text:
Joint Security Station Thrasher, in the western Baghdad suburb of Ghazaliya, is housed in a Saddam-era mansion with twenty-foot columns and a fountain, now dry, that looks like a layer cake of concrete and limestone. The mansion and two adjacent houses have been surrounded by blast walls. J.S.S. Thrasher was set up last March, and is part of the surge in troops engineered by General David Petraeus, the American commander in Iraq. Moving units out of large bases and into Joint Security Stations—small outposts in Baghdad's most dangerous districts—has been crucial to Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy, and Thrasher is now home to a hundred American soldiers and a few hundred Iraqis. This fall, on the roof of the mansion, amid sandbags, communications gear, and exercise equipment protected by a sniper awning, Captain Jon Brooks, Thrasher's commander, pointed out some of the local landmarks. "This site was selected because it was the main body drop in Ghazaliya," he said, indicating a grassy area nearby. "There were up to eleven bodies a week. Most were brutally mutilated."
The Mother of All Battles Mosque, with its unmistakable phalanx of minarets shaped like Scud missiles, is nearby. Saddam Hussein hid in Ghazaliya during the American bombing in the first Gulf War, and built the mosque to show his gratitude to the neighborhood. ("Ghazaliya used to have—still does—a lot of retired Saddam military people," Brooks said.) In April, 2004, wounded gunmen taking part in the battle for Falluja took refuge in the mosque. Ghazaliya borders the eastern edge of Anbar province, the center of the Sunni insurgency, and it became a strategic gateway to Baghdad for insurgents and foreign jihadis. On a previous visit to Ghazaliya, in December, 2003, I had met insurgents at a safe house in the neighborhood. They told me that they were intent on killing Americans. Since those days, with few exceptions, Ghazaliya had been a no-go area for Westerners, including journalists, who ran the risk of being kidnapped and killed. American patrols in Ghazaliya were regularly ambushed.
Captain Brooks is twenty-eight, of medium height and a stocky build, with close-cropped brown hair. From the roof, he pointed to where Sergeant Robert Thrasher, for whom the J.S.S. was named, had been killed by a sniper, last February. At the time, the company was working out of Camp Victory, the American base encompassing a large swath of Baghdad, including the airport. Thrasher was twenty-three; he had joined the Army out of high school.
Despite the insurgency's influence, Ghazaliya remained, at first, what it had been for decades—a middle-class Baghdad neighborhood in which sectarian tensions were more or less held in check. The vast majority of the estimated hundred thousand residents were Sunni, but, Brooks said, "there were a lot of professionals, college-educated Sunnis, and Shias, too, and mosques for both." The neighborhood changed after February, 2006, when Sunni militants bombed the ninth-century Askariya shrine, in Samarra, one of the Shiites' holiest sites, and sectarian violence flared up across Iraq. Shiite militias, foremost among them the Mahdi Army, pushed deeper into Ghazaliya from Shulla, a poor, sprawling Shiite neighborhood just to the north. The Sunnis responded by turning to hard-line insurgents and to the foreign jihadis of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, whom the U.S. Army called Al Qaeda in Iraq.
"You had Sunni extremists in the area before Samarra. After Samarra, though, Al Qaeda in Iraq came on strong," Captain Brooks said. "They had death squads. They systematically selected people because of the locations of their houses, or their relationships. They brutally tortured them, killed them, and dumped their bodies." Shia families, and many Sunnis—those who had the financial means—fled the neighborhood. By the beginning of this year, southern Ghazaliya was under the de-facto control of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, while the northern part of the neighborhood was besieged by Shiite militiamen. "Twenty dollars and a phone card could get you an I.E.D. placed," Captain Brooks said, referring to the improvised explosive devices that have caused the majority of American military deaths in Iraq. "The people realized they had let something in that they couldn't control."
President Bush, after securing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's resignation, in November, gave his new war team—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General Petraeus—an opportunity to change the strategy in Iraq, and in February the surge began. The plan called for thirty thousand extra troops; estimates of the actual number run as high as fifty thousand. Thirty-four Joint Security Stations were opened in Baghdad, three of them in Ghazaliya: the first, J.S.S. Casino, in northern Ghazaliya; next, in the southwest, J.S.S. Thrasher; and, last May, J.S.S. Maverick, in the southeast.
Brooks pointed to a large house with broken windows across from the base. His men called it the Cannister-Round House, because when they were first moving in snipers had fired on them from inside, and they responded by lobbing tank shells into the house. "We don't get shot at anymore," he said. Brooks's men began the manpower-intensive work of conducting systematic patrols by day and aggressive raids at night; William Bushnell, a sergeant in Brooks's company, was killed on one of those patrols in April. Previously, Brooks's men had headed back to the heavily fortified Camp Victory after roving through Ghazaliya. With the surge, the Americans became a permanent presence in the neighborhood. After they moved in, the U.S. Army erected twenty miles of concrete walls in Ghazaliya, both to separate Shiite and Sunni residents from each other and to establish secure perimeters. Brooks said that his unit's success had been made possible by his colleagues at J.S.S. Casino, who kept Shiite militiamen from Shulla out of the neighborhood.
By midsummer, Ghazaliya's violence had abated significantly. This fall, when I stood on the roof of J.S.S. Thrasher at night, I occasionally saw explosions in the distance, fireballs flaring up in the sky. One night, a large blast shook the building, followed by automatic-weapons fire that momentarily illuminated the streets. But most of the explosions were so far away from Ghazaliya that they could not even be heard. The number of bodies found in the neighborhood had fallen steeply, "to practically zero, to pre-Samarra levels," Brooks said. His company had not lost any more men. When Petraeus spoke before Congress in September, he cited Ghazaliya as an example of the progress the military was making in Iraq.
The new strategy is also meant to prepare the ground for Iraqi security forces to replace the Americans, and all the Joint Security Stations, as the name suggests, involve Americans and Iraqis. But the Iraqis do not all belong to the official, government forces. With American assistance, several hundred armed Sunni volunteers called the Ghazaliya Guardians were gradually assuming police duties. Such U.S.-approved Sunni forces had begun to sprout up everywhere. Many of them, to the dismay of some Shiites, included former insurgents. An official with one of the major Shiite political parties told me, "Some of these armed groups were, until yesterday, hostile forces that attacked the Iraqi government, Coalition forces, and anyone who was involved in the government. They were considered terrorists. What happened?"
It was a question I heard often in Iraq. Colonel J. B. Burton is a good-natured bull of a man who commands the First Infantry's Dagger Brigade, covering most of northwest Baghdad, with fourteen J.S.S.s, including the three in Ghazaliya. "We began by asking ourselves the question: What is facilitating the entry of Al Qaeda into an area populated by moderate secular Arabs?" Colonel Burton said. The answer, he said, was fear of Shiite militias. "I think we're in a time of increasing opportunity to bring in people who want to be part of the solution. It's done by talking to people. Hell, it's no different than Tullahoma, Tennessee, where I'm from. It's sitting on the back porch, drinking tea, listening to the crickets, and talking." Colonel Burton went on, "You're talking with people who've pulled a trigger against American forces? Hell, yeah! Because we're fighting a common enemy—Al Qaeda."
His brigade's mission, Burton said, was "to defeat Al Qaeda and effect the transition to Iraqi authorities, and that's full-spectrum operations, which means everything from fighting terrorism to fixing sewage lines." Whether those goals could be accomplished ultimately hinged on political progress toward national reconciliation among Iraqis, Burton said. "We're in a window that's very narrow, and we have some important decisions to make. Which way Iraq goes will depend on what we do."
At Thrasher, Captain Brooks told me, "The new buzzword is 'sustainability.' We've learned from our experiences—for sustainable development here we need security. If they can have a local security force that can do the job, then that allows us to return home."
Ghazaliya is not the only area of Iraq in which the landscape has changed. On my previous visit to the country, ten months before, the violence seemed uncontrollable, with mass abductions and killings taking place in broad daylight. Most of the Iraqis I knew spoke bitterly about how the Americans and Iraq's political leaders were safely ensconced in the Green Zone, while mayhem raged around them. According to the Pentagon, in February the war took the lives of nearly two thousand Iraqi civilians; by October, that number had dropped to under a thousand. As with all body-count statistics in Iraq, these figures are disputed, but no one denies that the violence has waned considerably. The deaths of American soldiers have also fallen sharply, from a high of a hundred and twenty-six last May, as the surge intensified, to thirty-eight last month. For the moment, at least, it looked as if the surge might be working.
In a sense, the surge was belated emergency triage. Some of Baghdad's most dangerous Sunni neighborhoods, like Ghazaliya and Amiriya, have been tackled, but much of Diyala province, stretching from Baghdad northeast to the Iranian border, and Kirkuk, which has become a flashpoint because of Kurdish claims to the city and its oil resources, remain horrific battlegrounds. On October 29th, the same day that the decapitated bodies of twenty men were found outside Baquba, in Diyala, a suicide bomber on a bicycle killed twenty-nine policemen in the city.
And there has yet to be any significant U.S. troop presence in Baghdad's Shiite slums, such as Sadr City and Shulla, which are controlled by Shiite militiamen. Many of them claim to be members of the Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, whose political brinkmanship and tactical use of violence have been an enduring source of bewilderment to the Pentagon's war planners. Indeed, analysts credit much of the recent drop in Iraqi civilian deaths not to the surge but to Sadr's decision, in August, to order the Mahdi Army, which is believed to have been responsible for much of the Shiite-on-Sunni sectarian killing in and around Baghdad, to "freeze" its activities for six months. Sadr's apparent aim was to ward off an escalation of a two-day gun battle between the Mahdi and another Shiite militia, and to reassert his control over his men.
The surge also coincided with the so-called Sunni Awakening, the decision by some Anbar tribesmen to ally themselves with the Americans and to fight against Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia—a shift that was not foreseen in Petraeus's plan. Sunnis in other areas have since joined them, though many have not; Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia is still active, and foreign jihadis remain in the country. On September 13th, Abu Risha, the Sunni tribal leader regarded as the catalyst of the alliance, whom President Bush had met in Anbar ten days before, was assassinated. Abu Risha was an influential and charismatic figure, and although his brother stepped in to take his place, most of the Iraqis I spoke to viewed his death as a serious loss and wondered how long his brother would survive. Still, there was hope that Al Qaeda might eventually be neutralized, thus removing at least one vicious aspect of the multifaceted war.
Some combination of the surge, the Sunni Awakening, and Sadr's freeze has helped to stabilize troubled areas of the capital and Anbar; it is unclear whether the gains can be expanded upon—or even sustained—with fewer troops, but further increases alone will not win the war. And no more troop additions are planned; instead, President Bush has promised to withdraw, by next July, almost as many troops as were brought in for the surge. Iraq's future, for the moment, is in limbo. The best one can say, perhaps, is that the U.S. has bought or borrowed a little space to work with. But there have been costs, some more obvious than others.
A few days before General Petraeus testified before Congress, I met with Sheikh Zaidan al-Awad, a prominent Sunni tribal leader from Anbar. The last time I had seen him, in 2004, he was full of hostile bluster about the U.S., and made no secret of his identification with the "resistance," as he described the hard-line Sunni insurgents. Sheikh Zaidan was a fugitive, suspected by the Americans of being a sponsor of the insurgency, and he was living in voluntary exile in Jordan. But when we spoke this fall, in an apartment in Amman, Zaidan told me that he had recently met for informal talks with American military and intelligence officials, because he approved of what they were now doing—allowing Sunni tribesmen to police themselves.
I asked Zaidan what sort of deal had led to the Sunni Awakening. "It's not a deal," he said, bristling. "People have come to realize that our fate is tied to the Americans', and theirs to ours. If they are successful in Iraq, it will depend on Anbar. We always said this. Time was lost. America was lost, but now it's woken up; it now holds a thread in its hand. For the first time, they're doing something right."
Zaidan said that Anbar's Sunni tribes no longer had any need to exact blood vengeance on U.S. forces. "We've already taken our revenge," he said. "We're the ones who've made them crawl on their stomachs, and now we're the ones to pick them up." He added, "Once Anbar is settled, we must take control of Baghdad, and we will." There would have to be a lot more fighting before the capital was taken back from the Shiites, he said. "The Anbaris will take charge of the purge. What the whole world failed to do in Anbar, we have done overnight. Baghdad will be a lot easier."
Many of the players in Iraq seemed, like Zaidan, to be positioning themselves for the next battle. While the Shiites issued warnings about the Sunnis' intentions, nearly all the talk among the Americans was of the Mahdi Army and its reputed sponsor, Iran, which Petraeus accused of waging a "proxy war" in Iraq; there were dismissive references to Al Qaeda as a spent force.
Colonel Burton said, "Al Qaeda is relatively easy to fight. You just fight them, deny them access." The Mahdi Army, he said, "was harder." By all accounts, the Mahdi Army and other Shiite militias had penetrated the Iraqi security forces, and Sadr's political party was an on-again, off-again partner in Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Shiite-dominated coalition government. "We began investigating the Iraqi security forces and began to target them, their leaders, and members of the Iraqi government," Burton said. (One notorious case of official involvement in sectarian killings concerns the former deputy health minister and the ministry's security chief. In February, the men, who are Shiites and loyalists of Moqtada al-Sadr, were arrested on charges of organizing the murders of hundreds of Sunnis in Baghdad's hospitals—including patients, their relatives, and medical staff.)
Referring to the Mahdi Army by the acronym of its Arabic name, Jaish al- Mahdi, Colonel Burton said, "I talk to some of these JAM guys, you know. I have e-mail contact with some of them. Recently, a JAM sheikh in Khadamiya told me that if I released three of his guys there'd be no more attacks on U.S. forces there." He raised his eyebrows.
The Shiite authorities' control over many government services meant that there was a great deal of institutional discrimination against Sunni communities. When I was there, for example, Ghazaliya residents complained of receiving half as much electricity a day as a neighboring Shiite area. The Americans were doing a lot of politicking to alleviate the situation, but it hadn't been easy. "On the Shia side, there's lots of money moving around, and essential services are doing really well," Burton said. "But on the Sunni side—not so well."
The new strategy, like most of the previous strategies employed in Iraq, had the drawback of having been imposed by the Americans. Many of the Shiite politicians in Iraq's government were angry about the U.S. decision to wall off Baghdad neighborhoods and to recruit and arm Sunni volunteer organizations without consulting them. There were fears that the U.S. was simply arming a new set of militias—undermining the authority of the fragile coalition government. This may have been part of the goal. Iraq, with a hundred and seventy thousand U.S. troops on its soil, is not a sovereign country, and the U.S. uses its military power to shape the Iraqi political scene. By strengthening the hand of the Sunnis, the U.S. effectively forced the Maliki government to incorporate more Sunnis into the security forces—a step toward national reconciliation.
Shiite political parties and militias are so interwoven that a Shiite equivalent of the Sunni Awakening seems unlikely—it would probably require a split within the Shiite community, a civil war within a civil war. Iran would also be a major factor. Given Sadr's alleged close links to Iranian hard-liners, and the growing hostility between Iran and the United States, his future moves are virtually impossible to predict. A largely covert conflict is already taking place between Iran and the United States. Iran has intervened in Iraq by providing financial and military support for Shiite militia groups, and, more directly, by sending agents and officials there. Iraq's Shiite leaders have long had close ties to Iran, where many of them lived in exile during Saddam's rule, and they and the Kurds have, without visible success, sought greater coöperation between Iran and the U.S. over security in Iraq. Many Sunnis, meanwhile, are distrustful of any dealings with Iran, and are unabashed about their hostility.
