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In affirming respondent Jeffers' first-degree murder conviction and death sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court, inter alia, independently reviewed the evidence supporting the trial court's finding of the statutory aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." The court noted its recent ruling that the infliction of gratuitous violence on the victim is among the factors to be considered in determining whether the murder was "especially heinous . . . and depraved," and found the presence of this factor in light of evidence that Jeffers had climbed on top of the dead victim and hit her in the face several times, causing additional wounds and bleeding. Noting further that the apparent relish with which the defendant commits the murder is another relevant factor under its decisions, the court concluded that Jeffers' relish for his crime was evidenced by testimony that, while he was beating the dead victim, he called her a "bitch" and a "dirty snitch" and stated, as each blow landed, that "[t]his one is for" someone on whom he felt she had informed. The Federal District Court denied Jeffers' habeas corpus petition. The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the "especially heinous . . . or depraved" aggravating circumstance, as interpreted and narrowed by the State Supreme Court, was not void on its face, but vacated Jeffers' death sentence on the ground that the circumstance was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that Arizona's construction of the "especially heinous . . . or depraved" aggravating circumstance in this case contravened Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 , and Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 . There is no dispute here that the Arizona Supreme Court applied its narrowing construction to the facts of Jeffers' case. More important, the Court of Appeals noted that the circumstance, as construed by the state courts, was not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Even if it had not so held, Jeffers' claim that Arizona has not construed the circumstance in a constitutionally narrow manner is disposed of by Walton v. Arizona, ante, at 652-655, which upheld, against a vagueness challenge, the precise aggravating circumstance at issue here. Moreover, a claim identical to Jeffers' assertion that the aggravating circumstance may nevertheless be vague "as applied" [497 U.S. 764, 765] to him was rejected in Walton, ante, at 655-656, which makes clear that if a State has adopted a constitutionally narrow construction of a facially vague aggravating circumstance and has applied that construction to the facts of the particular case, the fundamental constitutional requirement of channeling and limiting the capital sentencer's discretion has been satisfied. Pp. 773-780.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in conducting a de novo, case-by-case comparison of the facts of those cases with the facts of this case to decide Jeffers' as-applied challenge. That challenge reduces, in essence, to a claim that the state court simply misapplied its own aggravating circumstance to the facts of Jeffers' case. Because federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, federal habeas review of a state court's application of a constitutionally narrowed aggravating circumstance is limited, at most, to determining whether the state court's finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation. In making that determination, the appropriate standard of review is the "rational factfinder" standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , under which the federal court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Under the standard, a rational factfinder could have found that Jeffers both relished his crime and inflicted gratuitous violence, given the evidence of his conduct toward the victim's body. Pp. 780-784.
832 F.2d 476, reversed and remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, ante, p. 674. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 784.
Gerald R. Grant, Assistant attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert K. Corbin, attorney General, and Jessica Gifford Funkhouser.
James S. Liebman, by appointment of the Court, 493 U.S. 952 , argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Donald S. Klein and Frank P. Leto. *
[ Footnote * ] Kent S. Schneidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal. [497 U.S. 764, 766]
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues pertaining to federal court review of a state court's determination that an offense was committed "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner," Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13-703(F)(6) (1989).
The relevant facts are undisputed. The evidence at trial showed that, in May, 1976, police arrested respondent Jimmie Wayne Jeffers and his girlfriend, Penelope Cheney, on state-law charges of possession of narcotics and receipt of stolen property. Respondent posted bond for Cheney, but was unable to post bond for himself, and remained in custody at the Pima County Jail. While in jail, respondent received reports that Cheney had been cooperating with police by providing the police with information about respondent and certain heroin transactions. Respondent wrote a note to another jail inmate offering him money if he would kill Cheney. The detention officer who was supposed to deliver the note read it and seized it.
In October, 1976, respondent was released from jail on bond pending appeal of his convictions. About a week later, he met Doris Van Der Veer and began living with her at a motel in Tucson. Respondent subsequently invited Cheney to the motel in order to provide her with some heroin.
On the day of the murder, respondent told Van Der Veer that Cheney was coming over and that they wished to be alone. When Cheney arrived, respondent introduced her to Van Der Veer, who then excused herself. After about two and a half hours, Van Der Veer returned to the motel room and knocked on the door. Respondent admitted her, pointed a gun at her, and ordered her to sit in a chair and be quiet.
Upon entering the motel room, Van Der Veer saw Cheney lying unconscious on the bed. Cheney appeared cyanotic. Respondent injected a fluid into Cheney's hand and told Van Der Veer that he had "given her enough shit to kill a horse, [497 U.S. 764, 767] and this bitch won't die." Van Der Veer noticed foam coming from Cheney's mouth, which she recognized from her training as a nurse to be a sign of heroin overdose. Van Der Veer checked Cheney's condition and determined that she was still alive. Van Der Veer asked respondent if he was going to help Cheney, to which he responded, "No, I'm going to kill her."
Respondent then removed the belt from around Cheney's waist and began to choke her with it. He soon discarded the belt and choked her with his bare hands. Van Der Veer urged him to stop, saying Cheney would probably die anyway, but respondent replied, "No, I've seen her this way before, and she's come out of it."
After strangling Cheney, respondent instructed Van Der Veer to check Cheney's pulse. Van Der Veer found no pulse and reported that Cheney was dead. Respondent then ordered Van Der Veer to inject more heroin into Cheney and to choke her while he took pictures. Van Der Veer complied. Respondent told Van Der Veer that he did this to have proof that she was an accomplice. Respondent then beat Cheney with his hands several times, calling her a "bitch" and a "dirty snitch" and stating, as each blow landed, that "[t]his one is for [naming several names]." Respondent then dragged the body off the bed and placed it in the shower stall. After three days, when the body began to smell, respondent and Van Der Veer wrapped the body in newspaper and plastic garbage bags, placed it in a sleeping bag, and transported it to a secluded area, where they buried it in a shallow grave.
