text:
Services on Demand
Related links
- Cited by Google
- Similars in Google
South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences
On-line version ISSN 2222-3436
Print version ISSN 1015-8812
S. Afr. j. econ. manag. sci. vol.17 n.4 Pretoria Apr. 2014
Economic incentives for family controlling shareholders and the monitoring role of non-dominant large shareholders in corporate governance: Evidence from the manufacturing firms in Malaysia
Chin Fei Goh; Amran Rasli ; Saif-Ur-Rehman Khan
Faculty of Management, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia
This article explores the economic incentives of dominant controlling shareholders with regard to the expropriation of minority shareholders, on the one hand, and the monitoring role of non-dominant large shareholders in family firms, on the other. The authors argue that family controlling shareholders (or family owners) do not share common interests with other shareholders. Drawing on 141 family firms in the manufacturing sector that were listed on Bursa Malaysia (the Malaysian stock exchange) from 2003 to 2006, the article finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between excess control rights and a firm's market performance. The findings also show that both the cash flow rights (i.e. claims on cash payouts) of family controlling shareholders and the presence of non-dominant large shareholders with the ability to contest control of the firm have a positive relationship with market performance.
This study contributes to the literature by indicating that family owners are unlikely to collude with other large shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Furthermore, low levels of excess family-owner control rights are beneficial for market performance because firms may benefit from group affiliations and receive patronage from wealthy owners. However, high levels of excess control rights are understood to be an economic incentive for family owners to expropriate minority shareholders during non-crisis periods.
Key words: governance, family firms, ownership concentration, cash flow rights, excess control rights
1 Introduction
Studies of corporate governance have clearly demonstrated that ownership structures in many emerging economies exhibit high levels of ownership concentration (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Claessens & Fan, 2002; Steyn & Stainbank, 2013). In East Asia, wealth concentration is prevalent, and equity ownership is concentrated within families (Claessens & Fan, 2002). Consequently, there is limited demarcation between ownership and management in family firms. Minority shareholders may be expropriated when the interests of controlling shareholders do not align completely with those of minority shareholders (Jiang & Peng, 2011) in what agency theory calls principal-to-principal conflicts.
Broadly speaking, two branches of the literature are relevant in analysing large shareholders in emerging economies. The first branch considers ownership concentration as the economic incentive for large shareholders to monitor and control firms. However, high ownership concentration may also lead to expropriations by controlling shareholders in emerging economies (Claessens, Simeon, Fan & Lang, 2002). Prior empirical studies have discovered conflicting evidence about the relationship between ownership concentration among multiple large shareholders and firm performance in emerging economies (e.g. Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Chen, Li & Shapiro, 2011; Choi, Park & Hong, 2012). Several studies have found a positive and significant relationship between ownership concentration among multiple large shareholders and firm performance (Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Driffield, Mahambare & Pal, 2007). However, other studies have shown that ownership concentration among multiple large shareholders is not significantly related to firm performance (Claessens, Djankov & Lang 2000; Choi, Park & Hong, 2012). Notably, the recent study by Chen et al. (2011) indicated a significant and inverted U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration (shareholdings owned by the ten largest shareholders) and firm performance in China. Chen et al. (2011) concluded that large shareholders-whether large shareholders were private or state shareholders-colluded to expropriate minority shareholders when ownership concentration was high. Thus, the conflicting and ambiguous empirical findings on ownership concentration in emerging countries demand more research attention.
The second branch of the literature has focused on excess control rights of dominant controlling shareholders (or the largest shareholders) as the economic incentives to expropriate minority shareholders in emerging economies. Excess control rights can be defined as control rights in excess of cash flow rights (Driffield et al., 2007; Jiang & Peng, 2011). Several researchers have argued that excess control rights owned by dominant controlling shareholders were linked to poor firm performance during the East Asia financial crisis of 1997-1998 (Claessens et al., 1999a; Claessens et al., 1999b; Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2003), i.e. excess control rights are an economic incentive for dominant controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. However, Driffield et al. (2007) found that dominant controlling shareholders with excess control rights did not produce exclusively negative effects on firm performance when the study period was extended to the non-crisis period of 1994-1998 in East Asia. This conflicting empirical evidence has raised the question of whether the excess control rights of dominant controlling shareholders adversely affect firm performance during non-crisis periods.
Thus, this article attempts to fill the research gaps regarding the ambiguous findings on the impact of ownership concentration among multiple large shareholders and excess control rights on firm performance during non-crisis periods. The article also addresses the call from Steyn and Stainbank (2013) to investigate the cost and benefits of firm control owned by dominant controlling shareholders in corporate governance. This study focuses on family firms to examine the economic incentives of family controlling shareholders in firm monitoring and management under the theory that family firms tend to prioritise firm control and family interests in business enterprises, and that family controlling shareholders are unlikely to share common interests with other large shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Tam & Tan, 2007). Additionally, the ultimate ownership concept was employed to examine the economic incentives of family controlling shareholders in corporate governance. The ultimate ownership concept posits that controlling shareholders can leverage cash flow rights to achieve greater firm control through pyramid or cross-holding structures (Porta et al., 1999).
This study focuses on a single-country study because the emergence of organisation structure is heavily influenced by institutional context (Wielemaker & Gedajlovic, 2011). Malaysia is an excellent empirical context for investigating the economic incentive of controlling shareholders in expropriation of minority shareholders because of the prevalent firm control practice of using cross-sectional and pyramid structures. Corporate practitioners also perceived severe concerns about the expropriation of minority shareholders in Malaysia (Liew, 2007).
The rest of the article is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and formulates hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the datasets and research methods. The main results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1 Economic incentives for family controlling shareholders in corporate governance
In general, there is a high level of equity ownership concentration in Asian emerging markets (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Jiang & Peng, 2011). Additionally, ownership interests and firm management are frequently inter- twined, and this has led to the corporate governance research to focus on the economic incentives of dominant controlling shareholders (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Claessens et al., 2002). However, empirical studies in this line of research have revealed inconclusive evidence about the relationship between the ownership interests of dominant controlling shareholder and firm performance (e.g. Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Claessens et al., 1999a; Tam & Tan, 2007). On the one hand, Claessens et al. (1999a) and Claessens et al. (1999b) have indicated that the concentrated ownership by controlling shareholders is detrimental to firm performance in East Asian countries. On the other hand, Tam and Tan (2007) has offered evidence that firm performance is not affected by the concentrated ownership by dominant controlling shareholders in Malaysia. Perhaps the researchers should first determine the reasons why concentrated ownership by dominant controlling shareholders may not be beneficial to firm performance.
In agency theory, economic utility is the main incentive for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), which is also consistent with the argument that controlling shareholders may not necessarily share common interests with other investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Expropriating minority shareholders allows controlling shareholders to reap exclusive benefits while some proportion of the costs are borne by minority shareholders (Claessens & Fan, 2002). For example, the controlling shareholders who engage in a non-arms-length transaction with controlled firms would reap all the benefits, but would only be liable for a portion of the cash flow claims.
To understand how concentrated ownership by controlling shareholders affects firm performance, Porta et al. (1999) conceptualises the term 'ultimate ownership' to evaluate the ownership of dominant controlling shareholders. As opposed to traditional approaches, ultimate ownership does not assume that shareholdings are equivalent to ownership. Instead, the ultimate ownership concept views voting rights as the ownership of the shareholder. This definition encompasses the scenario in which the shareholder has greater voting rights vis-á-vis cash flow rights (i.e. claims on cash payout). The use of 'ultimate ownership' can determine the real power of shareholdings and how dominant controlling shareholders maintain control over the firm via pyramid or cross-holding structures. Therefore, ultimate shareholdings might more clearly explain the incentives and entrenchment effects of controlling shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002).
Excess control rights theory suggests that dominant controlling shareholders have an incentive to appropriate firm resources. Consistent with this argument, previous empirical studies have indicated that excess control rights wielded by controlling shareholders generally led to lower firm performance in emerging economies during the 1997-1998 East Asian Financial crisis (Claessens et al., 1999a; Claessens et al., 1999b; Claessens et al., 2002; Jiang & Peng, 2011). Previous research has also indicated that the market valuation of firm performance in emerging economies will be reduced when management increases its cash flow rights to achieve control over the firm because investors are aware of the potential managerial entrenchment that stems from misaligned incentives (Lins, 2003). The excess control rights owned by controlling shareholders threatens the confidence of minority investors because there is a general perception that controlling shareholders will expropriate minority shareholders particularly during crisis periods (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang, 2008).
However, the excess control rights of controlling shareholders may not necessarily impose harmful effects on firm performance. Notably, excess control rights typically imply that the firm is affiliated with pyramidal business groups (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006) and thus with wealthy owners (Heugens et al., 2009). A group-affiliated firm may benefit from the economies of scale offered by large group-affiliated business in two ways (Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen & Van Oosterhout, 2011). First, a group-affiliated firm can access the intangible resources of the entire business group for various ventures. For instance, the firm may leverage the 'family-based brand' in the family business group to enhance customer confidence in new products (Craig, Dibrell & Davis, 2008). Second, a group-affiliated firm is equipped with stronger business networks to internalise transaction costs in inefficient market environments because a high level of trust exists between the affiliated businesses (Peng & Zhou, 2005). A firm that is part of an affiliated group might also achieve higher profits through internal business transactions on top of regular business activities (Chang & Hong, 2000). Additionally, wealthy owners from business groups possess the ability to inject personal resources into firms for business venturing.
The benefits of group-affiliated firms and concerns about incentives for expropriation induce the question of whether excess control rights are harmful or beneficial to firm performance. A related study on the effect of excess control rights on controlling shareholders in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand during the 1994-1998 period sheds some light on this controversial issue (Driffield et al., 2007). The Driffield study indicated that there was a non-monotonic relationship between the excess control rights of dominant controlling shareholders and firm performance. In that particular study, two dummy variables were used to represent the level of excess control rights simultaneously: (i) a dummy variable that assumed the value of '1' if voting rights exceeded cash flow rights, and (ii) a dummy variable that assumed the value '1' if excess control rights exceeded the median level of excess control rights in the samples. Specifically, Driffield et al. (2007) found that a low level of excess control rights was positive to firm performance, but a high level of excess control rights was detrimental to firm performance.
Based on these findings, it is likely that the relative strength of beneficial and harmful effects vary with the level of excess control rights. The benefits of being a group-affiliated firm in a family business group dominate the expropriation effect when there is a low level of excess control rights during a non-crisis period, which would indicate that there is a positive market premium under such conditions. However, expropriation concerns are expected to dominate when controlling shareholders are exposed to high levels of incentives with high levels of excess control rights. Thus, the first hypothesis was formulated as follows:
H1: There is an inverse U-shaped relationship between excess control rights and firm performance during non-crisis periods.
As described in the previous discussion leading to Hypothesis 1, the separation of cash flow and control rights (or excess control rights) leads to concerns about expropriation and to the conclusion that the concentrated cash flow rights provide an economic incentive for dominant controlling shareholders to engage in firm monitoring and management. Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi (1997) indicated that large ownership stakes have an immediate impact on shareholders' decisions to monitor and control firms when there are no deviations of cash flow and control rights. A shareholder will evaluate potential gain against potential loss when engaging in firm monitoring and control based on owned portion of shares. Thus, the economic incentive of cash flow rights is the prime motivation for dominant controlling shareholders to engage in firm monitoring and management.
Similar examples can be found in both theoretical and empirical studies. For example, several studies in emerging economies in Asia have indicated that the cash flow rights of dominant controlling shareholders were generally positive for firm market performance (Claessens et al., 1999a; Claessens et al., 1999b; Claessens et al., 2002). Based on these examples, cash flow rights are the economic incentives for dominant controlling shareholders to monitor effectively as per the following hypothesis:
H2. The cash flow rights of family controlling shareholders are positively related to firm performance.
2.2 The role of non-dominant large shareholders in family firms
Two related bodies of research address the role of multiple large shareholders in the ownership structure. The first body of research focuses on the impact of multiple large shareholders on alleviating concerns about expropriation by the dominant controlling shareholder (Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch & Hege, 2001; Su, Xu & Phan, 2008). Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) developed a hypothetical model to examine how large shareholders could form a coalition to share control of the firm. The model demonstrates that the presence of multiple large shareholders with sufficient cash flow stakes may be effective in inducing mutual monitoring and limiting the consumption of private benefits. Additionally, Bloch and Hege (2001) proposed a competition model that indicates the presence of two large shareholders in the firms might shift the attention of the large shareholders in order to compete for corporate control instead of extracting private benefits. The rationale is that each large shareholder is willing to sacrifice private benefits to gain support from the minority shareholders. Therefore, large shareholders resort to submitting corporate proposals that are favoured by minority shareholders. The proposed model is also manifested in actual competition for corporate control in Malaysia. For example, Khoo (2013) reported that dominant controlling shareholder from Bright Packaging Industry Berhad in Malaysia resorted to proposing a 100 per cent dividend payout policy to gain support from minority shareholders and to prevent a takeover by a coalition of non-dominant large shareholders. Su et al. (2008) also provided evidence that the largest shareholders require a high level of voting power concentration to gain control of a board of directors and extract private rents in China, which implies that dominant controlling shareholders are likely to lose the exclusive control with the presence of non-dominant large shareholders. The evidence given is also consistent with the argument that principal-to-principal conflicts are largely dependent on whether controlling shareholders have strong controlling power in corporate control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
The second body of research focuses on whether and how multiple large shareholders collude to expropriate minority shareholders (Zwiebel, 1995; Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000; Gomes & Novaes, 2005). Notably, an empirical study by Chen et al. (2011) found that the ownership concentration of the ten largest shareholders exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm performance in China. Whilst the study by Chen et al. (2011) seems to provide support for second body of research, it is unlikely to be applicable to family firms for several reasons.
To illustrate, Zwiebel (1995) proposed a model that indicated that the presence of multiple large shareholders in the ownership structure makes the shareholders susceptible to colluding to extract and share the control benefits of the firm. The underpinning assumption is that the benefits of control are divisible among large shareholders. However, this assumption may not be practical because the types of controlling shareholders may also affect the objectives behind gaining firm control. Specifically, family controlling shareholders tend to prioritise firm control and family interests in business enterprises, associated with strong emotional components and prioritise the family welfare in firm decision-making (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).
Likewise, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) developed a model to elucidate that the large shareholders with the greatest excess control rights may form a coalition to seize control of the firm. Subsequently, controlling shareholders may expropriate non-controlling shareholders. This scenario, however, is unlikely to occur in practice because no empirical evidence has indicated large shareholders in emerging economies have low concentrations of cash flow rights. Additionally, the empirical studies indicate that activism by large shareholders such as institutional investors can improve firm performance (Le, Walters & Kroll, 2006; King & Wen, 2011). Furthermore, some institutional investors with short-term investment horizon may be reluctant to engage in firm monitoring and may prefer to liquidate shares when the firm's prospects deteriorate (Le et al., 2006; Rasli, Goh & Khan, 2013).
Similarly, Gomes and Novaes (2005) developed a theoretical model that indicates multiple large shareholders may share control and collude to share the private rents extracted from firm's resources. Gomes and Novaes (2005) also indicated that more balanced control between large shareholders can increase the minority shareholder protection in economies with weak legal institutions. The main rationale is that controlling shareholders are exposed to greater incentives to extract private rents in a weak legal environment. Thus, the control contestability exercised by non-dominant large shareholders can be effective to monitor dominant controlling shareholders in emerging economies.
The literature discussed above suggests that the control contestability exercised by non-dominant large shareholders will limit the opportunistic behaviour of dominant controlling shareholders in extracting private benefits. Specifically, family controlling shareholders, who tend to prioritise firm control and family interests in business enterprises, are unlikely to share common interests with other large shareholders in family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Tam & Tan, 2007). Thus, high control contestability exercised by non-dominant large shareholders is an effective monitoring mechanism and will translate into a countering effect on the self-serving behaviour of family controlling shareholders, which leads to the following hypothesis:
H3. The level of control contestability exercised by a large shareholder (or a coalition of large shareholders) with respect to family controlling shareholders is positively related to firm performance.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data Collection
The 'Industrial Products' sector index on Bursa Malaysia (the Malaysian stock exchange) was the sample selection used to identify the manufacturing firms. Subsequently, family firms were identified as those in which the ultimate family owners own at least 10 per cent of the voting rights and appear to be the largest shareholder in the firms (Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). The data were collected using annual reports, company announcements database, and Datastream. The reliability and comprehensiveness of data is covered because Bursa Malaysia requires firms to report ownership and family relations (including substantial shareholders and directors) in annual reports. Additionally, this research tracks ultimate ownership by using the disclosed ownership information in annual reports and 'change in shareholdings' in company announcements databases available through Bursa Malaysia. The market equity prices and financial information of the firms are obtained via Datastream.
