text:
MI Supreme Court
CAIN v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Docket Nos. 101628, 101736. Argued December 6, 1995 (Calendar No. 8). Decided May21, 1996.
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Chief Justice
James H. Brickley
Charles L. Levin
Michael F. Cavanagh
Patricia J. Boyle
Dorothy Comstock Riley
Conrad L. Mallett, Jr.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
No. 101628
PEPPER MOORE, RAMON COBOS, and
RONALD SIMPSON-BEY, on behalf
of themselves and all others
similarly situated,
and SUSAN FAIR, on behalf of
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Intervening Plaintiffs,
PEPPER MOORE, on behalf of
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
and SUSAN FAIR, on behalf of
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
v ———– No. 101736
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except Weaver, J.).
In this factually intricate case, we are asked, in an interlocutory appeal, to decide whether the judgment of the Court of Appeals, calling for the disqualification of a circuit court judge, is proper. Ingham Circuit Judge James R. Giddings[1] denied the Department of Corrections' motion to disqualify himself. Chief Circuit Judge Peter D. Houk also denied the disqualification motion. The department appealed in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals panel (Griffin, P.J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr., and Weaver, JJ.), ordered that Judge Giddings be disqualified and therefore reversed the findings of Chief Judge Houk and remanded the case for the appointment of a different judge. This Court granted
appellants' (plaintiffs' and plaintiffs-intervenors') interlocutory applications for leave to appeal. We now reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Procedural Background
The issue presented to this Court regarding the disqualification of Judge Giddings is an outgrowth of a prisoners' rights class action originally filed in 1988.[2] The pertinent procedural history of this litigation will now be set forth.[3]
In 1985, the Department of Corrections issued a policy directive to address the subject of prisoner personal property control. It is important to note that for purposes of personal property, this 1985 policy directive did not differentiate between security classifications of the prisoners. In 1988, as a result of the massive prison construction program responding to the large increases in prisoner population that began in 1984-85, the department attempted to revise its 1985 policy directive. It decided
that changes needed to be made in its policy regarding the type and quantity of personal property that prisoners would be allowed to possess.[4] This 1988 revised policy directive specifically associated the type and amount of personal property afforded to a prisoner with the security classification of the prisoner.[5]
Approximately two months later, on April 26, 1988, six male prisoners filed a complaint and a request in the Court of Claims for an ex parte temporary restraining order.[6] These individuals challenged the department's authority to reduce or change possession of personal property by prisoners. The primary cause of action asserted by the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs-intervenors is that the security classification system created by the department is arbitrary and capricious and violates the Michigan and United States Constitutions
because the policy directive involves the taking of personal property by the department that is dependent on the security classification system.
On April 27, 1988, Judge Giddings entered a temporary restraining order that precluded the department from implementing its 1988 revised policy. On September 26, 1988, Judge Giddings granted the female prisoners' motion to intervene. Subsequently, the respective classes of male and female prisoners were certified.
On August 21, 1989, the Legislature entered this arena by giving effect to MCL 800.42; MSA 28.1411.[7] Although Judge Giddings' order enjoined the department's 1988 revision of its personal property policy directive, this statute served to impose similar limitations on the type and quantity of personal property that could be possessed by prisoners at differing levels of security. This caused the male prisoners to file a motion to enjoin the enforcement of this statute that was granted by Judge Giddings after a hearing on the
matter on September18, 1989.[8] This preliminary injunction was reduced to writing and entered on November 14, 1989.[9] The injunction currently remains in effect.
Disqualification: Significant Background Events
The road leading up to the department's motion to disqualify Judge Giddings has been long, winding, and bumpy. The focus of the department's motion centers on the relationship (or lack thereof) between Judge Giddings and Governor Engler. In the interest of time and space, this opinion will only recount the essential facts culminating in the department's decision to seek the disqualification of Judge Giddings.
The preliminary injunction issued by Judge Giddings generated numerous disputes over control of prisoner personal property. Many prisoners brought contempt proceedings against the department, alleging that it was violating the November 1989 injunction.[10] As a result, prisoners were often required to appear in court as witnesses to the alleged violation. A question arose concerning whether these individuals were entitled to receive the statutory witness fee pursuant to MCL 600.2552; MSA 27A.2552. On October 7, 1993, at a hearing on the issue, Judge Giddings decided that the prisoners were entitled to receive their statutory witness fee of $12 a day.[11]
On Thursday, October 14, 1993, while attending a dedication ceremony for the Saginaw Regional Correctional Facility, Governor John Engler made a comment regarding Judge Giddings that evidenced the Governor's distaste for the
witness fee ruling.[12] At the time, Judge Giddings stated that he would not respond to the Governor's comments. However, "[p]ursuant to [his] ethical obligation imposed … by Subsection 3B(3)[13] of the Code of Judicial Conduct," Judge Giddings sent a letter to the Attorney Grievance Commission regarding the Governor's statements on October 21, 1993. In his letter, Judge Giddings stated that the Governor's statements appeared to violate Rules 3.5,[14] 8.2,[15] and
8.4(c),[16] of the Michigan Rules of Professional Responsibility.[17] On February 7, 1994, the Attorney Grievance Commission informed Governor Engler that Judge Giddings'
request for investigation was dismissed. However, the commission "cautioned" the Governor regarding the ramification of such comments on the integrity of Michigan's legal system.[18]
Additionally, during this time, the news media were taking great interest in the Governor's press releases and comments in this case. The record indicates that Judge Giddings was progressively becoming concerned over the statements reported by the press. Particularly, Judge Giddings focused on the substance of the Governor's press releases. On November 2, 1993, Judge Giddings held a hearing to address miscellaneous matters. At this time, Judge Giddings discussed what he termed to be "inaccuracies" in statements made to the press.[19] Further, Judge Giddings
questioned whether it would be appropriate for him to respond to what he felt were incorrect statements made by a litigant.[20]
The next significant event took place on June 2, 1994, when Judge Giddings, sua sponte, entered an order responding to what he viewed as the media problems surrounding the case. The media contacts order reads, in pertinent part:
This matter having come before the Court as a result of media contacts with the Court and the Court being made aware of certain inaccurate reports disseminated to the public media by representatives of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and other state agents, and the Court perceiving the need to impose reasonable steps to foster an environment to allow the case to be fairly litigated, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby sua sponte ordered that:
Any written remarks or press releases
made or given to a member of the press by any employee or agent of the State, regarding this Cain litigation, must also be faxed to Plaintiffs' spokesperson Linda Forster, Plaintiff class-member Mark Coleman and Plaintiffs' counsel Charlene Snow at the same time that the remarks are provided to the public media. Similarly, any remarks or press releases given by the Plaintiffs to the public media must be faxed to Defendant's Counsel, A. Peter Govorchin, Assistant Attorney General, and the Michigan Department of Corrections' press spokesperson, Warren Williams.
Subsequently, the department moved that this order be stayed pending appeal on the merits because the order allegedly restricts the free speech of all state employees. Further, the plaintiffs moved for guidance concerning the interpretation of the June 2, 1994, order. After a hearing on June 30, 1994, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for clarification of the June 2, 1994, order and denied the department's motion for a stay. Much of the discussion during the hearing revolved around who could be included in the scope of the media contacts order.[21] Particularly of concern was
whether the Governor could be included within the scope of the order.
And I'm going to close with this one point and emphasis [sic] that frankly, I gave a lot of thought as to whether or not the chief executive should be included within the scope of this order. . . .
[O]n several occasions he has taken upon himself to speak directly about this case and purports to speak with authority. And I assume he does. As the Governor of the state he has access to information, and those who work for the
Department of Corrections are accountable to him at some level and because of that supervisory authority, and because he both apparently and actually, it seems to me that if he is going to speak on this, and because there is that history there—and I already referenced of fairly significant misrepresentation, not the criticism. I'm talking about misrepresentations of what, in fact, this court did. It seems to me that in that context, it's appropriate to include him within this requirement that copies of those remarks be forwarded to relevant persons in this lawsuit.
Judge Giddings then issued an order clarifying his previous order. Specifically, the revised order stated:
Any written remarks or press releases made or given to a member of the press by the Governor or his Press Secretary, or by the Department of Corrections Director; or the Department's press spokesperson, or by any employee or agent of the Department of Corrections purporting to speak for the Department regarding this Cain litigation, must also be faxed to Plaintiffs' spokesperson Linda Forster, Plaintiff class-member Mark Coleman and Plaintiff Intervenors' counsel Charlene Snow at the same time that such remarks are provided to the public media.
Similarly, any remarks or press releases given to the public media by agents of the Plaintiffs or Plaintiff Intervenors, including named class representatives, or any other members of the class purporting to speak for the Plaintiff or Plaintiff-Intervenors' class, must be faxed to Defendant's counsel, A. Peter Govorchin, Assistant Attorney General, and Department of Corrections press spokesperson, Warren Williams. [Order denying defendant's motion for stay of order regarding public media contact and granting clarification of order regarding public media contacts, June 30, 1994, pp 2-3.]
Clearly, Judge Giddings intended that Governor Engler be subject to the media contacts order.
The Governor rejected Judge Giddings' attempt to regulate the operation of the executive press office. In fact, through his spokesperson, John Truscott, Governor Engler announced his intention to disobey the June 2, 1994, and June 30, 1994,
orders. As early as November 1993, in response to Judge Giddings' bench ruling, Mr.Truscott announced,
We have often said there is Michigan law and then there is Giddings law and often times they are not even similar . . . . We don't expect the Department of Corrections to comply, nor will our office comply. We do not feel an obligation to inform convicted felons of state business or the legal proceedings of the state. [The Detroit News, PR for inmates? Engler enraged, November 24, 1993, p1A.]