Sheikh Zaidan offered a vision of how the conflict in Iraq could escalate to the advantage of the Sunnis: "I think America will be able to start a Shia-Shia civil war in the south—with the Arab Shia, the tribes, being supported by the U.S., and the Persian Shiites supported by Iran." He said that this would be an opportunity for the Americans to "cut off the head of Iran's government and its militias in Iraq." The Sunnis could help in this fight, he suggested.
The likelihood of Zaidan's scenario being played out depends, to a large extent, on how the Iranians, the Americans, and the Iraqi Shiites choose to shape their ongoing competition for influence. Political moderates may broker a settlement. But Zaidan's views are shared by many in the Sunni community, where extremist positions still have a hold. At one roadblock in Ghazaliya, I spoke with a Ghazaliya Guardian, a twenty-six-year-old Sunni who identified himself as Officer Ahmed. He told me that he thought a purge of Shiites from power in Baghdad, such as that proposed by Zaidan, was a good idea. When I asked Officer Ahmed how his neighborhood had gone from being a bastion of the insurgency to a model of coöperation, his response was vague. "When the Ghazaliya Guardians started, the terrorists disappeared," he said. "We don't know where they are now." He had been elsewhere during the fighting, he said, and returned only when it was over.
I found the young Guardian's story of the recent past—in which he had merely tried to keep his head down until things blew over—unconvincing. In most of my conversations with the Iraqis working with the Americans, their true motivations struck me as unknowable. The Americans, no doubt driven by an urgent need to establish greater security, to be able to draw down troops, seemed all too willing to take their new allies at face value.
At J.S.S. Thrasher, Brooks and his men conducted raids several times a week, usually after dark. The raids were generally the result of tips from residents who called in to a hot line manned twenty-four hours a day by Iraqi interpreters, known as Terps; during daily patrols, Brooks's men passed out flyers with the phone number. "We say, 'If anyone threatens you, give a call.' The foot patrols are key: when you see someone walking down your street, when you see a face—it's different," Brooks said. "As a tank commander, I found it funny—the first thing I had to do was tell my tankers to get out and walk."
Brooks said that he had wanted to be a tank commander ever since he was a boy ("I love tanks"). After high school, in Springdale, Arkansas, he had gone to the New Mexico Military Institute, in Roswell, and afterward joined the Kansas Army National Guard. He was in the U.S. Armor Officer Basic Course during the attacks of September 11th, and in 2003 was sent to Iraq. He was eleven months into his second fifteen-month deployment. Brooks and his men had been told that they might be home for Christmas, but nobody was getting his hopes up too much yet.
One night, I went along on a raid, which Brooks designated Operation Muttonchops, because the main target was a man with a lot of facial hair. We drove from Thrasher in a Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The Americans had superimposed their own lexicon on the neighborhood's geography, to make it comprehensible to themselves. Just as Ghazaliya had been divided into three areas—Casino, Thrasher, and Maverick—all the major road arteries were referred to in Pentagonese: Red Falcon, Caradine, Vernon, Cecil, R.P.G. Alley, High Tension Road, and so forth. Few of the American soldiers knew how the locals referred to those same streets.
When the hydraulic rear hatch of the Bradley opened, I saw Iraqi and American soldiers running here and there, shouting, guns drawn. I followed some soldiers into a house. In the kitchen, a young American in full combat gear was bending over a man who was lying face down on the floor. The soldier cursed as he struggled to tie the man's hands behind his back with plastic handcuffs. A couple of half-eaten plates of food were on a table, along with a mobile phone, which rang repeatedly. In an adjacent room, another prone man was being trussed. A teen-age Iraqi, the younger brother of the two men, entered the kitchen and began to object; the American soldier handcuffed him as well. Pushing the teen-ager's face toward the floor, the soldier shouted, in English, "Shut the fuck up! Move your fucking head!"
A middle-aged woman in a flower-patterned smock emerged, sobbing, as the three brothers were moved outside. They were made to kneel, their cuffed hands behind their heads. A masked Terp held a photograph up next to each of the men's faces. As American soldiers inspected the teen-ager, who had peach fuzz on his chin, one muttered, "This isn't Muttonchops."
The three men were shoved down the street aggressively by the young soldier. (He was the only soldier I saw behave in that way; later, when he began berating women in another home, an officer told him to cool down.) After further consultation between the Americans and their masked Terps, it was decided that none of the three detainees were targets of the raid. Their handcuffs were cut, and they were told to go home.
The Americans now turned their attention to three other men, who were seated on a curb. One was a chubby adolescent. With him was a thin, scraggly-bearded youth in his early twenties and a man in his thirties. They explained that they had been sitting outside in the cool air, chatting and smoking. Their families, with several small children, were roused from bed. The Americans released the boy—he was fourteen years old—into his father's custody, but decided to take the two other men back to Thrasher.
I climbed into the Bradley, along with the older of the detainees, who was seated on the bench across from me. His hands had been bound, and he was trembling. The gunner of the Bradley leaned back, grabbed the detainee's T-shirt, and forced it over his head, like a hood. The disoriented man sat stiffly upright, and held his mouth open against the cloth around his face, as if to help himself breathe.
As it happened, an Iraqi whom I knew well had begun working for the Americans at a base under Colonel Burton's jurisdiction. I will call him Karim. He is a Shiite, and lives in a mixed Baghdad neighborhood just east of Ghazaliya. Karim said that he and a friend, whom I will call Amar (other names in their account have also been changed), had called in more than forty American raids, which had resulted in the capture of several dozen terrorists.
Karim said that, at first, he had welcomed the Mahdi Army, because it offered a measure of protection against Sunni extremists. But the militia had transformed itself into something like a Mafia organization, extorting money and abducting and murdering his neighbors—Shiites and Sunnis alike. The Mahdi Army men in their neighborhood, who regarded Karim and Amar as friends, had no idea that they were turning them in. Then Karim told me that it wasn't only the Mahdi Army that he was deceiving but the Americans, too.
Amar was a lifelong friend of Karim's. Three months earlier, Amar and his older brother, Jafaar, had been riding in the van of a friend, Sayeed, when a group of gunmen hailed them. Amar recognized them as Mahdi Army men, and assumed that they were coming to say hello. As Sayeed braked, the car was riddled with gunfire. Amar crouched as low as he could, as the Mahdi Army men emptied their Kalashnikovs. He was unhurt, but Jafaar and Sayeed were dead.
That night, Amar told Karim that, at the morgue, he had sworn over his brother's body to take revenge. He had vowed to kill a hundred Mahdi men—ten for each of Jafaar's fingers. His mother, Um Jafaar, supported him, and begged Karim to help her son. He agreed.
Their first concern was to make sure that the Mahdi militiamen didn't suspect them. During Jafaar's funeral procession, they shouted angry denunciations of a Sunni tribe that lived nearby. Word soon spread that Jafaar's family and friends blamed the Sunnis for his death.
Karim and Amar also decided that it would be easier to carry out the killings if they won the Americans' trust. Karim went to a nearby U.S. military base, and spoke to a captain. "I told the captain, 'You help me, I help you. I love my country, my neighbors. The Mahdi have killed many of my friends, and American soldiers, too. I want to coöperate.' " Karim gave the captain the names of two of the men who had killed Jafaar. The captain said that, if they were detained, Karim would get some money. He refused: "If I take it, it makes me a spy, and I am a gentleman, not a spy.' "
Karim put the captain in touch with Amar, who directed American soldiers to the houses where the two gunmen were staying. The operation was a success. "They found many guns and pistols," Karim said. "They took them, investigated, and they were convinced about what they were—killers. One was young, fifteen or sixteen, and had killed five or six people. He was just starting out. He is now in Bucca"—a U.S. prison camp in southern Iraq.
"Then the killing started," Karim told me. Their first victim was the father of the younger gunman. When I asked him whether the father had anything to do with Jafaar's killing, he looked nonplussed, and said no, but that the man had been an intelligence officer under Saddam, and had probably killed people, too. (In Iraq's tribal vendettas, male relatives are often seen as legitimate targets.) The father was now working as a taxi-driver. Karim told Amar's sister to wave him down as he left his house, and ask to be dropped off at a warehouse on the outskirts of a Sunni district. "Amar and I followed," he said. "She got out, and crossed the street. I told Amar, 'Do it now.' "
Amar drove in front of the taxi-driver, cutting him off. "Amar got out of the car and he shot him in the face. I had put five dumdums and four normal bullets in the gun, a SIG Sauer. One dumdum is enough to kill one man. I told him to shoot only four and keep some back, just in case, but he shot them all." (Afterward, according to Karim, Amar apologized. "He said, 'I couldn't help it. I became crazy.")
Next, they went to a Sunni sheikh whom Karim knew, whose brother was in the insurgency. The brother and his men kidnapped six Mahdi militiamen, including four who had been in the group that killed Jafaar. They took them to a house in Mansour, a Sunni district, where Karim and Amar met them. "They were tied up and their heads were covered. Amar beat them too much—not me," Karim said. "We were pretending to be Sunni mujahideen. We told them, 'If you tell the truth we release you, but if not we will kill you.' Of course, this was not the truth."
The men said that Sayeed had been their target; Jafaar just happened to be in the car. "They said they had killed Sayeed because he was a member of Badr"—the military wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a major rival of the Mahdi Army—"and worked with Americans. But this is not true. They killed him because he was rich and didn't respect the Mahdi Army. They were jealous."
Karim told me that he left before the interrogation was over, and didn't talk to Amar until the next day. "When I saw him, he kissed me. He said, 'I left three bodies near the train track, and two in Canal Street, to be taken to the morgue.'
"I said, 'No. 6, where is he?' Amar said, 'The sheikh's brother took him, because he thinks he killed his cousin.' "
The killing continued. After fifteen days, they went to Um Jafaar, Amar's mother. "I told her who was dead and who was in jail. She was very happy," Karim said. "Then she said, 'Do you want me to be completely comforted?' " Um Jafaar asked them to bring her parts of the dead men's bodies. Amar did what she asked.
"One man, he cut off his ear when he was still alive," Karim said. "But I swear that Amar has never killed anyone who was innocent."
Karim said that Amar had killed eighteen or twenty men. "After a while, I told Amar to stop this. My wife, also, was angry with me. I didn't like to do this, either, but we had to. We had to kill these guys, because they were killing too many people. When some of them were killed, my neighbors celebrated—sometimes even the Mahdi Army guys did."
Karim mentioned the American captain with whom Amar worked. "Amar is a friend of the captain, but he doesn't know about this." He added, "Amar was friends of the Mahdi—real friends. I have to be honest with you. If not for Jafaar's killing, he still would be."
Amar told Karim that he would not stop killing until he reached his goal of a hundred victims. "He is hungry for killing now," Karim said. "Sometimes I think maybe he has gone a little crazy."
In the next days, I confirmed that Amar was working with the American military; I also heard that he had been employed by a large private military contractor. Amar's case underscores one of the many dangers of fighting a war in a land where the culture and the language are incomprehensible to most of the soldiers. The U.S. military can do little without the assistance of local allies at every level, from collaborators like Amar to political leaders. Paradoxically, it is during the Americans' well-armed raids that their vulnerability in Iraq is most acutely on display. The Americans are always accompanied by their spectral Terps. They often act on tips whose sources are opaque, without knowing what lies behind them. Among the Iraqis I met who were working with the Americans, motives seemed to range from the pecuniary—a job and a good wage—to the patriotic, or a combination of both. But, in great measure, their ultimate loyalties must be taken on faith.
There have been some well-publicized embarrassments, such as when the U.S. Marines named a former Iraqi general to lead a militia, the so-called Falluja Brigade, to combat insurgents there in 2004. The general, it turned out, had been accused of involvement in Saddam-era atrocities against the Kurds. He was quickly replaced; months later, the brigade fell under suspicion of aiding insurgents, and was disbanded.
Amar's killing spree may not pose that sort of problem for the U.S. military—assuming that his victims really are all "bad guys." In wars, killing acquires a kind of perverse logic, and at times can come to be seen as part of the solution. Colonel Burton made it clear to me that he hadn't been sorry to hear that in the area under his command a notorious Shiite militia leader had been, as he put it, "whacked": "If he is gone, then it means that a big area that was influenced by him has been lifted from his control." Burton acknowledged, however, that the assassination of the Shiite militia leader had sparked a series of sectarian revenge killings; the neighborhood had to be placed under a "no-move policy." (I learned that the militia leader had been killed by the same man who had helped Amar kidnap six of his victims—the ones they had tortured before killing.)
Later, I told Colonel Burton that I had heard about Iraqis working with the U.S. who engaged in revenge killings. He responded, "Let me put it this way: I know that we do work with people who have provided information that has led to the capture of criminals and weapons caches. They have also called us and said they know where we can find the remains of people that we're looking for. There is a form of justice in Iraq that is traditional, but we do our best to get ahead of it."
Tribal vendettas have been an underlying feature of the Iraq war since it began. Amar's story may be unusual in the scale of his ambitions—a hundred men for his brother—but such crimes are common. At least some of the initial impetus for Iraq's insurgency came in the spring of 2003, when American troops in Falluja shot and killed seventeen demonstrators, and kinsmen of the dead sought revenge by killing Americans. In tribal families, it is often the matriarch who encourages the vendetta, as Amar's mother did.
Um Jafaar is a handsome, elderly woman. When I arrived at her home, with Karim, she was wearing a black abaya, and I noticed blue tribal tattoos on her chin and her hands. She invited me to sit down on a couch, and sat next to me in an armchair. Jafaar's three young daughters were watching us. When I asked Um Jafaar if she wanted revenge for her son's death, she got up from her chair, came over, and kissed the top of my head.
"Yes, I want revenge," she said. "I am a mother, and I lost my son for nothing." She began weeping, great wracking sobs. When she recovered, Um Jafaar pointed to her granddaughters. "Look, they have no father," she said. "Why?"
Um Jafaar went on to tell me that she took the body parts of Amar's victims, wrapped in cloth, to his grave, in the holy city of Najaf, and buried them there. "I talk to my son, I tell him, 'Here, this is from those who killed you, I take revenge.' " Moving one hand in a horizontal circle, she said, "I put them around the grave. So far, I have taken one hand, one eye, an Adam's apple, toes, fingers, ears, and noses." (Karim told me that the hand had made the house stink for days.) I asked her how many Mahdi men Amar had killed. "I don't know: eighteen, twenty? But still my heart hurts. Even if we kill all of them, I won't have comfort," she said.
"The Americans catch them and put them in jail," Um Jafaar went on. "This is not a solution, they have to be killed!" She turned to me: "Tell the American forces I am ready to fight with them against the Jaish al-Mahdi. I am a woman but I am ready. When you come here, we will sacrifice everything for you, because you did not kill my son. I pray for the Americans—even if they are Christians and Jews—and to the Prophet Muhammad, to protect you."
A few days earlier, Um Jafaar told me, she had been at the funeral of a Mahdi fighter, and had heard one of his comrades vow to avenge him: "He said, 'If before I decapitated them at the neck, now I will do it at their mouths.' " She made a hacking motion across her mouth.
Karim's cell phone rang. He answered it, and began speaking in Arabic. Afterward, he told me that it was Amar, who was out on an American patrol. "They have caught two Jaish al-Mahdi, and the Americans' Terps are making them dance at gunpoint," Karim said, laughing.
I asked if I could meet Amar. Karim said that he would see.
