needed to draw conclusions about the presence or absence of water and other substances in Cabeus crater.
We at NASA all too often strive to give the impression that complex, difficult missions are routine. They're not. They're complex and difficult. What makes them possible is long planning, teamwork, and careful review by people both inside and outside the project. One name for this process is "Systems Management", which recognizes that people need backup just like the parts of a complex machine. I personally made some mistakes and caught some mistakes. Together, we caught enough of them that we were successful. For me, it was a huge privilege and a wonderful experience. I'm very grateful to have been a part of this mission.


text:
Death Toll In West, Texas, Fertilizer Explosion Rises To 15
The number of people who died in a fertilizer plant explosion in West, Texas, last week now stands at 15, officials said Tuesday. Some earlier reports had indicated that 14 people had lost their lives. At least 200 more were injured.
In Waco, TV station KXXV says that officials believe they have found all the victims, quoting Mayor Pro Tem Steve Vanek saying "No more victims. Everything is searched," in a news conference today.
The latest death toll comes as investigators continue to study the catastrophe and the fire that preceded it. The explosion left a crater 93 feet wide and 10 feet deep, investigators said Tuesday.
State and federal investigators working at the scene have eliminated natural causes — such as a lightning strike — as a potential spark for the fire, according to The Dallas Morning News.
As we reported Monday, authorities are still in the process of publicly identifying people who were killed in the blast; the majority of them were first responders.
After fleeing their homes in an evacuation and then being forced to stay away by safety concerns and a continuing investigation, the first wave of West residents were allowed to return to their damaged homes Saturday.
The White House announced Monday that President Obama will attend a memorial service for the explosion's victims, to be held Thursday at Baylor University. The president has declared the West, Texas, site a federal disaster area.


text:
John: "No! I just thought you might be hungry!"
Me: "Oh, I see, because I'm ALWAYS hungry, right? RIGHT?!?"
John: [backing away slowly before sprinting from the room.]
It's loads of fun.
Anyway, I can only imagine how much fun this lady had:
Here's one way to tackle a friend's hairy situation:
When your dad turns the big 4-0, you want a cake that shows not only just how much you love him, but also how much time, thought,and effort went into finding him juuust the right design:
Or, if that doesn't do the trick:
Hillary H., Kris, Cynthia P., Mark R., & Kjaere, I love you guys this much. Which is to say, enough to type your names here.


text:
Project Members
- Thomas J. Conners
- J. Joseph Errington (Yale University)
- Michael Ewing (University of Melbourne)
- Sander Adelaar (University of Melbourne)
- Zane Goebel (Nagoya University)
The Javanese Dialect Mapping Project
The Javanese dialect mapping project aimed to collect, document, and analyze various aspects of a number of Javanese dialects. Focus was given to in-depth, naturalistic speech recordings, with the addition of word lists and elicitations. As part of the project, we were 'debunking' the myth of a 'standard' Javanese, based on the Surakarta and Yogyakarta varieties.
Javanese as described in most grammars, dictionaries, and scholarly works refers to the varieties spoken in and around Surakarta and Yogyakarta. However, with over 100 million speakers, there is tremendous variation among sometimes non-mutually intelligible dialects of Javanese. Our project focused on these 'non-standard' dialects.
By focusing on these 'peripheral' languages, many unexpected patterns have emerged. For example it has become clear that in many respects, but particularly in terms of lexicon, phonology and morphosyntax, the 'standard' language is in many ways the most innovative, with different innovations radiating out from this center. Vowel raising and harmony provide an excellent example.
In Solo/Yogya Javanese, /a/ becomes /ɔ/ in word final position, so that lima 'five' is pronounced [limɔ]. A suffix will block vowel raising: lima-né 'the five of them' [lima-ne]. This vowel raising feeds vowel harmony, and there will be regressive assimilation of an /a/ vowel in an immediately preceding open syllable, for example, mata 'eye' is pronounced [mɔtɔ], but mata-né is [mata-ne].
Both vowel raising and vowel harmony are unknown in Old and Middle Javanese, and turn out to be innovations of the Solo/Yogya dialect. These changes have spread out and now affect many other dialects in Java. However, the geographically disconnected dialects of Banten, Pesisir Lor, Banyumasan, Tengger, and Osing all maintain the original pattern.
Following the International Symposium on the Languages of Java, organized through MPI EVA JFS, we were developing collaborative data collection projects with Yale University, Melbourne University, and other independent researchers. The local office has become a clearing house for data and recordings on Javanese dialects, available to all interested scholars.


text: Free sexy nude babe pics site was made on 2016, because we just love to watch hot and sexy naked girls. So we decided to create a site, where we will post the hottest and sexiest nude women we can find and we will post them every day, several times a day. We will put up naked chicks from Playboy, to MetArt, FemJoy, Twistys, Sun Erotica and many other great erotica sites. There are some many out there, that it's hard to pick. But we will try to show you babes with big tits, shaved pussy, big round ass or sexy naked women with small tits, but still nice round ass with tight body and beautiful face. Those gorgeous looking girls are always willing to take off their clothes and see how kinky they are and what this can bring them to life. To get naked is always a good thing. So enjoy in our free nude pictures and bookmark or share this site to other sexy babes lovers!


text:
e-mail: email@example.com
Material on this website is protected by copyright laws of the United States and international treaties. All copyrights remain the property of the copyright owner. No images or material on this website may be copied or printed without express authorization. For further information about copyright laws visit the U.S. Copyright Office.