Subsequent to the issuance of the order, Mr. Truscott was quoted as stating, "I object to being ordered to fax my press releases to prisoners . . . . My job is to communicate to the media, not to murderers and rapists." The Detroit News, Engler, judge battle over faxing news releases to inmates, June 24, 1994. Mr. Truscott stated that, at that time, he had released about four statements from the Governor that were not forwarded to the prisoners, their attorneys, or the spokesperson for the prisoners appearing in propria persona. Id.
The department appealed the denial of its motion for a stay of the media contacts order to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the department's application for leave regarding its motion to stay the media contacts order. Further, the Court of Appeals granted the department's motion to stay, and the appeal on the merits is currently pending.[22]
In August 1994, before entry of the stay by the Court of
Appeals, the Governor wrote a letter to Attorney General Frank Kelley. The letter was dated August 12, 1994, and pertained to the Cain litigation. The importance of this letter will become apparent below.[23] Further, during this time,
onAugust23, 1994, the Governor issued a press release addressing the recent escape of inmates from the Ryan Correctional Facility. This press release directly linked the Ryan facility outbreak with Judge Giddings' rulings in the Cain litigation and was not forwarded to the plaintiffs.[24]
Disqualification: The Most Significant Event
As a result of the Governor's failure to forward his
August 23, 1994, press release to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an order to show cause why Mr.Truscott and Governor Engler should not be held in criminal contempt. This motion was scheduled to be heard on September 12, 1994. The parties and Judge Giddings each have differing perspectives of what actually took place that day.
Before a hearing on the motion, Judge Giddings, the parties, their attorneys and representatives, and the monitor held a conference in chambers off the record. The purpose of the conference was to discuss, inter alia, the plaintiffs' motion for an order to show cause regarding Governor Engler. During the course of this conference, Judge Giddings referred to the motion of the plaintiffs appearing in propria persona to show cause. He indicated to Mr. Walen that the pleadings, as filed, were inadequate. As a result, Judge Giddings indicated that the motion needed to be redrafted. What happened next is in dispute.
Attorney General Govorchin, by way of affidavit, describes the events that took place in chambers as follows:[25]
. . . Judge Giddings reviewed the [plaintiffs'] motion [to show cause] and noted that the Plaintiffs were placing more emphasis on the alleged false statements in a press release issued by John Truscott than on the assertion that the press release had not been faxed as directed in the Court's order . . . .
. . . Judge Giddings expressed doubt about a motion to hold John Truscott in contempt because he could probably not act on his own. Judge Giddings stated that the show cause hearing would have to be heard by a different judge. Judge Giddings then reviewed the three alleged false statements set forth in the Plaintiffs' motion and commented that the falsity of those statements was not all that clear. Judge Giddings noted that if Plaintiff was seeking criminal contempt, the motion should set forth distinct counts describing the contempt.
* * *
Judge Giddings then said that another statement would seem more appropriate for the motion. He referred to a letter sent by Governor Engler to Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General for the State of Michigan, on August 12, 1994. Judge Giddings asked if anyone had a copy of that letter. Both Charlene Snow, Plaintiff-Intervenors' counsel, and Plaintiffs' representative Chuck Walen had a copy. . . .
. . . Judge Giddings then read a portion of the letter out loud. That portion concerned the Governor's statement that Judge Giddings had adjourned the trial date in Cain again, "for reasons known only to the Court."
Judge Giddings stated that that statement
was not true. That the record would reflect that the Cain case was adjourned due to the MDOC's non-compliance with Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests and a default entered against the MDOC.
* * *
Judge Giddings then implied that the Governor's letter to Attorney General Frank J. Kelley . . . would be a more appropriate basis for contempt on the basis of the "false" statement regarding the adjourned trial, under the contempt statute [MCL 600.1701(1); MSA 27A.1701(1)]. Plaintiffs' representative Walen indicated that he would revise the motion for contempt. [Emphasis added.]
The department argued before this Court that this action by Judge Giddings is indicative of bias. Accordingly, the September 12, 1994, conference forms the basis of the department's motion to disqualify.
However, Judge Giddings viewed the in-chambers conference in a different light.[26] He described the events as follows:
The Court has little disagreement with the summary of the in-chambers discussions and other events described [in] Defendant's Brief in Support of the Motion to Disqualify. The summary is, however, somewhat incomplete and contains inaccuracies.
Serious inaccuracies are contained in the affidavits of attorneys representing the Department. With regard to the Govorchin Affidavit, the Court disputes Mr. Govorchin's comment . . . that this Court "said that another statement would seem more appropriate for the motion." That is not correct. The Court did indicate that if Plaintiffs intended to proceed with the contempt, then they should consider including reference to inaccuracies in Governor Engler's letter of August 12th. This Court did not suggest, as asserted in . . . Govorchin's affidavit that the letter of August 12th was "a more
appropriate basis for contempt."
Accordingly, there is a conflict between the department and Judge Giddings with respect to the events of the September 12 conference.
The department filed its motion to disqualify Judge Giddings on September 26, 1994. The hearing transcripts indicate that the department did not inform the judge or the other parties of the existence of this motion until the day it was filed.
The Department of Corrections'
Motion to Disqualify Judge Giddings
Pursuant to the requirements of MCR 2.003, see part V, the department filed its motion for disqualification of Judge Giddings from the Cain v Dep't of Corrections litigation. Initially, the department argues that its motion is based on the happenings of the in-chambers meeting. Specifically, the
department stated that Judge Giddings,
actively counseled the male prisoners' "representative" on how best to pursue a motion for an order to show cause why Governor John Engler and John Truscott (the Governor's press spokesperson) should not be held in criminal contempt . . . , and . . . raised, on the Judge's own initiative, a new and additional ground that the male prisoners should utilize to pursue the allegations of criminal contempt against Governor Engler . . . . These actions, in the context of this case, demonstrate a personal legal bias on the part of Judge Giddings against Governor Engler and bias against the MDOC because Judge Giddings repeatedly stated that he considered the Governor (who is not a defendant) and the Department of Corrections (which is the only defendant) to be a single entity subject to his authority.
Accordingly, the department argues that Judge Giddings' conflict with the Governor bred animosity that was transferred into prejudice or bias against other parts of the Executive Branch. Consequently, the department contends that it will be denied a fair trial in this matter.
The department's motion to disqualify was made pursuant to MCR2.003, which imposes a mandatory filing time of fourteen days after discovery of the grounds for the motion. Thus, the department points to September 12, 1994, as the day that the grounds for its motion surfaced. However, the department urges this Court to consider other instances occurring within the previous eleven months in support of its allegation of bias.[28]
Specifically, the department urges us first to consider Judge Giddings' "filing" of a "complaint" with the Attorney Grievance Commission because of the Governor's speech. The
department further stated that Judge Giddings "repeatedly" throughout the proceedings declared there to be a unity of interest between the Governor and the department. Moreover, Judge Giddings entered the media contacts order sua sponte. Lastly, he appointed the male prisoners a press spokesperson and appointed a nonclass representative prisoner to receive the Governor's and the department's faxes of press releases.
The department contends that Judge Giddings has "demonstrated excessive personal involvement and inappropriate advocacy . … [His] conduct reveals a willingness and personal interest in manipulating this litigation and using judicial time and resources to engage in a public dispute with the Governor . . . ." The department would like this Court to examine human nature and conclude from experience that the risk of bias or prejudice resulting from all of these circumstances is too great. Therefore, the department argues that all these instances, combined with the September 12, 1994, meeting, are sufficient to require the disqualification of Judge Giddings.
Michigan Disqualification Law
A. The Court Rule
In Michigan, a motion to disqualify a judge is made pursuant to court rule, MCR 2.003. Defendant moved to disqualify Judge Giddings under what is now MCR 2.003(B)(1), which states:
Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which
The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.
Further, MCR 2.003(C)(1) requires that a motion to disqualify "be filed within 14 days after the moving party discovers the ground for disqualification." The moving party must submit an affidavit including all grounds for disqualification that are known at the time the motion is filed. MCR 2.003(C)(2).
A judge is disqualified when he cannot hear a case impartially pursuant to MCR 2.003(B). The court rule sets forth a list of situations that are deemed to be the equivalent of an inability to hear a case impartially. One such instance is when the judge "is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party." MCR 2.003(B)(1).[29]
MCR 2.003(B)(1) requires a showing of actual bias. Absent actual bias or prejudice, a judge will not be disqualified pursuant to this section. In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 151; 486 NW2d 326 (1992); Mourad v Automobile Club Ins Ass'n, 186 Mich App 715, 731; 465 NW2d 395 (1991); Band v Livonia Associates, 176 Mich App 95, 118; 439 NW2d 285 (1989).
Coupled with the requirement of actual bias, § (B)(1) also requires that the judge be "personally" biased or prejudiced in order to warrant disqualification pursuant to this section. The federal disqualification statutes similarly contain the requirement that the bias or prejudice be
"personal" in nature. See 28 USC 144 ("the judge . . . has a personal bias or prejudice either against [a party] or in favor of any adverse party"), and 28 USC 455(b)(1) ("Where [the judge] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party"). As a result of this statutory language, the federal courts have developed what is commonly known as the "extrajudicial source" rule.
Simply stated, a showing of "personal" bias must usually be met before disqualification is proper. This requirement has been interpreted to mean that disqualification is not warranted unless the bias or prejudice is both personal and extrajudicial. Thus, the challenged bias must have its origin in events or sources of information gleaned outside the judicial proceeding. The United States Supreme Court addressed the "personal" bias requirement in Liteky v United States, 510 US ___; 114 S Ct 1147, 1155; 127 L Ed 2d 474 (1994), and stated that the words "bias" and "prejudice"
connote a favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess . . . , or because it is excessive in degree . . . . [Emphasis in original.]
