text:
- Share
Sugar spotted around star
Sweet star Scientists have detected simple sugar molecules in the gas surrounding a young Sun-like star.
While sugar has previously been detected in molecular gas clouds, this is the first time it has been seen close to a star.
The discovery shows that sugars, which are the building blocks of life, are in the right place, at the right time, to be included in the makeup of newly forming planets, say the group of international scientists led by Jes Jørgensen from the Niels Bohr Institute in Denmark.
"This simple sugar called glycolaldehyde is one of the ingredients in the formation of RNA, which, like DNA, is one of the building blocks of life," says Jørgensen.
"These are not much different to the sugar we put in coffee."
Jørgensen and colleagues found the sugars in radio wave measurements of the gas surrounding a young star, 400 light years away.
The team used the newly completed European Southern Observatory Atacama Large Millimeter-submillimeter Array radio telescope (ALMA) in Chile, which has provided new opportunities for astro-chemistry research.
"One of the most intriguing questions in studies of the chemistry of the early solar system is whether, how, when and where complex organic and potentially pre-biotic molecules are formed," says Jørgensen.
The team, whose findings are reported in the Astrophysical Journal Letters, also detected other complex organic molecules around the star including ethylene glycol, methyl-formate and ethanol.
Key to life
This discovery lets us see how the chemicals that form life get together, says Professor Malcolm Walter from the Australian Centre for Astrobiology at the University of New South Wales.
"It's important to know that these molecules can form or at least congregate at distances from a star comparable to where the planet Uranus orbits in our solar system," says Walter.
"Just as important was their discovery that these molecules were moving inwards, towards the star's habitable zone, where water can exist as liquid."
"That's what we need for the origin of life."


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No Change In Census Position On Missionaries: Utah Loses AgainSunday, August 16th, 2009
UPDATE: More solid reporting on this issue is available in the Salt Lake Tribune.
Back in June I wrote, "In America's last decennial headcount, Utah was 800 citizens short of gaining a fourth seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. One major factor: Many Mormons from Utah spend time overseas as missionaries and weren't counted in the 2000 Census." Well, as the AP just reported, "The U.S. Census Bureau has told Utah's elected leaders it won't count Mormon missionaries serving overseas in the nation's next head count."
SALT LAKE CITY — The U.S. Census Bureau has told Utah's elected leaders it won't count Mormon missionaries serving overseas in the nation's next head count.
Census Bureau officials, rejecting Utah's lobbying efforts for the better part of a decade, say there's no way to reliably count the overseas missionaries.
Utah leaders say the omission cost the state an extra congressional seat in 2000, when the state fell just 857 people short of receiving the last available slot in the U.S. House.
The Census Bureau does count military and federal employees serving overseas, and Rob Bishop, R-Utah, says it should include Mormons on proselytizing missions.
"The bottom line should still be fairness and accuracy," Bishop said. "If we are currently counting some people abroad and not others, there is just no logic to that whatsoever."
An experiment in counting Americans abroad in 2004 turned into a "colossal failure," said Louis Kincannon, a former Census Bureau director under President Bill Clinton. Few Americans responded to an outreach program in three sample countries — Mexico, France and Kuwait.
A government consulting firm, Election Data Services, estimates that 6 million Americans are living overseas. But federal officials say there's no dependable way to track down citizens who move around and may not want to be found because they don't want to pay U.S. taxes.
A review by the Government Accountability Office found that counting Americans overseas is impractical, and it suggested the Census Bureau abandon the effort. The bureau says overseas counts produce erratic results that could distort state-by-state counts.
Census officials said that if Congress wants them to count all citizens overseas, it will have to enact legislation making it a requirement.
Utah sued the Census Bureau in 2001 in an attempt to get the military count thrown out, saying it unfairly benefited North Carolina, which claimed the 435th House seat a year earlier largely because of the state's military bases, such as the U.S. Army's Fort Bragg and the Marine Corps' Camp Lejeune.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Utah's claims and ruled the Census Bureau enjoys wide discretion on counting.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
We welcomed our first Grandbaby into the world two weeks ago today.
Of course, we think he is the most beautiful and special person on the planet :)
Mommy & Daddy are pretty proud too!
I've designed this file that would be fun on a card front, gift bag or even a pennant garland.


text:
Why not use a P-channel instead, sourcing current into a 10K resistor to Gnd.When the P-channel opens up, the resistor pulls the analog pin low.Oherwise, post a schematic so we can see where this 48V is coming from.
Well, a Zener is only going to clamp the voltage if it can bring the supply side down to its cutoff voltage. In other words, it will try to pull your 48v rail to 5v (or whatever). If it's a high-current rail, it will probably fail to do so, catastrophically. If it succeeds (a BIG Zener!), your 48v rail, isn't.The solution to this is to have a series resistance before the Zener. But then you have resistance (other than the current sensing "resistor" formed by the Rds of the FET) in your sensing circuit that you have to deal with.If this is not news to you, you've found some suitable way to account for that series resistance, and you're able to to keep the shunt current within limits of the part, then I'm with the other guys here. The manufacturer should be able to supply reliability specs. :-)
Basically, I am using the source-drain resistance of the MOSFET as a current-sense resistor. A crude measurement of the current is all that is necessary.
Of course, doing this will guarantee that your 48v rail either never reaches 48v, or that the Zener will vaporize shortly after power-up.


text:
What are some uses for home servers?no_redirect=1
Internet Firewalls:
Frequently Asked Questions
Date: 2004/07/26 15:34:42
Revision: 10.4
This document available in .and .
1 Administrativia
1.1 About the FAQ
This collection of Frequenty Asked Questions (FAQs) and answers has been compiled over a period of years, seeing which questions people ask about firewalls in such fora as Usenet, mailing lists, and Web sites. If you have a question, looking here to see whether it's answered before posting your question is good form. Don't send your questions about firewalls to the FAQ maintainers.
The maintainers welcome input and comments on the contents of this FAQ. Comments related to the FAQ should be addressed to Before you send us mail, please be sure to see sections 1.2 and 1.3 to make sure this is the right document for you to be reading.
1.2 For Whom Is the FAQ Written?
Firewalls have come a long way from the days when this FAQ started. They've gone from being highly customized systems administered by their implementors to a mainstream commodity. Firewalls are no longer solely in the hands of those who design and implement security systems; even security-conscious end-users have them at home.
We wrote this FAQ for computer systems developers and administrators. We have tried to be fairly inclusive, making room for the newcomers, but we still assume some basic technical background. If you find that you don't understand this document, but think that you need to know more about firewalls, it might well be that you actually need to get more background in computer networking first. We provide references that have helped us; perhaps they'll also help you.
We focus predominately on "network" firewalls, but ``host'' or ``"personal'' firewalls will be addressed where appropriate.
1.3 Before Sending Mail
Note that this collection of frequently-asked questions is a result of interacting with many people of different backgrounds in a wide variety of public fora. The firewalls-faq address is not a help desk. If you're trying to use an application that says that it's not working because of a firewall and you think that you need to remove your firewall, please do not send us mail asking how.
If you want to know how to ``get rid of your firewall'' because you cannot use some application, do not send us mail asking for help. We cannot help you. Really.
Who can help you? Good question. That will depend on what exactly the problem is, but here are several pointers. If none of these works, please don't ask us for any more. We don't know.
- The provider of the software you're using.
- The provider of the hardware ``appliance'' you're using.
- The provider of the network service you're using. That is, if you're on AOL, ask them. If you're trying to use something on a corporate network, talk to your system administrator.
1.4 Where Can I find the Current Version of the FAQ?
The FAQ can be found on the Web at
It's also posted monthly to
Posted versions are archived in all the usual places. Unfortunately, the version posted to Usenet and archived from that version lack the pretty pictures and useful hyperlinks found in the web version.
1.5 Where Can I Find Non-English Versions of the FAQ?
Several translations are available. (If you've done a translation and it's not listed here, please write us so we can update the master document.)
- Norwegian
- Translation by Jon Haugsand
1.6 Contributors
Many people have written helpful suggestions and thoughtful commentary. We're grateful to all contributors. We'd like to thank afew by name: Keinanen Vesa, Allen Leibowitz, Brent Chapman, Brian Boyle, D. Clyde Williamson, Richard Reiner, Humberto Ortiz Zuazaga, and Theodore Hope.
1.7 Copyright and Usage
Copyright ©1995-1996, 1998 Marcus J. Ranum. Copyright ©1998-2002 Matt Curtin. Copyright 2004, Paul D. Robertson. All rights reserved. This document may be used, reprinted, and redistributed as is providing this copyright notice and all attributions remain intact. Translations of the complete text from the original English to other languages are also explicitly allowed. Translators may add their names to the ``Contributors'' section.
2 Background and Firewall Basics
Before being able to understand a complete discussion of firewalls, it's important to understand the basic principles that make firewalls work.
