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This discussion focuses on Algeria from the 19th century onward. For a treatment of earlier periods and of the country in its regional context, see North Africa.
From a geographic standpoint, Algeria has been a difficult country to rule. The Tell and Saharan Atlas mountain chains impede easy north-south communication, and the few good natural harbours provide only limited access to the hinterlands. This has meant that, before Ottoman rule, the western part of the country was associated more closely with Morocco while the eastern part had closer ties with Tunisia. A further impediment to unifying the country was that a significant minority of the population were native Tamazight speakers and were thus more resistant to Arabization as compared with North African countries to the east. Therefore, Ottoman Algeria, which contained few extensive, original, or long-lived Muslim dynasties, was not nearly as predisposed to developing political nationalism as was Tunisia during the first decades of the 19th century.
Modern Algeria can be understood only by examining the period—nearly a century and a half—that the country was under French colonial rule. The customary beginning date is in April 1827, when Ḥusayn, the last Ottoman provincial ruler, or dey, of Algiers, angrily struck the French consul with a fly whisk. This incident was a manifest sign of the dey's anger toward the French consul, a culmination of what had soured Franco-Algerian relations in the preceding years: France's large and unpaid debt. That same year the French minister of war had written that the conquest of Algeria would be an effective and useful means of providing employment for veterans of the Napoleonic wars.
The conquest of Algeria began three years later. The government of the dey proved no match for the French army that landed on July 5, 1830, near Algiers. Ḥusayn accepted the French offer of exile after a brief military encounter. After his departure, and in violation of agreements that had been made, the French seized private and religious buildings, looted possessions mainly in and around Algiers, and seized a vast portion of the country's arable land. The three-century-long period of Algerian history as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire had ended.
The French government thought that a quick victory abroad might create enough popularity at home to enable it to win the upcoming elections. Instead, only days after the French victory in Algeria, the July Revolution forced King Charles X from the throne in favour of Louis-Philippe. Although those who led the July Revolution in France had cynically dismissed the campaign in Algeria as foreign adventurism to cover up oppression at home, they were reluctant to simply withdraw. Various alternatives were considered, including an early ill-fated plan to establish Tunisian princes in parts of Algeria as rulers under French patronage. The French general, Bertrand Clauzel, signed two treaties with the bey of Tunis, one of which offered him the right to keep territories conceded to him in exchange for annual payments. Because the treaty was not communicated officially to the government in Paris, however, the bey considered this proof of French duplicity and refused the offer.
The first few years of colonial rule were characterized by numerous changes in the French command, and the military campaign began to prove extremely arduous and costly. The towns of the Mitidja Plain—just outside Algiers—and neighbouring cities fell first to the French. General Camille Trézel captured Bejaïa in the east in 1833 after a naval bombardment. The French took Mers el-Kebir in 1830 and entered Oran in 1831, but they faced stiffer opposition from the Sufi brotherhood leader, Emir Abdelkader (ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Muḥyī al-Dīn), in the west. Because towns and cities were plundered and massacres of civilian populations were widespread, the French government sent a royal commission to the colony to examine the situation.
During their campaign against Abdelkader, the French agreed to a truce and signed two agreements with him. The treaty signed between General Louis-Alexis Desmichels and Abdelkader in 1834 included two versions, one of which made major concessions to Abdelkader again without the consent or knowledge of the French government. This miscommunication led to a breach of the agreement when the French moved through territory belonging to the emir. Abdelkader responded with a counterattack in 1839 and drove the French back to Algiers and the coast.
France decided at that point to wage an all-out war. Led by General (later Marshal) Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, the campaign of conquest eventually brought one-third of the total French army strength (more than 100,000 troops) to Algeria. The new military campaign and the initial onslaught caused widespread devastation to the Algerians and to their crops and livestock. Abdelkader's hit-and-run tactics failed, and he was forced to surrender in 1847. He was exiled to France but later was permitted to settle with his family in Damascus, Syria, where he and his followers saved the lives of many Christians during the 1860 massacres. Respected even by his opponents as the founder of the modern Algerian state, Abdelkader became, and has remained, the personification of Algerian national resistance to foreign domination.
Abdelkader's defeat marked the end of what might be called resistance on a national scale, but smaller French operations continued, such as the occupation of the Saharan oases (Zaatcha in 1849, Nara in 1850, and Ouargla in 1852). The eastern Kabylia region was subdued only in 1857, while the final major Kabylia uprising of Muḥammad al-Muqrānī was suppressed in 1871. The Saharan regions of Touat and Gourara, which were at that time Moroccan spheres of influence, were occupied in 1900; the Tindouf area, previously regarded as Moroccan rather than Algerian, became part of Algeria only after the French occupation of the Anti-Atlas in 1934.
The manner in which French rule was established in Algeria during the years 1830–47 laid the groundwork for a pattern of rule that French Algeria would maintain until independence. It was characterized by a tradition of violence and mutual incomprehension between the rulers and the ruled; the French politician and historian Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that colonization had made Muslim society more barbaric than it was before the French arrived. There was a relative absence of well-established native mediators between the French rulers and the mass population, and an ever-growing French settler population (the colons, also known as pieds noirs) demanded the privileges of a ruling minority in the name of French democracy. When Algeria eventually became a part of France juridically, that only added to the power of the colons, who sent delegates to the French parliament. They accounted for roughly one-tenth of the total population from the late 19th century until the end of French rule.
Settler domination of Algeria was not secured, however, until the fall of Napoleon III in 1870 and the rise of the Third Republic in France. Until then Algeria remained largely under military administration, and the governor-general of Algeria was almost invariably a military officer until the 1880s. Most Algerians—excluding the colons—were subject to rule by military officers organized into Arab Bureaus, whose members were officers with an intimate knowledge of local affairs and of the language of the people but with no direct financial interest in the colony. The officers, therefore, often sympathized with the outlook of the people they administered rather than with the demands of the European colonists. The paradox of French Algeria was that despotic and military rule offered the native Algerians a better situation than did civilian and democratic government.
A large-scale program of confiscating cultivable land, after resistance had been crushed, made colonization possible. Settler colonization was of mixed European origin—mainly Spanish in and around Oran and French, Italian, and Maltese in the centre and east. The presence of the non-French settlers was officially regarded with alarm for quite a while, but the influence of French education, the Muslim environment, and the Algerian climate eventually created in the non-French a European-Algerian subnational sentiment. This would probably have resulted, in time, in a movement to create an independent state if Algeria had been situated farther away from Paris and if the settlers had not feared the potential strength of the Muslim majority.
After the overthrow of Louis-Philippe's regime in 1848, the settlers succeeded in having the territory declared French; the former Turkish provinces were converted into departments on the French model, while colonization progressed with renewed energy. With the establishment of the French Second Empire in 1852, responsibility for Algeria was transferred from Algiers to a minister in Paris, but the emperor, Napoleon III, soon reversed this disposition. While expressing the hope that an increased number of settlers would forever keep Algeria French, he also declared that France's first duty was to the three million Arabs. He declared, with considerable accuracy, that Algeria was "not a French province but an Arab country, a European colony, and a French camp." This attitude aroused certain hopes among Algerians, but they were destroyed by the emperor's downfall in 1870. After France's defeat in the Franco-German War, settlers felt they could finally gain more land. Spurred on by this and by years of droughts and famines, Algerians united in 1871 under Muḥammad al-Muqrānī in the last major Kabylia uprising. Its brutal suppression by French forces was followed by the appropriation of another large segment of territory, which provided land for European refugees from Alsace. Much land was also acquired by the French through loopholes in laws originally designed to protect tribal property. Notable among these is the sénatus-consulte of 1863, which broke up tribal lands and allowed settlers to acquire vast areas formerly secured under tribal law. Following the loss of this territory, Algerian peasants moved to marginal lands and in the vicinity of forests; their presence in these areas set in motion the widespread environmental degradation that has affected Algeria since then.
It is difficult to gauge in human terms the losses suffered by Algerians during the early years of the French occupation. Estimates of the number of those dead from disease and starvation and as a direct result of warfare during the early years of colonization vary considerably, but the most reliable ones indicate that the native population of Algeria fell by nearly one-third in the years between the French invasion and the end of fighting in the mid-1870s.
Gradually the European population established nearly total political, economic, and social domination over the country and its native inhabitants. At the same time, new lines of communication, hospitals and medical services, and educational facilities became more widely available to Europeans, though they were dispensed to a limited extent—and in the French language—to Algerians. Settlers owned most Western dwellings, Western-style farms, businesses, and workshops. Only primary education was available to Algerians, and only in towns and cities, and there were limited prospects for higher education. Because employment was concentrated mainly in urban settlements, underemployment and chronic unemployment disproportionately affected Muslims, who lived mostly in rural and semirural areas.
For the Algerians service in the French army and in French factories during World War I was an eye-opening experience. Some 200,000 fought for France during the war, and more than one-third of the male Algerians between the ages of 20 and 40 resided in France during that time. When peace returned, some 70,000 Algerians remained in France and, by living frugally, were able to support many thousands of their relatives in Algeria.
Algerian nationalism developed out of the efforts of three different groups. The first consisted of Algerians who had gained access to French education and earned their living in the French sector. Often called assimilationists, they pursued gradualist, reformist tactics, shunned illegal actions, and were prepared to consider permanent union with France if the rights of Frenchmen could be extended to native Algerians. This group, originating from the period before World War I, was loosely organized under the name Young Algerians and included (in the 1920s) Khaled Ben Hachemi ("Emir Khaled"), who was the grandson of Abdelkader, and (in the 1930s) Ferhat Abbas, who later became the first premier of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.
The second group consisted of Muslim reformers who were inspired by the religious Salafī movement founded in the late 19th century in Egypt by Sheikh Muḥammad ʿAbduh. The Association of Algerian Muslim ʿUlamāʾ (Association des Uléma Musulmans Algériens; AUMA) was organized in 1931 under the leadership of Sheikh ʿAbd al-Hamid Ben Badis. This group was not a political party, but it fostered a strong sense of Muslim Algerian nationality among the Algerian masses.
The third group was more proletarian and radical. It was organized among Algerian workers in France in the 1920s under the leadership of Ahmed Messali Hadj and later gained wide support in Algeria. Preaching a nationalism without nuance, Messali Hadj was bound to appeal to Algerians, who fully recognized their deprivation. Messali Hadj's strongly nationalistic stance, or even the more muted position of Ben Badis, could have been checked by such gradualist reformers as Ferhat Abbas if only they had been able to show that step-by-step decolonization was possible. Several efforts to liberalize the treatment of native Algerians, promoted by French reformist groups in collaboration with Algerian reformists in the first half of the 20th century, came too late to stem the radical tide.
One such effort, the Blum-Viollette proposal (named for the French premier and the former governor-general of Algeria), was introduced during the Popular Front government in France (1936–37). It would have allowed a very small number of Algerians to obtain full French citizenship without forcing them to relinquish their right to be judged by Muslim law on matters of personal status (e.g., marriage, inheritance, divorce, and child custody). The proposal was, therefore, a potential breakthrough because this issue had been shrewdly exploited by the settler population, who understood that most Algerians did not want to abandon this right. The small number of Algerians who would have received full French citizenship—the educated, veterans of French military service, and other narrowly defined groups—could then have been gradually increased in later years. Settler opposition to the measure was so fierce, however, that the project was never even brought to a vote in the French Chamber of Deputies. Many Algerians began to feel that organized violence was the only option, since all peaceful means for resolving the problems of colonial rule for the majority of the population had been denied. The group that inherited this mission, the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale; FLN), grew out of Messali Hadj's organization, later absorbing many adherents of the other two nationalist groups.
World War II brought with it the collapse of France and, in 1942, the Anglo-American occupation of North Africa. The occupation forces were to some extent automatically agents of emancipation; both Allied and Axis radio stations began to broadcast in Arabic, promising a new world for formerly subject peoples. The effect was further heightened by the June 1941 promise of emancipation for both Syria and Lebanon, given by the Free French and backed by the British authorities in the Middle East.