Further, the Court stated:
"First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. . . . In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved. . . . Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." [114 S Ct 1157.]
Thus, Liteky indicates that a favorable or unfavorable predisposition that springs from facts or events occurring in the current proceeding may deserve to be characterized as "bias" or "prejudice." However, these opinions will not consitute a basis for disqualification "unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Id. (emphasis added). See also United States v Young, 45 F3d 1405, 1415 (CA 10, 1995), interpreting Liteky, supra.[30]
Furthermore, the party who challenges a judge on the basis of bias or prejudice must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, supra at 151.[31]
B. The Crampton v Dep't of State Standard
The Due Process Clause requires an unbiased and impartial decisionmaker. Thus, where the requirement of showing actual bias or prejudice under MCR 2.003(B)(1) has not been met, or where the court rule is otherwise inapplicable, parties have pursued disqualification on the basis of the due process impartiality requirement. Crampton v Dep't of State, 395 Mich 347; 235 NW2d 352 (1975), is the leading Michigan case addressing the constitutional basis for disqualification.[32] The Crampton Court stated:
The United States Supreme Court has disqualified judges and decisionmakers without a showing of actual bias in situations where "experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Among the situations identified by the Court as presenting that risk are where the judge or decisionmaker
has a pecuniary interest in the outcome;
"has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him";
is "enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner . . ."; or
(4) might have prejudged the case because of prior participation as an accuser, investigator, fact finder or initial decisionmaker. [Id. at 351 (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
This Court has examined the issue of judicial disqualification pursuant to the Due Process Clause and has found that disqualification for bias or prejudice is only constitutionally required in the most extreme cases.[33]
The test articulated in Crampton was extracted from the United States Supreme Court decision Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35; 95 S Ct 1456; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975).[34] The Withrow Court
Concededly, a "fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." In pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. [Id. at 46-47 (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
Crampton sets forth specific examples of United States Supreme Court decisions that fall into the four listed categories.[36] Two of the four Crampton scenarios are implicated in the present case.
Situation 2 allows disqualification of a judge or decisionmaker who "has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him." Id. at 351 (emphasis added). The example cited in Crampton involved a situation in
which a trial judge had been insulted, slandered, and vilified during trial by a defendant representing himself. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge should not adjudicate postjudgment contempt proceedings against the defendant. Mayberry v Pennsylvania, 400 US 455, 465-466; 91 S Ct 499; 27 L Ed 2d 532 (1971). However, the Court stated:
It is, of course, not every attack on a judge that disqualifies him from sitting. . . . Many of the words leveled at the judge in the instant case were highly personal aspersions, even "fighting words"—"dirty sonofabitch," "dirty tyrannical old dog," "stumbling dog," and "fool." He was charged with running a Spanish Inquisition and told to "Go to hell" and "Keep your mouth shut." Insults of that kind are apt to strike "at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament." [Citations omitted.]
In Mayberry, the nature of the defendant's remarks necessarily required the judge to become "embroiled in a running, bitter controversy" with the defendant. Id. at 465. Thus, it would have been improper for the judge to adjudicate the defendant's contempt proceedings. Id. at 466. The facts of the present case do not rise to the level of those presented in Mayberry. See part VIII(B).
Situation 3 listed in Crampton calls for the disqualification of the judge or decisionmaker in an instance where that individual is "'enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner.'" 395 Mich 351, citing Johnson v Mississippi, 403 US 212, 215; 91 S Ct 1778; 29 L Ed 2d 423 (1971) (emphasis added). In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court found that a trial judge should be disqualified from adjudicating a defendant's contempt proceedings where the judge had revealed deep prejudice against the defendant's
profession and, further, was recently a losing party in a civil rights suit brought by that individual. The United States Supreme Court stated:
In concluding that Judge Perry should have recused himself, we do not rely solely on the affidavits filed by the lawyers reciting intemperate remarks of Judge Perry concerning civil rights litigants. Beyond all that was the fact that Judge Perry immediately prior to the adjudication of contempt was a defendant in one of petitioner's civil rights suits and a losing party at that. From that it is plain that he was so enmeshed in matters involving petitioner as to make it most appropriate for another judge to sit. Trial before "an unbiased judge" is essential to due process. [403 US 215-216 (emphasis added).]
Accordingly, this situation involved an actual previous lawsuit between the judge and the defendant before him. Again, the situation in Johnson differs from that presented by the facts of this case. See part VII(B).
C. The Clemens v Bruce Decision
In the present case, the department has placed heavy reliance on the Court of Appeals decision in Clemens v Bruce, 122 Mich App 35; 329 NW2d 522 (1982). Clemens ineffectively interprets the disqualification standard articulated in Crampton. The plaintiffs in Clemens moved to disqualify the judge on the basis of personal bias against their attorney, who had filed a complaint against the judge with the Judicial Tenure Commission as a result of a dispute over the appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants.[37] Thus, it appears that the plaintiffs were alleging actual bias pursuant to the court rule. However, without an examination
of disqualification law under the court rule, the Court of Appeals held that
[t]he circumstances presented . . . fall within factors (2) and (3) of the test stated in Crampton. The circumstances suggested such a risk of actual prejudice on the part of the judge that due process required his disqualification even absent a showing of actual prejudice. . . . Our decision is not to be construed as suggesting that the trial judge was guilty of any actual impropriety. [122 Mich App 38.]
Aside from a repetition of the Crampton language, the Court of Appeals in Clemens opinion gives little, if any, guidance regarding an interpretation of the listed situations calling for disqualification. The decision incorrectly refers to the Crampton scenarios as "factors," as if it is applying some sort of balancing test. We disagree with this characterization, because the Crampton scenarios are examples, not factors to be balanced. Moreover, the lack of insightful analysis in Clemens fails to aid this Court in its attempt to understand and apply the Crampton standard for disqualification. Accordingly, we find the department's emphasis and reliance on Clemens to be misplaced and find that decision to be without precedential value.
Opinions Denying the Department of Corrections'
Motion to Disqualify
In determining the issue before us, we review the factual findings made by Chief Judge Houk for an abuse of discretion. Judge Houk accepted the version of events as related by Judge Giddings. Consequently, we defer to the factual findings and conclusions of both Chief Judge Houk's and Judge Giddings'
opinions.[38] In their arguments to this Court, the plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors have, for the most part, relied on the analysis presented in these opinions. Therefore, the plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors' arguments will be addressed within this section.
As previously discussed, Judge Giddings' perception of what took place on September 12, 1994, at the in-chambers meeting is much different from that of Messrs. Govorchin and Soros. Judge Giddings correctly stated that MCR 2.003 requires a showing of actual bias or prejudice.[39] However, Mr. Govorchin admitted that Judge Giddings has not prejudged the case, nor has he shown actual bias or prejudice.[40]
Accordingly, because of the lack of any actual bias, the opinion states that the court rule has not been satisfied.
Judge Giddings rejected the department's arguments made under Clemens.[41] In response to the department's statement that Judge Giddings had become "sufficiently irritated with and has personalized his judicial response to the public statements of Governor John Engler," Judge Giddings stated:
That is utterly false. A dispassionate examination of this Court's statements makes clear that this Court's concern has been directed to one thing and one thing only. That one thing is the accurate reporting of court proceedings. That is reflected in repeated statements made on and off the record by this Court.
* * *
This record is barren of any indication of "irritation" or some "personalized" response to the Governor's or any public criticism.
Additionally, Judge Giddings responded to the
department's argument that it was inappropriate for him to make comments about the plaintiff's show cause petition. Judge Giddings stated, "[n]ot only does this Court have the right to examine into the sufficiency of allegations in support of a petition for show cause, the Court has a duty to do so."
No matter how Defendant chooses to characterize the matter, the upshot of those discussions was that this Court refused to issue the requested Order to Show Cause [why Governor Engler and John Truscott should not be held in contempt] for several reasons. First, the petition was somewhat unclear and imprecise. Moreover, it included allegations against Mr. Truscott which the Court felt would accomplish little but to confuse the process. . . .
What Defendant really objects to is the Court's suggestion that Plaintiff might want to focus on Engler's letter of August, 1994 to Attorney General Kelley. This, it is said by counsel for Defendant, demonstrates "the appearance of bias or prejudice" against Governor Engler. Assuming that to be true, it is of no consequence here. To the extent Engler may become involved in these proceedings in the future, this judge would not be presiding at such proceedings.
At this point, Governor Engler is not a party to these proceedings. Nor is he personally affected by them.
Judge Giddings clearly stated that he does not consider the Governor to be a party to the Cain case. Even under the Clemens (i.e., Crampton) standard for disqualification, the bias or prejudice must involve a party. Therefore, Judge Giddings concluded that both of the Clemens situations 2 and 3 are inapplicable.
In response to the Governor's August 12 letter to Attorney General Kelley, Judge Giddings set forth reasons for the delay in this case.
[T]he most recent trial adjournment occurred because the Department is in default. This is the second time the Department has been defaulted. The trial was also adjourned because discovery had been delayed by the Department's failure to comply with the court rules regarding discovery. Moreover, numerous contempt proceedings have been brought against the [Department of Corrections] and the Department has been held in contempt on six different occasions.
Accordingly, it appears that the department is in part responsible for the delay in this case.
Lastly, Judge Giddings characterized his actions at the September 12 conference as follows:
The Court did suggest that Plaintiffs clarify their petition and be more specific. This Court also tried to discourage Plaintiffs from proceeding against Press Secretary Truscott. True, this Court did suggest (not demand or even request) a contempt proceeding against the Governor based on the August12th letter. The suggestion, however, is appropriate in light of MCL 600.1701(10); MSA 27A.1701(10)
) and in light of the Canons of Ethics
) and Michigan case law . . . . [Emphasis added.]
