text:
1. Numbers
Key Points
1.1 ONS submission to the House of Lords Select
1.2 What are the number of recent immigrants?
1.3 What are the expected future trends for
immigration from within and outside the EU?
2. Public finance and net fiscal impacts
2.1 How does immigration affect the public
2.2 Do immigrants contribute more in taxes
than they use in public services?
2.3 As the UK population ages, does immigration
affect the shortfall in pension funding?
3. Macroeconomic impacts: what has been the
impact of immigration on key macroeconomic indicators
3.1 What is the impact on growth?
3.2 What is the impact on trend growth?
3.3 GDP per head
3.4 Productivity and innovation
4. Labour market, productivity and skills
4.1 The labour market impact of immigration:
4.2 The labour market impact of immigration:
4.3 The impact of immigration on employment
4.4 The impact of immigration on wages
5. Sectors and occupations
5.1 Definition of immigration
5.2 Why do employers want to hire migrants?
5.3 In what sectors and occupations are immigrants
5.4 How doe immigrants' labour market outcomesinluding
their employment rates and earningscompare to those of
local workers?
5.5 What determines immigrants' performance
and integration in the UK labour market?
5.6 Which sectors and occupations in the UK
economy are particularly dependent on migrant labour and why?
5.7 What is the impact of immigration on mechanisation
and investment in technical change?
5.8 What are the alternatives to immigration
to reduce labour shortages?
6. Economic effects of demographic impacts
6.1 What is the economic impact of a net change
in the UK population?
6.2 If there is a net increase, does the impact
differ when this comes from higher immigration rather than from
changes in birth and death rates?
7. The economic impact of illegal immigration
7.1 Background
7.2 The economic importance of illegal immigration
7.3 The costs of illegal immigration
8. How can data on immigration be improved?
9. Government policy on immigration
9.1 How will the points system for immigrants
from outside the EU operate?
9.2 How will the Government decide where there
are skills shortages in the economy as the basis for its points
9.3 How will the Government respond to employers
asking for non-EU workers to fill low-skilled jobs?
This is a cross-departmental submission. Each section
has been produced by a lead department, with input from others
as appropriate. The lead departments were:
Key Points
1.1.1 The Office for National Statistics
(ONS) has provided the House of Lords Select Committee with a
separate statistical submission. This contains the following sections:
Section 1: Background
Section 2: Numbers and characteristics of immigrants
Section 3: Population projections and migration
Section 4: Employment of immigrants
Section 5: How can data on immigration be improved?
Annex A: How immigration is reflected in the
national accounts
1.1.2 The ONS submission provides the statistical
background to this cross-departmental submission. Whilst not replicating
all of the material contained within the ONS report, this cross-departmental
submission does highlight some of the headline data to provide
context for the rest of the report.
1.2 What are the numbers of recent immigrants?
1.2.1 According to UN statistics, between
1960 and 2005 the number of persons across the world who were
living abroad more than doubled from 75 million to 191 million
(about a fifth of this increase was due to the transformation
of internal to international migrants following the fall of the
former Soviet Unionin particular, the split of former Yugoslavia
and the division of former Czechoslovakia).
1.2.2 Figure 1.2.1 shows UK total international
long-term migration from mid-1996 to mid-2006. In the year to
mid-2006, the flow of long-term migrants into the UK was 574,000
and the outflow was 385,000. Net international migration
(the difference between long-term migration into and out of the
UK) was 189,000 in 2006, down from 262,000 in the year to mid-2005.
1.2.3 These figures report the total number
of international migrants that is, without any separation by country
of birth. In accordance with the United Nations definition, these
figures also include British nationals returning after a year
or more abroad.[1]
1.3.1 For the purposes of producing population
projections, assumptions are made about future levels of migration.
It must be stressed that assumptions about future migration are
assumptions based on past trends. They are not forecasts. As a
result they do not take into account future policy changes (eg
the impact of the Points Based System on future migration flows).
For the 2004-based projections the assumption was made that, in
the long term, there would be an inflow of 500,000 people a year
coming to live in the UK on a long-term basis. On the same basis,
the assumed outflow was 355,000, giving total long-term net migration
of 145,000 per year. The assumptions about the groups comprising
these figures are shown in Table 1.3.1.
1.3.2 On 27 September ONS published the
headline assumptions that will underpin its 2006-based population
The new figures increase the net migration assumption to 190,000,
per year, up from 145,000 in the 2004-based projections. This
increase is partly due to taking account of data for two new years
(2004 and 2005) where net migration to the UK has been at record
levels, and partly because of methodological changes. The ONS
submission discusses the differences between the 2004 and 2006-based
assumptions in more detail. The full set of 2006-based population
projections and the underlying migration assumptions will be published
on 23 October 2007.
The projections in this table are based mainly on data from
the International Passenger Survey (IPS). This is a sample survey
of passengers arriving at, and departing from, the main United
Kingdom air and sea ports and the Channel Tunnel. Figures based
on the IPS shown in this table are based on relatively small sample
numbers. For this reason, the disaggregation of the IPS totals
should be regarded as purely illustrative.
Migrants are defined as individuals who change their country
of usual residence for a period of at least a year. Adjustments
to IPS data are required for people who originally intend to enter
or leave the country initially for a short stay but subsequently
decide to remain for a year or more (visitor switchers), and for
people who intend to be migrants but in reality stay in the UK
or abroad for less than one year (migrant switchers).
The IPS excludes most, but not all, persons seeking asylum
and some dependants of such asylum seekers. An adjustment for
those not covered by the IPS is needed for this reason. Asylum
seeker assumptions are based on advice from the Home Office. The
assumption for the 2004-based projections covers the migration
of all asylum seekers (including failed asylum seekers) not captured
by IPS flows, and is on a consistent basis with the annual estimates
of asylum seeker migration made by the ONS.
Flows between the UK and the Republic of Ireland are based
on Irish data sources including the Irish National Quarterly Household
Survey. Following consultation with the Central Statistics Office
in Ireland, an assumption of a future annual net outflow of 10
thousand has been made.
Old Commonwealth: This is defined as Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and South Africa.
New Commonwealth: This is defined as all other Commonwealth
countries, British Dependent Territories and British Overseas
citizens. This excludes Hong Kong. Malta and Cyprus are included
in the New Commonwealth grouping.
EEA: European Economic Areathis consists of
the EU Member States as constituted on I May 2004 as well as Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway.
2.1 How does immigration affect the public finances?
2.1.1 Migrants to varying degrees pay taxes, claim benefits
and consume government-provided goods and services for the entire
time they live in the host country. Through their participation
in these activities they have a direct impact on government expenditure
and revenue. If migrants pay more in taxes than they consume in
benefits and state services they are said to be net fiscal contributors.
If migrants consume more in public services than they contribute
through taxes, they are a net fiscal cost to the state. The former
represents a net transfer of resources from the migrant to the
native population. The latter represents a transfer of resources
from the native population to the migrant.
2.2 Do immigrants contribute more in taxes than they use
in public services?
2.2.1 In broad terms, the lifetime fiscal profile of
an individual can be split into three distinct stages. From birth,
until the end of state-funded education, an individual will be
a net fiscal cost to the state. Once an individual enters the
job market, he or she is likely to be a net fiscal contributor;
the magnitude of this contribution will depend on the rate of
employment and the level of earnings. At the end of an individual's
working life, he or she is likely to again become a fiscal cost
through the state-funded pension and increased health costs. If
society treats every age cohort equally, then the net contribution
from these distinct phases will average to zero over a lifetime.
2.2.2 Given this outline of the fiscal system, it is
clear that the fiscal contribution of immigrants must be considered
in both the short and long run. In the short run, the impact on
the public finances will depend on the amount of tax migrants
pay (a function of their rate of employment and level of earnings)
and the extent to which they or their families draw on public
services and benefits. The overall magnitude and direction of
any effect will also be heavily influenced by whether the current
budget is in deficit or surplus. For this reason it is best to
compare the net fiscal contribution of migrants to that of non-migrants
in particular years.
2.2.3 In 2001, the Home Office published a research study,
"Migration in the UK an economic and social analysis"[3].
This was supplemented in 2002 by a more detailed look at the fiscal
impact of migration, "The Migrant Population in the UK:
fiscal effects", by Gott and Johnston.[4]
The headline finding of the more detailed paper was that migrants
contributed more than natives. In 1999-2000, first generation
migrants in the UK contributed £31.2 billion in taxes and
consumed £28.8 billion in benefits and state services. After
rounding, this amounted to a net fiscal contribution of £2.5
billion. A number of assumptions were made to arrive at this estimate
but the main characteristics driving the effect were a smaller
proportion of people over 65 in the migrant population and a larger
percentage of migrants of working age than in the native born
population. Further, although at that time a greater proportion
of migrants were unemployed than was the case for the native population,
a higher percentage were employed in professional and other high-skilled
2.2.4 There are two main caveats to the 2002 Gott and
Johnston study. Firstly, the average nature of the calculation
masks variations across different migrant groups. Secondly, the
calculations relate to 1999-2000, when the government budget was
in surplus overall. As a result, the average fiscal contribution
of both natives and migrants was positive. Nonetheless, whilst
the UK-born population was estimated to have paid almost 5% more
in taxes than it received in terms of public services and welfare
benefits, migrants were estimated to have paid 10% more than they
2.2.5 In 2005, the Institute for Public Policy Research
(IPPR) produced updated estimates of the net fiscal impact of
migration, based largely on the Gott and Johnston works.[5]
Again, the authors found that migration had a positive influence
on the public finances, but also that the impact was growing.
Between 1999-2000 and 2003-04 it is estimated that revenue from
migrants grew by 22% in real terms as opposed to 6% for the UK-born
population. In 1999-2000 the study estimates that migrants accounted
for 8.8% of government receipts and 8.4% of government expenditure.
By 2003-04 it was estimated that migrants contributed 10% of government
receipts and accounted for 9.1% of government expenditure.
2.2.6 In the long run, it is likely that the net fiscal
contribution of an immigrant will be greater than that of a non-immigrant.