Ferhat Abbas drafted an Algerian Manifesto in December 1942 for presentation to Allied as well as French authorities; it sought recognition of political autonomy for Algeria. General Charles de Gaulle declared a year later that France was under an obligation to the Muslims of North Africa because of the loyalty they had shown. French citizenship was extended to certain categories of Muslims three months later, but this did not go far enough to satisfy Algerian opinion. A display of Algerian nationalist flags at Sétif in May 1945 prompted French authorities to fire on demonstrators. An unorganized uprising ensued, in which 84 European settlers were massacred. The violence and suppression that followed resulted in the death of about 8,000 Muslims (according to French sources) or as many as 45,000 (according to Algerian sources). The main outcome of the massacres, however, went far beyond the human losses. They became the foundation for the Algerian War of Independence, which began nearly a decade later. The demonstrations were the last peaceful attempts by Algerians to seek their independence.
The French National Assembly voted for a statute on Algeria on September 20, 1947, in which the country was defined as "a group of departments endowed with a civic personality, financial autonomy, and a special organization." The statute created an Algerian assembly with two separate colleges of 60 members each, one representing some 1.5 million Europeans and the other Algeria's 9 million Muslims. After lengthy debates the statute was passed by a small majority. Muslims were finally considered full French citizens with the right to keep their personal Qurʾānic status and were granted the right to work in France without further formalities. Military territories in the south would be abolished, and Arabic would become the language of educational instruction at all levels.
The law was poorly implemented, however, and the subsequent elections were widely held to have been manipulated to favour the French. Most of the reforms laid down by the statute were never enforced. In spite of this, Algeria remained quiet. The principal change had been the fact that some 350,000 Algerian workers—five times as many as in the post-World War I period—were able to establish themselves in France and remit money to Algeria.
Nationalist parties had existed for many years, but they became increasingly radical as they realized that their goals were not going to be achieved through peaceful means. Prior to World War II the Party of the Algerian People (Parti du Peuple Algérien) had been founded by Messali Hadj. The party was banned in the late 1930s and replaced in the mid-1940s by the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques; MTLD). A more radical paramilitary group, the Special Organization (Organization Spéciale; OS), was formed about the same time, but it was discovered by the colonial police in 1950, and many of its leaders were imprisoned. In 1954 a group of former OS members split from the MTLD and formed the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (Comité Révolutionaire d'Unité et d'Action; CRUA). This organization, later to become the FLN, prepared for military action. The leading members of the CRUA became the so-called chefs historiques ("historical leaders") of the Algerian War of Independence: Hocine Aït-Ahmed, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, Moustapha Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Belkacem Krim, Mohamed Khider, Rabah Bitat, and Ahmed Ben Bella. They organized and led several hundred men in the first armed confrontations.
The war began on the night of October 31, 1954. The movement, led by the newly formed FLN, issued a leaflet stating that its aim was to restore a sovereign Algerian state. It advocated social democracy within an Islamic framework and equal citizenship for any resident in Algeria. A preamble recognized that Algeria had fallen behind other Arab states in social and national emancipation but claimed this could be remedied by a difficult and prolonged struggle. Two weapons would be used: guerrilla warfare at home and diplomatic activity abroad, particularly at the United Nations (UN).
Though the first armed assault—which occurred in the region of Batna and the Aurès—was ineffective militarily, it led to the arrest of some 2,000 members of the MTLD who had not been supporters of the rebellion. The armed uprising soon intensified and spread, gradually affecting larger parts of the country, and some regions—notably the northeastern parts of Little Kabylia and parts of the Aurès Mountains—became guerrilla strongholds that were beyond French control. France became more involved in the conflict, drafting some two million conscripts over the course of the war. To counter the spread of the uprising, the French National Assembly declared a state of emergency, first over the affected provinces and later that year over the entire country. Jacques Soustelle arrived in Algiers as the new governor-general in February 1955, but the new plan he announced four months later once again proved to be ineffective.
A decisive turn in the war took place in August 1955 when a widespread armed outbreak in Skikda, north of the Constantine region, led to the killing of nearly 100 Europeans and Muslim officials. Countermeasures by both the French army and settlers claimed the lives of somewhere between 1,200 (according to French sources) and 12,000 (according to Algerian sources) Algerians.
The electoral victory in January 1956 of the Republican Front in France and the premiership of Guy Mollet led to the appointment of the moderate and experienced General Georges Catroux as governor-general. When Mollet personally visited Algiers to prepare the way for the new governor-general, Europeans bombarded him with tomatoes. Yielding to this pressure, he allowed Catroux to withdraw and named in his place the pugnacious socialist Robert Lacoste as resident minister. Lacoste's policy was to rule Algeria through decree, and he gave the military exceptional powers. At the same time, he wanted to give the country a decentralized administrative structure that allowed some autonomy.
A French army of 500,000 troops was sent to Algeria to counter the rebel strongholds in the more distant portions of the country, while the rebels collected money for their cause and took reprisals against fellow Muslims who would not cooperate with them. By the spring of 1956 a majority of previously noncommitted political leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas and Tawfiq al-Madani of the AUMA, had joined FLN leaders in Cairo, where the group had its headquarters.
The first FLN congress took place in August–September 1956 in the Soummam valley between Great and Little Kabylia and brought together the FLN leadership in an appraisal of the war and its objectives. Algeria was divided into six autonomous zones (wilāyāt), each led by guerrilla commanders who later played key roles in the affairs of the country. The congress also produced a written platform on the aims and objectives of the war and set up the National Council for the Algerian Revolution (Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne) and the Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution), the latter acting as the executive branch of the FLN.
Externally, the major event of 1956 was the French decision to grant full independence to Morocco and Tunisia and to concentrate on retaining "French Algeria." The Moroccan sultan and Premier Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, hoping to find an acceptable solution to the Algerian problem, prepared to hold a meeting in Tunis with some important Algerian leaders (including Ben Bella, Boudiaf, Khider, and Aït-Ahmed) who had been guests of the sultan in Rabat. French intelligence officers, however, forced the plane that had been chartered by the Moroccan government to land in Oran instead of Tunis. The Algerian leaders were then arrested and confined in prison in France for the rest of the war. This act hardened the resolve of the rest of the Algerian leadership to keep fighting and provoked an attack on Meknès, Morocco, that cost the lives of 40 French settlers before the Moroccan government could restore order.
Beginning in 1956 and continuing until the summer of the following year, the FLN attempted to paralyze the administration of Algiers through what has come to be known as the Battle of Algiers. Attacks by the FLN against both military and civilian European targets were countered by paratroopers led by General Jacques Massu. To stem the tide of FLN attacks, the French military resorted to the torture and summary execution of hundreds of suspects. The entire leadership of the FLN was eventually eliminated or forced to flee.
The French also cut Algeria off from independent Tunisia and Morocco by erecting barbed-wire fences that were illuminated at night by searchlights. This separated the Algerian resistance bands within the country from some 30,000 armed Algerians who occupied positions between the fortified fences and the actual frontiers of Tunisia and Morocco, from which they drew supplies. These troops had the advantage, however, of a friendly people and sympathetic government as a base; and, though they could not penetrate into Algeria proper, they could harass the French line.
Provoked by these assaults, in February 1958 the French air force bombed the Tunisian frontier village of Sāqiyat Sīdī Yūsuf; a number of civilians were killed, including children from the local school. This led to an Anglo-American mediation mission, which negotiated the withdrawal of French troops from various districts of Tunisia and their sequestration at a naval base in the Tunisian town of Bizerte.
The Maghrib Unity Congress was held at Tangier in April under the auspices of the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist parties and the Algerian FLN, and it recommended the establishment of an Algerian government-in-exile and a permanent secretariat to promote Maghrib unity. Five months later the FLN formed the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisionel de la République Algérienne; GPRA), initially headed by Ferhat Abbas.
By then, however, conditions had been radically changed by events in May 1958; these began as a typical settler uprising—thousands of them attacked the offices of the governor-general and, with the tacit approval of the army officers, called for the integration of Algeria with France and for the return of de Gaulle to power. The following month de Gaulle, in his capacity as prime minister, visited Algiers amid scenes of great enthusiasm. He granted all Muslims the full rights of French citizenship, and on October 30, while in Constantine, he announced a plan to provide adequate schools and medical services for the Algerian population, to create employment for them, and to introduce them into the higher ranks of the public services.
He went even farther the following September when, in anticipation of the opening of the UN General Assembly, he publicly declared that the Algerians had the right to determine their own future. The settler population responded by staging a fresh uprising in January 1960, but it collapsed after nine days from lack of military support. A year later, however, as the prospect of negotiations with the GPRA became more probable, there was another uprising, this time organized by four generals, of whom two—Raoul Salan and Maurice Challe—had previously been commanders in chief in Algeria. De Gaulle remained unshaken, and the rising, lacking support from the army, collapsed after only three days.
Negotiations were opened in France with representatives of the GPRA in May 1961. This body had long been recognized by the Arab and communist states, from which it received aid, though it had never been able to establish itself on Algerian soil. Negotiations were broken off in July, after which Abbas was replaced as premier by the much younger Benyoussef Ben Khedda. Settler opposition was meanwhile coalesced around a body calling itself the Secret Army Organization (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète; OAS), which began to employ random acts of terror in an effort to disrupt peace negotiations.
Negotiations resumed the following March, and an agreement was finally reached. Algeria would become independent, provided only that a referendum, to be held in Algeria by a provisional government, confirmed the desire for it. If approved, French aid would continue, and Europeans could depart, remain as foreigners, or take Algerian citizenship. This announcement produced a violent outburst of terrorism, but in May it subsided as it became obvious that such actions were futile. A referendum held in Algeria in July 1962 recorded some 6,000,000 votes in favour of independence and only 16,000 against. After three days of continuous Algerian rejoicing, the GPRA entered Algiers in triumph as many Europeans prepared to depart.
The human cost of the war remains unknown, particularly on the Algerian side. Some estimates put French military losses at 27,000 killed and civilian losses at 5,000 to 6,000. French sources suggest that casualties among Algerians totaled between 300,000 and 500,000, while Algerian sources claim as many as 1,500,000.
Scores of villages were destroyed; forests were widely damaged; and some 2,000,000 inhabitants were moved to new settlements. The Europeans who left Algeria at the time of independence constituted the great majority of senior administrators and managerial and technical experts, yet many public services remained functional; only some 10,000 French teachers remained, often in isolated posts. With the loss of management on farms and in factories, however, production fell, while unemployment and underemployment reached extreme levels. The mass exodus of the French left the new government with vast abandoned lands. These and the remaining French estates (all French land had been nationalized by 1963) were turned into state farms run by worker committees, which began to produce export crops, notably wine.
Political life was particularly contentious following independence. The leadership of Ben Khedda, the president of the GPRA, was upset by the release from French custody of five GPRA leaders, including Ben Bella. Soon the heads of the provisional government—and, more decisively, the army commanders—split. Houari Boumedienne and his powerful frontier army sided with Ben Bella, who had formed the Political Bureau to challenge the power of the GPRA. Other dominant figures sided with Ben Khedda, while the commanders of the internal guerrillas, who had led the war, opposed all external factions, both military and civilian. Mounting tension and localized military clashes threatened an all-out civil war. The spontaneous demonstrations of a population weary of nearly eight years of war with France interceded between the military factions and saved the country from sliding into more warfare. Through delicate political maneuvering, Ben Bella and the Political Bureau were able to draw up the list of candidates for the National People's Assembly, which was ratified in September 1962 by an overwhelming majority of the electorate. The new assembly asked Ben Bella to form the nation's first government.
With the military support of Boumedienne, Ben Bella asserted his power, fighting a localized armed rebellion led by fellow rebel leader Aït-Ahmed and Colonel Mohand ou el-Hadj in Great Kabylia. Because Ben Bella's personal style of government and his reckless promises of support for revolutionary movements were not conducive to orderly administration, there were also serious divisions within the ruling group. Following vicious political infighting in April 1963, Political Bureau member and FLN secretary-general Khider left the country, taking a large amount of party funds with him. He was assassinated in Madrid several years later. Other dissident leaders were also gradually eliminated, and this left control securely in the hands of Ben Bella and the army commander Boumedienne. Ben Bella's apparent plan to remove Boumedienne and his supporters was foiled in June 1965 when Boumedienne and the army moved first. Ben Bella's erratic political style and poor administrative record made his removal acceptable to Algerians, but the Boumedienne regime began with little popular support.
