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Some time this year, Said Bahaji, a member of the al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany along with a few of the 9/11 hijackers, speaks to his mother on the telephone, the New York Times will report in 2009. Anneliese Bahaji, Bahaji's mother living in Germany, will tell the Times that in 2007, Bahaji "said he just wanted to call and say he's still alive." She will mention that he does not say where he is, and she does not hear from him afterwards. In October 2009, there will be renewed interest in Bahaji after his German passport is found in the tribal region of Pakistan (see Late October 2009). Bahaji's mother will also mention that Said has a Moroccan passport, and he may travel using that. [New York Times, 10/30/2009] Bahaji is wanted in Spain and Germany on terrorism charges (see September 21, 2001). However, the US has never put a bounty on him, or even put him on their most wanted lists, despite reports that he had a key role in supporting the 9/11 attacks. [CNN, 10/30/2009]
Entity Tags: Anneliese Bahaji, Said Bahaji
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region
The Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence. [Source: Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence]An analysis by Swiss researchers casts doubt on the authenticity of over a dozen of the more recent communications allegedly made by Osama bin Laden. According to a 2009 article in the American Spectator (see March 2009), the Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence in Manno, Switzerland, which does computer voice recognition for bank security, compares the voices on 15 undisputedly authentic earlier recordings of bin Laden with the voices on 15 more recent recordings that have been attributed to the al-Qaeda leader. The researchers find that all of the more recent, alleged bin Laden recordings clearly differ from each other and from the genuine earlier recordings. This would therefore indicate that these more recent recordings have been faked. In contrast to the Dalle Molle Institute, the CIA found all of the recordings to be authentic. Angelo Codevilla, a professor of international relations at Boston University, will comment, "It is hard to imagine what methodology might support [the CIA's] conclusion." [American Spectator, 3/2009] The American Spectator will be the only publication to report this analysis. An analysis by the Dalle Molle Institute for Perceptual Artificial Intelligence in November 2002, of an audio recording allegedly made by bin Laden around that time, concluded that the recording was likely a fake (see November 29, 2002). [Guardian, 11/30/2002]
Entity Tags: Dalle Molle Institute, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements
US intelligence learns al-Qaeda courier Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's real full name. According to later media reports, his real name is Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed. In late 2005, intelligence analysts concluded Ahmed was very likely working for Osama bin Laden or some other high ranking al-Qaeda leader (see Late 2005). [MSNBC, 5/4/2011; Associated Press, 6/1/2011] An unnamed US official will cryptically say that the crucial intelligence on his real name comes not from Pakistan, but "from a different part of the world." [CNN, 5/2/2011] Intel from Ahmed's Family? - Apparently, around 2006, US intelligence somehow learned his real last name (see (2006)). But since "Ahmed" is a common name in many countries, more work was needed to learn the rest of his name. It appears that intelligence comes from learning about his family. The New York Times will later report that after his last name was discovered, analysts "turned to one of their greatest investigative tools—the National Security Agency (NSA) began intercepting telephone calls and e-mail messages between the man's family and anyone inside Pakistan. From there they got [Ahmed's] full name." [New York Times, 5/2/2011] How Did US Intelligence Know about His Family? - The exact sequence of events of how analysts learn who his family is will not be revealed. But the "al-Kuwaiti" in Ahmed's "Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" alias obviously refers to Kuwait, and US intelligence learn at some point from other prisoners that Ahmed's parents had moved to Kuwait (even though he originally was from Pakistan). [Associated Press, 6/1/2011] Could Ahmed's Father Be Important Al-Qaeda Figure? - It will later be reported that Ahmed's father was close to bin Laden. This still unnamed father, who lived and worked in Kuwait, allegedly had a trusting relationship with bin Laden going back 30 to 40 years. [Dawn (Karachi), 5/7/2011] Perhaps this is not relevant, but if US intelligence already had some intelligence on Ahmed's father, this could have narrowed down the search of Pakistani-linked families living in Kuwait. Real Name Will Lead to Location - It is unclear when, but the NSA eventually starts tracking the phone calls of Ahmed's relatives in the Persian Gulf to anyone they call in Pakistan. Later, the NSA will be able to figure out Ahmed's location in Pakistan from one such phone call (see Summer 2009). [Associated Press, 6/1/2011]
Entity Tags: US intelligence, National Security Agency, Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, Osama bin Laden
Category Tags: Remote Surveillance, Osama Bin Laden, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan
Afghan intelligence allegedly suggests that Osama bin Laden is hiding in a town very close to Abbottabad, Pakistan, but the Pakistani government will not listen. Shortly after bin Laden's death in Abbottabad in 2011 (see May 2, 2011), Amrullah Saleh, who from 2004 to 2010 was head of the NDS (National Directorate of Security), Afghanistan's intelligence agency, will claim that in 2007, the NDS identified two al-Qaeda safe houses in the town of Manshera. Manshera is only about 13 miles from Abbottabad. Saleh brought this information up in a meeting with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, also in 2007. But Saleh says that Musharraf was outraged at the suggestion that bin Laden would be able to hide so far inside Pakistan. Musharraf allegedly smashed his fist on a table. "He said, 'Am I the president of the Republic of Banana?' Then he turned to President Karzai and said, 'Why have you have brought this Panjshiri guy to teach me intelligence?'" Saleh says Karzai had to physically intervene after Musharraf started to physically threaten Saleh. [Guardian, 5/5/2011] In March 2011, a US strike force will assault a compound in Abbottabad and kill bin Laden (see May 2, 2011).
Entity Tags: Hamid Karzai, Amrullah Saleh, Osama bin Laden, Pervez Musharraf, National Directorate of Security (Afghanistan)
Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan
Ahmed Shayea. [Source: BBC]In an attempt to persuade Islamist militants to abandon violence, the Saudi government opens an unusual prison for militants designed to rehabilitate them. The small compound near Riyadh is called a "care center" and its inmates "beneficiaries." It is run by the Interior Ministry's newly-created Ideological Security Unit (ISU). The compound offers recreational facilities, including swimming pools, video games, and table tennis, even art therapy classes. Inmates are required to follow religious classes designed to modify their views. Since its opening, the center has processed former militants from Iraq as well as former Guantanamo prisoners. In a July 2008 report, the BBC interviews one of the inmates, Ahmed Shayea, who drove a truck bomb into the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad in August 2003, killing nine. He says he was tricked by Iraqi recruiters and the authorities have chosen to believe him. "I am now an enemy of al-Qaeda," declares the former militant. According to the BBC, some former inmates have also received financial support after their release. [Terrorism Monitor, 8/15/2007; Christian Science Monitor, 10/9/2007; Strategic Comments, 5/2008; Sunday Times (London), 7/6/2008; BBC, 7/9/2008] Juma al-Dosari, who recruited people to join al-Qaeda in the US, is a beneficiary of this program after being mysteriously released from the Guantanamo prison in 2007 (see July 16, 2007).
Entity Tags: Juma al-Dosari, Ahmed Shayea, Ideological Security Unit
Category Tags: Saudi Arabia
A 2008 Justice Department report reveals that in January 2007, the CIA prevents Justice Department investigators from questioning al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida, who is being held at the Guantanamo prison. The Justice Department will say the CIA's obstruction was "unwarranted" and "hampered" an investigation by the department's Office of Inspector General into the FBI's knowledge of abuse by CIA and Defense Department interrogators. The CIA's acting general counsel John Rizzo refused to grant access to Zubaida, claiming that he "could make false allegations against CIA employees." By contrast, Defense Department officials grant the same investigators access to other Guantanamo detainees also allegedly subjected to torture. After Zubaida was captured in early 2002, the CIA subjected him to harsh torture techniques, including waterboarding (see Mid-May 2002 and After). [Newsweek, 5/20/2008]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Abu Zubaida, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives
Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees
CIA officer Richard Blee, who headed Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, at the time of the 9/11 attacks (see August 22-September 10, 2001), is considered for the position of chief of station in Baghdad, one of the CIA's largest stations. [Harper's, 1/28/2007] However, he does not get the position. [Harper's, 2/9/2007] The reasons for him not getting the job are apparently that he is seen as a "bad fit," and is closely associated with detainee abuse and renditions, in particular that of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (see Shortly After December 19, 2001). In addition, he is said to have a poor relationship with the military, in particular the Special Operations community. An unnamed former official calls Blee a "smart guy," but says, "He's the last guy you want running a tense place like the station in Baghdad, because he creates a lot of tension himself." [Harper's, 1/28/2007] Shortly before mid-May 2003, Blee had been loaned to the FBI, where he had a senior position, but his career history after that is unknown. [New York Times, 5/15/2003]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Richard Blee
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri releases a new audio message, entitled "Set Out and Support Your Brothers in Somalia." The audio comes with a video still of al-Zawahiri from one of his previous videos, lasts for five and a half minutes, and was produced by al-Qaeda's media arm As-Sahab. "You have to use ambushes and mines, and raids and suicidal attacks until you rend and eat your prey as the lion does with his prey," says al-Zawahiri, who calls on Muslims everywhere—but specifically those in Yemen, the Arab Peninsula, Egypt, North Africa, and Sudan—to participate in a holy war against secular government and Ethiopian forces in Somalia. According to al-Zawahiri, Somalia needs men, experience, money, and advice to defeat the Ethiopian forces, which he calls the "slaves of America." Addressing Somali Muslims directly, al-Zawahiri reminds them of US intervention in Somalia between 1992 and 1994, saying that America has been defeated before (see October 3-4, 1993), and due to terrorist strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American Army is relatively weaker. Al-Zawahiri also directly calls upon the youth of the radical Egyptian Islamic group Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya to participate in the jihad. He states that these members joined the group to obey Allah, and if they are prevented from that duty, "they must crush the sarcophagus where they were embalmed alive." [Fox News, 1/5/2007]
Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, As-Sahab, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements
A graphic showing the similarities between the super-dollars and real dollars. [Source: Lee Hulteng and Judy Treible / McClatchy Newspapers]The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), a German daily newspaper, accuses the CIA of being the source of sophisticated, almost perfect, counterfeit US bills called "super-notes" or "super-dollars." FAZ claims that the CIA prints the bills in a secret facility close to Washington, DC. The US government has long accused North Korea of being the source of the "super-notes," but this claim remains unproven and disputed by some. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Frankfurt), 1/7/2007] In early 2008, McClatchy Newspapers will publish a similar article. It will note that the Secret Service has presented no actual evidence that the North Koreans are behind the notes, and witnesses making that claim have been discredited. The State Department has stopped accusing North Korea of making the notes. In May 2007, the Swiss federal police conclude an investigation and decide it is unlikely the North Koreans are behind the notes, though they do not know just who is. Remarkably, the super-notes have gone through at least 19 different versions, each corresponding to a tiny change in US engraving plates. Thomas Ferguson, former director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, says the super-notes appear to have been made by someone with access to some government's printing equipment. Klaus Bender, the author of a book on the subject, "claims that the super-notes are of such high quality and are updated so frequently that they could be produced only by a US government agency such as the CIA." The article will note that the CIA counterfeited the Soviet Union's currency during the Cold War, and "Making limited quantities of sophisticated counterfeit notes also could help intelligence and law enforcement agencies follow payments or illicit activities or track the movement of funds among unsavory regimes, terrorist groups, and others." [McClatchy Newspapers, 1/10/2008]
Entity Tags: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Other Post-9/11 Events
In a review of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's autobiography In the Line of Fire, Fouad Ajami, director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, writes in the New York Times, "It is essential for Musharraf that Pakistan be a 'dangerous place': he and his country… feed off the menace." Pakistani journalist and regional expert Ahmed Rashid agrees. He will later write: "As long as Pakistan remained the center for Talibanization, terrorism, or nuclear proliferation, the world could not ignore the military regime or dispense with Musharraf.… The West continued to view Musharraf as the only person capable of holding Pakistan together, even though some diplomats acknowledged that 'Pakistan now negotiates with its allies and friends by pointing a gun to its own head.'" [Rashid, 2008, pp. 291, 444]
Entity Tags: Ahmed Rashid, Pervez Musharraf, Fouad Ajami
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI
Mounir El Motassadeq, a former associate of three of the 9/11 hijackers, is sentenced to 15 years in prison in Germany. El Motassadeq was convicted of assisting the 9/11 attacks in November (see November 2006) and is currently serving a seven-year sentence for being a member of a terrorist organization (see August 19, 2005). The 15-year sentence is the maximum possible, as the conviction was only as an accessory to the deaths of the 246 people who died on the airliners. As El Motassadeq has already served three years, this period will be deducted from the sentence. Defense lawyers say they will appeal the conviction, and that the case may go all the way to the European Court of Justice. [New York Times, 1/9/2007; Associated Press, 1/9/2007]
Entity Tags: Mounir El Motassadeq
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte says that al-Qaeda's central leadership is based in Pakistan and is regrouping there. Speaking before a Senate committee, he says that al-Qaeda operatives "are cultivating stronger operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders' secure hide-out in Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe." This is the first time a high-ranking US official has described Pakistan as a "secure hide-out" for al-Qaeda or used similar language. He adds, "Pakistan is our partner in the war on terror and has captured several al-Qaeda leaders. However, it is also a major source of Islamic extremism. Eliminating the safe haven that the Taliban and other extremists have found in Pakistan's tribal areas is not sufficient to end the insurgency in Afghanistan but it is necessary." [Reuters, 1/12/2007]
Entity Tags: John Negroponte, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region
Muhammad Hanif confessing on video. [Source: BBC]A captured Taliban spokesman claims that Taliban leader Mullah Omar is living in Pakistan under the protection of the ISI. Muhammad Hanif, a.k.a. Abdul Haq Haji Gulroz, one of two Taliban spokesmen, was recently captured by the Afghan government. He is seen on video saying to his captors, "[Omar] lives in Quetta [a Pakistan border town]. He is protected by the ISI." He further claims that the ISI funds and equips Taliban suicide bombings and former ISI Director Hamid Gul supports and funds the insurgency. The Pakistani government denies the allegations and claims Omar has not been seen in Pakistan. [BBC, 1/17/2007; Daily Telegraph, 1/19/2007]
Entity Tags: Muhammad Hanif, Hamid Gul, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Mullah Omar
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Afghanistan
A man thought to be al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri releases a new video, which is mostly focused on the situation in Iraq. In the 14-minute video the man said to be al-Zawahiri predicts a fate "worse than anything you have ever seen" for the US and wonders why only 20,000 additional troops are being sent to Iraq. "Why not send 50,000 or 100,000?" he asks. The man also says that the US "must honestly try to reach a mutual understanding with the Muslims," adding: "If we are secure, you might be secure, and if we are safe, you might be safe. And if we are struck and killed, you will definitely—with Allah's permission—be struck and killed." [CNN, 1/23/2007]
Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri
Youssef Nada in 2007. [Source: PBS]Egypt freezes the assets of dozens of top Muslim Brotherhood figures and then announces that 40 of them will stand trial in Egypt's military court. The Associated Press notes this court is "known for its swift trials and no right of appeal." Figures targeted include most of the top leaders of the Al Taqwa Bank in Switzerland, the Muslim Brotherhood bank banned by the US for its alleged ties to al-Qaeda. About five of those to be tried in absentia are tied to the bank, including bank directors Youssef Nada and Ghaleb Himmat. [Agence France-Presse, 1/24/2007; Associated Press, 2/6/2007; Ikhwanweb, 2/8/2007] The Muslim Brotherhood has been officially banned in Egypt for decades but it has generally been tolerated by the government. Muslim Brotherhood members became the largest opposition bloc in the Egyptian parliament after winning 88 of the 454 seats in the 2005 legislative elections by running as independents. [Associated Press, 2/6/2007]
Entity Tags: Ghaleb Himmat, Egypt, Al Taqwa Bank, Muslim Brotherhood, Youssef Nada
Category Tags: Terrorism Financing, Al Taqwa Bank
Italian authorities investigating the kidnapping of radical imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar) seize half of a villa belonging to Robert Seldon Lady, a CIA substation chief involved in the abduction (see Noon February 17, 2003 and February 22-March 15, 2003). The half of the villa that belongs to Lady (the other half belongs to his wife) is to be held until the end of Lady's trial for the kidnapping (see February 16, 2007). If Lady is convicted, it will be sold to pay for court costs and possibly damages. [Associated Press, 1/26/2007]
Entity Tags: Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, Robert Seldon Lady
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Al-Qaeda in Italy
Interpol's bureau in Washington, DC, sends a bulletin about bin Laden's brother-in-law Mohammed Jamal Khalifa to the FBI, the NSA, and the Department of Homeland Security, concerning an unnamed "project initiated to proactively target terrorism from captured terrorists." The bulletin will later be released in heavily redacted form by the Intelwire.com website, and what else it says is unclear. Just four days later, Khalifa will be murdered in Madagascar in mysterious circumstances (see January 30, 2007). It is his first trip outside of Saudi Arabia since the 9/11 attacks. [Guardian, 3/2/2007]
Entity Tags: Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Interpol
Category Tags: Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11
Journalist Ken Silverstein writes a piece about a CIA officer who is being considered for the position of station chief in Baghdad (see January-February 2007). According to Silverstein, who uses the pseudonym "James," the officer is "the son of a well-known and controversial figure who served at the agency during its early years." Silverstein also mentions the officer's time managing Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, problems with his management style (see June 1999), his closeness to former CIA Counterterrorist Center chief Cofer Black (see 1998 and After), his work as station chief in Kabul after 9/11 (see December 9, 2001), and his involvement in the rendition of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (see Shortly After December 19, 2001). [Harper's, 1/28/2007] The officer, Richard Blee, will finally "out" himself in a joint statement issued with former CIA Director George Tenet and Black in August 2011 (see August 3, 2011).