J**·**S.S. Maverick, in the southeast corner of Ghazaliya, was the quietest of the neighborhood's three Joint Security Stations. When I visited, in September, it had been two months since the last I.E.D. explosion. There was still danger but a certain tedium had set in to the soldiers' routines. "They hate the daily shit, like all soldiers do," an officer told me. "But they love not getting shot at or blown up by I.E.D.s every day"—which, until midsummer, was how it had been in Ghazaliya. "It's like going from cocaine to weed," he said.
I drove through Maverick with a crew in a Humvee. There were no people on the streets, and the senior soldier in the unit said, "I don't like it. Makes me expect something to go boom." The Humvee cut across a field, and halted where a suspicious-looking metal cannister lay in our path; the driver gave it a wide berth. As we made our way, very slowly because of the armored Humvee's weight—six tons—we approached a street that was covered in raw sewage. "Doo-doo water!" one of the men yelled. "Ooooh!" the others in the Humvee shouted in disgusted unison.
That evening, units from Maverick went on a "census mission"—part of a program aimed at creating a central register with the biometric profile of every military-age man living within its area, to help identify infiltrators. Iraqi police closed off either end of the street, as Americans and Terps searched each house. The residents seemed to know what was expected of them. The men came forward politely and handed over their identification cards; an Army man took their photographs with an iris-scanning camera.
In theory, operations like this represent the advantage of moving U.S. soldiers into neighborhoods like Ghazaliya, where they can build relationships and glean intelligence, and that night's census was civil enough. But the constant raids and patrols can also alienate local residents, and reinforce the impression of the Americans as a coercive force with the overweening power to invade the homes of Iraqis, and detain them at will. The Army's tactics can become the catalyst that leads Iraqis to the insurgency.
Maverick's area of Ghazaliya did not yet have a contingent of Guardians, and so the soldiers were using the Iraqi National Police, which is predominantly Shiite, as their auxiliaries. The national police in Ghazaliya, however, were suspected of being under the control of the Mahdi Army. The local police commander had recently been arrested and charged with helping carry out kidnappings and murders. A new police commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ahsin al-Khazragee, had been appointed, but the detachment remained a matter of concern. "No one trusts 'em," Lieutenant Matthew Holtzendorff, who led the census mission, told me. (The complaints go in both directions: while I was there, a truck belonging to Kellogg, Brown, and Root, the military contractor, had ploughed through barriers manned by the national police in Maverick's area, killing one policeman and badly injuring another, and then sped on without stopping. An Army officer told me that the incident was being investigated; K.B.R., when asked for comment, denied any knowledge of it.)
On the way back to Maverick, the convoy drove past a group of sullen-looking Iraqi police at a barricade, then pulled up in front of a well-tended middle-class home. A young boy opened the door, smiling when he saw Lieutenant Holtzendorff. We went inside, and were greeted warmly by a man in his thirties whom I will call Sabah, and who worked as a civil engineer inside the Green Zone. A few months earlier, Holtzendorff had saved Sabah from being kidnapped by the Iraqi police detachment down the street—the ones we had just passed. They had beaten him badly, and, most likely, had planned to kill him. Holtzendorff made a point of visiting Sabah regularly, to make it clear that he was under American protection.
Sabah was sweating, and he chainsmoked. He anxiously asked Holtzendorff where he had been; it had been two weeks since his previous visit. Holtzendorff explained that he had been called away, but said that he had asked his men to stop by every few days. They had, hadn't they? Sabah nodded and smiled, but his hands shook. After thirty minutes or so, despite Sabah's entreaties to stay longer, Holtzendorff stood up, promising to return.
Later, I discussed Sabah's case with one of the unit's officers. Developing a nonsectarian national police force is an essential part of the U.S. military's plan to disengage its own troops, but, as the officer saw it, the police were still part of the problem. "Please don't print my name, or Petraeus will kill me," he said. "The national police are supposed to be our salvation; all our hopes are pinned on them!" He added, "Balancing the Shia and the Sunni—the politics of it—that's the hardest part of my job. 'Hunt bad guy, kill bad guy'—O.K., that's what I'm trained to do. But they don't train you for this."
Colonel Ahsin, the newly appointed police chief in Maverick's area, is a punctilious man in his late thirties; when I joined him for an evening walkabout, on a street a few blocks from Maverick, I picked up the aroma of cologne. Ahsin was accompanied by Major Robert O'Brien, the American officer in charge of Maverick's National Police Transition Team, or N.P.T.T.s, known by all as Nip-its.
Three bodyguards moved around Colonel Ahsin like a protective fan. As we headed down the street, a mixture of homes and shops, Ahsin made a great display of courteousness to the stall keepers. At one stand, he popped a sweetmeat in his mouth. He bent down to tousle the hair of some small boys. As he walked on, an older man approached, and the bodyguards immediately huddled around him. The man complained that an Iraqi police car had collided with his car. Ahsin listened and then, in a loud voice, called out, "Maaa-jor!"
O'Brien trotted over, saying deferentially, "Na'm, sayyidi?" ("Yes, sir?"). Colonel Ahsin told O'Brien that he wanted to have the offending policeman arrested. "Na'm, sayyidi," O'Brien said, scribbling in his notebook. As we proceeded, this scene was repeated again and again: Ahsin gave orders to O'Brien, who obsequiously wrote them down. At one point, O'Brien smiled in my direction, and said, "This is the magic. Yeah!"
Later, I asked O'Brien what he knew about Colonel Ahsin. "All I know is that he was thirteen years in the special forces with Saddam's Army, and joined the national police in 2004," O'Brien said. They had known each other only a week and a half, but he thought that Ahsin was "fantastic."
I said that Ahsin seemed to enjoy the role of the Big Man.
O'Brien flashed me a look. "Look, it works," he said quietly. "That's what I want. I want him to take charge. Some advisers want to take command, and we need them to." He paused. "It's like surfing, except that here we're surfing on top of a shit tidal wave, and we're just trying not to fall in." O'Brien laughed. "Saddam Hussein once said that the trick of counterinsurgency is to separate the people from the insurgents. That's what we're trying to do here. If the people like what you do more than what the others do, then you have a chance."
The Americans hoped that the Ghazaliya Guardians, the Sunni volunteer group, would serve as a new police force. Here, too, there were complications: General Petraeus had singled out the Guardians as a positive development, but the Shiites had a very different view. "The policy adopted by the Iraqi government, along with the Coalition, has been to disband armed militia groups," an official of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq said. He acknowledged that Iraq's security force was a "weak and sick body," ridden with militias, and needed to be reformed. "But the solution is not to bring new forces onto the scene, ones that people have doubts about."
The Americans, the Shiite official said, were arming the Sunni volunteers without adequately looking into their backgrounds. "There are a lot of stories now that some of those involved in the Awakening were known to be very dangerous criminals in their areas," he said. He mentioned hard-line insurgent groups like the 1920 Revolution Brigades and the Islamic Army, whose members have joined volunteer groups. "Now they're walking around armed, with uniforms and badges that allow them to go into places normally permitted only to Iraqi security forces." He added, "There must be mechanisms put into place to insure that these people's loyalties are to Iraq and its government—before they get stronger and have their own controlled territories."
On a clear morning in late September, about a dozen members of the Ghazaliya Guardians mustered at a small public marketplace to meet Captain Brooks. Dressed in matching cream-colored shirts, khaki pants, and beige baseball caps, they resembled security guards for a golf course. Their only noticeable insignia were small shoulder badges showing the Iraqi flag. (Colonel Burton had told me, "The guys in Ghazaliya, now, they're militaristic, pretty well dressed, pretty professional; a lot of them are former Iraqi Army guys.") Their leader, a portly middle-aged man with a notebook, greeted Captain Brooks attentively.
This was an important day for the Guardians. After three months under Iraqi Army supervision, they were about to be allowed to man roadblocks on their own—just the sort of transition that the Shiite official worried about. Their leader conducted Brooks to several spots around the intersection, which he proposed as the Guardians' checkpoints. At the first, Brooks said, "You wouldn't want to fight from here; you need a place you can retreat to." The Guardian pointed to a row of buildings, and suggested that it might be an ideal place for a Guardian office, where his men could rest. Brooks said, "I don't want you hunkered down," and that, instead, they should set up a stall in the market, with an awning.
As Captain Brooks walked around, a shopkeeper came up to him and pointed to the sewage in the street. Brooks said that he would send in the "suck truck" to remove it. Another man complained about electricity, and a third said that the neighborhood needed a water truck, "to keep the dust down." Brooks rolled his eyes. "I can fix a lot of things," he said. "But I can't do much about dust."
After he moved on, Brooks was approached by a woman who said that her son, a member of the Guardians, had recently been arrested. She had heard nothing more of him since.
As she was speaking, gunshots rang out from the other side of the marketplace: a Guardian had fired off warning shots when a vehicle did not heed his command to halt. Brooks sent his men over with orders to check out the position: "See if it can be fixed so people have more time to react." Turning back to the woman, he told her that he would try and find out about her son. He said that, in a few days, an office would open nearby, where residents could get information about detainees.
It was now midday; the heat was intense, and Brooks was getting impatient. He was besieged by another group of shopkeepers, who complained about a trash-strewn field next to their stalls. Brooks pointed to a large wire-mesh basket; it was one of several that his soldiers had placed in vacant lots around Ghazaliya. He noted that it was nearly empty, and that garbage had been dumped all around it. He challenged them: "Why should I care about your garbage if the people here don't?"
We climbed back into the Humvee and drove off. As we were leaving the marketplace, Brooks yelled for the driver to stop, and leaped out of the Humvee, cursing loudly. He strode up to a man who sat under a tree behind a table that was laden with chocolate, potato chips, cigarettes, and some cheap plastic toys. Brooks grabbed a plastic pistol and a toy AK-47 off the table and brandished them in the face of the vender. "What are these?" he shouted. The vender, who had smiled anxiously as Brooks approached, now crumpled with apprehension. "They're just toys, for babies," he said placatingly, still forcing himself to smile. A tall masked Terp named Leo was translating for Brooks.
"You're an idiot!" Brooks shouted. Leo said something to the man in Arabic. "What do you think will happen if one of my soldiers sees this pointed at him at night?" Brooks waved the toy pistol in the man's face. "You will kill more children in this area than Al Qaeda!" Brooks demanded a reply. Leo spoke again to the vender, who said that he was not the only person selling toy guns; there was a stall in front of Ghazaliya's municipal offices. "Everyone sells them," he said.
Brooks listened stonily. Then he stepped back and spat on the ground in front of the vender's table. Shaking a fist, he said, "You make me sick, you killer of children," and wheeled around to leave. Stopping a few feet away, he turned back again and kicked a cloud of dust toward the vender. "Let's go!" he shouted. Brooks was silent for the return journey to J.S.S. Thrasher.
Back at the base, I asked Leo about the exchange. He said that he had not translated "exactly" what Captain Brooks had said: "His words were very insulting, you know. If I had told him exactly, the man would have been very offended."
Several days after I saw Um Jafaar, Karim arranged a meeting for me with Amar. A stocky man in his mid-thirties, Amar had a close-shaven head and a lumpy, fleshy face with a thick mustache. There was an unnervingly serene air about him, and I found it difficult to look him in the eye for very long.
Amar spoke in a matter-of-fact monotone. "Jafaar had ten fingers; each one of his fingers was worth ten Jaish al- Mahdi guys," he said. "So I decided to take my revenge against a hundred of them. So far, I have taken my revenge against twenty."
Did he count those he had helped the Americans capture? I asked.
Amar shook his head. "Some are now in prison," he said. "If they are released, I will kill them. If they are not released, I will kill their brothers or their fathers. Today, I have one in my mind. " He and Karim spoke in Arabic for a moment. Turning to me, Karim said, "Yes, this man deserves it. He's killed, like, three hundred people in Baghdad."
Amar mentioned a nearby neighborhood. "I take most of the people and kill them there," he said. "It's two minutes from Hay al-Adil, a Sunni district. The Jaish al-Mahdi think the people of Hay al-Adil are killing them." Amar smiled wanly. "They come with me, as my friends. They trust me, the Jaish al- Mahdi." Amar said that he would also invite the Mahdi men to a warehouse he owned—"to eat or to drink, or to race pigeons. I make up different stories." Once there, he usually put a drug in their tea or sprinkled it on dates he offered them. "They fall asleep, then I shoot them in the head." Sometimes, he slit their throats.
"Americans are too honorable, too clean," he said. "They have to kill these people. They are dirty. Anyway, if they don't kill them, I will. But helping the Americans arrest them helps them not suspect me."
Before Jafaar's death, Amar had made mistakes—drinking, women. In seeking revenge, he had become closer to God, and that, he said, had kept him going. "God wants me to kill these people. It is haram to kill cats, but it is good to kill the Jaish al-Mahdi," he said. "They have strangled honest Sunni people in front of me. I feel no difference between me and the Sunni; I feel very angry about that. The Mahdi are not like they were before; they kill Shia or Sunni, for whatever reason. If I go to Hell, I will be comfortable, because I took my revenge." He added, "Honestly, it was only after the first one that I didn't sleep well, because I had not killed before. But afterward it felt normal."
Last week, I spoke again to Karim. He told me that something had happened—there was now reason to believe that the Mahdi Army had become aware of Amar's involvement in the killings. Karim was urging him to leave Baghdad, at least for a while. If he didn't, there was a good chance that he would be a target. For the moment, though, Amar was simply lying low.
One afternoon, sitting with Captain Brooks in Thrasher's rooftop gym, I asked if he felt that what he was doing in Iraq was appreciated by the people back home. "Oh, yeah," he said. Turning to one of his N.C.O.s, who was seated nearby, smoking a cigar, he asked, "What do you think, Sergeant Cochran?"
Lowering his voice, Cochran replied, "When that bullet goes by my head, all the politics goes right out the window. My only thought is to get my men out of there alive."
"Thanks for quoting 'Black Hawk Down,' Sergeant Cochran," Brooks drawled. Turning back to me, he said, "When I went home the last time, we went skiing in Colorado. Everywhere we went, people thanked me. One man said, 'I don't support the war but I support the soldiers.' I can accept that. We have a system that allows freedom of speech. Hell, I put on the uniform to defend that."
Brooks seemed to feel that what he and his men were doing in Iraq was worthwhile. He felt that, for now, the country needed the U.S. military, as much for its peacekeeping duties as for its combat role. "In the Sunni population, there is still fear of Shia militias, and fear that violence will start again," Captain Brooks said. "We've seen efforts by Al Qaeda in Iraq to reignite sectarian violence, but, to the people's credit, nothing really reignited, and has not yet." He knocked on a wooden table in front of him. "There's still a lot of work to be done on national reconciliation in this area. Ghazaliya is a microcosm of what Iraq faces as a whole. The Iraq Study Group said national reconciliation was essential, and I agree. Until Iraqis work out the Sunni-Shia sectarian issues, they're going to have a very tough time making meaningful or lasting progress."
I asked Brooks if he planned to stay in the Army after his tour ended. He gave me a candid look, and said he hadn't made up his mind yet. "I want to go on vacation when I get home and then decide," he said.
When I asked how long he thought the U.S. would remain in Iraq, Brooks thought for a while, and said, "I'm not just blowing smoke up your ass, but it really depends on what the U.S. civilian-controlled government decides its goals are and what it tells the military to do."
Brooks continued, "Things are going well. Just about everything we wanted to achieve on a local level, we've achieved. It's counterinsurgency, it's different from what one would normally associate with war—i.e., 'victory is won.' I feel that winning will be a point you never realize that you're there—that at some indeterminate point you'll look back and realize that you've won." ♦