Judge Giddings' decision denying the disqualification motion was affirmed by Chief Judge Houk in his opinion dated October7, 1994. In his opinion, Judge Houk supported the analysis and conclusion reached by Judge Giddings.[44]
After a thorough review of the entire record in this case, this Court is of the opinion that disqualification of Judge Giddings is not required. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision requiring disqualification and remand to the trial court for swift, fair, and accurate
The Court of Appeals, without conducting oral argument or reviewing the complete lower court record, particularly the transcripts of the hearings on the motion to disqualify, peremptorily reversed the decisions of Chief Judge Houk and Judge Giddings. The pertinent portions of the Court of Appeals one-page order are as follows:
The lower court abused its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify Judge James R. Giddings. The record clearly demonstrates actual bias on the part of the trial judge thereby mandating disqualification. MCR 2.003.
Further, the procedural due process guarantees of the Michigan and the United States Constitutions require disqualification under these circumstances. Crampton v Dep't of State, 395 Mich 347, 351; 235 NW2d 352 (1975); Clemens v Bruce, 122 Mich App 35; 329 NW2d 522 (1982).
The record reveals that the trial judge has become personally enmeshed in the prosecution of this claim. At a time when the trial judge considered the Governor of the State of Michigan and defendant Department of Corrections to be a single entity, the judge personally filed a grievance with the Attorney Grievance Commission against the Governor based upon the Governor's criticisms of the trial judge's rulings. Thereafter, the trial judge advised plaintiff's counsel how to most effectively proceed with a motion to hold the Governor in contempt of court.
Under the circumstances of this case, this Court concludes that the trial judge has abandoned his essential role of a neutral and detached judicial officer. [Unpublished order, entered December 1, 1994 (Docket No. 179431) (emphasis added).]
A. No Showing of Actual Bias or Prejudice
This Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals decision that the department succeeded in showing that Judge Giddings has demonstrated actual bias or prejudice against it. There has been no such showing of actual bias or prejudice as
required by MCR 2.003(B)(1).[45] This conclusion is primarily based on Mr. Govorchin's admission of no actual bias, see n40, as well as the lack of evidence to indicate bias throughout the record.
Furthermore, pursuant to a literal reading of the court rule, disqualification is simply not required on the basis of these facts. The fact of the matter is that the Governor of this state is not a party to this action, nor was he ever a party to this action. Although the department argues that Judge Giddings considered the Governor to be a party, Judge Giddings never declared him to be so.[46] In fact, after reviewing the record, this Court finds that Judge Giddings was hesitant to include the Governor within the scope of the media contacts order, but did so because the Governor, at that time, was purporting to speak with authority on the subject of Cain
v Dep't of Corrections.[47] However, Judge Giddings never declared the Governor to be a party to this lawsuit.
It did not escape our attention that the plaintiffs and plaintiffs-intervenors have presented inconsistent arguments regarding the status of the Governor in relation to this case. They argue that the Governor is not a party for purposes of the Crampton theory of disqualification. Yet, they also argue that the Governor is a party for purposes of amenability to the orders issued by the court.
Coincidentally, the dissent presents the mirror image of the inconsistent argument advanced by the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs-intervenors. The dissent would impose a test for determining who constitutes a "party" under MCR 2.003(B)(1) that is dependent on the trial judge's subjective beliefs. Without any support for its contention, the dissent states that "the judge's perception" is the touchstone for determining disqualification questions. Slip op at 7. Apparently, the dissent wishes to implement a two-pronged subjective inquiry. First, in determining who is a "party" for purposes of MCR 2.003(B)(1), the dissent contends that we must look to the judge's perception. Second, in determining whether the trial judge is personally biased or prejudiced, the dissent contends that we must again step inside the mind of the judge. The dissent fails to set forth any support for
either of these contentions. Conversely, the federal statutes employ an objective standard for determining the bias or prejudice prong of the disqualification analysis. See n 48. We find the federal objective test to be a sound approach to disqualification motions brought pursuant to MCR 2.003(B)(1).
Under the dissent's proposed definition, a "party" for purposes of MCR 2.003(B)(1) is anyone whom the judge perceives to be a party. Under this analysis, which requires this Court to examine the judge's subjective beliefs, the dissent impliedly concludes that Governor Engler is a party to the Cain litigation. Therefore the dissent explicitly concludes that the department is thereby precluded from receiving a fair trial of this matter.
However, the dissent's argument, if followed to its logical conclusion, would subject the Governor to the orders and contempt powers of the trial court in this case. Surely, the dissent would not stand for such a result. Like the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs-intervenors, the dissent cannot manipulate the present situation so as to achieve its desired, albeit inconsistent, result. If the Governor is deemed a party by virtue of Judge Giddings' alleged beliefs or perceptions as the dissent proposes, then the Governor would be subject to the orders set forth by the judge and is further amenable to the judge's contempt powers. It is that simple.
We prefer an alternate course to that suggested by the dissent. Specifically, we employ a commonsensical and literal reading of the court rule in reaching the conclusion that the Governor is not a party to this case. Moreover, we believe
that imposing a subjective test for determining a "party" will only create confusion in disqualification and other situations involving a "party."
In order for disqualification pursuant to MCR 2.003(B)(1) to be proper, the judge must have shown actual bias against a party or a party's attorney. Because the bias in this case was between the judge and a nonparty, the requirements of MCR2.003(B)(1) have simply not been met. Moreover, this Court would like to stress that the record reveals a mutual respect between Judge Giddings and the attorneys for the department. Clearly, the Court of Appeals was wrong when it held that Judge Giddings demonstrated actual bias against the department.[48]
Additionally, there has been no showing that the alleged bias or prejudice is "personal" as required by MCR 2.003(B)(1). The department has challenged actions on the part of Judge Giddings that took place within the confines of this lawsuit. It has not alleged that the bias stems from some extrajudicial source. We find the United States Supreme Court decision in Liteky, supra, to be instructive with respect to our application of MCR 2.003(B)(1). Accordingly, the department has failed to persuade us that Judge Giddings' alleged animosity toward the Governor or his actions at the September12 in-chambers conference are such that he has displayed a "deep-seated favoritism" for the plaintiffs (or the plaintiffs-intervenors) or "antagonism" for the department to the extent that fair judgment is rendered impossible in this case.[49]
B. The Crampton Standard for Disqualification
Pursuant to Crampton, the question is whether the present situation is one where "experience teaches that the probability of actual bias . . . is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." 395 Mich 351. Analysis of disqualification issues under Crampton requires a case-by-case determination of when the risk of actual bias is too prevalent, so that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial would be inhibited. As stated in n 33, the constitutional standard for disqualification is not easily met. We stress that it is only through an examination of the four listed scenarios and their concomitant examples that the "experience teaches" test articulated in Crampton is rendered meaningful. See n 36.
We find that Judge Giddings' apparent conflict with the Governor is not a proper basis for disqualification under the test or the scenarios articulated in Crampton. A narrow reading of Crampton leads us to conclude that the facts of this case are unquestionably distinguishable from those situations listed in Crampton.
First, Judge Giddings was not the target of personal abuse by a party before him, as was the judge in Mayberry.
See part V(B).[50] Rather, the comments were made by the nonparty Governor who at that time was at the height of his campaign for reelection. We find it most unfortunate that Judge Giddings failed to recognize and insulate himself from the political climate in which he was operating at the time.[51] However, it is this Court's belief that with the passage of time, so comes the cooling of tempers and the cooling of rhetoric. What was once a very hot climate surrounding this case has now become considerably cooler. Accordingly, the remarks made some time ago are not likely to resurface. Furthermore, "[t]he mere fact that a judge has been subjected to press criticism in connection with a case or a party does not necessarily require the judge's disqualification." Illinois v Coleman, 168 Ill 2d 509, 541; 660 NE2d 919 (1995).[52] The Governor is not the department,
just as the department is not the Governor. This Court is confident that the department will not be denied a fair trial of this matter.
Second, unlike the judge in Johnson, supra, Judge Giddings is not enmeshed in other matters involving the department or other parties to this case.[53] This Court finds that the struggle between the Governor and Judge Giddings does not rise to the level of being "enmeshed" as set forth in Crampton. See part IV(B). Judicial officers should resist the temptation to enter into public political discussions with candidates for public office. However, this Court recognizes the ability of individual judges to file requests for investigation with the Attorney Grievance Commission pursuant to the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct.[54]
Moreover, on the basis of the facts of this case, we understand Judge Giddings' concern regarding the accuracy of the statements made to the press. Cognizant of the fact that the propriety of Judge Giddings' allegedly overbroad media contacts order is not before us, it must be remembered that trial judges are human and they do make mistakes. However,
the remedy for mistakes made by trial judges lies in the appellate process, not in motions to disqualify. Therefore, we do not think that Judge Giddings' vigorous attempt to regulate the accuracy of statements made to the press is a sound basis for his disqualification.
Additionally, we do not find that Judge Giddings' actions at the September 12, 1994, in-chambers meeting warrant his disqualification. In reaching this conclusion, we choose to defer to the findings of both Judge Giddings and Chief Judge Houk. See pp36-40.[55] Particularly, we accept Judge Houk's decision regarding the events that took place during that meeting. This is not only a class action, it is a class action involving a class of prisoners who are proceeding in propria persona. Therefore, the nature of this lawsuit dictates that the judge assume a more active role than he would in ordinary day-to-day civil litigation. Accordingly, we find that Judge Giddings' advice to the plaintiffs appearing in propria persona regarding the structure of their motion was appropriate.