Entity Tags: Richard Blee, Ken Silverstein
Category Tags: Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, brother-in-law and former best friend of Osama bin Laden, is killed in Madagascar. Khalifa's family claims that a large group of armed men broke into his house and killed him as he slept. His computer and laptop is stolen. Khalifa was living in Saudi Arabia but traded precious stones and was staying at a mine that he owns. His family says they do not believe he had been killed by locals. There is considerable evidence Khalifa was involved in funding al-Qaeda-connected plots in the Philippines and Yemen in the 1990s (see December 16, 1994-February 1995, December 16, 1994-May 1995, and 1996-1997 and After). Since that time, Khalifa has steadfastly denied any involvement in terrorism and has criticized bin Laden. CNN reporter Nic Robertson asks, "Was he killed by bin Laden's associates for speaking out against the al-Qaeda leader or, equally feasibly, by an international intelligence agency settling an old score?" Just one week earlier, a Philippine newspaper published a posthumous 2006 interview with Khaddafy Janjalani, former leader of Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim militant group in the southern Philippines. In the interview, Janjalani claimed Abu Sayyaf received $122,000 from Khalifa and bomber Ramzi Yousef in the mid-1990s (see Early 1991). [CNN, 1/31/2007; Reuters, 2/1/2007] And four days before his murder, Interpol put out a bulletin about him, notifying a number of US intelligence agencies (see January 26, 2007). [Guardian, 3/2/2007] His murderers have not been found or charged.
Entity Tags: Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Abu Sayyaf, Osama bin Laden, Khaddafy Janjalani
Category Tags: 1995 Bojinka Plot, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, Saudi Arabia, Terrorism Financing, Philippine Militant Collusion, Bin Laden Family, Key Captures and Deaths, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia
In his new book America at Night, author and former CIA agent Larry Kolb writes: "[O]ur government has spent trillions turning Iraq into the world's largest terrorist training camp, while pursuing policies guaranteed to keep at least a billion people around the workd intensely pissed at us. Our military forces are so overstretched that, if any real threat emerges, we will risk being seen as a paper tiger. And in spite of all the blue ribbon panels and commissions, and the new layer of bureaucracy called the Department of Homeland Security, the hundreds of billions of dollars spent to make us safe at home, America is less safe now from terrorism and cataclysm than it ever was." [Kolb, 2007, pp. 225-226]
Entity Tags: Larry Kolb, US Department of Homeland Security
The Bush administration is opposed to a bill in Congress that would link military aid for Pakistan to tackling the Taliban. The bill, which has passed the House of Representatives, calls for an end to military assistance to Pakistan unless it stops the Taliban from operating out of Pakistan. Administration officials say the bill would undermine the fostering of a closer relationship with Pakistan. [Reuters, 2/1/2007]
Entity Tags: Pakistan, Bush administration (43)
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar) is released in Egypt. He was kidnapped by the CIA in Milan, Italy, in 2003 and taken to Egypt, where he was imprisoned. This sparked a confrontation between the CIA and Italian anti-terrorist authorities, who had been investigating him before he was kidnapped (see Noon February 17, 2003). Nasr, who filed an action for unlawful detention against Egypt's Interior Ministry, is released in Alexandria after a State Security Court declares his detention "unfounded." Nasr will apparently remain in Egypt and not return to Italy, where a warrant for his arrest was issued on terrorism counts (see April 2005). [Associated Press, 2/12/2007]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11
Mohammed Haydar Zammar in 2001. [Source: Knut Muller / Der Spiegel]Mohammed Haydar Zammar, an alleged member of al-Qaeda's Hamburg, Germany, cell with a few of the 9/11 hijackers, is given a 12-year prison sentence in Syria. It had been known that Zammar was arrested in late 2001 in Morocco and renditioned to Syria for likely torture and interrogation (see October 27-November 2001 and December 2001), but his exact location was not confirmed until a European Union official spotted him in Syrian custody in October 2006 (see October 2006). It has been reported that Zammar had extensive al-Qaeda connections and a probable role in the 9/11 plot, but he was not charged for any of that, and instead was accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. This group is banned in Syria, and membership in it is a crime that is punishable by death. The court initially sentences Zammar to life imprisonment but commutes his sentence to 12 years. Der Spiegel comments, "Zammar's German citizenship and the fact that German diplomats were closely monitoring the trial may have gone some way toward saving him from the gallows." [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 2/12/2007]
Entity Tags: Mohammed Haydar Zammar
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, 9/11 Timeline
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, 9/11 Related Criminal Proceedings
An Italian judge rules that there is enough evidence to try thirty-five people in the affair of kidnapped imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (a.k.a. Abu Omar). Nasr was kidnapped by the CIA, with the knowledge of the Italian military intelligence service Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI), in Milan in 2003 (see Noon February 17, 2003). Nasr, a former CIA asset (see August 27, 1995 and Shortly After), was then taken to Egypt, where he says he was tortured (see April-May 2004). The 26 Americans that are indicted can be tried in absentia in Italy and include Robert Seldon Lady, former chief of the CIA's substation in Milan, the former CIA station chief in Rome, and an officer from the US air base in Aviano, near Venice. The nine Italians include former SISMI head Nicolo Pollari, but three of them are only charged with complicity in the kidnapping, not the kidnapping itself. However, none of the Americans are in Italy at this time, and Italy has not asked for them to be extradited. [Associated Press, 1/26/2007; CNN, 2/16/2007]
Entity Tags: Nicolo Pollari, Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Seldon Lady, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, SISMI
Vice President Dick Cheney flies to Pakistan to meet with President Pervez Musharraf. The White House is tight-lipped about the trip and refuses to provide details about what the two leaders discuss. But media accounts, citing administration officials, suggest that Cheney warns Musharraf that US aid to Pakistan could be in jeopardy if his government does not improve in its efforts to combat al-Qaeda and the Taliban. [New York Times, 2/26/2007] Cheney's trip comes after the head of US military operations in Afghanistan compiled a dossier of evidence indicating the Pakistani government is secretly supporting the militants attacking US troops in Afghanistan (see Autumn 2006- February 2007). But Cheney is known to be a strong supporter of Musharraf and generally has blocked pressure against him (see June 27, 2007). Pakistani intelligence sources will later tell ABC news that the two leaders discussed a secret operation (see 2005 and After) to support attacks against Iran by the Sunni militant group Jundullah. [ABC News, 4/3/2007]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Pervez Musharraf, Al-Qaeda, Jundullah, Richard ("Dick") Cheney
Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran
In early March 2007, the Pakistani government announces that a top Taliban official has been captured. Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the Taliban's former defense minister, was supposedly captured on February 26, 2007, the same day that Vice President Cheney visited Pakistan, which the Associated Press says "has been under growing international pressure to crack down on Taliban militants believed to seek sanctuary on its soil." If so, he would be the most senior Taliban leader ever captured since 9/11. However, the Swiss weekly SonntagsBlick claims that one of its reporters interviewed him in Quetta, Pakistan on February 28, just two days after his supposed capture. SonntagsBlick writes, "The world press reported: top-Taliban imprisoned. At the same time he was sitting with a SonntagsBlick reporter having coffee." [Associated Press, 3/2/2007; Associated Press, 3/11/2007] He was also reportedly captured by the Northern Alliance in early 2002 and then released with US approval (see Early January 2002).
Entity Tags: Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, Taliban
A report by the Center on Law and Security (CLS) finds that the "Iraq effect" is costing lives around the world. The report finds that the Iraq occupation is directly to blame for an upsurge in fundamentalist violence worldwide. It finds that the number killed in jihadist attacks around the world has risen dramatically since the Iraq war began in March 2003, comparing the period between 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq with the period since the invasion. The count—excluding the Arab-Israel conflict—shows the number of deaths due to terrorism rose from 729 to 5,420. Iraq has served as the catalyst for a ferocious fundamentalist backlash, according to the study, which says that the number of those killed by Islamists within Iraq rose from 7 to 3,122. A similar rise in attacks has occurred in Afghanistan, Chechnya, in the Kashmir region between India and Pakistan, and throughout Europe. Both President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair insist that the opposite is true. Bush has said, "If we were not fighting and destroying the enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. They would be plotting and killing Americans across the world and within our borders. By fighting these terrorists in Iraq, Americans in uniform are defeating a direct threat to the American people." Blair insists that the Iraq war was not been responsible for Muslim fundamentalist attacks such as the 7/7 London bombings which killed 52 people (see July 7, 2005). "Iraq, the region and the wider world is a safer place without Saddam," Blair said in July 2004. [Independent, 3/1/2007]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda, UK Security Service (MI5), George W. Bush, Tony Blair
Timeline Tags: Iraq under US Occupation
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism
A bipartisan group of senators headed by Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Kit Bond (R-MI) campaign to force the CIA to release the executive summary of a report by its inspector general about some aspects of its performance before 9/11. Wyden says, "It's amazing the efforts the administration is going to stonewall this," adding that he is considering linking acceptance of President Bush's nominations for national security positions to the report's release. Wyden also says that the report is not being kept secret for national security reasons, but merely to protect individuals from embarrassment. Apparently, some of the officials criticized in the report are still in "senior government positions." The idea of releasing the executive summary is twice approved by the Senate before being made law in August 2007 (see August 8, 2007). [Associated Press, 5/18/2007]
Entity Tags: Christopher ("Kit") Bond, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Central Intelligence Agency, Ron Wyden
Category Tags: CIA OIG 9/11 Report, 9/11 Investigations
Iftikhar Chaudhry being arrested by secret agents. An agent is holding Chaudhry's hair as he is being pushed into a car. [Source: Public domain]In June 2005, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf appointed Iftikhar Chaudhry as chief justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court. Pakistan's judiciary had traditionally been complaint to military rule, and Chaudhry was not expected to act any differently. But in 2007, as the date for Musharraf's relection neared, Chaudhry leads the judiciary in becoming more proactive defending civil rights and the rule of law. The Supreme Court begins issuing rulings against police abuse, forced marriages, unjust rape laws, and more. Most controversially, the judiciary begins demanding the appearance in court of hundreds of prisoners who had been secretly arrested by the ISI in recent years and never brought to trial. The ISI responds by mysteriously releasing about 200 people in late 2006 and early 2007. Fearing an Independent Judiciary, Musharraf Acts - Musharraf claims that Chaudhry has become dangerous because he is releasing al-Qaeda linked militants, but in fact most of those released are political opponents from the regions of Sindh and Balochistan, where there are separatist movements. There is speculation that the Supreme Court will rule against allowing Musharraf to run again as president, since Pakistani law states that a serving military officer can not be elected president, and Musharraf has not resigned from the military. On March 9, 2007, Musharraf suspends Chaudhry on charges of corruption and misuse of authority and places him under house arrest. Mass Protests Culminate in Chaudhry's Reinstatement - Musharraf and most political observers are surprised when mass protests ensue, mostly made up of Pakistan's middle class, which is tired of military rule. Over the next months, the protests grow in size and number. The Pakistan government responds by frequently beating and/or arresting protesters. Press censorship is imposed and live television broadcasts are forbidden. But this does not stop the movement. On July 20, 2007, the Supreme Court reinstates Chaudhry as chief justice, dealing Musharraf's reputation a heavy blow. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 380-381]
Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Iftikhar Chaudhry
Judge Marcia Cooke. [Source: Daily Business Review]Federal prosecutors in the Jose Padilla case (see May 8, 2002) say that a video of Padilla's final interrogation, on March 2, 2004, is inexplicably missing. The video was not part of a packet of DVDs containing classified material turned over to the court handling the Padilla case. Padilla's lawyers believe that the missing videotape may show Padilla being subjected to "harsh" interrogation techniques that may qualify as torture, and wonder if other potentially exculpatory recordings and documentation of Padilla's interrogations have also been lost. Padilla's lawyers say something happened during that last interrogation session on March 2, 2004, at the Navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina, that led Padilla to believe that the lawyers are actually government agents. Padilla no longer trusts them, the lawyers say, and they want to know what happened. Prosecutors say that they cannot find the tape despite an intensive search. "I don't know what happened to it," Pentagon attorney James Schmidli said during a recent court hearing. US District Court Judge Marcia Cooke finds the government's claim hard to believe. "Do you understand how it might be difficult for me to understand that a tape related to this particular individual just got mislaid?" Cooke told prosecutors at a hearing last month. Padilla, a US citizen, is scheduled to stand trial in April. Padilla's lawyers want the brig tapes, medical records, and other documentation to prove their claims that Padilla suffers intense post-traumatic stress syndrome from his long isolation and repeated interrogations, though Cooke has ruled that Padilla is competent to stand trial. They believe that he was mistreated and possibly tortured in the Naval brig before being transferred to civilian custody. This missing DVD may not be the only one because brig logs indicate that there were approximately 72 hours of interrogations that either were not recorded, or whose recordings were never disclosed. Prosecutors claim some interrogations were not recorded, but defense lawyers question that, pointing out that there are even videos of Padilla taking showers. [Newsweek, 2/28/2007; Associated Press, 3/9/2007] Statements by then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey in June 2004 indirectly support the defense's claim that Padilla was subjected to harsh interrogation tactics (see June 2004). Other videotapes that may pertain to the Padilla case have been destroyed by the CIA (see November 22, 2005). Former civil rights litigator Glenn Greenwald writes, "[I]f the administration's patently unbelievable claim were true—namely, that it did 'lose' the video of its interrogation of this Extremely Dangerous International Terrorist—that would, by itself, evidence a reckless ineptitude with American national security so grave that it ought to be a scandal by itself. But the likelihood that the key interrogation video with regard to Padilla's torture claims was simply 'lost' is virtually non-existent. Destruction of relevant evidence in any litigation is grounds for dismissal of the case (or defense) of the party engaged in that behavior. But where, as here, the issues extend far beyond the singular proceeding itself—we are talking about claims by a US citizen that he was tortured by his own government—destruction of evidence of this sort would be obstruction of justice of the most serious magnitude." [Salon, 3/10/2007]
Entity Tags: Anthony Natale, US Department of Justice, US Department of Defense, Marcia Cooke, Jose Padilla, Al-Qaeda, Glenn Greenwald, James B. Comey Jr., James Schmidli
Timeline Tags: Torture of US Captives, Civil Liberties
Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
High value detainees. Top row, from left: KSM, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Hambali, Khallad bin Attash. Middle row, from left: Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Abu Zubaida. Bottom row, from left: Majid Khan, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Mohamad Farik Amin, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, and Gouled Hassan Dourad. [Source: FBI (except for AFP for Hambali, New York Times for Abu Zubaida, and Reuters for Majid Khan)]Combat Status Review Tribunal hearings are held for fourteen high-value detainees who have been moved to Guantanamo Bay and are being held there by the US military (see September 2-3, 2006). The purpose of the hearings is to check that the detainees are properly designated as "enemy combatants." Transcripts of the unclassified part of the hearings are released to the media, but no journalists are allowed to attend the hearings, and no photographs of the prisoners are released. However, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and former Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) view Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's confession on closed circuit television in Guantanamo Bay (see March 10, 2007). Alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) admits to being involved in dozens of terror plots and attempts to morally justify his actions (see March 10, 2007), causing a good deal of interest in the media (see March 15-23, 2007 and Shortly After). Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi says he is not an al-Qaeda member. However, he admits receiving military training from al-Qaeda, and helping some of the 9/11 hijackers, as well as knowing Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and KSM (see March 21, 2007). Hambali is accused of being a leader of al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and being involved in several bomb plots in Southeast Asia. He submits a wide-ranging written statement and denies all involvement in terrorist acts, saying he resigned from JI in 2000. [US department of Defense, 4/4/2007 ] Khallad bin Attash is accused of being involved in the attacks on US embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole. He says that the details of his participation in the attacks, as presented in the evidence, are incorrect, but admits being involved in the attacks. [US department of Defense, 3/12/2007 ] Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi) admits sending hijacker Marwan Alshehhi some money, but says he knew nothing of the plot, denies being an "enemy combatant," and says he has provided "vital information" to the US (see March 30, 2007). Ramzi bin al-Shibh refuses to attend the hearing, or talk to his personal representative and translator, so only the summary of unclassified evidence is read out at the hearing. He is accused of knowing three of the hijacker pilots and facilitating the plot, as well as helping Zacarias Moussaoui and being captured at an al-Qaeda safehouse. [US department of Defense, 3/9/2007 ] Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is accused of involvement in the African embassy and USS Cole bombings, but claims that he was tortured into confessing details of plots he invented (see March 10-April 15, 2007). However, he admits knowing Osama bin Laden and several other militants, as well as receiving up to $500,000 from bin Laden and distributing it to associates, some of whom used the money to get married and some of whom used it "to do other stuff." He admits knowing the people involved in the USS Cole attack, such as al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash, who he describes as a "regular guy who was jihadist," and he admits buying the boat used in the attack and some explosives in Yemen using money provided by bin Laden. [US department of Defense, 3/14/2007 ] Abu Zubaida is accused of heading the Khaldan and Darunta training camps in Afghanistan, and admits heading Khaldan, but denies actually being a member of al-Qaeda (see March 27, 2007) and complains of torture (see March 10-April 15, 2007). Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani is accused of being involved in the 1998 embassy bombings (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998), for which he was indicted in the US. He admits being present when one of the bomb trucks was purchased and traveling in a scouting vehicle, but not to the embassy; and he admits buying the explosives, but argues another team member "could have gotten it himself, but he sent me to get it and bring it to him." He also says he was told the explosives were for "mining diamonds." He admits working with al-Qaeda, but denies actually being a member. He concludes by saying he "would like to apologize to the United States Government for what I did before… it was without my knowledge what they were doing but I helped them." [US Department of Defense, 3/17/2007 ] Majid Khan, who is alleged to have facilitated travel for extremists and to have planned an attack inside the US, attends the hearing, but says he "would rather have a fair trial… than a tribunal process." He also denies the charges, complains of being tortured in US custody (see March 10-April 15, 2007), and submits favorable testimony from witnesses. For example, one witness claims he was forced to make a false statement saying that Khan wanted to participate in a suicide operation against Pakistani President Musharraf by the FBI, which threatened to transfer him to Guantanamo Bay. Khan also points out that he helped the FBI catch an illegal immigrant and says he will take a lie detector test. [US department of Defense, 4/15/2007 ] Abu Faraj al-Libbi, who was accused of running an al-Qaeda guest house in Afghanistan, running a communications hub, and facilitating travel for militant trainees, elects not to participate in his hearing, as, according to his personal representative, "his freedom is far too important to be decided by an administrative process and [he] is waiting for legal proceedings." [US department of Defense, 3/9/2007 ] Mohamed Farik Amin is accused of being involved with the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah and of helping finance attacks by it. He attends the hearing, but does not say anything. [US department of Defense, 3/13/2007 ] Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie) does not to attend the hearing and is represented by his personal representative. He is accused of facilitating the transfer of funds for attacks in Southeast Asia, being an associate of Hambali, and having suspicious materials in the apartment where he was arrested. He says he has "nothing to do with JI" and that "it is true I facilitated the movement of money for Hambali, but I did not know what it was going to be used for." He also points out, "it is not against the law in Thailand to have an M-16 in your apartment." [US Department of Defense, 3/20/2007 ] Gouled Hassan Dourad is accused of heading an al-Qaeda cell in Djibouti and of participating in operations by Al-Ittihad al-Islami in Somalia, but decides not to attend the hearing. He denies the specific allegations, but acknowledges fighting Ethiopians, which he says is his "right." [US Department of Defense, 4/28/2007]
Entity Tags: Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Gouled Hassan Dourad, Jemaah Islamiyah, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Hambali, Abu Zubaida, Majid Khan, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, Mohammed Nazir Bin Lep, Mohamad Farik Amin, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, Khallad bin Attash
Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline, Civil Liberties
Category Tags: Abu Zubaida, Hambali, Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh, 2000 USS Cole Bombing, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
A photo of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed allegedly taken during his capture in 2003 (there are controversies about the capture). [Source: FBI]Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) attends his combat status review tribunal at Guantanamo Bay (see March 9-April 28, 2007), where he admits participating in the 9/11 attacks and numerous other plots, and offers a defense of his actions. He claims responsibility or co-responsibility for a list of 31 plots, including: The 1993 World Trade Center bombing (see February 26, 1993); The 9/11 operation: "I was responsible for the 9/11 operation from A to Z"; The murder of Daniel Pearl (see January 31, 2002): "I decapitated with my blessed right hand the head of the American Jew, Daniel Pearl"; The late 2001 shoe bombing operation (see December 22, 2001); The 2002 Bali nightclub bombings (see October 12, 2002); A series of ship-bombing operations (see Mid-1996-September 11, 2001 and June 2001); Failed plots to assassinate several former US presidents; Planned attacks on bridges in New York; Various other failed attacks in the US, UK, Israel, Indonesia, Australia, Japan, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, India, South Korea, and Turkey; The planned destruction of an El-Al flight in Bangkok; The Bojinka plot (see January 6, 1995), and assassination plans for President Clinton (see September 18-November 14, 1994) and the Pope (see September 1998-January 1999); and Planned attacks on the Library Tower in California, the Sears Tower in Chicago, the Empire State Building in New York, and the "Plaza Bank" in Washington State (see October 2001-February 2002). [US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 ] However, the Plaza Bank was not founded until 2006, three years after KSM was captured. The bank's president comments: "We're confused as to how we got on that list. We've had a little bit of fun with it over here." [Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 3/15/2007] On the other hand, KSM denies receiving funds from Kuwait or ever heading al-Qaeda's military committee; he says this was a reporting error by Yosri Fouda, who interviewed him in 2002 (see April, June, or August 2002). In addition, he claims he was tortured, his children were abused in detention, and that he lied to his interrogators (see June 16, 2004). He also complains that the tribunal system is unfair and that many people who are not "enemy combatants" are being held in Guantanamo Bay. For example, a team sent by a Sunni government to assassinate bin Laden was captured by the Taliban, then by the US, and is being held in Guantanamo Bay. He says that his membership of al-Qaeda is related to the Bojinka operation, but that even after he became involved with al-Qaeda he continued to work with another organization, which he calls the "Mujaheddin," was based in Pakistan, and for which he says he killed Daniel Pearl. [US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 ] (Note: KSM's cousin Ramzi Yousef was involved with the militant Pakistani organization Sipah-e-Sahaba.) [Reeve, 1999, pp. 50, 54, 67] Mohammed says he was waterboarded by his interrogators. He is asked: "Were any statements you made as the result of any of the treatment that you received during that time frame from 2003 to 2006? Did you make those statements because of the treatment you receive from these people?" He responds, "CIA peoples. Yes. At the beginning, when they transferred me." [ABC News, 4/11/2008] He goes on to compare radical Islamists fighting to free the Middle East from US influence to George Washington, hero of the American War of Independence, and says the US is oppressing Muslims in the same way the British are alleged by some to have oppressed Americans. Regarding the fatalities on 9/11, he says: "I'm not happy that three thousand been killed in America. I feel sorry even. I don't like to kill children and the kids." Although Islam prohibits killing, KSM argues that there is an exception because "you are killing people in Iraq.… Same language you use, I use.… The language of war is victims." [US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 ] The hearing is watched from an adjoining room on closed circuit television by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) and former Senator Bob Graham (D-FL). [US Congress, 3/10/2007] KSM's confession arouses a great deal of interest in the media, which is skeptical of it (see March 15-23, 2007 and Shortly After).
Entity Tags: Daniel Robert ("Bob") Graham, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Carl Levin
Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, 2002 Bali Bombings, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia
Majid Khan. [Source: Associated Press]At hearings in Guantanamo Bay in spring 2007 to determine whether they are "enemy combatants" (see March 9-April 28, 2007), several alleged top al-Qaeda leaders complain of being tortured in US custody: Alleged al-Qaeda logistics manager Abu Zubaida says he is ill in Guantanamo Bay and has had around 40 seizures that temporarily affect his ability to speak and write properly, as well as his memory; apparently they are originally the result of a 1992 injury from which he still has shrapnel in his head. He says that the seizures are brought on by broken promises to return his diary, which he describes as "another form of torture," as he is emotionally attached to it. He also says he was tortured after being captured (see Mid-May 2002 and After), when he was "half die", due to a gunshot wound received when he was taken, and that he lied under torture. However, the passage in which he describes his treatment at this time is redacted. He has many other injuries, has lost a testicle, and also complains the Guantanamo authorities refuse to give him socks for his cold feet. He has to use his prayer hat to keep his feet warm and does so during the hearing. [US Department of Defense, 3/27/2007 ] 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed remarks that, "I know American people are torturing us from seventies." However, the next section of the transcript is redacted. He also says his children were abused in US custody. [US Department of Defense, 3/10/2007 ] Alleged travel facilitator Majid Khan submits a 12-page "written statement of torture." Khan's father also gives an account of the torture he says his son was subjected to: he was tied tightly to a chair in stress positions; hooded, which caused him difficulty breathing; beaten repeatedly; deprived of sleep; and kept in a mosquito-infested cell too small for him to lie down in. His father also says Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's children, aged about 6 and 8, were held in the same building and were tortured by having insects placed on their legs to make them disclose their father's location. [US department of Defense, 4/15/2007 ] Alleged al-Qaeda manager Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri says he was tortured into confessing the details of plots he invented. He claims that "he was tortured into confession and once he made a confession his captors were happy and they stopped torturing him… [and] he made up stories during the torture in order to get it to stop." Many of the details of the torture are redacted, but he says in one unredacted comment, "One time they tortured me one way and another time they tortured me in a different way." [US department of Defense, 3/14/2007 ] Eugene Fidell, president of the National Institute of Military Justice, says that the claims of torture could undermine the legitimacy of future military commissions: "Someone has got to get to the bottom of these allegations… If there is something there, they are going to need to address it." The Pentagon promises to investigate the allegations, but Amnesty International comments, "Given the Bush administration record so far on these matters, it strains credulity that any such investigation would be anything other than substandard, or [that] those responsible would be held accountable." [Los Angeles Times, 3/31/2007]
Entity Tags: National Institute of Military Justice, Majid Khan, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaida, Amnesty International, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Eugene R. Fidell
Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees, Abu Zubaida, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Silvestre Reyes. [Source: US House of Representatives]In response to a question asked at a briefing, CIA Director Michael Hayden makes an "offhand comment" to the House Intelligence Committee indicating that tapes the CIA has made of detainee interrogations have been destroyed (see Spring-Late 2002). Although some committee members have been aware of the tapes' existence since 2003 (see February 2003), this is apparently the first time they learn of their destruction, which occurred over year ago (see November 2005). The destruction is again "briefly mentioned" in a letter to a member of the committee in mid-April. Leading committee members Silvestre Reyes and Peter Hoekstra will later write to Hayden, "We do not consider this to be sufficient notification. Moreover, these brief mentions were certainly not contemporaneous with the decision to destroy the videotapes." [US Congress, 12/7/2007] The Senate Intelligence Committee is apparently not informed until later (see December 7, 2007).
Entity Tags: Michael Hayden, Peter Hoekstra, Central Intelligence Agency, House Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes
Category Tags: Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Rosie O'Donnell. [Source: ABC]TV personality Rosie O'Donnell is heavily criticized after she raises questions about the 9/11 attacks and who was responsible for them. On ABC's popular morning show The View, which she co-hosts, O'Donnell suggests that a recent confession by alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, where he'd admitted responsibility for 9/11 and other terrorist attacks, was false and had been elicited by using torture. [WorldNetDaily, 3/15/2007; Fox News, 3/16/2007] In a March 15 posting on her Internet blog, she raises questions about World Trade Center Building 7, which collapsed late in the afternoon of 9/11, such as, "The fires in WTC 7 were not evenly distributed, so a perfect collapse was impossible," and, "Molten steel and partially evaporated steel members were found in the debris." She lists various official records that were supposedly destroyed when WTC 7 collapsed, including records of investigations of Enron and other companies. [WorldNetDaily, 3/19/2007] Two weeks later, she says on The View, "I do believe… it is impossible for a building to fall the way it fell without explosives being involved, World Trade Center 7." Asked who she thinks was responsible, she replies, "I have no idea." [MSNBC, 4/5/2007] O'Donnell is subsequently fiercely attacked by some commentators. Fox News host Bill O'Reilly accuses her of "spitting out the worst propaganda that is fed to [her] by far-left American haters on the net." [Fox News, 3/30/2007] MSNBC's conservative host Joe Scarborough calls for her to be fired. Jonah Goldberg writes in the Los Angeles Times that O'Donnell "seems to think that [The View] is the perfect venue to audition as grand marshal for the next tinfoil hat parade." [Los Angeles Times, 4/3/2007; Chicago Sun-Times, 4/10/2007] At the end of April, O'Donnell announces she is leaving The View, reportedly because she has been unable to come up with a contractual agreement with ABC. [ABC News, 4/25/2007] She plans to address the collapse of WTC 7 in a special segment of the show before departing. [New York Times, 5/16/2007] She also reportedly books the producers of the popular 9/11 conspiracy documentary Loose Change (see April 2005-January 2006) to appear on The View. [New York Post, 5/27/2007] But neither of these plans transpires, and she last appears on the show late in May. [Associated Press, 5/25/2007] Brian Frons, the president of ABC's daytime television group, says in a statement, "We had hoped that Rosie would be with us until the end of her contract three weeks from now, but Rosie has informed us that she would like an early leave." [Fox News, 5/25/2007; New York Times, 5/26/2007] In her defense, the Toronto Star writes that O'Donnell "had to go," because she "messed up the pretty picture that the corporate media present." [Toronto Star, 5/1/2007]
Entity Tags: Bill O'Reilly, Brian Frons, Jonah Goldberg, Rosie O'Donnell, Joseph Scarborough
Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism, Media
A cartoonist's view of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's confession. [Source: Rob Rodgers / Pittsburgh Post-Gazette]Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's (KSM) confession at a Guantanamo Bay hearing (see March 10, 2007), becomes, as Time puts it, "a focus of cable TV and other media coverage, a reminder of America's ongoing battle against international terrorism." [Time, 3/15/2007] However, terrorism analysts are skeptical of some aspects of it. In an article entitled Why KSM's Confession Rings False, former CIA agent Robert Baer says that KSM is "boasting" and "It's also clear he is making things up." Specifically, Baer doubts that KSM murdered Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl (see January 31, 2002). Baer notes that this "raises the question of just what else he has exaggerated, or outright fabricated." Baer also points out he does not address the question of state support for al-Qaeda and that "al-Qaeda also received aid from supporters in Pakistan, quite possibly from sympathizers in the Pakistani intelligence service." [Time, 3/15/2007] Pearl's father also takes the confession of his son's murder "with a spice of doubt." [Hindustan Times, 3/23/2007] Journalist Yosri Fouda, who interviewed KSM in 2002 (see April, June, or August 2002), comments, "he seems to be taking responsibility for some outrages he might not have perpetrated, while keeping quiet about ones that suggest his hand." Specifically, he thinks KSM may have been involved in an attack in Tunisia that killed about 20 people (see April 11, 2002). [London Times, 3/18/2007] KSM is also believed to have been involved in the embassy and USS Cole bombings (see Mid-1996-September 11, 2001), but these are also not mentioned. Terrorism analyst Bruce Riedel also does not take the confession at face value, saying, "He wants to promote his own importance. It's been a problem since he was captured." [Time, 3/15/2007] The Los Angeles Times notes that, according to intelligence officials, "the confession should be taken with a heavy dose of skepticism." A former FBI manager says: "Clearly he is responsible for some of the attacks. But I believe he is taking credit for things he did not have direct involvement in." [Los Angeles Times, 3/16/2007] The Seattle Post-Intelligencer points out that the Plaza Bank, one of the targets KSM says he planned to attack, was actually established in 2006, three years after he was captured. [Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 3/15/2007] Michael Scheuer, formerly head of the CIA's bin Laden unit, notes KSM only says he is "involved" in the plots and that 31 plots in 11 years "can hardly be called excessive." [Hindustan Times, 3/23/2007] Some media are even more skeptical. For example, the Philadelphia Inquirer comments that KSM, "claimed credit for everything but being John Wilkes Booth's handler." [Philadelphia Inquirer, 3/30/2007]
Entity Tags: Yosri Fouda, Judea Pearl, Daniel Pearl, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Michael Scheuer, Robert Baer, Bruce Riedel
Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi. The picture is taken from a stamped document prior to 9/11. [Source: US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division]At his combat status review tribunal in Guantanamo Bay, 9/11 facilitator Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi denies providing a large amount of funds for the plot, although he does admit knowing some of the hijackers and helping them travel to the US. According to the Los Angeles Times, his denial that he provided substantial amounts to the hijackers is surprising because, "US authorities, as well as the Sept. 11 commission that investigated the attacks, have long alleged that al-Hawsawi was a top lieutenant of plot mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed… [and he]… arranged funding and travel for several of the 19 hijackers." Meyer also points out that, "the unclassified summary of evidence read at the hearing did not mention any instances in which he allegedly sent money to them. When specifically asked during the hearing if he had done so, al-Hawsawi said he had not." [Los Angeles Times, 3/30/2007] The unclassified facts supporting his designation as an enemy combatant mostly relate to his receiving money transfers from some of the hijackers just before 9/11 (see September 5-10, 2001), a laptop computer hard-drive containing information about al-Qaeda that is said to be "associated with the detainee," and a nineteen-page address book. He admits returning to Pakistan just before 9/11 on the advice of 9/11 managers Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, meeting Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, receiving military training in an al-Qaeda camp, meeting four of the muscle hijackers (see Early-Late June, 2001), and talking to Mohamed Atta on the phone. However, he says that the information on the hard-drive was copied from other computers and was not put there by him, the address book is not his, he never swore bayat to Bin Laden, and is therefore not an al-Qaeda member. [US department of Defense, 3/21/2007 ] Several other high-value detainees have combat status review tribunals hearings at this time (see March 9-April 28, 2007).