2.1 What is a network firewall?
A firewall is a system or group of systems that enforces an access control policy between two or more networks. The actual means by which this is accomplished varies widely, but in principle, the firewall can be thought of as a pair of mechanisms: one which exists to block traffic, and the other which exists to permit traffic. Some firewalls place a greater emphasis on blocking traffic, while others emphasize permitting traffic. Probably the most important thing to recognize about a firewall is that it implements an access control policy. If you don't have a good idea of what kind of access you want to allow or to deny, a firewall really won't help you. It's also important to recognize that the firewall's configuration, because it is a mechanism for enforcing policy, imposes its policy on everything behind it. Administrators for firewalls managing the connectivity for a large number of hosts therefore have a heavy responsibility.
2.2 Why would I want a firewall?
The Internet, like any other society, is plagued with the kind of jerks who enjoy the electronic equivalent of writing on other people's walls with spraypaint, tearing their mailboxes off, or just sitting in the street blowing their car horns. Some people try to get real work done over the Internet, and others have sensitive or proprietary data they must protect. Usually, a firewall's purpose is to keep the jerks out of your network while still letting you get your job done.
Many traditional-style corporations and data centers have computing security policies and practices that must be followed. In a case where a company's policies dictate how data must be protected, a firewall is very important, since it is the embodiment of the corporate policy. Frequently, the hardest part of hooking to the Internet, if you're a large company, is not justifying the expense or effort, but convincing management that it's safe to do so. A firewall provides not only real security--it often plays an important role as a security blanket for management.
Lastly, a firewall can act as your corporate ``ambassador'' to the Internet. Many corporations use their firewall systems as a place to store public information about corporate products and services, files to download, bug-fixes, and so forth. Several of these systems have become important parts of the Internet service structure (e.g., , , ) and have reflected well on their organizational sponsors. Note that while this is historically true, most organizations now place public information on a Web server, often protected by a firewall, but not normally on the firewall itself.
2.3 What can a firewall protect against?
Some firewalls permit only email traffic through them, thereby protecting the network against any attacks other than attacks against the email service. Other firewalls provide less strict protections, and block services that are known to be problems.
Generally, firewalls are configured to protect against unauthenticated interactive logins from the ``outside'' world. This, more than anything, helps prevent vandals from logging into machines on your network. More elaborate firewalls block traffic from the outside to the inside, but permit users on the inside to communicate freely with the outside. The firewall can protect you against any type of network-borne attack if you unplug it.
Firewalls are also important since they can provide a single ``choke point'' where security and audit can be imposed. Unlike in a situation where a computer system is being attacked by someone dialing in with a modem, the firewall can act as an effective ``phone tap'' and tracing tool. Firewalls provide an important logging and auditing function; often they provide summaries to the administrator about what kinds and amount of traffic passed through it, how many attempts there were to break into it, etc.
Because of this, firewall logs are critically important data. They can be used as evidence in a court of law in most countries. You should safeguard, analyze and protect yoru firewall logs accordingly.
This is an important point: providing this ``choke point'' can serve the same purpose on your network as a guarded gate can for your site's physical premises. That means anytime you have a change in ``zones'' or levels of sensitivity, such a checkpoint is appropriate. A company rarely has only an outside gate and no receptionist or security staff to check badges on the way in. If there are layers of security on your site, it's reasonable to expect layers of security on your network.
2.4 What can't a firewall protect against?
Firewalls can't protect against attacks that don't go through the firewall. Many corporations that connect to the Internet are very concerned about proprietary data leaking out of the company through that route. Unfortunately for those concerned, a magnetic tape, compact disc, DVD, or USB flash drives can just as effectively be used to export data. Many organizations that are terrified (at a management level) of Internet connections have no coherent policy about how dial-in access via modems should be protected. It's silly to build a six-foot thick steel door when you live in a wooden house, but there are a lot of organizations out there buying expensive firewalls and neglecting the numerous other back-doors into their network. For a firewall to work, it must be a part of a consistent overall organizational security architecture. Firewall policies must be realistic and reflect the level of security in the entire network. For example, a site with top secret or classified data doesn't need a firewall at all: they shouldn't be hooking up to the Internet in the first place, or the systems with the really secret data should be isolated from the rest of the corporate network.
Another thing a firewall can't really protect you against is traitors or idiots inside your network. While an industrial spy might export information through your firewall, he's just as likely to export it through a telephone, FAX machine, or Compact Disc. CDs are a far more likely means for information to leak from your organization than a firewall. Firewalls also cannot protect you against stupidity. Users who reveal sensitive information over the telephone are good targets for social engineering; an attacker may be able to break into your network by completely bypassing your firewall, if he can find a ``helpful'' employee inside who can be fooled into giving access to a modem pool. Before deciding this isn't a problem in your organization, ask yourself how much trouble a contractor has getting logged into the network or how much difficulty a user who forgot his password has getting it reset. If the people on the help desk believe that every call is internal, you have a problem that can't be fixed by tightening controls on the firewalls.
Firewalls can't protect against tunneling over most application protocols to trojaned or poorly written clients. There are no magic bullets and a firewall is not an excuse to not implement software controls on internal networks or ignore host security on servers. Tunneling ``bad'' things over HTTP, SMTP, and other protocols is quite simple and trivially demonstrated. Security isn't ``fire and forget''.
Lastly, firewalls can't protect against bad things being allowed through them. For instance, many Trojan Horses use the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol to allow an attacker to control a compromised internal host from a public IRC server. If you allow any internal system to connect to any external system, then your firewall will provide no protection from this vector of attack.
2.5 What about viruses and other malware?
Firewalls can't protect very well against things like viruses or malicious software (malware). There are too many ways of encoding binary files for transfer over networks, and too many different architectures and viruses to try to search for them all. In other words, a firewall cannot replace security-consciousness on the part of your users. In general, a firewall cannot protect against a data-driven attack--attacks in which something is mailed or copied to an internal host where it is then executed. This form of attack has occurred in the past against various versions of sendmail, ghostscript, scripting mail user agents like Outlook, and Web browsers like Internet Explorer.
Organizations that are deeply concerned about viruses should implement organization-wide virus control measures. Rather than only trying to screen viruses out at the firewall, make sure that every vulnerable desktop has virus scanning software that is run when the machine is rebooted. Blanketing your network with virus scanning software will protect against viruses that come in via floppy disks, CDs, modems, and the Internet. Trying to block viruses at the firewall will only protect against viruses from the Internet. Virus scanning at the firewall or e-mail gateway will stop a large number of infections.
Nevertheless, an increasing number of firewall vendors are offering ``virus detecting'' firewalls. They're probably only useful for naive users exchanging Windows-on-Intel executable programs and malicious-macro-capable application documents. There are many firewall-based approaches for dealing with problems like the ``ILOVEYOU'' worm and related attacks, but these are really oversimplified approaches that try to limit the damage of something that is so stupid it never should have occurred in the first place. Do not count on any protection from attackers with this feature. (Since ``ILOVEYOU'' went around, we've seen at least a half-dozen similar attacks, including Melissa, Happy99, Code Red, and Badtrans.B, all of which were happily passed through many virus-detecting firewalls and e-mail gateways.)
A strong firewall is never a substitute for sensible software that recognizes the nature of what it's handling--untrusted data from an unauthenticated party--and behaves appropriately. Do not think that because ``everyone'' is using that mailer or because the vendor is a gargantuan multinational company, you're safe. In fact, it isn't true that ``everyone'' is using any mailer, and companies that specialize in turning technology invented elsewhere into something that's ``easy to use'' without any expertise are more likely to produce software that can be fooled. Further consideration of this topic would be worthwhile [3], but is beyond the scope of this document.
2.6 Will IPSEC make firewalls obsolete?
Some have argued that this is the case. Before pronouncing such a sweeping prediction, however, it's worthwhile to consider what IPSEC is and what it does. Once we know this, we can consider whether IPSEC will solve the problems that we're trying to solve with firewalls.
IPSEC (IP SECurity) refers to a set of standards developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). There are many documents that collectively define what is known as ``IPSEC'' [6]. IPSEC solves two problems which have plagued the IP protocol suite for years: host-to-host authentication (which will let hosts know that they're talking to the hosts they think they are) and encryption (which will prevent attackers from being able to watch the traffic going between machines).
Note that neither of these problems is what firewalls were created to solve. Although firewalls can help to mitigate some of the risks present on an Internet without authentication or encryption, there are really two classes of problems here: integrity and privacy of the information flowing between hosts and the limits placed on what kinds of connectivity is allowed between different networks. IPSEC addresses the former class and firewalls the latter.
What this means is that one will not eliminate the need for the other, but it does create some interesting possibilities when we look at combining firewalls with IPSEC-enabled hosts. Namely, such things as vendor-independent virtual private networks (VPNs), better packet filtering (by filtering on whether packets have the IPSEC authentication header), and application-layer firewalls will be able to have better means of host verification by actually using the IPSEC authentication header instead of ``just trusting'' the IP address presented.
2.7 What are good sources of print information on firewalls?
There are several books that touch on firewalls. The best known are:
Related references are:
- Internetworking with TCP/IP Vols I, II, and III
- Authors
- Douglas Comer and David Stevens
- Publisher
- Prentice-Hall
- Edition
- 1991
- Comment
- A detailed discussion on the architecture and implementation of the Internet and its protocols. Volume I (on principles, protocols and architecture) is readable by everyone. Volume 2 (on design, implementation and internals) is more technical. Volume 3 covers client-server computing.
