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The following is the transcript of the hearing on the nomination of John Negroponte to Director of National Intelligence as provided by CQ Transcriptions, Inc.
U.S. SENATOR RON WYDEN (D-OR)Continue reading the main story
ROBERTS: The committee will come to order.
The distinguished vice chairman will be here momentarily.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the president's nomination for the newly created position of director of national intelligence.
Our distinguished witness today is the president's nominee, the Honorable John D. Negroponte.
Ambassador, the committee does welcome you and your guests.
The committee also welcomes our distinguished colleague who will introduce the nominee, the Senate's president pro tem and senior senator from Alaska, the Honorable Ted Stevens.
The junior senator from New York, the Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton was to be here, but apparently has a conflict.
The president has made an excellent choice I believe in nominating Ambassador Negroponte to serve as the nation's first director of national intelligence. Ambassador Negroponte is a distinguished public servant, having dedicated 40 years and service to our country.
During his career, the Senate has confirmed him five times -- five times for ambassadorial positions in Honduras, Mexico, the Philippines, at the United Nations and, of course, most recently as our first ambassador to the new Iraq.
Ambassador Negroponte also has held a number of key positions in the executive branch, including serving as deputy national security adviser. He has worked on intelligence and national security issues all throughout his career, and in that respect I think brings a great deal of experience to this position.
Most important, Ambassador Negroponte has a demonstrated record as an outstanding manager and a leader. He is well suited for this position and I look forward to his confirmation.
Intelligence has long played an important role in the defense of the United States and its interests. We developed what is now known as the intelligence community to determine the capabilities and intentions of state actors and their respective militaries.
The idea that a nonstate actor could seriously threaten our national security was virtually inconceivable 50-plus years ago.
Given the grave dangers that our nation now faces from threats such as terrorism and the expansion of weapons of mass destruction, what was inconceivable a half century ago has now become reality, and intelligence is now the key to our success.
In the past few decades, there have been many unsuccessful attempts to reform the intelligence community.
ROBERTS: Those attempts, quite frankly, resulted in little more than incremental and marginal changes.
It took the very visible intelligence failures associated with 9/11 and the flawed assessments on Iraq's WMD programs to build the historic consensus required for substantial change.
And change is a very necessary process. If it ultimately results in fundamental and substantial change, as it appears that it might, it will have been for the good.
Change will be good not only for the U.S. national security but also for the men and women of the intelligence community.
In my years on the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have met many of these hardworking men and women who work day in and day out with one goal in mind: keeping this nation secure and its people safe.
They are held back, however, I think by a flawed system that does not permit them, as a community, to do their very best work.
We need to honor their commitment and their sacrifices by giving them an intelligence community worthy of their efforts and capable of meeting their aspirations and our expectations of them.
I understand that change can be hard and stressful, but we need change. And not just a month or a year of change, but sustained, fundamental change that becomes a continuing process of adaptation as new threats emerge.
Now, we all know that terrorism is a long-term threat to our national security, but I can assure you that it will not be the last threat that we face. There will be others which will require our intelligence community to continue to be adaptive and flexible.
Mr. Ambassador, the process of change begins with you.
ROBERTS: It is my foremost hope that, when confirmed, you will begin to provide the strong, independent leadership that has long been lacking in our intelligence community.
The position for which you have been nominated was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. It is no secret that this bill did not go as far as I would have liked in creating a director of national intelligence, or the DNI, with very clear authority and chain of command that the intelligence community, I think, required.
As I have said before, the Intelligence Reform Act is not the best possible bill, but rather the best bill possible under very difficult circumstances.
If we embrace the concept of change as a continuing process, however, this reform effort is a very solid first step in the right direction of someday creating a clear chain of command and accountability within that chain.
For now we must implement and oversee an Intelligence Reform Act that is somewhat ambiguous with respect to your authorities and responsibilities. Ambassador, this ambiguity has created justifiable concern about whether you, as the DNI, have the clear authorities you will need to meet your vast responsibilities.
In other words, we have high expectations. But did we give you the tools you will need to meet them?
President Bush has made some very forceful statements about the strong authority that the DNI will have in his administration. I am confident that, when confirmed, you will have the strong support of the president.
I am equally confident that you will have the same strong support from this committee. In other words, if you need help, let us know. I'll be the stagecoach driver along with the rest of the members of the committee. You can be the shotgun rider.
I think that's turned around. You be the stagecoach driver. We'll be the shotgun rider.
But for now you have a blank slate. And any ambiguities in your authority will be up to you to resolve. We need your advice.
This leads me to an important point: As the first DNI, you will establish historic precedents that will define all future DNIs as well as set the course for the future of the entire intelligence community.
We can legislate powerful authorities all day long, but as the history of the position of the director of central intelligence has shown, if the first DNI does not exercise his authorities, it will be difficult for any subsequent DNI to do so.
Exercising the authorities of the DNI will not be easy. Setting the precedent of a strong DNI will likely mean stepping on more than a few toes along the way. I am confident, however, that you are the right man for that job.
It is my hope that, as the director of national intelligence, you will be independent of the interests of any one intelligence agency, and that you will achieve a better flow of information in our government.
To me this means that intelligence information will be passed to decision-makers not because it comes from a particular agency, but because it represents the best work from any agency.
This also means that we must reject the concept of information sharing in favor of what the vice chairman and I call information access. I believe, as does the WMD commission, that information sharing is a limited idea that falsely implies that the data collector is also the data owner.
The concept of information sharing relies on our collectors to push the information to these analysts who they deem that they really need it.
We need new thinking on this issue. While we must continue to protect sources and methods -- we know all know that -- cleared analysts with a need to know should be able to pull information by searching all intelligence databases without waiting for any one agency to deem them worthy.
Now, this is a very challenging proposition. I can assure you that the intelligence collection agencies will not greet such efforts with great enthusiasm. Even with the intelligence failures of 9/11 and Iraq WMD hanging over us and the staggering willful inability to share information associated with those failures, achieving a free flow of intelligence information has still proved very, very elusive.
Mr. Ambassador, it is my hope that you'll be able to provide leadership and, quite frankly, a kick in the pants when necessary to get our collection agencies to finally perfect the concept of information access.
As you know, in Washington politics and turf is a zero-sum game. Just by showing up on your first day of work you will already have stepped on quite a few toes. I am confident, however, that you will perform your duties in a manner that will soon have us wondering how we ever got along without a director of national intelligence.
When we get to that point, and I hope it happens sooner than later, we can begin moving toward what I believe must be the ultimate goal: a more rationalized, organized intelligence community with a clear chain of command and accountability that comes with it.
With that said, I, again, welcome you to the committee and look forward to your testimony.
I now recognize the distinguished vice chairman, Senator Rockefeller.
ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome.
It's my view that the president's confidence in you to lead the intelligence community as director of national intelligence at a time of enormous turbulence, 20 or 30 or 40 years of war on terrorism out in front of us and a lot of national introspection, is a well-founded decision.
You have a 40-year career of public service in some of the most difficult places. People tend to forget how hard that can be. In Vietnam, the Paris peace talks, which most Americans probably don't know, South and Central America, the United Nations and obviously, most recently, Iraq.
This breeds a tough and disciplined man with self-esteem and with the willingness to make decisions and to tell truth to power, which I think is key in all of this.
Since joining the Foreign Service as a young man out of college, you've ably served our country and if confirmed you will continue to do so.
ROCKEFELLER: Your abilities as a manager, your skill as a negotiator, your understanding of the workings of government are going to be applied to a much different and certainly much more difficult task than even those that you've had.
You've been asked to lead an intelligence community that is bruised but fundamentally unbowed by the failures of 9/11 and Iraq prewar intelligence, a group of 15 agencies with their own respective cultures that are in the process of being reshaped and redefined into a cohesive entity that can more effectively blunt the murderous plots of the terrorists and stymie the global spread of weapons of mass destruction.
This is happening to a certain extent in the intelligence community. There has been some of that thanks to the counterterrorism center.
This is a tall order for any well-seasoned professional, which is what you are. The position of director of national intelligence is one of the toughest jobs in Washington. I've put it in the top three or four, frankly, in terms of the pressure that'll be on you, the spotlight that'll be on you, and the mandate for the country that will be placed squarely on your shoulders.
You will need to call upon all of the skills that you have.
Now, let me take this opportunity to summarize what I see as five pressing challenges that you will have to deal with if you are confirmed, and hopefully we can discuss them further during the questioning period.
ROCKEFELLER: First, it is absolutely essential that our intelligence is timely, objective and independent of political considerations.
As you know, this is what the law requires. This is not a simple judgment. This is the 1947 National Security Act, as amended by the Intelligence Reform Act. Timely, effective, independent, objective intelligence is the law.
You will need to speak truth to power, and that includes the president of the United States, obviously -- that's very important; and I'll have a specific question for you on that -- even if the truth is not well received by any policy-maker or a group of, or inconsistent with stated policy goals.
The credibility of the intelligence community and, by extension the credibility of the United States, has suffered when key intelligence reports, such as the prewar intelligence on Iraq, failed the test of being timely, objective and independent, as required by law.
Second, the issue of accountability is to many of us a very important one. The WMD commission highlighted the issue very strongly.
As far as I can determine, no one was held accountable for the numerous failures to share critical intelligence and act on the intelligence warnings in the year and a half prior to the 9/11 attacks.
In fact, the committee is still waiting -- now three years later -- for the CIA inspector general report on accountability after 9/11.
Government doesn't function without accountability. You, as DNI, if you're confirmed, will bear that very heavy responsibility to make it effective.
It's not just negative accountability, it can also be positive accountability.
Likewise, there has been a lack of accountability over the misrepresentation of intelligence by analysts prior to the Iraq war. There was a great deal that went on between the time that the Senate voted to authorize the president, and then the Powell speech, and then, later in March, the decision to go to war. There was an enormous amount of statements that were made, what I -- some of us would call hyping and misrepresenting what the intelligence actually said, particularly in the area of Iraq's nuclear and biological weapons programs.
ROCKEFELLER: If accountability is absent, workers are sent the wrong message; that there are no incentives for improving job performance.
That is not a monetary matter I'm talking about; it's a question of firing, promoting, good words to them, something good in the record. I think it's an extremely important part of accountability and that does not disinclude firing.
Third, the intelligence reform bill passed by Congress last December is a blueprint for achieving a more focused and effectively managed intelligence community.
Making this vision a reality will take time and require you and your deputies and your staff to flesh out, as they say, some of the details in the legislation.
I disagree with the statement of the chairman only in this regard, and that is that I think it's very important -- and we've talked about this when we met privately -- that we not try to cram a whole bunch of new reforms into our authorization bill or do it into some vehicle on the floor of the Senate.