text:
American Dufner may take out European Tour membership
JASON Dufner is considering widening his horizons by competing more in Europe and could decide to become a member of the tour in future, the United States Ryder Cup player said today.
Dufner is 11th in the world rankings after winning twice on the U.S. PGA Tour last season and making his debut appearance in the Ryder Cup.
He was also runner-up to compatriot Bo Van Pelt at the European Tour's Perth International event in Australia in October and is looking forward to competing in this week's Abu Dhabi Championship and the Qatar Masters tournament that follows.
"I've had the opportunity the last couple of years with my play in the U.S. to... come over and play these events," he told reporters on Wednesday. "I think it's a good thing to compete around the world and see where you stack up.
"We are pretty spoiled in the U.S. We just kind of play in one area and people are pretty focused on the PGA Tour but there are a lot of other tours and a lot of other great events around the world.
"I've discussed taking up membership of the European Tour, I thought about possibly doing it this year," said Dufner.
"With the four majors and the World Golf Championships counting as events and throw in three or four more that would also count, it may be a possibility in the future."
Dufner, 35, said it could only improve his game to mix up his playing schedule.
"I think it makes you a little bit of a better player to come over here and experience golf in different places against different golfers," he added.
"It's up to the individual and I can see both sides of the argument. Guys in the U.S. get comfortable and they want to stay close to their families and obviously travelling over here can be difficult for some."
Dufner is normally calm and reserved on the course but he provided the occasional excitable fist-pump at the Ryder Cup where he was one of his team's standout performers, winning three points out of a possible four.
"Usually when I'm out playing there are maybe 25 or 30 people watching me," he said. "At the Ryder Cup the holes are just packed with people - the atmosphere is unbelievable and I'd never experienced anything like that.
"It takes over and the moment kind of gets inside your body I guess. A couple of fist-pumps here and there were probably much needed."
Who is your sportstar of the year?
Vote in the Irish Independent Sport Star Awards and you could win the ultimate sports prize.
Prizes include, tickets to Ireland's against Scotland in the Six Nations, All Ireland football and hurling final tickets and much more.
Simply click here to register your vote