A jury convicted respondent of the first-degree murder of Cheney. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors. In accordance with the Arizona death penalty statute, Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13-454 (Supp. 1973) (currently Ariz.Rev. Stat. 13-703 (1989)), respondent was sentenced to death. App. 5-10. [497 U.S. 764, 768]
On direct review of his conviction and sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court, following this Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), vacated respondent's death sentence and remanded for resentencing. See State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978) (requiring the trial court to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924 (1979). At the second sentencing hearing, the trial court again found two aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: that respondent had created a grave risk of death to another person (Van Der Veer) in the commission of the murder and that respondent committed the murder in an especially heinous, cruel, and depraved manner. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. 13-703(F)(3) and (6) (1989). 1 The [497 U.S. 764, 769] court found no mitigating factors, and thereupon resentenced respondent to death. 2 App. 11-16.
On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 661 P.2d 1105, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983). With regard to respondent's death sentence, the court stated that, under Arizona law, "this court independently reviews the facts that the trial court found established the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and we determine for ourselves if the latter outweigh the former when we find both to be present." 135 Ariz. at 428, 661 P.2d at 1129 (citations omitted). Applying this standard, the court reversed the trial court's finding that respondent "knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person . . . in addition to the victim of the offense," Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-703(F)(3) (1989).
The court then reviewed the trial court's finding that respondent committed the offense in an "especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner," 13-703(F)(6). The court noted that it had interpreted and applied this provision in light of the dictionary definitions of the words used:
The court then rejected respondent's contention that the "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance, as construed and applied by the court, was unconstitutionally broad. Relying on its decision in State v. Gretzler, supra, the court held that "[e]ach element - cruel, heinous, and depraved - has been narrowly defined and construed . . . to meet constitutional standards." 135 Ariz. at 430, 661 P.2d at 1131. The court explained:
Respondent then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging, among other claims, that Arizona's interpretation of its "especially heinous . . . or depraved" aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The District Court reiterated that, under Arizona law, "[a] murder that is especially heinous and depraved includes the infliction of gratuitous violence upon the victim and the indication that the defendant committed the crime with relish." Jeffers v. Ricketts, 627 F.Supp. 1334, 1360 (Ariz. 1986) (citations omitted). The District Court then noted:
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated respondent's death sentence on the ground that the "especially heinous . . . or depraved" circumstance was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Jeffers v. Ricketts, 832 F.2d 476, 482-486 (1987). As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the [497 U.S. 764, 773] subsection (F)(6) aggravating circumstance was not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Id., at 482 (citing Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1194-1196 (CA9 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987)).
The Court of Appeals then held, however, that "[w]hile Chaney establishes that the Arizona statute is not void on its face and is capable of constitutional application, it naturally does not answer the question whether the Arizona statute was constitutionally applied to Jeffers in this case." 832 F.2d at 482. Reviewing a number of Arizona Supreme Court cases defining and applying the "especially heinous . . . or depraved" circumstance, the Court of Appeals compared the facts of those cases to the facts of this case, and concluded that "the standard of heinousness and depravity delineated in prior Arizona cases cannot be applied in a principled manner to Jeffers." Id., at 485. The Court of Appeals therefore struck down respondent's death sentence as arbitrary: "To apply the standard of especial heinousness and depravity to Jeffers' case when the facts do not permit it is arbitrary or capricious, and is therefore an unconstitutional application of the standard. . . . Arizona's existing standard . . . cannot be extended to Jeffers' case without losing its ability to distinguish in a principled manner between those it condemns to death and those it does not." Id., at 486 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)). The dissenting member of the panel maintained that "the majority [was] doing little more than second-guessing the Arizona Supreme Court's interpretation of facts that quite reasonably fit within the statutory definition of aggravating circumstances." 832 F.2d at 487.
We granted certiorari, Ricketts v. Jeffers, 493 U.S. 889 (1989), and now reverse.
Petitioners contend that this case presents the question whether a federal court may make a de novo review of the evidence supporting a state court's finding of a facially constitutional [497 U.S. 764, 774] aggravating circumstance. Respondent maintains that this case presents only the question whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that Arizona's construction of the subsection (F)(6) aggravating circumstance in this case contravened this Court's decisions in Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, and Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). We begin our analysis with respondent's contention.
Our capital punishment doctrine is rooted in the principle that "`[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be . . . wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed.'" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (joint opinion) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Furman, supra, at 313 (WHITE, J., concurring) (invalidating capital punishment statute where "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"). Accordingly, "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg, supra, at 189.
This principle requires a State to "channel the sentencer's discretion by `clear and objective standards' that provide `specific and detailed guidance,' and that `make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.'" Godfrey, supra, at 428 (footnotes omitted). A State's definitions of its aggravating circumstances - those circumstances that make a criminal defendant "eligible" for the death penalty - therefore play a significant role in channeling the sentencer's discretion. The Court in Gregg, for example, held that Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile" aggravating [497 U.S. 764, 775] circumstance, Ga.Code Ann. 27-2534.1(b)(7) (Supp. 1975) ("outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim"), was not unconstitutionally vague because the Georgia courts could give it a narrowing construction. See 428 U.S., at 201 (joint opinion) (Although "arguabl[y] . . . any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravating battery," there was "no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction"); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976) (joint opinion) (upholding Florida's "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance, Fla.Stat.Ann. 921.141(5)(h) (Supp. 1976-1977), on the ground that the Supreme Court of Florida had restricted the circumstance to include only "`the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim'").
In Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, however, a plurality of the Court held that, although the Georgia Supreme Court had adopted a narrowing construction of Georgia's subsection (b)(7) aggravating circumstance, the death sentence at issue could not stand because no evidence existed that the state courts had applied the narrowing construction to the facts of that case. 446 U.S., at 432 ("The circumstances of this case . . . do not satisfy the criteria laid out by the Georgia Supreme Court itself" in the cases adopting the narrowing construction). Because the Georgia courts had not applied the narrowing construction, the plurality considered whether the Georgia Supreme Court, in affirming the death sentence, had nevertheless applied a constitutional construction of the subsection (b)(7) aggravating circumstance. Id., at 432-433. The plurality concluded that the State court had not, because "[t]here is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." Id., at 433. [497 U.S. 764, 776]
We have reiterated the general principle that aggravating circumstances must be construed to permit the sentencer to make a principled distinction between those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984) ("If a State has determined that death should be an available penalty for certain crimes, then it must administer that penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ("[A]n aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder") (footnote omitted); see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("A constant theme of our cases - from Gregg and Proffitt through Godfrey, Eddings, and, most recently, Zant - has been emphasis on procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner"); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 -246 (1988).