In the following years Boumedienne moved undramatically but effectively to consolidate his power, with army loyalty remaining the basic element. Efforts to reorganize the FLN met with some success. Boumedienne's cautious and deliberate approach was apparent in constitutional developments as communal elections were held in 1967 and provincial elections in 1969. Elections for the National People's Assembly, however, did not first take place until 1977.
Socialism was pursued diligently under Boumedienne, who launched an agrarian reform in 1971 aimed at breaking up large privately owned farms and redistributing state-held lands to landless peasants organized in cooperatives. The agrarian reform also aimed at grouping peasants in "socialist villages," where they could benefit from modern amenities. The state also exerted complete control over the economy and the country's resources. French petroleum and natural gas interests were nationalized in 1971, and the vast revenues derived from oil sales abroad, especially after the rise in prices in 1973 and thereafter, financed an ambitious industrialization program. Each branch of industry was placed under the control of a state corporation; Société Nationale de Transport et de Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures (Sonatrach), the oil corporation, was the most powerful. Boumedienne's regime hid serious weaknesses, however, notably a one-party system dominated by the FLN that tolerated no dissent.
Following Boumedienne's death in December 1978, there was a short period of indecisiveness about who should succeed him. The army and the FLN both supported Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, another former guerrilla officer, who was confirmed as his replacement in a referendum in February 1979.
Government control of the economy loosened under Bendjedid. State corporations were restructured into smaller companies, and private enterprise was promoted through a series of new regulations and financial incentives. Power was decentralized and gradually passed to elected local assemblies. The press received greater freedom, and restrictions on Algerians traveling abroad were also relaxed. The main foundations of the socialist ideology were increasingly challenged, and by the mid-1980s the state-controlled press was even being encouraged to refute the socialist line.
Bendjedid's rule, however, was marked by serious setbacks. The revolution in Iran in 1979 triggered a continued rise in Islamic militancy, which sometimes broke out as rioting, and the war in Afghanistan spurred greater militant mobilization and direct action. In Algeria the breakdown of the socialist system contributed even further to the rise of Islamists. A sharp fall in petroleum prices in the mid-1980s seriously affected the country's financial capabilities and opened questions regarding the petroleum-based industrialization program conducted under Boumedienne. The regime found itself without the resources it had relied on to pay the wages of its labour force. Basic foods became difficult to find, and social needs—housing in particular—could no longer be fulfilled.
Foreign debt rose tremendously in 1988, and riots continued. Unemployment rates exceeded one-fifth; unofficial figures reported much-higher numbers. Agriculture, already crippled by heavy state interference and bureaucracy, was hit by one of the worst droughts in the country's history. Water shortages were frequent and crippled urban life and industry. This was further compounded by high rates of population growth, which created more demand for social services and food. Public resentment rose, as did awareness of the corruption that existed at all levels in the government.
Late in the year, serious riots broke out in Algiers, Annaba, and Oran. Bendjedid, taking advantage of the discontent, moved to liberalize the system and challenge the FLN political monopoly. A new constitution, approved in February 1989, dropped all references to socialism, removed the one-party state, and initiated political plurality. The emergence of a myriad of parties mainly benefited the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut; FIS). The FIS built on the population's resentment of the incompetence and corruption of the regime and captured clear majorities in the provincial and municipal councils in 1990. Other less-radical Islamic parties never matched the popularity of the FIS.
Relations between the Islamists and the army remained strained. The first round of balloting for the National People's Assembly, held in December 1991, produced a striking victory for the FIS, which won 188 seats, just 28 short of a simple majority and 99 short of the two-thirds majority needed to amend the constitution. There seemed little doubt that the FIS would achieve a majority in the second ballot round, scheduled for January 1992. Instead Bendjedid resigned, and the next day the army intervened to cancel the elections. Mohamed Boudiaf, another former chef historique, was sworn in as president of a ruling Supreme State Council. Boudiaf, who was assassinated in June in Annaba, was succeeded by Ali Kafi. He presided over a country descending into civil war, where murder had already claimed some 1,000 lives, generally civilians but also journalists and past figures of the regime.
Retired general Liamine Zeroual succeeded Kafi in January 1994, but few improvements occurred, and countless more civilians were slaughtered. Those initially implicated in the violence included illegal Islamic groups such as the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé; GIA) and the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut; AIS), but subsequent evidence indicated that much of the violence had been at the hands of elements within the state's security services. Zeroual attempted to legitimize his position by holding presidential elections in November 1995. The elections were to include candidates from all legalized parties, but several of them boycotted the proceedings. Because the FIS had been banned, the results gave Zeroual more than three-fifths of the vote, followed by Mahfoud Nahnah, the moderate Islamist leader of Ḥamās (not connected with the Palestinian organization of the same name), with about one-fourth. The new prime minister, Ahmed Ouyahia, soon reaffirmed his government's commitment to further privatization and liberalization of the economy.
A referendum was held in November 1996 to amend the 1989 constitution. The new document was approved by a majority of the voters, although claims of manipulation were made by the opposition parties. The main change, however, took place in early 1997 when a new government party, the National Democratic Rally (Rassemblement National et Démocratique; RND), was formed. Benefiting from unlimited government support, including the use of official buildings and funds, the RND quickly gained power. In the June elections for the National People's Assembly, the RND won 156 out of 380 seats, and it continued its success in regional and municipal elections, where it won more than half the seats. In December elections for seats in the Council of the Nation, the new upper chamber, the RND again won the majority.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the former foreign minister under Boumedienne, ran for president unopposed in the elections of April 1999, as opposition candidates withdrew after hearing rumours that the elections were rigged. Bouteflika assured the international community that the elections were legitimate and vowed to work with other political parties. Violence ensued, however, and the number of killed, missing, and injured continued to rise. From the mid-1990s several discussions were held between the government and Ḥamās, the FIS, the GIA, and the AIS, among other parties, in order to clear up differences between the groups. In spite of a 1999 peace initiative, at the outset of the 21st century the situation remained unresolved, and violence continued. By that time the civil war, which had begun in 1992, had claimed the lives of some 100,000 civilians and numerous political figures.
In 2004 Bouteflika was reelected by an overwhelming margin; the election was considered by international observers to be generally free from manipulation. The following year Bouteflika put forth the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which was endorsed by referendum in late September. In February 2006 a presidential decree concerning its implementation was approved by the council of ministers. Among those measures were compensation for the families of the "disappeared," an amnesty for state security forces and militias, and restraints on debate and criticism of those forces' conduct during the armed conflict. Islamist groups that surrendered voluntarily would be pardoned, along with those already held or sought—so long as none were implicated in massacres, rapes, or bombings. The measures were opposed not only by victims' families but also by a number of international human rights groups, which jointly stated that the provisions denied justice to victims and their families and violated international law. Although a number of militants took the amnesty as an opportunity to resign their weapons, it was estimated that some 800 militants remained in operation following its expiration in late August. In spite of a general decline in the level of conflict, periodic violence continued.
In November 2008 the Algerian parliament approved a constitutional amendment abolishing presidential term limits. The arrangement permitted Bouteflika the opportunity to run for his third consecutive term, which he easily won in April 2009.
Protests broke out in January 2011 as young Algerians took to the streets to demonstrate against rising food prices, unemployment, and political repression. The protests in Algeria coincided with a wave of mass demonstrations that swept the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011, forcing Tunisian Pres. Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Egyptian Pres. Ḥosnī Mubārak from power. As the demonstrators' calls for Bouteflika to step down intensified, officials argued that the protests were the work of a small minority and not the start of a popular uprising. Even so, officials seemed to offer a concession to the protesters, vowing to lift Algeria's state of emergency, in place since 1992.
Since independence Algeria's foreign policy has been revolutionary in word but pragmatic in deed. The country was a haven for Third World guerrilla and revolutionary movements in its early years, and, while some militancy persists, Bendjedid and subsequent leaders have moved away from that stance. Throughout the 1960s and '70s Algeria supported North Vietnam, and from 1975 it supported Vietnam, decolonization in Africa, and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. The question of Palestine remained a central preoccupation, equal after 1975 with the Western Sahara issue. Yet, while Algeria continued to support the Palestine Liberation Organization, it also took a decisive role in mediating the release of U.S. hostages in Iran in 1981. Throughout the Cold War, Algeria sought to play the leading role in establishing a Third World alternative that was not aligned to the Eastern or Western bloc. The country also tried to obtain high prices for its petroleum within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which it joined in 1969, but more often found itself at odds with other members.
Relations with neighbouring Morocco have often been strained. A short border war that broke out in the fall of 1963 (the area in dispute being rich in deposits of iron ore) was resolved through the intervention of the Organization of African Unity. A rapprochement achieved in 1969–70 broke down over Morocco's efforts to absorb Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara), as Algeria supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario) in resisting Morocco. The strained relations, which kept the two countries on the brink of an all-out war, were connected in part to the somewhat revolutionary leanings of Boumedienne and his antipathy for the Moroccan monarchy. Support for the Polisario continued under Bendjedid, but problems between the two countries gradually eased. Bendjedid and King Hassan II of Morocco met to discuss a possible resolution for the Western Sahara issue in May 1987, and diplomatic relations were restored the following year. Friction reemerged, however, notably in 1993 when Hassan stated that it would have been better if the FIS had been allowed to gain power in Algeria. Tensions over the Western Sahara intensified in the mid-1990s and remained an unresolved issue at the start of the 21st century.
The Arab Maghrib Union (AMU), established in 1989, not only improved relations between the Maghrib states—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—but also underscored the need for concerted policies. The AMU sought to bring the countries closer together by creating projects of shared interests. Initially there was some sense of enthusiasm regarding a project that included road and railway networks between these states. Tensions between member states, however, have substantially increased, and shared interest in carrying out joint projects has faltered.
Relations with France have frequently been contentious. Disputes developed soon after independence over the Algerian expropriation of abandoned French property (1963) and its nationalization of French petroleum interests (1971). There were also problems with the Algerian migrants living and working in France, who consistently remained at the bottom of the economic scale and were subject to ethnic prejudice. After Algerian independence France banned the importation of Algerian wine, deeming it competitive with its own production. In response Boumedienne uprooted and removed grapevines on large stretches of land. Throughout the 1980s the renegotiation of natural gas prices constituted another source of disagreement between the two countries, although Algeria obtained some concessions. In the 1990s the volatile political situation and violence in Algeria greatly affected the French, who suffered more casualties than any other nationality in the country. This terror reached Paris in the mid-1990s when Algerians set off a number of bombs in the city. Economic ties, however, have remained basically intact and include reciprocal investment agreements. Trade between Algeria and other Western and Southeast Asian countries has grown substantially and has reduced France's importance as a trading partner.
As the role of the European Union (EU) widens, so does the link between Algeria and the member states in that organization. The Barcelona Conference initiative in November 1995 established a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, bringing together the EU and the countries bordering the Mediterranean in North Africa (excluding Libya). The partnership sought to achieve political stability in the region, create a zone of shared prosperity through economic and financial cooperation, and establish a free-trade zone early in the 21st century. There have also been specific European financial efforts directed toward Algeria to fund industrial restructuring and privatization.
Algeria initially was reluctant to accept the intervention of the UN in 1997 to help deal with the civilian massacres. But eventually a high-level UN delegation was sent to Algeria in July 1998 to meet with various parties in an effort to put a halt to the violence, which had declined enough by mid-2000 that Algeria's borders with Tunisia and Morocco could be reopened.