Entity Tags: Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi
Category Tags: Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding, High Value Detainees
CIA officer Alfreda Frances Bikowsky, who ordered the wrongful rendition of a German citizen (see Before January 23, 2004) and made an unauthorized trip to view the waterboarding of alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (see After March 7, 2003), is considered for the position of deputy chief at the CIA's station in Baghdad. Harper's journalist Ken Silverstein learns of her candidacy from two sources, who describe her as "a person who inspires little confidence, and who is highly adept at working her way through the bureaucracy, but has no leadership ability." Apparently, she is being considered because "no one wants to take high-profile positions at Baghdad station, so the CIA is stuck taking whoever is willing to go." However, in the end she does not get the job. [Harper's, 3/23/2007] Several weeks later, CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano will write to Silverstein to defend Bikowsky. Gimigliano says that at this time she "is neither considering, nor being considered for, service in Iraq." He adds: "I can tell you that she has been central over the years to the efforts of our government, and other governments, to discover and disrupt al-Qaeda operations worldwide. Her work, and the work she has led, has stopped terrorist attacks and saved innocent lives. The counterterrorist expertise she has built and applied on behalf of our country is the product of great effort and exceptional commitment." [Harper's, 4/16/2007]
Entity Tags: Paul Gimigliano, Central Intelligence Agency, Alfreda Frances Bikowsky
At a Guantanamo Bay tribunal to decide his combat status (see March 9-April 28, 2007), militant Islamist logistics manager Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002) is accused of heading Khaldan and Darunta training camps in Afghanistan and of co-ordinating their operation with Osama bin Laden, as well as moving money for al-Qaeda, desiring fraudulently-obtained Canadian passports for a terrorist plot, and making diary entries about planned attacks in the US. [US Department of Defense, 3/27/2007 ] Complaints of Torture, Admission of False Confessions - Zubaida complains of being tortured in US custody (see Mid-May 2002 and After and March 10-April 15, 2007). Zubaida's statements about his treatment in US custody will be redacted from the trial transcripts, but a few remarks remain. In broken English, Zubaida states: "I was nearly before half die plus [because] what they do [to] torture me. There I was not afraid from die because I do believe I will be shahid [martyr], but as God make me as a human and I weak, so they say yes, I say okay, I do I do, but leave me. They say no, we don't want to. You to admit you do this, we want you to give us more information… they want what's after more information about more operations, so I can't. They keep torturing me." The tribunal president, a colonel whose name is also redacted, asks, "So I understand that during this treatment, you said things to make them stop and then those statements were actually untrue, is that correct?" Zubaida replies, "Yes." [US Department of Defense, 3/27/2007 ; Vanity Fair, 12/16/2008] Denies Being Al-Qaeda Member or Enemy of US - He goes on to deny that he is an "enemy combatant," saying that the Khaldan training camp, which he admits being logistics manager of, was around since the Soviet-Afghan War and was also used to train Muslims who wanted to fight invaders in Muslim lands, such as Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines, and Bosnia, where "America helped us." After he was captured the US administration exaggerated his importance, and some media accounts have suggested his role was greatly exaggerated (see Shortly After March 28, 2002). He denies being an official member of al-Qaeda and says he disagrees with attacks on civilians. However, he admits some of his trainees subsequently decided to join al-Qaeda and that he did not prevent them from doing this. He also denies moving the money and submits a volume of his diary that apparently shows he was in Pakistan when the charges state he went to Saudi Arabia to collect the money. He requests the production of other volumes of his diaries, on which some of the charges are based, but they are not made available to the tribunal. In addition, he denies corresponding with bin Laden before 2000 and details a dispute that arose between them after that time. He says his diary entries about military targets are "strictly hypothetical," and the passports are for non-terrorist travel. Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, he admits he helped non-aligned fighters escape from South Asia. He states that he is an enemy of the US because of its alliance with Israel, which he claims is oppressing his fellow Palestinians, saying, "A partner of a killer is also a killer." [US Department of Defense, 3/27/2007 ]
Entity Tags: Darunta training camp, Abu Zubaida, Al-Qaeda, Khaldan training camp
Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Abu Zubaida
Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi) at Guantanamo in July 2009. [Source: International Committee of the Red Cross]At his Combat Status Review Tribunal hearing in Guantanamo Bay (see March 9-April 28, 2007), 9/11 facilitator Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi) denies being an enemy combatant and says he has provided "vital information" to the US. Regarding the allegations against him: He admits sending money to hijacker Marwan Alshehhi in the US, but says it was Alshehhi's money and he regularly moved money for others—he did not know Alshehhi intended to hijack airliners (see June 28-30, 2000); He admits knowing and working for Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), his uncle, but says he had no idea KSM was connected to al-Qaeda; He admits leaving Dubai just before 9/11, but says this was due to residence permit problems (see September 9-11, 2001); He also denies various other allegations made against him and says he has never been a member of al-Qaeda, trained in the camps, or met Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Statements by KSM and Ramzi bin al-Shibh saying he was not involved in the operation are also submitted in his defense. In his final statement to the tribunal he says: "Ever since I was turned in to the United States government, about four years ago, the government uses my services by getting information from me about al-Qaeda activities and personnel that I obtained through independent research. The United States has benefited from the vital and important information I supplied by foiling al-Qaeda plans and obtaining information on al-Qaeda personnel… So, is it fair or reasonable that after all the important and vital information I have supplied to the United States government that I be considered an enemy combatant?" [US Department of Defense, 4/12/2007 ] The CIA refuses to comment on Ali's claim he is cooperating. [Los Angeles Times, 4/13/2007]
Entity Tags: Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Possible 9/11 Hijacker Funding
Damage after one of the Algiers bombings. [Source: Agence France-Presse]Two bombs hit Algiers, the capital of Algeria. At least 23 people are killed and 160 are injured. One of the bombs hits the prime minister's office but the prime minister is not injured; the other bomb hits a police station. The group Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb reportedly takes credit for the bombings. The group, known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) until recently, is considered the main Islamist rebel group in Algeria. [BBC, 4/11/2007]
Entity Tags: Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb
Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks, Algerian Militant Collusion
French investigative journalist Guillaume Dasquie writes an article for Le Monde detailing the extensive knowledge obtained by the French intelligence service Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) about al-Qaeda between July 2000 and October 2001. The article is based on a series of DGSE reports leaked to Dasquie about al-Qaeda's funding (see July 24, 2000), aerial photographs of Osama bin Laden (see August 28, 2000), and al-Qaeda threats against the US (see Between September 2000 and August 2001), including aircraft piracy. [Le Monde (Paris), 4/15/2007; Le Monde (Paris), 7/4/2007]
Entity Tags: Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Guillaume Dasquie
Category Tags: Warning Signs
Germany rejects a fresh bid from Spain to extradite Mamoun Darkazanli, a German-Syrian businessman who associated with 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and Ziad Jarrah and is suspected of helping the 9/11 plot (see October 9, 1999 and Spring 2000). Germany had rejected a previous extradition request (see July 18, 2005), but German law had been amended and the Spanish, who had indicted Darkazanli on terrorism charges, tried again. The justice ministry in Hamburg was apparently in favor of extradition, but the move was blocked by the federal justice ministry, which said Germany had already investigated Darkazanli and found no grounds to prosecute him. Apparently, they could not find evidence that he supported the 9/11 plot and being a member of al-Qaeda only became illegal in Germany in 2002, so he cannot be extradited. It appears no action can now be taken against Darkazanli, and a spokesman for the justice department in the city-state of Hamburg says, "We now assume that the Darkazanli case is closed for us." [EUbusiness(.com), 4/30/2007; Agence France-Presse, 4/30/2007]
Entity Tags: Mamoun Darkazanli, Germany
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Germany, Mamoun Darkazanli, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Al-Qaeda in Spain
According to former CIA Director George Tenet, he speaks to a "senior CIA officer" with knowledge of pre-9/11 intelligence failures, apparently in preparation for a book he is writing. They discuss the failure to inform the FBI that one of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, had a US visa (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). The officer tells Tenet: "Once Almihdhar's picture and visa information were received, everyone agreed that the information should immediately be sent to the FBI. Instructions were given to do so. There was a contemporaneous e-mail in CIA staff traffic, which CIA and FBI employees had access to, indicating that the data had in fact been sent to the FBI. Everyone believed it had been done." [Tenet, 2007, pp. 195] The claim that "everyone agreed" the information should be sent to the FBI is false, because two officers, deputy unit chief Tom Wilshire and Michael Anne Casey, specifically instructed two other people working at Alec Station, the CIA's bin Laden unit, not to send it (see 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. January 5, 2000 and January 6, 2000). The "contemporaneous e-mail" was then written by Casey, who must have known the claim the information had been passed was incorrect (see Around 7:00 p.m. January 5, 2000). Casey later appears to have lied about this matter to Tenet (see Before October 17, 2002) and the Justice Department's inspector general (see February 2004).
Entity Tags: Michael Anne Casey, Central Intelligence Agency, Alec Station, George J. Tenet
Category Tags: Key Hijacker Events, Alhazmi and Almihdhar, CIA Hiding Alhazmi & Almihdhar, Al-Qaeda Malaysia Summit
Kurt Sonnenfeld (right) at Ground Zero. [Source: FEMA / Mike Reiger]Kurt Sonnenfeld, a former videographer for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) who spent weeks at Ground Zero in New York filming the site for the agency, says he doubts the official account of the World Trade Center's collapse and adds that US intelligence is trying to recover videotapes in his possession that it does not want the public to see. He says a large archive facility located in the World Trade Center complex was apparently emptied of its contents before the collapse, showing US intelligence knew of the attacks beforehand. [Rocky Mountain News, 5/23/2007] Sonnenfeld was one of several FEMA videographers and photographers who were given exclusive access to Ground Zero in the fall of 2001. [TVTechnology.com, 11/28/2001] His claims surface after US authorities file murder charges against him for the death of his wife in 2002. Sonnenfeld claims her death was clearly a suicide and that false charges are being used to force his return back to the United States.
Claiming to be persecuted by US agents, he is seeking political asylum in Argentina. [Rocky Mountain News, 6/14/2002; Rocky Mountain News, 6/14/2002; Rocky Mountain News, 5/23/2007] He will later detail his claims in a Spanish-language book entitled The Persecuted. [Sonnenfeld, 2009]
Entity Tags: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Kurt Sonnenfeld
Fahad al-Quso. [Source: New York Times]Fahad al-Quso, implicated in the 2000 USS Cole bombing, was sentenced to 10 years in prison in Yemen in 2004 for his role in that bombing (see April 11, 2003-March 2004). He attended a key 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in which the 9/11 plot was discussed (see January 5-8, 2000). The US maintains a $5 million bounty for him. However, around May 2007, al-Quso is secretly freed. Since 2002, the Yemeni government has had a program of "reeducating" al-Qaeda prisoners and then releasing them (see 2002 and After). The US learns of al-Quso's release in February 2008, but takes no known action in response. Al-Quso apparently remains free. [Washington Post, 5/4/2008]
Entity Tags: Fahad al-Quso
Category Tags: 2000 USS Cole Bombing, Yemeni Militant Collusion
At the end of April 2007, a trial against a group of men accused of planning a fertilizer bomb plot in Britain concluded (see Early 2003-April 6, 2004), and a press ban on the trial was lifted. A number of stories come out revealing details on how two of the 7/7 London bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, were monitored by British intelligence as they interacted with some of the fertilizer bomb plotters (see February 2-March 23, 2004). This leads to new calls for an independent inquiry into the 7/7 bombings, since many of these details were left out of the two official government reports on the 7/7 bombings released in May 2006 (see May 11, 2006). But on May 2, 2007, British Prime Minister Tony Blair rejects demands for an independent inquiry. He says that the May 2006 Intelligence and Security Committee report examined the bombings in "immense detail." He claims any further inquiry would "undermine support" for the intelligence agencies. "For us then to have a full, independent, further inquiry… would simply have the security service and the police and others diverted from the task of fighting terrorism." He adds that many claims made in the media about what was known about the 7/7 bombers were "misleading and wrong." But David Cameron, the leader of the opposition Conservative Party, says that only a fully independent inquiry would "get to the truth" as to why Khan and Tanweer were not stopped despite being monitored. Fifty survivors and relatives of the 7/7 victims sign a letter renewing their calls for a public inquiry. [Guardian, 5/2/2007]
Entity Tags: David Cameron, Intelligence and Security Committee, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Tony Blair
Category Tags: 2005 7/7 London Bombings, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism
Haris Silajdzic [Source: Public domain]Press reports indicate that the Muslim leader of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, Haris Silajdzic, is under investigation for international arms smuggling. Police are also said to be investigating former Bosnian Deputy Defense Minister Hasan Cengic, Elfatih Hassanein, and Turkish businessman Nedim Suljak. Hassanein was the head of the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) and Cengic was closely tied to TWRA. During the Bosnian war in the early 1990s, TWRA was a radical militant charity front providing cover for a massive illegal arms pipeline into Bosnia (see Mid-1991-1996). Silajdzic was Bosnian foreign minister during the war. Bosnian state prosecutors confirm that a weapons smuggling investigation into international illegal weapons smuggling had opened but refuse to say who is being targeted. [Agence France-Presse, 5/5/2007] TWRA has remained active and there are reports that it is still connected to radical militants (see January 25, 2002). In late 2006, it was announced that Hassanein was opening a new charity in Bosnia. [BBC, 12/29/2006]
Entity Tags: Nedim Suljak, Elfatih Hassanein, Hasan Cengic, Third World Relief Agency, Haris Silajdzic
Category Tags: Al-Qaeda in Balkans, Terrorism Financing
Fort Dix plot suspects. [Source: NBC]Six Muslim men are arrested in Cherry Hill, New Jersey, and accused of plotting to attack the Army's Fort Dix in New Jersey and massacre scores of US soldiers. FBI agent J. P. Weiss says "Today we dodged a bullet. In fact, when you look at the type of weapons that this group was trying to purchase, we may have dodged a lot of bullets." The FBI says the men had formed a "platoon" and had performed documented reconnaissance of their target. Although no evidence is uncovered linking the men to international terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, several of the men were willing to kill and die "in the name of Allah" according to court records. [Washington Post, 5/8/2007] Officials characterize the plot as "homegrown" and still in the planning stages. They state that no attack was imminent. [CBS News, 5/8/2007] The plotters are characterized as self-directed terrorist sympathizers. US Attorney Christopher J. Christie says, "Unlike other cases we've done, there was no clear ringleader. They all seemed to feed off each other. They were clearly guys turning to this element for inspiration. They wanted to be jihadists." [Washington Post, 5/9/2007] The men are identified as ethnic Albanian Yugoslavian illegal immigrants Dritan Duka, his brothers Eljvir Duka and Shain Duka, legal Turkish immigrant Serdar Tartar, and US citizens Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer and Agron Abdullah. [Hurriyet, 5/8/2007] The FBI was first made aware of the alleged plot in January 2006. An unidentified Circuit City store clerk alerted police to a video that showed the men firing assault weapons, calling for jihad and yelling "God is great" in Arabic, according to officials. The video had been taken into the store in order to be transferred to DVD. The video came from firearms training in the Poconos, according to the indictment. [Washington Post, 5/9/2007] The FBI managed to implant an informant in the group of friends. This informant discovered 50 loaded 9mm magazines in Tartar's car. [Hurriyet, 5/8/2007] Another informant infiltrated the group and was told of the plans to attack military installations. Shnewer was recorded as saying, "My intent is to hit a heavy concentration of soldiers… This is exactly what we are looking for. You hit four, five or six Humvees and light the whole place [up] and retreat completely without any losses." [US Department of Justice, 5/8/2007 ] The men allegedly possessed jihadist videos and documents, including copies of the last will and testament of two of the 9/11 hijackers. [US Department of Justice, 5/8/2007 ] The target was allegedly decided by information gathered by one of the men, Tartar, who had access to Fort Dix from a job delivering pizzas there. [Hurriyet, 5/8/2007] The men are arrested when they attempt to buy AK-47s, M-16s, and other weapons from yet another FBI informant. [Washington Post, 5/8/2007] Most face possible life sentences. [Washington Post, 5/9/2007]
Entity Tags: Serdar Tartar, Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, Shain Duka, J.P. Weiss, Eljvir Duka, Dritan Duka, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Agron Abdullah, Muslim Tartar, Christopher J. ("Chris") Christie
Category Tags: Other Possible Moles or Informants, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Internal US Security After 9/11
President Bush issues a classified presidential directive updating the nation's secretive post-disaster "National Continuity Policy." The highly classified Continuity of Government (COG) and Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans are designed to keep the government functioning in times of national emergency. Bush's presidential directive, officially titled National Security Presidential Directive 51 (NSPD-51)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (HSPD-20), is described by the Boston Globe as a "special kind of executive order that can be kept secret." The non-classified portion of the directive is posted quietly on the White House website, with no explanation. The document states, "It is the policy of the United States to maintain a comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed of Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government programs in order to ensure the preservation of our form of government." The directive orders executive branch officials to establish a wide range of special protocols to keep the government running during an emergency. The directive stresses the importance of relocating to alternative facilities, delegating powers to emergency leaders, and securing and allocating the nation's vital resources. According to NSPD-51, the special emergency plans should be ready to go at a moment's notice, and incorporated into the daily operations of all executive departments and agencies. The special emergency protocols are designed for any "catastrophic emergency," which NSPD-51 defines as "any incident, regardless of location, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the US population, infrastructure, environment, economy, or government functions." Incidents falling into this category would not be limited to hostile attacks, the document makes clear, but would also include "localized acts of nature" and "accidents." The new plan centralizes post-disaster planning in the White House, and appears to limit the powers of the legislative and judicial branches in times of emergency. The directive creates the position of national continuity coordinator, which is to be held by the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism. The secretary of homeland security and the national continuity coordinator are to oversee the development and implementation of the continuity plans. [Washington Post, 5/10/2007; US President, 5/14/2007 ; Progressive, 5/18/2007; Boston Globe, 6/2/2007] Conservative Commentators Warn of 'Dictatorial Powers' - Conservative commentator Jerome Corsi says the directive appears to give the president a legal mechanism to seize "dictatorial powers" since it would not require consultation with Congress about when to invoke emergency powers, or when to relinquish them. It is also noted that the new plan does not explicitly acknowledge the National Emergencies Act, which gives Congress the authority to override the president's determination that a national emergency still exists. James Carafano, a homeland security specialist at the Heritage Foundation, says that the lack of an explanation for the unexpected directive is "appalling." [Boston Globe, 6/2/2007]
Entity Tags: Continuity of Government, George W. Bush, James Carafano, Jerome Corsi
Timeline Tags: Civil Liberties
Mullah Dadullah Akhund. [Source: Reuters]Mullah Dadullah Akhund, the Taliban's top military commander, is killed in Afghanistan. The Telegraph claims that, "Since the Taliban's ousting in late 2001, Dadullah emerged as probably the militant group's most prominent and feared commander." He often appeared in videos and media interviews. [Daily Telegraph, 5/14/2007] He is only the second high-ranking Taliban leader captured or killed since 9/11 (see December 19, 2006). ABC News claims that 36 hours before he was killed, Dadullah said in a videotaped interview that he was training US and British citizens to carry out suicide missions in their home countries. US officials claim to have tracked him from this interview in Quetta, Pakistan, back to a Taliban hiding base in Afghanistan, then carried out a helicopter assault against his base. [ABC News, 5/14/2007] The Taliban immediately announce that his younger brother, Mullah Bakht Mohammed, will be his replacement as the chief military strategist (see June 5, 2007). [CBC News, 5/14/2007]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Mullah Bakht Mohammed, Mullah Dadullah Akhund
Category Tags: Key Captures and Deaths, Afghanistan
Iran television reports that the country's border patrol detained 10 people who illegally entered the country from Pakistan carrying $500,000 in cash, maps of "sensitive areas," and "modern spying cameras." [Reuters, 5/13/2007] A senior Pakistani official will tell ABC News the 10 men were members of Jundullah. [ABC News, 5/23/2007] (Jundallah is reportedly being supported by the Pakistanis and advised by US government officials (see 2005 and After).)