This study selects 2003-2006, which is a stable economic phase of the Malaysian economy, as the sample period to investigate economic incentives of family controlling shareholders. The 2007-2009 financial crisis periods which had adversely affected Malaysian economy are avoided (Gomez, 2012). Additionally, temporal changes of ownership structure may occur after the Malaysian government had reduced the quota for Bumiputera equity requirement for newly listed companies from 30 per cent to 12.5 per cent in 2009 (Gomez, 2012). The final dataset covering 141 family firms over a four-year period leads to 564 firm-year observations.
3.2 Methods
The Partial Least Squares-Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) method is used to test the proposed theoretical hypotheses in this study. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was employed because the governance variables can be measured by more than one observed variable (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Lin, 2005; Azim, 2012). PLS-SEM, a non-parametric SEM approach, is more appropriate compared to covariance-based SEM because PLS-SEM allows the modelling of non-linear relations (Rigdon, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2010). This study adopted the SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende & Will, 2005) with path weighting scheme to test the hypotheses. In reporting the PLS-SEM results, a two-step approach, was followed to assess the measurement models and the structural model (Chin, 2010).
3.3 Measures
This study employed PLS-SEM, which is a construct-oriented approach, in model estimations. A single-item measure was used when no latent variables were available (Li, Lam, Qian & Fang, 2006). The single-item measure has been used in prior corporate governance studies that utilised structural equation modelling (Li et al., 2006; Tam & Tan, 2007; Azim, 2012; Berthelot, Francoeur & Labelle, 2012). Additionally, the single-item construct (or concrete construct) is appropriate in structural equation modelling when only one attribute is represented (Diamantopoulos, Arstedt, Fuchs, Wilczynski & Kaiser, 2012).
Endogenous construct. The endogenous construct used is firm performance. The firm performance construct was the market-to-book ratio, in which firm performance is the ratio of the market value of common stock and book value of preferred shares and debt to the book value of total assets. Market-based firm performance (i.e. market-to-book ratio) is the appropriate measure in emerging markets because market investors would perceive it as a discount in the fair value of shares due to principal-to-principal conflicts in the ownership structure (Claessens et al., 2002; Young et al.. 2008).
Predictor constructs. The economic incentives for family controlling shareholders are examined by cash flow rights and excess control rights whereas monitoring of non-dominant large shareholders is represented by control contest-ability.
The cash flow rights represented the cash flow rights of the family controlling shareholders who are also the largest shareholders in the ownership structure (Claessens et al, 2002; Laeven & Levine, 2008; Attig, El Ghoul & Guedhami, 2009). The main contention of this study is that cash flow rights is the appropriate measure of economic incentive for family owners in firm management and monitoring.
Excess control rights were calculated as the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights held by the family controlling shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Laeven & Levine, 2008; Attig et al, 2009; Jiang & Peng, 2011). The excess control rights represent the ultimate owners' utilisation of cross-sectional or pyramid structures to manipulate share- holdings and achieve greater control over the firm. The square of excess control rights was also included because of the inverted U-shaped relationship proposed in the hypothesis HI.
Control contestability was measured by two items: (i) the ratio of the voting rights of the second largest shareholder to the voting rights of the family controlling shareholders and (ii) the ratio of the combined voting rights of the second to the fifth largest shareholders to the voting rights of family controlling shareholders (Attig et al, 2009). The purpose of control contestability is to reflect the balance of power between family controlling shareholders and non-dominant large shareholders in the ownership structure.
Controls. This study controls firm investment, capital structure, firm size and year in the proposed theoretical model. Firm investment represented the capital intensity, i.e. capital expenditure divided by total sales (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Capital structure was the ratio of total debt to total assets (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Firm size was measured by two items: (i) the book value of firm assets and (ii) firm sales. Three dummy year variables 2004-2006 are included to control year fixed effect (Chen et al., 2011) whereas year 2003 is omitted as the reference year.
The research model for all hypothetical relationships in this study is shown in Figure 1.
4 Empirical results and discussions
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for key constructs. The average cash flow rights owned by family controlling shareholders are 36.85 per cent whereas on average, excess control rights are 1.27 per cent. Notably, the average control contestabiltiy exercised by non-dominant large shareholders is approxi- mately 53.3 per cent, which implies that family controlling shareholders have strong controlling positions in most firms. With respect to firm-level characteristics, family firms have conservative business strategies (capital structures with an average leverage ratio of 26.3 per cent) and low firm investment (with average capital expenditures only accounting for approximately 8.9 per cent of total sales).
4.1 Measurement models
The measurement models of reflective constructs were assessed based on indicator reliability, internal consistency reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity (see Tables 2 and 3) (Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt, 2011).
The results demonstrate that all indicator loadings are 0.869 or higher, which is above the minimum stipulated value of 0.70 and supports the indicator reliability in all reflective constructs (Hair et al., 2011). Likewise, all composite reliability values are above the minimum stipulated value of 0.7, and internal consistency reliability is achieved. Additionally, convergent validity is achieved because average variable extracted (AVE) is greater than the minimum stipulated value of 0.50 (Hair et al., 2011). With respect to discriminant validity, the square roots of the AVEs are higher than all inter-construct correlations (see Table 3), which provides support for discriminant validity based on the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Hair et al., 2011).
4.2 Structural model
To estimate the statistical significance level of the path coefficients in the structural model, the standard bootstrapping procedure (564 cases and 5000 samples) with the no sign changes option was performed. Notably, the validity of the structural model is verified via predictive relevance (Hair et al., 2011). The endogenous constructs must achieve predictive relevance with the minimum threshold value of zero to indicate that the model can adequately predict the indicators of endogenous constructs. Following the guideline proposed by Hair et al. (2011), the blindfolding procedure was used to obtain the Q-square for the predictive relevance.
Table 4 summarises the estimation results of the structural model. The Q-squared in Table 4 is 0.19 and above zero, which supports the validity of the structural model. Consistent with H1, the results suggest that excess control rights exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm performance. In effect, the excess control rights and square of excess control rights demonstrate a statistically significant relationship with firm performance (p < 0.05). However, the excess control rights have a positive path coefficient, whereas square of excess control rights have a negative path coefficient. These results support the contention in this study that excess control rights imply that the family firms are group-affiliated firms and (or) associated with wealthy owners. Thus, these firms can access various resources through affiliated business networks to increase market competitiveness and, in turn, to achieve higher firm performance. However, the high level of excess control rights provides significant economic incentive for family controlling shareholders to appropriate firm assets for own private benefit and negatively impact firm performance.
Consistent with H2's prediction that the cash flow rights of family controlling shareholders influence firm performance, the results show a positive and statistically significant relationship (p < 0.01) between cash flow rights and firm performance. The results affirmed the contention in this study that cash flow rights, not control rights, are the economic incentive for family controlling shareholders to engage in firm monitoring and management. The cash flow rights of dominant controlling shareholders are particularly relevant in the ownership context in emerging markets which dominant controlling shareholders use cross-sectional and pyramid structures to control firms.
Since control contestability was found to be positively related to firm performance (p < 0.05), H3 is supported. It could be concluded that control contestability exercised by non-dominant large shareholders can monitor family controlling shareholders effectively. These findings can be supported through prior empirical evidence that shows that the main objectives of family owners are protecting family interests and control in family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Tam & Tan, 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). That is, family owners, i.e. owners who prioritise the transgenerational control, are unlikely to collude with other large shareholders to harm the family reputation and the long-term prosperity of the firms. Additionally, the findings reject the view that excessive monitoring may hinder manager initiative to make profitable investments in technology-based firms (Grosfeld, 2009), which might be explained by the possibility that the overlap between family shareholdings and management shifts the firm objectives to protect family interests.
The control variables show certain notable findings (see Table 4). The results suggest that firm investment has a non-significant relationship with firm performance, but firm size has a negative and statistically significant relationship with firm performance (p < 0.01). It could be that firm investment in family firms may focus on lowering the risk of investment and forgo profitable business investments in safeguarding family security (Tam & Tan, 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). This study also finds that firm leverage shows a positive, albeit mildly significant relationship with firm performance (p < 0.10), which can be attributed to proper use of debt and increasing shareholder return.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to examine the economic incentives of family controlling shareholders and the monitoring role of non-dominant large shareholders in family firms. The results suggest that the excess control rights owned by family controlling shareholders are not necessarily detrimental to firm performance because the firms can access more resources in wider business networks (the family business group) and (or) receive patronage from wealthy owners during non-crisis periods. However, high levels of excess control rights translate into greater economic incentives for family controlling shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders, which, in turn, harms firm performance. This phenomenon can be observed through an inverted U-shaped relationship between excess control rights and firm performance. The findings warrant future research attention because the excess control rights imply that the family firm is a group-affiliated firm or associated with wealthy owners.
Moreover, this study finds that the cash flow rights of family controlling shareholders exhibit a positive relationship with firm performance. This outcome suggests that cash flow rights represent the economic incentive for family controlling shareholders to monitor and control firms. The study also finds that the balance of voting power distributions between family controlling shareholders and non-dominant large shareholders can be effective in monitoring family controlling shareholders. Stated differently, the second largest shareholder and coalitions of non-dominant large shareholders can play a monitoring role in family firms. Thus, the study provides new evidence that large shareholders do not exhibit same behaviour in corporate governance or expropriating minority shareholders in family firms. The findings also lend support to the family business research in which a family controlling shareholder is a distinct economic entity that prioritises family interests (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). This study rejects the view that multiple large shareholders, including private shareholders, will collude to expropriate minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2011). Specifically, family controlling shareholders are unlikely to collude with other non-dominant large shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders.
There are two limitations in the article. The study is based on a sample of 141 family firms in the Malaysian manufacturing sector, and the generalisability may be most relevant to the technology-based sectors. The rationale for this is that the different activities of industries may limit the function of ownership structures in corporate governance. Additionally, the study mainly focused on the publicly traded family firms in Malaysia. Consequently, the generalisation the findings beyond publicly traded family firms may be limited because privately held firms are usually smaller and not bound to stringent corporate governance regulations. Further research may be extended to study whether control contestability exercised by non-dominant large shareholders could be an effective monitoring mechanism in privately held family firms. Extending this research by comparing with other advanced and emerging economies remains another avenue for further research.
The authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions. Any errors remaining are the full responsibility of the authors.
ALMEIDA, H.V. & WOLFENZON, D. 2006. A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups. The Journal of Finance, 61(6):2637-2680. [ Links ]
ATTIG, N., EL GHOUL, S. & GUEDHAMI, O. 2009. Do multiple large shareholders play a corporate governance role? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of Financial Research, 32(4):395-422. [ Links ]
AZIM, M.I. 2012. Corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on company performance: A structural equation model analysis. Australian Journal of Management, 37(3):481-505. [ Links ]
BENNEDSEN, M. & WOLFENZON, D. 2000. The balance of power in closely held corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2):113-139. [ Links ]
BERTHELOT, S., FRANCOEUR, C. & LABELLE, R. 2012. Corporate governance mechanisms, accounting results and stock valuation in Canada. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 8(4):332-343. [ Links ]
BLOCH, F. & HEGE, U. 2001, Multiple shareholders and control contests. Working Paper, France, Aix-Marseille Université [ Links ].
BURKART, M., GROMB, D. & PANUNZI, F. 1997. Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3):693-728. [ Links ]
CARNEY, M., GEDAJLOVIC, E.R., HEUGENS, P.P.M.A.R., VAN ESSEN, M. & VAN OOSTERHOUT, J. 2011. Business group affiliation, performance, context, and strategy: A meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 54(3):437-460. [ Links ]
CHANG, S.J. & HONG, J. 2000. Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea: Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions. The Academy of Management Journal, 43(3):429-448. [ Links ]
CHEN, V., LI, J. & SHAPIRO, D. 2011. Are OECD-prescribed good corporate governance practices really good in an emerging economy? Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1):115-138. [ Links ]
CHIN, W.W. 2010. How to write up and report PLS analyses. In Esposito Vinzi, V., Chin, W.W., Henseler, J. & Wang, H. (ed.) Handbook of partial least squares. Heidelberg: Springer Berlin. [ Links ]
CHOI, S.B., PARK, B.I. & HONG, P. 2012. Does ownership structure matter for firm technological innovation performance? The case of Korean firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(3):267-288. [ Links ]
CLAESSENS, S. & DJANKOV, S. 1999. Ownership concentration and corporate performance in the Czech Republic. Journal of Comparative Economics, 27(3):498-513. [ Links ]
CLAESSENS, S., DJANKOV, S. & LANG, L. 1999a. Corporate ownership and valuation: Evidence from East Asia. In Harwood, A., Litan, R.E. & Pomerleano, M. (eds.) Financial markets and development: The crisis in emerging markets. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. [ Links ]
CLAESSENS, S., FAN, J.P.H., DJANKOV, S. & LANG, L.H.P. 1999b. The expropriation of minority shareholders: Evidence from East Asia. Policy Research Working Papers, World Bank, Washington, DC. [ Links ]
CLAESSENS, S., DJANKOV, S. & LANG, L.H.P. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1-2):81-112. [ Links ]
CLAESSENS, S. & FAN, J.P.H. 2002. Corporate governance in Asia: A survey. International Review of Finance, 3(2):71-103. [ Links ]
CLAESSENS, S., SIMEON, D., FAN, J.P.H. & LANG, L.H.P. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The Journal of Finance, 57(6):2741-2771. [ Links ]
CRAIG, J.B., DIBRELL, C. & DAVIS, P.S. 2008. Leveraging family-based brand identity to enhance firm competitiveness and performance in family businesses. Journal of Small Business Management, 46(3): 351-371. [ Links ]
DIAMANTOPOULOS, A., SARSTEDT, M., FUCHS, C., WILCZYNSKI, P. & KAISER, S. 2012. Guidelines for choosing between multi-item and single-item scales for construct measurement: A predictive validity perspective. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 40(3):434-449. [ Links ]
DRIFFIELD, N., MAHAMBARE, V. & PAL, S. 2007. How does ownership structure affect capital structure and firm value? Recent evidence from East Asia. Economics of Transition, 15(3):535-573. [ Links ]
GOMES, A. & NOVAES, W. 2005. Sharing of control as a corporate governance mechanism. PIER Working Paper No. 01-029, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Econ Research Paper:01-12. [ Links ]
GOMEZ-MEJIA, L.R., HAYNES, K.T., NUNEZ-NICKEL, M., JACOBSON, K.J.L. & MOYANO-FUENTES, J. 2007. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1): 106-137. [ Links ]
GOMEZ-MEJIA, L.R., MAKRI, M. & KINTANA, M.L. 2010. Diversification decisions in family-controlled firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2):223-252. [ Links ]
GROSFELD, I. 2009. Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different? Economic Systems, 33(3):259-277. [ Links ]
GOMEZ, E.T. 2012. State-business linkages in Southeast Asia: The developmental state, neo-liberalism, and enterprise development. In Walter, A. & Zhang, X. (eds.) East Asian capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [ Links ]
HAIR, J.F., RINGLE, C.M. & SARSTEDT, M. 2011. PLS-SEM: Indeed a silver bullet. The Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 19(2):139-152. [ Links ]
HANIFFA, R. & HUDAIB, M. 2006. Corporate governance structure and performance of Malaysian listed companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33(7-8):1034-1062. [ Links ]
HEUGENS, P.P., VAN ESSEN, M. & VAN OOSTERHOUT, J.H. 2009. Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3):481-512. [ Links ]
JIANG, Y. & PENG, M. 2011. Principal-principal conflicts during crisis. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(4):683-695. [ Links ]
JOHNSON, R.A. & GREENING, D.W. 1999. The effects of corporate governance and institutional ownership types on corporate social performance. The Academy of Management Journal, 42(5):564-576. [ Links ]
KHOO, D. 2013. Bright's 100% dividend payout attracts some attention, The Star. Available at: http://www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx/?file=% 2f2013%2f1%2f22%2fbusiness%2f12607446&sec=business [accessed 2013-04-03]. [ Links ]
KING, T.-H.D. & WEN, M.-M. 2011. Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(3):512-531. [ Links ]
LAEVEN, L. & LEVINE, R. 2008. Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. Review of Financial Studies, 21(2):579-604. [ Links ]
LE, S.A., WALTERS, B. & KROLL, M. 2006. The moderating effects of external monitors on the relationship between R&D spending and firm performance. Journal of Business Research, 59(2):278-287. [ Links ]
LI, J., LAM, K., QIAN, G. & FANG, Y. 2006. The effects of institutional ownership on corporate governance and performance: An empirical assessment in Hong Kong. Management International Review, 46(3):259-276. [ Links ]
LIEW, P.K. 2007. Corporate governance reforms in Malaysia: The key leading players' perspectives. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(5):724-740. [ Links ]
LIN, Y.-F. 2005. Corporate governance, leadership structure and CEO compensation: evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(6):824-835. [ Links ]
LINS, K.V. 2003. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(1):159-184. [ Links ]
PENG, M. & ZHOU, J. 2005. How network strategies and institutional transitions evolve in Asia. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 22(4):321-336. [ Links ]
PORTA, R.L., LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, F. & SHLEIFER, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of Finance, 54(2):471-517. [ Links ]
RASLI, A., GOH, C.F. & KHAN, S.U.R. 2013. Demystifying the role of a state ownership in corporate governance and firm performance: evidence from the manufacturing sector in Malaysia. Zbornik Radova Ekonomskog Fakulteta u Rijeci-Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics, 31(2):233-252. [ Links ]
RIGDON, E.E., RINGLE, C.M. & SARSTEDT, M. 2010. Structural modeling of heterogeneous data with partial least squares. In Malhotra, N.K. (ed.) Review of marketing research. United Kingdom: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. [ Links ]
RINGLE, C., WENDE, S. & WILL, A. 2005, Smartpls 2.0, University of Hamburg. [ Links ]
SHLEIFER, A. & VISHNY, R.W. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2):737-783. [ Links ]
STEYN, B. & STAINBANK, L. 2013. Separation of ownership and control in South African-listed companies. South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences, 16(3):316-345. [ Links ]
SU, Y., XU, D. & PHAN, P.H. 2008. Principal-principal conflict in the governance of the Chinese public corporation. Management and Organization Review, 4(1): 17-38. [ Links ]
TAM, O.K. & TAN, M.G.-S. 2007. Ownership, governance and firm performance in Malaysia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2):208-222. [ Links ]
VILLALONGA, B. & AMIT, R. 2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2):385-417. [ Links ]
WIELEMAKER, M. & GEDAJLOVIC, E. 2011. Governance and capabilities: Asia's entrepreneurial performance and stock of venture forms. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1):157-185. [ Links ]
YOUNG, M.N., PENG, M.W., AHLSTROM, D., BRUTON, G.D. & JIANG, Y. 2008. Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1):196-220. [ Links ]
ZWIEBEL, J. 1995. Block investment and partial benefits of corporate control. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(2):161-185. [ Links ]
Accepted: January 2014