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Graduate Student Associations
Graduate Student Association
Devoted to increasing interaction among graduate students, events sponsored include orientation get-togethers, class socials, an annual picnic and the GSA-sponsored annual speaker each May.
Faculty-Student Association
The Association administers scholarships, loan funds and student activity fees, and sponsors special projects.
Upstate Student Government
The student government for all students at SUNY Upstate. The purpose and function of this organization is to serve as a forum for student opinion, to facilitate cooperation and communication with the administration, faculty and community and to collect and allocate the student activity fee to classes, events, programs and recognized organizations.

subset: commoncrawl


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Dinner and a Movie: Back to School
There's no better time to throw a pool party than during the heat of August. For a fun theme, treat your guests to a total tropical experience that will make them feel like they're on vacation. Customized invitations, colorful decorations and other party treats will transform your backyard into an island escape. Flip through our slideshow for some great ideas.
Let everyone know about the party quickly and inexpensively by sending an electronic invitation using Evite. There are plenty of pool party-themed invites to choose from—once you've done so, you can customize the card to your liking us
Dinner and a Movie: Foodie Night


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The Church of Scientology has been in the news recently (see here and here) with the publication of Lawrence's Wright's book Going Clear: Scientology, Hollywood, and the Prison of Belief that exposes the seamy underbelly of the organization and its cruel and despotic leader David Miscavige.
Stephen Colbert devoted two segments of his show on Wednesday to this topic. Colbert is a practicing Roman Catholic who even teaches in Sunday school but at the same time he seems to be quite aware that his own church's beliefs and its practices are pretty bizarre and differ from those of Scientology only in degree. He seems to be one of those people who are so wedded to their faith that it is hard to break free even though they are not blind to the church's faults or even its crimes. I can relate to some extent because I too was like that, making excuses and finding increasingly contorted reasons to continue to believe until I finally escaped.
In the first segment he discusses the contents of Wright's book.
The Colbert Report
Get More: Colbert Report Full Episodes,Political Humor & Satire Blog,Video Archive
In the second, he interviews Wright, where he explains how Scientology managed to force the IRS to accept them as a religion and thus escape their tax liability of around a billion dollars.
The Colbert Report
Get More: Colbert Report Full Episodes,Political Humor & Satire Blog,Video Archive
(This clip was aired on February 6, 2013. To get suggestions on how to view clips of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report outside the US, please see this earlier post.)