I think you and your team will need the time to look over the landscape, to make judgments about what's being done and what's not being done, and then make your decisions and your recommendations about what should be changed, if anything, from that point.
In fact, I would go further. I think the fact that we did not so perfectly delineate your responsibilities is a great advantage -- it was important. Congress cannot do that; only you and your team can do that, and then go over that with us.
I'm concerned that while some progress has been made in the coordination of agency activities at places like the National Counterterrorism Center, which I've mentioned, much more needs to be done.
Specifically, I'm concerned that the increase in the overseas collection of intelligence by the CIA, the Pentagon, the FBI, while laudatory is not being properly orchestrated in a cohesive fashion.
On the domestic front, I see the insular culture at the FBI changing, but much too slowly, and the counterterrorism efforts of the bureau still hampered by outdated and dysfunctional information technologies systems.
ROCKEFELLER: Fourth, the collection of intelligence through the detention, interrogation and rendition of suspected terrorists and insurgents will be a responsibility of the intelligence community for as long as our nation remains in a global war against terrorism, which I suspect will be decades yet to come.
I believe that we have lacked a comprehensive and consistent legal and operational policy on the detention and interrogation of prisoners since we began our operations in Afghanistan.
This in turn, in my judgment, has led to confusion among officials in the field and numerous cases of documented abuses that appear several times every week.
I've been advocating for over two months now that our committee undertake an investigation that would get to the heart of these legal and operational matters and propose corrective recommendations.
The intelligence that we gain through these interrogations is too important -- much too important to allow shortcomings in this program to continue, for boundaries to be ill-defined.
I trust that you share my concern. And I hope you will assist our committee in undertaking a constructive inquiry into detention, interrogation and rendition practices.
Finally, the president's intelligence budget for the fiscal year 2006 was formulated during the time last year when your position was being worked through in terms of legislation, not when you were in office.
Obviously, the budget that was sent to Congress prior to your confirmation -- by the time that you're in office, it may be relevant or lack some relevancy, either for this coming fiscal year or for the following one.
My point is that it's absolutely essential that this budget becomes your budget, as the director of national intelligence. If the intelligence spending priorities proposed in the national intelligence program do not match your own priorities, I urge that you prepare a budget amendment and forward it to us with alacrity. That would refer to 2006.
You will be the individual responsible for executing the new intelligence budget come October. The sooner it reflects your guidance the better.
Ambassador, the support of the president will be a key factor in your ability to meet these and other challenges facing you as DNI. The reform act provides the director position with considerable authorities.
ROCKEFELLER: But the most important authority of all is the backing of the president when you get to your first couple of tests. And it'll be those first couple of tests on which you will be judged. And who knows where that will come from, but I think reasonable people can make reasonable guesses on that.
So you will make a decision, and it will be very important for the president to back you up. If he does not, you will be weakened. If he does, you will be strengthened.
And it does not take long in this city, as you know, for people to make up their minds about the aura and therefore the fact of power of holding a powerful position.
So I thank you again for appearing before us, for being willing to take on a job of this dimension, which I said, I think is historic in its reach -- global reach, national reach -- and affect on the lives of all Americans.
I thank you.
ROBERTS: I thank the vice chairman.
Just for the record, I don't know what chairman you're listening to, but it was not me that suggested that we cram the authorization bill with changes to the intelligence reform bill. I don't think it's possible to cram anything through the Senate, let alone any changes to the intelligence reform bill.
And that, as you have suggested, Mr. Vice Chairman, we do listen very carefully and ask the advice and counsel of the DNI before we move on any changes.
ROBERTS: It is my privilege now to recognize the distinguished senior senator from Alaska, the Alaskan of the century, Senator Stevens.
I would only indicate to you, Mr. Ambassador, this is what some of us in Dodge City, Kansas, would call your friendly hometown intelligence community banker. So I think the closer you sit next to him, why, the more successful you might be.
Senator Stevens?
STEVENS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Member of the committee, I'm glad to have the opportunity to come here today to recommend a speedy reporting of this nomination to the Senate and a quick action on it.
Ambassador Negroponte and I have known each other now for almost 30 years. And we have developed a great personal friendship.
Actually, John started out in the deputy assistant secretary for oceans and fisheries affairs with the rank of ambassador. And in that connection he handled several matters that pertained to fisheries. This goes back into the early '70s. And one of the things he did was to not only visit our state frequently, but he also conducted the breakthrough agreement with the government of Japan that provided for crucial protection of the wild salmon for the United States on the open sea -- in the oceans.
This high seas fishing agreement has led to the preservation of the largest fish found in the world, the Bristol Bay salmon, and he was directly associated with that. Those benefits continue to protect a series of small native communities in Alaska.
And I have had the pleasure of working with them in the assignments that all of you have mentioned so far -- the two of you mentioned so far, ambassador to Honduras, assistant secretary of the oceans, international environment and scientific affairs, ambassador to the Philippines, ambassador to the United Nations and, of course, he is currently the ambassador to Iraq.
I have witnessed his ability to work on very difficult assignments, to manage large and complex diplomatic and joint State and Defense missions. I have observed his effectiveness and sensitivity in dealing with foreign counterparts, which I think is going to be crucial to this job of his.
Educated at Yale, my friend speaks five languages fluently, and I consider that to be a really true asset for the job he's got ahead of him.
I believe President Bush, as you've said, has chosen extremely wisely and I welcome his selection to be our nation's first director of national intelligence.
And as you've indicated, Senator Inouye and I currently have the responsibility of overseeing the funding for this new position.
STEVENS: We certainly are going to do everything we can to work with Ambassador Negroponte -- now Director Negroponte.
This is, as you said, a very crucial period of our history, and we need his vast experience to guide this new establishment and to fulfill the obligations and commitments we've made to the country in this new position. It requires finesse and skill.
I can tell you very seriously, I think this is one of the most distinguished public servants I've had the honor of knowing. In my 36 years here in the Senate, I don't think I've known anyone who's handled every single job he undertook in the way that John has completed his assignments.
I am confident that the United States will be well served by his confirmation, and we look forward to working with this committee to assure that he has the tools to complete this job and to really find new headquarters, to do a great many things.
And I wouldn't worry, Senator Rockefeller, about sending up a different budget. I can assure you that the two of us will listen to him and what his needs will be for the fiscal year 2006.
Thank you very much.
ROBERTS: Senator Stevens, on behalf of the committee, we thank you for being here to introduce this fine nominee. I know, sir, that you have many important duties. We would love to have you for the full hearing, seeking your continued advice and counsel, but we know you have miles to go and things to do.
STEVENS: Thank you very much.
ROBERTS: Mr. Ambassador, you may proceed. And may I suggest to you, sir, that you introduce your lovely wife Diana and the rest of your family who is sitting directly behind your right shoulder?
NEGROPONTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to introduce my wife Diana and two of my five children. Diana teaches history at Fordham University at the moment.
My daughter Alejandra, who is a junior at Georgetown University, and my son John, who is a junior at St. Johnsbury Academy in St. Johnsbury, Vermont.
I also happen to have three other children who, for a variety of reasons, were not able to be here with us at this hearing.
ROBERTS: Well, we welcome you and your family and we thank you very much and you may certainly proceed with your statement.
NEGROPONTE: Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller, distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today as the president's nominee to be the first director of national intelligence.
ROCKEFELLER: Do you have any concerns -- I mean, there are varieties of techniques, et cetera, leading up to the word torture, hopefully not including that word. But do you have any concerns about what you have read or come to understand about interrogations that have been carried out at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo or Afghanistan?
NEGROPONTE: Well, there were abuses, as we know -- appalling abuses -- that were carried out in Abu Ghraib. I'm not intimately familiar with all the practices either there or certainly not in the other countries that you've mentioned.
But I would come back to my main point: I think the guiding principle must be that the intelligence community must abide by all applicable laws and the Constitution of the United States.
I think, beyond that, there might be some questions that we could discuss in the closed session. But I have not been extensively briefed, I want to stress, Senator, on all the practices that have been undertaken here.
And I might, as a general point, just add, you know I just recently left Iraq and was ambassador there until only recently and have just been back in the country two weeks. So this has been a process of really total immersion, but the learning curve has been extremely steep.
ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Ambassador, this morning's paper indicated the State Department released hundreds of documents related to your time in Honduras. This question, as you know, is bound to come.
ROCKEFELLER: Do you have any concerns -- I mean, there are varieties of techniques, et cetera, leading up to the word torture, hopefully not including that word. But do you have any concerns about what you have read or come to understand about interrogations that have been carried out at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo or Afghanistan?
NEGROPONTE: Well, there were abuses, as we know -- appalling abuses -- that were carried out in Abu Ghraib. I'm not intimately familiar with all the practices either there or certainly not in the other countries that you've mentioned.
But I would come back to my main point: I think the guiding principle must be that the intelligence community must abide by all applicable laws and the Constitution of the United States.
I think, beyond that, there might be some questions that we could discuss in the closed session. But I have not been extensively briefed, I want to stress, Senator, on all the practices that have been undertaken here.
And I might, as a general point, just add, you know I just recently left Iraq and was ambassador there until only recently and have just been back in the country two weeks. So this has been a process of really total immersion, but the learning curve has been extremely steep.
ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Ambassador, this morning's paper indicated the State Department released hundreds of documents related to your time in Honduras. This question, as you know, is bound to come.
NEGROPONTE: I support the fine work this committee has done to guide and inform United States intelligence policy. And if confirmed, I look forward to our continued close consultation.
I know that the members of the committee share my conviction that timely, accurate intelligence is a critical component of preserving our national security.
Without good intelligence, we will be unable to defeat the terrorists who began their assault us on long before September 11th, 2001; we will fall short in our efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; we will lack the insight we need to deal with hostile regimes that practice artful schemes of denial and deception to conceal their dangerous intentions; and we will possess insufficient understanding of an array of global phenomenon that could have consequences for our economy, our health and environment, our allies and our freedom.
The United States intelligence community, staffed by talented, patriotic Americans, forms what President Bush has rightly called our first line of defense.
My job, if confirmed, will be to ensure that this community works as an integrated, unified, cost-effective enterprise, enabling me to provide the president, his Cabinet, the armed services and the Congress with the best possible intelligence product, both current and strategic, on a regular basis.
NEGROPONTE: My qualifications for this post extend over a career in public service that began in October of 1960.
Since then, I have been nominated for posts subject to confirmation by the United States Senate eight times.
On five occasions, I have served as chief of mission of United States embassies and had the privilege of working with many fine representatives of the United States intelligence community, the armed services and the Cabinet departments.
I also have served as deputy national security adviser to the president of the United States. Coordinating intelligence support for the National Security Council was one of my primary responsibilities under President Reagan.
During my most recent assignment as the United States ambassador to Iraq, I saw firsthand the savage depredations of terrorists and insurgents who oppose the birth of a new democracy.