For migrants of working age who enter the country this is relatively
clear; the UK is receiving the fiscal contribution of their work,
without paying for the education and training that enables them
to work. Even for young children, by assuming as we do that each
age cohort is treated equally through the fiscal system, then,
in the long run, migration to the UK is still likely to mean a
net fiscal transfer to the native population.
2.2.7 A 2006 paper by MigrationWatch[6]
criticises the methodology of the 2002 Home Office paper and the
subsequent IPPR work. The criticism centres on the treatment of
UK-born dependent children of migrants. Specifically, the large
number of UK-born children of mixed households (one migrant and
one non-migrant parent) were included as UK-born children in the
Home Office and IPPR studies. MigrationWatch argue that such children
should be apportioned 50:50 to migrants and non-migrants, although
once they reach working age they are regarded as non-migrants.
No usual definition of "migrant" would consider such
children as migrants, and doing so would substantially bias the
calculation against migrants. Children born in the UK are UK citizens
and it is inconsistent to view them as "part migrant"
before the age of 16, but UK nationals after that age. An article
providing further details of this issue and the subsequent Home
Office critique of the MigrationWatch findings was submitted as
written evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Home
2.2.8 To our knowledge, there are no published estimates
of the long-run fiscal contribution of an immigrant to the UK.
Any such estimate would of course be subject to a large degree
of uncertainty as the tax and benefit system and earnings and
employment profiles are difficult to predict accurately in the
long run. Despite these uncertainties, estimates of the lifetime
net present value of a migrant to the US fiscal system were published
in 1997.[8] The results
of the work estimate that, on average, an immigrant has a net
present value of around $80,000 to the US fiscal system, in 1996
US Dollars. This surplus is estimated to be very large for highly
skilled migrants (around $180,000) and slightly negative for individuals
educated to below secondary high school level (around -$13,000).
These estimates do not make any assumptions about migrants increasing
the productivity of native workers. If this type of effect was
incorporated into analysis of the long-run fiscal contribution
of migrants, then the contribution of migrants would be enhanced.
2.3 As the UK population ages, does immigration affect
the shortfall in pension funding?
2.3.1 To our knowledge, there are no published estimates
of the direct impact of immigration on the shortfall in pension
funding in UK. Any attempt to produce such an estimate would have
to take into account that whilst immigrants are more likely to
be of working age and hence reduce the dependency ratio, in the
long run these migrants will also age. Nonetheless, theoretical
considerations suggest the impact is still likely to be beneficial
in the long term.[9]
2.3.2 Analysis by the Government Actuary's Department
(GAD)[10] looks at the
impact of different migration assumptions on the National Insurance
Fund. As well the state pension, the National Insurance Fund contributes
funding for items such as incapacity benefits, bereavement benefits
and the Jobseekers' Allowance. The GAD bases its calculations
on 2001-based interim population projections.[11]
Whilst these assumptions are some way from those used in the latest
set of population projections, the calculations still provide
a useful illustration of the impact of immigration on the public
2.3.3 The GAD analysis looks at the joint (employer and
employee) Class 1 National Insurance contribution rate necessary
to balance income and expenditure in the year. Under the low migration
scenario, the joint contribution rate would need to be 27.9% in
2060-61 to balance the fund. Under the high migration scenario,
this rate would fall to 26.3%. The positive long-term impact of
immigration on the National Insurance Fund should not, therefore,
be overlooked.
2.3.4 Section 6 of this submission considers more fully
whether immigration could ease the pressure on the public finances
resulting from population ageing.
3.1.1 Immigration has clear benefits for both the labour
market and the economy as a whole. Riley and Weale (2006)[12]
have estimated that the economy grew by 5.3% in 2004 and 2005
together. Of this, 0.9 percentage points can be attributed to
the direct effect of immigration. That is, approximately 17% of
economic growth during the period is attributable to immigration.
3.1.2 Immigration, along with greater labour force participation
among older people, has been a key source of additional labour
supply in recent years. Concerns that native workers would be
displaced by migrant workers, especially following the accession
of the new member states in 2004, seem ill-founded, as migrant
workers appear to have complementary skills to the native labour
3.1.3 This is supported by the OECD in its assessment
of the UK in its Economic Outlook in November 2006:[14]
"Record high inward migration has been adding to
potential growth while fuelling domestic demand ... Since strong
labour force growth also leads to a higher path for potential
output, stronger growth achieved through this channel would not
necessarily result in an acceleration of inflation. On the contrary,
international as well as UK evidence suggests that immigration
can serve to make the labour market as a whole more fluid and
wages less sensitive to demand fluctuations."
3.1.4 Recent ad-hoc survey evidence from business further
supports the view that migrant workers make a significant positive
contribution to the UK economy.[15]
This evidence highlights the benefits arising from the skills,
higher productivity and work ethic that migrant workers bring.
3.2.1 The Treasury's framework for assessing trend growth[16]
measures the change in four components:
3.2.2 From the start of the economic half-cycle in 2001
Q3 to mid-2006 migration added around 0.5% per annum to the working
age population, stimulating growth in total output. Average output
growth over this period was around 2.7% per annum and migration
is estimated to have contributed around 15-20% of this. On this
basis, migration contributed around £6 billion to output
growth in 2006.
3.2.3 Looking ahead, migration is expected to continue
to contribute towards growth in the population of working age,
and hence overall growth in the economy. While projections of
net migration are subject to uncertainty, data on migration released
during 2006 provided evidence to support an upward revision of
the assumed working-age population growth rate post-2006, from
0.4% to 0.6%. Details of this are set out in Trend Growth: new
evidence and prospects, published alongside the 2006 Pre-Budget
3.3.1 The Committee has asked about the impact of migration
on GDP per head. It is of course important to consider not only
the impact of migrants on GDP, but also how they might contribute
to an increase in wealth in the population as a whole. Because
it may take migrants some time to fully integrate in the UK labour
market, and because changes in migrant numbers in any one year
are marginal to the totality of economic activity, it will always
be difficult to determine exactly what effect migrant labour as
a whole has on economic activity and hence GDP per head in the
medium term.
3.3.2 There are two ways of approaching this question:
the direct effect of migrants on employment and earnings; and
their indirect effect on non-migrant workers.
3.3.3 The first way is to examine the contribution to
GDP per head that an individual migrant makes through his or her
personal contribution to economic production. If migrants gain
employment and earn at a rate above the national average, they
will tend to raise GDP per head through a simple averaging effect.
The earnings and employment propensities of foreign-born workers
are discussed in more detail in Section 5.4 of this submission.
This suggests that, on average, migrants contribute more to GDP
than natives, so raising GDP per head. However, even 200,000 additional
migrants in any one year constitute a relatively small proportionate
increase in the overall population of the UK, so the direct impact
of migration on GDP per head will inevitably be small.
3.3.4 As noted elsewhere, migrants differ markedly in
their characteristics and economic outcomes. The impact of an
"average" migrant is therefore not representative of
the impact of any given migrant. A decrease in high-skilled economic
migration would, for example, have a much greater negative impact
than the average data would suggest.
3.3.5 The second approach is to ask what contribution
foreign-born workers make to the economy, jointly with their UK-born
counter-parts. If migrant workers complement the activities of
native workers, then the productive contribution of all workers
is increased, with the potential for larger increases in wealth.
Over the medium to long term this effect is likely to dominate,
but is much harder to quantify than the direct effect.
3.3.6 Again, examination of earnings can help shed some
light on this question. There is some evidence on complementarities
from the Low Pay Commission, discussed in Section 4.4. This suggests
that migrant workers raise the earnings of native workers by not
insignificant amounts overall (a 1% increase in the ratio of immigrants
to natives would lead to a 0.3% to 0.4% increase in average earnings
for natives). Earnings growth is higher in the middle and upper
part of the native earnings distribution, and lower at the very
bottom, relative to the position in the absence of migration.
This suggests migrants may raise the productivity of those in
the middle and upper part of the distribution and so raise GDP
per head. The transmission mechanisms which lead to differential
effects in different parts of the earnings distribution are, however,
as yet unclear.
3.3.7 Migration might impact on components of GDP other
than earnings, such as the returns to capital. We are not aware
of any research providing quantification of this issue.
3.3.8 The labour market integration of migrants seems
to improve over time, as they gradually move towards full assimilation
as workers, gaining from work experience, improved language skills
and better work search techniques. This means that estimating
the full contribution to wealth of migrant workers on the basis
of the immediate contribution of the annual inflow in any one
year will be misleading.
3.3.9 In addition, it would not be right to estimate
the total contribution of all migrant workers simply by
subtracting their productive output and numbers respectively from
the numerator and denominator of the GDP per head ratio calculation.
The integration of migrant workers in the economy, and their ability
to complement the activities of other workers, means that the
impact on national output of a total withdrawal of migrant labour
would be likely to be very substantial. However, quantifying this
impact is difficult given the lack of data in this area and the
large number of assumptions that would underpin estimates of productive
3.4.1 Migrants' impact on aggregate productivity is dependent
on the level and composition of their skills, their ability to
employ these skills effectively in the host country and the ability
of the host economy to employ them effectively.
3.4.2 Migrant workers may boost the labour productivity
of UK workers if their skills are complementary, and contribute
to technical progress and innovation. Contact with people from
different backgrounds and experiences of alternative work practices
can contribute to both process and product innovation and raise
productivity through these channels. Evidence from the US points
to highly skilled migrants encouraging technical progress.[18]
3.4.3 In addition, the impact on productivity depends
on the amount of capital available in the UK economy. If the capital
stock is fixed in the short term, inward migration may depress
aggregate labour productivity, though this depends on the extent
to which migrant workers complement the existing workers. However,
investment is likely to increase in the face of an increase in
the labour supply as the return to capital increases and firms
expect a larger population to demand more goods and services.