text:
In a blog post that is not to be missed, Hot Air founder and longtime conservative stalwart Michelle Malkin this morning threw the weight of her opinion behind former Pennsylvania Sen. Rick Santorum — and, perhaps even more importantly, explained why she chose not to endorse the other three candidates. She has had — and continues to have — reservations about all the GOP contenders, including Santorum himself, but she was especially adamant about her opposition to Newt Gingrich. At Townhall.com, Guy Benson thoroughly dissects her piece, illuminating how conspicuous was her criticism of the former Speaker of the House. For now, I offer this excerpt that focuses on the positive side of Rick Santorum:
He didn't cave when Chicken Littles in Washington invoked a manufactured crisis in 2008. He didn't follow the pro-bailout GOP crowd — including Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich — and he didn't have to obfuscate or rationalize his position then or now, like Rick Perry and Herman Cain did. He also opposed the auto bailout, Freddie and Fannie bailout, and porkulus bills.
Santorum opposed individual health care mandates — clearly and forcefully — as far back as his 1994 U.S. Senate run. He has launched the most cogent, forceful fusillade against both Romney and Gingrich for their muddied, pro-individual health care mandate waters.
He voted against cap and trade in 2003, voted yes to drilling in ANWR, and unlike Romney and Gingrich, Santorum has never dabbled with eco-radicals like John Holdren, Al Gore and Nancy Pelosi. He hasn't written any "Contracts with the Earth." …
Santorum is an eloquent spokesperson for the culture of life. He has been savagedand ridiculed by leftist elites for upholding traditional family values — not just in word, but in deed.
She also praises his strong views on border security and national defense — and even has a good word or two for his campaign management. She forestalls knee-jerk criticisms of the former senator by addressing head-on his 2006 reelection loss, his endorsement of Arlen Specter and a few of his more pronounced big-government tendencies.
Predictably, readers still found objections to her endorsement: One complained that the endorsement, though ideologically pure, was politically stupid. The reader wondered: Why didn't Malkin endorse Santorum after Iowa when it might actually have helped? He suggested that, at this point, support for Santorum just draws support away from Newt Gingrich and makes it that much easier for Mitt Romney to secure the nomination.
But supporting Santorum helps Romney only if voters buy the premature spin that this is already a two-man race. It's not. The race has barely begun — and Santorum speaks to the concerns of the quietly conservative heartland — and to the concerns of working-class, swing-state voters like the voters who elected him in Pennsylvania in the first place — in a way the other candidates don't. He is just as much an alternative to Romney as he is an alternative to Gingrich and could draw support from both camps if concerned conservatives would come to understand that he still has a chance to win.
As Malkin points out, Santorum is in this campaign for the long haul. He is headed to Colorado, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nevada. Her endorsement comes as many conservatives, despite their best efforts to fall in line with either of the establishment candidates, still find themselves disenchanted with the frontrunners. It comes as Santorum begins to distinguish himself as the lone traditional conservative candidate who was also strong on two of the most definitive issues of this election cycle — the bailouts and Obamacare. It comes, in other words, right on time.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
How To Win A Drinking Contest — Last Man Standing
Last Man Standing are articles intended to help the average guy prepare for some of life's oddest events. It's just advice. It's better than being clueless.
While extreme drinking can actually kill you, sometimes you've just got to cut loose and prove to the guys, and the gals, that you can hold your booze better than anyone else in the bar. It's a macho thing. And what better way to show off your impressive skills than by drinking the next guy under the table?
Here are a few tips to keep you out of the hospital, if you choose to challenge someone to a drinking contest. No one likes to hear the phrase, "Oh, yeah, he's getting his stomach pumped right now."
Know Your Basic Biology
You might already have a leg up on the competition, and not even know it. Some people have a genetic predisposition toward alcohol, which allows them to drink more than average. Their natural tolerance is just higher, even without excessive training. Know what camp you fall into, so you can be better prepared for a serious night of drinking.
Eat Before, During and After the Drinking Contest
Eat real food before you drink. Carbs and fat are great at slowing down your body's alcohol absorption rate. Greasy food can also insulate your stomach lining and other parts of your body against alcohol absorption (a fact most winos already know). The worst thing you can do is go on a bender with an empty stomach. If you can eat a little bit while you're drinking, even better.
Get Fat
As a general rule, the more you weigh, the longer it will take for the alcohol to affect you. Your blood alcohol level is a combination of the amount of booze in your system, divided by the amount of water that makes up, well… you (we're just big sacks of mostly water). Fatter people have more water than thinner people, obviously, because they have more overall mass. If you're really serious about binge drinking, build up your muscles too. Muscles contain more water than fatty tissue.
Hydrate Often
Alcohol dehydrates you, and it dehydrates you quickly. If the rules of the drinking game you've entered allow for a few sips of water now and then, do so. If you're only allowed alcohol during the heat of the battle, make sure you fill your stomach with plenty of water before the competition starts. Your bladder might not thank you at the time, but the rest of your body will be grateful for reducing the overall damage to your system.
Excuse yourself and go to the bathroom and drink water from the faucet during the contest, and eat a few of the chocolate muffins you stashed away in your pockets. When you return to the table, you'll be ready for the next round of drinking.
In the near future, you'll probably be able to buy the drug dihydromyricetin (DHM), which will let you drink as much as possible, without getting drunk at all. Sadly, for all you booze-guzzlers out there now, the drug has not been cleared for human consumption yet. But once (and if) it becomes available, there will be no end to the drinking prowess you can proudly display. Of course, every other Einstein on the planet will be able to buy the same drug, and do exactly the same thing.
[Via Intox]


