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At petitioner Lankford's arraignment on two counts of first-degree murder, the Idaho trial judge advised him that the maximum punishment under state law that he could receive if convicted on either charge was life imprisonment or death. A jury found him guilty on both counts, and, prior to his sentencing hearing, the court entered an order requiring the State to provide notice whether it would seek the death penalty. The State filed a negative response, and there was no discussion of the death penalty as a possible sentence at the sentencing hearing, where both defense counsel and the prosecutor argued the merits of concurrent or consecutive, and fixed or indeterminate, sentence terms. At the hearing's conclusion, however, the trial judge indicated that he considered Lankford's testimony unworthy of belief, stated that the crimes' seriousness warranted punishment more severe than that recommended by the State, and mentioned the possibility of death as a sentencing option. Subsequently, he sentenced Lankford to death based, inter alia, on five specific aggravating circumstances. In affirming, the State Supreme Court rejected Lankford's claim that the trial court violated the Constitution by failing to give notice of its intention to consider imposing the death sentence despite the State's notice that it was not seeking that penalty. The court concluded that the express advice given Lankford at his arraignment, together with the terms of the Idaho Code, were sufficient notice to him that the death penalty might be imposed.
The sentencing process in this case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, at the time of the sentencing hearing, Lankford and his counsel did not have adequate notice that the judge might sentence him to death. There is nothing in the record after the State's response to the presentencing order and before the judge's remarks at the end of the hearing to indicate that the judge contemplated death as a possible sentence or to alert the parties that the real issue they should have been debating at the hearing was the choice between life and death. Moreover, the presentencing order was comparable to a pretrial order limiting the issues to be tried, such that it was reasonable for the defense to assume that there was no reason to present argument or evidence directed at whether the death penalty was either appropriate or permissible. If defense counsel had had fair notice that the judge was contemplating a death sentence, presumably she would [500 U.S. 110, 111] have advanced arguments at the sentencing hearing addressing the aggravating circumstances identified by the judge and his reasons for disbelieving Lankford; she did not make these and other arguments, because they were entirely inappropriate in a discussion about the length of Lankford's incarceration. Thus, it is unrealistic to assume that the notice provided by statute and the arraignment survived the State's response to the presentencing order. The trial judge's silence following that response had the practical effect of concealing from the parties the principal issues to be decided at the hearing, and thereby created an impermissible risk that the adversary process may have malfunctioned in this case. Cf. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 . Pp. 119-128.
116 Idaho 279, 775 P.2d 593, reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and SOUTER, JJ., joined, post, p. 128.
Joan Marie Fisher argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Timothy K. Ford.
Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James T. Jones, former Attorney General, and Lynn E. Thomas, Solicitor General.
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the sentencing process followed in this capital case satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 More narrowly, the question is whether, at the time of petitioner's sentencing hearing, he and his counsel had adequate notice that the judge might sentence him to death.
The unique circumstance that gives rise to concern about the adequacy of the notice in this case is the fact that, pursuant to court order, the prosecutor had formally advised the trial judge and the petitioner that the State would not recommend the death penalty. To place this circumstance in [500 U.S. 110, 112] proper perspective, it is necessary to relate the procedural history of the case.
On or about June 21, 1983, Robert and Cheryl Bravence were killed at their campsite near Santiam Creek, Idaho. On December 1, 1983, the State filed an information charging petitioner with the crime of first-degree murder. The first count alleged that Robert Bravence had been beaten to death and the second count alleged that Cheryl Bravence had been killed in the same way. Identical charges were also filed against petitioner's older brother, Mark. At the arraignment, the trial judge advised petitioner that "the maximum punishment that you may receive if you are convicted on either of the two charges is imprisonment for life or death." App. 14.
After the arraignment, petitioner's appointed counsel entered into plea negotiations with the prosecutor. During these negotiations, petitioner agreed to take two lie-detector tests. Although the results of the tests were not entirely satisfactory, they convinced the prosecutor that petitioner's older brother Mark was primarily responsible for the crimes, and was the actual killer of both victims. Id., at 193. The parties agreed on an indeterminate sentence with a 1-year minimum in exchange for a guilty plea, subject to a commitment from the trial judge that he would impose that sentence. In February, 1984, the judge refused to make that commitment. In March, the case went to trial. The State proved that petitioner and his brother Mark decided to steal their victims' Volkswagen van. Petitioner walked into the Bravences' campsite armed with a shotgun and engaged them in conversation. When Cheryl left and went to a nearby creek, Mark entered the campsite, ordered Robert to kneel down, and struck him on the head with a nightstick. When Cheryl returned, Mark gave her the same order, and killed her in the same manner. See State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 691, 747 P.2d 710, 713 (1987). [500 U.S. 110, 113]
Petitioner testified in support of a defense theory that he was only an accessory after the fact. 2 The jury was instructed, however, that evidence that petitioner "was present, and that he aided and abetted in the commission of the crime of robbery" was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree murder. App. 16. 3 The trial judge refused [500 U.S. 110, 114] to instruct the jury that a specific intent to kill was required. 4 The jury found petitioner guilty on both counts.
At the prosecutor's request, the sentencing hearing was postponed until after the separate trial of petitioner's brother was concluded. The sentencing was first set for June 28, 1984, and later reset for October, 1984. In the interim, pursuant to petitioner's request, on September 6, 1984, the trial court entered an order requiring the State to notify the court and the petitioner whether it would ask for the death penalty, and if so, to file a statement of the aggravating circumstances on which it intended to rely. 5 A week later, the State filed this negative response:
At the sentencing hearing on October 12, 1984, 8 there was no discussion of the death penalty as a possible sentence. The prosecutor [500 U.S. 110, 116] offered no evidence. He relied on the trial record, explained why he had not recommended the death penalty, 9 and ultimately recommended an indeterminate life sentence with a minimum of "somewhere between ten and 20 years." Id., at 104. The defense put on a number of witnesses who testified that petitioner was a nonviolent person, but that he was subject to domination by his brother Mark, who had violent and dangerous propensities. Id., at 95-97. In her argument in mitigation, defense counsel stressed these facts, as well as the independent evidence that Mark was the actual killer. She urged the court to impose concurrent, indeterminate life sentences, which would make petitioner eligible for parole in 10 years, less the time he had already served. She argued against consecutive indeterminate sentences which would have amounted to a 20-year term, or a fixed-life term that would have amounted to a 40-year minimum. She made no reference to a possible death sentence.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge made a rather lengthy statement in which he indicated that he considered petitioner's testimony unworthy of belief and that the seriousness of the crime warranted more severe punishment than that which the State had recommended. Id., at 114-118. At the beginning of this lengthy statement, he described the options available to the court, including the indeterminate [500 U.S. 110, 117] life sentence recommended by the State, "or a fixed life sentence for a period of time greater than the number of years he would serve on an indeterminate life sentence, i.e., ten. For example, a fixed term of 40 years or death or a fixed life sentence." 10 Id., at 114. He concluded by saying that he would announce his decision on the following Monday.