3.4.4 Past episodes of large immigration flows have indeed
been associated with periods of rapid capital accumulation, though
the sunk costs and adjustment costs associated with investment
can imply a lag between inward migration and increased investments.[19]
With liberalised capital markets such as in the UK, capital flows
are likely to respond fairly rapidly to an increase in labour
3.4.5 It is important to note that the impact of migration
on measured aggregate productivity will depend on the sectors
and occupations where migration is concentrated. For example,
if the migration is concentrated in lower productivity sectors
this may dampen aggregate productivity (since it increases
the number of workers in lower productivity sectors) but could
at the same time raise the productivity of every individual in
the economy (both migrants and non-migrants) if migrants and native
workers are complementary.
3.4.6 Wages over the longer term are an indicator of
labour productivity as they reflect the value added of workers,
though wage differences could in part reflect sectoral labour
demand and supply imbalances. The mean wage for the foreign-born
is £424 per week, compared with £395 for the UK-born,
suggesting migrants have higher productivity than UK workers.[20]
4.1 The labour market impact of immigration: Context
4.1.1 Over the last 10 years the UK labour market has
performed strongly, delivering both high employment and low unemployment.
Since 1997 the number of people in work has increased by around
2.7 million. This reflects both reductions in unemployment and
improvements in economic activity. The ILO unemployment rate has
fallen by 1.8 percentage points, to 5.4%, and the claimant unemployment
rate by 1.9 points, to 2.6%. Excluding students, inactivity has
fallen by 1.3 percentage points of the population, to 16.2%, as
some individuals who were previously not looking for work have
been drawn back into the jobs market. Migration is one source
of labour market growth, but not the only one. Firstly, there
are more older people, lone parents and disabled people in work.
Secondly, and more broadly, there are more people returning to
work and more people staying in jobs for longer.[21]
4.1.2 Meanwhile, the number of foreign-born in the labour
force has risen noticeably, particularly following the expansion
of the European Union in 2004 and the decision to allow free movement
of workers from the new Member States (the "A8"). According
to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), in Q4 2006 people born overseas
accounted for 12.5% of the UK working age population, up from
7.4% a decade ago (see Figure 4.1.1 below).
4.2 The labour market impact of immigration: theory
4.2.1 In theory, immigration could have a number of impacts
on the labour market and in particular the labour market outcomes
of natives. Depending on the characteristics of migrants and the
labour market adjustment process, impacts could be seen on both
employment and wages.
4.2.2 There is no theoretical reason why immigration
need either depress native wages or increase native unemployment.
Given that there is a strong long-run correlation between the
size of the labour force and employment, there is no "lump
of labour"; it is not true to say that there are only a fixed
number of jobs to go round. It is increasingly recognised that,
given sound macroeconomic management, unemployment is primarily
a structural phenomenon. If that is the case, then migrants will
have no effect on the job prospects of natives (in the medium
or long term); and the appropriate policies for Government to
pursue to address unemployment among natives (and, to the extent
relevant, among past and present migrants) are active labour market
policies designed to connect people with the labour market, including
by increasing their skills and employability. This is what the
Government is doing with its current programme of welfare reform.[22]
A key element of this is a new jobs pledge that aims for major
employers to offer a quarter of a million job opportunities to
local people at a disadvantage in the labour market. This pledge
will be delivered through Local Employment Partnerships.
4.2.3 Nor is there any theoretical reason to expect that
immigration will lead to a reduction (or increase) in native wages,
either overall or for specific groups. If the result of migration
is not to increase labour market competition at any particular
level, but to change the nature of the production in the economyand
hence of labour demand as well as labour supplythere is
no necessary impact on wages. If migration raises the productivity
of native workers through complementary skills, then wages may
rise. Indeed, the academic consensus is that the impact of migration
on native labour market outcomes, especially in a relatively open
and flexible economy like the UK, is likely to be small or zero:
"The usual theoretical models do not establish a
presumption for or against the existence of long-run employment
or wage effects. If the economy is characterised by a large and
heterogeneous traded goods sector, employment and wages may be
insensitive to immigration" (Dustmann et al, 2003)[23]
"There is some presumption that output-mix adjustment
fully absorbs the immigration shock ... our presumption should
be that immigration has no long run effect on labour market outcomes"
(Gaston and Nelson, 2002)[24]
4.3 The impact of immigration on employment
4.3.1 This theoretical presumption appears to be supported
by the available empirical evidence for the UK. A number of papers
have looked at the employment impacts of migration; none appears
to have found a statistically significant impact.
"The empirical literature from around the world suggests
little or no evidence that immigrants have had a major impact
on native labour market outcomes such as wages and unemployment.
Recent work by a number of other authors for the UK is also consistent
with this view". (Blanchflower, 2007)[25]
4.3.2 Dustmann et al (2002)[26]
looked at all migrants in the UK using a range of available migrant
data sources and found that:
"... if there is an impact of immigration on unemployment
then it is statistically poorly determined and probably small
in size".
4.3.3 However, this paper looked at migration flows over
a long period, and recognised that given the nature of the adjustment
process it might not be possible to isolate the direct impact
of migration.
4.3.4 More recently, a particularly strong test of the
labour market impact of migration is given by experience with
the accession of eight new European Union Member States in May
2004. This initially led to significant inflows to the UK labour
market over a relatively short period of time. Moreover, the new
migrants were concentrated in certain occupations and in certain
areas of the country.[27]
Whilst the occupational distribution of non-A8 foreign-born is
broadly similar to that of the UK-born, the A8-born are concentrated
in lower skill occupations. The A8-born have also gone to parts
of the country that are not traditionally associated with migration.
So if immigration was to have a significant impact, we would expect
to see it reflected in the more recent data.
4.3.5 The claimant count increased between 2004 and 2005
around the same time as the A8 countries joined the EU and migrants
from these countries began to come to the UK in significant numbers.
Between January 2005 and June 2006 the claimant count increased
by over 130,000. At the same time 310,000 A8 migrants registered
for work in the UK on the Workers Registration Scheme. It has
been suggested that the new A8 immigration might have caused the
rise in claimant unemployment.
4.3.6 The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has
performed an extensive and thorough statistical analysis of claimant
count data, the Annual Labour Force Survey and the Workers Registration
Scheme (WRS). This analysis found no discernible statistical evidence
that A8 migration has resulted in an increase in the claimant
count rate since May 2004.
4.3.7 Vacancies, including those in sectors where migrants
are concentrated have been and remain historically high. The magnitude
of vacancies in the UK in a given month is far greater than the
inflow of A8 migrants.
4.3.8 The chart above shows that there is no relationship
between the change in the claimant count rate between 2004-05
and 2005-06 and the concentration of A8 migrants across local
authority districts (LADs) in the UK. If A8 migrants had caused
an increase in the claimant count we would expect the line of
best fit to slope upwards from left to right, ie areas which have
seen a increase in the claimant count rate would also have a relatively
high concentration of A8 migrants and vice versa. In fact it is
effectively flat.
4.3.9 In the DWP paper, Gilpin et al (2006)[28]
performed a number of further sophisticated econometric tests
of this data, and concluded:
"... we have found no discernible statistical evidence
to suggest that A8 migration has been a contributor to the rise
in claimant unemployment in the UK."
4.3.10 So far, both theoretical and empirical analysis
suggests that migration has had no impact on the employment prospects
of UK natives. The August 2007 Labour Market Statistics report[29]
showed that employment had reached a near all time high of 29.07
million while the claimant count had fallen for 10 of the last
12 months, despite the continuation of significant inflows from
the new Member States.[30]
4.4.1 Research commissioned by the Low Pay Commission
(Dustmann et al 2007)[31]
looked at the inflow of migrants to the UK between 1997 and 2005,
largely pre-dating the recent wave of immigration from the A8
countries, and found that while there was, on average, a slightly
positive effect on wage growth there were very modest negative
effects at the lower end of the distribution. These findings are
in line with planned changes to Government immigration policy.
Under the new Points Based System, the Resident Labour Market
Test will only apply to jobs below a certain salary, since it
is here that there is most public concern about the impact of
migrant labour on the domestic labour market.[32]
4.4.2 To put their findings into perspective, Dustmann
et al (2007)[33]
look at the wage impact of immigration within the context of overall
wage growth for different groups of workers. Over the period considered,
the real hourly wage grew by an average of 18 pence per year at
the first decile. Without immigration, this figure would have
been 0.7 pence higher. Further up the wage distribution, immigration
added about 1.5 pence per year to real hourly wage growth at the
median, and 2.3 pence at the ninth decile. The authors conclude
that the wage effects at the low end of the wage distribution
are "very modest". The paper also notes that the National
Minimum Wage (NMW) has played an important role in insulating
the wages of low-paid workers from a larger impact.
4.4.3 It is not clear how to interpret these results.
Some commentators (Borjas 1994,[34]
Dustmann et al, 2007)[35]
have argued that low-skilled migration might reduce wages at the
lower end (through substitution and competition) while increasing
them at the middle and upper end (through complementarities).
It is important to note that over this period (which predated
the large expansion of migration from the Accession countries)
migrants were on average higher skilled, and higher paid, than
natives. Another hypothesis is that migrants increase the overall
flexibility and dynamism of the economy and hence the productivity
and earnings of natives, at least in certain sectors, but further
analysis is required.
4.4.4 Dustmann et al (2007)[36]
also note that many new arrivals initially move into lower level
occupations than their skills would dictate, increasing competition
for jobs at the lower end of the wage distribution. This suggests
that the problem is not caused by immigration per se, but by frictions
that hinder migrants' ability to move into jobs that are appropriate
to their skills. This is something that policy is addressing through
initiatives such as English language training (ESOL), so that
language does not represent a barrier to migrants putting their
skills to maximum productive use.
4.4.5 Furthermore, the downward impact on real wages
amongst lower paid workers is relatively small compared with the
large upward trend of earnings growth at the bottom of the distribution
over the period. Deflating using the RPI, real wage growth in
the 5th, 10th and 50th percentiles was 22%, 15% and 11% respectively,
hence lower paid workers experienced real wage increases well
above the average. Estimates by BERR show that in the absence
of increased immigration over the 1997-2005 period, additional
real wage growth at the lower end is likely to have been minimal,
ie around 1-2 percentage points higher.