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Why is it we need to drink so much?
I just got home from a football match(soccer for you Americans) and I'm sittin here to scared to lie down and close my eyes in case I throw up.
All I drunk is 8 pints and on the way home 1 litre of vodka.
Is this to much???
Do we English drink to much, and why do I feel proud of this??


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Follow the directions in the following article, section k through p:
I too have had fun and games with the Michelin Pilot Activ. If you follow my advice in k through p, it should go on fairly easily.
BTW...using anything over around 60 or 70 psi is VERY VERY dangerous. The tire can explode;........but the RIM CAN TOO.
Having aluminum shrapnel flying around is not a great idea. THINK about what that 100PSI really meant.


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Animal Species:Orange Leaf-nosed Bat
Orange Leaf-nosed Bats are very sensitive to people disturbing them in their roosts. They will often not return to a roost if it is disturbed more than a few times.
Standard Common Name
Orange Leaf-nosed Bat
Orange Leaf-nosed Bats prefer warm humid caves, although some have been found in hollow tree trunks and roost together in colonies that can be as small as 20 or as large as a few thousand bats.
Feeding and Diet
Orange Leaf-nosed Bats feed mainly on moths, but also on beetles, weevils, bugs, wasps and ants. They often feed close to their roost site, returning to the roost several times during the night's feeding.
Economic/social impacts
Orange Leaf-nosed Bats are vulnerable to disturbance from human visitors to cave roosts, destruction of caves by mining, and loss of feeding habitat by clearing and land degradation from agriculture.
- Species:
- aurantius
- Genus:
- Rhinonicteris
- Family:
- Hipposideridae
- Order:
- Chiroptera
- Subclass:
- Eutheria
- Subphylum:
- Vertebrata
- Phylum:
- Chordata
- Kingdom:
- Animalia
Last Updated:
Tags bats, mammals, flight, flying, eutherians, placentals, vertebrates, bats in Australia, identification,
2 comments
Yes , loss of habitat is a leading cause of the decline of a species.


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Carved wooden head of Henry V. English, about 1688-91 (XVII.44)
Carved wooden head of Henry V. English, about 1688-91 (XVII.44)
Plaster model of jousting knights in the New Horse Armoury. 1870s (XVII.29) © Private collection 2013
'Interior of the Horse Armoury', anon engraving, The Penny Magazine, 1836 © Royal Armouries 2013
The Horse Armoury, by an unknown artist, early 19th century
Figure of William the Conqueror, detail from a watercolour of the Line of Kings. Early 19th century (I.69 )
|Object Provenance:
|Object Number:
Henry V is most famous for his victory against the French at the battle of Agincourt where the English longbowmen triumphed.
This success was celebrated in the Tower of London guidebooks where Henry V was described in the 1753 guide as the 'warlike and Victorious Henry the Vth, who by his conquests in France gained immortal glory'. This was echoed in at least one London guidebook, London and its Environs Described, published in 1761, which used the phrase 'victorious Henry V'.
However the guidebooks give no detail about the armour that the figure of Henry V was wearing, what weapon he was holding or any other detail to represent his successes. Prints and drawings from 1800-25 give an impression of Henry V's figure in a white armour and holding a sword.
Samuel Meyrick, the expert brought in to re-display the Tower collections in the 1826-7, records that Henry V was one of the representations removed as the suit of armour worn by the figure did not originate from the period in which Henry V had lived.
Nonetheless we believe that the wooden head used for the figure of Henry V has survived. It is made of oak and was probably carved between 1688 and 1691. Over time it has been stripped and cut down, with none of the original paint surviving. Though down to the basic wood, it has a distinctive long, straight, aquiline nose. Compared to the other heads there appears to be a slight smile on Henry V's face – perhaps this is a sign of the carver's attempt to acknowledge Henry's victories?
Henry V is represented in the present Line of Kings display in the White Tower by this carved wooden head from his figure.
|Object Provenance:
|Object Number:


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Toward Collaborative Evidence Based Information Practices: Organisation and Leadership Essentials
This commentary is based on my key note for the EBLIP conference held in 2009 in Stockholm, Sweden. The title was: Bridging the gap between users and systems – the potential contribution of Social Informatics to Evidence Based Library and Information Practice. In the following commentary, I focus on the application of social informatics principles to develop a collaborative evidence based approach grounded in shared workplace leadership. My remarks highlight some main contributions from the field of library and information science and social informatics and conclude with implications for practice, including further research.
library organisation leadership model; systems thinking; information and communication practice; viable system model
Full Text:PDF
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18438/B8203H
Evidence Based Library and Information Practice (EBLIP) | EBLIP on Twitter


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Bach's Lunch: Piano Man II: Chuck Clevenger - February 22, 2014 - Calendar - Cedarville University
Bach's Lunch: Piano Man II: Chuck Clevenger
February 22, 2014 from 12:00 p.m.
Dr. Charles Clevenger will perform a lunch concert. Bach's Lunch is a series of lunch time concerts for the music lover. Bring a sack lunch (water only, please) to the Recital Hall and enjoy an informal concert while you dine. Hope you can join us for the fun! (Warning: Concerts may or may not contain the music of Bach.)
Campus Facilities
Dixon Ministry Center Recital Hall [Tour]
Performance, Student, Parents, Musical Recitals, Music and Worship, Staff, Faculty


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Gene Chague: What did they see: a bobcat or a panther?
Bobcats are in the news lately thanks in part to the excellent Eagle article written on Nov. 27 by John Sakata ("Bobcats in the backyard"). It featured great pictures of some cats, which were taken by Raymond Jacoub.
Big cat stories always grab our attention. Let me relate an old one. It was 65 years ago (Dec. 7, 1945) that the North Adams Transcript broke the following story about two local hunters who were reportedly chased by an animal thought to be a panther.
Charles Hunt and Ruth Godfrey, both of Henderson Road, Williamstown, went hunting about 6 a.m., in order to be in the woods for the opening hour of hunting. According to the article, while slowly making their way through thick underbrush, they heard a crackling noise off to one side. Taking a position underneath a large pine tree, they stood quietly, awaiting developments. The crackling noise continued, but seemed each time to come from a different location, causing the hunters to come to the conclusion that they were being circled by some animal. The deep shadows in the forest did not permit them to make out any form, but the circling noise persisted.
Suddenly there was a blood-curdling screech, which Godfrey described as "making your hair stand on end and as if some woman was being horribly murdered." This convinced the couple that the encircling animal was a member of the cat family. Again the blood-curdling cry resounded through the woods, but this time much closer. At this time, Godfrey decided it was time to leave. She started on a run for the clearing behind her home about a half-mile away, calling to her companion to follow, which he did.
She said that she did not want to meet up with any animal that could utter such cries when she was armed with only a 410 shotgun and her fellow hunter with a 12 gauge, also when the visibility was so poor. After reaching home, they waited for full daylight to re-enter the forest. There, they found that the animal had followed them into the clearing. Tracks of the animal were as large as a man's fist and it took 15 foot leaps. Following its trail, they learned that in running, the animal's tail trailed in the snow.
After studying various animal books, the conclusion was reached that it must have been a panther, because of the trail signs. Godfrey's brother, James Godfrey, hunting further back in the woods that day, came across further traces of the animal where it had stalked deer.
On Dec. 19, 1945, the Transcript reported that Charles Hunt shot the animal about 9 p.m. the evening before. He had trailed it from the chicken coop of his residence to the Godfrey wagon shed, where a bobcat had been cornered by a dog. The bobcat weighed 31 lbs. The newspaper caption read, "Williamstown Panther is now dead bobcat."
Nevertheless, on Saturday evening, Jan. 26, 1946, from 8-8:15 p.m., the couple appeared on the Sportsman's Column of the Air, a radio show aired by WBRK in Pittsfield, where they discussed their hair-raising experience. They were interviewed by attorney Frank Albright of Great Barrington; Jim Hurley, outdoor writer for the New York Daily Mirror and participant of the weekly radio show Hunting and Fishing Club of the Air; and George Wiles of the Williamstown Fish and Game Protective Association.
The radio show took place in the crowded auditorium of WBRK, which had a seating capacity of about 300. A number of interesting gifts were presented to them, including a two-day, all-expenses-paid trip to the National Sportsman's Show in New York City; new Trail Blazer Wrist Compasses by the Illinois Merchandise Finance Company of Pittsfield; and other items of outdoor equipment donated by local dealers. Godfrey was presented a corsage. Hurley appeared in person to present the certificate for the trip to the New York Sportsman's Show.
The couple admitted that the panther experience brought them to the realization that they were in love. Following Wiles' announcement of the couple's upcoming marriage, they were photographed by New York, Boston, Springfield and Pittsfield papers. The Berkshire Evening Eagle featured a front page picture of the couple in its Jan. 29, 1946 edition, with the caption "Panther Romance Pays Off." The Transcript's caption was, "Williamstown Panther appears employee of Cupid."
Regardless, Wiles still felt that the animal they encountered was a panther. He claimed to have seen one after the bobcat had been killed in the same vicinity, and there were similar subsequent reports by others. Nothing like a good " big cat" story, eh? They live forever.
Many thanks go to Lew Brown of Pittsfield for bringing this story to our attention. Lew's father was Richard (Dick) Brown, who was the Northern Berkshire Reporter for the Springfield Republican in those days. He received his information from George Wiles.
Incidentally, the WBRK sportsman's radio program was aired weekly and sponsored by KFC CERO-MEATO, nationally known dog food, and was conducted by Roland Mitchell.
Shotgun deer hunting season ended Saturday, and the harvest results have not yet been released by MassWildlife. Monday marks the opening of the Primitive Firearms deer hunting season, and it runs to Dec. 31. Happy hunting and keep your gunpowder dry.
Monday and this Thursday from 5-9 p.m., the Lee Sportsmen's Association will offer an NRA Basic Pistol Safety course. The cost is $100 per student, which includes an individual membership in the club, and students will receive both NRA and Massachusetts certificates. Contact Larry Karlquist at (413) 442-7807 or email firstname.lastname@example.com for further information.
To reach Gene Chague:
(413) 637-1818.
If you'd like to leave a comment (or a tip or a question) about this story with the editors, please email us. We also welcome letters to the editor for publication; you can do that by filling out our letters form and submitting it to the newsroom.