text:
Thing you probably don't know about me: I can't look at Peanuts without tears welling up in my eyes, especially the older stuff.
Sure, everybody knows Snoopy now. But, it's really the entire mix of characters—Charlie Brown, Lucy, Peppermint Patty et al—and their mix of adult prickliness and childlike naiveté that made Charles Schulz's iconic comics strips so timeless. The daily black-and-white comics were great but the full-color Sunday strips gave Schulz a big, beautiful canvas to let his expert pacing and amazing linework breathe in a rainbow of color.
So, it's great news that Fantagraphics will be collecting Schulz' Sundays work into an all-new series of hardcovers. Peanuts Every Sunday: 1952-1955 (Vol. 1) kicks things off this fall, featuring painstaking re-coloring that recreates how the strips originally looked. Maybe you didn't know that Charlie Brown's shirt wasn't always yellow. Sometimes it was red! Look how different Snoopy's nose is!
Look at this stuff. Just look at the cute, round faces, the body language, the framing. So damn perfect. Hurry up already, November!


text:
Most Taiwanese are unhappy with almost every aspect of the nation and are pessimistic about the future, as President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) remains highly unpopular, an opinion poll shows.
The year-end survey, conducted by the Taiwan Thinktank between Wednesday and Friday, polled people on a wide range of topics and the results reflected the "collective anxiety and pessimism" of Taiwanese, Citizen Congress Watch executive director Ku Chung-hwa (顧忠華) told a press conference yesterday.
A majority of respondents were not satisfied with the increasing wealth gap, with 89.1 percent expressing concerns over stagnant wages, while the tax system, judicial system and media reporting received unsatisfactory ratings in all five categories, exceeding 64 percent.
In terms of economics, 84.7 of respondents said Taiwan had experienced a bad year, with 68.1 percent saying jobs had been hard to find.
Most people, or 63.9 percent, were pessimistic about next year. Among eight profession categories listed in the questionnaire, civil servants, including military, police and government employees, was the only category with more than half of the respondents expressing optimism about next year.
"It showed that currently, Taiwanese have 'three noes' — no confidence, no trust in the government and no faith," Ku said.
The increase in fuel and electricity prices was named by 45.6 percent of respondents as the single incident with the greatest impact this year, followed by the year-end bonus for retired civil servants and the capital gains tax on stock transactions.
The Ma administration has failed to come up with any substantial measures to boost domestic demand and reduce unemployment in the last three quarters after a misreading of the year's economic outlook in the first quarter, National Taiwan University professor Kenneth Lin (林向愷) said.
According to Lin, the Ma administration's stimulus plan, which focused on lower-cost and labor-intensive industries, demonstrated a mindset that belonged to the government of the 1980s.
The solution should be assisting industries with automation and gaining technological advantages, he said.
The widespread discontent with the government was why Ma's high disapproval rating of 68.2 percent was not a surprise, despite improving slightly from the 70.5 percent in the think tank's survey last month.
The poll found that most respondents did not support Ma doubling as Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman, with 80.9 percent — including 58.7 percent of those who identified as pan-blue supporters — saying Ma should give up the post.
Asked who would be the best candidate to serve as KMT chairman, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) received the most support with 28.2 percent, followed by New Taipei City (新北市) Mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) at 22.1 percent.
Former EasyCard Corp chairman Sean Lien (連勝文), a son of former KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰), ranked third with 16 percent.
However, the survey found that Ma's unpopularity did not translate into an advantage for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), despite 55.7 percent of respondents expressing support for a massive demonstration against Ma on Jan. 13 organized by the party.
While the DPP led the KMT by more than 10 percentage points in the approval ratings for political parties, the party garnered only 30.7 percent of support, with 57 percent of respondents saying they were not satisfied with the DPP's performance.