These are violent, determined adversaries who cannot be thwarted, captured or killed without close coordination between all of our intelligence assets: military and civilian, technical and human.
The forces of freedom are making progress in this struggle, with the most notable accomplishment being Iraq's national election on January 30th. But much remains to be done.
To prevail, Iraqis must keep to the political timetable established in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 and continue to train, equip and motivate effective military and police forces.
This is their struggle, but President Bush has made clear that they will have our support.
NEGROPONTE: With time, patience and tenacity, I believe that they will succeed. The formation of a transitional Iraqi government now under way is a major step forward.
The position for which I am now nominated is a new position, in a new era, and the specific recommendations I will make to the president will require careful study and engagement that is not possible prior to confirmation.
That being the case, I am not now prepared to describe in detail exactly how I plan to carry out the job of director for national intelligence.
Nonetheless, there are clear requirements set forth in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and I understand that the Congress and the American people expect more of the intelligence community today than perhaps ever before in our history.
In the past four years our homeland has been attacked and we have miscalculated the arsenal, if not the intent, of a dangerous adversary.
Our intelligence effort has to generate better results. That is my mandate, plain and simple.
I expect this will be the most challenging assignment I have undertaken in more than 40 years of government service.
Just as my first requirement in Iraq was to stand up a new embassy, my first requirement as director of national intelligence will be to stand up a new organization.
In this regard, I am grateful that the president has nominated Lieutenant General Mike Hayden as principal deputy director for national intelligence. General Hayden's distinguished career in the field of military intelligence, capped by his tenure as director of the National Security Agency, will enable him to complement my efforts with great insight, wisdom and experience.
In addition to General Hayden, I will have the support of other deputies and senior appointees.
NEGROPONTE: I have never been able to accomplish anything in government without the help of highly skilled, dedicated colleagues, nor have I ever taken an approach to leadership that is not built on the principle of teamwork.
Teamwork will remain my North Star as director of national intelligence, not just for my immediate office but for the entire intelligence community.
My objective will be to foster proactive cooperation among the 15 intelligence community elements and thereby optimize this nation's extraordinary human and technical resources in collecting and analyzing intelligence.
We can only make the United States more secure if we approach intelligence reform as value-added, not zero-sum. The office of the director of national intelligence should be a catalyst for focusing on the hardest, most important questions and making it possible for very good people to outperform their individual talents by drawing on the nation's investment in intelligence as a whole.
The president has made clear that the intelligence community needs fundamental change to successfully confront the threats of the 21st century, and this is what I take fundamental change to mean: working and thinking together, trusting one another across the various disciplines of intelligence collection and analysis, jettisoning outmoded methods, questioning assumptions, breaking down bureaucratic barriers, establishing priorities, both short-term and strategic, and sticking to them.
When I have to make difficult decisions or recommendations to achieve that kind of change, I will do so. We cannot let another decade tick away without making intelligence reform a reality.
Mr. Chairman, I am not someone who believes that intelligence is a panacea. I suspect the members of the committee agree with me.
Intelligence is an ingredient in national security and foreign policy, not the policy itself. It has limits encrypted in the illusions of dictators and the fantasies of fanatics.
But even if we cannot know every fact or predict every threat, by working more closely and effective as a team we can be more specific about what we do not know. And this is critical: It's the only way we can pinpoint gaps in our knowledge and finds way to fill them.
As director of national intelligence, I will spare no effort to ensure that our intelligence community is forward-leaning but objective, prudent but not risk-averse, and yet always faithful to our values and our history as a nation.
We must make sure that the information generated in one part of the community is accessible to other parts of the community. We must recognize that what we do is on behalf of the taxpayer and not on behalf of individual institutional interests.
We must welcome new ideas, new approaches and new sources of intelligence.
In this information age, there are many open secrets to be discovered across the spectrum of government, private sector and academic enterprise. Our intelligence community is already alert to this fact, but now is the time to pick up the pace, mirroring the agility and adaptability of entrepreneurs across the globe.
NEGROPONTE: A great deal has been said about intelligence Fidel within the United States government. Some argue that there are three intelligence communities, not one: a military intelligence community centered on the Department of Defense; a foreign intelligence community centered on the CIA; and a domestic intelligence community centered on the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security and the FBI.
Where there's so much talk, there's always some truth.
In times past, these arrangements have served the nation well. But times present demand that we transcend any foreign-military- domestic divide that may historically have characterized our approach to intelligence.
This committee and the American people know that. The 9/11 Commission knew that. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States knew that.
And having served as ambassador to the United Nations, where a multitude of issues transcend national borders and overflow 20th century categories of threat, I know that.
We do not confront a monolithic adversary or a state-based pact. Rather, we are dealing with an eclectic array of sometimes discreet, sometimes allied forces that are cunning in their efforts to define the battlefield to their advantage.
Terrorists, narcotraffickers, high-tech criminals and the leaders of anti-democratic states know that head-on assaults against any of our instruments of national security are not likely to succeed.
It is in the cracks and the overlooked gaps where we are at risk, places where our organizational stance and, more importantly, our mindset has not caught up with the dynamics of globalization, which can be used to exacerbate the grievances and leverage the capacities of our enemies.
NEGROPONTE: It is difficult and often dangerous to produce. Many valiant Americans have given their lives in its service. But it is the best way for us to ensure that freedom, democracy and our national security are protected in the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the committee for this opportunity to share these thoughts with you. And, of course, I welcome your comments and questions.
ROBERTS: Mr. Ambassador, thank you for a very comprehensive statement.
The committee will now proceed to questions. Each member will be recognized by the order of their arrival. Each member will be granted eight minutes so that we can explore fully any questions that members have and, if necessary, we will have a second round.
Given the number of members that we have -- i.e., 14 and probably 15 in just a few moments, i.e., the full committee -- I am going to insist in terms of lightly tapping on the gavel when each member's eight minutes is up with the knowledge that you would, obviously, have an opportunity in the second round.
Mr. Ambassador, do you agree to appear before the committee here or in other venues when invited?
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.
ROBERTS: Do you agree to send the intelligence community officials to appear before the committee and designated staff when invited?
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.
ROBERTS: Do you agree to provide documents or any material requested by the committee in order to carry out its oversight and its legislative responsibilities?
NEGROPONTE: I do, sir. Yes.
ROBERTS: Will you ensure that all intelligence community elements provide such material to the committee when requested?
NEGROPONTE: I do.
If I could just interject, Senator...
ROBERTS: Certainly.
NEGROPONTE: ... I've never reviewed in its entirety the procedures. Being a career diplomat, I'm familiar with the State Department procedures, I'm not entirely familiar with the procedures for the release of documents by the intelligence community to the committee.
So there may be some, either, limitations of which I am not aware. But in any event, you can be certain that I will do my utmost to be entirely cooperative with the committee.
ROBERTS: There has been a great deal of discussion, Mr. Ambassador, about the U.S. government's involvement in interrogation, rendition and detention of terrorists in the global war on terror.
I am not going to ask you to discuss in an open hearing the specifics of any ongoing intelligence operations or, for that matter, any investigations. But can you commit to us that as the DNI you will ensure the intelligence community's activities comply with the Constitution of the United States and all applicable laws and treaties, and that the elements of the intelligence community will cooperate with all relevant and possible investigations?
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir. And I am assured that our behavior -- although I have not been briefed in detail -- our comportment in regard to this question is in keeping, and our policy is to comply with the Constitution and all applicable laws.
ROBERTS: In the administration's supplemental funding request for fiscal year 2005 the president requested $250.3 million to support the initial establishment of the office of the DNI.
I understand the House Appropriations Committee fully funded the request but placed some restrictions on the fund, and that the Senate Appropriations Committee has not fully funded the request. The statement of administration policy on the supplemental strongly urges the Senate to restore the funding.
What is the impact, sir, if you do not receive these funds?
NEGROPONTE: Well, I believe the principal impact, Senator, may relate to our ability to find permanent quarters for the community. But I've also -- just in a dialogue I've had with Senator Stevens just this morning, he has assured me that he will be supportive of providing whatever funding is required to deal with that issue.
ROBERTS: We will await the action of the Senate and possible action in the conference in regards to that. Our concern is, without these funds, the establishment of the office of the DNI could be set back.
I'm going to yield back the balance of my time at this particular point and recognize the vice chairman.
ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your last question was my first question.
I think you've answered it very correctly, because we've said you can't be inside the White House.
ROCKEFELLER: So where you're going to land is important and that money is important for it. And I find it distressing that money was cut just as you're, in my view, being confirmed.
Ambassador Negroponte, as I indicated in my opening statement, the collection of intelligence through interrogation of prisoners is an enormously valuable tool in finding out important events that might be taking place.
If prisoners are abused or tortured, the information produced may be unreliable and misleading.
Over a year has passed since the first photos of the abuses of Abu Ghraib appeared.
As DNI, what role will you have in approving the legal and operational guidance pertaining to how intelligence is collected from detainees?
NEGROPONTE: Senator, if confirmed, I will do all in my power to make sure that all practices of the intelligence community are in full compliance with the law.
And as you know, the legislation directs that the director of the CIA report to the office for which I have been nominated. So given the DNI's authority over the CIA specifically and the intelligence community generally, I would expect that the DNI would oversee all such activities at the strategic level.
And coming back to your original point, not only is torture illegal and reprehensible, but even if it were not so, I don't think it's an effective way of producing useful information.
ROCKEFELLER: The committee has not had a chance to review those documents. I'm not sure that there's anything new in those documents but let me ask you a couple of questions about the report.
According to the article, immediately after the House voted to cut off funding to the Contra rebels, you sent a cable expressing continued support for this policy. Were you advocating continuing of some kind of aid to the Contras after the congressional cut-off of funds? What was the purpose of this cable?
And I might go on to say the Post describes back-channel messages. Can you describe what this back channel was as opposed to the normal State Department cable traffic method?
NEGROPONTE: Senator, first and foremost, with respect to the question of support for the Contras, whatever activities I carried out, whatever courses of action I recommended in Honduras were always entirely consistent with applicable law at the time.
So if your question is whether I ever undertook any activity or made any recommendation that was inconsistent with legal prohibitions that existed at various times, known as the Boland amendment, I made every effort to scrupulously to comply with that amendment.
Secondly, as far as the material is concerned, if I read the story correctly -- and I haven't had an opportunity to look at the cables to which The Washington Post refers -- but it sounds to me like the same set of cables that was my chronological file -- my file of cables that I personally drafted which was declassified and made available to the Foreign Relations Committee prior to my hearings to be ambassador to the United Nations in 2001.
The committee also reviewed this very same matter in practically microscopic detail in 1989 when I was nominated to be ambassador to Mexico. And I think in both instances have found that I had not carried out any improper behavior.