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by Denise Rolark Barnes
In her first media interview, Cerita Battles, senior vice president, head of Diverse Segments for Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, sat down with The Washington Informer Publisher Denise Rolark Barnes last month to answer questions about the national homeownership crisis. With foreclosures slowing down, interest rates falling and home purchases on the increase, The Washington Informer wanted to know how Battles, through her role at Wells Fargo, is helping low-income residents and minorities acquire new homes.
Describe what lenders learned as a result of the recent homeownership crisis?
First, Wells Fargo learned that it needed to always put customers first — we need to make sure we are educating them and preparing them for sustainable homeownership. Second, as lenders, we have a responsibility to be responsible; to remember that quality is important; making sure we're doing all the right things, asking all the right questions, meeting the customers' needs and providing the right solutions that cater to those needs. Third, we need to create an infrastructure that supports the commitment. The organization has to be a responsible lender. When hiring we must be dedicated to making sure we are hiring the right people; folks committed to doing their job with integrity to the lending practices, and making sure we're out there representing the community and Wells Fargo, well. We [Wells Fargo] are doing those things well from a lending standpoint.


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I'll make this short, 7 minutes left in the 3rd Q Sunday vs. Bulls; the Raptors, as a team, suck this year. Bosh isn't playing, whatever, he had another meaningless, statistically successful year. Every single time they face a big game, big play, big quarter, anything of remote importance, they fail. They don't fail to superior opposition, they fail because of a total lack of substance. Now, in the biggest game they've played in three years, they are down 19 to a very beatable Chicago Bulls team. The ONLY excitement I feel like I have felt this year is when Jack Armstrong or Leo are pondering whether the Raps can finish closing the gap when they 'narrow the lead to 9'.
If Triano isn't fired in the off-season and something isn't done about defense and competitive fire in the line-up this will be my last season watching this failure of a franchise. It's all you can do as a fan, my only voice is forums and not buying/watching/attending anything Raptors.
I couldn't make it short I guess, just too frustrated.


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It's all in the mind as Wallabies put England away
LONDON: Robbie Deans has defended his record as Wallabies coach and praised Australia for harnessing the mental aspect of their game to claim a fightback 20-14 victory over England at Twickenham on Saturday.
Deans said getting their attitude right in the lead-up to the Test allowed the Wallabies to turn their fortunes around after their 33-6 flogging at the hands of the French the week before.
When asked if he knew the key to harnessing the Wallabies' mental game in the long term, to even out recent fluctuations, Deans defended the team's results. ''You say fluctuations but this is the third year in a row we've been ranked second in the world,'' he said. ''The first two years we went from fifth to third, [then stayed on] third, [then] second, second, second. That's consistency. We'd like to crack No.1, we're the closest [country] to doing that, but we're not there.''
There was visible joy on the field after the full-time bell sounded on Saturday afternoon and extensive celebrations in the dressing room afterwards as the Wallabies digested a pressure-relieving win with a gutsy effort against England.
Man of the match Michael Hooper, whose efforts at the breakdown and in attack played a huge part in the Wallabies' dominance, said the squad was capable of that effort every week. ''There is no science to it, it's about doing an 80-minute performance and getting that consistency, for 80 minutes,'' Hooper said. ''We are good enough to do that every week.''
The danger for the Wallabies is a repeat of the mental cooling off that brought them undone in Paris. A defining draw against the All Blacks was wasted as the Wallabies found themselves without answers to the questions France asked of them at Stade de France.
Deans said the coaching staff and players tried hard each week to not surrender the psychological edge required to eke out back-to-back wins against Test teams.
''[Attitude] is a key component, particularly at this level, because it's just relentless, it [can be] slightly off and you're gone. The intensity in the game is so real that if you're not up for it, forget it,'' he said. ''It's important you enjoy what you do as well, because it's like in the game itself, not everything goes your way. It's about ensuring you get up and keep going and don't go missing. Post-match has the same challenge. There's another Test match coming.''
That would be Italy, hovering just outside the top 10 and for that reason a classic death trap for these Wallabies, who posed for photographs with a beer-filled Cook Cup after their win in London.
''They'll be lining up for a crack, they're a very competitive international side and they've put us under the pump on a couple of occasions, often in Italy when we tend to play on tabletops,'' Deans said. ''Set-piece will be big. It will be another Test match.''
With Pat McCabe on his way home after scans revealed a fracture in the centre's neck, Deans will be heartened by the performance of the back line, which played with cohesion and creativity against England.
Ben Tapuai and Adam Ashley-Cooper partnered well in the midfield with five-eighth Kurtley Beale, wing Nick Cummins's efforts in attack were razor sharp and effective, while fullback Berrick Barnes patrolled confidently in the back.
''Berrick, he's legit,'' Cummins said. ''He's secure, he's safe at the back there, he'll take the high balls, which brings a lot of trust in the back three there as well. You know he's there, he's fit and he can tackle, so you know he's got your back. I thought he was very safe at the back there and we benefited from it.''
The Wallabies' forward pack was a different eight to the group that went missing against France a week earlier.
Ben Alexander's insertion into the front row had immediate impact but so, once again, did the entire pack's mental game.
''There's no secret the scrum is a massive booster,'' Hooper said. ''If the scrum is doing well, then your tails are up and you're going forward in all aspects of the field. From last week's [performance], it was a massive area.''
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WASHINGTON, Sept. 25 (UPI) -- The aging U.S. population will have a broad, long-term economic impact, particularly for federal programs for the elderly, the National Research Council says.
A congressionally mandated report from the council said people over age 65 making up an increasingly large percentage of the population is not a temporary phenomenon associated with the aging of the baby boom generation but a pervasive trend that is here to stay.
Long-term effects on all generations will be mediated by how -- and how quickly -- the nation responds, the study authors said.
"The bottom line is that the nation has many good options for responding to population aging," said Roger Ferguson, chief executive officer of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association -- College Retirement Equities Fund and co-chairman of the committee that wrote the report. "Nonetheless, there is little doubt that there will need to be major changes in the structure of federal programs, particularly those for health."
Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid -- the cost of which currently amounts to roughly 40 percent of all federal spending -- are on unsustainable paths, the report said.
Because of overall longer life expectancy and lower birth rates, these programs will have more beneficiaries with relatively fewer workers contributing to support them in the coming decades, it said.
"The nation needs to rethink its outlook and policies on working and retirement," said Ronald Lee, professor of demography and economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and committee co-chairman. "Although 65 has conventionally been considered a normal retirement age, it is an increasingly obsolete threshold for defining old age and for setting benefits for the elderly."