4.4.6 Recent migration from the new Member States provides
additional evidence. It has been suggested that since May 2004
A8 migration has reduced wage growth in sectors in which migrants
are concentrated. However, this is not supported by the evidence.
For example, there have been particular concerns about the construction
sector, but wage growth in the construction sector exceeded average
wage growth in both 2005 and 2006 (see Table 4.4.1). Of course,
it may still be the case that migration reduced wage growth in
certain sectors relative to what it would otherwise have been.
DWP continues to undertake research in this area.
4.4.7 Using a similar methodology to that described above
for employment, we can use the ASHE data from 2004 to 2006 broken
down to the LAD level to perform simple linear correlations comparing
wage growth with the concentration of A8 migrants in LADs across
the UK, based on Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) data. The chart
below shows that there is no discernible statistical relationship
between the change in the growth of wages between 2004-05 and
2005-06 and the concentration of A8 migrants across LADs in the
Source: WRS applications processed, May 2004-September 2006.
5.1.1 The analysis below draws heavily on the Labour
Force Survey (LFS). It should be noted that the LFS figures on
the foreign-born population do not match the UN definition of
"long-term international migration".[37]
They instead cover the foreign-born household population, irrespective
of year of arrival. They do not include certain short-term migrants
and those living in communal establishments. One consequence of
the latter point is that the number of foreign-born workers in
sectors such as construction and agriculture may be under-reported.
More broadly, these survey results are inevitably subject to a
margin of uncertainty due to sampling variability.
5.2 Why do employers want to hire migrants?
5.2.1 The best source of data in this area is a report
commissioned by the Home Office[38]
which conducted in-depth interviews with employers in order to
produce a qualitative survey.
Interviews were conducted in five sectors:
In total, 50 employers were interviewed, each falling into
one of three groups:
5.2.2 The overwhelming majority of employers across sectors
and regions started to recruit migrant workers because they could
not get applications from domestic workers for low-skilled jobs.
In some cases employers noted that a greater proportion of applications
were from foreign nationals, possibly because they are more mobile
than UK nationals, who may limit their job search to the local
labour market.
5.2.3 Nonetheless, the report also found that, in some
areas, employers preferred migrant workers to non-migrant workers
for a number of reasons listed below.
5.2.4 Native workers sometimes proved unreliable in certain
sectors, especially Agriculture and Hotels and Catering, which
makes a business difficult to run. Some employers had tried recruiting
applicants via a Jobcentre, but found that they sometimes turned
up for interviews purely to get a form signed to enable them to
receive Jobseekers' Allowance.
Skills/labour shortages
5.2.5 In Construction, where employers were seeking skilled
workers, the recruitment of migrant workers was directly related
to skills shortages. Polish workers were generally valued in London,
where they were seen as highly-motivated skilled workers who could
fill a skills gap.
5.2.6 One employer in the Finance and Accountancy sector
said that there was only a very small pool of qualified applicants
in the UK. The employer used headhunters who could recruit internationally
and took the best-qualified candidate.
5.2.7 In lower-skilled jobs, the issue was, unsurprisingly,
a shortage in the supply of labour rather than skills. This supports
the notion that migrants are filling jobs that natives will not
do rather than competing for the jobs that they will.
Other positive attributes
5.2.8 Only a minority of employers thought there were
no particular advantages to using migrant workers, other than
that they were available. The majority cited a range of positive
attributes. The ones most frequently mentioned were:
Other survey evidence
5.2.9 Two other recent surveys confirm that business
sees migration as a good thing for the UK economy. A survey conducted
by the Institute of Directors (IoD) in December 2006[39]
found that three-quarters of IoD members supported the view that
migrant workers made a significant positive contribution to the
UK economy. This finding was mirrored in a similar study by the
British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), also undertaken in December
2006.[40] Both surveys
indicate that business focuses on migrants' skills, higher productivity
and better work ethic, rather than lower wage costs. The IoD survey
reported that migrant workers significantly outperform the existing
workforce in terms of productivity, education and skills, work
ethic, reliability and the amount of sick leave. The BCC survey
found that less than 6% of employers employed migrant workers
because of the potential for lower wage costs.
5.3 In what sectors and occupations are immigrants employed?
5.3.1 Foreign-born workers may be divided between those
from the A8 countries and those from other countries. A significant
proportion of "other foreign-born" are working in the
public administration, education and health (29%), distribution,
hotels and restaurants (21%) and banking, finance and insurance
(19%) sectors. A8 foreign-born are particularly concentrated in
the distribution, hotels and restaurants (24%), manufacturing
(21%) and construction (14%) sectors.
5.3.2 A large proportion of the "other foreign-born"
(49%) are working in higher skilled occupations, while only around
13% are working in elementary occupations. The majority of A8
foreign-born work in elementary occupations (38%), as process,
plant and machine operatives (16%) and in skilled trade occupations
5.4 How do immigrants' labour market outcomesincluding
their employment rates and earningscompare to those of
local workers?
5.4.1 The Labour Force Survey shows that both UK-born
and foreign-born employment has risen in the UK over the last
ten years. The UK-born employment rate rose until 2001 and has
remained at around 75% for the last five years. The overall foreign-born
employment rate has improved to reach, 68%, closing the "UK-born/migrant
employment rate gap" from 10 percentage points in 1997 to
7 percentage points in 2006 (Figure 5.4.1). The employment rate
of the foreign-born has increased as more migrants appear to be
coming to the UK for work-related purposes than in the past. These
figures are based on the standard definition of the employment
rate (employment as a proportion of the working age population).
It is worth noting that employment as a proportion of the total
population is higher for the foreign-born than for the UK-born
(54% against 48% in the final quarter of 2006), because migrants
have a younger age profile.
5.4.2 The current foreign-born employment rate of 68%
hides a large variation in labour market outcomes for those from
different country groups (Figure 5.4.2).
5.4.3 Foreign-born men compare quite well to UK-born
men in employment outcomes, with the exception of those from the
Middle East who have an employment rate of 56%, 23 percentage
points lower than UK-born men (79%). Further research is needed
to understand the reasons for these differences, but one possibility
is that different groups have different reasons for coming to
the UK.
5.4.4 Foreign-born women fare far worse in comparison
to UK-born women. This is particularly true for Pakistani women
(who have an employment rate of 23%, 50 percentage points lower
than native women) and for Bangladeshi women (who have an employment
rate of 19%). This discrepancy could arise for a combination of
reasons, such as English language ability, discrimination[41]
and cultural differences.
5.4.5 The approximate 50:50 gender split of the foreign-born
UK working age population means that low female employment rates
in most migrant groups significantly reduce overall employment
rates. For example, the employment rate for Pakistani men is 6
percentage points lower than for native men, but the female rate
is 50 percentage points lower than for native females, resulting
in the overall Pakistani employment rate being 26 percentage points
lower than for all natives.
5.4.6 Foreign-born from Romania & Bulgaria (94%),
South Africa (85%), Australia and New Zealand (84%), the A8 countries
(81%) and EU15 countries (76%) have higher employment rates than
UK-born workers (76%).
5.4.7 The employment rate of foreign-born is lower than
for UK-born at all levels of education, although the size of the
gap falls as the level of education rises (Figure 5.4.3).[42]
5.4.8 The proportion who were economically inactive,
in the final quarter of 2006, was 14% of the working age population
born in A8 countries and around 20% amongst those born in the
UK and other EU countries. The equivalent figure for all overseas-born
was 26%.
5.4.9 Overall, all foreign-born have a similar self employment
rate (15%) to UK natives (13%). Some migrant groups such as those
from Romania and Bulgaria (55%),[44]
Pakistan (30%) and the Middle East (24%) have above-average proportions
of employed workers in self-employment. A8 foreign-born are notable
because the proportion in employment that are self-employed has
fallen over the last three years from over 21% in the final quarter
of 2004 to about 11% in the same quarter of 2006.
5.4.10 Since 2001, average UK-born wage levels have steadily
risen while average foreign-born wages have fallen, causing the
weekly wage gap to fall from £76 in 2001 to £28 in 2006
(Figure 5.4.6). This apparent fall in wages amongst foreign-born
workers is a compositional effect. Historically, foreign-born
workers coming to the UK have tended to take-up high-paid jobs.
More recently, a greater proportion of migrants have come to the
UK to work in low-paid jobs. This is particularly true for those
coming from the A8 countries during the last three years (see
far right-hand bar in Figure 5.4.7). The growing proportion of
foreign-born workers taking low-paid jobs has pulled down the
average wage for all foreign-born workers.
5.4.11 Figure 5.4.7 looks at wages by region of birth
and the data are calculated on a slightly different basis from
those presented above. They are calculated only for full time
workers and look at the average for all of 2006, rather than just
the final quarter. They demonstrate that full-time workers from
developed Western economies and the Middle East earn more than
their UK-born counterparts. In contrast, those from the A8 and
A2 countries earn noticeably less than UK-born workers.
5.4.12 On average, foreign-born workers in full-time
employment have higher skill levels than their UK-born counterparts.
This is particularly true for those from the countries on the
left-hand side of Figure 5.4.7. As a result, foreign-born workers
have higher productivity and, on average, are employed in more
highly-skilled jobs than the UK-born, and therefore earn higher
5.5 What determines immigrants' performance and integration
in the UK labour market?
5.5.1 Migrants who speak functional English are more
likely to find work because they are able to communicate more
effectively with employers, use job vacancy facilities and meet
employers' English language requirements.
5.5.2 English language skills can influence wages directly
through greater productivity, resulting from an ability to communicate
effectively. There may also be an indirect impact because those
with stronger language skills are likely to obtain more benefit
from their education and previous labour market experience, finding
a job that better fits their skill levels.
5.5.3 There are waiting lists for ESOL (English for Speakers
of Other Languages) classes. Many migrants do not have time to
learn English because they are always working. They often work
alongside other migrants and so cannot learn from work colleagues.