Indeed, in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), we applied the teachings of Godfrey to hold that the Oklahoma courts had not construed Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance in a manner sufficient "to cure the unfettered discretion of the jury and to satisfy the commands of the Eighth Amendment." 486 U.S., at 364 . We concluded that the Oklahoma court's "conclusion that on th[e] facts [of the case] the jury's verdict that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel was supportable did not cure the constitutional infirmity of the aggravating circumstance." Ibid.
Respondent's reliance on Godfrey and Cartwright, however, does not yield the result he seeks. Unlike in Godfrey, there is no dispute in this case that the Arizona Supreme Court applied its narrowing construction of Arizona's subsection [497 U.S. 764, 777] (F)(6) aggravating circumstance to the facts of respondent's case. See State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 429-430, 661 P.2d at 1130-1131. More important, the Court of Appeals noted that the subsection (F)(6) aggravating circumstance, as interpreted by the Arizona courts, was not unconstitutionally vague on its face. See 832 F.2d at 482 (citing Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d at 1194-1196). "The Arizona Supreme Court appears to have sufficiently channeled sentencing discretion to prevent arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing decisions. The court has defined each of the factors set forth in section 13-703(F)(6). These definitions have been applied consistently." Chaney, supra, at 1195 (citations and quotations omitted).
Even had the Court of Appeals not so held, we resolved any doubt about the matter in Walton v. Arizona, ante, p. 639, where we upheld, against a vagueness challenge, the precise aggravating circumstance at issue in this case. See ante at 652-655. Our holding in Walton, which disposes of respondent's claim that Arizona has not construed its subsection (F)(6) aggravating circumstance in a constitutionally narrow manner, bears repeating here:
The dissent's suggestion that our reliance on Walton is misplaced is without merit. We granted certiorari in Walton to decide "[w]hether Arizona's `especially heinous, cruel or depraved' aggravating circumstance, as interpreted by the Arizona courts, fails to channel the sentencer's discretion as required by the Eighth Amendment," Brief for Petitioner in Walton v. Arizona, O.T. 1989, No. 7351, p. i, and our judgment in that case plainly rested on a negative answer to that question. See ante at 652-656; ante at 674 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also ante at 692-699 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (discussing vagueness of the state courts' construction of the "especially heinous . . . or depraved" aggravating circumstance). We decline the dissent's apparent invitation to reconsider arguments addressed and rejected in a decision announced only today.
In light of the Court of Appeals' rejection of respondent's facial challenge, respondent defends the decision below on the ground that, even if Arizona has adopted a constitutionally narrow construction of its subsection (F)(6) aggravating circumstance, and even if the Arizona Supreme Court applied that narrowing construction to the facts of his case, the aggravating circumstance may nevertheless be vague "as applied" to him. We rejected an identical claim in Walton, however, and the conclusion we reached in Walton applies with equal force in this case:
In light of our rejection of respondent's constitutional challenge to Arizona's "especially heinous . . . or depraved" aggravating circumstance, see Walton, respondent's contention - that the Arizona Supreme Court's application of its narrowing construction to the facts of his case nevertheless failed to distinguish his case from cases in which the court did not find the aggravating circumstance - reduces, in essence, to a claim that the state court simply misapplied its own aggravating circumstance to the facts of his case. Because federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, see, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 -22 (1975) (per curiam), federal habeas review of a state court's application of a constitutionally narrowed aggravating circumstance is limited, at most, to determining whether the state court's finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation. Cf. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974) (absent a specific constitutional violation, federal habeas review of trial error is limited to whether the error "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process").
In making such a determination, respect for a state court's findings of fact and application of its own law counsels against the sort of de novo review undertaken by the Court of Appeals in this case. Cf. 832 F.2d at 484 ("Illumined . . . by the case examples furnished by the Arizona Supreme Court, [the "especially heinous . . . or depraved" standard] seems to call for conduct or attitudes more shocking than those exhibited by Jeffers"). Where the issue is solely whether a state court has properly found the existence of a constitutionally narrowed aggravating circumstance, we have never required federal courts "to peer majestically over the [state] court's shoulder so that [they] might second-guess [497 U.S. 764, 781] its interpretation of facts that quite reasonably - perhaps even quite plainly - fit within the statutory language." Godfrey, 446 U.S., at 450 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See Barclay, 463 U.S., at 947 (plurality opinion) (review of state court findings of aggravating circumstances is "limited to the question whether they are so unprincipled or arbitrary as to somehow violate the United States Constitution"); id., at 968 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("It is not our role to reexamine the trial court's findings of fact, which have been affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. Assuming those facts to be true, there is no federal constitutional infirmity in these two findings of statutory aggravating circumstances").
Rather, in determining whether a state court's application of its constitutionally adequate aggravating circumstance was so erroneous as to raise an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation, we think the more appropriate standard of review is the "rational factfinder" standard established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). We held in Jackson that, where a federal habeas corpus claimant alleges that his state conviction is unsupported by the evidence, federal courts must determine whether the conviction was obtained in violation of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), by asking "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 443 U.S., at 319 (citation omitted); see also id., at 324 ("We hold that, in a challenge to a state criminal conviction brought under 28 U.S.C. 2254 - if the settled procedural prerequisites for such a claim have otherwise been satisfied - the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt") (footnote omitted). The Court reasoned: [497 U.S. 764, 782]
Moreover, a federal court should adhere to the Jackson standard even when reviewing the decision of a state appellate court that has independently reviewed the evidence, for the underlying question remains the same: If a State's aggravating circumstances adequately perform their constitutional function, then a state court's application of those circumstances raises, apart from due process and Eighth Amendment concerns, only a question of the proper application of state law. A state court's finding of an aggravating circumstance in a particular case - including a de novo finding by an appellate court that a particular offense is "especially heinous . . . or depraved" - is arbitrary or capricious if and only if no reasonable sentencer could have so concluded. Indeed, respondent agrees that "a state court's `especially heinous . . . or depraved' finding, insofar as it is a matter of state law, is reviewable by the federal courts only under the "rational factfinder" rule of Jackson v. Virginia." Brief for Respondent 95-96 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
Applying the Jackson standard in this case, we hold that a rational factfinder could have found that respondent both relished the crime and inflicted gratuitous violence on the victim. Given the evidence that, "while Jeffers was beating the [dead] victim he called her `a bitch and a dirty snitch' and, with each striking blow, said, `This one is for so and so. [naming several names],'" State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. at 430, 661 P.2d at 1131, we think that the Arizona Supreme Court's finding that respondent had relished the killing is one that a rational factfinder could have made. Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court's finding that respondent had inflicted [497 U.S. 764, 784] gratuitous violence is rationally supported by the evidence that respondent "climbed on top of the dead victim and hit her in the face several times which eventually resulted in additional wounds and bleeding," ibid. In light of the Arizona Supreme Court's narrowing construction of the "especially heinous . . . or depraved" aggravating circumstance, see State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52-53, 659 P.2d at 11-12 (listing factors), the Arizona Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that respondent committed the murder in an "especially heinous . . . or depraved manner."