This Court is less certain about the propriety of Judge Giddings "suggestion" that the August12 letter from the
Governor to Attorney General Frank Kelley was an alternative ground for a contempt motion. Nonetheless, defense counsel did not object at that time, nor were any objections made at the hearing following that in-chambers meeting. Each of the events challenged by the department, even when viewed together, do not amount to the judge being enmeshed in other matters to the extent that disqualification is required.
Having concluded that the disqualification of Judge Giddings was erroneously ordered by the Court of Appeals, we reverse and remand this case for immediate scheduling of trial. After nearly eight years of pretrial litigation, this Court is convinced that the resolution of this case must be accomplished fairly and expeditiously. We expect not only the swift resolution of this case, we further expect that the parties and the court will engage in the appropriate good will so that resolution will be an easier task. In conformance with our directive of swift resolution, we order the trial court judge to investigate, with the state's Attorney General, the advisability of the appointment of a special counsel to represent the class of male prisoner plaintiffs who have thus far proceeded in propria persona. We further order that the court and the parties prepare an expedited calendar for scheduling purposes and that the court submit to this Court a report indicating the dates set for trial in this matter.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
Levin, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Mallett, J.
C. PEPPER MOORE, RAMON COBOS, and
RONALD SIMPSON-BEY, on behalf of
themselves and all other
similarly situated,
and SUSAN FAIR, on behalf of
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Intervening Plaintiffs
v ———– No. 101628
C. PEPPER MOORE, on behalf of
themselves and all other
similarly situated,
and SUSAN FAIR, on behalf of
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
v ———– No. 101736
BRICKLEY, C.J. (concurring).
While I agree with the majority's conclusion that Judge Giddings should not be disqualified from hearing the underlying suit, I write separately because the conflict between the majority and the dissent over whether the Governor is a "party" to this suit threatens to overwhelm thoughtful resolution of the actual issue in this case—whether the conduct of the Governor and Judge Giddings requires Judge Giddings' disqualification from the Cain litigation.
The Court's struggle to define the Governor's relationship to the suit is understandable. The relationship between a governor and a department is difficult to define because it is unique. On the one hand, the State Constitution vests in the Governor broad powers over the departments of state. See, e.g., Const 1963, art 5, §§ 2, 3 and 8. On the other hand, we do not expect the Governor, as a practical matter, to be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the departments, including most litigation. This particular relationship renders any attempt to decide whether the Governor is a "party" to litigation between a department and a third party a frustrating and divisive task at best.
At worst, this attempt distracts this Court's attention from the disqualification issue. The court rule disqualifies a judge from hearing the underlying litigation when the "judge
cannot impartially hear a case . . . ." MCR 2.003(B). By focusing on subsection (B)(1) of the court rule, the majority and the dissent ignore the broader mandate of the court rule in favor of an example of when a "judge cannot impartially hear a case."[1] I would not restrain disqualification to situations that happen to be accurately reflected in an example. Instead, I would disqualify this judge if I determined, with reference to the examples, that this judge could not in fact impartially hear a case.
Under the facts before this Court, I agree with the majority that Judge Giddings can impartially hear the Cain litigation. The facts show that Judge Giddings aided a plaintiff in propria persona by recommending substantive additions to plaintiff's show cause motion—in chambers in the presence of opposing counsel. Such an action is consistent with the judge's separate power to "properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity . . . ." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(8).
Additionally, in the present case Judge Giddings could have filed the show cause order himself. See MCR 3.606 and MCL 600.1701(g); MSA 27A.1701(g). Where the judge could have filed the show cause order, I find nothing improper in the judge's decision to aid a plaintiff in propria persona to accomp


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The capital of West Kalimantan, on the island of Borneo, Pontianak is one of Indonesia's more unique cities, as it is located directly on the equator. To celebrate its
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Year of Release 2015
License & Trademark TM & (c) DC Comics (s15)
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AMZ repricing category 7 cents below
Material Polycotton Blend
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Several weeks ago, British pop band Rixton visited LA Galaxy training and got the opportunity to train alongside LA captain and Ireland soccer legend Robbie Keane.
In this video by VEVO -- a music video hosting service which is a joint venture by Universal Music Group, Google, Sony Music Entertainment and Abu Dhabi Media -- in their VEVO LIFT series, the Manchester-based group is profiled while at StubHub Center and LA Galaxy training. You might know the band from their single "Me and My Broken Heart" which peaked at 65 in the Billboard Hot 100.
Regardless of your musical tastes, the video is actually very well done, check it out below.


text:
5th September
Opening address
Presentations during the day.
Evening : Conference Dinner.
6th September
Presentations during the day
4.30pm. Ethnographic film presentation.
Evening: Dinner and social evening in Pub district of Lodz.
7th September
Morning: Presentations
Afternoon ; Field trip.
Visit to Zelazowa Wola, Chopin's Birthplace and childhood home for a private concert. This will be followed by a trip to nearby Lowicz to visit the archaeological field base for the local motorway excavation programme. The trip will conclude in the evening with a Polish Barbeque and entertainment in the ruins of the nearby 16th Century castle.
8th September
Presentations to 4pm .
4pm Ethnographic film presentation.
9th – 11th : Post conference field excursion. (200 Euros to be paid on registration).
This trip is an optional extra and is not included in the conference registration fee.
An optional post-conference field trip will be offered 9th – 11th September providing a minimum of 10 people sign up. Maximum number of people is 20 so if you wish to attend please book early.
Leave Lodz on the 9th September:
Visit to Polish flint mines at Krzemionki (http://www.krzemionki.pl). Arrive Krakow (www.krakow.pl.en). Evening meal in typical Krakow restaurant.
10th September. Guided tour around the Medieval City of Krakow and visit to the e archaeological Museum. Evening meal in typical Krakow restaurant.
11th September. Leave Krakow and visit Palaeolithic cave sites (www.ojcow.pl/english/caves.htm). Arrive Lodz evening of the 11th. End of trip.
Additional nights in the university hotel in Lodz can be arranged as required.


text:
SHOT Show 2010: Grauer Systems enhances weapon grip for LEOs
The Integrated Grip Rail System improves control for AR/M4/M16s
By PoliceOne Staff
There were many weapon enhancements and accessories at SHOT Show this year, but Grauer Systems' new Integrated Grip Rail System (IGRS) seemd to cater directly to law enforcement professionals and SWAT teams.
Designed to enhance performance and comfort for officers who are needing to grip their AR for long periods of time, the IGRS improves the traditional horizontal hold for both shooting and patrolling.
From observing military use, Grauer saw that many officers were holding the magazine with their non-shooting hand. However, gripping the magazine in this way causes a lot of limitations, including having your hands positioned too close together. The IGRS feels like a traditional hold, but spreads hands further apart.
From a tactical standpoint, this seems to be a small product that could make a big impact when faced with holding your weapon for long periods of time.
"It works well especially in a police environment because an officer might have to hold his weapon for 30 minutes, covering a builidng during a standoff for example," says Greg King of Grauer. "Using the IGRS, it becomes more comfortable to hold a position for long periods of time."
Other features included in the IGRS: laser/light switch integration (functions to re-route wires internally to laser devices and pressure switches), superior rail loading (elminates the need for a vertical grip), and flared magazine funnel (to increase on-target confidence).
For more information about the IGRS product, visit Grauer Systems online
Request product info from top Tactical Products companies
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This Week on PlayStation Network - Knights, Rapture, and Tanks Video Feature
This week, we take a look at Castle Crashers, Sam and Max, R.U.S.E., and BioShock 2 downloadable content.
This week, we take a look at Castle Crashers, Sam and Max, R.U.S.E., and BioShock 2 downloadable content.
New content hits This Week on PlayStation Network.
Check out a new behind-the-scenes look at Yakuza 3 on the PlayStation 3.
Dan Chiappini gets his heat moves on in this video review for Yakuza 3.
A player tries to recruit a friend through fighting.
A player learns to combine street punks with solid objects.
A player makes friends with a local thug.
Japanese hits come stateside this week, with Final Fantasy XIII and Yakuza 3 headlining the releases!
Say "thanks for the memories" in this awesome new trailer.
Check out the latest downloads with This Week on PSN!
This Trailer introduces you to some of the allies and enemies you'll face as you take on the role of Kazuma Kiryu in Yakuza 3 when it launches next month. ...
Toshihiro Nagoshi talks about the influences behind Yakuza 3.
Head of worldwide consumer business discusses strategy, his thoughts on the state of the game industry, and whether or not Sega is thinking of reentering the console market.
Producer discusses crime game's target audience, Yakuza Kenzan's sequel potential, and how Japanese developers approach Western audiences.
Get your GameSpot news update for Thursday, December 10, 2009!
It's a high-speed foot chase in Yakuza 3.
Beat thugs with bikes and bats in Yakuza 3.
Use swords and elbows in Yakuza 3.
We're back with a brand-new show featuring Ryu ga Gotoku 3, otherwise known as Yakuza 3, and take a look back at some notable new releases of the past few ...
Yakuza 3 / Ryu ga Gotoku 3. Check out this trailer that shows off the variety of game mechanics available in Yakuza 3, coming straight to you from PlayStation Network ...
Yakuza 3 / Ryu ga Gotoku 3. This trailer gives you a glimpse of the story in Yakuza 3, coming straight to you from PlayStation Network in Japan.
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text:
It is time to say farewell to my many friends and readers. It has been fun over the last few years to write about Internet Marketing. Doing the research and writing about the Internet has been fun and very educational. I learned a lot and hopefully, I helped those who chose to take the time to read my column. But, it is time for me "kick the can down the road" and take on additional challenges and enjoy new ventures. I can assure you I will be busy.