The Commission on Integration and Cohesion[45]
identified a number of employers for whom there was a sound business
case for providing free English classes on work premises, or giving
staff time off to attend outside classes.
5.5.4 Wheatley-Price and Shields[46]
conclude that fluency in English (assessed by an interviewer and
not through a formal test) increases the average hourly occupational
wage by approximately 20%.
5.5.5 A Canadian study[47]
concluded that immigrants who do not usually speak either English
or French (the two official Canadian languages) at home have earnings
10% to 12% lower than those who do. This study also found that
those with better language skills receive more benefit from an
additional year of education (in terms of the wages earned).
5.5.6 Dustmann and van Soest[48]
find that language proficiency increases productivity and hence
the market wage.
5.5.7 Migrants' employment outcomes improve over time.
Dustmann and Van Soest[49]
found lower employment rates for migrants upon arrival in Germany,
but they increased with years of residence, as job search costs
decrease over time (due to more information and networks, and
greater language fluency).
5.5.8 Turning to the UK evidence, Dustmann et al (2003)[50]
suggest that the labour market performance of the foreign-born
relative to the UK-born changes with length of residence. The
foreign-born may acquire additional skills, specific to the UK-economy,
or tailor their existing skills to the UK labour market. Information
acquired about the UK labour market after arrival will also make
it easier to find work as time passes. The authors find that:
"... employment and participation probabilities of
minority immigrants are initially substantially lower than those
of UK-born whites, but there is adaptation. We estimate that after
about 20 years of residence, participation and employment probabilities
are similar to those of UK-born whites".
However, the employment and participation probabilities for
white migrants relative to British-born whites are not found to
significantly vary over time.
Education and qualifications
5.5.9 Bell[51]
finds that the number of years of schooling has a greater positive
impact on wages than the number of years of UK work experience.
5.5.10 Battu and Sloane[52]
also find that foreign qualifications receive lower returns in
the UK than domestic ones.
Work experience
5.5.11 Bell[53]
finds that immigrant wage rates are positively related to experience,
but foreign experience is worth significantly less than UK experience.
Amongst the groups in the study, `Black with significant foreign
experience' experiences the greatest wage disadvantage, although
this disadvantage reduces over time in the UK.
5.5.12 In Canada, Schaafsma & Sweetman[54]
found that foreign experience appeared to yield virtually no return
in terms of wages.
Ethnicity (country of origin)
5.5.13 This sub-section draws on evidence from Dustmann
et al (2003),[55]
who compare white UK-born individuals with immigrants of the same
age, education and geographical distribution.
5.5.14 The study found that white immigrants have similar
employment probabilities to white non-migrants, but minority immigrants
have, on average, poorer employment prospects than these groups,
with Pakistanis and Bangladeshi immigrants exhibiting some of
the lowest employment rates amongst the groups studied. This applied
for both men and women.
5.5.15 Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are among those with
the lowest participation rates. They also found that individuals
from most white immigrant communities have, on average, higher
wages than UK-born whites with the same characteristics. This
is in contrast to immigrants from ethnic minority communities
who tended to have lower wages than UK-born white workers.
5.5.16 After about 20 years of residence, participation
probabilities for male ethnic minority immigrants are approximately
the same as for UK-born whites. For ethnic minority female immigrants,
however, participation is still 10 percentage points lower than
UK-born whites after 40 years of residence.
5.5.17 Evidence on wage convergence was less clear due
to the limited number of observations. For all groups of immigrants
in the study, the authors find no real trend in wage profiles,
except for Irish and European immigrants, who have wages that
are initially higher than those of UK-born individuals, but the
difference diminishes with time of residence.
5.6 Which sectors and occupations in the UK economy are
particularly dependent on migrant labour and why?
Survey evidence[56]
5.6.1 Almost all employers in Agriculture said that migrant
workers were crucial to their business. Several went so far as
to say that the business would not survive without migrant workers.
5.6.2 In the Construction sector, views were more varied.
Some said that migrant labour was not important to them, while
others said it was crucial.
5.6.3 In the Hotels and Catering sector in London, several
employers reported that migrant workers were crucial to the business.
In the North East, some Hotels and Catering employers agreed that
migrant workers were very important to the business. However,
there was less sense than in London that business depended on
migrants. In East Anglia, several employers said that migrant
workers were very important because they simply could not fill
staff requirements without them. Some respondents in the North
East and East Anglia noted that migrant workers in Hotels and
Catering were an asset by bringing a mix of cultures and a positive
attitude in a sector that strives to be international.
Work permit approvals
5.6.4 Employers can use the Work Permits system to fill
vacancies that cannot be filled from the existing EU labour market.
The table below shows how demand for work permits has varied over
time between the sectors of highest demand.
5.6.5 Since May 2004, significant numbers of migrants
from the eight new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe (A8)
have registered under the Worker Registration Scheme (over 600,000
workers were registered for the period up to June 2007). These
workers are principally working in lower paid jobs, and this may
account for some reduction in the number of work permits approved
in sectors such as hospitality.
Labour Force Survey Evidence
5.6.6 The analysis above draws on different data sources
to build up a picture of the parts of the economy which are most
dependent on migrant labour. An overall picture is perhaps best
provided by data from the LFS (see Table 5.6.7).
5.6.7 Overall, the "other foreign-born" account
for around 10% of those employed in each industrial sector in
the UK, although lower proportions are recorded for agriculture
& fishing and construction. As discussed in paragraph 5.1.1,
this could reflect the fact that the data do not capture short-term
migrants and those living in communal establishments.
5.6.8 Construction and manufacturing have the greatest
reliance on workers born in the A8 countries, but even here they
account for less than 2% of the total employed. Distribution,
hotels & restaurants and transport & communication have
a relatively strong reliance on non-A8 foreign-born workers. Whilst
there are relatively few A8-born workers in banking, finance &
insurance and public administration, education & health, these
sectors do rely on foreign-born workers from other countries.
5.7.1 Productivity depends on the amount of labour and
capital available and the efficiency with which they are combined.
Migration may have an impact on both the supply of capital, and
the technical progress of the economy.
5.7.2 Immigrants will increase both the overall population
and the workforce. As the population increases, it will increase
the demand for goods and services. This may feed through into
demand for both capital and labour as companies seek to increase
production. As the workforce increases it could increase the returns
to capital as there are more workers for each unit of capital.
It is therefore possible to argue that investment will increase
in the face of an increase in the labour supply due to migration.[57]
Previous periods of migration have tended to coincide with periods
of rapid capital accumulation. However, there is very little evidence
in this area and much of it is anecdotal.
5.7.3 From the information that we have on wages, it
would be expected that any increase in capital would be slightly
higher in sectors employing staff at the higher end of the distribution.
5.7.4 An increase in the number of migrants could increase
the technical progress of the economy. They could do this directly,
through having different knowledge to native workers. Alternatively,
they might be more capable of innovative work in research and
development. These arguments are explored in more detail in Section
3.4 of this report.
5.8 What are the alternatives to immigration to reduce
labour shortages?
5.8.1 Economic theory provides a range of options, not
all of which are practical.
5.8.2 Education and training of native workers is one
option for reducing skills shortages. Whilst labour force participation
is already high in the UK by international standards, raising
the labour force participation rate and the skills of the native
population remains a government priority and will continue to
support the supply of skilled labour. For example, in July 2007
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) published a Green Paper[58]
setting out a series of measures designed to meet the long-term
objectives of an employment rate of 80% and the eradication of
child poverty. A key element of this is a new jobs pledge which
aims for major employers to offer a quarter of a million job opportunities
to people at a disadvantage in the labour market. The Green Paper
also sets out the following proposals to be introduced following
consultation and as resources allow:
The Government is consulting on these proposals and wants
to build a consensus in support of full employment as a key aim
of government policy.
5.8.3 These measures go alongside others announced in
the 2006 Green Paper "A New Deal for Welfare: Empowering
People to Work",[61]
where a particular focus was on providing extra support to people
with health conditions and disabilities.
5.8.4 Upskilling the labour force is essential in a competitive
global economy. To the extent that the supply of skilled labour
remains deficient, migration is an important complement to these
activities. The increased focus on joined up skills/employment
in the UK should boost the skills of disadvantaged workers, while
we will ensure that the work of the Migration Advisory Committee
(MAC), which will advise Government on where in the economy migration
can fill labour shortages, will complement that of the Commission
for Employment and Skills. The latter body will be represented
on the MAC.
5.8.5 The Government is also targeting improvements in
the skills of the population at all levels. World-Class Skills,[62]
published in July 2007, set out the Government's response
to the Leitch Review of Skills.[63]
It presented the Government's new ambition for a world-class skills
base by 2020 and a series of underpinning reforms in England to
allow for progress against this ambition, including:
5.8.6 Another alternative to immigration is to raise
fertility rates. The impact of government policy in this area
is likely to be limited. An OECD paper[64]
reviewed the evidence on the impact of various policies on fertility
rates across OECD countries. The paper drew the following generalised
So, whilst there is some suggestion that governments may
be able to have at least some effect on fertility rates, it is
worth noting that this is a long-term solution. It would be a
long time before the labour market felt any benefit.
5.8.7 If Britain imported more labour intensive products
instead of producing them at home this could decrease the reliance
on unskilled labour and therefore unskilled migration. However,
Britain already imports most labour-intensive products, so the
scope for further substitution of domestically-produced goods
with imports is likely to be limited. Moreover, much unskilled
migration is in the service sector, where work must be done close
to its point of sale (eg a haircut).
5.8.8 Off-shoring the production of goods and services
that require large amounts of migrant labour would reduce demand
for migrants within the UK. However, as above, many service sector
roles cannot be off-shored.
5.8.9 The labour market could be left to find a "without
migration equilibrium". The benefits of migration are very
similar to the gains to trade. If we allowed the economy to find
a "without migration equilibrium" we would expect people
to be moved away from their area of expertise. Sectors that currently
rely on migrants would need to increase wages in order to attract
UK workers to fill vacancies. This would reduce the competitiveness
of the UK economy. It could also lead to reduced output as certain
industries contract.