On that Monday, the trial judge spent the entire day conducting the sentencing hearing in Mark's case. At 9:38 p.m., he reconvened petitioner's sentencing hearing. After a preliminary colloquy, he read his written findings and sentenced petitioner to death. These findings, some of which were repeated almost verbatim in his later order sentencing Mark to death, repeatedly reflected the judge's opinion that the two brothers were equally culpable. 11 [500 U.S. 110, 118]
Petitioner sought postconviction relief on a variety of grounds, including a claim that the trial court violated the Constitution by failing to give notice of its intention to impose the death sentence in spite of the State's notice that it was not seeking the death penalty. Id., at 168. The trial court held that the Idaho Code provided petitioner with sufficient notice, and that the prosecutor's statement that he did not intend to seek the death penalty had "no bearing on the adequacy of notice to petitioner that the death penalty might be imposed." Id., at 200. Petitioner's request for relief on this claim was therefore denied. Id., at 201.
In a consolidated appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence and also affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. On the notice issue, the Court concluded that the express advice given to petitioner at his arraignment, together with the terms of the statute, were sufficient. State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho at 697, 747 P.2d at 719.
One Justice dissented from the affirmance of petitioner's sentence. Id., at 705, 747 P.2d at 727. Relying on the absence of any contention that petitioner struck any of the fatal blows, and the fact that the evidence concerning petitioner's intent was equivocal, he concluded that the sentence was invalid under our decisions in Enmund v. Florida 12 and Tison v. Arizona, 13 as well as under the Idaho cases that the majority had considered in its proportionality review. 14 [500 U.S. 110, 119]
This Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Idaho Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988); 486 U.S. 1051 (1988). On remand, by a vote of 3 to 2, the court reinstated its earlier judgment. 116 Idaho 279, 775 P.2d 593 (1989). We again granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 919 (1990), to consider the question raised by the trial court's order concerning the death penalty and the State's response thereto.
Before discussing the narrow legal issue raised by the special presentencing order and the State's response, it is useful to put to one side certain propositions that are not in dispute in this case. As a matter of substantive Idaho law, the trial judge's power to impose a sentence that is authorized by statute is not limited by a prosecutor's recommendation. Thus, petitioner does not argue that the State made a formal waiver that limited the trial judge's authority to impose the death sentence. The issue is one of adequate procedure, rather than of substantive power. Conversely, the State does not argue that a sentencing hearing would be fair if the defendant and his counsel did not receive adequate notice that he might be sentenced to death. The State's argument is that the terms of the statute, plus the advice received at petitioner's arraignment, provided such notice. This argument would plainly be correct if there had not been a presentencing order, or if similar advice had been given after petitioner received the State's negative response and before the sentencing hearing commenced.
As a factual matter, it is also undisputed that the character of the sentencing proceeding did not provide the petitioner with any indication that the trial judge contemplated death as a possible sentence. A hearing to decide whether the sentences should be indeterminate or fixed, whether they should run concurrently or consecutively, and what period of imprisonment was appropriate, would have proceeded in exactly the [500 U.S. 110, 120] same way as this hearing did. Indeed, it is apparent that the parties assumed that nothing more was at stake. There is nothing in the record after the State's response to the presentencing order and before the trial judge's remark at the end of the hearing that mentioned the possibility of a capital sentence. During the hearing, while both defense counsel and the prosecutor were arguing the merits of concurrent or consecutive, and fixed or indeterminate, terms, the silent judge was the only person in the courtroom who knew that the real issue that they should have been debating was the choice between life or death.
The presentencing order entered by the trial court requiring the State to advise the court and the defendant whether it sought the death penalty, and if so, requiring the parties to specify the aggravating and mitigating circumstances on which they intended to rely, was comparable to a pretrial order limiting the issues to be tried. The purpose of such orders is to eliminate the need to address matters that are not in dispute, and thereby to save the valuable time of judges and lawyers. For example, if the State had responded in the affirmative and indicated an intention to rely on only three aggravating circumstances, the defense could reasonably have assumed that the evidence to be adduced would relate only to those three circumstances, and therefore, the defense could have limited its preparation accordingly. Similarly, in this case, it was surely reasonable for the defense to assume that there was no reason to present argument or evidence directed at the question whether the death penalty was either appropriate or permissible. Orders that are designed to limit the issues would serve no purpose if counsel acted at their peril when they complied with the orders' limitations.
It is, of course, true that this order did not expressly place any limits on counsel's preparation. The question, however, is whether it can be said that counsel had adequate notice of the critical issue that the judge was actually debating. Our [500 U.S. 110, 121] answer to that question must reflect the importance that we attach to the concept of fair notice as the bedrock of any constitutionally fair procedure. Justice Frankfurter eloquently made this point in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951):
One of the arguments that petitioner's counsel could have raised had she known the death penalty was still at issue pertained to a concern voiced by the dissenting Justice in the Idaho Supreme Court, who was troubled by the question whether Bryan Lankford's level of participation met the standard described in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), and several Idaho cases. 16 The dissenting Justice described the majority's [500 U.S. 110, 123] opinion as having mischaracterized the trial court's findings as to Bryan Lankford's state of mind. State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 706, 747 P.2d 710, 728 (1987). The factual dispute over the record, combined with the dissenting Justice's reliance on Idaho cases, demonstrates that petitioner failed to make an argument that, at least as a matter of state law, might have influenced the trial judge's deliberations. There was, however, no point in making such an argument if the death penalty was not at issue.
One of the aggravating circumstances that the trial judge found as a basis for his sentence was that the "murders of the Bravences were especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and manifested exceptional depravity." App. 156-157. Even if petitioner had been the actual killer, it is at least arguable that the evidence was insufficient to support this finding. 17 If petitioner was not the actual killer, this finding was even more questionable. The point, however, is that petitioner's counsel had no way of knowing that the court was even considering such a finding, and therefore she did not discuss that possibility at the sentencing hearing. It is unrealistic to assume that the notice provided by the statute and the arraignment survived the State's response to an order that would have no purpose other than to limit the issues in future proceedings.
In view of the fact that the trial Judge's sentence appears to rest largely on his disbelief of petitioner's testimony 18 and [500 U.S. 110, 124] consequent conclusion that he was just as culpable as his brother, the omission of certain factual evidence takes on special significance. In her postconviction motion, petitioner's counsel represented that the results of two polygraph examinations demonstrated that petitioner was truthful in his testimony concerning "his lack of participation in, or knowledge of, the killings." App. 170. Such evidence is inadmissible in Idaho in an ordinary case, and therefore, appropriately, was not offered at the sentencing hearing. Petitioner argues, however, that under the teaching of our decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), 19 such evidence would be admissible in a capital sentencing proceeding. Whether petitioner would ultimately prevail on this argument is not at issue at this point; rather, the question is whether inadequate notice concerning the character of the hearing frustrated counsel's opportunity to make an argument that might have persuaded the trial judge to impose a different sentence, or at least to make different findings than those he made.