NEGROPONTE: And I certainly believe that I was -- my comportment was always in an absolutely legal and entirely professional manner.
ROCKEFELLER: I thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
ROBERTS: For the record, all committee members should know that the Foreign Relations Committee has supplied the committee with approximately 100 documents that we recognize as a chronological file, as the ambassador has pointed out. And they will be available to all members of this committee should any member with to go over those documents.
In my personal view, I don't think there is any mystery documents. I think this is the first time that -- as a matter of fact, the timing of it's sort of -- I guess it's interesting to me.
But at any rate, all members can have access to this file, which has been made available to us by the Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Wyden?
WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, I want to stay with this human rights issue in Honduras for a moment, because I've read all the reports and the letters and the testimony regarding the human rights practices there. And I will tell you when you compare what you wrote and what you testified to what the CIA said and what the Inter-American Court said and what the Honduras human rights commissioner said, there is a very big gap. It is almost as if you were an ambassador to a different country.
So let us, if we could, begin by having you reconcile what is on the record with respect to these human rights practices and what is so remarkably different about what the CIA said and all of these other bodies who have looked at the period as well.
NEGROPONTE: Thank you for your question, Senator.
First of all, I don't think it is necessarily such a large gap, certainly not...
WYDEN: Would you like me to review it, because I can go case by case?
NEGROPONTE: ... especially, with regard to the CIA.
But let me just put Honduras in context. Now, we're talking about history, really. It's something that -- things had happened 24, 25 years ago.
But I think one has to understand that Honduras was a country surrounded by trouble. There were civil wars going on in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.
The political freedom was relatively greater in Honduras than it was in the neighboring countries. In fact, there were refugees streaming to Honduras from those three countries. It wasn't the other way around. It wasn't that Hondurans were fleeing their country to their neighboring countries because of political repression.
When I got to Honduras shortly thereafter, there was a first democratic election that had taken place in nine years. And there had been six such elections in the years that have followed.
Honduras had a free labor movement. It had a free press.
Now, were there human rights abuses? Yes. And our human rights reports -- I have the 1984 report here right in front of me -- they talk about those things, about disappearances, about arbitrary arrests, about defects in the administration of justice in that country.
But I think, if you look at it in the context of what was happening in Central America at the time, I think Honduras' record compared favorably with the neighboring countries.
NEGROPONTE: And I would submit to you that improvements occurred during the time of my tenure there, including an administration of justice program, a revision of the penal code, and other efforts to deal with human rights issues in that country.
WYDEN: With all due respect, Mr. Ambassador, that's simply not responsive to my question.
I mean, for example, in 1982 you wrote a letter to the New York Times: Honduras' increasingly professional armed forces are dedicated to defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country; they're publicly committed to civilian constitutional rule.
The CIA, for example, said during that period the Honduran military committed hundreds of human rights abuses since 1980, many of which were politically motivated and officially sanctioned.
The Inter-American Court said the same thing. The Honduran human rights commissioner said the same thing.
I mean, I see a pattern essentially of you ducking the facts. And what troubles me is not the idea of re-litigating what happened in Central America 20 years ago; nobody wants to do that, and I don't think that's constructive.
But we're making a call now about your judgment, and it looks to me like you saw things through an administration-colored lens then. And what you need to do over the course of today is convince me that when you brief the president, you have this extraordinarily important duty that you're going to make sure the facts get out there. And when I look at what you said about human rights issues in the '80s and I look at what the CIA said and all these other objective parties, there's just no way I can easily reconcile those differences.
So I want to give you another chance to be responsive to my question.
For example, if you tell me, you know, I should have said more about these human rights issues in the early '80s, in those country reports, in those letters and interviews you gave, that's an indication -- because I have certainly made loads of mistakes over the years -- that's responsive to what I'm interested in seeing.
WYDEN: But I'm very troubled at this point and I want you to reconcile the differences between what you said and wrote and what these other parties have said.
NEGROPONTE: Just to pick up on one of your examples there where you mentioned the CIA, I remember one of the principle allegations of the CIA inspector general's report was that I had suppressed or sought to suppress reporting on human rights.And I was able to establish to the satisfaction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that that was not the case. And in fact, my deputy station chief from that time, who was quoted as the source of that information, himself wrote the committee and said that that was absolutely incorrect. He wrote to Senators Helms and Biden.So, if I may, Senator, I think that sometimes when one tries to reconstruct these situations 15, 20, 25 years after the fact, some subjective judgments creep into these analyses that don't necessarily stand up to scrutiny.I can tell you that I, in good conscience, can sit here and tell you that I believe that I called to Washington's attention what was going on in Honduras.Within the first several months of my tenure there, I asked the embassy to conduct a review of the administration of justice system.I had a meeting with the president of the country and the chief of staff of the armed forces within the first year that I was there and urged them to undertake urgent steps to review the administration of justice, particularly with the way that some of their police forces were treating terrorists.
NEGROPONTE: And we ended up establishing a strong administration of justice program in that country.
WYDEN: I'm just looking again at what you testified -- my time is up -- but you said, Allegations of human rights-related abuses are fewer than in previous years. The Honduran government shows enhanced sensitivity. That's what you said in 1984.And I will tell you -- I'm going to explore this further on other rounds -- but the point really is if you disagreed with the CIA, that's fine. But all of these other objective analysts said the same thing, Mr. Ambassador.And I hope in the course of today you can convince me that when you brief the president, the president's going to get all the facts. And I will tell you I am not convinced that that's the case as of now.Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ROBERTS: Senator Levin?
LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Welcome, Ambassador, to you and your family.Mr. Ambassador, we need a director of national intelligence who will tell a president what a president may not want to hear but what he needs to hear.We've too often seen heads of the intelligence community exaggerate or misrepresent or misstate intelligence to support the policy preferences of the White House.We saw this with Bill Casey, who a bipartisan Iran-Contra report concluded had, quote, misrepresented or selectively used available intelligence to support the policy that he -- Bill Casey -- was promoting.Now, that was the finding of a very bipartisan and a very distinguished Iran-Contra commission.Did you agree with the Iran-Contra report's conclusion about Bill Casey's misrepresenting intelligence?
NEGROPONTE: Sir, I'm not sure I was focused on that issue at the time.
LEVIN: Were you involved in his thinking and conclusions relative to the Contras?
NEGROPONTE: Well, of course, I knew Director Casey and met with him on numerous occasions, including when he visited Honduras.But, as you may know, by the time the Iran-Contra situation developed, I had already moved on from Honduras in May of 1985 and taken on my new responsibilities as assistant secretary of state for oceans and international and environmental and scientific affairs.
NEGROPONTE: So I was not in a position dealing with Central America at the time the Iran-Contra scandal developed.
LEVIN: Now, more recently, George Tenet also was engaged in exaggerations and misstatements when he said, for instance, publicly that Iraq had, quote, provided training in poisons and gases to two Al Qaida associates, which was close to what the president was saying publicly about the same issue. But the underlying intelligence said that that reporting was contradictory and was from sources of varying reliability.Judge Silberman explained recently in talking about his report that, quote, The intelligence community was resistant to notions that there was an important connect between Saddam and Al Qaida or terrorism, and yet you had the director, the DCI, talking about Iraq, quote, providing training in poisons and gasses to Al Qaida associates.My question is this: Are you troubled by that kind of a public statement of Director Tenet which differs or differed from the underlying intelligence relative to the connection between Al Qaida and Saddam Hussein?
NEGROPONTE: Senator, let me try to answer you question this way. And I think it goes back to the question that Senator Wyden was putting to me earlier.I'm an experienced foreign policy professional. As a junior officer, I was a political reporting officer. I don't know how many hundreds...
LEVIN: Given our time problem, I'm just wondering whether you could give a shorter answer.
NEGROPONTE: Well, I'm just going to -- OK. My punchline is, I believe in calling things the way I see them. And I believe that the president deserves from his director of national intelligence and from the intelligence community unvarnished truth.
LEVIN: That's important. We've got too many...(CROSSTALK)
NEGROPONTE: ... as I best understand it.
LEVIN: That's critically important because it's not been the case.When the DCI said that something was a slam dunk which was not a slam dunk, even given the underlying classified intelligence, that was not giving the president the unvarnished truth.Now, you're not responsible for what Tenet said, but your assurance here that you will do that is important.
LEVIN: There's another aspect of unvarnished truth here, though, and that is that if you conclude that policymakers are making public statements that differ from the classified intelligence, what action will you take?And I want to just give you a couple recent examples.Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, a single uncorroborated report alleged that the lead 9/11 hijacker, Mohammed Atta, had met in Prague in April 2001 with an Iraqi intelligence officer named Al-Ani.On December 9th, 2001, Vice President Cheney said that the Prague meeting had been, quote, pretty well confirmed, although it had never been confirmed.On September 8th, 2002, Vice President Cheney was asked if the CIA thought the report of the meeting was credible, and he said it was credible. But in fact -- in fact -- as early as late spring of 2002, long before that statement, the intelligence community was skeptical that the meeting had taken place.In June of 2002, the CIA issued a then-classified report that said that the information about the meeting was contradictory.It now turns out that in January 2003 -- now that's still before the war -- that the CIA published a then-classified report that said the following, quote: Some information asserts that Atta met with Al-Ani. But -- and these are the key words -- the most reliable reporting to date casts doubt on that possibility, close quote.Now, that language was just declassified at my request within the last week by the CIA. So you have the CIA, in its classified assessment, saying that the most reliable reporting to date casts doubt on that possibility. But yet you have the top policymakers saying that, That meeting, we believe, took place.My question to you is this: What would you do if you were DNI at the time that kind of a public statement were made, if you believed that it went beyond the classified intelligence?
NEGROPONTE: I think you're raising a hypothetical.
FEINSTEIN: Now, the intelligence just isn't there, according to this report. And I would add that even if we had intelligence, I doubt that it would be believed by many of us or by the international community.I think the American public deserves some unclassified answers as to how you intend to develop the needed intelligence and the credibility to use it so that it will be believed.
NEGROPONTE: Well, Senator, the law prescribes a number of approaches to this. And as I've said earlier in my testimony, I'm not ready to give you a detailed blueprint.But there are, obviously, guideposts with respect to analytical integrity, with respect to objectivity, with respect to the approach of creating a National Counterterrorism Center, which will be an all- source center that tries to integrate the work of the many different agencies involved in dealing with that issue.It also talks about the possibility of establishing a nonproliferation center.And the WMD Commission also makes a number of detailed recommendations, some 75 in all. And those are now being studied carefully at the White House and we would -- and the president has set a 90-day timetable for a response to those recommendations.So I would expect that shortly after being confirmed, I'll be in a position to come to the committee with some specific ideas for you as to how I propose to deal with these questions.