While I will not be writing about the Internet, I will from time-to-time contribute an article on "Leadership in the Workplace." When I first retired, I was hired by a number of companies to solve some of their people issues. The majority of problems I encountered were directly related to a lack of leadership in the workplace. As a result of my "consulting gigs", I was asked to write a column on "Leadership in the Workplace" for a national trade magazine. I wrote a monthly column for over a year but I had to give it up because I was actively involved in running my small Internet company (Systems Connect). I enjoyed writing about leadership because in my mind leadership in any organization/company, etc. must be priority No. 1. I'll tell you why when I write the first article!
I want to thank my wife who was my homegrown editor and best critic. She did a great job of challenging my use of words, and sometimes my ideas. The Savannah Morning News staff are really a great group of professionals, especially my main editor, Gale Baldwin. Not only was he the guy who approved my articles for publishing, he was also my mentor, coach and friend. Thanks Gale. I must also thank my guys at Systems Connect who gave me ideas, solutions and research sites. They are great! Jesse Bushkar, my former VP and GM (now CEO of Sysconn New Media), will take my place as a columnist. You will be treated to a fresh approach about the wonderful world of the Internet and technology. Finally, I must thank the many readers who took the time to write, call or comment on my articles. Without exception, they all were terrific.
Note: I will still be adding "blogs" to my website and you can read what I am doing by going to www.chuckstarnaud.com.
Farewell and may all of you have a great day and an even better tomorrow.
Chuck St. Arnaud is the chairman emeritus of Sysconn New Media. He can be reached by email at email@example.com or phone at 912-224-2017. Go to his blog website at chuckstarnaud.com.


text:
Jessalyn Gilsig Curly Formal Updo Hairstyle
Description(Added: 4th March 2010 )
This amazing up-style is pinned up through the back to create body and volume for a stunning look and finish. The roots are teased for control and height and random pieces are left out to compliment the face and softens the over-all style.
- Hair Category: Formal
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- Gender: Women
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- Age: 21 - 30, 31 - 40, and 41 - 50
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- Styling Time: 30+ minutes
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text:
Legislative leaders said they were still studying the impact of the court's Thursday ruling, which Gov. Mike Beebe and other top elected officials said threatened years of reforms aimed at providing an equitable education across the state's school districts. The reforms were the result of a long-running school funding case that ended in 2007.
The high court ruled 4-3 that state education officials cannot withhold excess money from the Eureka Springs and Fountain Lake school districts, where higher property tax collections pushed the districts above total school funding levels set by state law. The court ruled that current law doesn't allow the excess funds from a state-mandated minimum property tax to be redistributed to other school districts by the Arkansas Department of Education.
Attorney General Dustin McDaniel said Friday that he planned to ask the court to reconsider its ruling, saying it has created confusion over the state's efforts to provide equity in its school funding reforms. McDaniel has until Dec. 17 to file the petition for rehearing.
"This case has taken a pretty settled and certain area of law and created a whole lot of uncertainty," McDaniel said.
Though the court said the Legislature could allow the state to redistribute the excess money, even critics of the decision said they weren't in any rush to look at that option.
"I am not sure that a legislative solution is what we ought to be bringing to this issue because as surely as we pass a bill, somebody else can pass another bill. It's hard for me to see how that's going to give any kind of sustainability or certainty to school funding going forward," said Sen. Joyce Elliott, D-Little Rock, who was said she was disappointed with the court's ruling.
The districts sued last year after the Education Department billed Fountain Lake for $1.4 million and Eureka Springs for $825,000, saying they'd received too much money from levying the state-mandated minimum property tax. State officials said the financial impact of the ruling would be relatively small, with only six of Arkansas' 239 districts this year collecting more in property taxes than the state school funding amount. However, they fear the ruling will undermine a series of school funding equity reforms.
A 1996 constitutional amendment approved by voters requires each school district to levy no less than 25 mills of property tax for maintenance and operation of schools. Districts are allowed to levy more than 25 mills. A mill produces $1 for every $1,000 of assessed property value.
The state argued it had the authority to withhold the excess money because it would have given the districts more than the per-student funding it receives from the state each year. The four-justice majority said there was no law that allowed the state to redistribute the funds to other schools.
A coalition of education reform groups on Friday criticized the ruling and signaled it would work with lawmakers next year to address the situation.
"It will be necessary for the legislature to modify the statutes to clearly define the funding structures for schools, and the AEA will be an active partner in changing the appropriate laws," Donna Morey, president of the Arkansas Education Association, said in a statement issued by the coalition.
Beebe, a Democrat who authored the 1996 amendment as a state senator, has also said he's wary of asking the Legislature to allow the funds to be redistributed. If he does, he'll likely face opposition from Republicans who will control both chambers of the Legislature next year.
House Republican Leader Bruce Westerman has said he'll oppose any efforts to prevent the districts from keeping the money. Westerman, R-Hot Springs, has disputed the idea that it would hurt the state's school funding efforts.
"I'm waiting for somebody to show me how one district is getting less money than they were before," Westerman said Thursday.
The incoming chairman of the Senate Education Committee on Thursday said lawmakers need to take a close look at the ruling and the state's districts to see what the impact will be in the future.
"Is that disparity going to grow as economic cycles occur or will it be a situation where those districts come back down and there's equalization again?" said Sen. Johnny Key, R-Mountain Home. "I think we need to think a little longer term before we just jump in there and decide what we need to fix."


text:
Surprising sources for healthy foods
Finding Frugal Organics
by Heather L. Seggel
Related Articles
A Buying Guide for Shopping at Your Local Farmers Market
8 Ways to Eat Organic Produce and Save Money
How to Be a Vegetarian or Vegan on a Budget
From the ages of 16 to 24, I was a vegetarian. These days I'm an omnivore whose main dilemma is a lack of cash flow, but my favorite foods are still the first ones I learned to make myself. Loving healthy foods doesn't have to be a budget-buster. You just need to know where to look for deals.
Make your first stop the nearest dollar store for healthy foods. Locally, one pound of red beans, two pounds of white rice, and a quart of organic soymilk cost $3. Three doors down at the supermarket in the same complex, those items cost over $7! Shop here for oats, pasta, and canned tomatoes as well. Chain stores like Dollar General are stocking more brand name items to compete with larger markets; as demand for healthier food goes up, so will the appearance of these goodies on their shelves. Independently owned dollar stores can hide treasure in the form of ethnic foods, teas and spices. Put on your Indiana Jones hat and dig up a great deal for dinner tonight.
Now is the time to change gears and go to the nearest natural foods store. Skip the aisles of packaged foods; you're here for produce, dairy, soy, and bulk items. Look in the lobby or ask at the register for in-store coupons. Organic produce, milk, soymilk, and meatless meat like Boca Burgers are often cheaper here than at the supermarket; take off a little more with a coupon and the savings really add up. "Bulk" isn't just food here, either; check out laundry detergent, dish soap, shampoo, lotion, and other goodies for sale by the ounce. Bring a few empty containers with you; it's a good deal and also a great way to try new products without committing to a whole box or bottle. If your store doesn't have Mambo Sprouts or Co-op Advantage coupons, check to see if they offer free magazines like Delicious Living. These magazines have fine articles and yummy recipes to inspire you, but right now you want to just give a quick flip through them to look for coupons; each issue usually has several inside. Snip and go!
Does your community have a farmer's market? If you answered "no," look harder. There might be one hiding somewhere, you just need to find the time and place. Ask your Chamber of Commerce or the health food store. Don't go early, either. Sleep late and breeze in afternoon, when vendors are ready to leave and looking to unload what's left in their trucks. Chances are that you can negotiate a good deal on fruit, vegetables, meat, fish, or cheese. And take the time to enjoy the sights and sounds! I've gone to my local farmer's market on a Saturday morning with a commuter mug and just bought a cup of coffee to justify my roaming about, sniffing all the soaps and fresh flowers, fantasizing future meals (goat cheese tarts! Tomato and kale soup!), and looking at the gorgeous colors of fruits and vegetables. After an hour, I felt like I'd been to a museum. If there's not a farmer's market near you, start one. You'll be a hero in your city, and make it a far better place to live and eat. Plus, you can probably work a kind of Godfather angle and get a lot of free samples in reward for your efforts (kidding).
Take the TDS Pantry Challenge.
Clean out that pantry, fridge and freezer and see how much extra cash you can free up this month!
Make the last stop your regular supermarket for anything you need that you couldn't find above. If you're a meal planner, you've got a list to get through. Otherwise, let the fresh and healthy ingredients you've got so far inspire a simple meal. Winter vegetables shine in a stew with lentils and/or sausage. Summer vegetables need no more than bread and cheese or olives to make a gorgeous salad that's a meal in itself. Seasonal fruit brings the outdoors right to your table deliciously. Bake local apples stuffed with raisins and dotted with butter for a homey, yet decadent treat. Topped with vanilla ice cream, it becomes Atkins Diet apple pie a la mode! The local supermarket charges $1.99 to $2.49 a pound for apples flown in from New Zealand, which are a delight to look at but have very little flavor. Cross the street and look at the co-op; you'll pay $0.75 a pound for locally grown organic apples that taste freshly picked because they are. Branch out from the stores you know, and you'll find new opportunities to eat like royalty on a pauper's wages.
Reviewed April 2017
Take the Next Step:
- Discover more smart ways to buy organic foods on a budget by visiting the Dollar Stretcher Library.
- Continue to trim food costs by visiting our food & groceries section to get tips and tools for keeping more of your hard-earned dollars in your pocket.
- Join those who 'live better...for less' - Subscribe to The Dollar Stretcher newsletter, a weekly look at how to stretch both your day and your dollar! Subscribers get a copy of our ebook Little Luxuries: 130 Ways to Live Better...For Less for FREE!