At the very least, this is a case in which reasonable judges might differ concerning the appropriateness of the death sentence. It is therefore a case in which some of the reasoning that motivated our decision in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. [500 U.S. 110, 125] 349 (1977), is applicable. In that case, relying partly on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and partly on the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the Court held that a procedure for selecting people for the death penalty that permits consideration of secret information about the defendant is unacceptable. The plurality opinion, like the opinion concurring in the judgment, 20 emphasized the special importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing context. We emphasized that "death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country." Id., at 357. 21 We explained: [500 U.S. 110, 126]
Without such notice, the Court is denied the benefit of the adversary process. As we wrote in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
The judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[ Footnote 2 ] The Idaho Supreme Court explained:
Mark "hit [Mr. Bravence] over the head with a thing about a foot long, which is a little club that he has had for a long time. . . . He hit him both times in the back of the neck, actually. Not in the head. Kind of across, you know, across the neck in the back (indicating). . . . Next the lady came up. Mrs. Bravence came up from the river and saw her husband laying there, and Mark told her to get on the ground. . . . Mark hit her apparently, it looked like to me, in the same place." 4 Tr. 705-707.
[ Footnote 3 ] "Based upon that statute, it is therefore not necessary that the State prove that this defendant actually committed the act which caused the death of the victims, provided the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present, and that he aided and abetted in the commission of the crime of robbery as alleged, or that, if he was not present, that he advised and encouraged the commission of such crime." App. 16.
[ Footnote 4 ] 5 Tr. 833-834; 1 Record 239-242.
[ Footnote 5 ] The court order provided:
[ Footnote 6 ] The judge explained that, because petitioner's counsel had the preliminary hearing transcript, the trial tapes, and the option of consulting with former defense counsel, she had "all of the information . . . that [she] need[ed] to adequately prepare for sentencing." Id., at 60.
[ Footnote 7 ] The dissent relies on the judge's comment at the April 5, 1984 hearing, at which he had indicated that the death penalty was still a possibility, regardless of which sentence the State might ultimately recommend, see post at 132, to support its argument that counsel should have known that the death penalty was still at issue. It should be noted not only that the judge's comment was made prior to the State's response of September 13, 1984, that it would not be seeking the death penalty, but also that the information was imparted to petitioner's former counsel. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-27. The information was never given to the counsel who actually represented petitioner during his sentencing, and who was required to proceed without a transcript of the earlier hearing. See id. at 43.
The dissent also suggests that petitioner should have been aware that the judge was still considering the death penalty as a possibility when he ordered a presentence investigation at the April 5, 1984, hearing, see post at 132-133, but of course, that, too, was ordered prior to the State's response of September 13, 1984, in which the State confirmed that it would not be seeking the death penalty. Moreover, there is nothing unusual about ordering a presentence investigation prior to a sentencing.
[ Footnote 8 ] In Idaho, sentencing in both capital and noncapital cases is done by the trial judge alone. See Idaho Code 19-2515 (1987).
[ Footnote 9 ] "Those things, all taken together, in my view and, apparently, in the jury's view, ultimately resulted in a death occurring as part of a robbery and makes Bryan guilty of murder in the first degree. If it were not for the Felony Murder Rule, there would be a difficulty in the proof in this case and in the conviction of Bryan Lankford, but it was, and that was the law. Bryan does stand, then, convicted of two counts of first degree murder for his participation. I tend to generally believe the witnesses from Texas, the family members, and I have believed this for a long time: that Bryan has traditionally been a pretty good person, except when he's been around Mark. Those are the reasons, the bottom line, what his family says about him as to why he would not and I would not and did not earlier recommend the death penalty, as the Court required, to be a filed document." App. 101-102; see id. at 191.
[ Footnote 10 ] He continued:
[ Footnote 11 ] For example:
[ Footnote 12 ] 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) ("For purposes of imposing the death penalty, [defendant's] criminal culpability must be limited to his participation in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt").
[ Footnote 13 ] 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) ("[M]ajor participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement").
[ Footnote 14 ] See, e.g., State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1985).
[ Footnote 15 ] The statutory aggravating circumstances, identified by the trial judge for the first time when he sentenced Bryan Lankford to death, were:
[ Footnote 16 ] See, e.g., State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 186, 687 P.2d 570, 576 (1984) ("The difference in the degrees of participation in the actual killing justifies the differences in the sentences"); State v. Small, 107 Idaho 504, 506, 690 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1984) (Codefendants "had different backgrounds [500 U.S. 110, 123] and played different parts in the commission of the crime. Under these circumstances, the disparity in the sentences was justified").
[ Footnote 17 ] "A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.'" Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 -429 (1980).
[ Footnote 18 ] In his statement toward the end of the sentencing hearing, the judge described Bryan Lankford as follows: "[H]e is a liar, and he is an admitted liar. He's a deceitful individual." App. 116.
[ Footnote 19 ] "[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 438 U.S., at 604 (footnotes omitted).
[ Footnote 20 ] In his opinion concurring in the judgment, JUSTICE WHITE made it plain that the holding in Gardner applied only in capital cases.
[ Footnote 21 ] "[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.) (footnote omitted).
[ Footnote 22 ] Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864) ("Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity to make his defense"); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (due process requires that a person be given "reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense . . . to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel"). In a variety of contexts, our cases have repeatedly emphasized the importance of giving the parties sufficient notice to enable them to identify the issues on which a decision may turn. See, e.g. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections"); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 549 -550 (1965) (failure to notify petitioner of pendency of adoption proceedings deprived him of due process of law); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) ("students facing suspension . . . must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing"); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) ("The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story"). In the capital context, in which the threatened loss is so severe, the need for notice is even more pronounced.
[ Footnote 23 ] See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness").
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting.
The Court holds that Lankford's due process rights were violated because he did not receive adequate notice that his sentencing hearing could result in the death penalty. I disagree.
Lankford knew that he had been convicted of first-degree murder, and Idaho Code 18-4004 (1987) clearly states that "every person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life." At arraignment the presiding judge, after reading aloud the substantive code provisions and describing the charges, told Lankford: "[T]he maximum punishment that you may receive if you are convicted on either of the two charges is imprisonment for life or death. Do you understand . . . ?" 7 Record 15. Lankford stated that he did. Ibid.
The Court's theory is that the unquestionable constitutional adequacy of this notice was destroyed by the judge's later order that the State indicate its intentions with regard to sentencing and the prosecutor's consequent statement that the State would not seek the death penalty. That theory would perhaps be correct if there was any reasonable basis for Lankford or his counsel to believe that the sentence could not exceed the prosecutor's recommendation. But plainly there was not.