FEINSTEIN: I must say, I'm a bit taken back by the vagueness of your answer. I'm rather surprised by it, because it would seem to me that by now -- and you said you've read these reports -- you must have some concept of what needs to be done.
NEGROPONTE: Well, I think that...
FEINSTEIN: And it's not just the setting up of a center, I believe. I don't think that is going to change much.
NEGROPONTE: Well, I think we've -- it's still at a -- here are some of the things we're talking about senator. Of course, one of them is developing a sense of community. Another is to make sure that we don't rely only on intelligence from one agency, but get the best possible benefit from all 15 different members of the intelligence community.We're talking about red cell analysis and alternative analysis.I mean, these approaches are all laid out there. But what I'm saying is the specific mechanisms as to how we're going to carry out all these different ideas have yet to be fully developed.
FEINSTEIN: OK, well, that takes care of two of my other questions.Let me quote from one of your answers in the pre-hearing questions.The secretary of defense has significant discretion over the JMIP and TIARA, where as the DNI has control over the national intelligence program. This creates natural tensions. The DNI can participate in budget development of JMIP and TIARA and is to be consulted by the secretary of defense with respect to any funds transfer or reprogramming under JMIP. And then you go on to say, I would expect to exercise these budget authorities.So my question really is, how would you proceed?This morning, as I came in, I was listening to PBS. There was some discussion over the fact that the defense community may be realigning to try to prevent any loss of authority in this area.
FEINSTEIN: And we know it's a very sensitive area.I hope that this -- and my intention certainly is that this be a very powerful position; that you be able to use the budget authority and the statutory authority to its fullest strength.So could you comment more fully on that answer to the question please?
NEGROPONTE: Thank you, Senator.I mean, as you mention, according to the legislation, I do have enhanced powers relating to budgetary, to personnel and acquisition matters among others. And, in addition, when the president announced my nomination he said he would fully back me and the new role of the DNI. And you may recall that he made specific reference to my role in determining the national intelligence budget.So I will seek to make the fullest possible use of these authorities.And as regards some of the discussion that has been put forward about the Defense Department -- and I think yesterday there was a reference to an effort to bring together the different intelligence components of the Pentagon and have them all report through Undersecretary Cambone with regard to dealing with the DNI, I see my authority under the law, given my responsibilities for determining the national intelligence budget, in no way will preclude my ability to deal directly with such agencies as the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and so forth.And also, as I think I mentioned to you when we met privately, I've met with Secretary Rumsfeld. We've agreed that we will meet on a regular basis to go over these issues. I've also seen Budget Director Bolten. And I'm confident I can count on his strong support in these matters.
FEINSTEIN: Thank you.With respect to chapter 13 of the...
ROBERTS: Senator, the time has expired. We will go to a second round.
FEINSTEIN: I beg your pardon. Thank you very much. Thank you.
ROBERTS: Senator Snowe?
SNOWE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Ambassador Negroponte. And I going to thank you for once again stepping forward to serve our nation in this precedent- setting role that has responsibility for overseeing a transformation, a sweeping transformation of our intelligence community that carries with it the future security of our country.
As everybody's indicated, and you've acknowledged in your own statement, your leadership skills will be sorely tested as the first director of this newly created agency. And particularly because you're going to have to break down the stovepipes and the barriers that exist between and among all of the intelligence agencies.
I mean, that was abundantly apparent in the more than four reports that have been done over the last few years, the two regarding 9/11 and then the weapons of mass destruction-related intelligence reports that were done by the Silberman-Robb commission, and also our committee.
SNOWE: You'll have to break down those barriers and the loyalties that each individual employees has to the agency or bureaucracy and to replace that with an understanding that they now, as part of their agencies, comprise an intelligence community team, and that team's goal is to secure the security of America.
So the real question is, in my mind, and many questions that have been raised in respect to that ultimate goal in creating that team that you've acknowledged in your statement as well, that it is building teamwork, because we have so many outstanding men and women who have put their lives on the front line and display enormous professionalism and courage.
But I think the question is how you see your authority in breaking down those barriers, solidifying your position. Even the Silberman-Robb report indicated that headstrong agencies will try to run around and over the DNI, that these agencies have an almost perfect record of resisting external recommendations.
So the key is, number one, how you intend to solidify your authority. Some say that you're going to lack the command authority, as a result of the legislation we passed. Maybe the ambiguity and the gaps may be more positive than negative.
On the other hand it could be a negative if you don't have the ability to do what you need to do -- if we haven't given you the authority to succeed.
And we, obviously, will need to know that sooner rather than later.
So first of all, how do you view your role in solidifying your position? And if you lack the command authority as director under this legislation -- obviously, I'd like to hear your response to that -- how will you direct the agencies to do what you want them to do?
NEGROPONTE: Well, I think the law does give me substantial authority. And even in areas where there might be ambiguities, I think I've been encouraged by many of the people that I've consulted with during these past two weeks to push the envelope and use what authorities I believe I have to the utmost.
And I think there's also been commentary to the effect that I will need the support of the president. And he has, in announcing my nomination, made public assurances of supporting me in these new functions.
CHAMBLISS: And I see now where Secretary Rumsfeld has picked up on this notion, as Senator DeWine mentioned, and has recently named Undersecretary Dr. Stephen Cambone to serve as your single point of contact, at least for the interim period of time, at the Department of Defense.
How do you foresee the DNI working with the Department of Defense? And what are your thoughts about working with a single INTCOM commander who could coordinate the vast intelligence capabilities within the DOD to support your efforts?
NEGROPONTE: Well, first of all, Senator, Senator Rumsfeld and I have agreed that we will meet frequently to discuss intelligence issues, so I would expect cooperation at that level in the first place, and certainly will cooperate with Mr. Cambone.
And even though he's a focal point within the Defense Department, the way I read the statute, which gives me authorities to recommend or determine the budget with respect to the NRO, the NGA and the NSA, it seems to me that, in addition to working with the secretary and Mr. Cambone, I will want to work directly with those agencies as well.
But coming back to Senator Hagel's point, I think these things come down to relationships, investing time and effort and understanding into each other's point of view.
And I look forward to working with the Department of Defense in addition to all the other agencies in carrying out my job.
CHAMBLISS: What about as far as the concept of an INTCOM commander there? Do you see any problems if that comes about, working with a single point of contact with the eight Defense Department agencies?
NEGROPONTE: Well, I'd have to study that legislation more carefully and get back to you on that, Senator. I haven't had a chance to look at it carefully.
Although if memory serves me correctly, I believe some in the administration have raised concerns with the creation of such a position.
CHAMBLISS: And actually some have raised concerns and some are supportive, so we're still in the negotiating process, Mr. Ambassador.
I'm very concerned about the rebuilding of our HUMINT capability, and as well as protecting our morale at the CIA and our Defense Department case officers in the field as we continue to reform the intelligence community with the formation of the DNI.
What are your general views on the state of HUMINT, both overt collectors like our military attaches as well as our CIA covert capabilities?
And what's been your relationship with both CIA case officers as well as DIA case officers over the years, relative to HUMINT collection?
NEGROPONTE: I think to the extent that we can comment about this in public session, Senator, first of all, I've had extensive relationships with both the CIA and the DIA in the field, so I feel that I'm quite well acquainted with their work.
I was ambassador to the Philippines from 1993 to 1996, which was a time during which the budgets were being cut for intelligence purposes, and I remember the station there being cut by about 50 percent when I was there. And it was an ironic situation, because it was just at the time that we captured some people who were connected with the World Trade Center bombing and who had developed a plot to assassinate the pope and hijack 12 airliners in the Pacific. You may remember that case, the Ramzi Yousef case.
And there we were, with the Filipinos capturing those individuals just at the same time that we were reducing our HUMINT capabilities.
So I think it needs to be strengthened. I know there are plans afoot to do that. And I'm fully supportive of that effort. And it's one of the efforts that I certainly will be devoting a lot of attention to.
CHAMBLISS: Mr. Ambassador, thank you. And we look forward to completing your confirmation process and to continuing to work with you in this very difficult but exciting position that you're going to be assuming.
ROBERTS: Senator Hatch?
HATCH: Welcome to the committee, Mr. Ambassador, Madam Negroponte. We appreciate both of you.
I've known you for a long time. I spent some time with you in Honduras way back when. And I agree with everything Senator Stevens had to say about you. There's no question you're one of the finest public servants we've had.
I believe you've been confirmed by the Senate eight times?
NEGROPONTE: If you confirm me this time, sir, it will be eight.
HATCH: It'll be eight.
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.
HATCH: Well, then, seven times.
It seems to me we don't even need this hearing. But we do need it, because we need to discuss some of these matters, of course.
But I'm pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you moved as fast as possible to bring and schedule this confirmation hearing, following the actions we took last fall to establish the position of director of national intelligence.
And so we've told the nominee now and in our own meetings his tenure will define the way we need to go to use our intelligence community to its fullest to address the various threats that still loom over us and around us.
So I welcome my old friend John Negroponte, who has served this country for more than 40 years in some of the most challenging international situations we have faced. And I'm grateful for that service.
In my opinion, you've already met your missions admirably. And I want to thank you for choosing once again to assume a very, very large challenge.
And I'll make only two points.
One is that this is the toughest job you're ever going to have. And I realize I'm saying this to someone who has just come back after serving as ambassador to Baghdad.
The president wouldn't have chosen you if he didn't think you could do it. And if confirmed, I think you need -- please work with this committee, as you have said you will, and I assure you of my support.
Number two, Osama bin Laden is not sitting wherever he is because Congress and the president have just created the position of director of national intelligence.
Too often, we delude ourselves in Washington by believing that bureaucratic realignment is the policy solution. The bureaucratic shift can only support the policy solution. And that's what you do with this position.
What you do with this position is what will make bin Laden sweat, and that will hopefully lead to his ultimate elimination on the world scene.
Now, you know from your years of being a top consumer of intelligence what the value of intelligence is and can be. You've handled, I think, at least five chiefs of station. And that's big- time stuff; there's no question about it.
You know from your last post about the complexities of the various threats that we face. And now you must use your position to raise the level of analytic and operational quality of our intelligence community to new levels.
You will be leading thousands of superb professionals with experienced leaders like Porter Goss, and working with them all to achieve a level of security that the American public deserves and that our enemies should fear.
HATCH: There's no question that we will support you, in my opinion, on this committee. And I certainly support you strongly, knowing you as well as I do.
I found it, kind of, interesting, some of the questions about you might be ducking issues. I've never seen you duck an issue the whole time I've been around you. And, frankly, you've been in some of the hottest spots on earth, and especially with regard to your work in Honduras.
I think it's important to point out, if I recall it correctly, you and your wonderful wife have adopted five Honduran children. Is that correct?