subset: commoncrawl


text:
New lung cancer staging system (TNM 7) better predicts local/regional recurrence, study shows
The new TNM 7 lung cancer staging system seems to be a better predictor of local or regional recurrence of lung cancer following surgery, according to a study published in the April issue of the Journal of Thoracic Oncology.
Being able to better define which patients might experience a cancer recurrence is important, especially given the controversies surrounding the use of adjuvant therapies, particularly postoperative radiation therapy (RT), for patients with non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC).
In 2009, the International Association for the Study of Lung Cancer (IASLC) published its 7th edition of the tumor, node, metastasis (TNM) classification, which was developed in collaboration with the American Joint Committee on Cancer and the Union Internationale Contre le Cancer. The changes were based on an analysis of a large international database.
Researchers at Duke University School of Medicine in Durham, N.C., analyzed 709 patients who had undergone surgery for non-small cell lung cancer between 1995 and 2005. Stage was assigned based on both TNM 6 and TNM 7. The 5-year actuarial risk of local/regional recurrence (LRR) for all patients was 23%. None of the patients received any adjuvant chemotherapy or radiation therapy.
When patients were converted from TNM 6 to TNM 7, about 13% were placed in a higher stage and 8% in a lower stage. For most malignancies, increasing stage is generally associated with a higher risk of disease recurrence.
Five-year rates of local/regional recurrence for stages IA, IB, IIA, IIB and IIIA disease using TNM 6 were 16%, 26%, 43%, 35% and 40%, respectively. Using TNM 7, the corresponding rates were 16%, 23%, 37%, 39% and 30%.
"The TNM 7 system seems to be a better predictor for LRR after surgery for NSCLC than TNM 6," researchers wrote in the study. "This information may prove to be valuable when designing future studies of postoperative RT."
Explore further