5.8.10 In reality, in a dynamic and flexible economy,
there will always be skill shortages in certain sectors at any
point in time, and some of these will always be most efficiently
filled by migration. In the absence of migration, the economy
would still function at some equilibrium point, but the result
would be a reduction in overall flexibility, and ultimately lower
productivity and output growth.
6.1 What is the economic impact of a net change in the
UK population?
6.1.1 The impact of immigration on the public finances
is discussed in Section 2 and the macroeconomic impact of immigration
is discussed in Section 3.
6.2 If there is a net increase, does the impact differ
when this comes from higher immigration rather than from changes
in birth and death rates?
6.2.1 Based on the Government Actuary's Department 2004-based
projections,[65] the
overall population of the UK is expected to continue to grow,
driven by positive natural change (more births than deaths) and
net in-migration. However, the key demographic challenge for the
UK in the years ahead will be population ageing. The proportion
of the population that is aged over 65 is expected to rise from
16% in 2007 to 21% in 2027, and then to 26% in 50 years' time,
due to continued increases in life expectancy and the ageing of
the post-WW2 baby boomers.
6.2.2 Population ageing will place increased pressure
on the public finances as state pension and healthcare expenditure
rises, with no corresponding increase in tax revenues. A simple
measure of how the likely degree of pressure on the public finances
will change over time is provided by the dependency ratio. This
calculates the ratio of dependents (children and those of state
pension age) to those of working age. Under the Government Actuary's
Department principal population projections, this dependency ratio
will rise from 61% in 2007 to 63% in 2027, and then to 74% by
2056.[66] These figures
assume positive long-term net migration to the UK of 145,000 per
annum. It must be stressed that these, along with all the other
assumptions about future migration in this section, are stylised
assumptions based on past trends and not forecasts.
6.2.3 If it is instead assumed that there is zero net
migration, the dependency ratio would be slightly higher at 66%
in 2027, but would rise to 82% by 2056. This is because migrants
into the UK are predominantly adults of young working age. In
fact, by the mid 2030s, it is estimated that the "natural"
change in population (resulting from births and deaths) will be
negative, leaving the UK entirely reliant on net migration for
population growth.
6.2.4 These calculations are based on the 2004-based
population projections. A new, 2006-based projection set is currently
being prepared and the assumptions for this have just been published[67]
The long-term migration assumption has been increased to 190,000
per annum, and the fertility assumption has also increased in
response to several years' of rises in births within the UK. In
addition, the published dependency ratios from the new projections
will take account of the Pensions Bill 2007, which has recently
become law. This will raise the state pension age, in three stages,
to 68 for both sexes by 2046. However, since work on the new projections
is not complete, the current submission is based on the 2004-based
projections. The reasons behind the increase in the separate ONS
statistical submission.
6.2.5 As part of their 2004-based work, GAD also produced
a range of other variant scenarios using different combinations
of assumptions about fertility, life expectancy and net migration,
which can be compared to see how each affects the resulting dependency
ratios. These assumptions, along with those dependency ratios,
are shown in the table below:
6.2.6 In the table, fertility, migration and life expectancy
assumptions are either the central estimate, as used in the Principal
scenario, or GAD's high or low variant assumptions.[68]
In addition, a zero net migration projection was produced, assuming
no migration and principal fertility and life expectancy assumptions.
The dependency ratios resulting from each combination of assumptions
are shown on the right-hand side. If a ratio is lower than under
the Principal scenario in a given year it is shown in blue. If
it is higher, it is shown in red.
6.2.7 A higher dependency ratio indicates that there
will be relatively fewer people of working age to support children
and old-age dependents within the economy. Higher dependency ratios
are therefore associated with a greater degree of pressure on
the public finances and, all else being equal, to a greater burden
of taxation on the working age population.
6.2.8 Varying the assumptions in the way described makes
it possible to look at how projected dependency ratios change
over time when population growth comes from different sources.
For example, the "High Medium-Term Dependency" scenario
considers a case where fertility and life expectancy are higher
than in the Principal scenario, but migration is lower. This increases
the number of children and older people in the population, causing
the dependency ratio to rise to 76% by 2044 (the last year for
this set of projections), compared to 70% in the Principal scenario.
The total population is around 2 million higher by this time.
6.2.9 The opposite case is considered in the "Low
Medium-Term Dependency" scenario, which assumes that migration
is higher than in the Principal scenario, but that fertility and
life expectancy are lower. Under these assumptions, the dependency
ratio is 63% by 2044, up only slightly from 61% in 2007. At just
under 67 million, total population is about 2 million lower than
in the Principal scenario.
6.2.10 In the very long term, the "Young" scenario
results in the lowest possible dependency ratio, although the
pessimistic assumptions about life expectancy may not be regarded
as desirable.
6.2.11 The Low Migration and High Migration scenarios
demonstrate the effects of varying the migration assumption whilst
holding fertility and life expectancy at their central levels.
In both cases, the resulting dependency ratio is little different
to that produced by the Principal scenario. Combining higher fertility
rates with central life expectancy and migration has a slightly
bigger impact on dependency ratios in the long term.
6.2.12 Unsurprisingly, the highest total population is
achieved by setting all three assumptions to their higher levels.
However, this does not provide a solution to the challenges of
population ageing: the resulting dependency ratios are higher
than under the Principal scenario.
6.2.13 On balance, the scenarios provide a useful illustration
of how the dependency ratio, and therefore the likely degree of
pressure on the public finances, changes when different assumptions
are made about the source of population growth. Although the levels
of the dependency ratio are sensitive to the assumptions made,
and will change when the results of the 2006-based projections
are known and can be compared in the same way, the comparison
between the different variant scenarios is still valid.
6.2.14 There is a great deal of uncertainty associated
with these projections, particularly over such a long time horizon.
Nonetheless, it is possible to assert that:
6.2.15 In reality, it is questionable whether it would
be possible to deliberately engineer these kinds of demographic
changes. As discussed in paragraph 5.8.6, international evidence
suggests that many policies designed to influence fertility rates
have a relatively, modest effect.
6.2.16 It may be easier to address the problems of population
ageing through policies to influence participation rates and the
effective age of retirement. Shaw (2001)[71]
highlights the difficulties in influencing migration flows, which
typically depend on a combination of socio-economic and political
circumstances in receiving and sending countries, and concludes
that "measures such as raising workforce participation
rates or discouraging early retirement are likely to remain a
more practical tool for increasing the working population than
attempting to influence demographic behaviour".
7.1.1 Analysis of illegal immigration is hampered by
a lack of information. This is intrinsic to the issue: illegal
migrants wish to keep themselves unobservable to the State. Nonetheless,
we can make best estimates using the information that we do have.
7.1.2 The "unauthorised" or "illegally
resident" migrant population in the UK is made up of quite
distinct categories. Broadly, these cover anyone who does not
have valid leave to remain in the UK and will include:
7.1.3 No government has been able to produce an accurate
figure for the number of people who are in the country illegally.
However, a number of different studies have attempted to estimate
the size of the unauthorised migrant population. These include:
7.2 The economic importance of illegal immigration
7.2.1 Work on the economic importance of illegal immigration
is underdeveloped, although there have been some studies which
relate to the UK. For example:
7.3.1 Illegal immigrants live without the protection
of the State and are therefore vulnerable to, exploitation. Since,
by definition, they are working illegally, their employers are
perhaps more likely to break the law and deny them the National
Minimum Wage and other worker protections, such as health and
safety provisions and the working hours directive. They may also
have low job security, no bargaining rights, and be unable to
get an employer's reference.
7.3.2 HM Treasury (2000)[72]
argue that companies employing illegal workers could have an unfair
competitive advantage, which may force competitors to resort to
illegal employment as well, or move parts of their production
to countries where labour is cheaper.
7.3.3 It is hard to measure the effects of illegal migrants
on regular workers as they make themselves as unobservable as
possible. Moreover, they often perform work that is dirty, dangerous
and difficult. These jobs are likely to be the least favoured
amongst legal residents.
Section 5 of the ONS submission to the House of Lords Select
Committee provides details of the recommendations made by the
Inter-Departmental Task Force on International Migration Statistics
(December 2006). This Task Force made recommendations on how improvements
could be made to estimates of migration and migrant populations
in the United Kingdom, both nationally and at a local level. The
ONS submission also provides details on the improvements that
have already been put in place, work in progress and plans for
further improvements over a two to five year period.
9.1 How will the points system for immigrants from outside
the EU operate?
9.1.1 Central to the design for the new system is a five
Tier framework covering the main routes through which people coming
to work, study or train will enter the UK; a points-based approach
to determining which migrants will be successful with their applications;
and the inclusion of sponsors to help ensure that the system is
not being abused.
9.1.2 The five Tiers of the Points-Based System
will replace the existing 80 different routes by which a non-EEA
national can come to the UK to work, study, or train. This will
help people understand how the system works and direct applicants
to the category that is most appropriate for them:
9.1.3 For each Tier, applicants will need sufficient
points to gain entry clearance or leave to remain in the UK. Points
will be awarded according to objective and transparent criteria.
In all tiers points will be awarded for control factors which
indicate whether the applicant is likely to comply with their
immigration requirements in the UK. In Tiers 1 and 2, points will
also be awarded for attributes such as age, previous salary or
prospective salary and qualifications. Prospective migrants will
be able to assess themselves against these criteria, and see whether
they are likely to have enough points to qualify before paying
an application fee.
9.1.4 All applicants in Tiers 2-5 will need to provide
a certificate of sponsorship from an approved sponsor when making
their application. The certificate will act as an assurance that
the migrant is able to do a particular job or course of study.
Sponsors will need to be licensed by the Border and Immigration
Agency, after which they will be placed on the sponsor register.
The Border and Immigration Agency will review sponsors' behaviour
and compliance with the rules and take appropriate action where
there is evidence of transgression.
9.2 How will the Government decide where there are skills
shortages in the economy as the basis for its points system?