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OCEAN CITY – There will not be a happy ending for the Gakurias family this year, as scoot coupes will not be allowed on any local roadway after the City Council killed an ordinance that would have allowed them on city owned roads.
The council took steps to get more restrictive on one hot button issue, helmets on scooters, on Monday, but feared that getting less restrictive on another, scoot coupes, would be hypocritical or counterproductive. Much to Councilman's Jim Hall's chagrin, the ordinance to allow scoot coupes on city-owned roadways died in a 4-3 vote (Council President Joe Mitrecic and Council members Lloyd Martin, Doug Cymek, and Mary Knight in opposition).
"I just feel bad for the [Gakurias] family in this instance," said Hall, who fought on Monday night for both the family who owns Fun Cycles on 26th Street and the helmet ordinance. "We are working on safety on our roadways and we are putting helmets and shoes on people, but I think [scoot coupes] are safer than scooters."
Hall, normally conservative in the name of safety on Ocean City streets, was an adamant supporter of the scoot coupes and the proprietors of the business, at one point proclaiming, "I'm just trying to get a fourth vote for these guys here." His efforts were to no avail, as the slight majority thought adding these vehicles to the town's already crowded roadways, namely in the area of Baltimore Ave. between 15th and 33rd streets, was entirely too risky.
"There's a tremendous amount of delivery trucks that drive in that area and you could put a flag 20 feet in the air attached to those things, but if you are driving a truck, chances are, you aren't going to see it, so I can't have someone getting run over on my conscience," Mitrecic said.
Knight visited Fun Cycles last week and sat in one of the scoot coupes and determined that she didn't feel comfortable with them being in the flow of regular traffic on Baltimore Ave.
"I was surprised to see how low to the ground they were, and I don't think that I would rent one," said Knight. "I really wouldn't feel comfortable with them being restricted to Baltimore Avenue because on the southbound side, you only have one lane in certain spots."
The ordinance would have allowed the scoot coupes to operate from 15th street to 33rd streets on Baltimore Ave. only, as state law prohibits the coupes, which are classified as a three-wheeled mini-bike, from being driven on or crossing over state roads.
In essence, ideas at the Police Commission level last week about potentially allowing the scoot coupes to be operated on St. Louis Avenue were thwarted because the Gakurias' store sits on the ocean side of Coastal Highway, according to City Solicitor Guy Ayres' interpretation of the state law.
"I just want to go on record saying that if we lock them into the areas of 15-32nd streets we are just asking for trouble and it seems like we are setting ourselves up for a catastrophe," said Cymek. "Everyone I talk to in law enforcement agrees that this is a mistake."
Oddly enough, the issue was deemed "dead in the water", according to Jim Hall, after Maryland District Court Judge Daniel Mumford ruled the coupes to be illegal in June, but the issue was put back into proverbial play by the Ocean City Police Department in recent weeks.
"I'm a little disconcerted that the police went back there and said they could work it out, and let [the Gakurias family] think that if they waited a few more weeks it would work out," explained Hall. "I feel bad for the family because this was dead in the water, the department brought it back and now nothing is going to change for these guys."
Peter Gakurias claims that he and his brother Kozmas had done everything necessary prior to buying six scoot coupes for upwards of $40,000 in order to make sure that they were legal.
He cited in a prior interview that he spoke with state, local and town government and police officials who all informed him that the coupes were legal before being told otherwise, and then forced to remove them from the roads in early June.
"I know you guys are concerned for the safety, but we are more concerned for the safety," said Gakurias at this week's meeting. "When we rented these vehicles for six weeks, we had zero accidents, but we've had 40 accidents with the two-wheel scooters. These are very safe."
Last week Chief Bernadette DiPino praised the Gakurias brothers for cooperating with the police, but on Monday, the OCPD announced it was taking a "neutral stance" on the issue, according to Captain Michael Colbert.
"We aren't advocating them, but we aren't going against them either," said Colbert. "There's good and bad points to these things."
Gakurias told council that DiPino had asked him to install an eight-foot flag from the highest point of the back of the coupe to increase visibility to other vehicles on the roadways, as well as place maps on the dashboard of the coupes explaining where the drivers would legally be allowed to navigate to in the downtown area.
"I don't see the difference between the scooters and bikes on the highway and these things," said Councilwoman Margaret Pillas. "Sometimes laws don't make a lot of sense when you let little kids with training wheels on the highways with no flags, but you single these out. It's not right."
Colbert said that the Gakurias family received "erroneous" information from a lower level police officer about the coupes being "allowable on Maryland roads" and noted that the stance in state agencies about the future for scoot coupes seems solid.
"The State Highway Administration (SHA) and the Department of Motorized Vehicles (DMV) were adamantly opposed to these, so at this point, it's not going to be sponsored or promoted by any of the state agencies in future legislature," said Colbert.
In the end, Hall may have cried foul but the majority of council remained skeptical of the three-wheeled vehicles.
"It's a safer vehicle than a scooter," said Hall. "I would hope that if one of my kids rented something, it would be one of these things, rather than a scooter because I don't see these things as being any less safe than anything else on the road."
Mayor Rick Meehan said that passing the ordinance would have "solved one problem, but created another". He thought the ordinance needed more work but did show some remorse for the Gakurias family.
"I know you got your hopes up, and I think you are good operators, but sometimes it's not all about the money, it's about what is safe," he said.


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Read the full story here Web Link posted Friday, October 19, 2012, 12:00 AM
Town Square
Council says no way to Chick-Fil-A
Original post made on Oct 19, 2012
Read the full story here Web Link posted Friday, October 19, 2012, 12:00 AM
a resident of Shoreline West
on Oct 19, 2012 at 9:27 am
This council, except for Means just doesn't get it. We are busy here, carting kids back and forth. No matter what you try to legislate, we are for the most part going to continue to drive our cars, face it. If you want mass transit, move to Europe. It is not feasible here. This whole thing couldn't come at a better time, a relevant time to vote out these so called representatives. Furthermore if you keep voting to stifle businesses, thereby reducing tax revenue, you did it to yourselves, cut your own expenses, do now even think about trying to raise my taxes or fees!
a resident of Monta Loma
on Oct 20, 2012 at 9:52 am
I ride mass transit and bicycle as often as I can. I applaud the efforts to make this even more feasible!
a resident of Old Mountain View
on Oct 20, 2012 at 9:05 pm
Believe it or not, the rejection of a drive-thru at this location does not mean that cars are not allowed to drive on El Camino. It's a terrible idea that would create safety and traffic problems in that neighborhood. Then, if you consider a possible 'grand boulevard' scenario, then it really doesn't make any sense.
I'm sorry that the landowner cannot charge high rent for their location. Unfortunately, there are quite a few stretches along El Camino that cannot charge high rent as they don't get the foot traffic. If property owners would get together and merge their land into larger multi-tenant shopping areas, then they could generate synergy to drive more traffic (read $$$) for the tenants and *then* the rents can go up.
a resident of Old Mountain View
on Oct 20, 2012 at 10:06 pm
Busy drive-thrus are a terrible traffic hazard if they allow cars to back-up out onto the street. Other drive-thrus like this cause a lot of accidents. Chick-Fil-A thinks their customers are too fat and lazy to get out of their cars. Is that really true?
a resident of Shoreline West
on Oct 23, 2012 at 7:33 pm
Thankfully, the shared driveway that is used by In n Out burger and some office bldg that dumps cars right into the backup at Grant/237/El Camino is completely free of these problems. I credit the city council for their brave and coherent action on both locations.
a resident of Whisman Station
on Oct 25, 2012 at 2:20 pm
Do council members really care about children inhaling fumes from cars?
There is a newer child-care center on E. Dana & Moorpark right above the 237 off-ramp.
Now THERE are some fumes to inhale all day. (& noise/traffic)
Who approved that business to be built and operate?
The biking/cycling is dangerous all around E. Dana.
Its not all about El Camino Real's traffic. And drive-thrus for food.
The child-care center has a crazy drop off and well as the Gold Star Gymnastics on E. Dana.
a resident of Sylvan Park
on Nov 19, 2012 at 6:10 pm
Shirley has it right
The only good thing about the child-care center it has a big fence to keep the kids in and there is no where anyone would want to walk to so no pedestrian traffic.
The parking allotment allowed especially for the Gold Star Gymnastics was under estimated. Theyneed about 50% more space as it over flows onto the nearby buildings. Lucky most are empty / not utilize. As the Mtn View poor building plan and approvals system seem to drive out business. Like the Hackers DOJO next door.