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Pakistan and the ISI
The Los Angeles Times reports that US intelligence has no idea where bin Laden is hiding. The search for bin Laden was disrupted in early 2002 when most US intelligence assets and equipment was pulled out of Afghanistan to prepare for war with Iraq, and the search has yet to recover. There has not been a single substantiated lead on bin Laden's location since early 2002 (see Early 2002). "We're not any closer," says a senior US military official who monitors the US intelligence on bin Laden. A former senior CIA official says, "We've had no significant report of him being anywhere," and adds that the US does not even have information since 2002 that "you could validate historically," meaning a tip on a previous bin Laden location that could be subsequently verified. There have been no solid leads on the location of al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri in recent years either. [Los Angeles Times, 5/20/2007] The Washington Post similarly reported in September 2006 that the search for bin Laden has gone "stone cold" (see September 10, 2006). In June 2008, a Western military analyst" will tell NBC News, "We don't have a clue where [bin Laden] is or even may be. We have had NO credible intelligence on [him] since 2001. All the rest is rumor and rubbish either whipped up by the media or churned out in the power corridors of Western capitals." This analyst says the last good information on bin Laden from the battle of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in late 2001. [MSNBC, 6/13/2008]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, US intelligence
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan
According to a poll by the Pew Research Center, only 40 percent of Muslims in the US believe that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arabs. [Chicago Tribune, 5/22/2007]
Entity Tags: Pew Research Center
Category Tags: US Government and 9/11 Criticism
Insurance companies reach a $2 billion settlement with real estate development and investment firm Silverstein Properties for the destruction of the World Trade Center on 9/11. The agreement, which involves seven of the two-dozen insurers for the WTC, ends more than five years of legal wrangling. The other insurance companies involved have already paid out about $2.55 billion, meaning the total payout will be $4.55 billion. In September 2006, Silverstein Properties and the New York Port Authority had agreed to split the reconstruction of the WTC site between them, and to divide up the remaining insurance proceeds accordingly. Consequently, the Port Authority is to receive about $870 million from the latest settlement, while the remaining $1.13 billion will go to Silverstein Properties. [New York State, 5/23/2007; New York Times, 5/23/2007; Newsday, 5/23/2007; Reuters, 5/23/2007] Silverstein Properties acquired the lease on several of the World Trade Center buildings, including the Twin Towers, in July 2001 (see July 24, 2001). [Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 7/24/2001] As the New York Times summarizes, "At that time, two dozen insurers had signed binders pledging to provide $3.5 billion in insurance coverage, but had not finished the documentation." Therefore, after 9/11, an "ugly dispute developed over which insurance policy was in effect at the time of the attack. Mr. [Larry] Silverstein [the president of Silverstein Properties] argued that since two jetliners slammed into the two towers, he was entitled to a double payment on the $3.5 billion policy. But many of the insurers countered that they had agreed to a different policy that did not permit double claims." [New York Times, 5/23/2007] In 2004, federal juries had decided that Silverstein Properties could collect a maximum of $4.68 billion for the loss of the WTC. The current settlement therefore means the insurers are obliged to pay 97.2 percent of that maximum. [Bloomberg, 5/23/2007; New York State, 5/23/2007; Newsday, 5/23/2007; Reuters, 5/23/2007] Silverstein Properties had separately been awarded $861 million of insurance money in 2002 for the loss of World Trade Center Building 7, which also collapsed on 9/11 (see May 2002).
Entity Tags: Larry Silverstein, Silverstein Properties, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, World Trade Center
Category Tags: 9/11 Related Lawsuits
Fort Huachuca [Source: Army]An FBI advisory is distributed in May 2007 to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, Customs and Border Protection, and the Justice Department, as well as numerous law enforcement agencies throughout the nation warning that up to 60 Afghan and Iraqi terrorists are to be smuggled into the US through underground tunnels with high-powered weapons to attack an Arizona Army base. The alleged target, Fort Huachuca, is the nation's largest intelligence-training center. It lies about 20 miles from the Mexican border and has members of all four service branches training in intelligence and secret operations. Security measures are swiftly changed at the base in response to the threat, according to multiple confidential law enforcement documents obtained by The Washington Times. The advisory warns that "a portion of the operatives were in the United States, with the remainder not yet in the United States [and]…the Afghanis and Iraqis shaved their beards so as not to appear to be Middle Easterners." The FBI report on which the advisory is based points to the involvement of Mexican drug cartels, stating that each operative paid drug lords $20,000 "or the equivalent in weapons" for assistance in smuggling them and their weapons , including anti-tank missiles and surface-to-air missiles, through tunnels along the border into the US. The advisory further warns that a number of the operatives are already in a safe house in Texas and some weapons have already been successfully smuggled into the US. The FBI report is based on Drug Enforcement Administration sources, including Mexican nationals with access to a "sub-source" in the drug cartels. This "sub-source" is allegedly "a member of the Zetas," the military arm of one of Mexico's most dangerous drug-trafficking organizations, the Gulf Cartel, who identified the Sinaloa cartel as the organization involved in the plot. However, the advisory states that "this information is of unknown reliability," while the DEA warns that the Gulf Cartel may be attempting to manipulate the US into acting against their rivals. FBI spokesman Paul Bresson says that the report is based on "raw, uncorroborated information that has not been completely vetted." A Department of Homeland Security document on the possible attack states "based upon the information provided by the DEA handling agent, the DEA has classified the source as credible [and]…the identity of the sub-source has been established; however, none of the information provided by the sub-source in the past has been corroborated." [Washington Times, 11/26/2007] The threat later proves to be unfounded. The attack never occurs and FBI spokesman Manuel Johnson, based in Phoenix, admits in November that the warning was the result of bad information. He says "a thorough investigation was conducted and there is no evidence showing that the threat was credible." [Arizona Daily Star, 11/26/2007]
Entity Tags: Manuel Johnson, US Department of Homeland Security, Defense Intelligence Agency, US Customs and Border Protection, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, Gulf Cartel, US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Paul Bresson, Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel
Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11
The Transactional Records Action Clearinghouse (TRAC), a data research organization affiliated with Syracuse University, has discovered that terrorism claims formed less that 0.01 percent of immigration court charges filed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The immigration court records were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. Of 814,073 cases brought to the immigration courts by the DHS, 12, or 0.0015 percent, were for charges of terrorism. In addition, 114 cases, or 0.014 percent, concerned individuals charged with national security violations. TRAC spokesman David Burnham says, "The DHS claims it is focused on terrorism. Well that's just not true. Either there's no terrorism, or they're terrible at catching them. Either way it's bad for all of us." TRAC further claims that there exists an "apparent gap between DHS rhetoric about its role in fighting terrorism and what it actually has been doing." DHS spokesman Russ Knocke calls the TRAC report "ill-conceived" and said the group "lack[s] a grasp of the DHS mission." The DHS claims that any clampdown on immigration decreases the likelihood of terrorists entering the US. [CNN, 5/27/2007]
Entity Tags: US Department of Homeland Security, David Burnham, Transactional Records Action Clearinghouse, Russ Knocke, Syracuse University
Category Tags: Internal US Security After 9/11, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Roslynn Mauskopf. [Source: US Department of Justice]US Attorney Roslynn Mauskopf describes a recently foiled alleged terror plot to blow up John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City as "one of the most chilling plots imaginable." She claims it "could have resulted in unfathomable damage, deaths, and destruction." But one unnamed law enforcement official with Mauskopf at her press conference will later say he cringed at the description. Newsday will later relate, "The plot, he knew, was never operational. The public had never been at risk. And the notion of blowing up the airport, let alone the borough of Queens, by exploding a fuel tank was in all likelihood a technical impossibility." Michael Greenberger, director of the Center for Health and Homeland Security at the University of Maryland, says, "It was a totally overstated characterization that doesn't comport with the facts.…there's a pattern here of Justice Department attorneys overstating what they have." [Newsday, 6/6/2007] Safety experts have criticize the government's description of the plot's danger. John Goglia, a former member of the US National Transportation Safety Board, describes the plot as a "fantasy," saying "You could definitely reach the tank, definitely start a fire, but to get the kind of explosion they were thinking they were going to get… this is virtually impossible to do." Jake Magish, an engineer with Supersafe Tank Systems, says "The fantasy I've heard about people saying, 'They will blow the tank and destroy the airport', is nonsense." The Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration comes under fire from aviation expert Michael Boyd, who states that these organizations are "not run by security professionals…[they are] run by political appointees." [MSNBC, 6/4/2007] In addition, the plotters lacked the explosives and financial resources to carry out the attack. Four alleged Islamic radicals have been charged with conspiracy to cause an explosion at the airport and three of them have been arrested. [The Australian, 6/6/2007] Newsday calls the plot's alleged mastermind Russell Defreitas "hapless and episodically homeless." [Newsday, 6/6/2007]
Entity Tags: Russell Defreitas, Jake Magish, John Goglia, Roslynn Mauskopf, Michael Greenberger
Category Tags: Terror Alerts, Internal US Security After 9/11, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Dennis Milligan. [Source: Raw Story]Dennis Milligan, chairman of the Republican Party of Arkansas, says in an interview, "I believe fully the president is doing the right thing, and I think all we need is some attacks on American soil like we had on [Sept. 11, 2001 ], and the naysayers will come around very quickly to appreciate not only the commitment for President Bush, but the sacrifice that has been made by men and women to protect this country." [Arkansas Democrat Gazette, 6/3/2007]
Entity Tags: Dennis Milligan
Aftab Khan Sherpao. [Source: Associated Press / Army Times]A document by Pakistani Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao warns that the Taliban and other Islamist militant groups are growing in strength in Pakistan. They are spreading beyond their strongholds in Pakistan's tribal regions near the Afghanistan border and without "swift and decisive" action, they could destabilize the entire country. Sherpao narrowly escaped a suicide bombing in April, near the city of Peshawar, the capital of North-West Frontier Province. The attack on his life caused him to reconsider the government's policy of appeasing militant groups. The Interior Ministry report is presented to the US National Security Council on June 4 with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in attendance. The report says: "The ongoing spell of active Taliban resistance has brought about serious repercussions for Pakistan. There is a general policy of appeasement towards the Taliban, which has further emboldened them." A Western diplomat familiar with the report says it is the first acknowledgment from Pakistan as to the danger of the militant threat. The diplomat calls it "an accurate description of the dagger pointed at the country's heart. It's tragic it's taken so long [for Pakistan] to recognize it." [New York Times, 6/30/2007] The report's gloomy predictions will quickly be proven correct as the raid on the Red Mosque one month later greatly increases militant violence throughout Pakistan (see July 3-11, 2007 and July 11-Late July, 2007).
Entity Tags: National Security Council, Pervez Musharraf, Taliban, Aftab Khan Sherpao
A judge says that the designation "enemy combatant," used to label detainees held by the US in Guantanamo Bay, is meaningless, throwing proceedings for hundreds of the men into what the Guardian describes as "chaos." Tribunals had been held in Guantanamo Bay to determine whether detainees held there were "enemy combatants," and it was thought that such designation was a necessary preliminary step to putting them on trial. However, the judge, Colonel Peter Brownback, says that it is not enough to designate a detainee as an "enemy combatant," and that a tribunal must be proceeded by a designation that a detainee is an "unlawful enemy combatant," as this is the wording used in the Military Commissions Act, which established the tribunals. Colonel Brownback throws out cases against detainees Omar Khadr and Salim Ahmed Hamdan, alleged to have been Osama bin Laden's chauffeur, saying that a person "has a right to be tried only by a court that has jurisdiction over him," and the court does not have that right. The ruling means that none of the other hundreds of detainees can be brought before the tribunals, because the incorrect designation was applied to all of them. However, the ruling is without prejudice, and the US can still try to re-designate detainees "unlawful enemy combatants" and bring them before tribunals. Defense attorney Kristine Huskey calls the situation a "shambles," and says, "It's another example of how everything has been so ad hoc. The Military Commissions Act was just not done thoughtfully." Another defense attorney, Colonel Dwight Sullivan, comments, "The system right now should just stop… The commission is an experiment that failed and we don't need any more evidence that it is a failure." [Guardian, 6/5/2007]
Entity Tags: Kristine Huskey, Dwight Sullivan, Peter Brownback, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Omar Khadr
Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
A high-ranking Taliban leader says that Osama bin Laden is alive and well. Mullah Bakht Mohammed (a.k.a. Mansoor Dadullah) says in an interview with Al Jazeera: "Sheikh Osama bin Laden is alive and active. He's carrying out his duties. The latest proof that he is alive is that he sent me a letter of condolences after the martyrdom of my brother." Bakht's brother, Mullah Dadullah Akhund, was the Taliban's top military commander, but was killed in May 2007 (see May 13, 2007), and Bakht immediately took his place. [Al Jazeera, 6/5/2007] In December 2007, the Taliban will announce that Bakht has been replaced as military commander due to insubordination. He will continue fighting for the Taliban however, and will be injured and captured by Pakistani forces near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in February 2008. [Associated Press, 2/11/2008]
Entity Tags: Mullah Bakht Mohammed, Mullah Dadullah Akhund, Osama bin Laden, Taliban
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan, Afghanistan
Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi. [Source: Public domain]Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and four other organizations file a US federal lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act seeking information about 39 people they believe have "disappeared" while held in US custody. The groups mentions 39 people who were reportedly captured overseas and then held in secret CIA prisons. The US acknowledges detaining three of the 39 but the groups say there is strong evidence, including witness testimony, of secret detention in 18 more cases and some evidence of secret detention in the remaining 18 cases. In September 2006, President Bush acknowledged the CIA had interrogated dozens of suspects at secret CIA prisons and said 14 of those were later sent to Guantanamo Bay (see September 6, 2006). At that time it was announced that there were no prisoners remaining in custody in US secret facilities (see September 2-3, 2006). However, the groups claim that in April 2007 a prisoner named Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was transferred from CIA custody to Guantanamo, demonstrating the system is still operating (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). The groups also claim that in September 2002 the US held the two children of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM), then aged seven and nine, in an adult detention center. KSM was later captured and is now held at Guantanamo; it is unknown what happened to his children. [Reuters, 6/7/2007] Some of the more important suspects named include: Hassan Ghul, said to be an important al-Qaeda courier. In 2005, ABC News reported he was being held in a secret CIA prison (see November 2005). Apparently, the CIA transferred Ghul to Pakistani custody in 2006 so he would not have to join other prisoners sent to the Guantantamo prison (see (Mid-2006)), and Pakistan released him in 2007, allowing him to rejoin al-Qaeda (see (Mid-2007)). Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a high-ranking al-Qaeda leader. The same ABC News report also mentioned him. Al-Libi was secretly transferred to Libya around 2006 (see Between November 2005 and September 2006) and will die there in 2009 under mysterious circumstances (see (May 10, 2009)). Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman, a son of the Blind Sheikh, Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman. The same ABC News report also mentioned him. He was reportedly captured in Pakistan in 2003 (see February 13, 2003). Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi, a.k.a. Abu Bakr al Azdi. He is said to be a candidate 9/11 hijacker who was held back for another operation. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission reported he was in US custody. Suleiman Abdalla Salim Hemed. Wanted for involvement in the 1998 African embassy bombings, he was reportedly captured in Somalia in March 2003. Witnesses claim to have seen him in two secret US prisons in 2004. Yassir al-Jazeeri. Said to be a high-ranking al-Qaeda leader, he was reportedly captured in Pakistan in March 2003. Witnesses later saw him in a secret CIA prison (see March 15, 2003). Musaad Aruchi, a nephew of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He was reported captured in Pakistan in June 2004 and then taken into CIA custody (see June 12, 2004). Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan. Wanted for a role in the African embassy bombings, there were various reports he was captured in Pakistan in 2002 and taken into US custody (see July 11, 2002). However, it appears these reports are false, because he will allegedly be killed in Pakistan in 2009 (see January 1, 2009). Anas al-Liby, also wanted for a role in the African embassy bombings. He was reportedly captured in 2002 (see January 20, 2002- March 20, 2002) and it is suspected the US has handed him over to Egypt. [Human Rights Watch, 6/7/2007]
Entity Tags: Pacha Wazir, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, Suleiman Abdalla Salim Hemed, Yassir al-Jazeeri, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, Human Rights Watch, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi, Amnesty International, Anas al-Liby, Hassan Ghul, Mohammed Omar Abdul-Rahman, Musaad Aruchi
Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports that US agents were intercepted by German police trying to enter the highly secure enclosure surrounding the G8 summit taking place in Heilingendamm, Germany, with explosive material. "[S]ources told Deutsche Presse-Agentur that US security men tested German security by trying to smuggle C4 plastic explosive past a checkpoint at Heiligendamm. German surveillance machinery detected the tiny stash in a suitcase in a car and the Americans in plainclothes then identified themselves. German police declined comment." [Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 6/7/2007]
The FBI terrorist watch list now includes over half a million names, which civil liberties advocates say limits its usefulness. Although the actual content of the list is classified, the FBI's 2008 budget request refers to "the entire watch list of 509,000 names," which is utilized by its Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. It is common for many names on the list to be associated with one individual. The FBI foreign and domestic terror watch list, combined with the interagency National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) list of suspected international terrorists, comprise the watch list used by federal security screening personnel on the lookout for terrorists. The NCTC refuses to reveal how many US citizens are on the list (see February 15, 2006). ACLU senior legislative counsel Tim Sparapani says the FBI watch list "grows seemingly without control or limitation. If we have 509,000 names on that list, the watch list is virtually useless." Internal reviews of the list by the US Terrorist Screening Center have previously found the list to be incomplete and inaccurate (see June 14, 2005). Reviews of versions of the list reveal the names of US lawmakers; former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, imprisoned at the time of review; al-Qaeda member Zacarias Moussaoui, also imprisoned; and 14 of the 19 9/11 hijackers, all deceased (see March 2006). [ABC News (The Blotter), 6/13/2007]
Entity Tags: Timothy Sparapani, Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, American Civil Liberties Union
It is reported that an unclassified FBI budget document states that since the 9/11 attacks the Bureau has dramatically increased so-called 'black bag' jobs. In a black bag job a team of specialists secretly enter a premise, search the contents, and leave no indication they were ever there. Whereas most of the FBI's secret search operations previously related to criminal investigations, by 2006 close to 90 percent of such operations are for national security matters. The FBI is asking for more money and personnel to conduct more such operations. [ABC News.com, 6/15/2007]
Entity Tags: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Internal US Security After 9/11
Relatives of some of the victims of the 9/11 attacks call on the CIA to release a report drafted by its inspector general into some aspects of the agency's failings before 9/11. The report was completed in 2004 (see June-November 2004), and rewritten in 2005 (see January 7, 2005), but was not then released (see October 10, 2005). The call is backed by 15,000 signatures on a petition calling for the release. The victims' relatives, Patty Casazza, Monica Gabrielle, Mindy Kleinberg, and Lorie Van Auken, say the report "is the only major 9/11 government review that has still not been made publicly available," and quote Newsweek journalist Michael Isikoff saying that the main reason for the report's non-release is "a desire to protect the reputations of some of the main figures [named in the report]." [Raw Story, 6/18/2007] This coincides with efforts by lawmakers to get part of the report published (see Spring-Summer 2007) and is eventually partially successful (see August 21, 2007).
Entity Tags: Mindy Kleinberg, Lorie Van Auken, Monica Gabrielle, Office of the Inspector General (CIA), Central Intelligence Agency, Patty Casazza
According to reports in the Indian press, a recently arrested militant leader says he believes Saeed Sheikh wired money to lead hijacker Mohamed Atta before 9/11 (see Early August 2001 and Summer 2001 and before). The militant, who is known as Babu Bhai and is a leader of the militant organization Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami, says that the money came from a ransom paid for the release of a kidnapped shoe company executive and that he was involved in the kidnap operation as a deputy to the local commander, Asif Raza Khan. Other people involved in the money transfer are arrested based on the information disclosed by Babu Bhai. This confession supports previous reports about the transfer (see September 30-October 7, 2001, January 22-25, 2002 and July 31, 2003). [Times of India, 6/25/2007; News Post India, 6/25/2007; Ahmedabad Newsline, 6/29/2007]
Entity Tags: Saeed Sheikh, Babu Bhai, Asif Raza Khan, Mohamed Atta, Harkat ul-Jihad al-Islami
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Saeed Sheikh, Pakistani ISI Links to 9/11
A Newsweek poll reveals that 41% of Americans believe that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was involved with the planning, financing, or commissioning of the 9/11 attacks. This is a slight increase from a September 2004 poll which showed that 36% believed in the Bush administration's claims of Iraq's involvement. These claims formed a cornerstone of the administration's push to garner public support for the war, which began in the immediate wake of the events of 9/11 (see September 15, 2001-April 6, 2002). Additionally, 20% of respondents believe that the majority of the 9/11 hijackers were Iraqi (when in fact none of them were). The same percent believe that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction at the time of the invasion. [Editor & Publisher, 6/25/2007]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein
Category Tags: Alleged Iraq-Al-Qaeda Links
Pakistani journalist and regional expert Ahmed Rashid writes an editorial in the Washington Post entitled, "America's Bad Deal With Musharraf, Going Down in Flames." Cheney in Control - Rashid reveals, "Current and past US officials tell me that Pakistan policy is essentially being run from [Dick] Cheney's office. The vice president, they say, is close to [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf and refuses to brook any US criticism of him. This all fits; in recent months, I'm told, Pakistani opposition politicians visiting Washington have been ushered in to meet Cheney's aides, rather than taken to the State Department." The State Department seems acquiescent to this policy, and is refusing to even consider alternative policies if Musharraf were threatened with being ousted. But the CIA and Defense Department are more resistant, and worry about the lack of an alternative to fully supporting Musharraf. Officials in these agencies, "many of whom have served in Islamabad or Kabul, understand the double game that Musharraf has played—helping the United States go after al-Qaeda while letting his intelligence services help the Taliban claw their way back in Afghanistan." Lack of Expertise - Due to recent turnover, there has been a "dramatic drop-off in US expertise on Pakistan. Retired American officials say that, for the first time in US history, nobody with serious Pakistan experience is working in the South Asia bureau of the State Department, on State's policy planning staff, on the National Security Council staff or even in Vice President Cheney's office." One former senior US diplomat says, "They know nothing of Pakistan." US Policy Making Matters Worse - Rashid concludes that instead of confronting the Islamist militant threat, the Pakistani army "has focused on keeping Musharraf in power—negotiating with extremists, letting radical Islamic students set up a base in Islamabad, and so forth. Meanwhile, to spook the West into continuing to support him, Musharraf continues to grossly exaggerate the strength of the Islamic parties that he warns might take over his nuclear-armed country. In fact, the United States would be far safer if it pushed for a truly representative Pakistani government that could marginalize the jihadists, rather than placing all its eggs in Musharraf's basket." He speculates that the US's blind support of Musharraf allows Musharraf to continue to resist democratization and sharing power, exacerbating the crisis. "The message to the Pakistani public is clear: To the Bush White House, the war on terrorism tops everything, and that includes democracy." [Washington Post, 6/27/2007]
Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Ahmed Rashid, National Security Council, US Department of Defense, US Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Richard ("Dick") Cheney
Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan says in an interview: "Iraq was more than just a major distraction to Afghanistan. Huge resources were devoted to Iraq, which focused away from nation building in Afghanistan. The billions spent in Iraq were the billions that were not spent in Afghanistan." Annan was the UN secretary general from 1997 until the end of 2006. [Rashid, 2008, pp. xli, 401]
Entity Tags: Kofi Annan
Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism
Indian intelligence allegedly warns US intelligence that Osama bin Laden is likely living in Pakistan away from the tribal region, probably in northwest Pakistan. This is according to an article published in the Times of India shortly after bin Laden's death in May 2011 (see May 2, 2011). Reportedly, the warning comes shortly after a Taliban meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan, also attended by al-Qaeda number two leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, top leaders of the Haqqani network (a semi-autonomous Taliban faction based in Pakistan), and at least two officials of the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency. Immediately afterwards, al-Zawahiri visits Islamabad, Pakistan's capital city in the country's northwest. An unnamed top Indian official will later say: "The urgency with which al-Zawahiri visited Islamabad or the area in its vicinity suggested that he was there for some purpose. We told [the US] about al-Zawahiri visiting Islamabad and we also told them that we believed Osama may not be hiding in caves but in a highly urbanized area somewhere near Islamabad. Of course, nobody had spotted him and it was a conclusion we drew on the basis of the information we got." Islamabad is only 31 miles from Abbottabad, where bin Laden will eventually be found. Indian officials do not get the impression that US officials are particularly interested in their lead. [Times of India, 5/4/2011]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Haqqani Network, Taliban, Research and Analysis Wing (Indian external intelligence agency), US intelligence
Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Pakistan and the ISI, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan
The Pakistani government secretly releases al-Qaeda leader Hassan Ghul from its custody. Ghul was arrested in Iraq in 2004 and spent two and a half years in the CIA's secret prison system (see January 23, 2004). The CIA handed Ghul to Pakistan in mid-2006 after Pakistani pressure (see (Mid-2006)). Pakistan apparently wanted Ghul because he was linked to Lashkar-e-Toiba, a Pakistani militant group supported by the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency (see (2002-January 23, 2004)). The ISI had secretly promised to make sure that Ghul would never be freed, but he is released after about a year without ever being tried or even charged. It is not known exactly when Ghul is released. However, a British prisoner named Rangzieb Ahmed will later testify in Britain that he was held in an adjacent cell to Ghul's in Pakistan, and the last time he sees Ghul is in January 2007. In 2011, the Associated Press will report that unnamed former and current US intelligence officials say that Ghul has since rejoined al-Qaeda. Under US interrogation, Ghul provided key intelligence about Osama bin Laden's main courier, Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed. So when Ghul returns to al-Qaeda, he could warn bin Laden that US intelligence is learning about Ahmed. But either Ghul does not reveal what he confessed, or his warning is not heeded, because bin Laden continues to live with Ahmed in his Abbottabad, Pakistan, hideout. [Associated Press, 6/15/2011] Despite Ghul's return to al-Qaeda, the US has yet to put Ghul on any of its most wanted lists. No picture of Ghul has ever been made public either, even though the US goverment must know what he looks like since he was held by the US for several years.
Entity Tags: Hassan Ghul, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, Pakistan, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Rangzieb Ahmed
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan, High Value Detainees
Alleged al-Qaeda leader Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani is captured in Lahore, Pakistan, by local forces. His arrest will be reported in Pakistani newspapers in early August 2007, but the arrest receives little international attention because al-Afghani is a previously unheard of figure. However, the US government considers him valuable. He is soon transferred to the CIA's secret prison system and is held there until March 2008 when he will be sent to the US-run Guantanamo prison and officially declared a "high value" prisoner (see Late July 2007-March 14, 2008 and March 14, 2008). Rahim is an Afghan who is said to have been a long-time al-Qaeda planner and facilitator. He is probably highly valued because it is said he served as a translator for Osama bin Laden in recent years, and not many people in recent contact with bin Laden have been caught. [Asian News International, 8/2/2007; Los Angeles Times, 3/15/2008; New York Times, 3/15/2008]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Key Captures and Deaths, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11
In October 2007, the New York Times will report that in July, "after a month-long debate inside the administration, President Bush signed a new executive order authorizing the use of what the administration calls 'enhanced' interrogation techniques—the details remain secret—and officials say the CIA again is holding prisoners in 'black sites' overseas." The executive order is said to have been reviewed and approved by Steven Bradbury, head of the Office of Legal Counsel. [New York Times, 10/4/2007] In late 2005 the Justice Department issued a secret memo declaring all aggressive interrogation techniques used by the CIA legal (see Late 2005), so apparently this mostly reconfirms the gist of that earlier ruling. It has been clear since April 2007 that the secret CIA prisons are still operating (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). Hours after the new executive order is issued, CIA Director Michael Hayden issues a secret memo to his CIA employees: "The President's action - along with the Military Commissions Act of 2006 - gives us the legal clarity we have sought. It gives our officers the assurance that they may conduct their essential work in keeping with the laws of the United States." One senior Bush administration official will later hint that the order does allow sleep deprivation to be used but does not allow exposure to extremes of hot and cold. [MSNBC, 9/13/2007] Intelligence officials also later say that the order not to allow the use of waterboarding. [New York Times, 12/7/2007]
Entity Tags: Steven Bradbury, Office of Legal Counsel (DOJ), George W. Bush, Central Intelligence Agency, Michael Hayden
General Thomas Hartmann allegedly interfered with Guantanamo Bay prosecutions. [Source: US Air Force]A new legal adviser to military commission hearings for detainees in Guantanamo Bay, General Thomas Hartmann, interferes with prosecutions, angering lead prosecutor Colonel Morris Davis (see September 29, 2006). Davis says that Hartmann's position as adviser to the convening authority for the trials means he should stay neutral, but instead Hartmann requests detailed information on pending cases, defines the sequence in which they will be brought, and gets involved in "nano-management." A Pentagon review partially supports Davis, advising Hartmann that he should "diligently avoid aligning himself with the prosecutorial function so that he can objectively and independently provide cogent legal advice" to the official in charge of supervising the commissions. Hartmann also supports using classified evidence in closed court sessions, which Davis wants to avoid, because it might taint the trials in the eyes of international observers and make it seem that the trials are stacked against defendants. Davis also objects to all elements of the military commissions being put under the Defense Department's general counsel, as he thinks this could lead to a conflict of interest, and this causes him to resign in October (see October 4, 2007). [Washington Post, 10/20/2007]
Entity Tags: Thomas Hartmann, Morris Davis
Security forces after the Sheba temple bombing. [Source: Marib Press / Associated Press]A suicide bomber drives into a convoy of Spanish tourists visiting an ancient temple in Yemen, killing eight Spaniards and two Yemenis. The attack takes place near a 3,000 year old temple dedicated to the Queen of Sheba, about 85 miles east of the capital of Sana'a. No group claims responsibility for the bombing, but less than two weeks earlier, the US embassy issued a warning for Americans to avoid the area, due to suspicions of a planned al-Qaeda attack. [Associated Press, 7/3/2007; BBC, 8/8/2007] One month later, Yemeni security forces kill some suspected al-Qaeda militants, including three men, Ali bin Ali Naser Doha, Naji Ali Jaradan, and Abdul-Aziz Saeed Jaradan, who are believed to have been involved in the bombing. One of those that is not killed is Kassem al-Raimi, an alleged top al-Qaeda operative thought to have masterminded the attack. Al-Raimi was one of many who escaped from a Yemeni prison the year before (see February 3, 2006). [BBC, 8/8/2007; Yemen Times, 8/12/2007] In several interviews after the bombing, Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh will claim his government has reached a new truce with al-Qaeda. [Associated Press, 10/26/2007]
Entity Tags: Naji Ali Jaradan, Kassem al-Raimi, Ali Abdallah Saleh, Ali bin Ali Naser Doha, Abdul-Aziz Saeed Jaradan, Al-Qaeda
Category Tags: Yemeni Militant Collusion, Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks
An aerial view of the Red Mosque compound. [Source: Getty Images] (click image to enlarge)The Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) has long been a prominent center of Islamist militancy in Pakistan. ISI Ties Slowly Weaken - Located in Islamabad, just two miles from the president's residence and half a mile from ISI headquarters, the mosque has long-standing ties to the ISI. For instance, the mosque housed the orphans and relatives of suicide bombers who had died in the disputed region of Kashmir; the ISI worked closely with militant groups in Kashmir for many years. The mosque is run by two brothers, Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi and Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi, who also have long-standing ties to the ISI and Pakistani military. But feeling safe due to their government links, the Ghazi brothers had been acting increasingly assertive, seizing land around the mosque and slowly turning it into a large complex of madrassas (Islamic boarding schools) housing thousands of students. Armed Standoff Slowly Develops - Militants from the mosque began threatening and sometimes even kidnapping nearby citizens for being insufficiently religious. An increasing number of militants come to the mosque with weapons, turning it into a heavily armed compound. In April 2007, the Ghazi brothers threaten civil war if the government refuses to implement Sharia law, a strict Islamic legal code. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid will later comment, "It was clear that the movement was out of control, the Ghazi brothers had overstepped their limits and gotten carried away, and the militants were no longer listening to their ISI handlers." A Pakistani army brigade surrounds the estimated 10,000 students and militants barricaded inside the mosque compound. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 381-383] The crisis comes to a head in late June 2007, when activists from the mosque kidnap a six Chinese women and three Chinese men from a nearby acupuncture clinic. The activists claim the clinic is really a brothel and they will hold them until they are reeducated. [Agence France-Presse, 7/24/2007] Army Attacks and Takes Over - On July 3, 2007, there is an initial clash between the army and the militants, and several thousand inside escape or surrender. On July 8, the army begins a full scale assault against those remaining. It takes three days of heavy fighting to clear out the mosque and surrounding complex. Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi is killed while Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi is arrested while trying to flee as a woman. The government claims that 102 militants and/or students and 10 soldiers were killed, but the militants claim that hundreds in the complex were killed. Effects of Raid - Up until this time, there has been a loose alliance between the Pakistani government and Islamist militants in Pakistan, despite a continuing friction. But with the Red Mosque siege, the militants essentially launch a civil war against the government (see July 11-Late July, 2007). Twenty-one attacks are launched in the next three weeks alone. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 381-383] Musharraf's popularity is initially boosted after the raid, but this support dims after evidence comes out that a number of children were killed during the raid. [Sunday Times (London), 7/15/2007] Some evidence suggests that al-Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri were secretly supporting the militants in the mosque (see July 15, 2007), and al-Zawahiri apparently quickly releases an audio tape condemning the raid (see July 11, 2007).
Entity Tags: Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistani Army, Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi
Lt. Col. Doug Delaney argues that another attack like 9/11 could be helpful to keep the public resolute against the terrorist threat. Delaney is chair of Canada's war studies program at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario, the military academy of the Canadian armed forces. The Toronto Star paraphrases him saying: "The challenge for the government is maintaining support for a conflict when people don't perceive a threat—of a failed state falling into the hands of extremists, for instance—particularly as Canadian deaths are rising, says Delaney. It may well be that the key to bolstering Western resolve is another terrorist attack like 9/11 or the London transit bombings of two years ago, he says." Then the Star quotes Delaney directly: "If nothing happens, it will be harder still to say this is necessary." [Toronto Star, 7/8/2007]
Entity Tags: Doug Delaney
The New York Times reports that the US still rarely conducts missions inside Pakistan, where most of the top al-Qaeda leadership is assumed to be, out of consideration for the government of Pakistan. Such attacks could politically hurt Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. A former Bush administration official says, "The Special Operations guys are tearing their hair out at the highest levels." While there has not been good intelligence on the locations of the highest al-Qaeda leaders recently, there sometimes has been useful information on other figures. "There is a degree of frustration that is off the charts, because they are looking at targets on a daily basis and can't move against them." [New York Times, 7/8/2007]
Entity Tags: US Special Forces, Al-Qaeda, Pakistan
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan
Manfo Kwaku Asiedu (left) and Adel Yahya (right). [Source: Metropolitan Police]Four men are found guilty of plotting to bomb London's transport network on 21 July, 2005, two weeks after the 7/7 bombings (see July 21, 2005). After a six-month trial, the jury unanimously convicts Muktar Ibrahim, Yassin Omar, Ramzi Mohammed, and Hussain Osman, of conspiracy to murder. The four are sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum sentence of 40 years. Evidence included thousands of hours of CCTV film, as well as a suicide note left by Mohammed for his girlfriend and two children asking them to "rejoice in happiness." The men had also been monitored attending a militant training camp in the Lake District in 2004 (see May 2-August 2004). No verdict is reached for two other men accused of being members of the conspiracy. The men, Adel Yahya and Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, face a retrial. [BBC, 7/10/2007] Asiedu is said to have been the fifth bomber who abandoned his bomb at the last minute. He says he went along with the plot because he feared being killed by the others. Yahya is not accused of directly taking part in the attempted bombings, but is charged with assisting the others, for example by buying some of the bomb-making materials. [BBC, 7/11/2007] Shortly before the retrial is to begin, Asiedu pleads guilty and is sentenced to 33 years in prison, while Yahya pleads guilty to a lesser charge of possessing terrorist information and is sentenced to seven years in prison. [London Times, 11/5/2007; Daily Telegraph, 11/21/2007] The defendants claim that the bombs were fakes and that the plot was a protest against the war in Iraq. Prosecutor Nigel Sweeney tells the jury that the plot "had been in existence long before the events of July 7" and was not a "hastily-arranged copycat" operation. Responding to the defense, Sweeney says: "The failure of those bombs to explode owed nothing to the intention of these defendants, rather it was simply the good fortune of the traveling public that day that they were spared." [BBC, 7/10/2007] The judge, Justice Adrian Fulford, also dismisses the suggestion that the men did not intend to cause carnage. He says, "This was a viable and a very nearly successful attempt at mass murder." [BBC, 7/11/2007]
Entity Tags: Ramzi Mohammed, Nigel Sweeney, Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, Hussain Osman, Muktar Ibrahim, Adel Yahya, Adrian Fulford, Yassin Omar
Category Tags: 2005 7/7 London Bombings, Londonistan - UK Counterterrorism, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
A man claiming to be al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri condemns the Pakistani Army's raid of the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid), a center of Islamist militancy in Islamabad, Pakistan (see July 3-11, 2007). In an audio tape released on the Internet, the man says: "Muslims of Pakistan: your salvation is only through jihad [holy war]… Rigged elections will not save you, politics will not save you, and bargaining, bootlicking, negotiations with the criminals, and political maneuvers will not save you.… This crime can only be washed away by repentance or blood. If you do not revolt, [Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf will annihilate you. Musharraf will not stop until he uproots Islam from Pakistan." [BBC, 7/11/2007; Associated Press, 7/11/2007] The audio tape appears just days after the raid on the Red Mosque began. The Sunday Times notes, "Diplomats were surprised by the speed with which the fugitive al-Zawahiri condemned the raid and called on Pakistanis to rise up against Musharraf." [Sunday Times (London), 7/15/2007] The Sunday Times will claim that al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaeda leaders were secretly directing the militants in the mosque (see July 15, 2007). Osama bin Laden also apparently condemns the Red Mosque raid, but it will take until September for his message to appear (see September 20, 2007).
Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Pervez Musharraf
Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Pakistan and the ISI, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements
John Kringen. [Source: CIA]A new threat assessment compiled by the National Counterterrorism Center entitled "Al-Qaeda Better Positioned to Strike the West" is presented to a House committee and then leaked to some reporters. It concludes that al-Qaeda has significantly rebuilt itself. CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence John Kringen says that al-Qaeda appears "to be fairly well settled into the safe haven in the ungoverned spaces of Pakistan," adding: "We see more training. We see more money. We see more communications." [Washington Post, 7/12/2007] While the assessment remains classified, another official tells a reporter that it concludes al-Qaeda is "considerably operationally stronger than a year ago," "has regrouped to an extent not seen since 2001," and has managed to create "the most robust training program since 2001, with an interest in using European operatives." A different official concludes that the group is "showing greater and greater ability to plan attacks in Europe and the United States." [Salon, 3/27/2008]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Al-Qaeda, John Kringen, National Counterterrorism Center
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
An explosion at the Red Mosque during the government raid. [Source: Inter Services Public Relations]Prior to the Pakistani Army's raid on the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) from July 3-11, 2007, the Pakistani government had generally maintained an uneasy alliance with Pakistani Islamist militants, although these militants sometimes launched violent attacks on the government. But in the immediate aftermath of the Red Mosque raid (see July 3-11, 2007), Pakistani militants and government forces openly war with each other. In 2005 and 2006, the government made peace deals with militants in the tribal regions of South Waziristan and North Waziristan (see February 7, 2005 and September 5, 2006). But these deals immediately collapse. On July 11, the last day of the mosque raid, al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri apparently condemns the raid and calls for Pakistanis to overthrow their government (see July 11, 2007). On July 12, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf vows in a nationally televised address that he will crush extremists throughout Pakistan. He says, "Terrorism and extremism has not ended in Pakistan. But it is our resolve that we will eliminate extremism and terrorism wherever it exists. Extremism and terrorism will be defeated in every corner of the country." He also says that over the next few months, security forces will retake the tribal regions near the Afghanistan border now controlled by a mix of Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other militants. On the same day, Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi, who ran the Red Mosque along with his brother but was arrested during the raid, is allowed to speak at the funeral of his brother. He says, "God willing, Pakistan will have an Islamic revolution soon. The blood of martyrs will bear fruit." Also on July 12, the first retaliatory suicide bombings take place. [Associated Press, 7/12/2007; London Times, 7/16/2007] Over the next three weeks, 167 people, including 120 soldiers and police, are killed in 21 militant attacks, many of them suicide bombings. Most of these take place in the North-West Frontier Province and the tribal regions, both of which have a strong militant presence. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid will later comment, "The government's inept handling of the [Red Mosque] crisis was a turning point for al-Qaeda, Pakistani Taliban, and other extremist groups, who now joined together and vowed to topple the government and create an Islamic state." Hundreds of potential new suicide bombers vowed revenge and began training in the tribal regions. Al-Qaeda's focus "shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan, where it saw a demoralized army, a terrified citizenry, and an opportunity to destabilize the state. For the first time, senior Pakistani officials told me, the army's corps commanders accepted that the situation had radically changed and the state was under threat from Islamic extremism. In fact, the Pakistan army was now fighting a civil war." [Rashid, 2008]
Entity Tags: Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi, Ahmed Rashid, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Pervez Musharraf, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Pakistani Army
George W. Bush, defying calls to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq, says, "The same folks that are bombing innocent people in Iraq were the ones who attacked us in America on September the 11th, and that's why what happens in Iraq matters to the security here at home." Critics say Bush is grossly oversimplifying the nature of the Iraq insurgency and its putative, unproven links with al-Qaeda, and is attempting to exploit the same kinds of post-9/11 emotions that helped him win support for the invasion in the months preceding the Iraqi offensive. The al-Qaeda affiliate group in Iraq called al-Qaeda in Iraq (or al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia) did not exist at all before the March 2003 invasion, and since then, it has thrived as a magnet for recruiting and for violence largely because of the invasion. While US military and intelligence agencies contend that al-Qaeda in Iraq is responsible for a disproportionately large share of the suicide car bomb attacks that have stoked sectarian violence, the organization is uniquely Iraqi in origin and makeup, with few operational ties to the overall terrorist group. Bruce Riedel, a Middle East expert and former CIA official, says, "The president wants to play on al-Qaeda because he thinks Americans understand the threat al-Qaeda poses. But what I don't think he demonstrates is that fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq precludes al-Qaeda from attacking America here tomorrow. Al-Qaeda, both in Iraq and globally, thrives on the American occupation." Counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman says that if US forces were to withdraw from Iraq, the indigeneous al-Qaeda fighters would focus much more on battling Shi'ite militias in the struggle for dominance in Iraq than on trying to follow US troops home. Al-Qaeda in Iraq "may have more grandiose expectations, but that does not mean [it] could turn al-Qaeda of Iraq into a transnational terrorist entity," he says. [International Herald Tribune, 7/13/2007]
Entity Tags: Bruce Riedel, George W. Bush, Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Bruce Hoffman
Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi. [Source: Agence France-Presse]The Sunday Times reports that "al-Qaeda's leadership secretly directed the Islamic militants" in the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid), a center of Islamist militancy is Islamabad, Pakistan, that was raided by the Pakistani army several days earlier (see July 3-11, 2007). The Times claims that "senior intelligence officials" say that the soldiers who took over the mosque discovered letters from al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri written to Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi and Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, two brothers who ran the mosque and surrounding compound. The article alleges that up to 18 foreign fighters arrived weeks before the government raid and set up firing ranges to teach students how to handle weapons. Pakistani government ministers blame the presence of foreign fighters for the breakdown of negotiations between government and those inside the mosque. [Sunday Times (London), 7/15/2007] Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the Ghazi brothers admitted to having good contacts with many al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama Bin Laden. After 9/11, they denied links with al-Qaeda and other officially banned militant groups, but they strongly supported "jihad against America." Numerous speakers at the mosque openly condemned Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and even called for his assassination. [BBC, 7/27/2007] Al-Zawahiri apparently quickly releases an audiotape condemning the raid and callis for open revolt in Pakistan (see July 11, 2007).
Entity Tags: Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda, Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi
Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region
Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan. [Source: Agence France-Presse / Getty Images]Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, an al-Qaeda computer expert, is released in Pakistan. He had been arrested in July 2004 (see July 13, 2004) and was quickly turned, sending out e-mails to help out dozens of al-Qaeda operatives around the world before his name was leaked to the press (see July 24-25, 2004 and August 2, 2004). He was held for three years by Pakistan's intelligence agencies. He was never charged with any crime and apparently there are no plans to charge him in the future. He is said to be living with his parents in Karachi, Pakistan. He is being closely monitored and the media is not allowed to speak with him. US and British officials and analysts express dismay at Noor Khan's quick release. Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation says, "I find it strange and baffling.… He presents a major threat to the West." [Guardian, 8/23/2007] Former counterterrorism "tsar" Richard Clarke says, "Khan may have bargained for an early release because he cooperated." [ABC News, 8/21/2007] But his release also comes at a time when Pakistan's judiciary is releasing dozens of suspected Islamic militants and government critics who have been held without trial. This is seen as a sign of President Pervez Musharraf's eroding influence after public protests forced him to reinstate Pakistan's chief justice. [London Times, 8/23/2007] One former intelligence official says that Khan's case is a "murky tale" in which there are "no clear answers." [Guardian, 8/23/2007]
Entity Tags: Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, Seth Jones, Richard A. Clarke
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Action After 9/11, Other Possible Moles or Informants, Pakistan and the ISI
Juma al-Dosari in Saudi Arabia after his release. [Source: Nancy Durham / CBC]The Defense Department releases 16 Saudis being held in Guantanamo prison and returns them to Saudi Arabia. One of them is Juma al-Dosari, a dual Bahraini/Saudi citizen, and apparently a long-time al-Qaeda operative. [Gulf Daily News, 7/17/2007] Extensive Al-Qaeda Links - Al-Dosari was known as "the closer" for recruiting new al-Qaeda operatives, and he recruited the "Lackawanna Six" in New York State while he lived in the US from 1999 to 2001. According to his 2006 Guantanamo Administrative Review Board evidence review, there is a long list of evidence tying him to al-Qaeda since he was 16-years old in 1989, just one year after al-Qaeda was founded. He fought with militants in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Tajikistan. He was arrested in Kuwait and then again in Saudi Arabia for suspected involvement in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings (see June 25, 1996), but released without charge both times. An unnamed source claims he was involved in the 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). He was arrested during the battle of Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in late 2001, and then sent to Guantanamo. US intelligence intercepted communications between him and Osama bin Laden's son Saad bin Laden, and also him and al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash (see November 2001-May 2002). [PBS Frontline, 10/16/2003; PBS Frontline, 10/16/2003; US Department of Defense, 9/13/2006 ] Release Unnoticed, Unexplained - Al-Dosari's 2007 release goes almost entirely unnoticed by the US media, despite previous articles and books discussing his recruitment of the "Lackawanna Six." In June 2008, retired FBI agent Peter Ahearn will comment to the Buffalo News that he is baffled that the US government never criminally prosecuted al-Dosari, and then released him. "We felt strongly that we could try him in Buffalo on criminal charges, but the Justice Department declined." Ahearn is upset that al-Dosari "is walking around as a free man in Saudi Arabia." [Buffalo News, 6/22/2008] "Rehabilitated" in Saudi Arabia - Upon arriving in Saudi Arabia, al-Dosari is admitted into a "soft approach" government rehabilitation program designed to prevent militants from relapsing back into violent extremism (see 2007 and After). He is given a car, psychological therapy, a monthly allowance, help to find a job, and help to get married. He had attempted to commit suicide over a dozen times while in Guantanamo. In 2008, it will be reported that he is doing well in Saudi Arabia, with a new wife and a new job. He now says Osama bin Laden "used my religion and destroyed its reputation." [Los Angeles Times, 12/21/2007; Gulf News, 2/22/2008]
Entity Tags: Peter Ahearn, Juma al-Dosari
Category Tags: "Lackawanna Six", Counterterrorism Action After 9/11
A 2007 map showing Pakistan's tribal areas. Regions dominated by Islamist militants are highlighted in pink. [Source: New York Times]A summary of a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled "The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland" is declassified. The NIE, a unified assessment from all 16 US intelligence agencies, says that al-Qaeda has, in the words of the Post, "reestablished its central organization, training infrastructure, and lines of global communication over the past two years, putting the United States in a 'heightened threat environment'…" The last NIE on terrorism worldwide was completed in April 2006 and indicated that al-Qaeda's fortunes were declining (see April 2006). The main reason the new NIE gives for al-Qaeda's resurgence is the establishment of a safe haven in Pakistan's tribal region near the Afghanistan border. Its link with the affiliate group Al-Qaeda in Iraq has also helped "energize" militants and aided recruitment and funding. The NIE's release comes just days after a similar report by the National Counterterrorism Center entitled "Al-Qaeda Better Positioned to Strike the West" (see July 11, 2007), and also just days after the Pakistani government broke peace deals with Islamist militants in the tribal region (see July 11-Late July, 2007). Edward Gistaro, national intelligence officer for transnational threats and the primary author of the NIE, says in a press briefing, "Over the past 18 to 24 months, safe haven in Pakistan has become more secure." He says it has allowed al-Qaeda to develop of a new tier of leadership in the form of "lieutenants… coming off the bench," to replace the leaders who have been captured or killed. On the same day the NIE is released, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell says of al-Qaeda, "They're working as hard as they can in positioning trained operatives here in the United States.… They have recruitment programs to bring recruits into… Pakistan, particularly those that speak the right language, that have the right skills, that have the right base that they could come to the United States, fit into the population… and carry out acts." [Washington Post, 7/18/2007]
Entity Tags: Mike McConnell, US intelligence, Al-Qaeda, Edward Gistaro
Category Tags: Iraq War Impact on Counterterrorism, Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region
In the wake of the Pakistani government's attack on the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in early July 2007 (see July 3-11, 2007), peace deals between the government and militant groups in Pakistan completely break down (see July 11-Late July, 2007). Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf fires Ali Jan Orakzai, a regional military commander sympathetic to the Taliban who had been promoted to governor of the North-West Frontier Province. Then, on July 19, 2007, the Pakistani army formally launches an offensive in Pakistan's tribal region. The Taliban and al-Qaeda are believed to have their central leaderships there. There is no quick resolution, and fighting rages for months. Militants divert the army's attention by launching suicide bombings and other attacks in other parts of the country. [Rashid, 2008, pp. 385]
Entity Tags: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Ali Jan Orakzai, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani Army
The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) issues a national security bulletin based on four recent incidents in San Diego, Milwaukee, Houston, and Baltimore. The bulletin creates the impression of imminent terrorist plots targeting the aviation sector. The TSA warns that terrorists are testing the possibility of smuggling bomb components on to an airplane. TSA spokeswoman Ellen Howe says the agency has noticed an increase in unusual items in checked and carry-on luggage, including "wires, switches, cell phone components, and dense clay-like substances" - including a block of cheese. [International Herald Tribune, 7/25/2007] The incidents all turn out to have innocent explanations. On July 27, Brian Todd of CNN reports "That bulletin for law enforcement eyes only told of suspicious items recently found in passenger's bags at airport checkpoints, warned that they may signify dry runs for terrorist attacks… it turns out none of that is true." One such case was that of Sara Weiss, who was detained in San Diego after two ice packs covered in tape and containing clay were allegedly found in her baggage. Weiss, who works for a faith-based organization, was also carrying a survey about Muslim Americans. Weiss says she was held for three hours and questioned by San Diego Harbor Police and two other men who did not identify themselves. She says she was asked if she knew Osama bin Laden, which she described as "a ridiculous question." Todd reports "The FBI now says there were valid explanations for all four incidents in that bulletin, and a US government official says no charges will be brought in any of these cases." The FBI maintains "they were right" in putting the bogus reports on the TSA bulletin, which is distributed to law enforcement agencies nationwide. The TSA says that security officers must be trained in identifying suspicious packages, even when those packages turn out to be innocuous. [CNN, 7/27/2007] Defense for the TSA bulletin comes from a number of sources. "This is what TSA should be doing whether it turns out to be a whole bunch of harmless coincidences or part of a plot," says James Carafano, a security expert at the conservative Heritage Foundation who in the past called for TSA's abolition. House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Rep. Bennie Thompson, also a critic of the TSA, agrees the agency is handling this appropriately: "To stay ahead of potential threats to our aviation system it must use all of the intelligence available as part of its daily operations." However, the bulletin is questioned by San Diego Harbor Police Chief Kirk Sanfilippo who says officers found two ice packs wrapped in clear tape, not duct tape, and there was no clay inside. "It was not a threat. It was not a test run," Sanfilippo says. "The whole thing was very explainable and understandable." [International Herald Tribune, 7/25/2007] He characterizes the bulletin as "a little bit off." Local TSA Security Director and chief of the airport police Michael J. Aguilar says it was quickly determined the ice packs contained the usual blue gel. Aguilar says he doesn't know why the TSA memo, issued in Washington, reported the substance as clay. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 7/25/2007]
Entity Tags: Heritage Foundation, CNN, Brian Todd, Bennie Thompson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Transportation Security Agency, Sara Weiss, James Carafano, House Homeland Security Committee, Kirk Sanfilippo, Ellen Howe, Michael J. Aguilar, San Diego Harbor Police
After alleged al-Qaeda leader Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani is captured in Lahore, Pakistan, by local forces in July 2007 (see July 2007), he is soon transferred to a secret CIA prison. He is held in the CIA's secret prison system until March 14, 2008, when he is transferred to the US-run prison in Guantanamo, Cuba. [Los Angeles Times, 3/15/2008] It is not known when he is captured or handed to the CIA exactly, but a newspaper report on August 2, 2007, indicates he is already in US custody. [Asian News International, 8/2/2007] Secret CIA Prison System Still Operational - It is also not known where he is held exactly. In September 2006, President Bush announced that the CIA's secret prisons had been emptied, at least temporarily, and the remaining prisoners had been transferred to Guantanamo (see September 6, 2006 and September 2-3, 2006). Since then, there has only been one instance of anyone held in secret CIA custody, and that was Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, held by the CIA from autumn 2006 until April 2007 (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). Rahim's custody indicates that the CIA prison system is still being used, although Rahim may be the only prisoner held in it at this time. [Los Angeles Times, 3/15/2008] Is Rahim Interrogated Using Legally Questionable Methods? - In August and November 2007, an unnamed prisoner in a secret CIA prison is forced to stay awake for up to six days straight. This is almost certainly Rahim. The US State Department considers this treatment torture when other countries do it (see August and November 2007).
Entity Tags: Muhammad Rahim al-Afghani, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: Counterterrorism Policy/Politics, High Value Detainees
The CIA captures al-Qaeda leader Muhammad Rahim in the summer of 2007. Rahim, an Afghan, is little known to the public, but he is said to have helped Osama bin Laden escape from Tora Bora in late 2001. He is also known as a translator for bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders. CIA Director Michael Hayden calls Rahim "a tough, seasoned jihadist." But Rahim is not on any US most wanted list and there are no known pictures of him. Only one Pakistani newspaper mentions his arrest around the time it happens, and reports that he is captured near Lahore, Pakistan, in late July 2007. He is kept in a secret CIA prison and is presumably interrogated. On March 14, 2008 the US finally announces his arrest and says he has recently been transferred to the Guantanamo prison. Only after that will he be treated in accordance with US and international law. He is the first person transferred from a secret CIA prison for over a year (see Autumn 2006-Late April 2007). [Associated Press, 3/14/2008; New York Times, 3/15/2008]
Entity Tags: Muhammad Rahim, Central Intelligence Agency
Category Tags: High Value Detainees, Key Captures and Deaths, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11
Former 9/11 Commission staffer Barbara Grewe is hired by the MITRE Corporation. Grewe was a key investigator on the Commission and on the Justice Department inspector general's investigation of 9/11, where she had focused on FBI and CIA failures (see Between December 2002 and May 2003 and Late 2003). [Bellvue University, 8/9/2007; Center for American Progress Action Fund, 4/16/2008] The MITRE Corporation is closely linked to the CIA and other government agencies. For example, in December 2000 CIA Director George Tenet awarded the Intelligence Community Seal Medallion to Allan McClure of the MITRE Corporation for his help developing software and hardware to facilitate the exchange of information. [MITRE, 12/6/2000] After leaving the Commission, Grewe had worked as an associate general counsel at the Government Accountability Office (GAO). [Florida Atlantic University, 1/2005; National Security Law Report, 8/2005 ; Center for American Progress Action Fund, 4/16/2008] There she supervised the GAO's work related to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. [University of Michigan Law School, 3/7/2005; University Record Online, 3/14/2005] It is unclear exactly when she moves from the GAO to MITRE, but it must happen some time before August 2007. [Bellvue University, 8/9/2007] At MITRE, Grewe is a senior policy administrator and advises on information sharing issues regarding the intelligence community, the federal government, and local partners. [Bellvue University, 8/9/2007; Center for American Progress Action Fund, 4/16/2008] According to a MITRE press release, she also works as a "principal multi-discipline systems engineer." [MITRE, 4/2008]
Entity Tags: Barbara Grewe, MITRE Corporation
Category Tags: 9/11 Commission, Other 9/11 Investigations, 9/11 Investigations
In October 2007, Fox News military commentator Col. David Hunt claims that in August 2007, the US military had a chance to kill Osama bin Laden, but did not. "We know, with a 70 percent level of certainty—which is huge in the world of intelligence" that bin Laden was in a convoy heading south from Tora Bora. He claims that bin Laden was seen on satellite imagery and heard through communications intercepts. "We had the world's best hunters/killers—SEAL Team 6—nearby. We had the world class Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) coordinating with the CIA and other agencies. We had unmanned drones overhead with missiles on their wings; we had the best Air Force on the planet, begging to drop one on the terrorist." But, "[u]nbelievably, and in my opinion, criminally, we did not kill Osama bin Laden." He blames risk-aversion and incompetence for the failure to act. His account has not been corroborated by other sources. [Fox News, 10/23/2007]
Entity Tags: Joint Special Operations Command, US Military, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden, US Naval Special Warfare Development Group, David Hunt
Category Tags: Osama Bin Laden, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Counterterrorism Action After 9/11
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), while running for US president, says in a speech, "There are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again… If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and [Pakistani] President [Pervez] Musharraf won't act, we will." This is in response to a recent comment made by his main opponent for the Democratic presidential nomination, Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY). She said, "If we had actionable intelligence that Osama bin Laden or other high-value targets were in Pakistan, I would ensure that they were targeted and killed or captured." The difference between the comments is Obama's willingness to attack inside Pakistan without approval from the Pakistani government. [Reuters, 7/1/2007; ABC News, 6/9/2011]
Entity Tags: Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Osama bin Laden, Pervez Musharraf
Timeline Tags: War in Afghanistan, 2008 Elections
Category Tags: Pakistan and the ISI, Haven in Pakistan Tribal Region, Hunt for Bin Laden in Pakistan, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama says he would send US troops into Pakistan to hunt down terrorists, even without permission from that country's government. He says: "There are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They are plotting to strike again.… If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will." A spokeswoman for Pakistan's Foreign Ministry responds: "These are serious matters and should not be used for point-scoring. Political candidates and commentators should show responsibility." [London Times, 8/2/2007]
Entity Tags: Barack Obama
Video still of Ayman al-Zawahiri (top) and analysis by Krawetz (bottom). [Source: As-Sahab/Neal Krawetz]Researcher and computer security consultant Neal Krawetz first claims that the logos of As-Sahab, al-Qaeda's media arm, and the US-based IntelCenter organization, which monitors terrorist activity, were added to a video released by al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri at the same time, then retracts the claim when IntelCenter protests. Krawetz initially makes the claim during a presentation at a security conference about how analysis shows al-Qaeda videos are manipulated and backgrounds are added later. Krawetz says that the As-Sahab and IntelCenter logos have the same error level, so they must have been added at the same time. However, IntelCenter says that it did not add the As-Sahab logo and that just because two items in an image have the same error level, that does not mean they were added at the same time. Krawetz then tells a journalist that he retracts his initial claim and says that the IntelCenter logo has a different error level and was added later. The journalist comments: "However, in a taped interview I conducted with him after his presentation, he said the logos were the same error levels and that this indicated they were added at the same time. Additionally, after I'd written the first blog entry about his presentation, I asked him to read it to make sure everything was correct. He did so while sitting next to me and said it was all correct. He apologizes now for the error and the confusion it caused." [Wired News, 8/2/2007] Krawetz's method of analysis will attract some criticism. For example, Cambridge University expert Marcus Kuhn will say that Krawetz's tools were designed for still images, not video, and could lead a user to believe that a video had been manipulated when in fact it had not. [Times, 8/6/2007]
Entity Tags: Neal Krawetz, Marcus Kuhn, Ayman al-Zawahiri, As-Sahab, InterCenter
Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden, Alleged Al-Qaeda Media Statements
John Brennan. [Source: PBS]An article in the New Yorker magazine reveals that the CIA interrogations of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM) were not as reliable as they are typically made out to be. Mohammed was interrogated with methods such as waterboarding that are regarded as torture by many. CIA official John Brennan, former chief of staff for CIA Director George Tenet, acknowledges, "All these methods produced useful information, but there was also a lot that was bogus." One former top CIA official estimates that "ninety per cent of the information was unreliable." Cables of Mohammed's interrogation transcripts sent to higher-ups reportedly were prefaced with the warning that "the detainee has been known to withhold information or deliberately mislead." [New Yorker, 8/6/2007] For instance, one CIA report of his interrogations was called, "Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies" (see June 16, 2004). [Los Angeles Times, 6/23/2004] Former CIA analyst Bruce Riedel asks, "What are you going to do with KSM in the long run? It's a very good question. I don't think anyone has an answer. If you took him to any real American court, I think any judge would say there is no admissible evidence. It would be thrown out." Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) says, "A guy as dangerous as KSM is, and half the world wonders if they can believe him—is that what we want? Statements that can't be believed, because people think they rely on torture?" [New Yorker, 8/6/2007] Journalist James Risen wrote in a 2006 book, "According to a well-placed CIA source, [Mohammed] has now recanted some of what he previously told the CIA during his interrogations. That is an enormous setback for the CIA, since [his debriefings] had been considered among the agency's most important sources of intelligence on al-Qaeda. It is unclear precisely which of his earlier statements [he] has now disavowed, but any recantation by the most important prisoner in the global war on terror must call into question much of what the United States has obtained from other prisoners around the world…" [Risen, 2006, pp. 33] In a 2008 Vanity Fair interview, a former senior CIA official familiar with the interrogation reports on Mohammed will say, "90 percent of it was total f_cking bullsh_t." A former Pentagon analyst will add: "KSM produced no actionable intelligence. He was trying to tell us how stupid we were." [Vanity Fair, 12/16/2008]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Carl Levin, John O. Brennan, Bruce Riedel, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
Category Tags: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Destruction of CIA Tapes, High Value Detainees, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics
Congressional legislation forces the CIA to declassify and release the executive summary of its inspector general's report into some of its pre-9/11 failings. The legislation follows a long campaign by senators (see Spring-Summer 2007) and victims' relatives (see June 18, 2007), and orders the CIA to release the summary within 30 days, together with a classified annex for Congress explaining the report's redactions. The report was completed in 2004 (see June-November 2004), and rewritten in 2005 (see January 7, 2005), but was then not released (see October 10, 2005). Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) says, "All I can say is that it's an extraordinarily important, independent assessment, written with a specific purpose to learn how we can improve our security." Senator Kit Bond (R-MI) points out that "this should have been declassified a long time ago." [The Hill, 8/8/2007] The report is released two weeks later (see August 21, 2007).
Entity Tags: Ron Wyden, Christopher ("Kit") Bond, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General (CIA)
Key Events
Day of 9/11
The Alleged 9/11 Hijackers
Alhazmi and Almihdhar: Specific Cases
Projects and Programs
Before 9/11
Counterterrorism before 9/11
Warning Signs: Specific Cases
The Post-9/11 World
Investigations: Specific Cases
Possible Al-Qaeda-Linked Moles or Informants
Other Al-Qaeda-Linked Figures
Al-Qaeda by Region
Specific Alleged Al-Qaeda Linked Attacks or Plots
Miscellaneous Al-Qaeda Issues
Geopolitics and Islamic Militancy
Pakistan / ISI: Specific Cases
Terrorism Financing: Specific Cases
'War on Terrorism' Outside Iraq
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