9.2.1 The Government is establishing a new Migration
Advisory Committee (MAC) which will provide evidence-based advice
to Government on where migration might sensibly fill labour shortages
in the economy. In particular it will advise on:
9.2.2 David Metcalf[73]
has been appointed Chair and we are in the process of appointing
the MAC's membership, which will comprise experts on the labour
market. The MAC will be established in Autumn 2007 and will be
fully operational by April 2008.
9.2.3 The MAC will be accompanied by the Migration Impacts
Forum (MIF). This will provide a forum for proper, regular and
organised dialogue with interested parties outside of central
Government, focussed on the wider impacts associated with migration
experienced by local areas. The Forum will meet quarterly and
be chaired jointly by a Home Office and a Communities and Local
Government Minister.
9.3 How will the Government respond to employers asking
for non-EU workers to fill low-skilled jobs?
9.3.1 Low-skilled migration requirements are currently
met through two schemes. These are the Seasonal Agricultural Workers
Scheme (SAWS) and the Sector Based Scheme (SBS). In 2007, 100%
of the SBS and 40% of the SAWS has been drawn from Romania and
Bulgaria only. As of 2008, 100% of both schemes will be restricted
to Romania and Bulgaria.
9.3.2 These restrictions reflect the Government's policy
to phase out low-skilled migration schemes for non-EU nationals
unless evidence of significant labour shortages is identified
in specific sectors. There is currently believed to be sufficient
low-skilled labour in the UK and EU to meet the requirements of
the UK economy.
9.3.3 These restrictions are also in keeping with the
EU Accession Treaties, which require the UK to give preference
to EU workers over non-EU workers. So, as Bulgarians and Romanians
are subject to quotas, there will not be a scheme for migrants
from non-EU countries to do those low skilled jobs.
9.3.4 Nevertheless, it is an important principle of the
Points Based System that we maintain the flexibility to be responsive
to the changing needs of the UK labour market. Therefore, if,
following consultation with employers and industry stakeholders,
the Migration Advisory Committee advise that there is a low-skilled
labour market shortage that can sensibly be filled by migration
and once restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian access to the
labour market have been lifted, then it will be possible to set
up a low-skilled scheme under Tier 3 of the Points Based System.
However, we have no current plans to introduce Tier 3.
October 2007
Office for National Statistics (2007) 2006-based national population
projections: underlying long-term assumptions, available at http://
www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_population/PT129_Long_ term_assumptions.pdf Back
Glover, S, Gott, C, Loizillon, A, Portes, J, Price, R, Spencer,
S, Srinivasan, V and Willis, C (2001) Migration: an economic
and social analysis, Home Office RDS Occasional Paper No 67,
available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ67-migration.pdf Back
Gott, C and Johnston, K (2002) The migrant population in the UK:
fiscal effects, Home Office RDS Occasional Paper No 77, available
at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ77migrant.pdf Back
Sriskandarajah, D, Cooley, L and Reed, H (2005) Paying their way:
the fiscal contribution of immigrants in the UK, IPPR, available
at http://www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports/publication. asp?id=280 Back
Migration Watch (2006) The Fiscal Contribution of Migrants,
available at http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/Briefingpapers/economic/1_10_Fiscal
_Contribution_of_Migrants_Aug_06.asp Back
See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/775/775awe60.htm#note44 Back
Smith, J and Edmonston, B (eds), (1997), The New Americans: Economic,
Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, Washington DC:
National Research Council, National Academy Press. Back
See Munz, S and Werding, M (2003) Public pensions and international
migration: some clarifications and illustrative results, IFO Institute
for Economic Research and CESifo, available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jpenef/v4y2005i02p181-207_00.html Back
Government Actuary's Quinquennial Review of the National Insurance
Fund as at April 2000, published October 2003, available at http://www.gad.gov.uk/news/documents/quinquennial_Review_05-Full_Report.pdf Back
The 2001-based principal variant projections used in the GAD report
assume long-term net migration to the UK of 101,500 per annum.
A low-migration variant reduces this figure to 41,500 and a high-migration
variant increases it to 161,500. Back
Riley, R and Weale, M (2006) Commentary: Immigration and Its
Effects, National Institute Economic Review, No 198 October
2006. Back
Blanchflower, D (2007) Recent Developments in the UK Labour
Market, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2007 Q1. Back
OECD Economic Outlook 80, November 2006. Back
See Immigration-The Business Perspective, Institute of
Directors, January 2007; and Migration-Plugging the Gap,
The British Chambers of Commerce, February 2007. Back
The rate at which the economy can grow without putting upward
or downward pressure on inflation. Back
See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/1/pbro6_trendgrowth_345.pdf Back
See the following papers:
- Zucker, L, Darby, M and Brewer, M (1998) Intellectual human
capital and the birth of the United States biotechnology enterprises,
American Economic Review, Vol 88, pages 290-306
- Stephan, P and Levin, S (2001) Exceptional contributions to
US science by the foreign-born and foreign-educated, Population
Research and Policy Review, Vol 20, No 1, pages 59-79
- Chellaraj, G, Maskus, K E and Mattoo, A (2005) The Contribution
of Skilled Immigration and International Graduate Students to
U.S. Innovation, working paper, Department of Economics, University
of Colorado Boulder. Back
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2007 Q1, Volume 47 No 1, page
53, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
quarterlybulletin/qb0701.pdf Back
DWP calculations, based on the Labour Force Survey Back
As of August 2007, see Labour Market Statistics Report August
2007: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/lmsuk0807.pdf Back
DWP (July 2007) In work, better off: next steps to full employment,
available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/welfarereform/in-work-better-off/ Back
Dustmann, C, Fabbri, F, Preston, I and Wadsworth, J (2003) The
local labour market effects of immigration in the UK, Home
Office Online Report 06/03, available at http://www. homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0603.pdf Back
Gaston, N and Nelson, D (2001) The Employment and Wage Effects
of Immigration: Trade and Labour Economics Perspectives, The Leverhulme
Centre, research paper 2001/28, available at http://www.gep.org.uk/shared/shared_levpublications/Research_Papers/2001/01_28.pdf Back
Blanchflower, D, Saleheen, J and Shadforth, C (2007) The Impact
of the Recent Migration from Eastern Europe on the UK Economy,
Bank of England, available at http://www.bank ofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2007/speech297.pdf Back
Dustmann, C, Fabbri, E, Preston, I and Wadsworth, J, (2003) The
local labour market effects of immigration in the UK, Home
Office Online Report 06/03, available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0603.pdf Back
See Section 2 of the ONS statistical submission to the House of
Lords for more details on the geographical distribution of immigrants. Back
Gilpin, N, Henty M, Lemos, S, Portes, J and Bullen, C (2006) The
impact of free movement of workers from Central and Eastern Europe
on the UK labour market, Department for Work and Pensions, Working
Paper No. 29 available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/wp29.pdf Back
Office of National Statistics, Labour Market Statistics,
August 2007, available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/lmsuk0807.pdf Back
It should be noted that evidence from the WRS suggests that the
occupational and geographic mobility of A8 migrant workers has
increased since the period just after EU enlargement. All else
being equal, we would expect this to dampen any potential impact
on the UK labour market. Back
Dustmann, C, Frattini, T and Preston, I (2007) A study of migrant
workers and the national minimum wage and enforcement issues that
arise, report commissioned by the Low Pay Commission, available
at http://www.econ.ucl.ac.uk/cream/pages/LPC.pdf Back
In the current system an employer seeking a work permit needs
to satisfy the Border and Immigration Agency that they have advertised
a job in an appropriate medium and that they had no suitable applicants
who were nationals of the European Economic Area. The test is
waived by Border and Immigration Agency staff in certain circumstances. Back
Dustmann, C, Frattini, T and Preston, I (2007) A study of migrant
workers and the national minimum wage and enforcement issues that
arise, report commissioned by the Low Pay Commission, available
at http://www.econ.ucl.ac.uk/cream/pages/LPC.pdf Back
Borjas, G (1994) The economics of immigration, journal
of Economic Literature, Vol XXXII, available at http://ksghome.harvard.
edu/-GBorjas/Papers/JEL94.pdf Back
Dustmann, C, Frattini, T and Preston, I (2007) As above. Back
Dustmann, C, Frattini, T and Preston, I (2007), As before. Back
The United Nations recommended definition of a long-term international
migrant is: "A person who moves to a country other than that
of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year
(12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes
his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective
of the country of departute the person will be a long-term emigrant
and from that of the country of arrival the person will be a long-term
immigrant." Back
Dench, J, Hurstfield, S, Hill, D and Akroyd, K (2006) Employers'
use of migrant labour, Main report, Home Office Online Report
04/06 Back
Immigration-the business perspective, Institute of Directors,
published January 2007, available at http://www.iod.com/intershoproot/eCS/Store/en/pdfs/policy_paper_immigration_business_perspective.pdf Back
Migration: Plugging the Gap, The British Chambers of Commerce,
published February 2007, available at http://www.chamberonline.