Share your thoughts about this article with the editor.


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6-string Electric Guitar
Product Code 43358
Sale Price!
We're sorry, this product is no longer available.
The American Standard Stratocaster is the same great best-selling, go-to guitar it has always been, and now it's upgraded with aged plastic parts and full-sounding Fender Custom Shop Fat '50s pickups. The latest iteration of our time-honored classic, it is the very essence of Strat tone and remains a beauty to see, hear and feel.
0 0
- Body: Alder
- Body Shape: Stratocaster®
- Neck Shape: Modern 'C' Shape
- Number of Frets: 22
- Fret Size: Medium Jumbo
- Position Inlays: Black Dot
- Fretboard Radius: 9.5" (24.1 cm)
- Fretboard: Rosewood or Maple
- Neck Material: Maple
- Nut Width: 1.685" (42.8 mm)
- Scale Length: 25.5" (64.8 cm)
- Neck Plate: 4-Bolt Neck Plate with Micro-Tilt™
- Truss Rods: Bi-Flex™ Truss Rod System
- Truss Rod Nut: 1/8" American Series Nut
- Pickup Configuration: S/S/S
- Bridge Pickup: Custom Shop Fat '50s Strat® Pickup (Bridge)
- Middle Pickup: Custom Shop Fat '50s Strat® Pickup (Middle)
- Neck Pickup: Custom Shop Fat '50s Strat® Pickup (Neck)
- Pickup Switching: 5-Position Blade: Position 1. Bridge Pickup, Position 2. Bridge and Middle Pickup, Position 3. Middle Pickup, Position 4. Middle and Neck Pickup, Position 5. Neck Pickup
Special Electronics: No-Load Tone Control
- Controls: Master Volume, Tone 1. (Neck Pickup), Tone 2. No-Load Tone Control (Middle and Bridge Pickups)
- Hardware: Chrome
- Bridge: 2-Point Synchronized Tremolo with Vintage Style Bent Steel Saddles
- String Nut: Synthetic Bone
- Switch Tip: Aged White
- Truss Rod Wrench: 1/8" Hex (Allen) Wrench
- Strings: Fender® USA Super Bullets® 3250L, NPS, (.009-.042 Gauges)
- Unique Features: New Bent Steel Saddles with Elongated String Slots, Copper Infused High Mass 100% Metal Bridge Block, Thinner Undercoat Finish for Improved Body Resonance, Tinted Neck, Aged Plastic Parts
- Case/Gig Bag: Molded rectangular SKB® case
- Included Accessories: Molded rectangular SKB® case, Cable, Strap, Polishing Cloth
- Polishing Cloth: Polishing Cloth Included
- Control Knobs: Aged White
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Adjustable Guitar Stand


text:
Sign Up
To recognize Arrowmen at the lodge level who have given outstanding service.
Presented to Arrowmen active at the lodge level.
Presented by National OA office, sold to councils.
Bronze medallion bearing likeness of E. Urner Goodman and Carroll A. Edson on wooden base; red Founder's Award ribbon with a gold arrow worn on uniform.
Click here for more information.


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Born Jan. 21, 1929 in Rockland, Me., Sprague grew up on nearby Islesboro. After graduating from Gould Academy, Bethel, Me. in 1946, he entered the University of Maine as a journalism student. He was recognized for his talent in photography and won an Associated Press award for photojournalism.
After graduating in 1950, Sprague worked at the Bangor Evening Commercial newspaper, until joining the U.S. Army during the Korean Conflict. Following his honorable discharge, he joined the Bangor & Aroostook Railroad (BAR) in 1952 as assistant director-news bureau at Houlton, Me. In 1970, Sprague moved to the railroad's headquarters in Bangor, where he was promoted to vice president public relations. He subsequently was named vice president personnel and public relations in 1981 and senior vice president in 1988.
During Sprague's 39-year career, he started the company magazine, The Maine Line, which received several national and international awards for excellence, including one for the best railroad-produced magazine in the industry. After retiring, he wrote and published a collection of his best works, The Past is a Different Place, which mirrored his love of Aroostook County and the BAR people.


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On Monday, as the Miami Dolphins were preparing to face the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Dolphins owner Stephen Ross conducted a press conference and released a statement with his thoughts and subsequent actions on the Jonathan Martin-Richie Incognito situation.
Ross said that he was "appalled" by the reports of racist and abusive communication via phone and text from Incognito to Martin. "I think anybody would be appalled," Ross said. "When you first read that text that was reported, to me I didn't realize people would talk, text or speak that way."
Ross also said that he plans to meet with Martin, the second-year offensive tackle who left the team on Oct. 28 following what is claimed to be a long history of hazing. As the case developed, Incognito, a veteran offensive guard, was suspended indefinitely from the team.
"I'm going to meet with Jonathan Martin face to face and hear what he has to say," Ross said. "Then, I will deal with it from there. So much has been said about a lot of different things."
In his statement, Ross revealed that he has established an independent advisory council to look into the culture of the team's locker room. This council is separate from the investigation that the NFL is conducting at Ross' request.
"We have been careful in our statements and in our comments, as we have not wanted to make a rush to judgment until we know all of the facts," Ross said in his statement. "We still don't have a full picture of the facts. However, I want to be clear, that I and the Miami Dolphins organization are committed to getting to the bottom of this issue and making any necessary changes to improve our organization.
"In the past two weeks, our primary concern has been for Jonathan Martin. Immediately after learning that Jonathan left the team, I spoke with head coach Joe Philbin and Joe visited with Jonathan in person that evening. Over the ensuing days, both Joe and I reached out to Jonathan to express our concern and to offer our support. Jonathan and I have exchanged texts as recently as this weekend, and I am scheduled to meet with him in person to see how he is doing and to listen to his concerns."
The advisory group will consist of former head coaches Tony Dungy and Don Shula, as well as ex-NFL players Dan Marino, Jason Taylor and Curtis Martin.
"Together, these men bring integrity, respect and diverse experiences to the discussion, some having just recently retired from the locker room," Ross said. "Joe Philbin and others will be a part of the process, as will current Dolphin players. I want to be clear: this effort is to improve the Miami Dolphins only and is not intended to be a blueprint for other franchises. The working group will begin its charge after the season."
Both Martin and Incognito have most recently been in California. Martin has sought counsel from attorney David Cornwell, while Incognito did a long interview with FOX Sports' Jay Glazer in which he claimed that Martin's impressions of the incidents did not jibe with his.
"This isn't an issue about bullying," Incognito told Glazer. "This is an issue of my and John's relationship. You can ask anybody in the Miami Dolphins locker room, 'Who had John Martin's back the absolute most?' and they'll undoubtedly tell you [that it was] me. All this stuff coming out … it speaks to the culture of our locker room. It speaks to the culture of our closeness. It speaks to the culture of our brotherhood. The racism, the bad words … that's what I regret most, but that is a product of the environment, and that's something we use all the time."
Ross wasn't buying it -- clearly, the incentive now in Miami is to alter the culture on a no-matter-what basis.


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CORVALLIS, Ore. – When Oregonians can rototill their gardens in March, but then have to water their lawns all throughout April and May, you know it's drier than usual.
Experts say that through May 10, it has been the driest start to the year on record at the Eugene and Salem airport weather stations, and the second driest start at Hyslop Farm in Corvallis and the Medford Airport. This is the third driest start to the year for the Portland Airport station.
"We've seen some pretty drastic swings from very wet to very dry over the past year," said Oregon State University's Kathie Dello, who is the deputy director of the Oregon Climate Service at OSU. "The whole West Coast has been abnormally dry. We've had some strong high pressure ridging, which means the storm track is sent to our north.
"When it does that, we get weather that generally results in hot days and cool nights," Dello said, "and it is usually quite dry."
The spring of 2012 – from March to May – was the fourth wettest on record statewide, and then things dried up quickly. The summer July to September period was the second driest on record. But the fall October to December period saw above-normal precipitation, before the transition to this spring's dry conditions.
"It's been pretty topsy-turvy," Dello said. "On one hand, we built up a nice snowpack through November and December in the central and northern Cascades, but abnormally warm temperatures are melting that quickly."
More than 91 percent of Oregon is considered abnormally dry for this time of year, Dello said, citing the U.S. Drought Monitor. The NOAA Climate Prediction Center shows that the odds favor the dry trend continuing into July.
"The biggest concern when that happens is warm, dry ground and early melting of snow," Dello said. "That equates to fire danger. The National Interagency Fire Center is saying that fire season may begin weeks earlier than normal this year.
"And, of course, dry conditions are a concern for farmers, stream health and fish," she added. "We have seen occasional bouts of cloudiness and sprinkles, but not enough to chase the overall pattern of dryness."
For the record:
- Through May 10, the Eugene Airport has received just 6.54 inches of rain, which is 14.08 inches below normal. It is the driest on record dating back to 1940.
- The Salem Airport has had 7.65 inches of rain, driest on record back to 1928, and 9.67 inches below normal.
- The Corvallis Hyslop station has received 8.27 inches of rain, second driest on record back to 1893 and 10.59 inches below normal. The driest on record was in 2001, when it got just 7.98 inches.
- Medford Airport has received a scant 3.05 inches, which is 4.48 inches below normal in records dating back to 1928. The driest start to a year on record was in 1992 with 2.99 inches.
- Portland Airport has logged 8.3 inches of precipitation, 6.55 inches before normal and third driest since 1942. The record year was in 1985, with 6.0 inches.
Weather-lovers can learn more about Oregon weather by following Dello on Twitter at: www.twitter.com/orclimatesvc. The state is also looking for volunteers to collect precipitation data. For more information, go to http://www.cocorahs.org/.