- Unix System Security--A Guide for Users and System Administrators
- Author
- David Curry
- Publisher
- Addison Wesley
- Edition
- 1992
- 0-201-56327-4
2.8 Where can I get more information on firewalls on the Internet?
- Site Security Handbook
- The Site Security Handbook is an information IETF document that describes the basic issues that must be addressed for building good site security. Firewalls are one part of a larger security strategy, as the Site Security Handbook shows.
- Firewalls Mailing List
- The internet firewalls mailing list is a forum for firewall administrators and implementors.
- Firewall-Wizards Mailing List
- The Firewall Wizards Mailing List is a moderated firewall and security related list that is more like a journal than a public soapbox.
- Firewall HOWTO
- Describes exactly what is needed to build a firewall, particularly using Linux.
- Firewall Toolkit (FWTK) and Firewall Papers
- Marcus Ranum's firewall related publications
- Texas A&M University security tools
- COAST Project Internet Firewalls page
3 Design and Implementation Issues
3.1 What are some of the basic design decisions in a firewall?
There are a number of basic design issues that should be addressed by the lucky person who has been tasked with the responsibility of designing, specifying, and implementing or overseeing the installation of a firewall.
The first and most important decision reflects the policy of how your company or organization wants to operate the system: is the firewall in place explicitly to deny all services except those critical to the mission of connecting to the Net, or is the firewall in place to provide a metered and audited method of ``queuing'' access in a non-threatening manner? There are degrees of paranoia between these positions; the final stance of your firewall might be more the result of a political than an engineering decision.
The second is: what level of monitoring, redundancy, and control do you want? Having established the acceptable risk level (i.e., how paranoid you are) by resolving the first issue, you can form a checklist of what should be monitored, permitted, and denied. In other words, you start by figuring out your overall objectives, and then combine a needs analysis with a risk assessment, and sort the almost always conflicting requirements out into a laundry list that specifies what you plan to implement.
The third issue is financial. We can't address this one here in anything but vague terms, but it's important to try to quantify any proposed solutions in terms of how much it will cost either to buy or to implement. For example, a complete firewall product may cost between $100,000 at the high end, and free at the low end. The free option, of doing some fancy configuring on a Cisco or similar router will cost nothing but staff time and a few cups of coffee. Implementing a high end firewall from scratch might cost several man-months, which may equate to $30,000 worth of staff salary and benefits. The systems management overhead is also a consideration. Building a home-brew is fine, but it's important to build it so that it doesn't require constant (and expensive) attention. It's important, in other words, to evaluate firewalls not only in terms of what they cost now, but continuing costs such as support.
On the technical side, there are a couple of decisions to make, based on the fact that for all practical purposes what we are talking about is a static traffic routing service placed between the network service provider's router and your internal network. The traffic routing service may be implemented at an IP level via something like screening rules in a router, or at an application level via proxy gateways and services.
The decision to make is whether to place an exposed stripped-down machine on the outside network to run proxy services for telnet, FTP, news, etc., or whether to set up a screening router as a filter, permitting communication with one or more internal machines. There are benefits and drawbacks to both approaches, with the proxy machine providing a greater level of audit and, potentially, security in return for increased cost in configuration and a decrease in the level of service that may be provided (since a proxy needs to be developed for each desired service). The old trade-off between ease-of-use and security comes back to haunt us with a vengeance.
3.2 What are the basic types of firewalls?
Conceptually, there are three types of firewalls:
- Network layer
- Application layer
- Hybrids
They are not as different as you might think, and latest technologies are blurring the distinction to the point where it's no longer clear if either one is ``better'' or ``worse.'' As always, you need to be careful to pick the type that meets your needs.
Which is which depends on what mechanisms the firewall uses to pass traffic from one security zone to another. The International Standards Organization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) model for networking defines seven layers, where each layer provides services that ``higher-level'' layers depend on. In order from the bottom, these layers are physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, application.
The important thing to recognize is that the lower-level the forwarding mechanism, the less examination the firewall can perform. Generally speaking, lower-level firewalls are faster, but are easier to fool into doing the wrong thing.
These days, most firewalls fall into the ``hybrid'' category, which do network filtering as well as some amount of application inspection. The amount changes depending on the vendor, product, protocol and version, so some level of digging and/or testing is often necessary.
3.2.1 Network layer firewalls
These generally make their decisions based on the source, destination addresses and ports (see Appendix 6 for a more detailed discussion of ports) in individual IP packets. A simple router is the ``traditional'' network layer firewall, since it is not able to make particularly sophisticated decisions about what a packet is actually talking to or where it actually came from. Modern network layer firewalls have become increasingly sophisticated, and now maintain internal information about the state of connections passing through them, the contents of some of the data streams, and so on. One thing that's an important distinction about many network layer firewalls is that they route traffic directly though them, so to use one you either need to have a validly assigned IP address block or to use a ``private internet'' address block [5]. Network layer firewalls tend to be very fast and tend to be very transparent to users.
In Figure 1, a network layer firewall called a ``screened host firewall'' is represented. In a screened host firewall, access to and from a single host is controlled by means of a router operating at a network layer. The single host is a bastion host; a highly-defended and secured strong-point that (hopefully) can resist attack.
Example Network layer firewall: In Figure 2, a network layer firewall called a ``screened subnet firewall'' is represented. In a screened subnet firewall, access to and from a whole network is controlled by means of a router operating at a network layer. It is similar to a screened host, except that it is, effectively, a network of screened hosts.
3.2.2 Application layer firewalls
These generally are hosts running proxy servers, which permit no traffic directly between networks, and which perform elaborate logging and auditing of traffic passing through them. Since the proxy applications are software components running on the firewall, it is a good place to do lots of logging and access control. Application layer firewalls can be used as network address translators, since traffic goes in one ``side'' and out the other, after having passed through an application that effectively masks the origin of the initiating connection. Having an application in the way in some cases may impact performance and may make the firewall less transparent. Early application layer firewalls such as those built using the TIS firewall toolkit, are not particularly transparent to end users and may require some training. Modern application layer firewalls are often fully transparent. Application layer firewalls tend to provide more detailed audit reports and tend to enforce more conservative security models than network layer firewalls.
Example Application layer firewall: In Figure 3, an application layer firewall called a ``dual homed gateway'' is represented. A dual homed gateway is a highly secured host that runs proxy software. It has two network interfaces, one on each network, and blocks all traffic passing through it.
Most firewalls now lie someplace between network layer firewalls and application layer firewalls. As expected, network layer firewalls have become increasingly ``aware'' of the information going through them, and application layer firewalls have become increasingly ``low level'' and transparent. The end result is that now there are fast packet-screening systems that log and audit data as they pass through the system. Increasingly, firewalls (network and application layer) incorporate encryption so that they may protect traffic passing between them over the Internet. Firewalls with end-to-end encryption can be used by organizations with multiple points of Internet connectivity to use the Internet as a ``private backbone'' without worrying about their data or passwords being sniffed. (IPSEC, described in Section 2.6, is playing an increasingly significant role in the construction of such virtual private networks.)
3.3 What are proxy servers and how do they work?
A proxy server (sometimes referred to as an application gateway or forwarder) is an application that mediates traffic between a protected network and the Internet. Proxies are often used instead of router-based traffic controls, to prevent traffic from passing directly between networks. Many proxies contain extra logging or support for user authentication. Since proxies must ``understand'' the application protocol being used, they can also implement protocol specific security (e.g., an FTP proxy might be configurable to permit incoming FTP and block outgoing FTP).
Proxy servers are application specific. In order to support a new protocol via a proxy, a proxy must be developed for it. One popular set of proxy servers is the TIS Internet Firewall Toolkit (``FWTK'') which includes proxies for Telnet, rlogin, FTP, the X Window System, HTTP/Web, and NNTP/Usenet news. SOCKS is a generic proxy system that can be compiled into a client-side application to make it work through a firewall. Its advantage is that it's easy to use, but it doesn't support the addition of authentication hooks or protocol specific logging. For more information on SOCKS, see .
3.4 What are some cheap packet screening tools?
The Texas A&M University security tools include software for implementing screening routers. Karlbridge is a PC-based screening router kit available from .
There are numerous kernel-level packet screens, including ipf, ipfw, ipchains, pf, and ipfwadm. Typically, these are included in various free Unix implementations, such as FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD, and Linux. You might also find these tools available in your commercial Unix implementation.
If you're willing to get your hands a little dirty, it's completely possible to build a secure and fully functional firewall for the price of hardware and some of your time.
3.5 What are some reasonable filtering rules for a kernel-based packet screen?
This example is written specifically for ipfwadm on Linux, but the principles (and even much of the syntax) applies for other kernel interfaces for packet screening on ``open source'' Unix systems.
There are four basic categories covered by the ipfwadm rules:
- Packet Accounting
- Input firewall
- Output firewall
- Forwarding firewall
ipfwadm also has masquerading () capabilities. For more information on switches and options, see the ipfwadmman page.