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] Arizona Rev.Stat. 13-703(E) provides:
Seeking habeas corpus relief in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respondent Jimmie Wayne Jeffers raised two challenges to Arizona's "especially heinous . . . or depraved" aggravating circumstance. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13-7C3 F.6 (1989) (the (F)(6) circumstance). 1 First, Jeffers contended that the Arizona Supreme [497 U.S. 764, 785] Court has failed to articulate a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction of the (F)(6) circumstance. In the alternative, Jeffers argued that, even if a suitable limiting construction had been developed, its application to his case failed to satisfy constitutional requirements. The Court of Appeals, deeming itself bound by Circuit precedent, rejected respondent's first contention. Jeffers v. Ricketts, 832 F.2d 476, 482 (1987), citing Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1194-1196 (CA9 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987). With respect to the second contention, however, the court concluded that the standard enunciated by the Arizona Supreme Court "seems to call for conduct or attitudes more shocking than those exhibited by Jeffers," 832 F.2d at 484, and that, "[b]ecause we conclude that the standard of heinousness and depravity delineated in prior Arizona cases cannot be applied in a principled manner to Jeffers, his death sentence must be struck down as arbitrary." Id., at 485.
The State then filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The panel indicated that its ruling on the rehearing petition would be deferred "pending a further decision of this court, sitting en banc, in Adamson v. Ricketts." Order of March 30, 1988, quoted in Brief for Respondent 21. Several months later, the en banc court issued its decision in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (CA9 1988), cert. pending, No. 88-1553. After exhaustive analysis of the relevant Arizona precedents, the en banc court concluded:
As respondent in this Court, Jeffers defends the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the grounds that no satisfactory limiting construction of the (F)(6) circumstance can be derived from the Arizona precedents, and, alternatively, that, if such a construction does exist, it was improperly applied in his case. 3 Jeffers' first claim is logically antecedent to the second; it raises an issue of greater general importance, and, given the decision of the en banc Court of Appeals in Adamson, it can hardly be regarded as insubstantial. The Court today, however, simply refuses to discuss the merits of respondent's broad challenge to the (F)(6) circumstance; in lieu of analysis, it relies on a single sentence of dictum in an opinion [497 U.S. 764, 787] in another case issued today. Because I believe that Arizona's application of the (F)(6) factor cannot be squared with this Court's governing precedents - and because I regard the majority's approach as a parody of constitutional adjudication - I dissent.
This Court consistently has recognized that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). The application to respondent of Arizona's (F)(6) circumstance can be sustained only if that aggravating factor provides a "principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality opinion). The majority does not contend that the statutory language, which requires only that the murder be "especially heinous . . . or depraved," is itself sufficiently precise to meet constitutional standards. 4 Rather, the Court refers repeatedly to a "narrowing construction" of the (F)(6) circumstance announced by the Arizona Supreme Court. See, e.g., ante at 776, 780, 783, [497 U.S. 764, 788] and 784. The Court nowhere states precisely what that narrowing construction is, nor does it examine other Arizona cases to see whether that construction has been consistently applied. The majority suggests, however, that the "narrowing construction" was announced by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971 (1983). See ante at 19. Analysis of the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in Gretzler, and of its relationship to prior Arizona capital cases, belies that characterization.
Prior to Gretzler, the Arizona Supreme Court's application of the (F)(6) circumstance was based principally on its decision in State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978), in which the court recited dictionary definitions of each of the statutory terms. "Heinous" was defined as "hatefully or shockingly evil; grossly bad"; "cruel" was defined as "disposed to inflict pain esp. in a wanton, insensate or vindictive manner: sadistic"; and "depraved" was defined as "marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration." 114 Ariz., at 543, 562 P.2d at 716. The court concluded: "[W]hat our legislature intended to include as an aggravating circumstance was a killing wherein additional circumstances of the nature enumerated above set the crime apart from the usual or the norm." Ibid.
The Gretzler court did not suggest that the Knapp definitions were insufficient to guide the sentencer's discretion or that further narrowing was required. To the contrary, the court quoted these definitions with approval, and stated: "We believe that the statutory phrase "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" has been construed in a constitutionally narrow fashion, and has been properly applied in individual cases. A summary of the law which has been developing in the area supports this conclusion." 135 Ariz. at 50, 659 P.2d at 9. In explaining what kinds of murders properly would be regarded as "especially heinous . . . or depraved," the court [497 U.S. 764, 789] stated that, "[i]n contrast to the emphasis upon the victim's suffering and feelings in the case of cruelty, the statutory concepts of heinous and depraved involve a killer's vile state of mind at the time of the murder, as evidenced by the killer's actions. Our cases have suggested specific factors which lead to a finding of heinousness or depravity." Id., at 51, 659 P.2d at 10. Next, drawing on examples from prior Arizona cases, the court identified five factors the presence of which would indicate that a particular killing was "especially heinous . . . or depraved." These factors were (1) "the apparent relishing of the murder by the killer," (2) "the infliction of gratuitous violence on the victim," (3) "the needless mutilation of the victim," (4) "the senselessness of the crime," and (5) "the helplessness of the victim." Id., at 52, 659 P.2d at 11. Finally, the court noted: "[W]here no circumstances, such as the specific factors discussed above, separate the crime from the `norm' of first degree murders, we will reverse a finding that the crime was committed in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.'" Id., at 53, 659 P.2d at 12 (emphasis added).