text:
Lower Merion Township, PAHome Menu
Commissions and Boards Meetings
Events Relating to Lower Merion Township
Select a Category OR a Department to narrow the Meetings listed.
Starting from July 27th, 2016 and onward, the Commissions and Board meeting agendas are also available to view on our agenda software system, hosted by NovusAGENDA: https://lowermerion.novusagenda.com/Agendapublic/
For Commissions and Board meeting agendas prior to July 27th, 2016 and advisory Commissions and Board meeting agendas please use the below meeting list.
Commissions and Board Meeting Minutes can be found here: Meeting Minutes
For copies of Commissions and Board meeting agendas prior to 2015, please contact the Township Manager Office at 610-649-4000.
Fire Committee
All Times Are Approximate
- Date: 02/19/2020 7:00 PM
- Location: Township Administration Bldg - 2nd Floor Board Room
75 East Lancaster Ave, 2nd Floor Board Room
Ardmore, Pennsylvania 19003-2323
|Commissioner Daniel S. Bernheim
|Commissioners Sean P. Whalen & V. Scott Zelov
The meeting agenda is available to view on our agenda software system, hosted by NovusAGENDA. Click or copy and paste the following link on your browser to view the agenda. To view exhibits of the agenda item, click on the heading of the agenda line item.
Download the PDF version of the Agenda below.