The Idaho death penalty statute places full responsibility for determining the sentence upon the judge. It directs that, "[w]here the court finds a statutory aggravating circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be [500 U.S. 110, 129] presented outweigh the gravity of any aggravating circumstance." Idaho Code 19-2515(c) (1987) (emphasis added). Moreover, the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance is not dependent upon any presentation by the prosecution. Under Idaho law, "[e]vidence admitted at trial shall be considered and need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing." Idaho Code 19-2515(d). Anyone familiar with Lankford's case and Idaho law should have recognized immediately that the judge would necessarily find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, for the jury's guilty verdict on the two separate murder counts established that, "[a]t the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder," Idaho Code 19-2515(g)(2). 1 Thus, the judge would be bound by law, see 19-2515(e), to weigh all mitigating and aggravating circumstances and to impose the death penalty unless the former outweighed the latter. Moreover, since an aggravating circumstance would necessarily have been found, in the event that Lankford did not receive the death penalty, the court would be required to "detail in writing its reasons" for giving a lesser sentence. Ibid. No provision of the Idaho Code suggests that these duties placed upon the judge by 19-2515 dissolve upon the State's recommending a lower sentence. [500 U.S. 110, 130]
Not only is Idaho statutory law clear on its face, but Idaho case law confirms it. In State v. Rossi, 105 Idaho 681, 672 P.2d 249 (App. 1983), the defendant claimed an abuse of discretion when the trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment twice as long as the prosecutor had recommended. The Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
The Court nevertheless holds that Lankford reasonably concluded from the judge's September 6 order and the State's response that the death penalty did not remain an issue. "The presentencing order," the Court says, ". . . was comparable to a pretrial order limiting the issues to be tried." Ante at 120. To say that is simply to assume the conclusion. Assuredly, despite the clarity of Idaho law, if the judge explicitly limited the issues to be considered at sentencing, or in some other way indicated that he would not exceed the prosecutor's recommendation, Lankford would have a case. But was it reasonable to view the September 6 order as "a pretrial order limiting the issues to be tried"? A pretrial order having such preclusive effect is typically entered pursuant to a rule or statute that says it will be preclusive. See, e.g., [500 U.S. 110, 131] Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 16(e). When an order is not entered pursuant to such a provision, as was the case here, one would expect the order itself to specify its preclusive effect, if any. But the present order said only that the prosecutor must state his intentions. It seems to me that the absolute limit of preclusion even inferable from that order was that the prosecutor, if he did not express the intention to seek the death penalty, would not be permitted to argue for it at the sentencing hearing. The consequence of that, of course, would be that the death penalty would be less likely to be imposed, since no one would be pressing it upon the judge and defense counsel's arguments against it would go unanswered. But neither explicitly in the order, nor as an inference of the order, nor even as a consequence of an inference, does it appear that the judge would be entirely precluded from imposing the death penalty. There was simply no basis for thinking that.
But perhaps it could be argued that, even though the judge was not legally bound by the prosecutor's recommendation against the death penalty, his entry of the order indicated he intended (contrary to Idaho law) to be bound, and that he should be held to that indicated intent by a sort of promissory estoppel. Even as a factual matter, that argument has no support. If the judge had entered the order on his own initiative, one might think "Why else would he demand to know the State's position in advance unless he intended to accept it?" In fact, however, it was not the judge, but defense counsel, who asked that the State make its intentions clear.
In sum, it was clear that the death penalty remained at issue in the sentencing hearing, and there is no basis for the contention that the judge "misled" Lankford to think otherwise. Since that is so, today's decision creates a vast uncertainty in the law. If defendants are no longer to be held to knowledge of the law, or if their unreasonable expectations are henceforth to be the criteria of the process which is their due, the lawfulness and finality of no conviction or sentence can be assured. The defense created by the Court today will always be available, its success to be limited by factors we will presumably seek to identify in a series of future cases that will undertake the impossible task of explaining how much ignorance of the law, or how much unreasonableness of expectation, is too much.
The Court believes, and I have assumed up to this point, that Lankford and his counsel did detrimentally rely upon the State's declaration, i.e., that they did believe, albeit unreasonably, that the death penalty was foreclosed as an option at sentencing. It is far from clear, however, that that was so, [500 U.S. 110, 134] and I do not believe that Lankford has carried the burden of establishing it.
The reality that the death penalty was not foreclosed as a matter of law was so clear - from the Idaho statutes, from the case law, and even from the judge's explicit statement that the death-sentence "inquiry" would have to be held - that it is difficult to believe counsel thought otherwise. Counsel clearly did not believe that the prosecutor's recommendation established the permissible maximum with regard to a sentence less than death. For though the prosecutor, who spoke first at the sentencing hearing, recommended the minimum sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of parole in 10 to 20 years, Lankford's counsel argued specifically against life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 8 Record 329. It is conceivable, I suppose, that counsel thought the judge possessed legal authority to exceed the prosecutor's recommendation in that respect, but not in respect of imposing death; but the possibility of baseless belief that Idaho law contained such peculiar asymmetry is surely remote.
There remains, of course, the possibility that counsel genuinely (though unreasonably) believed, because of the September 6 order, that the death penalty had been precluded not in law, but as a matter of the judge's intentions. But there is some indication that even this was not so. The judge, in his lengthy statement at the end of the sentencing hearing - concluding with the announcement that he would not sentence immediately but would take the matter under advisement - stated that the available sentences included "[f]or example, a fixed term of 40 years or death or a fixed life sentence. So there are a great number of possibilities available to this Court." Id., at 330 (emphasis added). If Lankford's counsel believed that the defense had been given assurance that the death penalty was (at least as a practical matter) out of the case, one would have expected a shocked objection at this point. None was made - though counsel was aggressive [500 U.S. 110, 135] enough in objecting to another portion of the judge's concluding statement, two pages later in the transcript, that the judge interrupted with "Counsel, I'm not here to argue with you." Id., at 332.
The only evidence supporting detrimental (albeit unreasonable) reliance is the fact that counsel's presentation at the sentencing hearing did not specifically address the death penalty. That is not terribly persuasive evidence, since all the arguments made against a life sentence or a minimum term of more than 10 years would apply a fortiori against a sentence of death. In any event, counsel's presentation was entirely consistent with (1) belief that the death penalty was not entirely ruled out, but simply an overwhelmingly unlikely possibility, plus either (2) a tactical decision not to create the impression, by arguing the point, that that option was even thinkable, or (3) sheer negligence. If it was the last, Lankford may have a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, which can be raised in a petition for habeas corpus. But he has not carried the burden of sustaining the claim made here.
[ Footnote 1 ] Evidence at trial also established that the camping couple whom the Lankford brothers killed offered no provocation or resistance, that their skulls were brutally smashed while they were kneeling in a position of submission, that they were driven - dead or mortally injured - into a remote area where their bodies were hidden under branches and other debris and remained undiscovered until three months later. State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 691-692, 747 P.2d 710, 713 (1987). Thus, reasonable defense counsel would also have anticipated that a sentencer might well find additional statutory aggravating circumstances, see Idaho Code 19-2515(g)(5) (1987) (aggravating circumstance that the murder was "especially heinous atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity"); Idaho Code 19-2515(g)(6) (aggravating circumstance that "the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life").