3.5.1 Implementation
Here, our organization is using a private (RFC 1918) Class C network 192.168.1.0. Our ISP has assigned us the address 188.8.131.52 for our gateway's external interface and 188.8.131.52 for our external mail server. Organizational policy says:
- Allow all outgoing TCP connections
- Allow incoming SMTP and DNS to external mail server
- Block all other traffic
The following block of commands can be placed in a system boot file (perhaps on Unix systems).ipfwadm -F -f ipfwadm -F -p deny ipfwadm -F -i m -b -P tcp -S 0.0.0.0/0 1024:65535 -D 126.96.36.199 25 ipfwadm -F -i m -b -P tcp -S 0.0.0.0/0 1024:65535 -D 18.104.22.168 53 ipfwadm -F -i m -b -P udp -S 0.0.0.0/0 1024:65535 -D 18.104.22.168 53 ipfwadm -F -a m -S 192.168.1.0/24 -D 0.0.0.0/0 -W eth0 /sbin/route add -host 22.214.171.124 gw 192.168.1.2
3.5.2 Explanation
- Line one flushes () all forwarding () rules.
- Line two sets the default policy () to .
- Lines three through five are input rules () in the following format:
ipfwadm-F (forward) -i (input) m (masq.) -b (bi-directional) -P protocol)[protocol]-S (source)[subnet/mask] [originating ports]-D (destination)[subnet/mask][port]
- Line six appends () a rule that permits all internal IP addresses out to all external addresses on all protocols, all ports.
- Line eight adds a route so that traffic going to 184.108.40.206 will be directed to the internal address 192.168.1.2.
3.6 What are some reasonable filtering rules for a Cisco?
The example in Figure 4 shows one possible configuration for using the Cisco as filtering router. It is a sample that shows the implementation of as specific policy. Your policy will undoubtedly vary.
In this example, a company has Class C network address 22.214.171.124. Company network is connected to Internet via IP Service Provider. Company policy is to allow everybody access to Internet services, so all outgoing connections are accepted. All incoming connections go through ``mailhost''. Mail and DNS are only incoming services.
3.6.1 Implementation
- Allow all outgoing TCP-connections
- Allow incoming SMTP and DNS to mailhost
- Allow incoming FTP data connections to high TCP port (1024)
- Try to protect services that live on high port numbers
Only incoming packets from Internet are checked in this configuration. Rules are tested in order and stop when the first match is found. There is an implicit deny rule at the end of an access list that denies everything. This IP access list assumes that you are running Cisco IOS v. 10.3 or later.no ip source-route ! interface ethernet 0 ip address 184.108.40.206 no ip directed-broadcast ! interface serial 0 no ip directed-broadcast ip access-group 101 in ! access-list 101 deny ip 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip any 0.0.0.255 255.255.255.0 access-list 101 deny ip any 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 ! access-list 101 deny ip 188.8.131.52 0.0.0.255 access-list 101 permit tcp any any established ! access-list 101 permit tcp any host 22.214.171.124 eq smtp access-list 101 permit tcp any host 126.96.36.199 eq dns access-list 101 permit udp any host 22.214.171.124 eq dns ! access-list 101 deny tcp any any range 6000 6003 access-list 101 deny tcp any any range 2000 2003 access-list 101 deny tcp any any eq 2049 access-list 101 deny udp any any eq 2049 ! access-list 101 permit tcp any 20 any gt 1024 ! access-list 101 permit icmp any any ! snmp-server community FOOBAR RO 2 line vty 0 4 access-class 2 in access-list 2 permit 126.96.36.199 0.0.0.255
3.6.2 Explanations
- Drop all source-routed packets. Source routing can be used for address spoofing.
- Drop directed broadcasts, which are used in smurf attacks.
- If an incoming packet claims to be from a local net, loopback network, or private network, drop it.
- All packets which are part of already established TCP-connections can pass through without further checking.
- All connections to low port numbers are blocked except SMTP and DNS.
- Block all services that listen for TCP connections on high port numbers. X11 (port 6000+), OpenWindows (port 2000+) are a few candidates. NFS (port 2049) runs usually over UDP, but it can be run over TCP, so you should block it.
- Incoming connections from port 20 into high port numbers are supposed to be FTP data connections.
- Access-list 2 limits access to router itself (telnet & SNMP)
- All UDP traffic is blocked to protect RPC services
3.6.3 Shortcomings
- You cannot enforce strong access policies with router access lists. Users can easily install backdoors to their systems to get over ``no incoming telnet'' or ``no X11'' rules. Also crackers install telnet backdoors on systems where they break in.
- You can never be sure what services you have listening for connections on high port numbers. (You can't be sure of what services you have listening for connections on low port numbers, either, especially in highly decentralized environments where people can put their own machines on the network or where they can get administrative access to their own machines.)
- Checking the source port on incoming FTP data connections is a weak security method. It also breaks access to some FTP sites. It makes use of the service more difficult for users without preventing bad guys from scanning your systems.
Use at least Cisco version 9.21 so you can filter incoming packets and check for address spoofing. It's still better to use 10.3, where you get some extra features (like filtering on source port) and some improvements on filter syntax.
You have still a few ways to make your setup stronger. Block all incoming TCP-connections and tell users to use passive-FTP clients. You can also block outgoing ICMP echo-reply and destination-unreachable messages to hide your network and to prevent use of network scanners. Cisco.com use to have an archive of examples for building firewalls using Cisco routers, but it doesn't seem to be online anymore. There are some notes on Cisco access control lists, at least, at .
3.7 What are the critical resources in a firewall?
It's important to understand the critical resources of your firewall architecture, so when you do capacity planning, performance optimizations, etc., you know exactly what you need to do, and how much you need to do it in order to get the desired result.
What exactly the firewall's critical resources are tends to vary from site to site, depending on the sort of traffic that loads the system. Some people think they'll automatically be able to increase the data throughput of their firewall by putting in a box with a faster CPU, or another CPU, when this isn't necessarily the case. Potentially, this could be a large waste of money that doesn't do anything to solve the problem at hand or provide the expected scalability.
On busy systems, memory is extremely important. You have to have enough RAM to support every instance of every program necessary to service the load placed on that machine. Otherwise, the swapping will start and the productivity will stop. Light swapping isn't usually much of a problem, but if a system's swap space begins to get busy, then it's usually time for more RAM. A system that's heavily swapping is often relatively easy to push over the edge in a denial-of-service attack, or simply fall behind in processing the load placed on it. This is where long email delays start.
Beyond the system's requirement for memory, it's useful to understand that different services use different system resources. So the configuration that you have for your system should be indicative of the kind of load you plan to service. A 1400 MHz processor isn't going to do you much good if all you're doing is netnews and mail, and are trying to do it on an IDE disk with an ISA controller.
3.8 What is a DMZ, and why do I want one?
``DMZ'' is an abbreviation for ``demilitarized zone''. In the context of firewalls, this refers to a part of the network that is neither part of the internal network nor directly part of the Internet. Typically, this is the area between your Internet access router and your bastion host, though it can be between any two policy-enforcing components of your architecture.
A DMZ can be created by putting access control lists on your access router. This minimizes the exposure of hosts on your external LAN by allowing only recognized and managed services on those hosts to be accessible by hosts on the Internet. Many commercial firewalls simply make a third interface off of the bastion host and label it the DMZ, the point is that the network is neither ``inside'' nor ``outside''.
For example, a web server running on NT might be vulnerable to a number of denial-of-service attacks against such services as RPC, NetBIOS and SMB. These services are not required for the operation of a web server, so blocking TCP connections to ports 135, 137, 138, and 139 on that host will reduce the exposure to a denial-of-service attack. In fact, if you block everything but HTTP traffic to that host, an attacker will only have one service to attack.
This illustrates an important principle: never offer attackers more to work with than is absolutely necessary to support the services you want to offer the public.
3.9 How might I increase the security and scalability of my DMZ?
A common approach for an attacker is to break into a host that's vulnerable to attack, and exploit trust relationships between the vulnerable host and more interesting targets.
If you are running a number of services that have different levels of security, you might want to consider breaking your DMZ into several ``security zones''. This can be done by having a number of different networks within the DMZ. For example, the access router could feed two Ethernets, both protected by ACLs, and therefore in the DMZ.
On one of the Ethernets, you might have hosts whose purpose is to service your organization's need for Internet connectivity. These will likely relay mail, news, and host DNS. On the other Ethernet could be your web server(s) and other hosts that provide services for the benefit of Internet users.
In many organizations, services for Internet users tend to be less carefully guarded and are more likely to be doing insecure things. (For example, in the case of a web server, unauthenticated and untrusted users might be running CGI, PHP, or other executable programs. This might be reasonable for your web server, but brings with it a certain set of risks that need to be managed. It is likely these services are too risky for an organization to run them on a bastion host, where a slip-up can result in the complete failure of the security mechanisms.)
By putting hosts with similar levels of risk on networks together in the DMZ, you can help minimize the effect of a breakin at your site. If someone breaks into your web server by exploiting some bug in your web server, they'll not be able to use it as a launching point to break into your private network if the web servers are on a separate LAN from the bastion hosts, and you don't have any trust relationships between the web server and bastion host.