text:
This love story of the aged is a love story for the ages.
Joyce Kevorkian and Jim Bowman, both 81, were high school sweethearts and prom dates from Illinois, but life took them down different paths. They went to different colleges, married different people and had their own families. But now, 64 years later, the two are married, and it's almost like nothing has changed.
"The whole thing happened very quickly," Kevorkian's granddaughter, Anna Harris, 21, told NBC.
U.S. & World
Stories that affect your life across the U.S. and around the world.
Harris said that around the holiday season, Bowman sent Kevorkian a letter asking how she'd been and seeing if they could reconnect. She said her grandmother was really excited and responded right away.
Kevorkian told NBC that the two had good times together when they were younger, and that she thought it would be nice for the pair to see each other again.
They talked on the phone constantly, Harris said, until Bowman finally decided to make the drive from where he lived in Springfield, Illinois, to where Kevorkian resided in South Bend, Indiana.
Harris said her grandmother was initially worried about how the visit would go, but "it was like no time had passed and they reconnected immediately."
"It has been fun," Kevorkian added.
Kevorkian told her granddaughter that she felt like she was 17 years old again--and Harris couldn't agree more.
"She acts a little like a little kid, or a high schooler, who's fallen in love for the first time," Harris said. "It's really sweet."
Harris said that Bowman stepping into her family's life was a good thing. After her grandfather died, she said, her grandmother wasn't really herself anymore. But Bowman, who also lost his spouse, changed that.
"It was like a part of her died also," Harris said. "And once Jim came into the picture, she began having a more positive outlook."
Kevorkian said her granddaughter has told her she's more cheerful than she used to be, too.
Bowman's proposal came around Christmas time, and Harris was in the room for it. However, it wasn't exactly traditional, as he did it through the phone.
"She looks over at me and goes 'Well huh, that was a really strange phone call. Jim asked me to marry him," she said.
Grandma's response?
"Well I said, 'that sounds like a good idea!'" according to Harris.
Harris was charged with keeping the proposal a secret until her grandmother could announce it to her family on Christmas Eve. Initially, Harris said, her family was a little unsure of the situation, as they'd never met Bowman before.
"It didn't take long for everyone to warm up," she said.
Harris added, "It's pretty easy to see when they're together that they want to be around each other...they're clearly in love."
"I think our children just wanted us to be happy in our old age," Kevorkian said.
She added, "We wanted to be together...we picked up where we left off."
The couple still has the same jokes, she said, and they also still have a love for dancing.
The pair also reconnected with old friends from high school, who Kevorkian said were surprised to hear that the two were getting married.
The wedding was held on April 1 at the retirement community where Kevorkian lives in Indiana. Harris said it was a small wedding, but "really sweet."
"I think everyone's just so happy to see my grandma happy again," she said.
Kevorkian described the wedding as "perfect."
Bowman's daughter Julie even reached out to Kevorkian in a letter that said, "Thanks for helping my dad smile again."
Harris said when she posted photos of the wedding online, she half hoped it would spread. And now that it has, her grandmother is excited.
"Obviously they're happy," Harris said. "But it's a whole different level for her and Jim to see that their story is touching so many people."
Kevorkian added that she was surprised by the attention her story has garnered.
She thought, "Why should anybody be so entranced with such a simple story?"
Harris said she's been asked a lot about whether Kevorkian is related to the famous Dr. Jack Kevorkian. She's not.
She's also been asked about what it's like having Bowman in her family now. She said she's thrilled to have him in her life, and said that while some people think it's strange for grandparents to get remarried, Bowman isn't replacing her grandpa.
"Instead, he just gave my grandma back," she said.


text:
Not included in discounts and deals
Elisabeth Fredriksson is a Swedish graphic designer that from a young age has had an interest in art and creating. Since the age of 10, Elisabeth could be found painting for hours upon hours, and stopped only when her mom finally would holler that dinner was ready. She got her first camera at 15, and the start of a major passion was born.
After attending art school and experimenting with various forms of art, Elisabeth finally decided on pursuing graphic design, which is now her greatest interest. ''When I create I can get inspired from everything between a grain of sand to the universe at large. Art is my life.''
Search for a specific location, either by typing in an address or by dragging the red cursor on the map. Once you have selected your location, click "Set these coordinates to confirm and continue.


text:
|East Lyme, Conn.
|High School:
|East Lyme
2010-11 (Freshman):
Selected to CSA All-America first-team ... Named to All-Ivy League team ... Finished season ranked No. 7 in the nation ... Finished the season wtih a 13-6 overall record, going 10-5 as Harvard's No. 1 ... Began Freshman campaign with a 3-0 sweep of Brown's Brad Thompson … Defeated William Morris of Williams, 11-5, 11-7, 11-4, Nov. 21 … Won a close five-game match over Dartmouth's Christopher Hanson Dec. 2 ... Won matches over opponents from Western Ontario, St. Lawrence and Hamilton, 3-0, to begin 2011 ... Helped Harvard capture fifth at the 2011 CSA National Team Championship with a win against Dartmouth ... Went 3-2 at the 2011 Individual National Championship.
Before Harvard:
Played soccer all four years of high school … Captained soccer team as a senior … Two-time Ireland national squash champion in the under-19 division … Won the U.S. national title in the under-15 division … Most Valuable Player of soccer team … Three-time all-conference selection … Named all-state and All-New England twice … Academic All-American as a senior … French Honors Society member.
Sister, Siusi, is a member of the swimming team at Northeastern.


text:
Explore our psychic reading services, and learn more about what the stars have in store for you. You can read your free weekly horoscope, our psychic blog, browse our Love Psychic relationship advice column, and learn more about the New Age. We even offer a free psychic reading to new customers.
- Love & Relationship Readings
Questions about your love life or relationship? Do you wonder what the future has in store for the ones you love?
Find a love & relationship psychic
- Career & Finance Readings
Wondering about your career or money worries? Your psychic guide is here to help you with your finance questions.
Find a career & finance psychic
- Medium
Mediums use their psychic powers to channel the spirits of the loved ones who have passed on.
Find a medium today
- Tarot Readings
Our tarot readers use the cards to help you with any questions you have.
Find a tarot reading specialist
- Pet Psychic Readings
Pet Psychic specialists help communicate with your pets. From Fido to Fluffy, we can help.
Find a career & finance psychic
- Astrology & Horoscopes
Our psychics who use astrology and horoscopes can help you find answers in the stars.
Find a astrology and horoscope psychic
- Numerology
Numbers are everywhere, from the holy trinity to the magical numbers in the Da Vinci Code. Our numerology readings are very popular.
Find a numerologist
- Dream Interpretation
Wonder what your dreams are about? Let our psychics help you find the meanings of your dreams.
Find a psychic dream interpreter
- Lost Objects
If you've lost something, our psychics can help you find it. Sometimes it just takes a psychic eye to find what's been lost.
Find a psychic to help you find your lose object
- Past Life Readings
Do you believe you have led past lives? Learn more about your past, today.
Find a past life reading psychic


text:
Former Oakland Raiders quarterback JaMarcus Russell appears to be making progress in his NFL comeback attempt ... at least from a weight-loss standpoint.
Ben Volin of The Palm Beach Post reported Friday that Russell now is less than 300 pounds as he tries to get to 265 before his April pro day. Russell weighed 308 pounds when he began training with Jeff Garcia and the TEST Football Academy in San Diego on Feb. 7.
Arizona Cardinals wide receiver Larry Fitzgerald reportedly will lend his services at Russell's pro day, which is scheduled on or around April 10. Former Tampa Bay Buccaneers wideout Michael Clayton also is expected to attend, according to Volin.
Russell has allowed his comeback attempt to be documented by Bleacher Report. He recently ran the 40-yard dash for the first time in five years, posting a time of 5.2 seconds. Russell's trainers have set a goal at 4.8, close to the time of 4.83 seconds that Russell ran before the Raiders took him with the first overall pick in the 2007 NFL Draft.
We'll continue to give you periodic updates on Russell's journey. It's not often that a No. 1 overall pick can become a Rocky Balboa-level underdog over the course of five years. Consider our curiosity piqued.
Follow Dan Hanzus on Twitter @DanHanzus.


text:
This item is in excellent condition. You might mistake it for brand new!
Old Navy Maternity wear gives mothers-to-be a line of clothing that fits their ever-changing shape without losing out on style. There's clothing for each trimester that's cut to accommodate her shape during each stage of pregnancy. Shirred tops flow over the torso without binding, and tights come with full belly panels for the later stages.Shop all Old Navy - Maternity
All information is encrypted and transmitted without risk using a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. Shopping at thredUP is safe and secure! You'll pay nothing if unauthorized charges are made to your credit card.
The strikethrough price shown next to any listed item (excluding Remade apparel) represents the estimated original retail price of a comparable item of the same quality, construction and material offered elsewhere in new condition. If more than one strikethrough price is shown, the highest-priced strikethrough price next to the item represents the estimated original retail price referenced above and the lower-priced strikethrough price represents the original listed price on thredUP. While we acknowledge that pricing is not an exact science, we strive to provide fair and accurate pricing information. Our estimated retail reference prices are set by a seasoned team of merchants who monitor market prices for the brands and styles that we sell. If the estimated retail price is an important factor in your purchasing decision, we encourage that you do your own comparison shopping as well.


text:
My observations on the SEG sidekicks, not even to be mean, but you know; as an anthropologist. Andrew Studer is not a person I have figured out yet. But I heard when his parents were expecting, his mom wanted a son, his dad wanted a girl. And they both got what they wanted.
Teebie Smalls got his nickname "smalls" for the size of his hands. They are so small, he needed to put on those boxing gloves just to be able to fist the other patrons at the SEG crib ha ha.
One of the new guys in my gym needed to turn in his tickets and money, so he asked me what Jeremy Bjornberg looked like ha ha. A physical description was too easy. I told my fighter to look for the guy who was adding salt to his milk ba dum bum.
- The best place for Minnesota Mix Martial Arts news!
- It is currently Wed Feb 26, 2020 6:08 am
Outdoor Roast:
Everything you ever wanted to know about Mixed Martial Arts in Minnesota...
1 post • Page 1 of 1
1 post • Page 1 of 1
Return to Minnesota MMA News Talk
Who is online
Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 2 guests
Who is onlineIn total there are 2 users online :: 0 registered, 0 hidden and 2 guests (based on users active over the past 5 minutes)
Most users ever online was 101 on Mon Aug 29, 2016 12:28 pm
Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 2 guests


text: Seller: a-place-in-space (569.146) 100%, Location: Croydon, London, Ships to: Americas, Europe, Asia, AU, Item: 143299674657 After 80 years, it's here-the 1,000th issue of DETECTIVE COMICS, the title that literally defines DC! This 96-page issue is stacked with an unbelievable lineup of talent that will take you on a journey through Batman's past, present and future...plus a sensational epilogue that features the first-ever DC Universe appearance of the deadly Arkham Knight! But who is under the mask? And why do they want Batman dead? The incredible future of Batman adventures begins here! Terms and Conditions: Please read before purchasing. Please ensure you use the shopping basket facility within eBay, when placing your order, as we are unable to refund postage on multiple orders, if paid individually. If you are outside of the UK, please use the shopping basket facility on ebay.co.uk for automatically combined postage when you pay. Comics are now limited to 2 copies in total per customer, a change from our previous policy. However, if more than 2 copies of an item are purchased, your order will be cancelled and you will be required to rebuy under our policy terms. All of our comics are 1st prints, unless we state otherwise. All comics come bagged and boarded (excludes magazine and graphic novels). Payment via Paypal only. All our comics are brand new/unread, unless stated otherwise on the listing (i.e. some Auction items). Anything bought from us between Friday morning and Sunday evening will be dispatched Monday evening, which is our next postal collection. Please be aware before buying, that it is impossible for us to check every single item to try and identify every minor imperfection and therefore some items will not be in Mint condition. Unfortunately, many comics now have printing faults sustained during the printing process and additionally, with the amount of handling during the printing, packaging, shipping and distribution process, it is an unrealistic expectation for comics and magazines to be without any imperfections or fault. Brand new comics are subject to many industry accepted flaws (i.e. spine creases, corner wear, print faults, ink marks, smudges, ink disturbance/bleeding, small tears at the spine corners) and we do not accept requests for cancellation or return of affected issues. Many buyers have very exacting standards and expect new comics to be perfect and/or without fault,unfortunately we cannot guarantee this level of quality because of the reasons above. We do not state that our comics will achieve a certain grade at CGC and you should not expect that our books will be 9.6 or 9.8 etc. Many will be, however it should not be expected. We will not accept returns if a customer believes that a comic won't achieve an anticipated grade. We would recommend that if you require near perfect copies, that you visit your nearest comic store and personally hand pick the best copy. DAMAGES: Those who buy from us on a regular basis know the quality of our comics, we send the very best we have available. On occasion, new comics can be subject to many flaws, i.e. spine creases, minor print faults, ink marks, smudges and other minor imperfections. White Covers and Blank covers are particularly susceptible to printing marks and on occasion there are no better copies available from us or our suppliers. These are industry accepted printing flaws and therefore we are unable to accept returns or offer discount for these imperfections. If your item sustains postal damage, please contact us immediately. We will require images of the outer packaging and item clearly showing the damage being reported. This is required for our Supplier / Postal Services claim process. Options of a refund, replacement or alternative will be offered to the Buyer. Replacements are dependent upon availability. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE IMAGES USED ARE PROVIDED BY THE PUBLISHERS AND MAY DIFFER TO FINAL PUBLICATION COVERS. PLEASE ORDER BY THE ISSUE NUMBER RATHER THAN THE IMAGE. IF A PREORDER COMIC IS DELAYED FOR ONE OR TWO WEEKS, YOUR ORDER WILL WAIT UNTIL THAT COMIC HAS BEEN RELEASED BEFORE BEING SENT. IF A PREORDER COMIC HAS BEEN DELAYED FOR MORE THAN TWO WEEKS, WE WILL CONSIDER THE SITUATION AND EITHER CANCEL AND REFUND THE COMIC AND SEND THE REMAINDER OF THE ORDER OR SEND THE REMAINDER OF THE ORDER AND SEND ON THE DELAYED COMIC ONCE IT HAS FINALLY COME INTO STOCK. YOU SHOULD ALSO BE AWARE THAT ITEMS BOUGHT ON THE SAME DAY AS PREORDERS WILL BE COMBINED AND SENT WHEN THE FINAL PREORDER IS RELEASED. IF YOU ARE BUYING A MIXTURE OF PREORDER AND IN-STOCK ITEMS, YOUR ORDER WILL SHIP WHEN THE FINAL COMIC IS RELEASED. ORDERS OF 5 OR MORE ITEMS WILL QUALIFY FOR A 20% DISCOUNT WHEN USING THE SHOPPING BASKET ON EBAY.CO.UK POSTAGE: We dispatch orders usually within 24/48 hours from receipt of payment. The estimated delivery date given on the listing is provided directly by Ebay, not us, and this is an estimate only, not a guarantee and buyers should be aware that successful delivery is reliant upon Postal Services delivering in a timely and secure manner. In many cases, where a buyer is reporting delays, we have found Postal Services have already attempted delivery, but were unsuccessful. In these circumstances, items are taken to the local depot to await re-delivery/collection instructions. We would be very grateful if you would ensure you have made enquiries with your local depot, and perhaps your neighbours, to see if either party are holding your order. Royal Mail stipulate 10 working days (15 days for European and Rest of the World) are required before any item is considered officially lost or delayed – this period allows sufficient time for either delivery to be made, collection/re-delivery instructions to be completed, or the item to be returned undelivered to us,the sender. We comply with this directive from Royal Mail and advise buyers that if their order has not been received or returned to us within this period, we refund after this time frame has elapsed. RETURNS: The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (Clause 13), excludes the cancellation of Newspapers, Periodicals (i.e.comics), Magazines and additionally sealed products and those sold under Auction terms and these are therefore not eligible for return/cancellation and we are under no obligation to accept a cancellation or return. Unwanted or incorrect buying purchases received after dispatch are returnable therefore purely at our discretion.Please contact us if you wish to return an item and if agreed, we will advise the returns process. If we agree to a return then the buyer will be required to return the item(s) to us via tracked postage within 30 days of receipt at their cost. Item(s) must be returned in the same condition sent to obtain a full refund. If an item is inadvertently sent incorrectly by us, we will send the correct item immediately, subject to availability, and liaise with the buyer regarding the return of the incorrect item at our expense. If the correct item is not available a refund or alternative item will be offered. If an item is returned by Postal Services as undelivered, we will contact you and advise the reason for the return. A re-package and re-send fee, payable by the Buyer, is required for orders to be re-sent. If undelivered items are returned and are damaged or unsaleable as a result, we cannot offer a refund. Please note Auction items are not eligible for any form of return. Mail Order Subscriptions available on request - Don't miss another issue of your favourite series. Condition: New, Comic Limit: Strictly Limited to 2 Copies Per Customer, Series: Detective Comics, Vol. 3, Year: 2019, Publisher: DC Comics, Type of Product: This is a COMIC, Date of Issue (MM/YYYY): Mar-19


text:
Ubuntu Community Council
A funny thing happened on the way to the forums, I was elected to serve on the Ubuntu Community Council. First of all I would like to thank those who voted for me, your support is a tremendous morale booster, and I look forward to representing your interests in the council. I'd also like to congratulate the other council members on their election or re-election, I can't imagine a better group of people to be working with.
That's it, short and sweet. Thanks again and let's all get back to building awesome things!


text:
Why can't I access Fax Thru Email?
You may not be able to access the Fax Thru Email application because your security settings are set to High. To access the application, you can either change the security level to Medium or add the application's URL to your Trusted Sites list.
To Add Fax Thru Email to Your Trusted Sites
- From your browser, from the Tools menu, click Internet Options.
- Click Security.
- Click Trusted Sites.
- In the Security level for this zone box, check your security level. You may need to do one of the following:
- If it is set to High, use the slider to change it to a Medium or lower security level.
- If it is set to Custom, click Default Level, and then use the slider to change it to a Medium or lower security level.
- Click the Sites button.
- Clear the Require server verification check box.
- In the Add this website to the zone field, type http://www.faxthruemail.com.
- Click OK.
- On the Internet Options window, click OK.
Note: These steps are specific to Internet Explorer, and will be slightly different if you're using another browser.


text:
What it can do for your business
With IBM MobileFirst for iOS Inspect & Turn, airline mechanics get real-time access to a digitized set of work assignments and analytics-driven recommendations. To prevent costly aircraft delays, line maintenance mechanics must complete their work between arrival and departure. Now, mechanics can easily view and proactively prioritize work orders on iPhone and Apple Watch and get expert support using Inspect & Turn. They are able to receive analytics-driven suggestions, helping them troubleshoot problems and work more efficiently. This additional information can help ensure quicker turnarounds and more on-time departures.
Improve maintenance traceability
Collect photo and video evidence with the built-in camera on iPhone. Access expert support when needed through FaceTime.
Access all the relevant information
Get instant access to all the relevant information about the aircraft – including work history, crew reports and necessary parts and tools required for the job.
Reduce transcription errors
The app lets you input maintenance information as it is gathered in real time, so there is less paperwork and fewer errors.
Four good reasons to use Inspect & Turn
- Take advantage of powerful analytics for greater efficiency
- Going mobile makes inspections faster and easier
- Aircraft mechanics can get more done
- The app is backed by a great service plan


text:
Lisa Martin
Seneca Valley High Harmony, PA Class of 1980
Memories of Lisa Martin
Are you Lisa Martin?
This page means someone is someone is looking for you. Register for free to let other alumni contact you and more:
- Let others find you
- Contact old friends
- Share photos and memories with other registered alumni
Looking for Lisa Martin?
This is a placeholder page for Lisa Martin, which means this person is not currently on this site. We do suggest using the tools below to find Lisa Martin.
About placeholder profiles
You are visiting the placeholder page for Lisa Martin. This page is here because someone used our placeholder utility to look for Lisa Martin. We created this page automatically in hopes Lisa Martin would find it. If you are not Lisa Martin, but are an alumni of Seneca Valley High School Harmony, PA, register on this site for free now.


text:
The problem: I am taking an existing, 5 year old, html based MMORTS game and "HTML5-ing" it, "AJAX-ing" it and most importantly, optimizing for mobile devices like iPhone, android etc. For these devices, the application will be packaged as a downloadable app that is a wrapper for a browser which actually shows the game..
The Question Looking for a good book, or books, or in-depth articles that would help me learn:
- what tools I have in iOS, andriod applications for optimizing an html based game. things like caching of images, etc
- what kind of connectivity, or interactivity I can expect between the html/javascript pages and the wrapper - can I play sounds in the wrapper by triggering them from javascript? etc
- tip and tricks to optimize html/html5 & Javascript application to run well on mobile devices
Any recommendations would be greatly appreciated!!