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N.M. Corruption Probe
In November, New Mexico State Auditor Hector Balderas announced that his office had launched a formal investigation into possible fraud and collusion between former New Mexico Corrections Department (NMCD) employees and a handful of construction companies. Elements of the ongoing investigation preclude the mention of some specific information; Balderas, nevertheless, recently granted Correctional News an exclusive interview concerning the probe's progress.
CN: Can you tell us, specifically, what your investigation entails and who's involved?
Balderas: We're specifically focused on potential conflicts of interest, collusion, excessive billing and kickbacks between former NMCD employees and 3 to 4 construction companies that we've deemed high risk. We want to independently verify, of course, whether or not that bid rigging or excessive billing took place – and we want to see if the NMCD paid any taxpayer expenditures without receiving a return benefit. In other words, we have knowledge that this may have happened – that [several parties] were manipulating the fair-bid process and engaging in kickbacks once the bids were secured.
CN: How did you come about that knowledge – what was the catalyst for the investigation?
Balderas: Two things. First, we set up a fraud hotline about a year and a half ago, and news relevant to the current investigation was called in as an anonymous tip. My special investigations unit promptly opened a file. Not long after, the NMCD secretary expressed reservations about one of NMCD's former employees. They did the right thing and referred the matter to us for further review.
CN: So it was a very above-board move by the NMCD to report the potential fraud?
Balderas: Yes. You really hope that issues of corruption are addressed like this, that industries and organizations are able to self-identify possible fraud. They may not be able to verify it – that's where we come in – but they can report suspicious behavior and transactions.
I should add that the hotline has been invaluable for us. In many ways, it's a better means to catching fraud than some of the financial audit reports, which are documents that not many people know how to read.
Anyway, those two things triggered the first control check. Additional red flags have since been raised after meeting with independent auditors that had audited the NMCD in the past, studying expenditure patterns and meeting with management at the NMCD. We've identified at least $10 to $11 million worth of contracts that need to be tested for compliance.
CN: Can you explain, more specifically, an example of the illegal behavior?
Balderas: I can say generally that laws and regulations are in place to ensure that states and taxpayers receive the best possible services for the money they spend. It doesn't mean the cheapest, it just means that there's a competitive bid process that has integrity and the goal of that process is absolutely to hire the best vendor for a given job.
If there's a manipulation of that process, the end result could be that some of the better firms are not getting the work they should be getting, forcing an outcome which may not be in the best interest of the taxpayers.
When you hear bid rigging, that's where you typically get the collusion. You get an internal state or federal professional whose primary goal is to have no bias or attachment to any of the external vendors, and all of a sudden that official manipulates things to benefit a particular vendor and not the agency [he's supposed to represent].
Not only is it illegal for a vendor to engage in bid rigging, of course, but it's also illegal for a public official to receive any type of personal gain throughout the process. So we are going to be making sure that no one benefited from this, that there was no personal gain achieved by any officials.
We're also concerned that there may have been excessive billing once contracts were awarded. Say, for example, the max contingency for a service is $20,000: it looks a little too convenient when someone has billed exactly that amount for a service, especially when there may not be proof that that service was rendered.
CN: So beyond the anonymous tip and the note filed by the NMCD, you've already identified very specific areas where fraud allegedly occurred?
Balderas: All I can say is that we've since noticed suspicious expenditure patterns. We'll be testing whether or not services that were contracted were in fact performed. In addition, we'll be asking whether an official conducted overrides: Something like, "Hey, why don't you just bill me the $1.7 million instead of $1.5 million?" – and then there is no documentation or justification for why. In some cases, your grocery store list might have more justification than some of the things we see.


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Summaries of EU Legislation
Summaries of EU legislation: direct access to the main summaries page.
- Archived: true
Action plan to combat drugs (1995-1999)
To establish general guidelines for future Union measures to combat drugs.
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on a European Union Action Plan to combat drugs (1996-2000) [COM(94) 234 final - Not published in the Official Journal].
A global multi-annual (1996-2000) action plan under which the Union will implement a global strategy to combat drugs, aimed at reducing demand, combating illicit drug trafficking and taking action against non-member countries involved in the production and transit of drugs.
This plan is an extension of the first two European plans preceding the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which were approved by the European Councils in Rome (December 1990) and Edinburgh (December 1992).
The structure of the Action Plan is as follows:
a) Reducing demand
Pursuant to Article 152 (formerly Article 129) of the TEU, the Community action programme on drug addiction aims to encourage and facilitate activities involving high-risk groups in particular situations, to promote the identification, development, testing and use of the best methods to ensure the dissemination of information, to promote education and training initiatives with the aim of developing strategies for prevention, to support work on early detection and on advice for drug users and to promote social rehabilitation and reintegration.
b) Combating trafficking
The new action plan proposes to develop and consolidate existing Community legislation and to implement Title VI of the TEU. Results have been obtained at Community level as a result on the one hand of measures carried out in combating the diversion of precursors and psychotropic substances and, on the other, of the Directive on "money laundering". The Commission advocates reinforcing this activity by using existing instruments (development of electronic mail networks to speed up the exchange of information, etc.), by promoting cooperation with non-member countries (taking Community legislation and other international agreements as a model) and by assessing the practical implementation of these measures.
Title VI (cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs) introduces a new obligation for Member States of the Union to cooperate on matters of common interest in judicial, customs and police affairs (Article K.1.7, 8) and 9)). EUROPOL, once established, is to focus its activity initially on combating drug trafficking.
Pursuant to Article K.1.4, aimed at combating drug addiction, the Commission is formulating suggestions with a view to complementing measures currently in progress, namely:
- interdisciplinary exchanges between professionals and organisations responsible for reducing drug supply and demand;
- establishment of a European forum for inter-city exchanges and cooperation;
- cooperation in the area of the relationship between drugs and criminality.
c. International measures
The EU is to supplement its action plan by initiatives outside the Union, making use of Community instruments and of the new opportunities offered by the CFSP (common foreign and security policy). At Community level, measures should involve the following areas:
- continued EU participation in international efforts (UN international drug monitoring programme, the Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe, etc);
- at the bilateral level, reinforcing national and regional strategies in cooperation witih certain countries or regions representing a particular risk due to their proximity to the Union;
- development of cooperation by including clauses relating to combating drugs in EU agreements with non-member countries;
- including cooperation in combating drugs among the priorities in terms of commercial and development policy (e.g. recourse to GSP or the Lomé Convention).
The CFSP will enable the EU to lend its political and diplomatic weight to commercial and development cooperation mechanisms already in place. In addition, the Council has identified the combating of illicit drug trafficking as an appropriate field for joint action, targeting the Maghreb and the Middle East as priority areas in this context. The Communication suggests that action under the CFSP may take the form of joint positions intended to ensure increased international cooperation and joint measures intended to support Community efforts aimed at strengthening the ability of non-member countries to play a full part in combating drugs.
d. Coordination
The Communication stresses the importance of maintaining and improving coordination at both Member State and EU level, particularly in the following contexts:
- Coordination within and between Member States (national coordinators and the Permanent Representatives' Committee ought to have an important role to play);
- The European Drugs Monitoring Centre in Lisbon will be able to contribute to the political decision-making process through its important role in information and analysis, in liaison with its associated network of national centres;
- Multidisciplinary aspects (information, research and training are considered priorities).
4) implementing measures
5) follow-up work
Communication of 26 May 1999 from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on a European Union Action Plan to Combat Drugs (2000-2004 ) [COM(1999) 239 final - Not published in the Official Journal].
Following on from the European Councils in Cardiff (June 1998) and Vienna (December 1998), the Commission and the Parliament have been called on to draw up a new, comprehensive anti-drug strategy to replace the 1995-1999 action plan.
Last updated: 27.11.2003


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Students must drop this course by Friday of the first week of classes in order to get a refund and get no grade of record. After week 1, any students who drop will get a W. After week 4, no student can drop.
BIO 54 J Applied Human Anatomy & Physiology: Absorption, Excretions and Reproduction
Enrolled students may access course materials here: https://catalyst.deanza.edu
For De Anza's Online Education Webpage to access the online orientation, please click here: http://www.deanza.edu/online-ed
This is a 6 week videostreamed course taught through the Online Education Center. This course is offered in the second six weeks of the quarter and can not be taken concurrently with BIO54I.
Course Description: Survey of human anatomy and physiology with emphasis on the homeostatic limits the human body. Discussed topics include the Digestive System and Nutrition, Respiratory System Urinary System, Water, Electrolyte and Acid-Base Balance, Reproductive Systems and Pregnancy/Growth, Development and Genetics.
Enrolled students take their exams and hand in lab work at the Science Resource Center. Click here for contact information and hours of operation. http://www.deanza.edu/bhes/src.html
Class Schedule BIO54J for 11th Edition of Text
STUDENT STUDY PLAN FOR SUCCESS: I would like to encourage you to adopt a study plan to increase your chances of success in this course. BIO54G,H, I and J are difficult courses (especially for students who have never taken anatomy or physiology before) primarily because of the pace of the course. Here are some comments or tips from successful students have taken the BIO54 series.
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Fall 2012 Office Hours:
T 2:30-3:30 p.m. in KC215


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How did the demo guys mess up the shutoff?
My wife now works from home full-time.
It was great in the beginning, but now she has all this time to look around and stare at how much she hates our house.
She's either having a lot of affairs, or getting a lot of estimates.
At this point it would be tough to choose either scenario.
Wife: So how's it going?
ME: Not bad, but I don't think that's going to work there.
Wife: Why not? Just cut it to fit.
ME: Ok.....220, 221....whatever it takes
Wife: What?
ME: Never mind
Thread is useless without GMC
I redid my kitchen, as well as several others, something invariably goes wrong. Just wait til a friend comes over and tells you that you should've have done it this way, after saying absolutely nothing when you discussed the plans initially.
My tap water the other day:
Water table is down because of the drought and my well started pulling water that had iron levels off the chart. Stuff stained all of my fiberglass and porcelain.
I put in a softener this AM that eliminates the iron with chlorine. Pretty cool...it makes it's own chlorine, so I don't have to add any or adjust the levels. Just uses the last few minutes of the recharge cycle and siphons some of the salt brine and uses a little generator to make a supply of chlorine. And then another filter takes out the chlorine.


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Grand Theft Auto III surely started a revolution. Needless to say that it sparked the 3D sandbox, car-jacking phenomenon, which eventually lead to games like Mercenaries, Just Cause and Saint's Row.
Not too long ago, the game got a full re-release on iOS and Android platforms, giving gamers everywhere (at least those with a smartphone) a chance to roam the streets of Liberty City on the go. However, let's face it, the best way to experience GTA III is on a TV, with a controller. Lucky for you, you won't have to hunt down that used copy from GameStop that may or may not be completely scratched up, yet they'll sell it to you with a 'guarantee'. On Tuesday, July 31st, you'll be able to download GTA III on the PSN for a mere $10.
Before you get too excited for trophy support or an HD makeover, this PS2 Classic will feature none of that. It's the same GTA III you enjoyed playing back in 2001.
Mark your calendars!