Now, keep in mind that this is Ethernet. If someone breaks into your web server, and your bastion host is on the same Ethernet, an attacker can install a sniffer on your web server, and watch the traffic to and from your bastion host. This might reveal things that can be used to break into the bastion host and gain access to the internal network. (Switched Ethernet can reduce your exposure to this kind of problem, but will not eliminate it.)
Splitting services up not only by host, but by network, and limiting the level of trust between hosts on those networks, you can greatly reduce the likelihood of a breakin on one host being used to break into the other. Succinctly stated: breaking into the web server in this case won't make it any easier to break into the bastion host.
You can also increase the scalability of your architecture by placing hosts on different networks. The fewer machines that there are to share the available bandwidth, the more bandwidth that each will get.
3.10 What is a `single point of failure', and how do I avoid having one?
An architecture whose security hinges upon one mechanism has a single point of failure. Software that runs bastion hosts has bugs. Applications have bugs. Software that controls routers has bugs. It makes sense to use all of these components to build a securely designed network, and to use them in redundant ways.
If your firewall architecture is a screened subnet, you have two packet filtering routers and a bastion host. (See question 3.2 from this section.) Your Internet access router will not permit traffic from the Internet to get all the way into your private network. However, if you don't enforce that rule with any other mechanisms on the bastion host and/or choke router, only one component of your architecture needs to fail or be compromised in order to get inside. On the other hand, if you have a redundant rule on the bastion host, and again on the choke router, an attacker will need to defeat three mechanisms.
Further, if the bastion host or the choke router needs to invoke its rule to block outside access to the internal network, you might want to have it trigger an alarm of some sort, since you know that someone has gotten through your access router.
3.11 How can I block all of the bad stuff?
For firewalls where the emphasis is on security instead of connectivity, you should consider blocking everything by default, and only specifically allowing what services you need on a case-by-case basis.
If you block everything, except a specific set of services, then you've already made your job much easier. Instead of having to worry about every security problem with everything product and service around, you only need to worry about every security problem with a specific set of services and products.
Before turning on a service, you should consider a couple of questions:
- Is the protocol for this product a well-known, published protocol?
- Is the application to service this protocol available for public inspection of its implementation?
- How well known is the service and product?
- How does allowing this service change the firewall architecture? Will an attacker see things differently? Could it be exploited to get at my internal network, or to change things on hosts in my DMZ?
When considering the above questions, keep the following in mind:
- ``Security through obscurity'' is no security at all. Unpublished protocols have been examined by bad guys and defeated.
- Despite what the marketing representatives say, not every protocol or service is designed with security in mind. In fact, the number that are is very few.
- Even in cases where security is a consideration, not all organizations have competent security staff. Among those who don't, not all are willing to bring a competent consultant into the project. The end result is that otherwise-competent, well-intended developers can design insecure systems.
- The less that a vendor is willing to tell you about how their system really works, the more likely it is that security (or other) problems exist. Only vendors with something to hide have a reason to hide their designs and implementations [2].
3.12 How can I restrict web access so users can't view sites unrelated to work?
A few years ago, someone got the idea that it's a good idea to block ``bad'' web sites, i.e., those that contain material that The Company views ``inappropriate''. The idea has been increasing in popularity, but there are several things to consider when thinking about implementing such controls in your firewall.
- It is not possible to practically block everything that an employer deems ``inappropriate''. The Internet is full of every sort of material. Blocking one source will only redirect traffic to another source of such material, or cause someone to figure a way around the block.
- Most organizations do not have a standard for judging the appropriateness of material that their employees bring to work, e.g., books and magazines. Do you inspect everyone's briefcase for ``inappropriate material'' every day? If you do not, then why would you inspect every packet for ``inappropriate material''? Any decisions along those lines in such an organization will be arbitrary. Attempting to take disciplinary action against an employee where the only standard is arbitrary typically isn't wise, for reasons well beyond the scope of this document.
- Products that perform site-blocking, commercial and otherwise, are typically easy to circumvent. Hostnames can be rewritten as IP addresses. IP addresses can be written as a 32-bit integer value, or as four 8-bit integers (the most common form). Other possibilities exist, as well. Connections can be proxied. Web pages can be fetched via email. You can't block them all. The effort that you'll spend trying to implement and manage such controls will almost certainly far exceed any level of damage control that you're hoping to have.
The rule-of-thumb to remember here is that you cannot solve social problems with technology. If there is a problem with someone going to an ``inappropriate'' web site, that is because someone else saw it and was offended by what he saw, or because that person's productivity is below expectations. In either case, those are matters for the personnel department, not the firewall administrator.
4 Various Attacks
4.1 What is source routed traffic and why is it a threat?
Normally, the route a packet takes from its source to its destination is determined by the routers between the source and destination. The packet itself only says where it wants to go (the destination address), and nothing about how it expects to get there.
There is an optional way for the sender of a packet (the source) to include information in the packet that tells the route the packet should take to get to its destination; thus the name ``source routing''. For a firewall, source routing is noteworthy, since an attacker can generate traffic claiming to be from a system ``inside'' the firewall. In general, such traffic wouldn't route to the firewall properly, but with the source routing option, all the routers between the attacker's machine and the target will return traffic along the reverse path of the source route. Implementing such an attack is quite easy; so firewall builders should not discount it as unlikely to happen.
In practice, source routing is very little used. In fact, generally the main legitimate use is in debugging network problems or routing traffic over specific links for congestion control for specialized situations. When building a firewall, source routing should be blocked at some point. Most commercial routers incorporate the ability to block source routing specifically, and many versions of Unix that might be used to build firewall bastion hosts have the ability to disable or to ignore source routed traffic.
4.2 What are ICMP redirects and redirect bombs?
An ICMP Redirect tells the recipient system to override something in its routing table. It is legitimately used by routers to tell hosts that the host is using a non-optimal or defunct route to a particular destination, i.e., the host is sending it to the wrong router. The wrong router sends the host back an ICMP Redirect packet that tells the host what the correct route should be. If you can forge ICMP Redirect packets, and if your target host pays attention to them, you can alter the routing tables on the host and possibly subvert the security of the host by causing traffic to flow via a path the network manager didn't intend. ICMP Redirects also may be employed for denial of service attacks, where a host is sent a route that loses it connectivity, or is sent an ICMP Network Unreachable packet telling it that it can no longer access a particular network.
Many firewall builders screen ICMP traffic from their network, since it limits the ability of outsiders to ping hosts, or modify their routing tables.
Before you decide to block all ICMP packets, you should be aware of how the TCP protocol does ``Path MTU Discovery'', to make certain that you don't break connectivity to other sites. If you can't safely block it everywhere, you can consider allowing selected types of ICMP to selected routing devices. If you don't block it, you should at least ensure that your routers and hosts don't respond to broadcast ping packets.
4.3 What about denial of service?
Denial of service is when someone decides to make your network or firewall useless by disrupting it, crashing it, jamming it, or flooding it. The problem with denial of service on the Internet is that it is impossible to prevent. The reason has to do with the distributed nature of the network: every network node is connected via other networks which in turn connect to other networks, etc. A firewall administrator or ISP only has control of a few of the local elements within reach. An attacker can always disrupt a connection ``upstream'' from where the victim controls it. In other words, if someone wanted to take a network off the air, he could do it either by taking the network off the air, or by taking the networks it connects to off the air, ad infinitum. There are many, many, ways someone can deny service, ranging from the complex to the trivial brute-force. If you are considering using Internet for a service which is absolutely time or mission critical, you should consider your fallback position in the event that the network is down or damaged.
TCP/IP's UDP echo service is trivially abused to get two servers to flood a network segment with echo packets. You should consider commenting out unused entries in of Unix hosts, adding to Cisco routers, or the equivalent for your components.
4.4 What are some common attacks, and how can I protect my system against them?
Each site is a little different from every other in terms of what attacks are likely to be used against it. Some recurring themes do arise, though.
4.4.1 SMTP Server Hijacking (Unauthorized Relaying)
This is where a spammer will take many thousands of copies of a message and send it to a huge list of email addresses. Because these lists are often so bad, and in order to increase the speed of operation for the spammer, many have resorted to simply sending all of their mail to an SMTP server that will take care of actually delivering the mail.
Of course, all of the bounces, spam complaints, hate mail, and bad PR come for the site that was used as a relay. There is a very real cost associated with this, mostly in paying people to clean up the mess afterward.
The Mail Abuse Prevention System1Transport Security Initiative2maintains a complete description of the problem, and how to configure about every mailer on the planet to protect against this attack.
4.4.2 Exploiting Bugs in Applications
Various versions of web servers, mail servers, and other Internet service software contain bugs that allow remote (Internet) users to do things ranging from gain control of the machine to making that application crash and just about everything in between.
The exposure to this risk can be reduced by running only necessary services, keeping up to date on patches, and using products that have been around a while.
4.4.3 Bugs in Operating Systems
Again, these are typically initiated by users remotely. Operating systems that are relatively new to IP networking tend to be more problematic, as more mature operating systems have had time to find and eliminate their bugs. An attacker can often make the target equipment continuously reboot, crash, lose the ability to talk to the network, or replace files on the machine.