[ Footnote 2 ] The majority, ante at 115, n. 7, notes that "the judge's comment was made prior to the State's response." I fail to see how that is relevant. The court's statement was that the death penalty procedures would be followed "whether or not the state intends to pursue the death penalty." 7 Record 56 (emphasis added).
As the Court also notes, ante at 115, n. 7, Lankford obtained new counsel after this discussion. However, I think the knowledge of the first counsel (Mr. Longeteig) should be imputed to the second counsel (Ms. Fisher). It was obviously Ms. Fisher's duty to inform herself of all relevant circumstances, including the knowledge of Mr. Longeteig. That should not have been difficult, as the judge specifically ordered Mr. Longeteig to remain in the case and be at Ms. Fisher's "beck and call," 8 Record 25, to assist her in preparing for sentencing. If Ms. Fisher failed to ask him about the death penalty, that cannot be labelled a due process violation attributable to the State. [500 U.S. 110, 136]
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Citation: 500 U.S. 110
Docket No: No. 88-7247
Argued: February 19, 1991
Decided: May 20, 1991
Court: United States Supreme Court
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text:
Call for applications for the 2016/2017 academic year
The Eni Project offers international students the possibility to receive a scholarship and other benefits to graduate from the Politecnico di Torino attending the Master of Science program in Petroleum Engineering (2 years).
The project is promoted by the Politecnico di Torino and financed by Eni Corporate University.
General information on the MS program in Petroleum Engineering
The length of the program is 2 years full time and corresponds to 120 ECTS credits. All the courses are entirely held in English.
The activities will begin in September 2016.
Further information on the program is available on the Petroleum Engineering Program website.
Please visit the relevant page of the Apply@PoliTo website for detailed information on the admission procedure and on the entry requirements.
The number of scholarships assigned in the 2016/17 academic year depends on the program funding.
Application is open to students who:
- are not Italian citizens, or are Italian citizens who are also in possess of another citizenship;
- hold an international English language certification (the list of the accepted certificates is available at http://apply.polito.it/language_requirements.html);
- have not already enrolled in a Master of Science program of the Politecnico di Torino before the 2016/2017 academic year;
- are not recipients of other scholarships, Italian or foreign.
How to apply
To apply, students must, under the penalty of being excluded from the selection process, complete the application form for the admission to the academic programs of the Politecnico di Torino:
- Deadline: 8 p.m. (Italian time) on April 5th, 2016.
Method: fill in the online application form by first registering and providing your biographical information, logging in and choosing your level and degree course, and subsequently submitting the application. Students must also provide information on their previous educational career, language abilities and work experience, and they must attach the necessary documentation in pdf format. After having completed these steps, the application for a scholarship will be considered complete.
N.B. The scholarship or project for which the applicant is eligible is not specified in the application form, since the Politecnico will automatically assess your eligibility for the Eni Project scholarship based on the information you provide. At the end of the selection process, the Politecnico di Torino will inform you whether you have been selected for a Eni Project scholarship (see the "Selection outcomes" section below).
The following documentation must be attached in pdf format to the online application form:
an official transcript (original or authenticated copy) issued by the registrar of your university of origin containing ALL of the following information:
- Planned duration of the program of study (no. of semesters)
- Total number of exams sustained in the program of study
- Total number of credits obtained in the program of study (if available)
- Year of enrolment
- A list of the exams already taken with the score of each exam and, where applicable, the number of credits earned with each exam.
- The overall average score of the exams taken (at the moment of application)
- A list of the exams still to be passed to complete the degree course
- The grading system used with explanations (e.g. quantitative system from 0 to 10, with 5 corresponding to satisfactory; or qualitative system ABCD, with A as top grade and C corresponding to passing)
- The semester of enrolment at the moment of the presentation of the application (e.g. "on xxx [day] the student is enrolled in the second semester of the fourth year of the degree course in xxx")
If the transcript provided by the students' registrar does not contain ALL of the above information, an additional document will have to be sent that provides it. This additional document must be signed by an authority of the university of origin (Tutor of the degree course, Dean, etc).
- Curriculum Vitae, dated and signed (in English if possible) - maximum 3 pages
- English language certificate
- Passport (or, for EU citizens, another official ID)/Residence permit for Non EU citizens living in Italy
- The description of the courses attended in the framework of the previous academic career
- Optional Letters of reference (2 maximum) and/or a personal introduction letter (written by the applicant), which may uploaded in the "Other Document" field of the application form in a single file.
The above documents must be rendered in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian.
We emphasize that the data shown in the documents must coincide with those inserted in the online application form (with the exception of material errors). Moreover, failure to attach even one of the above documents will result in exclusion from the selection process. For information on the accepted English language certifications, please visit the Language Requirements section of our Apply@PoliTo website.
Selection criteria
Applicants will be selected based on their previous academic career and on their Curriculum Vitae.
Selection outcomes
Following the closure of the online application form, the applications of the students who have been deemed to be eligible for admission to the Master of Science program in Petroleum Engineering will be submitted to Eni Corporate University.
Eni Corporate University, in cooperation with Eni, will select the students eligible for the participation in the program and award the scholarships on the basis of the applicants' previous academic career and Curriculum Vitae, at its incontestable discretion.
At the end of the selection process, a list of standings will be composed with the names of the students who have been awarded a scholarship.
The list of standings will be published on the Official Register of the Politecnico di Torino, on this project website, and on the Apply@Polito section of the Politecnico website.
Publication of the final list of standings is foreseen for
June 2016.
We emphasize that the Politecnico di Torino assumes no responsibility for the applicant's failure to view the list of standings and/or the terms for the acceptance of the scholarships as published on the online Official Register of the Politecnico.
In all the e-mail messages and the correspondence sent to the Politecnico following the awarding of the scholarship, the recipient must clearly specify "Eni Project - Petroleum Engineering".
Please note that the disbursement of the scholarship is subject to the actual enrollment to the Master of Science program in Petroleum Engineering at the Politecnico di Torino.
Amount of the scholarship
- The gross amount of the Eni Project scholarship is 10.000 Euro per year (20.000 Euro for the complete period). The exact net sum is dependent upon the individual tax conditions of each student, which can be verified only upon the arrival of the student.
- The amount of the scholarship will not be increased in case the student needs more time to graduate than indicated.
- The allocation of the scholarship is dependent upon the submission, within 10 days from the arrival in Italy of the student, of the original documentation, which must correspond with the documentation attached to the online form (see the "Selection outcomes" section below).
- Payment of the scholarship occurs periodically. The first instalment is dependent upon the possession of the relevant documentation (enrollment certification, residence permit, Italian fiscal code, and bank account in the name of the scholarship recipient), all obtainable upon arrival in Italy; for this reason, the first instalment is not paid at the moment of arrival at the Politecnico di Torino, but in the course of the following month.