co.uk/policy/pdf/migration_survey_2007.pdf Back
See DWP (September 2006) Barriers to employment for Pakistanis
and Bangladeshis in Britain and constraints, Research Report No
360, available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rrs2006. asp#barrierstoemp Back
Comparing levels of education across those from different countries
can be problematic, so this result should be treated with caution. Back
Males and females Back
Bulgarian and Romanian nationals who are self-employed have free
labour market access. Otherwise they require a work permit. Back
See http://www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk/ Back
Shields, M. A. and Wheatly-Price, S. (2002) The English language
fluency and occupational success of ethnic minority immigrant
men living in English metropolitan areas, Journal of Population
Economics, pages 137-160. Back
Chiswick, B R and Miller, P W (2003) The complementarity of language
and other human capital: Immigrant earnings in Canada, Economics
of Education Review, vol 22, no 5, October 2003. pages 469-80. Back
Dustmann, C and van Soest, A (2003) The language and earnings
of immigrants, Industrial and labour relations review, Vol
55, No 3. Back
Dustmann, C and van Soest, A (2003) as before. Back
Dustmann, C, Fabbri, F, Preston, I, Wadsworth, J (2003) Labour
market performance of immigrants in the UK labour market,
Home Office Online Report 05/03, available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf Back
Bell, B D (1997) The Performance of Immigrants in the United Kingdom:
Evidence from the GHS, The Economic Journal (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers), 107, pages 333-44. Back
Battu, H and Sloane, P (2002) To What Extent Are Ethnic Minorities
in Britain Overeducated?, International Journal of Manpower, Vol
23 (3), pages 192-208. Back
Bell, B D (1997) As above. Back
ScSchaafsma, J and Sweetman, A (2001) Immigrant earnings: age
at immigration matters, Canadian Journal of Economics, 34(4),
pages 1066-99. Back
Dustmann, C, Fabbri, F, Preston, I and Wadsworth, J (2003) Labour
Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home
Office, 05/03. Back
These findings are also from Dench, J, Hurstfield, S, Hill, D
and Akroyd, K (2006). Employers' use of migrant labour,
Main report, Home Office Online Report 04/06. Back
See Ottaviano, G I P and Peri, G (2006) Rethinking the gains from
immigration: theory and evidence from the US, Fondazione Eni Enrico
Mattei, Note di Lavoro 52.2006, available at http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/D8689978-76C2-428D-A625-D0E49BBA81
CE/2198/5206.pdf Back
DWP (2007) In work, better off: next steps to full employment,
Welfare Reform Green Paper, available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/welfare
reform/in-work-better-off/in-work-better-off.pdf Back
Lord Leitch/HM Treasury (2006) Leitch Review of Skills, Prosperity
for all in the global economy-world class skills, available
at http:// www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/4/leitch_finalreport051206.pdf Back
Freud, D (2007) Reducing dependency, increasing opportunity: options
for the future of welfare to work, DWP, available at http:// www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2007/welfarereview.pdf Back
Available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/ cm67/6730/6730.pdf Back
World Class Skills: Implementing the Leitch Review of Skills in
England, Department for Innovation Universities and Skills, July
2007. Back
Lord Leitch/HM Treasury (2006) As before. Back
Sleebos, J (2003) Low fertility rates in OECD countries: facts
and policy responses, OECD Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional
Papers, No 15, available at http://www.sourceoecd.org/vl=1986418/cl=11/nw=1/rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?file=5lgsjhvj7qg7.pdf Back
The figures in this section are based on the Government Actuary's
Departments 2004-based Principal projections, available at http://www.gad.gov.uk/Population/index.asp?v=Principal&y=2004&subY
ear=Continue See Section 1.3 for discussion of the new 2006-basd
projections. Back
The figure for 2007 is based on current state pension age (SPA)
of 65 for men and 60 for women and the figures for 2027 and 2056
are based on a common SPA of 65 for both sexes. Under the provisions
of the Pensions Bill 2007, SPA will be 66 for both sexes by 2027,
and 68 for both sexes by 2056. This would decrease the dependency
ratios at 2027 and 2056 to 60% and 64% respectively. Back
See Population Trends 129, available at
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=6303&Pos=&ColRank=I&Rank=422 Back
For fertility assumptions, see http://www.gad.gov.uk/Population/2004/
For mortality assumptions, see http://www.gad.gov.uk/Population/2004/methodology/varmortass.htm Back
Whilst we can draw this conclusion about the overall dependency
ratio, and therefore the likely impact on public finances overall,
it is not theoretically correct to say that because migrants age
too, they cannot help to pay for pensions in the long run. This
is explored in detail in Munz, S and Werding, M (2003) Public
pensions and international migration: some clarifications and
illustrative results, IFO Institute for Economic Research and
CESifo, available from http://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jpenef/v4y2005i02p181-207_00.html Back
Whilst migrants returning to home countries would not contribute
to the UK dependency ratio (which is based on the UK population),
it should be noted that some may still be eligible to receive
a UK state pension. This would be the case if they had made sufficient
National Insurance contributions whilst working on the UK. Nonetheless,
they are still likely to cost the UK exchequer less than a retired
immigrant resident in the UK as non-residents will make less use
of other public services. Back
Shaw, C (2001) United Kingdom population trends in the 21st century,
in Population Trends 103, Spring 2001, National Statistics, available
at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme- population/PT103book_v3.pdf Back
HM Treasury (March 2000) The Informal Economy: A report by Lord
Grabiner QC. Back
Professor of Industrial Relations at the London School of Economics.
For further information see http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/pressreleases/new-chair-migration Back


text:
Annette Brune
"Annette has worked in food and agribusiness sector consultancy for more than 17 years, focusing on strategic market research, programme evaluation and consulting in international markets."
Annette, a native German, has been based in the UK for nearly 23 years. Over the past 17 years, she has been working on projects all over the world for Orrani Consulting, with a particular focus on Latin America.
She has gained particularly in-depth experience in developing markets – often personally conducting fieldwork in so-called "hard" markets such as Haiti, Nicaragua, Libya and, most recently, Nigeria.
Her geographic experience comprises Europe, North and Latin America, Asia and Africa. A fluent Spanish speaker, she has a particular affinity to Latin America, a region where she has worked extensively over the years on a multitude of different projects.
After joining the food sector consulting division at Landell Mills in the late 1990s, Annette took the business independent in 2003, re-branding it from IRIS Consulting to Orrani Consulting in 2008.
Since then, she has helped grow the company, continuing to explore different markets and sectors. More recently, she has been involved in a number of international programme evaluations for different industry organisations, an aspect of consulting work she particularly enjoys.
Over the years, Annette has presented at several international food industry conferences, in English, Spanish and German, the three languages that she speaks fluently.
Annette achieved an MA in European Business from the University of the West of England (UWE), Bristol, UK.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
December 18, 1937 - July 14, 2019
Janet Ruth Pichler passed away peacefully at home on July 14, 2019 at the age of 81. Born in Erie Pennsylvania on December 18, 1937 to Paul and Helen Newton, in 1974 she traveled to California to be near family who lived in San Diego. After retiring from a career as a skilled typesetter, she relocated to Stockton to be near her children. She belonged to several service clubs including the Veterans Club and Ladies of the Moose Club. For the past 25 years, she served as a dedicated volunteer for Kaiser Permanente in Stockton where she thrived in assisting patients with their needs. She enjoyed dinners out, bingo with friends and spending time with her family. Janet is survived by her loving children, Pauline Huff, Patty Garcia and Frank Pichler (Alesha). In addition to her 8 grandchildren, 7 great-grandchildren and multiple nieces and nephews which she adored, she doted on her beloved cat, Miss Holly.
A visitation will be held prior to the service on Friday, July 19th, 2019 from 12:00p.m. noon to 1:00p.m. at the Vineyard Chapel in Cherokee Memorial Park, located at 14165 N. Beckman Road, Lodi CA, 95240.
A service will be held on Friday, July 19th, 2019 at 1:00p.m. at the Vineyard Chapel at Cherokee Memorial Park,located at 14165 N. Beckman Rd, Lodi, CA 95240. The service will then conclude at graveside in Cherokee Memorial Park, located off of Highway 99 at Harney Lane, Lodi CA, 95240.
Cherokee Memorial is honored to serve the Pichler family.
Please leave your condolences below.


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text:
The mind burdens us and deems as burdens those who offer to relieve our burdens
Suppose someone thrusts a huge burden on us. We will feel annoyed, even angered: "Why do I have to carry this?" But if we somehow can't refuse the burden, we will carry it. Seeing us burdened, suppose some kind person offers to share or carry it for us. But then the burden-giver drives them away. We would feel infuriated, "Why are you making my life miserable?"
Unfortunately, that's what the mind does to us, but we hardly ever realize what it is doing.
Suppose something has gone wrong in our lives. Soon, the mind floods us with negative feelings such as: "Life stinks. The world is so cruel. No one cares for you. You are good-for-nothing." When we start feeling burdened by such thoughts, some well-wishers approach and ask us, "Are you ok? Can I do anything to help? Do you want to talk?" But our mind makes us see their offer for assistance as interference, impelling us to say something like: "I am ok. Just leave me alone."
Even if the mind doesn't rebuff other people, it certainly makes us rebuff our all-loving Lord, Krishna. Whatever burdens we are carrying can be best relieved if we turn toward him. When the light of his remembrance enters our consciousness, the darkness of negativity has to flee. But the mind makes us feel that the bhakti practices for connecting with Krishna are a big burden. And thus it keeps us burdened.
Empowering us to see through the mind's shenanigans, the Bhagavad-gita (13.29) reminds us that Krishna is present in everyone's heart, including ours. If we can remember that he is ready to help and if we reciprocate appropriately with offers for help from our various well-wishers, then our mind won't be able keep us down for long.
Think it over:
- How does the mind burden us?
- How does the mind drive away potential helpers?
- How can we see through the mind's shenanigans?
To know more about this verse, please click on the image
Explanation of article:


text:
The police hope to learn more about a missing French woman from a translator today - a French-Canadian tourist who met the missing tourist while tramping.
Police began searching for the French woman, known only as Celine, yesterday when she was reported two days overdue from a tramp near Arthur's Pass.
Police said they had spoken to the French-Canadian, Genevieve Forcier, who met Celine while tramping and walked out of the track with her.
Because of language barriers, police know only that Celine is in her mid-twenties, but have heard other reports she hitched a ride back to Arthur's Pass.
They plan to speak to Ms Forcier today through a translator, to learn Celine's surname and form a description of her.


text:
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To register for this event contact Stephanie Dvelis at 401-333-2382 or email@example.com by 4:00 PM on Monday, June 9.
For the June Luncheon flyer, click here.


text:
The gift that keeps on giving!
12 Month Gourmet Marshmallow Subscription
Add a Burner & Bamboo skewer set
How it works...
Remember to tell us, which month you want the subscription to start from, the name and address of the receiver and also which 12 flavours you would like us to send.
They will receive a gift certificate telling them about their gift and then they will receive the gourmet marshmallow gift each month for the length of the subscription paid for.
It's as easy as that, the gift that just keeps on giving...well until the subscription length runs out.