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I am having problems splitting 1 string into sub strings.
the section of code is as follows
getline ( file_1, line );
index = line.find(",",1);
time = line.substr(0,index);
prob = line.substr(index,4); //works when rem'd
line, time and prob are strings
index is size_t
The file i am ready has the data in the following format
When the program runs I get a abnormal program termination. with the prob line removed the prog runs fine with no errors.
I have tried casting index to int before the prob line and changed the substr format to line.substr(index); but nothing works
Can anyone point out where I am going wrong


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A&O Dresden Hauptbahnhof
The A&O Dresden opened in August 2007. The centrally located building offers you 165 rooms with modern furnishings in various categories. On the roof of the A&O Dresden there is a terrace and bar from which you can let your eyes wander over the panorama of the Altstadt.
The A&O Dresden is only 400 meters from the Dresden Central Station, just two bus stops away. Due to its central location and good connections the A&O is suitable for those coming by car, train or bus, and is great for excursions into the city.
The unique bar on the rooftop terrace, with its breath-taking panorama view over Dresden's Altstadt, is one of the highlights of the A&O Dresden. In addition the location has seminar rooms and a lobby with a bar that invite guests to work and relax. Because of its central location city tours are offered beginning at the A&O. There are parking spaces available for guests arriving by car or bus.
- 24 hours reception
- 'All you can eat' breakfast for just 7 EUR from 6 till 10 a.m. (7 till 11 a.m. at the weekend)
- bar
- Sky TV
- 24 hours snacks at our lobby-bar
- only non smoking rooms
- daily newspaper- check-out till 10 am (11 am at the weekend)
- Late-Check-Out till 2 p.m. on request (10,00 Euro per room extra)
- check-in at 3 pm
- free wifi in public areas and in all rooms
- multilingual and friendly staff
- ticket sale (walkabout, sight-seeing tours,') and information
- credit cards VISA und Master (+2.95 Euro fee), Maestro (for free)
- For 5 EUR per night, you are allowed to bring your dog around (only in double and single rooms).
- billard and table football
- free house safe
- Until two days prior to arrival before 6 o'clock pm (local time at hotel/hostel) free of charge. In case of cancellation after this period a cancellation fee of 100% of the first night will be charged. In a case of non-arrival 100% of booking costs will be charged. It's the same for short-term bookings, within two days before arrival.
- Any discounts or special offers booked through online booking engines cannot be cancelled.
For groups from 10 people we have special cancellation and payment conditions. Our reservation department will contact you!!!
- 8 weeks prior to arrival date free of charge
- from 55 days to 5 days prior to arrival date 50% of the agreed total price
- from 4 to 2 days prior to arrival date 75% of the agreed total price
- one day prior to arrival date 90% of the agreed total price
We will debit 50% of the agreed total price 8 weeks or less than 8 weeks before arrival from your credit card.
The house comes with both hotel and hostel rooms, which can be found on separate floors. All rooms are light, have modern furnishings and are equipped with a shower and WC. Each hotel room has a hairdryer.
For individual and business travellers we have hotel single and double rooms available. Likewise, we have family rooms which can sleep two adults and two children.
The hostel part of our house offers great deals on our multi bed rooms and is ideal for groups.
At the reception you will find internet access, we have WiFi and internet terminals available. Our friendly and experienced personnel will be happy to help you book trips, theatre or concert tickets, etc.
In our large and comfortable Skybar it is easy to loose track of time. Enjoy a cool beer or a cocktail in the summer in our beer garden or spacious roof terrace. Play a group game of table tennis or table football. We also have some videogames to entertain our guests and offer the option of renting one of our in- house bicycles so you can explore Dresden at your own pace.
Distances from the hostel.
- Frauenkirche (Church of Our Lady)- 2.5km
- Dresdener Altstadt- 2.5km
- Kulturpalast- 2.5km
- Messe Dresden- 2.5km
- Semperoper- 4km
- Ladies, in the event that you are an individual traveler and have booked a space in a multi- bed dorm we would like to inform you that we do offer 'Shared Women Dorms' if you would prefer.
- The hostel's multi- bed rooms require full payment in advance and there is a deposit when renting bed linen (3 €) and hand towels (1 €). In double and single rooms bed linen and hand towels are inclusive.
- In all A&O hotel's and hostel's pets are allowed at an extra 5 € charge per night only in single and double bed rooms, please inquire beforehand.
- Conference rooms and technical appliances are available, please inquire beforehand.
CHECK IN 4 p.m.
Reserved rooms shall be available for occupancy from 4 p.m. on the agreed day of the client's arrival. The client shall not be entitled to occupy the room(s) earlier than this.
CHECK OUT 10 a.m. (11 a.m. at the weekend)
On the agreed day of departure the client must vacate the room by 10 a.m. at the latest. If the client does not vacate the room by this time we shall be entitled to charge 50% of the full room rate as published in the price list until 6 p.m. for reasons of non-contractual occupation, and if the client vacates the room after 6 p.m. 100% of the full room rate will be charged. This shall not constitute any contractual claims on the part of the client.
- Until two days prior to arrival until 6 o'clock pm (local time hotel/hostel) free of charge. There is a cancellation fee of 100% of the first night, should the client cancel the room(s) after the aforementioned cancellation period. In a case of non-arrival 100% of the first night will be charged too. It's the same for short-term bookings, within two days before arrival.
- Any discounts or special offers booked through online booking engines are irreversible.
For groups from 10 people we have special cancellation and payment conditions. Our reservation department will contact you!!!
- until 8 weeks prior to arrival date free of charge
- until 4 weeks prior to arrival date 50% of the agreed total price
- until 8 days prior to arrival date 75% of the agreed total price
- from 7th day prior to arrival 90% of the agreed total price
We will debit 50% of the agreed total price 8 weeks or less than 8 weeks before arrival from your credit card.
Disponibilità e tariffePer visualizzare la disponibilità e i prezzi, seleziona le date e fai clic su "Aggiorna date"
Ostello Servizi & Politiche
- Reception 24 ore su 24
- Bar
- Noleggio biciclette
- Parcheggio per biciclette
- Prima colazione non inclusa
- TV via cavo
- Si accettano bambini
- Zona da gioco per bimbi
- Sala comune
- Carte di credito accettate
- Ascensore
- Mappe della città gratuite
- Wi-Fi gratuito
- Sala giochi
- Asciugacapelli
- Docce calde
- Pulizia
- Accesso a Internet
- Accesso con chiave elettronica
- Lavanderia
- Biancheria non inclusa
- Armadietti
- Deposito bagagli
- Sala per meeting
- Nessun coprifuoco
- Vietato fumare
- Parcheggio
- Si accettano animali
- Bigliardo
- Luce per lettura
- Cassetta di sicurezza
- IVA inclusa
- Travel Desk per i tour
- Asciugamani a noleggio
- Asciugamani non inclusi
- Distributori automatici
- WiFi
Politica di cancellazioneQuesta proprietà ha una politica di cancellazione di 2. La mancata cancellazione entro questo intervallo di tempo si tradurrà in una penale pari alla prima notte di pernottamento.
IndicazioniMostra mappaNascondi mappa
Walking direction
Take the train to Dresden Hauptbahnhof. Take the main exit and turn right. Pass under the bridge and turn left into Friedrich-List-Platz which becomes Strehlener Strasse after a few metres. You will find our A&O Dresden Hauptbahnhof after 200 m on the right. Or by bus- just 2 stops away: Take the line 66. The A&O Dresden Hauptbahnhof is directly at the bus stop.
By train
Take the train to Dresden Hauptbahnhof. Take the main exit and turn right. Pass under the bridge and turn left into Friedrich-List-Platz which becomes Strehlener Strasse after a few metres. You will find our A&O Dresden Hauptbahnhof after 200 m on the right. Or by bus- just 2 stops away: Take the line 66. The A&O HOTEL and HOSTEL is directly at the bus stop. Important Information: Until Dec. 8th some trains will not stop at Dresden central station due to construction works. During the works trains will stop at Dresden-Neustadt. Use regional train S1 heading towards Schna/Knigstein or the tramway No. 3 towards Dresden-Coschtz to get back to central station. Trains/tramway will depart each 10 min. - approx. journey time: 10-12 min. Dresdner Verkehrsbetriebe (DVB) get the latest information on public transportation in Dresden: www.dvb.de
By plane
Take the suburban train (S-Bahn), line S2, towards central station (Hauptbahnhof). Then follow the description above.
By car
From North and East: On the motorway A4 take exit Dresden-Hellerau, turn right and drive on the Rathenower Strasse (later renamed in Hansastrasse). After 4,5 km keep right, at the end turn left into Grosse Meissner Strasse (later renamed in Koepkestrasse). Drive across the bridge, after about 2 km turn left into Strehlener Strasse. From South (Nuremburg) and West: Leave the motorway A4 at the at the interchange Dresden-West towards Prague (A17). Leave A17 at the exit no.3, Dresden-Suedvorstadt and turn left. After 4 km turn right in to Strehlener Strasse. From South (Pirna, Prague): Leave the motorway A17 at exit no.3, Dresden-Suedvorstadt and turn right. After 4 km turn right in to Strehlener Strasse.


text:
Georgians hoping to hear Shaun Casey, head of the U.S. Department of State's new Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives, speak at Emory University will have to wait out the current government shutdown. The school announced Tuesday that Casey has postponed a public talk originally scheduled later this week at Emory University, due to the federal government gridlock.
Casey's talk, which was to be given at 2 p.m. Friday Oct. 4 and titled "Exploring Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Launching the State Department's Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives," will be rescheduled at a later date.
Casey's talk is sponsored by the Graduate Division of Religion, with the Laney Graduate School, Candler School of Theology and the Department of Religion.