Here, running as few operating system services as possible can help. Also, having a packet filter in front of the operating system can reduce the exposure to a large number of these types of attacks.
And, of course, chosing a stable operating system will help here as well. When selecting an OS, don't be fooled into believing that ``the pricier, the better''. Free operating systems are often much more robust than their commercial counterparts
5 How Do I...
5.1 Do I really want to allow everything that my users ask for?
It's entirely possible that the answer is ``no''. Each site has its own policies about what is and isn't needed, but it's important to remember that a large part of the job of being an organization's gatekeeper is education. Users want streaming video, real-time chat, and to be able to offer services to external customers that require interaction with live databases on the internal network.
That doesn't mean that any of these things can be done without presenting more risk to the organization than the supposed ``value'' of heading down that road is worth. Most users don't want to put their organization at risk. They just read the trade rags, see advertisements, and they want to do those things, too. It's important to look into what it is that they really want to do, and to help them understand how they might be able to accomplish their real objective in a more secure manner.
You won't always be popular, and you might even find yourself being given direction to do something incredibly stupid, like ``just open up ports foo through bar''. If that happens, don't worry about it. It would be wise to keep all of your exchanges on such an event so that when a 12-year-old script kiddie breaks in, you'll at least be able to separate yourself from the whole mess.
5.2 How do I make Web/HTTP work through my firewall?
There are three ways to do it.
- Allow ``established'' connections out via a router, if you are using screening routers.
- Use a web client that supports SOCKS, and run SOCKS on your bastion host.
- Run some kind of proxy-capable web server on the bastion host. Some options include Squid3, Apache4, Netscape Proxy5, and http-gw from the TIS firewall toolkit. Most of these can also proxy other protocols (such as gopher and ftp), and can cache objects fetched, which will also typically result in a performance boost for the users, and more efficient use of your connection to the Internet. Essentially all web clients (Mozilla, Internet Explorer, Lynx, etc.) have proxy server support built directly into them.
5.3 How do I make SSL work through the firewall?
SSL is a protocol that allows secure connections across the Internet. Typically, SSL is used to protect HTTP traffic. However, other protocols (such as telnet) can run atop SSL.
Enabling SSL through your firewall can be done the same way that you would allow HTTP traffic, if it's HTTP that you're using SSL to secure, which is usually true. The only difference is that instead of using something that will simply relay HTTP, you'll need something that can tunnel SSL. This is a feature present on most web object caches.
You can find out more about SSL from Netscape6.
5.4 How do I make DNS work with a firewall?
Some organizations want to hide DNS names from the outside. Many experts don't think hiding DNS names is worthwhile, but if site/corporate policy mandates hiding domain names, this is one approach that is known to work. Another reason you may have to hide domain names is if you have a non-standard addressing scheme on your internal network. In that case, you have no choice but to hide those addresses. Don't fool yourself into thinking that if your DNS names are hidden that it will slow an attacker down much if they break into your firewall. Information about what is on your network is too easily gleaned from the networking layer itself. If you want an interesting demonstration of this, ping the subnet broadcast address on your LAN and then do an ``arp -a.'' Note also that hiding names in the DNS doesn't address the problem of host names ``leaking'' out in mail headers, news articles, etc.
This approach is one of many, and is useful for organizations that wish to hide their host names from the Internet. The success of this approach lies on the fact that DNS clients on a machine don't have to talk to a DNS server on that same machine. In other words, just because there's a DNS server on a machine, there's nothing wrong with (and there are often advantages to) redirecting that machine's DNS client activity to a DNS server on another machine.
First, you set up a DNS server on the bastion host that the outside world can talk to. You set this server up so that it claims to be authoritative for your domains. In fact, all this server knows is what you want the outside world to know; the names and addresses of your gateways, your wildcard MX records, and so forth. This is the ``public'' server.
Then, you set up a DNS server on an internal machine. This server also claims to be authoritative for your domains; unlike the public server, this one is telling the truth. This is your ``normal'' nameserver, into which you put all your ``normal'' DNS stuff. You also set this server up to forward queries that it can't resolve to the public server (using a ``forwarders'' line in /etc/named.boot on a Unix machine, for example).
Finally, you set up all your DNS clients (the file on a Unix box, for instance), including the ones on the machine with the public server, to use the internal server. This is the key.
An internal client asking about an internal host asks the internal server, and gets an answer; an internal client asking about an external host asks the internal server, which asks the public server, which asks the Internet, and the answer is relayed back. A client on the public server works just the same way. An external client, however, asking about an internal host gets back the ``restricted'' answer from the public server.
This approach assumes that there's a packet filtering firewall between these two servers that will allow them to talk DNS to each other, but otherwise restricts DNS between other hosts.
Another trick that's useful in this scheme is to employ wildcard PTR records in your IN-ADDR.ARPA domains. These cause an an address-to-name lookup for any of your non-public hosts to return something like ``unknown.YOUR.DOMAIN'' rather than an error. This satisfies anonymous FTP sites like ftp.uu.net that insist on having a name for the machines they talk to. This may fail when talking to sites that do a DNS cross-check in which the host name is matched against its address and vice versa.
5.5 How do I make FTP work through my firewall?
Generally, making FTP work through the firewall is done either using a proxy server such as the firewall toolkit's ftp-gw or by permitting incoming connections to the network at a restricted port range, and otherwise restricting incoming connections using something like ``established'' screening rules. The FTP client is then modified to bind the data port to a port within that range. This entails being able to modify the FTP client application on internal hosts.
In some cases, if FTP downloads are all you wish to support, you might want to consider declaring FTP a ``dead protocol'' and letting you users download files via the Web instead. The user interface certainly is nicer, and it gets around the ugly callback port problem. If you choose the FTP-via-Web approach, your users will be unable to FTP files out, which, depending on what you are trying to accomplish, may be a problem.
A different approach is to use the FTP ``PASV'' option to indicate that the remote FTP server should permit the client to initiate connections. The PASV approach assumes that the FTP server on the remote system supports that operation. (See ``Firewall-Friendly FTP'' [1].)
Other sites prefer to build client versions of the FTP program that are linked against a SOCKS library.
5.6 How do I make Telnet work through my firewall?
Telnet is generally supported either by using an application proxy such as the firewall toolkit's tn-gw, or by simply configuring a router to permit outgoing connections using something like the ``established'' screening rules. Application proxies could be in the form of a standalone proxy running on the bastion host, or in the form of a SOCKS server and a modified client.
5.7 How do I make Finger and whois work through my firewall?
Many firewall admins permit connections to the finger port from only trusted machines, which can issue finger requests in the form of: finger [email protected]@firewall. This approach only works with the standard Unix version of finger. Controlling access to services and restricting them to specific machines is managed using either tcp_wrappers or netacl from the firewall toolkit. This approach will not work on all systems, since some finger servers do not permit [email protected]@host fingering.
Many sites block inbound finger requests for a variety of reasons, foremost being past security bugs in the finger server (the Morris internet worm made these bugs famous) and the risk of proprietary or sensitive information being revealed in user's finger information. In general, however, if your users are accustomed to putting proprietary or sensitive information in their .plan files, you have a more serious security problem than just a firewall can solve.
5.8 How do I make gopher, archie, and other services work through my firewall?
The majority of firewall administrators choose to support gopher and archie through web proxies, instead of directly. Proxies such as the firewall toolkit's convert gopher/gopher+ queries into HTML and vice versa. For supporting archie and other queries, many sites rely on Internet-based Web-to-archie servers, such as ArchiePlex. The Web's tendency to make everything on the Internet look like a web service is both a blessing and a curse.
There are many new services constantly cropping up. Often they are misdesigned or are not designed with security in mind, and their designers will cheerfully tell you if you want to use them you need to let port xxx through your router. Unfortunately, not everyone can do that, and so a number of interesting new toys are difficult to use for people behind firewalls. Things like RealAudio, which require direct UDP access, are particularly egregious examples. The thing to bear in mind if you find yourself faced with one of these problems is to find out as much as you can about the security risks that the service may present, before you just allow it through. It's quite possible the service has no security implications. It's equally possible that it has undiscovered holes you could drive a truck through.
5.9 What are the issues about X11 through a firewall?
The X Windows System is a very useful system, but unfortunately has some major security flaws. Remote systems that can gain or spoof access to a workstation's X11 display can monitor keystrokes that a user enters, download copies of the contents of their windows, etc.
While attempts have been made to overcome them (E.g., MIT ``Magic Cookie'') it is still entirely too easy for an attacker to interfere with a user's X11 display. Most firewalls block all X11 traffic. Some permit X11 traffic through application proxies such as the DEC CRL X11 proxy (FTP crl.dec.com). The firewall toolkit includes a proxy for X11, called x-gw, which a user can invoke via the Telnet proxy, to create a virtual X11 server on the firewall. When requests are made for an X11 connection on the virtual X11 server, the user is presented with a pop-up asking them if it is OK to allow the connection. While this is a little unaesthetic, it's entirely in keeping with the rest of X11.
5.10 How do I make RealAudio work through my firewall?
RealNetworks maintains some information about how to get RealAudio working through your firewall7. It would be unwise to make any changes to your firewall without understanding what the changes will do, exactly, and knowing what risks the new changes will bring with them.