text:
Details for Shortcutter Quick Settings Premium 2.7.4
App Name: Shortcutter Quick Settings
Version: 2.7.4 Premium Unlocked
Package ID: com.leedroid.shortcutter
Category= Personalization
Requirements: Android 7.0+
Size: 5.2 MB
What's New
* Screen recording permissions fixes
* Bug fixes
* Memory usage optimisations
* Enable togging custom ring mode values
* Additional validation for QS direct editing with settings secure access
* Correct toolbox/sidebar icon spacing
* Permission check improvements
* Rewrite Toolbox icon colouring logic & adjust off-mode drawable's
* Add "My Location" Activity – Shows a map snapshot & your current location, with options to share & view in maps
* Add My Location QS Tile & Toolbox Tile
tempohari.com — Customise your existing Android Quick Settings pull-down with Shortcutters Quick Settings Tiles!
Designed and developed to make life easier, taking advantage of the excellent Tile Service API provided in android Nougat, Screen Record & Capture, Countdown Timer & Data Usage, Battery Percentage, In Ear Audio, Brightness Presets & many more!
BETA Testers now welcome, with additional tiles & features added several times a week Opt In via: https://play.google.com/apps/testing/com.leedroid.shortcutter
** If you struggle to add tiles, please refer to the How To Add Tiles guide & pay attention to the foot note on the 2nd page **
* 46 Additional Quick Settings Tiles available for the standard user (38 in the free version).
* +6 Tiles for Advanced users with a little ADB knowledge & a PC.
* +4 tiles for users with ROOT access.
That's 56 Quick Setting Tiles for the power users out there & more to follow!
Now with an optional Floating Toolbox for even more convenience, offering up to 8 custom app tiles + most of the below options!
Available Tiles:
– Auto Sync
– Battery Percentage – Shows battery level percentage in icon with a link to the battery usage screen
– Camera Launch
– Clicker – Counts total clicks (can be reset in the "Customise Tiles" tab)
– Countdown Timer
– Dice – Random number generator (Define your own range in the app)
– Data Usage – Shows mobile data usage in defined 1 month cycle
– Flashlight
– File Browser
– Font Scale
– Touch Vibration / Haptic Feedback
– Location Mode: Toggle Off, Device Only, Battery Saving & High Accuracy.*
– In Ear Audio (play music through the device ear piece)
– Play/Pause Music
– Multi Window
– New Tweet
– New Email
– Next Alarm – Displays your next alarm, 1 click takes you to your alarms screen.
– Night Mode – Shortcut to the night mode fragment
– Power Menu
– Screen Lock
– Screen Orientation
– Recent Apps
– RAM Usage – Shows available vs. used RAM – click to view ram usage info.
– Quick SMS
– Volume Panel
– Screen Timeout
– Screen Brightness Mode – Auto/Manual
– Brightness Preset – Select increments to toggle through (i.e 3 steps = 33%, 66%, 100% / + Auto)
– Ring Mode
– Power Saver*
– Screen Wake: Keep screen awake indefinitely until deactivated or the screen is turned off via the power button.
– Screen Record (Premium) – Record your screen, save to SD & view in gallery / share.
– Screenshot (Premium) – Captures your screen content as an image
— Custom save location for screenshots & recordings.
– Web Search
– Voice Search
– SystemUI Tuner – Launch the hidden SystemUI Tuner to control your status bar Icons & more.
– 4 Custom App Tiles – Add a shortcut to any application on your device.
– 4 Custom URL Tiles – Add a shortcut to any web address.
*Shortcut to activity only if the app has no access to settings secure.
For advanced users:
– ADB (toggle ADB on/off)
– Ambient Display (Low power state notifications)
– Heads Up Notifications
– Immersive Mode/Expanded Desktop – Mode Dialog for devices with Nav Bar (INCOMPATIBLE WITH MIUI)
– Keep Screen On While Charging
Additional ROOT Only Tiles:
– Network Mode (Toggle mobile network modes)
– Mobile Data
– Reboot
– Reboot Recovery
– Wi-Fi Calling (HTC Only)
** Some tile functionality may be impacted by manufacturer customisation, I always work within the remit of the stock Android system where possible.
More Info for Shortcutter Quick Settings Premium 2.7.4
Free Download
Shortcutter Quick Settings Premium 2.7.4 Apk (6.8 MB)
Link 1 | Link 2


text:
Eurocom Panther 2.0 Mobile Workstation4 Jun, 2011 By: Ron LaFon
First Look Review: New system offers many connectivity options, fast performance.
Editor's Note: This article was originally published in the Winter/Spring 2011 issue of Cadalyst magazine.
The new Panther 2.0 mobile workstation from Eurocom comes with an extensive range of configuration options. The system I received for review included an Intel Xeon W3680 3.33 GHz six-core processor with 12MB of L3 cache that drew 130 W of power. The Panther 2.0 supports a full line of Intel Xeon processors, including X5680, X5670, X5660, X5650, and L5630.
The Intel processor is mounted on a Clevo X7200 motherboard that uses an Intel X58+ ICH10R chipset. The system supports 24GB of RAM when fully populated, but the review system came equipped with 12GB of DDR3 1,333-MHz RAM (3 x 4GB SIMM cards). The NVIDIA FX 3800M graphics card with 1GB of onboard RAM supports the graphics engine. This graphics card drives the 17.3" 1,920 x 1,080 display using the preinstalled v18.104.22.16885 NVIDIA driver. I used the 64-bit version of the NVIDIA AutoCAD performance driver for the AutoCAD portion of the benchmark tests, all running under Windows 7 Professional x64.
The Panther 2.0 is not a small system, measuring 16.76" x 11.44" x 2.26–2.43" (W x D x H) and weighing a hefty 11.66 lbs, including the battery. The Panther's sound system includes high-definition audio, S/PDIF output, a microphone, five speakers and a subwoofer, and Dolby Home Theater sound. The autoswitching 300-W AC power adapter is large and also on the hefty side.
The reviewed system included a 6X Blu-ray writer/8X DVD R/W drive, a 256-GB SSD RealSSD Micron SATA 600 drive, and 2x 750-GB Seagate Momentus SATA-300 drives. All told, the Eurocom Panther 2.0 can be equipped with as many as four hard, solid, or hybrid storage drives for as much as 3TB of storage
with RAID 0/1/5/10.
Connectivity options for the system include 2x USB 3.0, 3x USB 2.0, HDMI out, DVI-DL, eSata, IEEE 1394b, and S/PDIF. Additional connections include headphone, microphone, audio line in, and RJ45 ports. An HDMI-in v1.4 connector is available as an option. All connectors are located along the left and right sides of the system; the power feed is located at the rear center.
The Eurocom Panther 2.0 is an attractive and well-appointed system with conveniently located connections. The included carrying case should prove to be durable — no small consideration for a system this heavy.
Performance Testing
I ran two benchmark tests on the Eurocom Panther 2.0, with the first being the Cadalyst C2011 v.5.3b running in AutoCAD 2011 x64 with the most currently available patches and service packs installed. I tested at a screen resolution of 1,280 x 1,024 and at a color depth of 24 bits. I ran several iterations of the benchmark in two basic configurations. First I ran the C2011 benchmark with the native Autodesk drivers included with AutoCAD 2011, and then I ran several iterations of the same test using the latest NVIDIA performance drivers for AutoCAD. As is typical, the performance figures for the latter configuration were significantly higher than for the tests with the native drivers. I performed all tests with Vertical Sync set to the Force Off position, as I usually do for all testing.
Next I ran the SPEC ViewPerf 11 benchmark, the latest release of this industry-standard performance benchmark. For those familiar with the older SPEC ViewPerf 10 test, the results from that version of SPEC ViewPerf aren't directly comparable to the results from ViewPerf 11. The tests of the latter version are more complex and access different features, making a comparison between the two sets impossible.
The best score from the first runs of the Cadalyst C2011 benchmark using the native Autodesk drivers generated a total index score of 399, with a 3D graphics index of 806, a 2D graphics index of 333, a disk index of 213, and a CPU index of 242. Completion of the benchmark suite with this configuration took 15 minutes.
I ran a series of tests using the NVIDIA accelerated driver for AutoCAD, which produced a C2011 total index score of 1,020, a 3D graphics index of 3,286, a 2D graphics index of 336, a disk index of 214, and a CPU index of 244. The benchmark run was completed in only 13 minutes. This particular result is the fastest score for a mobile workstation that I've seen.
Next up was the SPEC ViewPerf 11 benchmark. The initial given test score with ViewPerf 11 shows single sample performance. Additional tests with as many as four samples are reported here with composite scores given for the four viewsets affected. I've reported the scores with the single sample performance first and, where applicable, the 4x samples in parentheses.
SPEC ViewPerf performance scores with the Eurocom Panther 2.0 were as follows: 27.99 for catia-03, 17.38 for ensight-04 (43.35, 73%), 59.07 for lightwave-01 (49.91, 102%), 51.00 for maya-03, 9.33 for proe-05 (5.84, 99%), 41.39 for sw-02 (47.17, 100%), 21.23 for tcvis-02 (28.04, 92%), and 29.30 for snx-01. These scores are all good, if not the absolute fastest we've seen.
I encountered some anomalies in running both benchmarks: In the first run of the SPEC ViewPerf 11 benchmark, the system failed to complete the CATIA portion of the test. For the Cadalyst C2011 benchmark, one run took approximately 3 minutes longer than either the previous or next iteration of the benchmark. These incidents are unusual, but there's no specific reason I can pinpoint for either one. As noted, all tests ultimately ran to completion.
Battery Testing
The Eurocom Panther 2.0 was delivered with an eight-cell lithium ion polymer 5300-mAh 78.44-Wh battery. I typically run two battery tests on a mobile workstation: one with the system entirely idle, the other running a long loop with multiple iterations of the Cadalyst C2011 benchmark but with no other input. I prepare a mobile workstation by eliminating polling background services such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi and by setting the power settings to brightest screen and to never power down the display or hard drives. On the Idle component of the test, the system shut down in 50 minutes. Then I recharged the system completely.
When I attempted to run the Active portion of the battery tests, I encountered difficulties immediately. The system simply would not run an active AutoCAD session while on battery power. After several attempts and after double-checking the relevant settings, I contacted Eurocom. Mark Bialic, president, replied, "Since we use power-hungry desktop Intel six-core Xeon processors (approximately 130 W), our battery is more like a built-in UPS — so we don't expect users to run their six-core applications on battery. For those that need battery life, we have other models that are based on Intel mobile processors (approximately 45 W)."
Thus, I was unable to run the second portion of the battery tests. If you plan to use a major application on-site with the Eurocom Panther 2.0 mobile workstation in the configuration I tested, you will need to have a reliable, on-site AC power supply. If power is interrupted while AutoCAD is functioning, the application will stop, without an opportunity to exit gracefully, even though Windows is still running.
Portable Power
Pricing for the Eurocom Panther 2.0 system as delivered for review is $3574, which includes one year to return it to the factory depot and one year of technical support. Other warranty plans are available, as is extended on-site coverage. No operating system is included in the base price. If purchased, Eurocom supplies the original disk, which is preinstalled with all the applicable drivers.
The Eurocom Panther 2.0 system is what I would call a portable system rather than a mobile workstation. For those who have access to on-site electrical power, this system is a good choice, but those who need to run power-hungry applications untethered will need to look elsewhere. The system is remarkably
speedy, but the battery issues—combined with the potential for loss of data with major applications—resulted in a B+ score for the system overall.