Requirements to maintain the scholarship
- Given that it is not possible to combine the benefits received from more than one scholarship, students who are assigned any another study grant while receiving the Eni Project scholarship must promptly notify the Politecnico di Torino.
- Payment of the scholarship will be suspended if the academic performance of the recipient does not meet the required standards, which will be disclosed to the selected students.
Tuition fees for Eni Project students are covered by the project.
Scholarship recipients, together with the Master of Science in Petroleum Engineering courses, will benefit from:
- one round trip air ticket from/to home country per year (provided by Eni)
- an Italian language course, free of charge
- advice on lodging facilities (for more information visit the Accommodation section)
- additional services offered to the student community (access to the Politecnico libraries and computer laboratories, WI-FI (Wireless LAN), etc.); scholarship recipients will also be entitled to all the services offered by the regional university student assistance organisation, Ente regionale per il DIritto allo Studio Universitario (EDISU Piemonte) at full fee: student canteen service, cultural and recreational activities, sports activities, libraries with lending service, etc. (for more information visit the Campus Facilities section)
- assistance in obtaining an entry visa. For more information consult the Immigration Requirements section and the websites of the Italian Embassies and Consulates
- assistance by the Stage and Job Placement office for internship and employment.
In order to benefit from a reduction on the fees of the services offered by EDISU, students must provide an official declaration about:
- the composition of their family unit
- the revenue generated abroad in 2015
- the property and real estate assets generated abroad at December 31st, 2015
These declarations, issued by the competent authorities of the foreign country where the family's income is generated, must be translated into Italian and certified by the Italian Embassy or Consulate.
Please see also: Information for students coming from particularly underdeveloped countries .
- The scholarship does not include accommodation costs, which are thus totally at the expense of the student.
- The Politecnico di Torino does not guarantee any type of accommodation for Eni Project scholarship recipients. For students turning to the private market to rent an apartment, the initial amount requested for the cautionary deposit is equal to about three months rent, plus any fees charged by the real estate agency, if applicable. The approximate amount of the rent for an apartment shared with other students comes to about 250 EURO/month per person, and the rent for a small/medium sized apartment is about 500 EURO/month.
Enrolment at the Politecnico includes insurance coverage for accidents occurring on the university premises.
Medical insurance for emergencies (First Aid), as required by the law for non-EU citizens, is about 100 EURO per year. Upon their arrival in Italy, students must pay this amount to INA Assitalia: this is required for the conversion of the entry visa into a residence permit. For further information on these matters, see the Health insurance section.
- We advise students to refer to the Italian Embassy or Consulate for information on the necessary requirements to obtain an entry visa for Italy.
Specific contacts for Master of Science
For Scholarship
International Relations Office
For Admission
Incoming Students Office
For Accommodation
Selected students will be contacted by the Foreign Citizens Services office
Approvato con Determina del DG n° 316 del 04/03/2016 (269.68 kB)

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Here are Nassim Taleb's top 10 life tips, all worthwhile, from this profile:
1. Skepticism is effortful and costly. It is better to be sceptical about matters of large consequences, and be imperfect, foolish and human in the small and the aesthetic.
2. Go to parties. You can't even start to know what you may find on the envelope of serendipity. If you suffer from agoraphobia, send colleagues.
3. It's not a good idea to take a forecast from someone wearing a tie. If possible, tease people who take themselves and their knowledge too seriously.
4. Wear your best for your execution and stand dignified. Your last recourse against randomness is how you act — if you can't control outcomes, you can control the elegance of your behaviour. You will always have the last word.
5. Don't disturb complicated systems that have been around for a very long time. We don't understand their logic. Don't pollute the planet. Leave it the way we found it, regardless of scientific 'evidence'.
6. Learn to fail with pride — and do so fast and cleanly. Maximise trial and error — by mastering the error part.
7. Avoid losers. If you hear someone use the words 'impossible', 'never', 'too difficult' too often, drop him or her from your social network. Never take 'no' for an answer (conversely, take most 'yeses' as 'most probably').
8. Don't read newspapers for the news (just for the gossip and, of course, profiles of authors). The best filter to know if the news matters is if you hear it in cafes, restaurants… or (again) parties.
9. Hard work will get you a professorship or a BMW. You need both work and luck for a Booker, a Nobel or a private jet.
10. Answer e-mails from junior people before more senior ones. Junior people have further to go and tend to remember who slighted them.
Elsewhere from the profile: he doesn't trust people who wear ties; he reads 60 hours a week but never a newspaper; he never watches television; he exercises fanatically; stress should be "irregular and ferocious — early men did not have bad bosses, but they did occasionally run into lions".


text: I am aware that the essential subject has already been discussed but after a variety of recent observations for my TOS Enterprise WIP and a suggestion of a friend I won't exclude the possibility that we might be looking at a minimum of a) three engine rooms in the b) "engineering section" of the c) engineering hull. In TOS there is a variety of episodes that are outspoken clear about the warp engines or nacelles containing antimatter and matter-antimatter reactors and blssdwlf has not only compiled these canonical dialogue statements but also drawn some fascinating conclusions (three matter-antimatter reactors) he posted and illustrated in his thread: http://www.trekbbs.com/showthread.php?t=119751&page=16 (I recommend starting at post # 229). I believe the dilithium re-amplifying room from The Alternative Factor to be separate place where you take exhausted crystals from the dilithium crystal 'cage' in the middle of the double-triangle casing in the (warp) engine room for "re-amplification". To power the warp drive (and else) they have to be placed back in their cage(s) for performance. As it appears the cage can only hold one crystal at a time and I presume the matter-antimatter annihilation energy from the nacelles' reactors (in addition to the TOS "warp core" suggested by That Which Survives) is also routed through two crystals easily accessible for replacement by the engineering personnel and located somewhere in the engineering hull. The very TOS beginning and Mudd's Women suggested that all three matter-antimatter reactors of the Enterprise were working at full power chasing Mudd's ship through an asteroid field resulting in the subsequent burnout of (di)lithium circuits and subsequent shutdowns of the reactors: CREWMAN [OC]: This is the Engine room. Temperatures are passing the danger line. FARRELL Our deflector screen's weakening, sir. We can't protect them much longer. (lights flicker) SULU: That was one of our lithium crystal circuits, sir. KIRK: Bridge to transporter room. If you don't start beaming that crew over soon SCOTT [OC]: They're not answering our signal. There's nothing to lock onto. SULU (lights go out again) Another circuit, sir. ... SULU: Another lithium circuit. Now supplementing with battery power, sir. At this time they appear to have only had three dilithium crystals circuits onboard (and no shuttlecraft ). If the structure in the engineering section only holds one dilithium crystal circuit, where is the location of the other two as it is unlikely they exchanged dilithium crystal circuits during the chase (!)? My friend wondered if the shaking and G-Force pressure seen in The Doomsday Machine might be an indicator of engine room orientation aboard the Constellation but I attributed the erratic movement of Scotty to hickups of the damaged inertial dampers and/or unfamiliarity of the director with the Enterprise's deck layout, which IMHO could look like this: https://www.dropbox.com/s/yscj4a4hid0p2v7/USS%20Enterprise%20Engineering%20Deck%209%20Uncompressed.jpg However, with The Immunity Syndrome I feel that's a more complicated story. We had already seen in an earlier episode produced (Mirror, Mirror) a rectangular console in the Emergency Manual Monitor (EMM) on the upper level of the (warp) engine room, yet for The Immunity Syndrome they decided a) to remove the rectangular console and b) to put the semi-circular console from the Auxilary Control Room in its place instead - to suggest this is a different engine room?! In the scene from this episode, when they combine warp and impulse power for one major forward thrust, we see accordingly on the bridge that they are all being pressed into their seats and towards the stern of the ship. However, in the engine room that's a totally different story. To the left side of 'this' engine room would be the entry and to the right side the 'cathedral' with its tubes (studio set). Thus the shot of the warp engine room seen from this "EMM" clearly suggests that the bow of the ship is to the right and the stern is to the left which would make this another engine room with a dilithium crystal cage as it apparently can't be the (main) warp engine room in the center of the engineering hull. Now, do we have to consider the existence of one starboard warp engine room, one to the port and one in the center? I doubt there'd be enough space. Bob


text:
As Bahrain's government intensifies its campaign to crush dissent, the world has been largely silent – embittering protesters and potentially creating an opening for Iran to expand its influence and undermine US-Saudi interests in the region.