5.11 How do I make my web server act as a front-end for a database that lives on my private network?
The best way to do this is to allow very limited connectivity between your web server and your database server via a specific protocol that only supports the level of functionality you're going to use. Allowing raw SQL, or anything else where custom extractions could be performed by an attacker isn't generally a good idea.
Assume that an attacker is going to be able to break into your web server, and make queries in the same way that the web server can. Is there a mechanism for extracting sensitive information that the web server doesn't need, like credit card information? Can an attacker issue an SQL and extract your entire proprietary database?
``E-commerce'' applications, like everything else, are best designed with security in mind from the ground up, instead of having security ``added'' as an afterthought. Review your architecture critically, from the perspective of an attacker. Assume that the attacker knows everything about your architecture. Now ask yourself what needs to be done to steal your data, to make unauthorized changes, or to do anything else that you don't want done. You might find that you can significantly increase security without decreasing functionality by making a few design and implementation decisions.
Some ideas for how to handle this:
- Extract the data you need from the database on a regular basis so you're not making queries against the full database, complete with information that attackers will find interesting.
- Greatly restrict and audit what you do allow between the web server and database.
5.12 But my database has an integrated web server, and I want to use that. Can't I just poke a hole in the firewall and tunnel that port?
If your site firewall policy is sufficiently lax that you're willing to manage the risk that someone will exploit a vulnerability in your web server that will result in partial or complete exposure of your database, then there isn't much preventing you from doing this.
However, in many organizations, the people who are responsible for tying the web front end to the database back end simply do not have the authority to take that responsibility. Further, if the information in the database is about people, you might find yourself guilty of breaking a number of laws if you haven't taken reasonable precautions to prevent the system from being abused.
In general, this isn't a good idea. See question 5.11 for some ideas on other ways to accomplish this objective.
5.13 How Do I Make IP Multicast Work With My Firewall?
IP multicast is a means of getting IP traffic from one host to a set of hosts without using broadcasting; that is, instead of every host getting the traffic, only those that want it will get it, without each having to maintain a separate connection to the server. IP unicast is where one host talks to another, multicast is where one host talks to a set of hosts, and broadcast is where one host talks to all hosts.
The public Internet has a multicast backbone (``MBone'') where users can engage in multicast traffic exchange. Common uses for the MBone are streams of IETF meetings and similar such interaction. Getting one's own network connected to the MBone will require that the upstream provider route multicast traffic to and from your network. Additionally, your internal network will have to support multicast routing.
The role of the firewall in multicast routing, conceptually, is no different from its role in other traffic routing. That is, a policy that identifies which multicast groups are and aren't allowed must be defined and then a system of allowing that traffic according to policy must be devised. Great detail on how exactly to do this is beyond the scope of this document. Fortunately, RFC 2588 [4] discusses the subject in more detail. Unless your firewall product supports some means of selective multicast forwarding or you have the ability to put it in yourself, you might find forwarding multicast traffic in a way consistent with your security policy to be a bigger headache than it's worth.
6 TCP and UDP Ports
by Mikael Olsson
This appendix will begin at a fairly ``basic'' level, so even if the first points seem childishly self-evident to you, you might still learn something from skipping ahead to something later in the text.
6.1 What is a port?
A ``port'' is ``virtual slot'' in your TCP and UDP stack that is used to map a connection between two hosts, and also between the TCP/UDP layer and the actual applications running on the hosts.
They are numbered 0-65535, with the range 0-1023 being marked as ``reserved'' or ``privlileged'', and the rest (1024-65535) as ``dynamic'' or ``unprivileged''.
There are basically two uses for ports:
- ``Listening'' on a port.
This is used by server applications waiting for users to connect, to get to some ``well known service'', for instance HTTP (TCP port 80), Telnet (TCP port 23), DNS (UDP and sometimes TCP port 53).
- Opening a ``dynamic'' port.
Both sides of a TCP connection need to be identified by IP addresses and port numbers. Hence, when you want to ``connect'' to a server process, your end of the communications channel also needs a ``port''. This is done by choosing a port above 1024 on your machine that is not currently in use by another communications channel, and using it as the ``sender'' in the new connection.
Dynamic ports may also be used as ``listening'' ports in some applications, most notably FTP.
Ports in the range 0-1023 are almost always server ports. Ports in the range 1024-65535 are usually dynamic ports (i.e., opened dynamically when you connect to a server port). However, any port may be used as a server port, and any port may be used as an ``outgoing'' port.
So, to sum it up, here's what happens in a basic connection:
- At some point in time, a server application on host 184.108.40.206 decides to ``listen'' at port 80 (HTTP) for new connections.
- You (220.127.116.11) want to surf to 126.96.36.199, port 80, and your browser issues a connect call to it.
- The connect call, realising that it doesn't yet have local port number, goes hunting for one. The local port number is necessary since when the replies come back some time in the future, your TCP/IP stack will have to know to what application to pass the reply. It does this by remembering what application uses which local port number. (This is grossly simplified, no flames from programmers, please.)
- Your TCP stack finds an unused dynamic port, usually somewhere above 1024. Let's assume that it finds 1029.
- Your first packet is then sent, from your local IP, 220.127.116.11, port 1029, to 220.127.116.11, port 80.
- The server responds with a packet from 188.8.131.52, port 80, to you, 184.108.40.206, port 1029.
- This procedure is actually longer than this, read on for a more in-depth explanation of TCP connect sequences.
6.2 How do I know which application uses what port?
There are several lists outlining the ``reserved'' and ``well known'' ports, as well as ``commonly used'' ports, and the best one is: . For those of you still reading RFC 1700 to find out what port number does what, STOP DOING IT. It is horribly out of date, and it won't be less so tomorrow.
Now, as for trusting this information: These lists do not, in any way, constitute any kind of holy bible on which ports do what.
Wait, let me rephrase that: THERE IS NO WAY OF RELIABLY DETERMINING WHAT PORT DOES WHAT SIMPLY BY LOOKING IN A LIST.
6.3 What are LISTENING ports?
Suppose you did ``netstat -a'' on your machine and ports 1025 and 1030 showed up as LISTENing. What do they do?
Right, let's take a look in the assigned port numbers list.blackjack 1025/tcp network blackjack iad1 1030/tcp BBN IAD
Wait, what's happening? Has my workstation stolen my VISA number and decided to go play blackjack with some rogue server on the internet? And what's that software that BBN has installed?
This is NOT where you start panicking and send mail to the firewalls list. In fact, this question has been asked maybe a dozen times during the past six months, and every time it's been answered. Not that THAT keeps people from asking the same question again.
If you are asking this question, you are most likely using a windows box. The ports you are seeing are (most likely) two listening ports that the RPC subsystem opens when it starts up.
This is an example of where dynamicly assigned ports may be used by server processes. Applications using RPC will later on connect to port 135 (the netbios ``portmapper'') to query where to find some RPC service, and get an answer back saying that that particular service may be contacted on port 1025.
Now, how do we know this, since there's no ``list'' describing these ports? Simple: There's no substitute for experience. And using the mailing list search engines also helps a hell of a lot.
6.4 How do I determine what service the port is for?
Since it is impossible to learn what port does what by looking in a list, how do i do it?
The old hands-on way of doing it is by shutting down nearly every service/daemon running on your machine, doing and taking note of what ports are open. There shouldn't be very many listening ones. Then you start turning all the services on, one by one, and take note of what new ports show up in your netstat output.
Another way, that needs more guess work, is simply telnetting to the ports and see what comes out. If nothing comes out, try typing some gibberish and slamming Enter a few times, and see if something turns up. If you get binary garble, or nothing at all, this obviously won't help you.
However, this will only tell you what listening ports are used. It won't tell you about dynamically opened ports that may be opened later on by these applications.
There are a few applications that might help you track down the ports used.
On Unix systems, there's a nice utility called that comes preinstalled on many systems. It will show you all open port numbers and the names of the applications that are using them. This means that it might show you a lot of locally opened files aswell as TCP/IP sockets. Read the help text.
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Big East M5: 10.21.13 EditionPosted by Dan Lyons on October 21st, 2013
- New York Times writer Zach Schonbrun experienced a sense of relief among the various schools at last week's Big East Media Day in Manhattan. After many seasons played under the shroud of conference realignment, culminating with the awkwardness of last season's farewell tour for Syracuse, Pittsburgh, and Notre Dame, the Big East is now a settled, basketball-driven league focused on private schools in metropolitan markets. While the conference's new members — Butler, Creighton, and Xavier — are all located in the Midwest, they fit into the league quite well culturally. St. John's head coach Steve Lavin actually thinks the new schools fit in better than some of the public universities that have moved on to the American Athletic Conference, and the schools who left for the ACC for largely football-based reasons: "It's not like a 'Sesame Street' deal — which one doesn't belong… You've got a tree, a bush, some seaweed and then a truck. It just didn't fit. I think now we have a league that's more similar."