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.
HATCH: That's during this time that others are saying that you should have stopped a human rights problem. I think that shows the compassion that you had for the Honduran people and for life in general, for families in general. And I commend you for it.
And as far as I can see, you've done a really good job with them too.
I was on the Iran-Contra Committee and I have to say, that was a very trying and difficult time in all of our lives. There were people on both sides, very sincere, very good people, very strong people, very educated people, very expert people, people who understood intelligence and I think people who had good points that they could make for both sides.
But you always went down the middle, as far as I was concerned. You always stood up for your positions, with which some disagreed, but you always were honest and straightforward about your positions.
Let me just ask you this: In your response to questions from the committee, you indicated your familiarity with the tools provided under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to provide for education and training for intelligence community personnel.
Now, this was in response to a growing consensus that there is a need to develop community-wide education and training to instill modern doctrine to create so-called jointness across specializations.
I have, in the past, supported the need to institutionalize a formal education structure toward this end.
HATCH: Now, have you given any consideration, or have you had a chance to give any consideration, to how exactly you would address the need for proper training of intelligence community personnel across the various specializations?
And do you believe there's a need for the teaching and training under the new doctrines? And if so, how do you propose to institutionalize addressing these needs?
NEGROPONTE: Thank you for your question, Senator.
Definitely there needs to be focus on education. And there are provisions in the law that mandate and require the DNI to address those issues.
I think one of the questions that's going to arise is whether one looks at the creation of some separate, free-standing national intelligence university, as the Robb-Silberman Commission proposes; or is it a question of maybe having someone overseeing the training efforts that take place throughout the intelligence community and try to ensure that at the various institutes, whether it's in the military or in the CIA, that the training curriculum is standardized.
But definitely, we've got to look at the training aspect: tradecraft, professionalism and so forth.
And the other point I would say, which, to me, as a career Foreign Service officer, is extremely important, is we've got to bolster the language and area training of our intelligence community.
I've looked at some of the statistics. I can't remember them off the top of my head. But I do know that the language skills, for example, in the Central Intelligence Agency are substantially lower than those that you'd find in the State Department, for example.
And I think those kinds of skills, in this day and age, have got to be improved.
HATCH: Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
ROBERTS: Senator Corzine?
CORZINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me welcome Ambassador Negroponte.
And let me also say that I think, for all of us, at least those people I represent, we want to express our gratitude for your long service to our nation, particularly your most recent efforts, both in Iraq and in the United Nations.CORZINE: Also, I would be remiss if I didn't say one of the reasons you're sitting here certainly flows from a lot of the activities of people who come from my home state, Governor Kean, in particular, with regard to the 9/11 Commission; but maybe even more importantly, the families, some of whom were -- 700 who lost their lives. And I commend them because I do think this is the proper step in the direction that we're taking. And I do believe that you have the experience and the opportunity to really lead here.
But all that said, let me express a reservation that really flows -- my reservation -- and I'm not going to change my view on this -- but much of the analysis that we've seen from the 9/11 Commission, now the WMD, from the reports of this committee itself, dealt with collection and analysis. It seems to me that there is a third leg to that stool and it's the use of intelligence and how that is presented.
I thought Senator Levin's recital of a series of issues and intelligence that backed up the intelligence community's view as regard to the Mohammad Atta meetings gets at the point.
Isn't the right answer -- and I think you said crossing the bridge when we got there was the ultimate answer if there were public statements by senior public policymakers.
Shouldn't the right answer going to the senior policymakers when there is serious contradiction with the intelligence (inaudible) when we're making advocacy for policy? Some of that could be done behind closed doors, of course. Some can be done in Intelligence Committees so that we're not making policy decisions with erroneous decisions and we can avoid it.
But it seems to me that it is almost imperative that the director of national intelligence -- what's the term? -- speak truth to power or whatever the phrase is will be absolutely a requirement that those contradictions in analyses are presented in a way.
Isn't that the response?
NEGROPONTE: And in answering Senator Levin, I think in part at least, Senator, I was trying to go to that. I was trying to say, from everything we've learned, from the experience we've had in the past several years, we don't want a repetition of this kind of situation. We don't want to have the Curveball situation again.
And one of the ways you're going to avoid it is to improve the quality of the analytical product, make sure it's comprehensive and lay the truth before the policymakers of our country, and try to avert the kind of -- the hypothesis he described.
CORZINE: Collection and analysis, the work and the organization, which is going to be an enormous task. And I more than believe you're up to that.
But the fact is that even when we come through with that process, sometimes there will be strongly held opinions that are colored by selectivity, colored by interpretation, potentially.
And isn't it the job of the independent arbiter of intelligence to make sure that the community that is most responsible for assessing those knows that those contradictions with what is said in public -- and maybe we'll never ever have that again; maybe because our collection and analysis will be so good that no one will ever have preconceived or group-think ideas come to fruition, that it will take -- but if they do, will it be the responsibility of the DNI to challenge that privately?
I'm asking for political confrontation.
NEGROPONTE: Yes, I have no problem whatsoever with that.
And I also, I believe, said in my statement that intelligence is not a panacea, nor is it policy.
But should the DNI place before the president and others other decision-makers the fullest and best possible analytical accounting that is available and identify the gaps in knowledge and talk about judgments as to reliability or unreliability and the various gradations and all of that? Yes. It has to be put before the decision-makers.
CORZINE: I'll end here because I think this whole issue of independent analysis, and making sure that the testing of hypotheses and knowing where holes are and contradictory perspectives on unknowables, leads to probabilistic analysis. And if that is not practiced, we get into certainty.
And I hope that as time unfolds, this committee and others will ask, within those probabilistic kinds of analyses, these most difficult questions.
I think sometimes that has appeared to have been missing.
ROBERTS: The senator from Maryland, Senator Mikulski?
MIKULSKI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Ambassador, welcome to you and to your wife and to your family.
We sure want whoever's going to be the head of the DNI to be a success. And if you're confirmed, we want you to be a success. And I think that's what the point of all the questions are. And that's why we're interested in really being the focus on how will you get control of the intelligence agencies, do you have authority, what will it take to ensure coordination and cooperation, speak truth to power, and of course the background on Honduras, which goes to speak truth to power.
Let me just tell you why I'm on the committee. I'm here to be a reformer and I'm here to be a transformer and to work with the executive branch. Because I view the purpose of intelligence is, number one, to prevent predatory attacks on the United States, on our assets abroad, like our embassies -- and as a Foreign Service officer you know about how threatening it is to our Foreign Service -- and, of course, to our troops and our allies, and then, of course, to support the war-fighter.
MIKULSKI: We've had three different recommendations going back to your job as being recommended by the 9/11 Commission. And whatever conversation we have today and in the future, I'm taking some of my questions from the 9/11 Commission, and also our Senate report on the failure of finding weapons in Iraq.So having said that, let me go first, though, to this question of truth to power. Other colleagues have raised this question but I want to come at it from a different angle.Again, you've been a professional at career: the guy at the beginning, as the political person, turning ambassador.What would you see as your job at the DNI to ensure that your subordinates are speaking truth to power?Because one of the problems we faced, for example, in the Iraq weapons analysis was the so-called group-think. The question was, number one, how would they speak truth to power? If they have yellow flashing lights -- like when Secretary Powell was going before the U.N. -- what mechanism or how would you, number one, create the tone, the climate and actually administrative mechanisms so that you're getting truth so that you then can do the kind of job that needs to be done?
NEGROPONTE: First of all, I couldn't agree with you more. I mean, truth to power is crucial. And we've got to assure the objectivity and integrity of our intelligence analysis.Senator, I see three key parts of my job. One is the budgetary part; I think there are some important authorities in the law on that. I see, secondly, the question of trying to mobilize and promote a sense of community rather than the different stovepipes. And thirdly, and perhaps one that goes to my own background and skills the most, has to do with the analytical product.So I guess the first thing I'd say to you there, in terms of how I would go about this, is I plan to devote quite a bit of attention to how our analytical efforts are organized and looking personally into ways by which we can assure that we get the best possible analytical product, whether it's from the regular analysts or from the red cells in the alternative analysis and so forth.
NEGROPONTE: And, secondly -- and I haven't had an opportunity to mention this this morning -- I really want to focus on getting the best possible people as deputies to me in the new DNI.And one of the deputies I would expect to have would be somebody in charge of overseeing analysis by the intelligence community. And I'm going to look for the finest possible person to occupy that position.
MIKULSKI: Well, I think that's a wonderful approach. But I'm going to go to another lesson learned from the State Department.As I understand at the State Department, there is something called the dissent channel, that can go right on up, even by, say, an intern or some beginning Foreign Service officer, all the way up to the secretary of state, just so that he or she is aware that there's an alternative opinion, not only the alternative analysis, which we desperately need, which was not present back when we got the NIE on Iraq, but also that an individual could let the top dog, if you will, know that there is a possible yellow flashing light to the direction.Would you consider within the intel community, both at CIA, DOD and others, to have some type of dissent channel that would get to you and your top team?
NEGROPONTE: I believe there's already provisions...
MIKULSKI: And I'm not talking about the exact replica...
NEGROPONTE: No, I understand. And I think it's a great idea.
MIKULSKI: I'm just talking about ways that we're ensuring that we're making sure the views are known.
NEGROPONTE: I think it's a very good idea. It's worked well in the State Department. There is a provision, I believe, for an ombudsman in the law, but maybe some variant of that.You also mentioned something earlier, as you asked the question, which I think is important also, which is some kind of lessons-learned mechanism within the intelligence community, to be sure that when we do have some problem with a product of ours that we can go back and really analyze and engage in self-criticism about how that arose and how it can be avoided in the future and what can be done to improve the product the next time around.
MIKULSKI: The other goes to leadership, which is different than management. Leadership helps crate a state of mind in an organization, whether it's a country or an executive branch agency or a corporation.As you go about building this sense of community -- and by the way, I do think it needs to be done for our people who are risking their lives in the field, people who work a 36-hour day, either out at Langley or the FBI or out at NSA.So will you also create a tone where you will ensure that there will be no retaliation for people who attempt to speak the truth?
NEGROPONTE: Yes. I think the short answer to you is a categorical yes.
MIKULSKI: And I would hope that that would be part of it.Is my time up, Mr. Chairman?
ROBERTS: Well, basically, I would tell the senator that your time is never up. But in terms of the eight minutes that we have allotted, yes, it is, ma'am. But we can have a second round.
MIKULSKI: Well, thank you.And then we'll talk about some of these other issues. But I think this was very important and I appreciate your forthrightness.
ROBERTS: Senator Bayh?
BAYH: Ambassador, welcome. I thank you for your devotion to public service.Did I hear correctly this is your eighth Senate confirmation process?
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.