In the past week, activists and others who speak out against the Bahraini government's campaign are increasingly being arrested and others have reported threats to themselves or their families. Security forces have targeted the nation's majority Shiites for beatings and arrest at checkpoints, and conducted near nightly raids on homes of activists and ordinary citizens. This week a fourth detainee died in police custody in less than two weeks, and witnesses said that his body, like the others, bore signs of abuse.
Bahrain's government has also sought to wipe out the political opposition, arresting politicians and briefly shutting down the nation's only independent newspaper. Today the Ministry of Justice announced it has begun proceedings to shut down Bahrain's largest opposition group, the Shiite bloc al-Wafaq, in a move that further confirms that Bahrain's Sunni rulers are not interested in a political solution to the crisis.
The silence of the world, and particularly the US, in the face of this campaign is galling to ordinary Bahrainis who oppose the crackdown, who watch the world condemn rulers in Libya, Syria, and Yemen without a mention of Bahrain.
"We are calling to the US, the United Nations, the EU," said a man at the funeral of 15-year-old Sayed Ahmed Said Shems in the Shiite village of Saar late last month. Eyewitnesses said police killed the teenager as he played in an alley with his friends. "Where are they?" he wondered as men shoveled sandy soil into the youth's grave. "Where is the world? Why are they silent?" Like many Bahrainis at this tumultuous time, he asked to remain anonymous for his own safety.
America's silence in particular is angering Bahrain's largely Shiite population. While the US initially urged Bahrain's government to negotiate with the opposition, it has issued no strong condemnation of Bahrain's use of violence and intimidation since the middle of March, when Saudi Arabia sent more than 1,000 troops into Bahrain to help the government crush the protest movement that started in February asking for democratic reforms.
While the US stance is generally attributed to an attempt to protect regional interests, the festering situation in Bahrain is actually increasing Iran's opportunity for influence in the region and widening rifts between Arab nations – neither of which are in the interest of the US.
Why the US went silent
Bahrain, an archipelago slightly smaller than New York City, is home to the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, which patrols the Persian Gulf and serves as a counterweight to an Iranian threat. The US and Saudi Arabia fear a Shiite government in Bahrain would be receptive to Iranian influence, possibly jeopardizing the US base there. And Saudi rulers fear that if Bahrain's Sunni rulers capitulated to protesters demands for reform, it could energize the Islamic kingdom's own restive Shiite minority to move.
Yet the regional rivalry alone does not explain US silence. Before Saudi troops rolled across the causeway that links Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, the US had pushed Bahrain's government to reach a political solution, sending Jeffrey Feltman, assistant secretary of State for near eastern affairs, to Bahrain multiple times. In a visit to Bahrain that ended just two days before Saudi troops arrived, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that "baby steps" toward reform were not enough.
The US went largely silent when Saudi troops arrived in Bahrain under the aegis the Gulf Cooperation Council's Peninsula Shield Force, analysts say, out of a desire to repair its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Those ties have been strained since the US urged former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a Saudi ally, to step down from power during a popular uprising. The Saudis viewed the fall of their ally as a dangerous precedent.
America's credibility, interests damaged
But the US failure to condemn human rights abuses committed by the Bahraini security forces while condemning such abuses in Libya and Syria is undermining any credibility it had with Bahrainis. If Saudi and the US had hoped to curtail Iran's influence through Bahrain, they may have instead given it an opening.
Bahrain's portrayal of its protest movement as sectarian has contributed to an overall increasing of the sectarian divide across the region. That has given Iran "fuel for the fire," says Justin Gengler, a PhD candidate at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor whose research has focused on Bahrain.
Indeed, the situation in Bahrain has given Iran repeated opportunities to publicly criticize the oppression of Shiites and criticize Bahrain, leading to increased verbal back-and-forth between Iran and the GCC, which "the US can't see as very helpful," says Mr. Gengler. But rifts have also opened in the Arab world. He points to the GCC's move to ask the upcoming Arab League summit in Iraq to be canceled, likely because Iraq's Shiite politicians have been vocal critics of Bahrain's crackdown.
The situation in Bahrain and the US handling of it, he says, has produced changes the US likely didn't anticipate. "[The US] knew that Bahrain was a lynchpin to the entire Gulf," he says. "They knew they wanted stability in Bahrain, because a lot of other things could go wrong. But it seems like a lot of other things are going wrong even with what they're doing."
Clinton speaks out
In a possible indication it is sensitive to such implications, the US has spoken up twice this week on Bahrain, albeit mildly. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in remarks at the US-Islamic World Forum in Washington on Tuesday, said that despite the long friendship with Bahrain, "we have made clear that security alone cannot resolve the challenges facing them. Violence is not and cannot be the answer. A political process is – one that advances the rights and aspirations of all the citizens of Bahrain."
And a State Department spokesman, responding to a reporter's question at a briefing in Washington about the fourth detainee death in police custody, called on Bahrain to ensure the security of detainees and conduct investigations in to the deaths.
While such statements, though mild, are a change from near silence, they will have to go further to satisfy the Bahrainis who bear the brunt of the crackdown.
"We are not different from the Libyan people, from the Tunisian people, from the Egyptian people," says Sayed el-Mouswi, cousin of the youth killed in Saar, at his funeral. "Why is the US making double standards?"


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text:
Sound Off for March 18th: Are you worried about North Korea?
The U.S. is beefing up its missile defense system in response to North Korea's latest threats.