text:
Morrison & Foerster LLP
Hollis Hyans focuses on state and local tax litigation and planning. She has handled a wide range of state and local tax controversies, litigating or resolving state tax disputes across the nation, in courts and in administrative tribunals in more than 40 states and localities.
Ms. Hyans advises clients on matters arising in all of the states and localities, at all stages from the earliest responses to initial audit inquiries, dealing with audit disputes, filing administrative protests, and handling them from beginning to end. She is familiar with and has handled disputes in courts in nearly every state, dealing with discovery issues, witness preparation, depositions, pre-trial proceedings, trials, and appeals. She has experience in just about every area of state and local tax, including corporate income and franchise taxes, sales and use taxes, personal income tax, utility taxes, state unemployment taxes, and unclaimed property. She also advises on the state and local tax ramifications of various business transactions, and on tactics for reducing state tax problems before they become large and expensive.
Ms. Hyans has written extensively on state and local tax issues, authoring numerous articles in many publications, including State Tax Notes, State & Local Taxes Weekly, and the New York Law Journal. She is the co-editor of New York Tax Insights, the firm's monthly publication covering developments in New York State and New York City tax issues. She is a frequent speaker on state and local tax issues, and has appeared before such groups as the Tax Executives Institute, the Council on State Taxation, the Institute for Professionals in Taxation, the Georgetown Advanced State and Local Tax Institute, and the New York State Bar Association. Ms. Hyans has served as a member of the Executive Committee of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association and as co-chair of the Association's Subcommittee on New York State Sales & Miscellaneous Taxes. In addition, she is a member of the Advisory Board of the Hartman State and Local Tax Forum at Vanderbilt University Law School, the Advisory Board of the NYU Institute on State and Local Tax, and the Bloomberg BNA State Tax Advisory Board.
Ms. Hyans is recommended as a leading lawyer by Chambers USA 2018, Legal 500 US 2018, Best Lawyers in America 2019 and Super Lawyers 2008 – 2011. She was also named to State Tax Notes' "Top 10 Tax Lawyers" list in 2011.
While earning her degree at New York University Law School, Ms. Hyans was elected to the Order of the Coif and was a staff member of the New York University Law Review. She earned her undergraduate degree, Phi Beta Kappa, from Brooklyn College of the City of New York.


text:
The Maine man dubbed the North Pond Hermit has broken his silence, telling a magazine writer that he doesn't know why he disappeared into the woods for nearly three decades and that jail was worse for his sanity than isolation. "I had a backpack and minimal stuff," Christopher Knight, 48, told GQ in an interview at the jail where he served seven months for committing hundreds of burglaries while camping out. "I had no plans. I had no map. I didn't know where I was going. I just walked away." He said that as he hiked through Maine in the summer of 1986, "I lost track of where I was...I didn't care."
Knight said that he lost his identity during his years of solitude. "With no audience, no one to perform for, I was just there. There was no need to define myself; I became irrelevant. The moon was the minute hand, the seasons the hour hand. I didn't even have a name. I never felt lonely. To put it romantically: I was completely free." Despite the physical hardships of living outdoors, Knight said being locked up in the county jail was mentally tougher. "I suspect," he wrote in a letter, "more damage has been done to my sanity in jail, in months; than years, decades, in the woods."
'North Woods Hermit' opens up to trooperApril 26, 201302:39
- The Strange Tale of the Last True Hermit (GQ)
- Maine Hermit Pleads Guilty to Theft
- Hermit Nabbed after Three Decades, 1,000 Burglaries


text:
President Obama's extraordinary mea culpa news conference Thursday was about more than making a fix in a provision of the Affordable Care Act.
It was about turning around a downward slide that could threaten the future of his presidency.
For more than three years, congressional Republicans have flailed at the Affordable Care Act with limited success. Now, in the space of six weeks, the administration's own missteps — the botched roll-out of the federal exchange website and the broken promises over consumers being able to keep insurance plans they like — have significantly eroded confidence in Obama's signature legislative achievement and Democratic unity behind it.
What's more, with a string of apologies and some uncomfortable admissions, Obama Thursday fueled questions about his administration's competence and his own leadership, the most fundamental of presidential characteristics.
"There have been times where I thought we got, you know, slapped around a little bit unjustly. This one's deserved, all right? It's on us," he said at one point. At another: "I do make apologies for not having executed better over the last several months." And one more: "We fumbled the roll-out on this health care law."
He said he would delay for a year provisions in the health care law that required insurance companies to end policies that didn't have minimum coverage standards. But the insurance industry warned that step could raise premiums for everyone and state insurance commissioners questioned whether it was even feasible at this late date.
And the revolt on Capitol Hill didn't seem to abate. House Republicans plan to vote Friday on a bill the White House opposes that would allow Americans to keep existing health care plans through 2014. Some Senate Democrats said they hoped to continue with plans for a similar measure.
STORY:Obama's health care fix doesn't allay Dems' jitters
STORY:Obama's HealthCare.gov story in 5 GIFs
"What's happened in recent weeks is, I think, a dagger aimed at the heart of Obama's presidency," says presidential scholar William Galston of the Brookings Institution, a veteran of the Clinton White House. "I say that not only because of the centrality of health care reform to the administration's agenda and to his legacy but also because it has posed a direct challenge to his standing as president in the eyes of the American people."
Obama's approval-disapproval rating was at 42%-52% in the daily Gallup Poll Thursday, in the neighborhood of George W. Bush at this point in his second term and well below the standing of Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan. For the first time in his presidency, a majority of Americans said Obama was not a strong and decisive leader.
Approval of the Affordable Care Act also may be dropping fast. Just a few weeks ago, 44% approved of the law, 47% disapproved. Now just 40% approve and 55% disapprove, the worst in at least a year.
Surely only dire circumstances could have convinced the candidate once known as "no-drama Obama" to announce a policy change and then field questions for almost an hour in the White House press room. Not a person given to public introspection or apology, his tone was contrite and even confessional at times.
To be sure, presidents have recovered from serious setbacks before. Reagan faced tough hearings over the Iran-contra scandal but finished his second term with a tax code overhaul and breakthrough agreements with the Soviet Union. Clinton survived impeachment. A booming economy and a falling jobless rate could do a lot to restore Obama's reputation.
If things go as the White House hopes, the HealthCare.gov website will be operating well by the end of this month. By the end of next March, when the sign-up period is scheduled to end, many of those consumers now concerned about losing their current plans will be persuaded that they're better off with a new one.
At the moment, however, the Obamacare landscape is sufficiently rocky that when a reporter asked about about stalled negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, it seemed to be almost a relief.
Follow @susanpage on Twitter.


text:
No straps? No dancing, N.J. middle school principal says
READINGTON TOWNSHIP, N.J. — The eighth-graders' annual dinner dance here has become a lesson in civil liberties and gender studies after a middle school principal banned strapless dresses.
She considers them too distracting for boys.
VIDEO:Prom dress wars take to social media
VIDEO:Free prom dresses for volunteer work
But parents, not rebellious teens, are the ones fighting this dress-code ruling at Readington Middle School.
"I'm objecting to the fact that government can come in and change the rules without asking parents. That's an abuse of authority," said Charlotte Nijenhuis, who plans to petition the Readington Board of Education to suspend the rule. She called the rule arbitrary, sexist and a violation of her daughter's 14th Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.
Plus, strapless dresses were allowed in previous years, parents said.
This month Principal Sharon Moffat sent parents a letter that said, "Young gentlemen are encouraged to wear collared shirts and trousers; many boys wear ties or jackets. Young ladies should wear a skirt, dress with straps, or dressy pants outfit. Jeans or sneakers are not appropriate for this event."
Nijenhuis said she spoke to Moffat, who told her that any girl who shows up June 12 in a strapless dress would be turned away.
The dance is being conducted off campus and parents are footing the bill. Many parents already have purchased dresses for their daughters, they said.
"Ms. Moffat has stated that such dresses 'distract boys' and are 'inappropriate' for young girls. As a parent, she is free to dictate the attire of her children, but as a principal of a public school and representative of all of the residents of Readington, she ought to not unilaterally dictate what our children may or may not wear," Nijenhuis wrote in a letter to Superintendent Barbara Sargent, who backed the principal.
"Ms. Moffat's comment about 'distraction' to the boys is particularly offensive because it suggests that boys are not able to control — or ought not to be required to control — their behavior when in the presence of girls wearing strapless dresses," Nijenhuis said. "It is neither a woman's nor a girl's responsibility to control a man's or boy's behavior."
Sargent could not be reached for comment Monday.
Some other schools across the country have banned strapless dresses this year, including Capistrano Valley High School in Mission Viejo, Calif., which said dresses at its winter formal this past February had to have straps.
The rationale? "Quite often strapless dresses fall while students are dancing, becoming inappropriate," Capistrano Valley school officials said on their website. They suggested sewing on ribbon, clear plastic or spaghetti straps to comply with the dress code. And the Southern California school had several other restrictions as well.
Here in Readington Township, Melissa May, 37, said she disagreed with the tone of the principal's letter.
"I would not allow my daughter to wear something that I felt was inappropriate to a function like that," May said. "As parents, we should have the ability to say what our children wear."
The junior section of clothing stores also reflects an affinity for short shorts and strapless dresses, she said.
"I've seen full dresses that are more inappropriate than these (strapless) dresses," said Harry Nijenhuis, who defended his daughter's planned outfit for the dance. "It's not an inappropriate dress. It's a fancy dress."


text:
Amazing Aha Free
by: Easymobi • 9
평가 등급
by: Easymobi • 9
Donkey Aha is a new amazing physics puzzle game.
Meet Donkey Aha and his family! Donkey Aha lives with his dad, mum, brother and sister. Their favorite food is carrot and they are infamously stubborn, so they will do anything to eat carrots.
No matter where they are, home or outdoor, bathroom or gym, even in theme park, they keep on looking for carrots. They jump, they climb, they swing and they strive to eat all carrots.
When they are indoors, you need to help Donkey Aha and his family with all kinds of tools: bungee rope, bubble and toy.
When they are outdoors, you need to help the Donkey family with a new set of tools: trampoline, balloon and seesaw.
Be careful, don't get hurt by nails and spikes.
Now, let's move our fingers, help Donkey Aha and his family to get their beloved carrots.
Key features:
Cute characters with different personalities.
Outstanding graphics, a visual feast.
Interesting game tools, guaranteed surprises .
Easy to start, hard to master.
Have a try, you won't regret it.
: 9 리뷰
다운로드 Amazing Aha Free
이 앱 공유


text:
Portland's Central Eastside: A Rich History of Economic Prosperity
History and Timeline
The Central Eastside has been an important part of Portland's economy since the city's earliest settlement.
Originally settled in 1845 as part of a 640-acre land claim, the area was once largely planted with orchards and hay. At the time, the east bank of the river was dominated by marshes, creeks and sloughs, making development near the river's edge difficult and requiring streets in the area to be built upon an expansive series of trestles.
In 1869 the East-Side Oregon Central Railroad connected the area with Salem, and an industrial economy based on the shipment of agricultural products began to take hold.
With the Morrison Bridge opening in 1887, the area (then part of the City of East Portland) was directly connected to the City of Portland. The bridge — the first to connect the east and west sides of the Willamette River — and the new rail lines to California and eastern states had a significant economic impact on the district and the entire Portland region. Portland was now a center of agricultural trade.
In 1891, East Portland was incorporated into the City of Portland, which was the Pacific Northwest's biggest port — even bigger than Seattle.
By the end of the 19th century the east side was a thriving commercial district, its riverbank lined with double-decker docks that allowed the loading and unloading of ships both in low and high tide. Produce distribution and industrial service businesses lined the railroad tracks and Union Avenue (now Martin Luther King Blvd). Commerce spanned Grand Avenue, and vacant lots throughout the area filled in with a mix of industrial, commercial and residential uses.
Evolution of an Industrial Center
Over the decades, the types of industries in the Central Eastside have diversified, as have the transportation modes used to move both employees and products. Workers once arrived by foot or horse but soon came to rely on streetcar, and eventually the automobile, as the primary means to get to work.
The district is now served by a dynamic and growing multi-modal system that includes the return of streetcar, as well as bus, trucks, freight trains, light rail, bikes, pedestrians and cars.
Types of businesses today
The slow evolution of the Central Eastside into an industrial area has shaped the urban form we see today. With each successive era, the types of buildings and transportation infrastructure in the district have changed to meet the business needs.
While the character and types of businesses in the district have not changed significantly, the number of business sectors co-existing in the district has expanded. And although some companies — such as large-scale manufacturers and distribution companies — have relocated for more space or direct access to port facilities, many new businesses find the district's buildings meet their needs.This evolution is most evident in the area between Water Avenue and Martin Luther King Blvd. Here older buildings that used to house a single produce distribution company now host numerous small scale manufacturing, industrial service and industrial office users.have changed to meet the business needs.
This is the second installment of a blog series aimed at exploring the past, present, and future of the Central Eastside. To learn more about the history of the Central Eastside and the planning efforts for the district, read the Central Eastside Reader and visit the SE Quadrant Plan calendar to learn about future events.