BAYH: Some people...
NEGROPONTE: Five ambassadorships -- just to clarify, because the chairman, at the beginning when he introduced me, mentioned five. I've had five ambassadorships, but I've been an assistant secretary of state, which required confirmation, for oceans and international, environmental and scientific affairs. And when I was deputy assistant secretary for fisheries I also had the rank of ambassador senatorially confirmed.
BAYH: Well, eight Senate confirmation processes, some people might say that's violative of the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. But we're grateful to you for your willingness to come before us yet again.And I hope, before I get into my questions, that you won't hesitate to let us know what we can do in working with you to improve the quality of the product that you will be charged with putting out.Recently, in a different setting, it was suggested that there were some legal changes that could be -- some things that could be done to actually improve the efficiency with which we're conducting particularly some aspects of the war on terror. So I hope you won't hesitate to let us know what you think we can do to uphold our part.My first question is: As we now all regrettably know, our nation suffered a colossal intelligence failure with regard to the assessment of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. It's been two years now. This has been the subject of review by this committee, by the Silberman report. We've uncovered some shocking lapses in tradecraft, frankly, that if the consequences weren't so profound -- you mentioned Curveball -- some of this would be almost comical if it wasn't so sad.My question to you, Ambassador, is this: As you undertake these responsibilities, can we tell the American people today, after the passage of two years, that the quality and the reliability of our intelligence product is materially better than it was two years ago in assessing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?
NEGROPONTE: In Iraq?
BAYH: In Iraq.
NEGROPONTE: Well, of course, we...
BAYH: There was obviously a huge failure there. Is it better today?
NEGROPONTE: Well, I think...
BAYH: Have we improved with the passage of the last year?
NEGROPONTE: I certainly think that Mr. Duelfer's report was a very candid and forthcoming one.
NEGROPONTE: And I think that his report, while it contained a number of revelations about the inadequacy of our intelligence beforehand -- but I think that it -- I think...
BAYH: These entities that you're about to assume supervisory authority over, have they improved? Are things getting better or are we just where we were two years ago that led to this very unfortunate miscalculation?
NEGROPONTE: Well, Senator, I'm not sure I have a holistic enough view at the moment. I think I'd probably have a better view once I take on this job.But certainly, speaking from the perspective of being ambassador to Iraq, for example, I believe that I was a beneficiary of a lot of useful intelligence information.But I think when you talk about WMD, you're talking about one of the toughest nuts to crack because usually what we're trying to get is WMD information in these very closed societies. So maybe the beginning of truth here is to acknowledge to ourselves candidly what we don't know before we start talking about what we do know.
BAYH: Let me put a little finer point on it. It is very difficult. And I want to second what you said: There's a lot of good intelligence work that's being done. This is a difficult area but it is, as you know, profoundly important.So let me put a finer point on it. There are troubling developments in North Korea and Iran. At least, we think there are troubling developments.So when we go to the American people, and we go to the international community and we say, Here's what we believe is happening in these two societies, should they have greater confidence in our assertions? Are things heading in a better direction with regard to our ability to assess these difficult targets and this difficult issue?Because if we're going to get international cooperation in dealing with these troubling developments, credibility is the coin of the realm and we had a failure. We need to be able to point to some evidence that things are getting better so that we will be believed.
NEGROPONTE: I think there are two questions in there.I think the first about the credibility of the assertions, I would suspect they're more credible because I think all of us have learned the lesson of being careful about assertions with respect to WMD. So I think that whatever we do say, I think we're going to be more cautious in how we develop those pronouncements.As to how much progress we're making, I'm not sure I'm able to comment in actually unearthing the kind of information we want to find out. But what I can assure you is that that's just got to be one of the principal focuses of our intelligence effort: terrorism and WMD. And that's certainly something -- those are issues that I'm going to devote an awful lot of my time.
BAYH: Let me, in part, tell you what I've been told by others in response to that question, and that is that our assessments are getting a lot better, but that's because we're admitting what we don't know.So the assessments are more accurate but not more illuminating. And ultimately, more illuminating, and therefore more credible, is where we need to arrive.I've also been told that the analytical part we're beginning to -- with some of the questions my colleagues have just -- we're beginning to deal with the analytical part, but collection is still an area that really needs work.If you had to list the two or three top priorities you would have in the area of collection, what would they be in terms of improving the quality of information, the volume and quality of information that we're collecting so that the analysts can do their job?
NEGROPONTE: Well, maybe we can discuss some of this a bit more in closed session. But I certainly think the WMD issues with respect to Iran and North Korea would be high on that list. And I think there's some intelligence issues, vis-a-vis Iraq, too, that I would rate very high.
BAYH: You've already touched upon the HUMINT aspect of this, I believe.Let me ask you finally, in terms of the priorities looking globally at our strategic priorities for intelligence collection and assessment and then use by the policy-makers, where would you rank China in terms of our priorities? We have the war on terror. We have proliferation. We have assisting the war fighter. Where would you rank China in...
NEGROPONTE: Well, I think this raises a broader issue, doesn't it, Senator? And you're talking to somebody who spent about 15 years of his career in East Asia: Hong Kong, the Philippines, Vietnam, but always on the periphery of China and as a deputy assistant secretary for East Asia. So I feel I know -- and I went to Beijing with Dr. Kissinger in 1972. So I was in on the takeoff, if you will, of our relationship with the People's Republic of China.
NEGROPONTE: That is a long-term issue. Our children and grandchildren are going to live in a world where China will be a very strong and powerful player on the world scene.So in terms of longer-term intelligence analysis, I think it's very important to follow countries such as China, analyze them well and carefully so that we understand the longer-term implications that a country like that has for our foreign policy.
BAYH: I would encourage you in allocating scarce resources -- and obviously you always have to set priorities -- but let's not let the long term -- let's not lose sight of the longer term, where I think this is going to be a very important relationship that we understand.Again, thank you, Ambassador. Look forward to working with you.Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence.
ROBERTS: Senator Rockefeller?
ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.Ambassador, I think it is amazing that you've been through all those investigations. And I know that I was very happy to vote for you on the foreign relations committee when you came up for the United Nations.There are some questions which are better discussed in the afternoon, but I just want to put this out because I don't think it violates anything. And, yet, if it draws a response which is interesting then I think that will of itself be interesting.The CIA is obviously the lead agency for the conduct of covert action programs. And the CIA director manages, as of this day, the carrying out of those activities to whatever extent they exist.Number one, do you believe that any agencies other than the CIA ought to carry out covert actions, because the war on terror is going to be with us for a very, very long time which we really haven't gotten into enough?And secondly, what do you see as the role of the DNI in your interaction with this traditional role of the CIA?
NEGROPONTE: Senator, on the first question, I believe the answer is that there are already other agencies, I think, that can carry out certain kinds of clandestine...
ROCKEFELLER: I didn't say clandestine. I said covert.
NEGROPONTE: I'm just not sure how to characterize some of the activities that might take place, for example, in a war theater. But as a general rule, I mean the concentration of covert action has been in the Central Intelligence Agency, which is as I think it should be.What is the relationship of the DNI to the CIA on these issues? Well, of course, the director of the CIA will report to me, as the law states and as the president also reaffirmed.But I think with respect to the operational aspects of covert actions, as distinct from, sort of generally overseeing them, I think that that will be something that, a, will have to be worked out, but I think more likely will be carried out by the director of central intelligence under the direction of the president through the National Security Council.I think it's a question of a command relationship. But my understanding of the legislation is that I will be responsible for reporting to the committee on covert action.So, obviously, Mr. Goss and I are going to have to work very closely together and reach good understandings on the division of labor with respect to this question.
ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.My final question is, you know, we spend -- because it's sort of intriguing to talk about, you know, the future, China, how long is the war on terror, how are we going to react, how are we going to get language so it's not just two years in a classroom, but also two years on the street in the place where you're going, so you learn the street language and all of those things.
ROCKEFELLER: We can talk -- and it's much more interesting, somehow, to talk about overseas. It's the American nature.But the American imperative, frankly, for us is not only to stop the terrorism, which is being planned or has been planned for what might go on in this country or American assets elsewhere in the world, but the whole question of homeland security.And the chairman and I have talked about this a good deal, and I think there's a great -- I believe, on this committee, and I believe generally in the Congress -- there's a great sense of lack of confidence in the way that the Homeland Security 22 or 27 agencies are coming together: the fact that they've had several directors; the fact that they have -- I think the chairman had pointed out to me -- that there's as many different communications systems as there are agencies, virtually; and the fact that, you know, in a state like one I come from, which doesn't have any cities over 45,000 people, we do have something called the Ohio River, which goes past some of the largest chemical plants in America, outside of New Jersey, and that there's virtually no coverage to their backside.We have power plants. There are 103 nuclear power plants in this country.Now, your job description is somewhat limited to intelligence that comes from that. But I would hope that, as the director of national intelligence -- which people are going to look upon as kind of making the whole deal work, as much as intelligence -- that you will stretch the envelope even further on the workings or the nonworkings of the Department of Homeland Security.I have grave reservations about what's going on there. I have grave reservations about the security of the American nation, the American people. I worry about it every day.
NEGROPONTE: Certainly, I think one of the challenges here is, as we discussed earlier, to integrate the foreign and the domestic intelligence.And it's, of course, not only the Department of Homeland Security, but dealing with all those local and state law enforcement officials that exist throughout the country.
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.
WARNER: Good.
And the new also have the funding of the Joint Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence Program, which are under the direct cognizance of the secretary of defense.
But there again you take an active participation in the budget. And also, you've established a reporting chain so that you know the activities of those organizations and their functions will be performed in consultation with you. Am I correct on that?
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.
WARNER: So again I find, based on your meeting which was reported to me, that you're working on as seamless as possible relationship that you can at the start-off of your new responsibilities subject to confirmation. Would that be correct?
NEGROPONTE: Yes, sir.
WARNER: Lastly, there's been some report in the press -- and I actually have addressed this -- about the organizational charter, a document that the secretary of defense asked Dr. Cambone to put together. And that's understandable: to draw on it all together, put it down on paper as to how the secretary of defense wishes to work within his structure over those responsibilities. Dr. Cambone basically will be his principal deputy for that.
And a draft of that charter was sent to the head of the -- that is the current acting DCI -- for comment. It's also before your transition staff. And I think, quite properly, you will await your comments on the draft of that charter, subject to the Senate's confirmation. Am I correct on that?
NEGROPONTE: Yes. And I have not had a chance to -- I have not had an opportunity to read the proposal yet, sir.
WARNER: I understand that. But that is another step that you will take such that I think the Senate can presume that eventually this charter will be adopted by the secretary of defense for the purpose of this organization and will incorporate such recommendations as you may wish to make, together with that of the head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
So, Mr. Chairman, I'm satisfied with those areas in which you and I, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, together with Senator Levin, have primary responsibilities.
And I look forward to working with you. Thank you again and thank your family.
ROBERTS: I thank the chairman for his comments. And I thank the ex officio member's questions. And I think they were -- needed clarification.
Senator Levin?
LEVIN; Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Negroponte, the Senate Intelligence Committee report of July 2004 contains over 500 pages detailing intelligence community mistakes, incompetence, misrepresentations, relative to its estimates of the Iraq WMD program.
LEVIN: The recent Silberman-Robb report contains about the same number of pages and similar detail about those failures of the intelligence community relative to that WMD program in Iraq.
Then we had the 9/11 Commission report on numerous failures within the intelligence community before the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
And prior to the 9/11 Commission report, there was a House-Senate joining inquiry into the failures of the intelligence community before the 9/11 attacks, including failures of officials to pass critical information to other agencies, including failures of headquarters to heed field reports concerning efforts of people to learn how to fly but not learn how to take off or land airplanes.
Now, despite all of the hundreds of pages of failures, mistakes, incompetence, misrepresentations, there's been no accountability within the intelligence community. Are you troubled by the lack of accountability?
NEGROPONTE: I think there should be accountability, Senator. And I think that we've got to learn from our lessons. We've got to fix what we think needs to be fixed. And we've got to go forward.
But I don't know enough about the specifics, about who might have been responsible for a specific intelligence lapse, one or another.
NEGROPONTE: And I know that there's work being done in that area. For example, I know that Mr. Goss is looking into the whole question of Curveball. And he's asked his inspector general to look into that.
So I'm reluctant to discuss what specific types of measures of accountability might be taken. But yes, people should be held accountable.
LEVIN: Have you read the Senate Intelligence Committee report of July 2004?
NEGROPONTE: I've read the...
LEVIN: Or a summary of it?
NEGROPONTE: I've read the executive summary of it.
LEVIN: Have you read the Silberman-Robb report?
NEGROPONTE: Yes I have. I've read a lot of it. And of course I've read all the recommendations.
LEVIN: Because it lays out in detail the failures, the lapses, the oversights, the incompetence, and yet nothing -- no action has been taken against anybody.
What kind of a message does that send?
NEGROPONTE: Well, Senator, I think the important thing is to deal with some of the systemic problems that might have existed, try to figure out how to improve the situation, and get on with the business of making these improvements.
I see that as my charge, is to try to improve the quality of the analytical product through the various mechanisms that are envisaged in the law.
And I think that's got to be the focus of the effort: Let's get on with the business of improving the quality of the intelligence product that is given to our decision-makers.
LEVIN: Everybody wants to do that.
NEGROPONTE: Yes.
LEVIN: Unless people are held accountable for failures to do their job, it seems to me we're more likely to repeat these problems.
You say you believe people should be held accountable for misstatements, failures to do their jobs. I hope you'll take that into your office, because it's not good enough to just simply say
systemic problems, although obviously there are. It's not good enough to simply say we should go forward, although we obviously must.
Part of trying to avoid a repeat of these problems is to hold folks accountable when they did things they should not have done.
Curveball has been one example -- just one example where you got people who say they brought this to the attention -- and this being the total incredibility of a source -- that they brought this to the attention of the leadership of the CIA, and the CIA leadership says,No, they didn't.
Someone's got to find out whether they did or didn't.
NEGROPONTE: And that, I understand, is what Mr. Goss is looking to do.
LEVIN: But there's dozens of examples like this in those reports.
And we need you to carry out this commitment about accountability. We need you to be confident that you mean what you say when you say you believe that there should be accountability for individuals who fail in the performance of their duties.LEVIN: Is that a yes? We should have that confidence because you will? I mean, I'm trying to figure out...
NEGROPONTE: To be honest with you, Senator, I don't know who specifically is accountable and who is not...
LEVIN: My last question, because the yellow light's on: According to the Silverman-Robb report, the intelligence community ignored the findings and the conclusions of the U.N. people relative to WMD programs.
They were specifically on the ground. Two agencies spent three months on the ground in Iraq inspecting every facility they could and interviewing Iraqi personnel.
Silverman-Robb pointed out that the intelligence community ignored that one source of real intelligence on Iraq at a time when it had no good intelligence of its own. Does that trouble you?
NEGROPONTE: I think that's, in part, what they are referring to in terms of group-think, of carrying assumptions forward from previous behavior by the Saddam regime and therefore being dismissive of reports that somehow the Iraqi regime's behavior might have been different than what the preconceived notion was.
But let's not forget, there was a lot of bias and prejudice built into the analysis. That's one of the things I think I take away from reading these various reports.
There was a lot of prejudice built into these analyses based on the past performance of the regime and the fact that we were taken by surprise in the early 1990s at the degree to which the Iraqi regime had developed weapons of mass destruction.
So I think a lot of these assumptions were simply carried forward and considered to still be valid.
LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ROBERTS: In closing, we want to thank you for your time here this morning, Mr. Ambassador. I think it's been very helpful. We will have a closed session at 2:30.
I have just a couple of questions or perhaps a comment and a question.
I noted with interest that not only have you been confirmed by the Senate seven times, but you have gone through nine background checks -- nine of them. I would venture to say I don't know too many senators that could go through nine background checks without at least a question or two being raised.
And you've had a distinguished career of public service, by my calculation, 40 years. I agree in total with the comments by Senator Stevens and others.
ROBERTS: This position is new. There are a lot of questions in regard to your authority.
Just this morning you have been asked a hypothetical: Will you stand up to your public policy officials, i.e., your bosses -- or the boss, in regards to commenting publicly or at least very aggressively to them if in fact you think that the consensus of that analysis is wrong?
In a milder version -- you ought to hear Senator Wyden when he really gets wound up -- but, you know, of ducking an issue of 25 years ago that he thinks has pertinence to the current situation -- and I'm not trying to perjure his comments in any way -- that you're vague, you're not aggressive -- the press expects you to have a public arm wrestling contest at RFK with Secretary Rumsfeld -- you have to worry about attack on the homeland; you have to worry about a broken intelligence community.
If we go back in history to Khobar, the India nuclear test, the USS Cole, the embassy bombings, the Belgrade embassy, the Khartoum chemical plant -- whoops, the wrong plant -- then we have -- 9/11 has been alluded to by Senator Levin, the WMD studies.
We've got the Bremer Commission, the Gilmore Commission, the CIS study, the Hart-Rudman Commission and God knows how many other commissions.
You have at least 1,000 armchair experts on television every night. You have authors writing books.
In the past, Mr. Tenet, Mr. Deutch, Mr. Woolsey, the chairman of this committee, Senator Specter, Senator Shelby and Senator Graham -- I don't think we took an activist approach on this to the extent that Senator Rockefeller and I want to have much more proactive or preemptive oversight.
ROBERTS: And you can see by the questions here that we are very eagerly awaiting that opportunity to work with you to achieve that.
Then, obviously, you have to have better collection, better HUMINT, better analysis, better consensus, threat analysis, better information access as opposed to sharing.
You've got to take a look at the capabilities in regards to the hard targets that pose a very threat to us today. And the Silberman- Robb Commission has indicated that unfortunately that still exists in terms of some lack of capability.
My question to you is -- and this is just the approach, the position -- given all of that, why in the hell do you want this job?
NEGROPONTE: Because it's important, Senator.
ROBERTS: And you think you can make that difference?
NEGROPONTE: Well, I hope I can make a difference.
ROBERTS: You've made a difference in the past.
I think you're an excellent appointee, but I just wanted to give you an opportunity, with all of that burden upon your shoulders, you know -- our very best wishes to you.
Do you have any comments on why you yourself think that you can get this job done?
NEGROPONTE: Well, as I said, I think it's important.
I think one of the reasons I may be able to get something done in this job is because I do have long experience in the national security and the diplomatic area. And I think that it will be dealing with several of the most serious national security issues that our country is going to be facing for the foreseeable future, namely international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among others.
So as somebody who's devoted his life to dealing with these kinds of difficult national security and foreign policy issues, I was honored when President Bush offered me the opportunity to undertake this responsibility.
ROBERTS: So you willfully went into the briar patch and now we're at the crossroads.
I can promise you, sir, that we will try to be of as much help as we possibly can.
There is one other comment I want to make.
Do you agree with this statement? We have heard over and over again during the debate on the intelligence reform bill and on other matters that 80 percent of the funding in regards to the intelligence community does go to the military or in regards to supporting the military.
ROBERTS: And we have heard during the debate under whose jurisdiction the national foreign intelligence program should be. But the majority user of intelligence is obviously the war-fighter. And you have just been through that with General Casey in your position over there as ambassador in Baghdad.
And that is true, and so I think there is a bias -- and understandably -- among those who serve on the committees who have that jurisdiction in support of the war-fighter and the military; count me in on that -- also Senator Levin, others.
But the principal user of intelligence is the president of the United States and the National Security Council and, with all due respect, the Congress of the United States.
And I don't think we should ever lose sight of that. Nobody in the Congress wants to deny or harm in any way that lash-up between the intelligence community and our war-fighters more especially when we're involved in any kind of a military mission.
But again, the principal user, and why Senator Levin is being so insistent, is that it is the president of the United States and the National Security Council and the Congress of the United States in the policy-making business that we must rely on credible intelligence. And unfortunately that has not been the case.
I should have phrased that better in a question. Are you in agreement with that comment?
NEGROPONTE: I wouldn't change a word of what you said, Senator.
ROBERTS: Bless your heart.
Thank you for coming...
WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, just a question with respect to scheduling. What is your plan with respect to how we proceed? We're going to have a session this afternoon, a closed session?
ROBERTS: Yes, sir. At 2:30. It's a closed session, and it's in the usual place.
WYDEN: When would you expect the vote on the nominee?
ROBERTS: As soon as we possibly can. I haven't scheduled that with the floor.
And I've talked with the leader, and it's his intent that he would like to do it as soon as he can.
WYDEN: But you wouldn't expect that the committee would vote this afternoon on the nominee?
ROBERTS: No.
WYDEN: I'm very appreciative of that, Mr. Chairman, because I'm anxious to hear from the nominee this afternoon behind closed doors.
ROBERTS: I know you have additional questions, sir.
WYDEN: Great. Thank you very much.
LEVIN: Mr. Chairman? As usual, the record will be kept open for how long, for additional questions?
ROBERTS: I think the remainder of the day should be sufficient, unless somebody wishes...
LEVIN: That's fine.
ROBERTS: ... some additional time.
LEVIN: Remainder of the day, that's fine.
ROBERTS: OK, yes, sir.
Ambassador, thank you very much.
NEGROPONTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ROBERTS: Go have lunch.
NEGROPONTE: Thank you.
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