- Georgetown lost an excellent player to the NBA Draft in standout forward Otto Porter, but guard Markel Starks thinks that the Hoyas are more than just one player and that his team will look to prove that this season: "We play as a unit… We play as a group. Obviously, we just lost a great player. Even still, with or without him, we play as a unit. … I think we can still be a very dangerous team." Starks, now a senior, will probably bear much of the weight of Porter's absence in the scoring column, after averaging 12.8 points per game last season. He will be joined in the backcourt by D'Vauntes Smith-Rivera, who proved capable of exploding for big point totals last season. Smith-Rivera scored at least 14 points in three of his last four regular season games last season, and dropped 33 in 34 minutes against DePaul on February 20.
- One of the major changes fans will notice in the conference this year is a lack of legendary coaches on the sidelines, although the Big East will not be hurting for talent in that spot. Gone are Hall of Famers like Jim Boeheim and Rick Pitino, but rising stars like Marquette's Buzz Williams and Georgetown's John Thompson III are poised to lead the conference into this new era. Thompson agrees that the coaching talent in the league is very high: "If you look around the room, the quality of coaching is outstanding. Yes, we lost some Hall of Fame coaches, but I don't think too many teams want to go up against the guys in this room. Every game is going to be a battle. That was true last year; that's going to be true this year." Williams also believes in the overall quality of the league, and thinks it stands up with the best conferences in college basketball: "Every coach is going to say they play in the best league, but if you objectively study the numbers, I think what this league has done the last five years speaks for itself. I think this year that will hold firm, too."
- Even without the likes of Syracuse, Louisville, and UConn, many are excited about the prospects of the Big East, especially those at the league's three new schools: Butler, Creighton, and Xavier. Between the television contract with Fox Sports 1 and the ability to play at Madison Square Garden, the Big East provides a great increase in exposure for the former Horizon League, Missouri Valley Conference, and Atlantic 10 teams. Rumble in the Garden's Chris Ronca caught up with Xavier's Chris Mack and Creighton's Greg McDermott, who were both very excited about these new possibilities. Mack says his players are excited about playing at MSG: "Playing for your conference championship in the Mecca is an amazing opportunity for Xavier fans and players." McDermott talked about the league's TV contract and it's impact on the Creighton program: "[Creighton's] fans have longed for this for awhile." McDermott went on to say that "with Fox [Sports] 1, it's very exciting for the program… there'll be a lot of new ideas with how [Creighton's] product is shown nationally."
- Sports Illustrated's [and RTC's] Chris Johnson's "Stock Watch" series sets its gaze on the Big East, and he's quite bullish on Villanova, while throwing a bit of shade on Butler. Johnson cites Villanova's surge in the middle of last season, where the Wildcats knocked off top five Louisville and Syracuse outfits in a a five-day stretch, as evidence that Jay Wright's club is very dangerous. He likes the combination of Ryan Arcidiacono, JayVaughn Pinkston, and Daniel Ochefu, and believes that if the team continues to get to the free throw line and play stingy defense, it can push for the top of the league standings. As for Butler, Johnson believes that the loss of Brad Stevens in conjunction with an increase in the difficulty of conference play will hurt the Bulldogs, as will the departures of Rotnei Clark and Andrew Smith as well as the injury to Roosevelt Jones.


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King's College London offers a wide range of funding opportunities for taught programmes and research degrees throughout the year for UK, EU and international students. This section provides information on current funding opportunities at King's and general advice on other sources of funding that may help finance your postgraduate study.
Please select the most relevant options below to help with your search. Alternatively, you can view all available funding.
Please note the database is updated regularly but is a guide only and not a guarantee of funding nor an exhaustive list of all funding available.


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The Greatest TV Shows Of All Time
List Rules Vote up and add all of your favorite TV shows of all time.
Choosing the best TV shows of all time means taking into account the best TV dramas, the best TV comedies, the best cartoons, and even the best TV miniseries to try and come up with a list that answers the question of "what are the best TV shows ever?" If you're a fan of reality television - spoiler alert - it's not one of those shows. However, if you're looking for the top TV comedy series and the top TV dramas to fill the top slots on the list, you won't be disappointed. In addition to new favorites like Lost, classic TV sitcoms like Friends and Seinfeld also fare well in the quest to answer the burning question of what are the top rated TV shows ever.
The greatest TV shows of all time also include the most popular TV shows with loyal fan bases like Sherlock and Buffy the Vampire Slayer. Even though some programs are not considered the most watched TV shows of all time, they later become cult classics and remain fan favorites. This list also includes critically acclaimed TV shows such as House of Cards and Breaking Bad, both outstanding programs that have won many Emmy awards. But could they be considered the best TV series of all time? That's up to the fans to decide.
Newer shows are currently dominating the top television shows list, but classic television shows like M*A*S*H and Star Trek are hot as well, and it's up to you to vote for your favorite TV show of all time to get it closer to the top of the list of the greatest television shows of all time. If your choice for the best TV series ever isn't on this list yet, make sure to add it so others can share in the bright glow of what you consider to be the best television show ever.


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AggreGate SCADA/HMI Demo
March 212016
ACEINNA releases video: 'How to Develop Localization & Navigation Sensor Solutions for Drones,...
This short video provides an overview of ACEINNA's new OpenIMU package.
KINGSTAR highlights Windows PC Machine Automation Controller
This video shows how uses can synchronize PLC, motion control and machine vision control all on the same real-time Windows IPC device. Control it...
Seeq Overview
Seeq is a visual analytics solution for process manufacturing data. Applications enable users to investigate and share insights from data stored...
Parker's AC Variable Frequency Drives: AC30 Series for North America
The AC30 VFD provides users with exceptional levels of control for AC motor speed control applications up to 300 HP. With three models and flexible...
KINGSTAR - Conveyor Using Machine Vision to Locate and Move Objects
KINGSTAR - Conveyor Using Machine Vision to Locate & Move Objects


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Delight friends and family with the gorgeous recipes in Soufflés & Meringues, from light-as-air soufflés to simple meringue bites with cream and fabulously fruity
Discover the different types of meringue and how to make yours perfect every time, plus follow our fail-safe tips to making sure your soufflé always rises to the occasion! Whisk your way to success with sweet and savoury soufflés, irresistible meringue-topped pies, baked Alaskas and Eton mess!
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Number of Pages: 96
Product details:
Format: Hardback
Number of Pages: 96
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The legality of a "stakeholder" meeting in San Diego between select members of the public and state utilities regulators is being challenged in court.
The March 20 meeting in La Jolla has been advertised as a chance for three groups of 20 people to meet with commissioners and staff of the California Public Utilities Commission about topics such as renewable energy and infrastructure. It takes place the day before a meeting that will be open to the public -- also in San Diego -- at which commissioners will consider granting permission for two new natural gas power plants in San Diego and Otay Mesa, among other matters.
A lawsuit filed Monday in state Superior Court by former San Diego City Attorney Michael Aguirre seeks an injunction to block the stakeholder meeting, citing provisions of California law pertaining to public meetings.
"It is required to be open to the public, not closed and only open to those the commission deems worthy of an invitation," states the lawsuit on behalf of San Diego resident Masada Disenhouse, whose request to attend the March 20 event was declined because the guest list was full.
An online flier for the event draws a distinction between the commission's open meeting and the stakeholder session, in which "each group will have the chance to meet with every commissioner and the directors, advisers and staff of various CPUC divisions."
"This is a chance to discuss State policy -- and how it affects our region -- directly with the decision makers," the notice states.
Utilities commission spokeswoman Terrie Prosper said the stakeholder meeting in San Diego would be the fifth in a series. She had no immediate comment on the lawsuit.
"The purpose of these meetings is to open a conversation, create a partnership, and see where the CPUC might be of service to the local community," Prosper wrote in response to an inquiry prior to the lawsuit.
Space is limited and local government officials are sometimes given priority, she said.
A request by U-T San Diego to attend the meeting was turned down because all seats were filled. Cancellations could open up new invitations, an organizer said.


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Remember when Pat Riley trademarked the phrase "Three-peat?" It's a good thing he did, because, you know, his team couldn't three-peat in the NBDL right now. Well, the Colorado Rockies have absorbed Riley's lesson: They're attempting to trademark the term "Rocktober."
It just rolls off the tongue, doesn't it? Shame they can't trademark Dane Cook as well.
When the Rockies originally filed their trademark request, bar owners in LoDo, near Coors Field, expressed concern that the trademark would prohibit them from marketing "Rocktober" events and specials during baseball's postseason run.
The Rockies request also seeks to prohibit other parties from using "Rocktober" on a long list of commercial items including foam fingers, baseballs, batting gloves and athletic supporters, commonly known as jock straps.
Oh, so that's what an athletic supporter is!
So, you know, hurry up and sell all your Rocktober merchandise while you can ... before it's too late!


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No need to compromise your style just because you've chosen not to use a bumper in your crib, the Zuri Cobblestone Bumperless Baby Bedding has plenty of character. Perfect for contemporary and modern nurseries the tone-on-tone color palette is a great base for layering color or continuing on with the earthy neutrals. Color coordinated accent pillows and throw blanket are also available.
Please note: Crib sheet in taupe stripe has replaced the dot sheet shown.
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