text:
Tokyo, Japan, October 30, 2010 - Japan vs Peru press conference
Peru player Patricia Soto: "I think we did a good job in third, but we saw lots of things we need to improve. Perhaps on the mental side we need to improve a lot."
Regarding loss turning point in the second set "We couldn't keep the momentum, and that was a problem. Hopefully we can improve it."
Peru coach Kim Cheol Yong: "We struggled to receive overall in the game, at that's one reason that led to the result in the match."
"Japan's team play is very fast. We did not have any chance to play any Asian teams. When Japan played fast we were unable to catch up to their rhythm."
Japan coach Masayosi Manabe: "Regarding the blackout, maybe in any other country there is also this kind of thing. It's rare here in Japan. But our players didn't lose concentration, and they started well. Our serving today was effective."
Japan's top scorer Saori Kimura: "The result is fine, but our performance is not as it should be. If we continue like this maybe we'll face a very serious situation in later stages in the tournament."
Japan player Mai Yamaguchi: "My attacking is ok because Kimura's reception is very good. We played well-functioning combination volleyball today."
Japan player Yukiko Ebata: "I didn't play well yesterday so I was determined today from the very start of the match. I cheered all my colleagues and my motivation was fine."


text:
- Isolation Booths (12)
Studio Acoustic Foam Treatment (153)
- - Acoustic Foam Panels (31)
- - 12" Acoustic Foam Tile Packs (11)
- - Acoustic Foam Tiles (41)
- - Melamine Acoustic Foam (16)
- - Bass Traps (10)
- - Acoustic Ceiling Tiles (3)
- - Acoustic Floor Tiles (3)
- - Isolation Equipment (7)
- - Acoustic Tile Kits (16)
- - Bass Trap Kits (4)
- - Starter Kits (8)
- - Installation Tools (1)
- - Discounted Items (2)
- Cinema & Listening Room Acoustics (17)
- Office Acoustics (46)
- Soundproofing Products (57)
Wedge Bass Trap Corner Kit
Product Code: WDBTCK
For delivery on :
Availability: 100
Ex Tax: £62.50
Add to Compare
Bass control is probably the most important aspect of your studio treatment and yet is commonly the area that is very often left alone. Installation of low frequency absorbers is especially inportant if the space you are working in is relatively small or the type of music you are working with has a lot of low end energy.
The Wedge Bass Traps we have developed are completely CNC machined to ensure a perfect cut every time. The face of the bass trap has been specifically developed for our range of bass traps. Most other bass traps that have a wedge profile cut into them remove a considerable amount of foam from the bass trap thus inhibiting performance. However the Wedge Bass Trap that we have carefully developed ensures that no foam is removed from the volume of a bass trap but instead material is added thus increasing the depth of a bass trap as opposed to reducing it as with other manufacturers. Surface area is increased to make the Wedge Bass Traps bigger than plain faced Bass Traps and so promoting increased absorption.
The advantage with this carefull development will become abundantly clear when these are installed in your room. You'll gain more control over your room and especially those low end frequencies which can be detrimental to recordings. Low frequency energy builds up in a room, specifically in corners, and this build up can severely cloud and colour your recordings or get in the way of getting accurate mixes together.
Our Wedge Bass Traps are available in two lenths, 2ft and 3ft. They are the standard size of 12" wide at the back and have a width of 17".
The acoustic foam we use conforms to the more stringent fire tests of Crib 5 and Schedule 1, Part 1 of the Furnishings and Furniture Regulations so you will have peace of mind that the product you are using is safe also. And you also have our guarantee that the foam will stand the test of time. The colour we use has been carefully selected to ensure that it doesn't quickly discolour or fade over time. You won't have the problem of the foam crumbling and turning to dust either. We know that treating your studio is a big investment and we want to make sure that your investment stands the test of time. The only way to ensure that is by sticking with Advanced Acoustics. We have many years of experience in acoustic treatment and soundproofing. Acoustic Treatment and Soundproofing are the only products we deal with. You won't see us selling any other forms of foam or bedding. Acoustic foam is all we do and we are very good at it as our outstanding feedback and previous customers will testify. Our products have been used by a full host of companies including the BBC, Williams F1 Team, McLaren, Cisco, Cadburys and ITN just to mention a few.
This item is kept permanently in stock. The foam we use is an open cell polyurethane acoustic foam and is available in charcoal only.
Technical Details
Individual Bass Trap Size
12" x 12" x 36" (305mm x 305mm x 915mm)
Quantity Of Bass Traps Per Kit
3 (Also includes a Bass Trap Corner Fill sized 12" x 12" x 12)
Acoustic Foam Colour
Acoustic Foam Density
30 kg/m3
Acoustic Foam Composition
Open Cell Polyurethane Acoustic Foam
Fire Classification
Crib 5 and Schedule 1, Part 1 of the Furnishings and Furniture (fire)(safety) Regulations 1988 (amended 1989)
Bass Trap Description
Triangle corner mounted bass trap with a CNC machined wedge profile face
Write a reviewYour Name:
Your Review: Note: HTML is not translated!
Rating: Bad Good
Enter the code in the box below:


text:
- English (1) (remove)
We consider a multiple objective linear program (MOLP) max{Cx|Ax = b,x in N_{0}^{n}} where C = (c_ij) is the p x n - matrix of p different objective functions z_i(x) = c_{i1}x_1 + ... + c_{in}x_n , i = 1,...,p and A is the m x n - matrix of a system of m linear equations a_{k1}x_1 + ... + a_{kn}x_n = b_k , k=1,...,m which form the set of constraints of the problem. All coefficients are assumed to be natural numbers or zero. The set M of admissable solutions {hat x} is an admissible solution such that there exists no other admissable solution x' with C{hat x} Cx'. The efficient solutions play the role of optimal solutions for the MOLP and it is our aim to determine the set of all efficient solutions


text:
Microsoft applies lipstick to MSN butterfly
Bigger, fewer wings
With Windows Live and Bing, Microsoft's MSN butterfly has had its wings ripped from it in recent years
MSN was once the flagship of Microsoft's online aspirations, led by the familiar butterfly logo introduced in 2000. The effort spanned search and advertising, Hotmail, Messenger, shopping, and maps, while serving content such as news. MSN and its butterfly attracted millions of users.
Even though MSN was one of the first such online services, it wasn't enough and Microsoft's flapping and indecision allowed others to rake in money and build market share during those important early web years.
The punishment: Hotmail, Messenger, and Web 2.0 maps went to Windows Live while Bing is the multimillion-dollar focus for search and shopping. Other ventures, such as the MSN Explorer browser, were consigned to the dustbin of history long ago.
Yet the MSN butterfly refuses to die. Indeed, Microsoft looks like it's about to give MSN yet another makeover, perpetuating its bifurcated web strategy.
Microsoft is reported to have just filed an application for an updated butterfly brand with the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in a document uncovered by blogger Long Zheng.
The new butterfly is bigger than the current logo, but the filing does not include colors. We should assume, however, that Microsoft will fall back on its standard blues, greens, reds, and yellows.
With the applications and services now with Windows Live and Bing, that leaves MSN holding content: MSN is big in markets around the world as a portal for news, forums, and other services.
It seems that the new logo will herald a new attempt to relaunch and reposition MSN and its butterfly, this time as a home for things you want to read and view. ®
Sponsored: How to get more from MicroStrategy by optimising your data stack


text:
Send us feedback via one of the links below:
Compliments and suggestions
Is this your first experience with AccuJazz? We'd love to hear what you think! To send us your comments, just click here to visit to our general feedback form. (But for specific problems and requests, see the links below.)
Having trouble with your player?
Music not playing? We can help: Check out our in-depth FAQ first! If that doesn't help, let us know by sending us feedback. (Click here to do so.)
Artists/songs you'd like to hear
We can't take direct requests (here's why), but if there's an artist or song that you think we should be playing, we're open to suggestions!
Want us to play your CD?
Have we overlooked your band? Bring it to our attention. (Our mailing address, by the way, is here.)
Interested in advertising on AccuJazz?
We've got a sophisticated, attentive, wonderful audience that you can reach with banner ads or radio commericals. (And note we've got very little clutter — typically only one or two commercials per hour!) Find out more about advertising here.
General feedback
If your feedback doesn't fit in to one of the above categories, send it here.
Unfortunately, we don't have sufficient resources to respond to every individual feedback that we get. However, we do read every one — we take your opinions very seriously and we try to adjust our efforts appropriately. Thanks for your comments!


text:
Mad Men actress January Jones made it very clear she wasn't wearing any underwear during her Friday night appearance on The Tonight Show with Jimmy Fallon by wearing a revealing, lacy black jumpsuit.
The head-to-toe jumpsuit was largely modest except for lacy panels along the side that showed plenty of skin and not a lot of something else that should've been there … her underwear.
While on the show, the 36-year-old actress told a mean story of how she pranked her ex-boyfriend from high school -- who's now a realtor -- into thinking she was planning to purchase a $1 to $2 million home from him.
Take a look: