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Freedom in the World
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2013 Scores
Freedom Rating (1 = best, 7 = worst)
Civil Liberties (1 = best, 7 = worst)
Political Rights (1 = best, 7 = worst)
At its 18th Congress in November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party announced a new slate of leaders for the next five years. Conservative figures made up a majority of the new Politburo Standing Committee, which would be headed by general secretary Xi Jinping. The delicate leadership transition had been disrupted in February, when a subordinate of Politburo member Bo Xilai fled to a U.S. consulate, setting off China's biggest political scandal in years. The subsequent months were marked by intense political wrangling, Bo's expulsion from the party, his wife's conviction for the murder of a British businessman, and a nationwide clampdown on activists. After the party congress, the new leadership pledged to strengthen anticorruption efforts, but also imposed tighter internet censorship and surveillance. Despite the regime's hostility toward organized dissent, however, a growing number of Chinese asserted basic rights, shared uncensored information online, and challenged perceived injustice, sometimes forcing government concessions. Key dissidents who had been silenced for much of 2011 as part of a crackdown in the wake of the Arab Spring were more vocal during 2012, adding to society's pushback against official repression.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in mainland China in 1949. Party leader Mao Zedong subsequently oversaw devastating collectivist and ideological-purification campaigns, such as the Great Leap Forward (1958–61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), which resulted in tens of millions of deaths.
Following Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping emerged as paramount leader. Over the next two decades, he maintained the CCP's absolute rule in the political sphere while relaxing ideological controls and launching widespread economic and social reforms.
The CCP signaled its resolve to avoid democratization with the deadly 1989 military assault on prodemocracy protesters in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and surrounding areas. Jiang Zemin was named CCP general secretary later in 1989 and state president in 1993. He became China's top leader following Deng's death in 1997. Jiang continued Deng's policy of rapid economic growth, but maintained a hard line in the political sphere.
Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as CCP general secretary in 2002, state president in 2003, and head of the military in 2004. Many observers expected Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao to implement modest political reforms to address pressing socioeconomic problems. However, particularly during their second term, the CCP intensified repressive measures in response to citizen activism and perceived threats to its authority. In March 2008, Shanghai party chief Xi Jinping was appointed vice president, setting the stage for him to succeed Hu.
The CCP's next leadership transition, set to be finalized at the 18th Party Congress in late 2012, was unexpectedly upset in February of that year, when Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun fled to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, setting off China's biggest political scandal in years. Wang, who left the consulate after 24 hours and was taken into custody by central authorities, reportedly made a number of criminal allegations against Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai, a contender for a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). Over the following months, Bo was expelled from the party, and his allies in the CCP's neo-Maoist wing fell out of favor amid intense political wrangling. At the party congress in November, conservative figures emerged with a majority on the new PSC. Xi became CCP general secretary, and Li Keqiang was named as his deputy; in March 2013 the pair will become state president and premier, respectively.
Despite CCP hostility toward organized dissent, a growing number of Chinese took steps to assert basic rights and combat perceived injustice. Millions of people joined public protests, online campaigns, and collective petitions to challenge local-level abuses of power, arbitrary detention of fellow citizens, corruption, and pollution, sometimes forcing government concessions.
In response, the party committed more resources to internal security forces and intelligence agencies, enhanced controls over online social media, and increased societal surveillance. Some observers expressed concerns about the destabilizing effect of the CCP's reluctance to end repressive policies and institute reforms that would fundamentally address citizen grievances. Conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, both home to restive ethnic and religious minorities, remained highly repressive in 2012.
China's economy grew at the slowest rate since 1999, though it appeared to be rebounding at year's end. Also during 2012, China asserted its territorial claims over islands in the South and East China Seas more aggressively, souring relations with several neighboring countries. Meanwhile, the regime's mistreatment of human rights defenders drew international attention in April, when blind activist Chen Guangcheng made a daring escape from extralegal house arrest to the U.S. embassy in Beijing. Following negotiations, Chen was permitted to travel to New York for legal studies.
China is not an electoral democracy. The CCP has a monopoly on political power, and its Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) sets government and party policy. In November 2012, a new PSC was announced following an opaque, internal selection process. The committee shrank from nine to seven members, only two of whom—new CCP general secretary Xi Jinping and his deputy, Li Keqiang—had served on the previous panel. Party members—who number over 80 million—hold almost all top posts in the government, military, and internal security services, as well as in many economic entities and social organizations. The country's legislature, the 3,000-member National People's Congress (NPC), is elected for five-year terms by subnational congresses, formally elects the state president for up to two five-year terms, and confirms the premier after he is nominated by the president. However, the NPC is a largely symbolic body. Only its standing committee meets regularly, while the full congress convenes for just two weeks a year to approve proposed legislation.
Citizens who attempt to form opposition parties or advocate for democratic reforms have been sentenced to long prison terms in recent years. In January 2012, Li Tie of Hubei Province was sentenced to 10 years in prison for being a member of the China Social Democracy Party and for his online writings. In October, Cao Haibo of Yunnan Province was sentenced to eight years for starting online discussion groups about a possible political party. Democracy advocate and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo remained behind bars in 2012, having been sentenced in 2009 to 11 years in prison. His wife, Liu Xia, was under strict house arrest throughout the year. In addition to democracy advocates, tens of thousands of grassroots activists, petitioners, Falun Gong practitioners, Christians, Tibetans, and Uighurs are believed to be in prison or extrajudicial forms of detention for their political or religious views, although complete figures are unavailable. In October, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China published a partial list of over 1,400 political prisoners. The rights group Chinese Human Rights Defenders documented 3,833 cases of arbitrary detention of human rights defenders during 2011, of which some 86 percent apparently had no basis in Chinese law.
Corruption remains endemic despite increased government antigraft efforts, and top party leaders acknowledged growing public resentment over the issue in 2012. Thousands of officials are investigated and punished each year by government or CCP entities, but prosecution is selective and highly opaque, with informal personal networks and internal CCP power struggles influencing both the choice of targets and the outcomes. During 2012, dozens of lower- and mid-level officials were disciplined, demoted, dismissed, or prosecuted after bloggers and journalists exposed evidence of corruption online. The highest-level targets in 2012 were former Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai, charged with bribery in September, and Sichuan Province deputy party secretary Li Chuncheng, who was dismissed in December for influence peddling and questionable real-estate deals. Investigations by Bloomberg News and the New York Times found that the family members of Xi Jinping and outgoing premier Wen Jiabao held assets worth $376 million and $2.7 billion, respectively, raising questions about corruption and conflict of interest. However, the reports were suppressed in China, and both outlets' websites were blocked shortly after the articles' publication.
CCP officials increasingly seek input from academics and civic groups, though without relinquishing control over the decision-making process. Since open-government regulations took effect in 2008, many agencies have become more forthcoming in publishing official documents. However, implementation has been incomplete, and government bodies retain wide discretion to classify or withhold information, including on vital public matters such as food safety, home demolitions, and environmental disasters. Courts have largely hesitated to enforce information requests, while the poor quality of official responses dampens citizens' initial enthusiasm to lodge complaints. China was ranked 80 out of 176 countries surveyed in Transparency International's 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index.
Despite relative freedom in private discussion and citizen efforts to push the limits of permissible speech, China's media environment remains extremely restrictive. All media are owned, though not always directly operated, by the CCP or the state. Moreover, all news outlets are required to follow regularly issued CCP directives to avoid certain topics or publish content from party mouthpieces. Routinely censored topics include calls for greater autonomy in Tibet and Xinjiang, independence for Taiwan, the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the persecuted Falun Gong spiritual group, the writings of prominent activists, and critical commentary regarding CCP leaders. Other directives issued in 2012 barred or "guided" reporting on Chen Guangcheng's escape, certain cases of police brutality and official corruption, and deadly floods in Beijing. Outlets that disobey official guidance risk closure, and journalists face dismissal and sometimes imprisonment. Censorship decisions during the year were often uneven or arbitrary, resulting in information vacuums on major events, fleeting openings on sensitive topics, and intrusive propaganda campaigns surrounding the Bo Xilai scandal and internal CCP power struggles. This uncertainty fueled speculation, online rumors, and increased use of circumvention tools by internet users seeking independent reporting from foreign media. Neo-Maoist programming initiatives piloted in Chongqing under Bo, such as the wholesale replacement of commercial advertisements with propaganda spots on television, were reversed after his ouster, but national media regulators continued to impose new restrictions on television entertainment programs and online video. Pressure on investigative journalism also intensified, as several periodicals and journalists known for their muckraking faced suspension, dismissals, or tighter supervision.
According to international watchdog groups, at least 67 journalists and online activists were behind bars in China in 2012, including many Uighurs and Tibetans, though the actual number was likely much higher. In the latter half of the year, human rights groups recorded dozens of cases of bloggers, petitioners, and free expression activists being displaced or detained in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress. Nevertheless, the harshness of the crackdown was not as severe as in 2011 in the wake of the Arab Spring, and key activists were more vocal in 2012 than the previous year. Authorities continued to harass prominent artist and blogger Ai Weiwei, who was abducted and held incommunicado for 81 days in 2011. During 2012, he was barred from traveling abroad, his appeal in a politically fraught tax case was rejected, and the license of his art company was revoked.
Harassment and violent assaults against foreign reporters escalated during the year, and their Chinese sources and assistants were intimidated. Two foreign correspondents—Melissa Chan of Al-Jazeera English and Chris Buckley of the New York Times—were forced to leave the country after the government refused to renew their visas, while others had difficulty obtaining visas to enter the country. Some international radio and television broadcasts, including the U.S. government–funded Radio Free Asia, remain jammed.
China's population of internet users, estimated at over 530 million in 2012, remained the world's largest. According to official figures, mobile-telephone users exceeded one billion, with approximately one-third accessing the internet via their devices. Alongside growing access, the government maintains an elaborate apparatus for censoring and monitoring internet and mobile-phone communications. The authorities block websites or force the deletion of content they deem politically threatening, and sometimes detain those who post such information. The U.S.-based social media platforms Twitter and Facebook remain blocked. Domestic microblogging services—with over 300 million users in 2012—have grown rapidly in influence as a source of news, an outlet for public opinion, and a tool for mobilization, though the companies in question are obliged to adhere to official censorship directives. Several public outcries and online campaigns in 2012 were credited with forcing government concessions, such as the release of a petitioner from a labor camp, an investigation into a labor activist's death in custody, and upgrades to air-quality monitoring in Shanghai. In response to such netizen activity, authorities stepped up pressure on microblogging services to tighten existing controls, and arrests for spreading "rumors" online reportedly increased. The two leading services—Sina Weibo and Tencent—shut down their commenting functions for three days in April, Sina launched a new points-based system to encourage users to self-censor in May, and in December the NPC passed regulations requiring real-name registration for users after implementation of previous rules on the issue proved inadequate.
Religious freedom is sharply curtailed. Religious and ethnic minorities remained a key target of repression in 2012, with several deaths in custody reported. All religious groups must register with the government, which regulates their activities, makes personnel decisions, and guides their theology. Some groups, including certain Buddhist and Christian sects, are forbidden, and their members face harassment, imprisonment, and torture. The CCP continues to devote considerable resources to suppressing the Falun Gong spiritual group and coercing adherents to renounce their beliefs. During the year, authorities abducted practitioners in home raids, sentenced them to labor camps and long prison terms, and punished those who appealed on their behalf. Other unregistered groups, including unofficial Protestant and Roman Catholic congregations, operate in a legal gray zone. State tolerance of them varies from place to place. In April 2012, authorities in Hebei Province raided a house church meeting and detained over 50 people. Most were released, but seven, including the church's preacher, were awaiting criminal sentencing at year's end.
In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, an increased security presence that followed ethnic clashes in 2009 remained in place for much of 2012, and many of the hundreds of people detained in 2009 remained imprisoned or unaccounted for. Authorities intensified curbs on Islam in the region, raiding private study sessions and destroying thousands of publications, including copies of the Koran. In May, a court in Kashgar sentenced nine people to between six and 15 years in prison for participating in "illegal" religious activities. Policies marginalizing use of the Uighur language in education, government efforts to alter the region's demography through resettlement and work-transfer programs, and displacement linked to destructive "urban renewal" projects in the ancient city of Kashgar continued throughout 2012.
Academic freedom remains restricted with respect to politically sensitive issues. The CCP controls the appointment of university officials, and many scholars practice self-censorship to preserve their positions and personal safety. Political indoctrination is a required component of the curriculum at all levels of education.
Freedoms of assembly and association are severely restricted. Citizens risk punishment for organizing demonstrations without prior government approval, which is rarely granted. Nevertheless, workers, farmers, and urban residents held tens of thousands of protests during 2012, reflecting growing public anger over wrongdoing by officials, especially land confiscation, corruption, pollution, and fatal police beatings. In some cases, officials tolerated demonstrations or agreed to protesters' demands. In July, for example, thousands of people peacefully protested against the construction of a copper plant in Shifang, Sichuan Province. Police responded with tear gas, stun grenades, and beatings. After photographs spread via social media, the authorities announced that they would cancel the project and release detained protesters, though residents expressed fears that the project would resume once attention died down. Local officials face penalties if they fail to limit the flow of petitioners traveling to Beijing to report injustices to the central government. As a result, petitioners are routinely intercepted, harassed, detained in illegal "black jails," or sent to labor camps without trial. Detained petitioners are reportedly subject to beatings, psychological abuse, and sexual violence.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are required to register, obtain a government sponsoring entity, and follow strict regulations, including vague prohibitions on advocating non-CCP rule, "damaging national unity," or "upsetting ethnic harmony." Hundreds of thousands of charitable organizations operate with government supervision to provide social and educational services. Groups seeking more independence organize informally or register as businesses, though they are vulnerable to closure at any time. While the number of organizations whose work is not politically sensitive continues to expand, restrictions have tightened on human rights advocacy and even previously tolerated activism on issues like public health. At least 10 NGOs assisting migrant workers in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, were evicted from their offices or forced to close in 2012, despite eased provincial registration rules that took effect in July. Regulations from 2010 that increased obstacles to foreign donations for grassroots NGOs remain in effect.
The only legal labor union is the government-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and independent labor leaders are harassed and jailed. Collective bargaining is legal but does not occur in practice. Nevertheless, workers have increasingly asserted themselves informally via strikes, collective petitioning, and selection of negotiating representatives. Three 2008 labor laws were designed to protect workers, counter discrimination, and facilitate complaints against employers, while also empowering CCP-controlled unions. However, implementation has been undermined by the lack of independent arbitration bodies, a growing backlog of complaints, and companies' exploitation of loopholes, such as the use of middleman employment agencies, to evade certain safeguards. In December 2012, amendments to the 2008 Labor Contract Law were passed to restrict the use of such agencies. Separately, new regulations that took effect in January required the establishment of mediation committees at all large companies to handle disputes internally, easing pressure on labor tribunals but strengthening the government's role in dispute resolution. Dangerous workplace conditions continue to claim lives, with many tens of thousands of deaths reported each year. Forced labor, including by inmates in "reeducation through labor" camps and juveniles in government-sanctioned "work-study" programs, remains a serious problem.
The CCP controls the judiciary and directs verdicts and sentences, especially in politically sensitive cases. In 2012, this was particularly evident in the opaque proceedings involving Bo Xilai, his wife, and their associates. Bo was held incommunicado after his detention in March, and his case was transferred to prosecutors in October, with charges of abuse of power, bribery, and sexual misconduct. His trial was pending at year's end. His wife, Gu Kailai, received a suspended death sentence for the murder of a British businessman following a one-day show trial in August. In September, former police chief Wang Lijun—whose flight to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu sparked the scandal—was sentenced to 15 years in prison for abuse of power, defection, and corruption. The cases featured blatant disregard for due process, use of the extralegal shuanggui detention system for interrogating party officials in isolation, and other violations of fundamental rights. Prosecutors also failed to pursue Bo and Wang for severe human rights abuses they reportedly oversaw in office, focusing instead on personal misconduct.
Adjudication in minor civil and administrative disputes is fairer than in politically sensitive or criminal cases, but even in commercial litigation and civil suits involving private individuals, previous limited progress toward the rule of law has stalled or been reversed, particularly since the appointment of a CCP veteran with no formal legal training as chief justice in 2008. Judges have increasingly been pressured to resolve civil disputes through mediation, sometimes forced, rather than actual adjudication. The downgrading of the CCP portfolio overseeing the legal system in November 2012, and more progressive wording in an October white paper on judicial reform, sparked speculation on a possible reduction of political control over the judiciary in the coming years.
Civil rights lawyers continued to face restrictions in 2012. Lawyers were prevented from seeing their clients, disbarred, harassed during sensitive times like the 18th Party Congress, and in some cases imprisoned. In March, relatives confirmed that prominent lawyer Gao Zhisheng was alive after two years of incommunicado detention by security forces, though he remained imprisoned and at severe risk of torture at year's end. In April, self-trained, blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng escaped from extralegal house arrest imposed after he completed a four-year prison term in 2010, having helped victims of forced abortions to file a class-action suit.
Criminal trials in China, which often amount to mere sentencing announcements, are frequently closed to the public, and the conviction rate is estimated at 98 percent. In March 2012, the NPC enacted amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law that will take effect in January 2013. They include improvements for ordinary criminal defendants, including exclusion of evidence obtained through torture, access for lawyers to their clients, and the possibility of witnesses being cross-examined. However, legal experts raised concerns that the revised law features exceptions for cases of "endangering state security," "terrorism," and "major bribery"—categories often employed to punish nonviolent activism and political expression. The amendments allow such suspects to be secretly detained for up to six months, essentially legalizing the practice of enforced disappearances.
Torture remains widespread, security agents routinely flout legal protections, and impunity is the norm for police brutality and suspicious deaths in custody. Many citizens—including a large contingent of political and religious prisoners—are detained by bureaucratic fiat in "reeducation through labor" camps, which permit individuals to be held for up to four years without a judicial hearing. Overall, detention facilities are estimated to hold three to five million people. Conditions are generally harsh, with reports of inadequate food, regular beatings, and deprivation of medical care; the government generally does not permit visits by independent monitoring groups. New forms of extralegal detention have multiplied in recent years, including the "black jails" for petitioners, psychiatric confinement of citizen activists, and disappearances of political dissidents for weeks or months at a time.
Fifty-five crimes, including nonviolent offenses, carry the death penalty. The number of executions each year is a state secret, but an estimate by the San Francisco–based Duihua Foundation put the number of executions in 2011 at 4,000, which would be the world's largest. Executed prisoners continue to be the primary source of organs for transplant operations, though the government announced plans in March 2012 to end the practice in the next three to five years. Some experts continued to raise concerns that those imprisoned for their religious beliefs or ethnic identity have also been used as sources for organs.
Security forces work closely with the CCP at all levels. During 2012, the party continued to expand its apparatus for "stability maintenance," a term that encompasses maintaining law and order, suppressing peaceful dissent, and closely monitoring the populace. Key components include state intelligence agencies, such as the Public Security Bureau; paramilitary forces like the People's Armed Police; and extralegal CCP-based entities like the 610 Office, stability-maintenance units, and administrative enforcers called chengguan who routinely engage in abusive conduct at the grassroots level. In March, the government announced that it would allocate 702 billion yuan ($111 billion) that year for internal security forces, an increase of over 12 percent from 2011. The new total surpassed the military budget for the second consecutive year. The massive spending has fueled a lucrative market for outsourcing surveillance to civilians and private companies. As the CCP leadership transition proceeded during the year, analysts said some party chiefs were pushing to curb the growing power of the security apparatus.
Minorities, the disabled, and people with HIV/AIDS or Hepatitis B face widespread societal and official discrimination, including in access to employment and education. The hukou (household registration) system remains in place, mostly affecting China's 200 million internal migrants and rural residents. Some local governments have experimented with reforms, but citizens continue to face restrictions on changing employers or residence, and many migrants are unable to fully access social services, such as education for their children. Among other restrictions on freedom of movement, dissidents, human rights defenders, and certain scholars are prevented from traveling abroad or placed under house arrest, particularly during politically sensitive periods. In the run-up to the 18th Party Congress in 2012, a series of restrictions on commerce, travel, and expression were imposed on Beijing residents. Law enforcement agencies continue to seek out and repatriate North Korean refugees, who face imprisonment or execution upon return. In August 2012, Chinese authorities repatriated at least 1,000 ethnic Kachin refugees from Burma who had fled violent conflict in their region.
Property-rights protection remains weak in practice. Urban land is formally owned by the state, while rural land is collectively owned by villages. Tens of thousands of forced evictions and illegal land confiscations occurred in 2012. Residents who resist eviction, seek legal redress, or organize protests often face violence at the hands of local police or hired thugs. Regulations adopted in 2011 offered greater protections against expropriation in urban areas by defining "public interest," requiring compensation at market value, and allowing for administrative review. However, implementation has been undermined by the lack of independent courts and local governments' reliance on land development as a key source of operating revenue and a driver of economic growth statistics. The regulations do not apply to rural land, which lies at the center of most land conflicts.
Despite increasing discussion of potential reforms, China's population controls remain in place, and couples are required to obtain government permission before conceiving. In urban areas, only one child per couple is permitted, while many rural families are limited to two children. Compulsory abortion and sterilization, though less common than in the past, still occur fairly frequently, and high-profile cases sparked public outrage during 2012. According to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, regulations in 18 of 31 provincial-level administrative units explicitly endorse mandatory abortions as an enforcement tool. Officials who fail to meet birth and sterilization quotas risk disciplinary action, and relatives of unsterilized women or couples with unapproved pregnancies were subjected to high fines, job dismissal, and detention in 2012. These controls, combined with commercial ultrasound technology and cultural and economic pressures favoring boys, have led to sex-selective abortion and a general shortage of females, exacerbating the problem of human trafficking.
Domestic violence affects one-quarter of Chinese women, according to statistics published in 2011 by the CCP-controlled All-China Women's Federation. In 2012, the NPC placed a draft law identifying domestic violence as a crime on its legislative agenda, but no decision had been made by year's end; the problem is currently addressed inadequately via scattered provisions in other laws. Several laws bar gender discrimination in the workplace, and gender equality has reportedly improved over the past decade, but China's score and relative ranking have dropped since 2009 on the Global Gender Gap Report. Women remain underrepresented in consequential CCP and government positions.
The numerical ratings and status listed above do not reflect conditions in Hong Kong or Tibet, which are examined in separate reports.


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subset: commoncrawl


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Kings bring back entire Cup-winning lineupby Corey Masisak
Los Angeles completed an incredible run to its first Stanley Cup title, then retained every player who dressed for a playoff game. Dustin Penner was an unrestricted free agent, but he re-upped on a one-year contract.
The Kings did not make a big move to improve the club, but general manager Dean Lombardi has a roster full of Cup winners and plenty of salary-cap space to work with, according to Capgeek.com. Lombardi's biggest move of the offseason was locking up Conn Smythe Trophy winner Jonathan Quick with a 10-year, $58 million contract.
There are some intriguing prospects who might be ready for full-time NHL duty, but it is going to take injuries for them to get a chance during the early stages of the season.
2012-13 Kings Fantasy Team Preview
Under-valued: Justin Williams – While there are plenty of big names among the Kings' forwards corps, Williams flies under the radar in fantasy drafts, but he clearly shouldn't after averaging 22 goals, 58 points, plus-12, 52 PIMs, 16 PPP and 227 SOG over the last two seasons.
Over-valued: Simon Gagne – Still remembered for his 40-plus goal seasons in Philadelphia, Gagne is likely a third-line forward for L.A. and had just seven goals and 17 points in 34 games last year -- between his injury history and disappointing stat lines over the last three years, he's not worth a draft pick.
Sleeper: Slava Voynov – Despite quiet playoff production (one goal, two assists), Voynov has potential to build off regular season totals (eight goals, 20 points, plus-12 in 54 games) and develop as Kings' second most valuable fantasy blueliner behind Drew Doughty.
-- Follow Matt Cubeta on Twitter: @NHLQubes
Dustin Brown - Anze Kopitar - Justin Williams
Dustin Penner - Mike Richards - Jeff Carter
Dwight King - Jarrett Stoll - Simon Gagne
Jordan Nolan - Colin Fraser - Trevor Lewis
Brad Richardson - Kevin Westgarth
Willie Mitchell - Slava Voynov
NOTES: Not only does coach Darryl Sutter have everyone back from a lineup that was essentially the same for every playoff game from the middle of the second round on, but Gagne is healthy and could be primed for a bounce-back season.
Those top two lines were so effective in dispatching the St. Louis Blues, Phoenix Coyotes and New Jersey Devils once Sutter moved Penner to the second unit that it would certainly make sense to start this season with that alignment. Gagne could be a top-six forward, but he might have to settle for third-line duty with Stoll and possibly playoff goal-poacher King.
This lineup doesn't even include Andrei Loktianov or Kyle Clifford, let alone prospect Tyler Toffoli. Any of those players would probably see regular minutes for a lot of teams. The defense was aligned in the same way for virtually the entire postseason, and Quick logged every minute in net.
There has been some speculation about the Kings trading Bernier, but Lombardi doesn't have any particular needs at this point. If the Kings do need cover on defense, prospects Jake Muzzin and Thomas Hickey are likely ready for a chance to prove they belong in the big leagues. If Bernier does get dealt, Martin Jones could be ready for NHL duty in his place.
Follow Corey Masisak on Twitter: @cmasisak22
For all 30 in 30 stories go to NHL.com/30in30stories and for the full 30 in 30 schedule visit NHL.com/30in30.


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2020 Toyota Supra & Compact SUV Challenge
Season 38 Episode 45 | 26m 48s
This week we drive an iconic Japanese sport coupe, now with a German heart, the Toyota Supra. Pat Goss reads the signs of small parts that set off a big bang. Stephanie Hart heads to motorsport's hallowed ground. Finally, small utilities battle it out to see which one stands above the rest.
Aired: 07/13/19Video has closed captioning.
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National corporate funding for MotorWeek is provided by Tire Rack, RockAuto and State Farm.


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If records are meant to be broken, California is about to set a new distinction for itself, albeit dubious. As of Friday, the state will have the longest budget delay since the Department of Finance began keeping such records in the 1960s. And there's no sign of ending the deadlock.
The previous record, September 16, was set in 2008 after a contentious stalemate between Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the Democratic majority in the state lgislature. Other than that, no other delay had spilled over into September.
Now for the second time in three years, September has become the "new normal" for meeting the June 15 budget deadline. There is no obvious end game. Both the governor and state leaders have hinted dates like November and even next January.
For many people, this is a non-story. After all, the roads are open, hospitals are functioning, and schools are in session. So, what's the big deal?
The "big deal" occurs in ways, many subtle, that most of us don't see.
For example:
- the legislature has withheld nearly three billion dollars from public schools, which would use the funds to purchase supplies, hire crossing guards, and service equipment;
- the state controller has stopped paying vendors, who sell goods to the state, placing many small businesses in jeopardy of failing;
- the governor has furloughed state workers, which has led to long lines at the Department of Motor Vehicles and other state agencies;
- the state has stopped paying operators of nursing homes and other facilities that house patients on state disability programs.
- California's precarious bond rating--already ranked 50th--has sunk even lower, which means higher interest when the state borrows money to pay its bills.
For many of us, these and other issues are removed from our daily lives. The budget is just a number. But for the college student who has had to put off attendance because he or she hasn't received an expected CalGrant financial aid package, the outcome is devastating.
So, why haven't the governor and legislature responded to these problems with a budget? The groups affected the most are among the least powerful in the state. They have no lobbyists; they aren't campaign contributors; they don't have the means to make their cases in large numbers. Stated another way, they are on the fringe of the power structure.
And so it goes. Until more people are directly impacted by the impasse, the stalemate will go on. One only wonders if there's a better way to run a state.
U.S. & World
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Let us know what you think. Comment below, send us your thoughts via Twitter @PropZero or add your comment to our Facebook page.


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Freedom on the Net
You are here
Sri Lanka
2012 Scores
Freedom on the Net Status
Freedom on the Net Total(0 = best, 100 = worst)
(0 = Best, 100 = Worst)
Obstacles to Access(0 = best, 25 = worst)
(0 = Best, 25 = Worst)
Limits on Content(0 = best, 35 = worst)
(0 = Best, 35 = Worst)
Violations of User Rights(0 = best, 40 = worst)
(0 = Best, 40 = Worst)
Since coming into power in 2005, the ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) has pursued an ambitious information, communications, and technology (ICT) policy characterized by the widespread provision of internet access and improvement in digital literacy. The new government's initiatives have also led to the adoption and further development of the decade-old e-Sri Lanka project, which is geared towards building "information infrastructure and an enabling environment, developing ICT human resources... leveraging ICT for economic and social development,"[1] and providing access to "diverse and unrestricted sources of information and means of communication."[2]
Despite recognition of the internet's value and impact on economic growth, the military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, or Tamil Tigers)—which ended in May 2009—hindered adequate investment in the ICT sector and expansion of the internet across the country. Furthermore, the empowering impact of the internet in Sri Lanka has been undermined by the government's efforts to arbitrarily block, filter, and regulate online content that provides dissenting views and reportage on sensitive political issues.
In January 2007, internet access and mobile phone connections in the northern and eastern regions of the country were disconnected on account of national security concerns.[3] In the same year, the government made its first attempt to clamp down on online content in response to reportage on the military campaign against the LTTE and civilian casualties.[4] While there is a clear trend with respect to the restriction of online content under the current government, since 2007 there has also been an incremental growth in the number of online news sites, new media initiatives, and the leveraging of social media for socioeconomic and political activism. However, in a post-war context, the arbitrary blocking of websites has continued in 2011—a trend that contradicts the government's own recognition of the role of ICTs in promoting access to information and free of expression—and the government has expressed a need for greater regulation of online content.[5]
The internet was first introduced in Sri Lanka in 1995, but penetration remained low for many years. Fifteen percent of the population had access to the internet in 2011, up from 2.5 percent in 2006.[6] Government expenditure and private investment in the information technology (IT) sector has gradually increased, leading to the implementation of several projects for the development of an island-wide telecommunications infrastructure.[7] In July 2011, it was announced that WiFi zones would be established with a focus on providing internet access in schools, government buildings, and public transport areas.[8]
Notwithstanding a literacy rate of 94.2 percent—the second highest in the region—and increased investment in the sector, a critical barrier to the penetration of ICTs is digital literacy, which stood at 35 percent in 2011 according to the Department of Census and Statistics.[9] Digital literacy is higher in urban over rural areas due to unaffordable personal computers and/or laptops, which affects lower-income families, the lack of a substantive IT literacy program instituted at all schools with adequate IT facilities, and the unavailability of software compatible with the Sinhala and Tamil language. However, as part of the e-Sri Lanka project, the government has supported the Nenasala (Knowledge Centre) project through the Information Communication Technology Agency (ICTA) to address the issue of literacy and access in rural areas.[10] Furthermore, the availability of computers in households both within urban and rural areas is increasing, with higher acquisition rates reported between 2005 and 2009, particularly in rural areas.[11]
There are additional concerns about the extent to which broadband penetration, which is the lowest in the region at 6 percent of the population, will increase given relatively high market prices and a low penetration of computers.[12] Nevertheless, reports in March 2011 indicate that the price of commercial broadband had been reduced as service providers lowered leased line prices in order to attract foreign ICT and business process outsourcing firms.[13] In a country with an estimated 16 million mobile phone users and a mobile penetration rate of over 87 percent in 2011,[14] increasing internet access through mobile broadband is also a challenge, limited primarily by expensive 3G/3.5G mobile handsets.[15]
In addition to the requirements of an expanding economic sector, the demand for internet access is driven by a growing youth population and its engagement with YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and international blog-hosting services, which are all freely available and widely-used. As of March 2012, there are over 1.2 million Facebook users in Sri Lanka and 1,084 blogs syndicated on the blog aggregator www.kottu.org.[16]
The two largest internet service providers (ISPs) are Dialog Axiata and Sri Lanka Telecom (SLT). The latter commands more than 50 percent of the market, and a majority of its shares is owned by the state. The broadband market is competitive and a few firms dominate wholesale access; however, SLT has the largest fiber-optic national backbone.[17] While there is no legal monopoly of the market, there is also absolutely no legal requirement for SLT to sell backbone access to its competitors. In contrast, Dialog Axiata has allowed wholesale access to its backbone network.[18] For mobile phones, the main service providers in the country are Dialog Axiata, which has the largest customer base of over six million subscribers, Mobitel (a subsidiary of SLT with a customer base of 3.8 million[19]), Bharti Lanka (with 1.8 million customers), Etisalat (with 3.5 million customers), and Hutchison Telecommunication (with under one million customers)
The regulatory environment under the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka (TRCSL) has led to concerns about transparency, independence, and overt politicization.[20] Following the ratification of Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in October 2011, which removed term limits to the executive presidency and allows the president to appoint the heads and members of all commissions,[21] any legislative guarantees for the independence of the TRCSL (and other statutory institutions) were subverted. The TRCSL now falls under the ambit of President Rajapaksa,[22] who appointed his permanent secretary as the Commission's chairman. The regulatory body's interventions to restrict online content and pronouncements on strengthening online regulation have been viewed as partisan, extralegal, and overly repressive.[23]
Since 2007, there have been numerous cases of arbitrary blocks on websites that report on human rights violations, corruption, and governance issues. These instances have occurred alongside the consistent failure by authorities to provide a legal basis for the blocks, follow due process in terms of judicial intervention in order to legitimize any move to restrict content, or protect partisan interests when it comes to content that is critical of government policies and actions.[24]
It is not clear whether the government possesses the expertise and funds to implement sophisticated methods of online content restriction—such as deep-packet inspection (DPI), real time filtering, and offline filtering—although there are unofficial reports that one or two Sri Lankan telecoms might have DPI programs for the enhancement of mobile data services. There were also reports in 2010 of IT experts from China's military intelligence division assisting the government in blocking "offensive" websites.[25]
The current system of censoring online content involves monitoring websites that publish sensitive political content and blacklisting them under the TRCSL, which requests ISPs to block access to blacklisted websites in the country. Any legal requirement for ISPs to comply to requests from the TRCSL to block websites are based on either specific license conditions—which is difficult to confirm given the lack of transparency in licensing—or political pressure. However, existing license conditions for ISPs also involve compliance with directions to act with the consent of the TRCSL and to address any matter that the ministry may find "…requisite or expedient to achieving the objectives" of the TRCSL.[26]
In the absence of an independent body for redress, a fundamental rights application challenging the blocking of a website or the imposition of any other restrictions remains the only method for appealing online freedom of expression violations. However, the application is rarely pursued due to a lack of trust in the country's politicized judiciary and fears of setting a repressive precedent.[27]
Since 2007, the regime's efforts at web censorship have focused primarily on targeting websites that report on human rights issues, government accountability, corruption, and political violence. The frequency with which websites are blocked increased considerably after 2009 when the government began restricting pornographic websites and the police sought to ban access to pornography on mobile phones.[28] However, instances of blocks on websites have not been properly coordinated or comprehensive, with some targeted websites available at times on one or more ISPs and at other times inaccessible on all ISPs. One particular case is Tamilnet.com, which has been blocked since 2007 and continues to be blocked in 2011, but not uniformly across all fixed-line and mobile broadband networks.[29] In 2009, SLT blocked access to most of the Tamil news websites that operate outside the country, but most of these sites were accessible throughout 2010 and 2011. In June 2011, the citizen media sites, Groundviews.org and Vikalpa.org, were temporarily blocked for a day on SLT broadband services but remained accessible on other ISPs,[30] and in October 2011, the news website Lankaenews.com was blocked allegedly due to coverage of intra-party violence associated with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), President Mahinda Rajapaksa's ruling party.[31]
In November 2011, five popular news websites known for their reporting on human rights, governance issues, and corruption were arbitrarily blocked.[32] Prior to this incident, the government and the TRCSL had never admitted to blocking websites but did so in this case on the premise of concerns about defamation and the violation of privacy. In December 2011 and intermittently in November 2011, Colombotelegraph.com, a news and commentary website run by exiled Sri Lankan journalists, was also blocked with absolutely no justification provided by authorities,[33] but is accessible as of early 2012. The authorities have occasionally blocked website domains hosted on the servers of blogging platforms rather than specific blogs themselves,[34] although only a few of the most popular blogs publish political content and dissenting narratives.
In addition to its blocking activities, the government has been intensifying its efforts to restrict internet and mobile phone content. For example, the government announced in December 2011 plans to introduce more comprehensive legislation to control internet use, including the use of Facebook, ostensibly to crackdown on child abuse online.[35] On March 9, 2012, the Media Centre for National Security (MCNS) announced that mobile phone SMS news alerts on matters related to "…national security and security forces, the police…" must be approved by the MCNS[36] prior to dissemination,[37] which could result in the censorship of news related to the security establishment. The MCNS, however, did not delineate the possible consequences of failing to comply with this directive and the legal basis upon which it could issue such an order.
A majority of the alternative news websites—such as Srilankaguardian.org, Colombotelegraph.com, and Tamilnet.com—are operated by exiled journalists and publish news covering human rights violations, political violence, and corruption, while online news sites of the mainstream media are more likely to self-censor controversial content out of fear of reprisals. In fact, self-censorship "on matters that would damage the integrity of the island" is actually encouraged by the current government.[38] The few pro-government websites in existence are the online platforms of the main state-run newspaper, a broadcasting network, and other news initiatives that are inclined towards the incumbent government.[39]
Despite the restrictions on certain ICT content, there are still diverse, free, and widely accessible sources of information, particularly on socioeconomic and political issues written in English, Sinhala, and Tamil. Notwithstanding the intermittent blocking of the Human Rights Watch website during the height of civil war in 2009,[40] all other websites of major international media institutions, human rights organizations, and media rights groups were freely accessible in the country in 2011. The emergence of blogs and social media has contributed to creating a space for the anonymous and pseudonymous critique of governance, development, political process, human rights and policymaking within government. The impact of citizen media initiatives such as Groundviews.org and Vikalpa.org is a demonstration of the increased engagement of human rights activists,[41] political commentators,[42] citizens,[43] and local as well as international journalists[44] who bear witness to critical post-war issues and provide reportage on topics that would otherwise not be covered by mainstream media in the country.
The right to freedom of speech, expression and publishing is guaranteed under Article 14 (1)(a) of the Constitution but is subject to numerous restrictions for the protection of national security, public order, racial and religious harmony as well as morality. The Supreme Court has recognized the "indispensability" of freedom of expression to the "operation of a democratic system" and the importance of wide dissemination from "diverse and antagonistic sources."[45] However, there is no specific provision under the Constitution that recognizes access to the internet as a fundamental right or guarantees online freedom of expression. Further, the Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to consider the applicability of existing freedom of expression guarantees to the internet.
The laws that impact the use of ICTs in the country are focused primarily on computer crimes and intellectual property rights violations, and they allow information contained within computers to be admissible in civil and criminal proceedings. It is also an offense to report on or publish official secrets, information about parliament that may undermine its work, malicious content and any content that could be considered an incitement to violence or cause disharmony.[46] As a result, online content that can be deemed an incitement to ethnic and religious violence, or poses a threat to national security, runs the risk of restriction and/or criminalization.
A key issue with the existing legislation is its overly broad scope and lack of detailed definitions, which may be used to prosecute or restrict legitimate forms of online expression. For example, in October 2011, the Ministry of Justice announced that it would introduce new legislation on obscenity in order to prevent the circulation of pornography with specific mention of regulating obscene content on "electronic media."[47] However, as with previous legislation on obscenity, the ministry failed to provide an exact definition of what is constituted as "obscene."
The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission[48] (LLRC)—a key post-war commission of inquiry appointed by President Rajapaksa in May 2010—highlighted the importance of freedom of expression and the right to information[49] in its final report, which was released in November 2011.[50] As of March 2012, the government had still not put forward a roadmap or time frame for the implementation of the recommendations detailed in the LLRC's report.
A culture of impunity, circumvention of the judicial process through arbitrary action, and a lack of adequate protection compound the poor enforcement of freedom of expression guarantees. Furthermore, online journalists and bloggers are not afforded the same rights and protection as broadcast and print journalists. In November 2009, the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) arrested a blogger for using the internet to make offensive comments about the president and secretary of defense.[51] No information was provided about the legal basis of the arrest, exact nature of the content, and why this specific case resulted in such action. There have also been arrests based on the content of text messages, revealing the possible existence of a sophisticated surveillance regime. During the 2010 presidential election, the authorities detained opposition supporters who had accused the government of electoral fraud via text messages[52] and other supporters for sending out text messages to organize protests following the announcement of the election results.[53]
Despite the fact that extrajudicial surveillance of personal communications is prohibited under the Telecommunications Act No.27 of 1996, this law can be circumvented by an order from a minister or by an employee of a telecommunication service acting in "pursuance of his official duty."[54] Additionally, there is no provision under the legislation that requires officials to notify a user that s/he is under surveillance. For example, in 2010, there were reports of Facebook and Twitter users being monitored in an effort to clamp down on dissent against the government, raising suspicions that the authorities were either hacking into user accounts or setting up fake accounts for infiltration.[55]
The threat to user rights in the country is further exacerbated by the lack of substantive laws for the protection of individual privacy and data respectively, which is extremely problematic given the government's proclivity for pervasive surveillance.[56] The involvement of Chinese telecoms, such as ZTE[57] and Huawei,[58] in the development and maintenance of Sri Lanka's ICT infrastructure has also raised concerns about the possibility of backdoor espionage and surveillance,[59] which is in line with international reportage about Chinese telecoms assisting Central Asian states with surveillance or "eavesdropping" technologies.[60] Nevertheless, it is not clear what exact technology or a prospective technical framework for it has been transferred in order to buttress the country's censorship and surveillance regime.
In November 2011, the Government Information Department instituted a registration policy for certain websites, stating that sites "carrying any content relating to Sri Lanka or the people of Sri Lanka" should register with the Ministry of Mass Media and Information.[61] The request was criticized for its lack of clarity and necessity as well as infeasibility, particularly in terms of the possible imposition of liability for content published, the categories of websites that are required to register, and the legal framework under which registration could be imposed.[62] There was also concern expressed about the compliance of ISPs to arbitrary requests for blocking websites without the requirement of judicial intervention. A similar announcement was made in 2010 by the Ministry of Defense concerning the registration of mobile phone users to collect user information for the purpose of "curbing negative incidents," which included "raising unnecessary alarm or creating panic."[63] While the directive and penalty of disconnection for users failing to register was never enforced, real name registration and the provision of identity and banking documents has been a standard policy for mobile phone subscription.
In December 2011, the operator of a website who challenged the blocking of his site through a fundamental rights petition at the Supreme Court agreed to a settlement with the TRCSL and other institutions. In return for lifting the block on the website, the settlement required compliance with several terms and conditions that included the immediate registration of the website with the TRCSL and Ministry of Mass Media and Information. The website was also required to "delink" other sites blocked by the TRCSL.[64]
While the possibility of legal penalties threatens freedom of expression online, online reporters and web users in Sri Lanka have faced various forms of physical intimidation and violence. On January 24, 2010, the Lankaenews.com online journalist and cartoonist, Prageeth Ekneligoda, was abducted and little progress has been made on his case despite widespread international pressure for progress with investigations.[65] It is speculated that Ekneligoda was abducted because of his anti-government writing, and at present, the government appears to have very little concern about the case, opting instead to accuse Ekneligoda of seeking asylum and living in hiding in another country.[66] Sri Lanka is ranked fourth on the Committee to Protect Journalists Impunity Index with nine unsolved murders.
In January 2011, over a year after the abduction of Ekneligoda, there was an arson attack on the offices of Lankaenews.com,[67] which was followed a few months later by the arrest of the website's editor and another journalist on charges of intimidation and contempt of court, respectively.[68] The attack and increased restrictions on websites as well as the continuing intimidation[69] and assault[70] of mainstream journalists reinforce the chilling effect on freedom of expression in the country and widespread self-censorship.
An additional threat to internet freedom is the rise of cyber-threats, particularly with regard to privacy breaches on social media and email accounts.[71] The issue of technical violence such as cyberattacks against websites is largely focused on the activities of cyber-terrorist networks associated with the LTTE that have attempted to hack into national security networks and carry out web defacement attacks.[72] The government has recognized the need to strengthen its defensive capability in order to prevent further cyberattacks and combat web propaganda campaigns, leading to the purchase of more sophisticated surveillance technology, which could in turn be used to restrict legitimate forms of expression on the internet.
[1] "Programmes," Information Communication Technology Agency (ICTA), accessed July 13, 2012, http://www.icta.lk/en/programmes.html.
[2] "Establishment of Nenasalas," Nenasala, accessed July 13, 2012, http://www.nanasala.lk/.
[3] "Cutting off Telecoms in Sri Lanka Redux…," Groundviews, January 30, 2007, http://groundviews.org/2007/01/30/cutting-off-telecoms-in-sri-lanka-redux/.
[4] "Tamilnet blocked in Sri Lanka," BBC, June 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2007/06/070620_tamilnet.shtml.
[5] Sarath Kumara, "Sri Lankan government prepares new Internet restrictions," World Socialist Web Site, February 15, 2010, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/feb2010/slmd-f15.shtml.
[6] International Telecommunication Union (ITU), "Percentage of individuals using the Internet, fixed (wired) Internet subscriptions, fixed (wired)-broadband subscriptions," 2006 & 2011, accessed July 13, 2012, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx#.
[7] Ministry of Finance and Planning: Sri Lanka, "Annual Report 2010," March 31, 2011, p.89, http://www.treasury.gov.lk/reports/annualreport/AnnualReport2010-eng.pdf; "Sri Lanka Dialog to invest US$150mn in expansion," Lanka Business Online, February 11, 2011, http://www.lankabusinessonline.com/fullstory.php?nid=754125283.
[8] Damith Wickremasekara, "Lanka to get WiFi zones," The Sunday Times, July 31, 2011, http://sundaytimes.lk/110731/News/nws_14.html.
[9] Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, "Computer Literacy Survey – 2009," December 2009, http://www.statistics.gov.lk/CLS/BuletinComputerLiteracy_2009.pdf.
[10] Objectives of the Nenasala initiative: "…to establish multi-service community information centres which provide access to internet, e-mail, telephones, fax, photocopy, computer training classes and other ICT services as well act as a hub of local, national and global information resources to provide an catalytic effect for the rural communities in poverty reduction, social and economic development and peace building while aiming at providing these services in a long-term, sustainable manner." Source: ICTA's 1000 Nenasala (Knowledge Centre) Project, http://www.nanasala.lk/.
[11] Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, "Computer Literacy Survey – 2009," December 2009; "Computer Literacy among Sri Lankans is in the ascension," Media Center for National Development of Sri Lanka, June 23, 2010, http://www.development.lk/news.php?news=620.
[12] "Sri Lanka broadband use weak due to costs, low PC penetration: Fitch study," Lanka Business Online, May 25, 2011, http://www.lankabusinessonline.com/fullstory.php?nid=1415055027.
[13] Rohan Samarajiva, "Sri Lanka: Leased line prices to be lowered to encourage BPO business and Internet use," Lirne Asia, March 9, 2011, http://lirneasia.net/2011/03/sri-lanka-leased-line-prices-to-be-lowered-to-encourage-bpo-business-and-internet-use/.
[14] International Telecommunication Union (ITU), "Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions," 2011, accessed July 13, 2012, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Indicators/Indicators.aspx#.
[15] Zulfath Suaheed, "Sri Lanka mobile internet usage poised for growth: Nielsen," Lanka Business Report, March 4, 2011, http://www.lbr.lk/fullstory.php?nid=201103041615077468.
[16] For the information on Facebook availability, see: "Sri Lanka Facebook Statistics," Socialbakers, accessed July 13, 2012, http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/sri-lanka/last-week#chart-intervals.
[17] Helani Galpaya, Broadband in Sri Lanka: Glass Half Full or Half Empty? (Washington, D.C,: infoDev/The World bank, 2001), http://www.broadband-toolkit.org/.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Bandula Sirimanna, "Mobitel reached 3.8 million subscribers by Nov. 2010," The Sunday Times, January 9, 2011, http://sundaytimes.lk/110109/BusinessTimes/bt46.html.
[20] Under the Telecommunications Act No. 21 of 1994, the Minister of Telecommunications and Information Technology has sole discretion in issuing licenses and imposition of license conditions based on the recommendations of the TRCSL.
[21] Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, October 2010, http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/18th%20Amendment%20To%20Sri%20Lanka%20Constitution%20(2).pdf.
[22] "Statutory Institutions and Ministries under the Executive President," Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, accessed July 13, 2012, http://www.president.gov.lk/about_presidency.php.
[23] Sarath Kumara, "Sri Lankan government prepares new Internet restrictions," World Socialist Web Site, February 15, 2010, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/feb2010/slmd-f15.shtml.
[24] "Chapter 4: Restriction of Content on the Internet," Freedom of Expression on the Internet, Centre for Policy Alternatives, November 2011, http://www.scribd.com/doc/73393066/Freedom-of-Expression-on-the-Internet-in-Sri-Lanka.
[25] Bandula Sirimanna, "Chinese here for cyber censorship," The Sunday Times, February 14, 2010, http://sundaytimes.lk/100214/News/nws_02.html.
[26] Freedom of Expression on the Internet in Sri Lanka, Centre for Policy Alternatives, November 2011, pg. 30, http://www.scribd.com/doc/73393066/Freedom-of-Expression-on-the-Internet-in-Sri-Lanka,
[27] International Crisis Group, "Sri Lanka's Judiciary: Politicised Courts, Compromised Rights," Asia Report No.172, January 30, 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/172-sri-lankas-judiciary-politicised-courts-compromised-rights.aspx.
[28] Indika Sri Aravinda, "Police seek mobile porn ban," Daily Mirror, May 12, 2010, http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/3705-police-seeks-mobile-porn-ban.html.
[29] Sanjana Hattotuwa, "Tamilnet.com accessible once more in Sri Lanka via SLT ADSL," ICT for Peacebuilding (blog), August 5, 2010, http://ict4peace.wordpress.com/2010/08/05/tamilnet-com-accessible-once-more-in-sri-lanka-via-slt-adsl/.
[30] "Groundviews blocked and unblocked," ICT for Peacebuilding (blog), June 22, 2011, http://ict4peace.wordpress.com/2011/06/22/groundviews-blocked-and-unblocked/.
[31] "In Sri Lanka, anti-government website blocked," Committee to Protect Journalists, October 19, 2011, http://www.cpj.org/2011/10/in-sri-lanka-access-to-anti-government-website-blo.php.
[32] The following five websites were blocked on the 5th of November 2011: www.lankanewsweb.com, www.srilankamirror.com, www.srilankaguardian.com, www.lankawaynews.com, www.lankaenews.com.
[33] "We are blocked but will not be stopped," Colombo Telegraph, December 26, 2011, http://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/we-are-blocked-but-we-will-not-be-stopped/.
[34] "More websites including ghs.google.com blocked in Sri Lanka?" ICT for Peacebuilding (blog), July 29, 2009, http://ict4peace.wordpress.com/2009/07/29/more-websites-including-ghs-google-com-blocked-in-sri-lanka/.
[35] Indika Sri Aravinda, "Government to Monitor Internet," The Sunday Leader, December 18, 2011, http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/12/18/government-to-monitor-internet/.
[36] The MCNS and Secretary of Defense issued a similar directive in 2006: "Any news gathered by your institution through your own sources with regard to national security and defense should be subjected to clarification and confirmation from the MCNS in order to ensure that correct information is published, telecast or broadcast" – "Sri Lankan defence authorities impose unofficial censorship," World Socialist Web Site, October 11, 2006, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/oct2006/sri-o11.shtml.
[37] "New censorship of SMS news in Sri Lanka," Groundviews, March 12, 2012, http://groundviews.org/2012/03/12/new-censorship-of-sms-news-in-sri-lanka/.
[38] Dinidu De Alwis, "Media should exercise self-censorship," Ceylon Today, March 23, 2012, http://www.ceylontoday.lk/16-3780-news-detail-media-should-exercise-self-censorship-lakshman-yapa.html.
[39] "Namal's disclosure of family embarrassment," The Island, December 21, 2011, http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=41622.
[40] Reporters Without Borders, "Internet Enemies - Countries under surveillance: Sri Lanka," March 12, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,RSF,COUNTRYREP,LKA,,4a38f97fc,0.html.
[41] "Jaffna: Brutal Assault of Civilians in Navanthurai," Groundviews, August 25, 2011, http://groundviews.org/2011/08/25/jaffna-brutal-assault-of-civilians-in-navanthurai/.
[42] "Jaffna and the Vanni today: Reality beneath the rhetoric," Groundviews, March 17, 2011, http://groundviews.org/2011/03/17/jaffna-and-the-vanni-today-the-reality-beneath-the-rhetoric/.
[43] "First images: The flooding in Menik Camp and the increasingly dire situation for IDPs," Groundviews, August 15, 2009, http://groundviews.org/2009/08/15/first-images-the-flooding-in-menik-camp-and-the-increasingly-dire-situation-for-idps/.
[44] "Northern Local Government Elections," Groundviews, July 23, 2011, http://groundviews.org/2011/07/23/local-government-elections-in-jaffna/; Charles Haviland, "A question Sri Lanka's leader's keep dodging: Where are the disappeared?" Groundviews, March 21, 2012, http://groundviews.org/2012/03/21/a-question-sri-lankas-leaders-keep-dodging-where-are-the-disappeared/.
[45] Joseph Perera v AG (1992) 1 SLR 199, at 202 per Sharvananda CJ.
[46] Respective legislation: Official Secrets Act No. 32 of 1955; Parliament (Powers and Privileges) (Amendment) 1997; Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act No. 48 of 1979.
[47] "Tough new laws against porn," Daily Mirror, October 24, 2011, http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/14318-tough-new-laws-against-porn.html.
[48] The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) website: http://www.llrc.lk/.
[49] An attempt by the United National Party, the main opposition party in the country, to put forward a Right to Information bill was defeated in Parliament in June 2011: "Govt. rejects our right to know," Sunday Times, June 26, 2011, http://sundaytimes.lk/110626/Columns/political.html.
[50] The report further recommended that legislation be enacted "to ensure the right to information" and that steps need to be taken in order to "prevent the harassment and attacks on media personnel and institutions." Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation, The Official Website of the Government of Sri Lanka, 2011, pp.197-8, http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201112/FINAL%20LLRC%20REPORT.pdf.
[51] "Blogger arrested in Sri Lanka for 'offensive' comments regarding President and Defense Secretary?" ICT for Peacebuilding (blog), November 1, 2009, http://ict4peace.wordpress.com/2009/11/01/blogger-arrested-in-sri-lanka-for-offensive-comments-regarding-president-and-defense-secretary/.
[52] Sarath Kumara, "Sri Lankan government prepares new Internet restrictions," World Socialist Web Site, February 15, 2010, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/feb2010/slmd-f15.shtml.
[53] "Fonseka plotted against President: Hulugalle," Campaign for Free & Fair Elections, January 29, 2010, http://caffesrilanka.org/Present%20Election-2----119.html.
[54] Interception of personal communications by a telecommunications officer can also occur under the direction of a Minister, as directed by the Court and in connection with the investigation of a criminal offence, as provided under the Telecommunications Act No. 27 of 1996, October 23, 1996, http://www.trc.gov.lk/images/pdf/ACT_27_1996.pdf.
[55] Sarath Kumara, "Sri Lankan government prepares new Internet restrictions," World Socialist Web Site, February 15, 2010, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/feb2010/slmd-f15.shtml.
[56] "It's ok for government to infiltrate online privacy of Sri Lankan citizens?" ICT for Peacebuilding (blog), April 17, 2010, http://ict4peace.wordpress.com/2010/04/17/its-ok-for-government-to-infiltrate-online-privacy-of-sri-lankan-citizens/.
[57] ZTE Corporation signed an agreement with Mobitel to develop its 4G(LTE) network and carried out successful trials in May 2011: "Sri Lanka's Mobitel and ZTE Corporation Carry Out the First Successful 4G(LTE) Trial in South Asia," ZTE, May 17, 2011, http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/en/press_center/news/201105/t20110517_234745.html; Pamela Weaver, "Sri Lanka hits the LTE road with trials, rollouts," Telecoms, May 10, 2011, http://www.telecoms.com/27530/sri-lanka-hits-the-lte-road-with-trials-rollouts/.
[58] Sri Lanka Telecom's (SLT) ADSL infrastructure is supported by Huawei Technologies: Ranjith Wijewardena, "SLT tie up with Huawei to expand Broadband Internet coverage," Nanasala, September 29, 2006, http://www.nanasala.lk/article_more.php?id=10.
[59] Sanjana Hattotuwa, "Are Chinese Telecoms acting as the ears for the Sri Lankan government?" Groundviews, February 16, 2012, http://groundviews.org/2012/02/16/are-chinese-telecoms-acting-as-the-ears-for-the-sri-lankan-government/.
[60] Deirdre Tynan, "Central Asia: Are Chinese Telecoms Acting as the Ears for Central Asian Authoritarians?" Eurasianet, February 15, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65008.
[61] "Website ban further broadened on News Director General notification," Lanka-e-news, November 5, 2011, http://www.lankaenews.com/English/news.php?id=12427.
[62] "Arbitrary Blocking and Registration of Websites: The Continuing Violation of Freedom of Expression on the Internet," Centre for Policy Alternatives, November 9, 2011, http://cpalanka.org/arbitrary-blocking-and-registration-of-websites-the-continuing-violation-of-freedom-of-expression-on-the-internet/.
[63] Bandula Sirimanna, "Sri Lanka to tighten mobile phone regulations," The Sunday Times, October 31, 2010, http://sundaytimes.lk/101031/BusinessTimes/bt32.html.
[64] S.S Selvanayagam, "Website previously blocked now permitted to operate by SC," DailyFT, December 16, 2011, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:rItgZngzetsJ:www.ft.lk/2011/12/16/website-previously-blocked-now-permitted-to-operate-by-sc/+website+previously+blocked+now+permitted+to+operate+by+SC&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=lk.
[65] T. Farook Thajudeen, "Prageeth Eknaligoda disappearance case still going on," Daily Financial Times, December 24, 2011, http://www.ft.lk/2011/12/24/prageeth-eknaligoda-disappearance-case-still-ongoing/; "UN heard Eknelygoda's cry for help; husband still missing," Committee to Protect Journalists, May 21, 2011, http://cpj.org/blog/2011/03/un-heard-eknelygodas-cry-for-help-her-husband-stil.php#more.
[66] Chris Kamalendran, "Eknaligoda case: Focus on Ex-AG," Sunday Times, December 11, 2011, http://sundaytimes.lk/111211/News/nws_24.html.
[67] "United Nations must intervene to protect Sri Lanka's media," Committee to Protect Journalists, January 31, 2011, http://cpj.org/2011/01/united-nations-must-intervene-to-protect-sri-lanka.php.
[68] "Another Lankaenews journalist arrested," Committee to Protect Journalists, April 25, 2011, http://www.cpj.org/2011/04/another-lanka-enews-journalist-arrested.php.
[69] "Sunday Leader Editor Threatened Again," The Sunday Leader, December 11, 2011, http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/12/11/sunday-leader-editor-threatened-again/.
[70] Chris Kamalendran, "Uthayan news editor brutally attacked," The Sunday Times, July 31, 2011, http://sundaytimes.lk/110731/News/nws_06.html.
[71] "681 SL cyber security incidents so far in 2011," The Sunday Times, October 16, 2011, http://www.sundaytimes.lk/111016/BusinessTimes/bt31.html.
[72] "Sri Lanka Army Commander says Cyber War still continues," ColomboPage, February 22, 2011, http://www.colombopage.com/archive_11/Feb22_1298388902CH.php.


text:
Kitted Workshop Cupboards. Kitted workshop cupboards from the Bisley ToolStor range provide secure and organised storage through 80kg capacity drawers and 100kg capacity galvanised shelves. Our kitted cupboards have a fully-welded steel carcass with 20.3mm front mouldings, a 1000kg UDL top load capacity and sit on a fully-welded reinforced base with four heavy duty adjustable feet. Our kitted workshop cupboards feature heavy duty doors that provide additional perforation storage. A variety of kitted cupboard sizes are available to suit your individual storage needs.
- Starting at: £612.09


text:
Competition Heats Up for Deutsche Bank's Giant Property Portfolio
By Craig Karmin and Laura Stevens
The field of a dozen suitors vying for Deutsche Bank's asset management business, which includes a giant real estate investment program, could be whittled in half with binding bids due on Wednesday, according to people familiar with the matter.
Those left are expected to include State Street, Ameriprise Financial, Macquarie Group, Aquiline Holdings LLC and Guggenheim Partners, these people said. Deutsche Bank is hoping to raise as much as $2 billion from the sale. Deutsche Bank spokeswoman Mayura Hooper in New York declined to comment on the bidders.
More than 50 of the biggest players in the money management and private equity industries showed initial interest in the business, though most have walked away after taking a closer look at it. J.P. Morgan Asset Management is among the recent firms to exit the process, say people familiar with the process.


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I've never used Youngblood make up before receiving this Holiday Glam set to review:
Youngblood Holiday Glam bag contains:
1. Vixen Lipstick (a red)
2. Truly Red Lip Liner Pencil
3. Venetian Sun Loose Blush (a light pink-gold type shade)
Its a little unusual, I guess, to review a lipstick and blush from a Mineral make up company, rather than foundation but it makes a nice change.
What I noticed about the lipstick is that it feels a little bit harder than I usually like – I like my lipsticks to be like Utterly Butterly at room temperature, but I've noticed this trait quite a lot in Mineral lipsticks.
In the tube it looks like a nice red – I have tons of nice reds at the moment but it really came to life once it was on the lips:
This is a great red, not overly vampy or too subtle. It also makes my lips look healthy rather than emphasizing my usually dry smackers.
Here is the blush:
On me, its more of a highlighter – its a light pink infused with gold. Its very pretty but as I said, more of a highlighter for girls with warm-dark skin.
Not a bad set for the holidays and a little slice of the brand. I'd like to try some of the base products out at some point to see if it can convert me (I am still a little cynical towards mineral make up – I just hate overly powdery finishes on the skin).
You can buy it here for £38 or if you are in the US, for a rather better value $39 here.