The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in Gretzler obviously did not announce a "narrowing construction" of the (F)(6) circumstance. The court did not suggest that the standards previously applied were inadequate, or that further constraints on the sentencer's discretion were essential. Instead, the Arizona Supreme Court cited the Knapp definitions with approval, and then gave examples of their application. No matter how vaguely defined an aggravating circumstance is, there will be a finite number of cases in which that circumstance has been applied. It hardly limits the application of that aggravating factor to list those prior decisions, or to provide illustrative examples from among them. I do not see how the Arizona Supreme Court's description of the manner in which a vague aggravating factor has been applied can be regarded as the establishment of a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction. [497 U.S. 764, 790]
Nor did the Gretzler court narrow the discretion of future sentencers simply by grouping its prior decisions into categories. The use of categories could serve to guide the sentencer if (a) the categories themselves are narrow enough that a significant number of homicides will not fall within any of them, and (b) the court indicates that a murder is covered by the aggravating circumstance only if it falls within one of the enumerated categories. The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Gretzler satisfies neither of these criteria. Most first degree murders will fall within at least one of the five categories listed in Gretzler - hardly a surprising result, since the Gretzler categories were simply descriptive of the prior period during which the Knapp definitions had governed the application of this aggravating factor. Since Gretzler, moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court has continued to identify additional circumstances that will support the conclusion that a particular murder is "especially heinous . . . or depraved." That fact is also unsurprising. The court in Gretzler did not purport to lay down rules for the future; it simply summarized prior case law, and indicated that an (F)(6) finding would be proper when "circumstances, such as the specific factors discussed above, separate the crime from the `norm' of first degree murders." Id., at 53, 659 P.2d at 12 (emphasis added).
The majority does not contend that the Knapp definitions furnished constitutionally sufficient guidance to capital sentencers in Arizona prior to Gretzler. Just as a reasonable sentencer might conclude that every first degree murder is "especially heinous, cruel or depraved," see n. 4, supra, a reasonable judge could surely believe that all such killings are "hatefully or shockingly evil" or "marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration." 5 Yet the majority [497 U.S. 764, 791] apparently concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court cured the constitutional infirmity by summarizing its prior decisions, reiterating with approval the constitutionally deficient construction relied on previously, and pledging to follow the same approach in the future. 6
The majority undertakes no close examination of Gretzler or of other Arizona cases, prior or subsequent. It makes no attempt to explain how the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the terms "especially heinous . . . or depraved" can be said to satisfy the constitutional requirements announced in this Court's prior decisions. Indeed, the majority's conclusion that the Arizona court has satisfactorily limited the reach of the statutory language is supported by no analysis at all. The Court instead relies on the assertion that "we resolved any doubt about the matter in Walton v. Arizona, ante, p. 639, where we upheld, against a vagueness challenge, the precise aggravating circumstance at issue in this case." Ante at 777. 7 The majority's claim that Walton [497 U.S. 764, 792] involves "the precise aggravating circumstance at issue in this case," however, fundamentally misrepresents the operation of the Arizona statute.
The Arizona Supreme Court consistently has asserted that the terms "heinous," "cruel," and "depraved" "are considered disjunctive; the presence of any one of three factors is an aggravating circumstance." State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 242, 762 P.2d 519, 529 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989). It is therefore more accurate to characterize the (F)(6) circumstance as three aggravating factors than as one. 8 In Walton, the Arizona Supreme Court, in determining that the (F)(6) factor had been established, relied primarily on the conclusion that the murder was especially cruel. Although the court also indicated that the murder was especially depraved, it stated clearly that this conclusion was not necessary to its finding of the (F)(6) circumstance. See State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 587-588, 769 P.2d 1017, 1033-1034 ("The clear evidence of cruelty is sufficient to sustain the trial judge's finding of that aggravating factor, but we believe that the evidence also supports the finding of depravity"). In affirming Jeffrey Walton's death sentence today, this Court also focuses its attention on the constitutional sufficiency of the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of "cruelty." The Court concludes: [497 U.S. 764, 793]
I think it is important that we be frank about what is happening here. The death penalty laws of many States establish aggravating circumstances similar to the one at issue in [497 U.S. 764, 794] this case. 9 Since the statutory language defining these factors does not provide constitutionally adequate guidance, the constitutionality of the aggravating circumstances necessarily depends on the construction given by the State's highest court. We have expressed apparent approval of a limiting construction requiring "torture or serious physical abuse." Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 365 (1988). This Court has not held that this is the only permissible construction of an aggravating circumstance of this kind, but, prior to today, we have never suggested that the aggravating factor can permissibly be construed in a manner that does not make reference to the suffering of the victim. The decision today will likely result in the execution of numerous inmates, in Arizona 10 and elsewhere, who would not otherwise be put [497 U.S. 764, 795] to death. Yet neither in this case nor in Walton has the Court articulated any argument in support of its decision. Nor has the majority undertaken any examination of the way in which this aggravating circumstance has been applied by the Arizona Supreme Court. Instead, the Court relies on a conspicuous bootstrap. Five Members have joined the majority opinion in Walton, which in a single sentence asserts without explanation that the majority cannot "fault" the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the statutory term "depraved." In the present case, the same five Members proclaim themselves to be bound by this scrap of dictum. In any context, this would be a poor excuse for constitutional adjudication. In a capital case, it is deeply disturbing.
It is to some degree understandable that the majority chooses to rely exclusively on the brief and passing dictum in Walton. Had the Court examined the range of homicides which the Arizona Supreme Court has held to be "especially heinous . . . or depraved," it could not plausibly have argued that the state court has placed meaningful limits on the application of this aggravating circumstance. The dissent in Walton explains in some detail the reasons for its conclusion that this aggravating factor, as defined by the Arizona Supreme Court, fails to satisfy constitutional requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, after exhaustive analysis of the relevant state precedents, also concluded that the "especially heinous . . . or depraved" circumstance is unconstitutionally vague. See Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d at 1031-1039. There is no need to reiterate these arguments here. It is sufficient to [497 U.S. 764, 796] note that neither this Court nor the Arizona Supreme Court has attempted to refute that analysis.
Indeed, the constitutional defects in the Arizona Supreme Court's application of the (F)(6) circumstance are illustrated by the state court's conclusion that respondent "relished" the murder, and that this factor supports a finding that the killing was "especially heinous . . . or depraved." The court based its conclusion on testimony indicating that respondent struck the victim several times after she appeared to be dead, that, while striking her, he called her a "bitch" and a "dirty snitch," and that, with each striking blow, he said, "This one is for ____," naming several of his friends on whom the victim had informed to the police. 135 Ariz. at 430, 661 P.2d at 1131. The Arizona Supreme Court did not explain precisely what it meant by saying that the respondent "relished" his crime. But the evidence does not suggest that Jeffers killed for the sake of killing, or found some intrinsic pleasure in the act of murder. Rather, the evidence indicates that respondent killed out of hatred for a particular individual and a desire for revenge. There is a difference.
It may be that a State could rationally conclude that a murder committed out of personal hatred is more reprehensible than is a killing committed for other reasons. 11 But the State of Arizona cannot be said to have arrived at any such conclusion. The Arizona Supreme Court has also held that a murder is "especially heinous . . . or depraved" if it is committed to eliminate a witness, see State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 481, 715 P.2d 721, 734 (1986); State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 570, 691 P.2d 655, 661 (1984), cert. denied, [497 U.S. 764, 797] 470 U.S. 1059 (1985); State v. Smith, 141 Ariz. 510, 511-512, 687 P.2d 1265, 1266-1267 (1984), or if it is "senseless," see Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52, 659 P.2d at 11-12, and the statute itself provides that it shall be an aggravating circumstance if the murder is committed for pecuniary gain. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13-703 F.5 (1989). 12 The Arizona Supreme Court has also identified other blameworthy motives which, in the court's view, suggest that a murder is "especially heinous . . . or depraved." 13 Taken together, the decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court hold that a murder will be deemed especially blameworthy if it is committed for virtually any reason, or for no reason at all.
The Arizona Supreme Court's decisions dealing with especially improper motives are symptomatic of a larger pattern in that court's construction of the (F)(6) circumstance. At least since Gretzler, the court has generally avoided the error of simply recounting the events surrounding a particular crime and then announcing, in conclusory fashion, that the murder was "especially heinous . . . or depraved." Rather, the court typically identifies specific factors to support its conclusion that the aggravating circumstance has been established. And if any one decision is examined in isolation, it may appear that the state court has narrowly construed the (F)(6) circumstance in a manner that satisfies constitutional requirements. The problem is that the Arizona [497 U.S. 764, 798] Supreme Court has identified so many such factors, and has shown itself so willing to add new factors when a perceived need arises, that the body of its precedents places no meaningful limitations on the application of this aggravating circumstance. 14 The constitutional infirmity of the court's approach cannot be recognized through examination of any one opinion. It becomes very apparent upon examination of the relevant decisions taken as a whole. Unfortunately, the inquiry required for an informed assessment of the Arizona Supreme Court's application of this aggravating factor is one that this Court simply refuses to undertake.
The majority devotes most of its energy arguing that a federal habeas court, having concluded that a State has adopted [497 U.S. 764, 799] a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction of an aggravating circumstance, largely should refrain from engaging in case-specific comparisons between the homicide under review and prior decisions in which the aggravating factor has been found. The Court concludes that, since a rational factfinder could have determined that respondent "relished" the murder and engaged in "gratuitous violence," the death sentence must be allowed to stand. I concede that respondent's crime was not plainly distinguishable from the other murders that the Arizona Supreme Court has found to be "especially heinous . . . or depraved." Indeed, my conclusion could hardly be otherwise: having argued that the (F)(6) circumstance has been construed so broadly as to cover virtually every first degree murder, I could scarcely contend that the court's finding in this case was bizarre or aberrational. I, however, do have some brief observations concerning the role of federal habeas courts in reviewing state court findings of aggravating circumstances.
(1) I think that the majority is wrong in arguing that a state court's application of a valid aggravating circumstance involves a question of state law only. See ante at 780. The statutory aggravating circumstances do perform the state law function of determining who will be sentenced to death. But the aggravating factors also perform the distinct function of determining which murderers are eligible for the death penalty as a matter of federal law. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S., at 862 , 878 ("[S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty"); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988). That point is particularly clear in cases like the present one, where the (F)(6) circumstance is the only aggravating factor that the Arizona Supreme Court found to exist. If the state court erred in its determination that this aggravating circumstance had been proved, that error is of federal constitutional significance: the defendant who claims [497 U.S. 764, 800] that no aggravating factor has been established is contending that the Eighth Amendment (and not simply state law) prohibits his execution. 15
(2) As the majority points out, under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) "federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings must generally accord a presumption of correctness to a state court's factual findings." Ante at 782 (emphasis added). The presumption of correctness does not apply, however, if the habeas petitioner demonstrates "that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing." 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). 16 In the present case, the trial-level sentencing procedure was conducted under a clearly unconstitutional scheme. See n. 5, supra. The relevant factfinder is therefore the Arizona Supreme Court, as the majority appears to acknowledge. See ante at 783 (arguing that "a federal court should adhere to the Jackson standard even when reviewing the decision of a state appellate court that has independently reviewed the evidence"). This Court has held that the general presumption of correctness mandated by 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) is applicable to the factual findings of state appellate courts. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545 -547 (1981). The Court has also recognized, however: "[T]here might be instances . . . in which the presumption would not apply to appellate factfinding . . . because appellate factfinding procedures were not "adequate," see 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). For example, the question . . . might in a given case turn on credibility determinations that [497 U.S. 764, 801] could not be accurately made by an appellate court on the basis of a paper record." Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 388 , n. 5 (1986).
Indeed, in the present case, the inadequacy of the Arizona Supreme Court's procedure goes beyond the fact that the court did not see the witnesses and was forced to rely upon a paper record. At the times of respondent's trial and sentencing hearing, and even when his appellate briefs were submitted and oral argument conducted, respondent had no reason to believe that the sentencer would attach particular importance to its conclusion that the defendant had "relished" the killing and inflicted "gratuitous violence" on the victim after her death. 17 The Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in Gretzler was issued 18 days prior to its decision in Jeffers' case - far too late for Jeffers to submit evidence or argument regarding the presence of the Gretzler factors.