The Pentagon announced it will spend $1 billion to add 14 interceptors in Alaska, responding to what it calls faster-than-anticipated North Korean progress on nuclear weapons and missiles.
In announcing the decision, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel acknowledged the interceptors already in place to defend against potential missile strikes have had poor test performances.
Hagel says he's determined to protect the U.S. homeland and stay ahead of a worrisome North Korean missile threat.
The 14 additional interceptors will be installed at Fort Greely, Alaska, where 26 already stand in underground silos.
Hagel says a portion of the $1 billion cost of the expanded system will come from scrapping the final phase of a missile defense system the U.S. is building in Europe.
Are you worried about North Korea?


text:
Standard marketing CRM type practice suggests that you should create and supplement a database of customers and prospects with the idea that you build more and more information to use to help build deeper relationships and create additional selling opportunities.
What if you look at database building as a service you provided for your customers? Now, in some cases that might be a good service offering as a profit center, but I'm talking about providing a service that simply allows you to differentiate your business by adding value in ways that your competitors aren't even thinking about.
RSS, search technology, and a slew of online apps have made the creation and streaming of database kind of content a pretty simple affair.
Below are some examples of the kind of information this way of thinking might produce.
1. The knowledge database
Create a custom RSS subscription database of blogs and news sites your customers would find interesting, either by virtue of information they provided you or based on an industry they should follow. You can set-up an RSS reader or upload and OPML file to the reader of their choice and magically create a hand crafted set of blogs they should follow. OPML files may sound a little techie, but essentially it's a list of RSS feeds that can be imported to an RSS reader to create lots of subscriptions at one time.
2. The best of class database
Build a list of best of class service providers that can deliver all the products and services you know your customers may need that are unrelated to your actual offerings. Create a database with all of the contact information and notes about each provider. Offer this to your customers as a service to help them find great companies for everything they buy. This strategic partner kind of database is something you should be building and maintaining for your referral and lead generation activities anyway, but take it a step further and make it a formal offering using a tool like Central Desktop to invite your partners to build and maintain their listings, including monthly specials.
3. The real time roundup database
Create custom social media and reputation monitoring databases for your customers that include all brand and competitive mentions in real time streams like Twitter, Facebook, and Media distribution sites and teach your customers how to monitor this database. This may be totally unrelated to your services, but it's such an essential bit of marketing wisdom that you can create incredible brand loyalty by being the organization that shows them how to do it. Use a tool like Trackur to create your own white label social media monitoring service.
4. The cutting edge B2B database
Create a database of web apps that can help your business customers do more with less using free and low cost tools for things like design, file backup, file storage, file streaming, collaboration, online meetings, CRM, finance and HR. This is another play that can allow your organization to be seen as an online thought leader and go to person for emerging tools. Simply gaining this reputation can open some doors to many other teaching and exposure opportunities in your industry – regardless of what you actually sell. Here's a nice example – The Freelancer's Toolset: 100 Web Apps for Everything You Will Possibly Need
5. The reminder database
What if you offered a service that could help remind each customer of important dates? Give them the opportunity to put all the birthdays, anniversaries and other important dates in their lives into a database with the promise to remind them to take action when the date was coming up. Obviously, this is a no brainer if you also have a product or service to offer as something for that date, such as flowers or gifts, but it also works for just about any business as a way to stay top of mind. The heating and cooling service could offer a monthly home maintenance reminder tied to the season and featuring a different partner each month. The key is to provide value and personalization. You might also get some inspiration from LIfeHacker's Top 10 Reminder Tools for Forgetful Minds


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Last chance to see "Impressionism," Matt Connors's show at MoMA PS1. His paintings embrace and rethink all the physical tropes of abstraction, including oily pigment halos, AbEx scale, hard edge geometry, and Twombly-esque calligraphy, reformulating each in the artist's own idiosyncratic, endearingly low-skilled way. The show closes today. Image at top: Matt Connors, Black/Blue, 2012, acrylic and colored pencil on canvas with artist's frame, 48 x 40 inches. Image above: Installation view.
Over the holidays, painter and Columbia University MFA student Tatiana Berg has been entertaining questions on her Tumblr, so I asked what was the best advice she has received at grad school so far. "The best advice I�ve gotten probably came from either Dana Schutz, who I was assigned as a mentor and who I AM IN LOVE WITH, or Keith Mayerson who is an amazing, kindhearted person and incredibly dedicated teacher. I�m trying to think of what his best advice is; in my case he plays the important role of cheerleader who keeps me from being cynical or overly miserable about my own work. 'Don�t swallow the bitter pill,' 'Don�t fall into the trap of production,' 'If someone rolls you a ball, pick it up and roll it back…'" Read More.
Two Coats of Paint's choice for Best Film of 2012 is "Amour," a French film about two retired music teachers who live in a shabby, well-loved apartment full of intimate french landscape paintings, books, CDs, and prints. In the NY Times critic Manohla Dargis called the film "a masterpiece about life, death and everything in between." Carefully observed, insightful and moving, "Amour" is one of those rare films that will make you look at life (and love) differently. Life is indeed beautiful. At the Film Forum and Lincoln Plaza.
Save the Date: The College Art Association's Annual Conference takes place at the New York Hilton, Wednesday, February 13, through Saturday, February 16, and artists should be aware that ArtSpace, a mini conference within the conference, is free and open to the public. Organized by CAA's Services to Artists Committee, ArtSpace is tailored to the interests and needs of artists (as opposed to art historians). Check out the schedule of panels and discussions here. More details to come.
Raymond Pettibon's advice to artists this week, via Twitter: "Spend the next 40 yrs wrkng 20 hrs a day on yr art like I have–and then ask me 4 advice on 'how to make it.' " Image above courtesy of Pettibon's website.
Related posts:
Two Coats of Paint @ The College Art Association Annual Conference (2012)
Matt Connors knows
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Summer 2013 Meetinghouse Readings Schedule
Moderator: Phil Pochoda
July 11: Cleopatra Mathis — reading from her book of poems, The Book of Dog
Joyce Carol Oates — reading from her novel, The Accursed
July 18: Jay Parini — reading from the manuscript of his new poetry collection, to be published in the fall
Nicholas Delbanco — reading from his recently re-released fiction trilogy, The Sherbrookes
July 25: Megan Marshall — reading from her biography, Margaret Fuller
Chris Bohjalian — reading from his novel, The Light in the Ruins
August 1: Joe Citro — reading from Vermont Haunts: Tall Tales and True from the Green Mountain State
Ivy Pochoda — reading from her novel, Visitation Street
The Canaan Meetinghouse Readings is proud to partner with the Norwich Bookstore for the upcoming summer events. They will be present at all of the events to offer listeners the opportunity to purchase books by the authors reading that day.
Free admission.
All readings begin at 7:30 pm.
In the Meetinghouse on Canaan St, 2.2 miles from Route 4
Please, no infants, toddlers or squirmers!