In the present case, there appears to be no dispute regarding the primary facts underlying the Arizona Supreme Court's finding of the (F)(6) circumstance. That is, respondent apparently does not deny that he struck the victim after she was dead or that he cursed her while doing so. But if there were a conflict in the testimony regarding this point, I would not regard the Arizona Supreme Court's factfinding procedures as "adequate" to resolve that conflict.
(3) In determining that Jeffers "relished" his crime and inflicted "gratuitous violence" on the victim, the Arizona Supreme Court did not simply apply determinate standards to a new set of facts. Rather, the assertion that the respondent "relished" [497 U.S. 764, 802] the killing of Penelope Cheney said as much about the court's understanding of the word "relish" as it did about Jeffers' state of mind at the time of the murder. Thus, despite the prior Ninth Circuit decision holding that the (F)(6) circumstance had been adequately narrowed, the federal court could not properly limit itself to the question whether a rational factfinder might conclude that Jeffers "relished" the killing or employed "gratuitous violence." Rather, the habeas court had both the right and the duty to ask whether the Arizona Supreme Court's construction of the (F)(6) circumstance remained adequate to satisfy the Constitution in light of its application to the case at hand. Thus, the habeas court's review in cases of this kind necessarily involves a comparison between the case under review and prior state-court decisions applying the aggravating factor - not as a means of determining whether the state court "incorrectly" applied its construction of the statutory terms but as a means of determining whether the state court's application of its construction to the instant case expands the scope of the aggravating factor in such a way as to make a previously valid limiting construction unconstitutionally broad.
(4) Indeed, I think that a comparative approach is necessary no matter what standard of review the habeas court employs. Even if the state court's finding is reviewed under a "rational factfinder" standard, the majority is wrong to say that the Court of Appeals erred in comparing Jeffers' crime to other cases in which the (F)(6) factor was established. Words like "relish" may be somewhat more precise than are "heinous" and "depraved," but they still are of less than crystalline clarity. A court attempting to apply the Jackson standard must ask whether a rational factfinder could believe that Jeffers "relished" the crime as that term has been construed by the Arizona Supreme Court. If the Arizona Supreme Court had used the word "relish" to mean one thing in each of its other decisions, and something very different in Jeffers' case, its application to Jeffers would be [497 U.S. 764, 803] arbitrary - even if both meanings could be found in a given dictionary. If the Court of Appeals departed from the "rational factfinder" standard here, it was by requiring too close a correlation between this case and others, not simply by employing a comparative approach.
Suppose, for example, that the Arizona Supreme Court had consistently construed the (F)(6) circumstance as requiring "physical abuse," but had found that standard satisfied only in cases where the killer subjected the victim to prolonged, severe physical suffering. Presumably that construction would be valid. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S., at 365 . Suppose that the court in a subsequent case found that the (F)(6) factor had been proved when the defendant slapped the victim once and then shot him dead. The defendant, on federal habeas, could raise two related but distinct challenges. First, the defendant might argue that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that a single slap constituted "physical abuse" as that term had previously been construed by the Arizona Supreme Court. (This would amount to a contention that the state court had misapplied its own rule.) Alternatively, the defendant might argue that "physical abuse" could no longer be deemed an adequate limiting construction if that phrase was construed as including a single slap. However the challenge was framed, though, the habeas court could not limit itself to the question whether a rational factfinder could conclude that the slap fell within some plausible definition of "physical abuse."
The majority's discussion of the way in which a federal habeas court should review the application of a valid aggravating circumstance to the facts of a particular case seems to me to be flawed in significant respects. My principal disagreement, however, is with the Court's insistence on addressing the issue. The majority makes no effort to justify its holding that the Arizona Supreme Court has placed [497 U.S. 764, 804] constitutionally sufficient limitations on its "especially heinous . . . or depraved" aggravating circumstance. Instead, the Court relies entirely on a sentence of dictum from today's opinion in Walton - an opinion which itself offers no rationale in support of the Court's conclusion. The dissenting opinion in Walton notes the Court's increasing tendency to review the constitutional claims of capital defendants in a perfunctory manner, but the Court's action in this case goes far beyond anything that is there observed.
I dissent.
[ Footnote 1 ] The (F)(6) circumstance applies when the sentencer finds that "[t]he defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." In the present case, the Arizona Supreme Court found that cruelty had not been proved because "[t]here was no evidence that the victim suffered any pain." State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 429, 661 P.2d 1105, 1130 (1983). The court did find that the murder was "heinous" and "depraved," and the adequacy of that finding is the issue in this case. The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's determination that Jeffers had "knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the victim of the offense," Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13-703 F.3 (1989). See 135 Ariz. at 428-429, 661 P.2d at 1129-1130. Consequently, Jeffers' sentence of death rests entirely on the (F)(6) factor.
[ Footnote 2 ] Eleven judges sat on the en banc panel in Adamson. Seven judges concluded that none of the three terms ("heinous," "cruel," or "depraved") in the (F)(6) circumstance had been construed by the Arizona Supreme Court in a manner that satisfied constitutional requirements. 865 F.2d at 1036. The other four judges argued that the state court had announced a satisfactory construction of the word "cruel"; these four declined to express a view as to the adequacy of the Arizona Supreme Court's application of the terms "heinous" and "depraved." Id., at 1058 (opinion concurring and dissenting).
[ Footnote 3 ] Petitioner contends that Jeffers is not entitled to argue in this Court that the Arizona Supreme Court has failed to articulate a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction of the (F)(6) circumstance. Petitioner argues that the point has been waived, since the Ninth Circuit panel ruled against respondent on this claim and Jeffers did not seek rehearing or cross-petition for certiorari. Reply Brief for Petitioner 4. The majority correctly (though silently) rejects this proposition. There is no basis for the suggestion that respondent should have sought rehearing at the Court of Appeals, or filed a cross-petition here, after he prevailed below. It is well established that respondent may defend the judgment of the Court of Appeals on any ground supported by the record. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 , n. 6 (1982).
[ Footnote 4 ] No such contention would be plausible. In Godfrey, the plurality, considering Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" aggravating circumstance, concluded that "[t]here is nothing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.'" 446 U.S., at 428 -429. In Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), the Court considered Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor. It unanimously concluded: "[T]he language of the Oklahoma aggravating circumstance at issue . . . gave no more guidance than the "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" language that the jury returned in its verdict in Godfrey." Id., at 363-364. The statutory language here is no more precise.
[ Footnote 5 ] In 1980, when respondent was sentenced lo death by the trial judge, the Arizona Supreme Court had provided no guidance in the application of the (F)(6) circumstance beyond the definitions quoted in State v. Knapp. Respondent's trial-level sentencing [497 U.S. 764, 791] procedure was therefore conducted under an invalid scheme, and I would affirm the judgment below on that ground, even if I believed that the Arizona Supreme Court had subsequently announced a valid limiting construction of this aggravating factor. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 762 -772 (1990) (dissenting opinion).
[ Footnote 6 ] In describing the kinds of murders that will qualify as "especially heinous . . . or depraved," the Arizona Supreme Court has continued to employ the formulations relied upon in Knapp. See, e.g., State v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 254-255, 778 P.2d 602, 619-620 (1988) (quoting Knapp definitions), cert. granted, 494 U.S. 1055 (1990); State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 242, 762 P.2d 519, 529 (1988) (same), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989); State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 405, 698 P.2d 183, 200 (1985) (same); State v. Johnson, 147 Ariz. 395, 401, 710 P.2d 1050, 1056 (1985) ((F)(6) finding is appropriate in cases where the killer "acted in such a fashion that his acts set him apart from the `norm' of first degree murderers").
[ Footnote 7 ] The majority also places peculiar emphasis on the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the (F)(6) aggravating factor, as construed by the Arizona Supreme Court, is not unconstitutionally vague. See ante at 776-777. It is most unusual for this Court to show deference to the legal conclusion of a Court of Appeals, particularly a conclusion made in the decision under review. And it is simply perverse for this Court to rely upon a Court of [497 U.S. 764, 792] Appeals decision for a proposition that is no longer good law within the Circuit. The majority inexplicably neglects to mention that the panel's conclusion on this point has been superseded by the decision of the en banc court in Adamson v. Ricketts, in which all seven judges who expressed a view on the question concluded that the Arizona Supreme Court had failed to articulate a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction of the terms "heinous" and "depraved."
[ Footnote 8 ] It might be even more accurate to say that the (F)(6) aggravating circumstance includes two distinct concepts: (1) cruelty and (2) heinousness/depravity. The Arizona Supreme Court has made only the most superficial effort to explain the difference between a murder that is "heinous" and a murder that is "depraved." See Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d, at 1034-1035, n. 38.
[ Footnote 9 ] One commentator has stated: "Twenty-four states permit imposition of the death penalty based on a finding that the murder was, in some ill-defined way, worse than other murders. The states use a variety of terms to denote this aggravating circumstance, with most statutes containing, either alone or in some combination, the terms `especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,' `depravity of mind,' or `outrageously vile wanton or inhuman.' These aggravating circumstances . . . have generated more controversy than any other aggravating circumstance. Commentators have universally criticized them as vague, overbroad, and meaningless." Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases - The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L.Rev. 941, 943-944 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
[ Footnote 10 ] In addition to the present case, on at least 12 occasions the Arizona Supreme Court has found that a particular murder was especially heinous and/or depraved, but not especially cruel. See State v. Ceja, 126 Ariz. 35, 39-40, 616 P.2d 491, 495-496 (1980); State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 436-437, 616 P.2d 888, 896-897, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); State v. Bishop, 127 Ariz. 531, 534, 622 P.2d 478, 481 (1980); State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 555, 633 P.2d 355, 364 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 210, 639 P.2d 1020, 1035 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982); State v. Woratzeck, 134 Ariz. 452, 457, 657 P.2d 865, 870 (1982); State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 69, 659 P.2d 22, 28, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983); State v. Harding, 137 Ariz. 278, 294, 670 P.2d 383, 399 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984); State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 252, 686 P.2d 750, 775, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1066 (1984); State [497 U.S. 764, 795] v. Villafuerte, 142 Ariz. 323, 331, 690 P.2d 42, 50 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985); State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. 441, 450-451, 702 P.2d 670, 679-680, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975 (1985); State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 367-368, 728 P.2d 232, 237-238 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1011 (1987). In four cases besides the present one, that has been the only aggravating circumstance. See State v. Ceja, supra; State v. Bishop, supra; State v. Villafuerte, supra; State v. Wallace, supra.
[ Footnote 11 ] The identification of particularly blameworthy motives for murder would seem, however, to be more appropriately a task for the legislature than for the State's judiciary. See Rosen, 64 N.C.L.Rev., at 990-991. The codification of an aggravating factor as vaguely defined as the (F)(6) circumstance is in essence an act of legislative abdication, since it requires the state courts to make fundamental policy choices under the guise of "interpreting" the statute.
[ Footnote 12 ] The Arizona Supreme Court has construed this aggravating factor as applying whenever "the expectation of financial gain was a cause of the murders." State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. at 436, 616 P.2d at 896. The court in Clark rejected the specially concurring justice's position, id., at 437, 616 P.2d at 897, that this aggravating circumstance applied only to murders committed by hired killers.
[ Footnote 13 ] See State v. Martinez-Villareal, 145 Ariz. at 451, 702 P.2d at 680 (murder to demonstrate "manliness" reflects "a manifest disregard for the fundamental principles upon which our society is based"); State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 162, 677 P.2d 920, 935 (1983) ((F)(6) finding supported in part by the fact that the mutilation of the victims' bodies "was designed to be a `message' to warn other people"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
[ Footnote 14 ] A State might reasonably conclude that a murder is especially reprehensible if the victim is 10 years old (because a child is physically vulnerable and has most of his life ahead of him); or 75 years old (because of the respect traditionally accorded to the elderly); or 40 years old (because a person of that age is likely to have others dependent upon him for support). A cogent argument could also be made that the killing of a 21- or 55-year-old victim is especially blameworthy. But while none of these choices would be unreasonable, the State, with a statute of this kind, must choose. If the state court invoked first one argument and then the other, and ultimately found in virtually every case that the age of the victim made the murder "especially heinous . . . or depraved," the aggravating circumstance would be too broad.
Under the approach developed by the majority here and in Walton, however, the Arizona Supreme Court with impunity could apply its aggravating circumstance in just such a fashion. If the state court held that the youth of the victim made a particular murder "especially heinous . . . or depraved," this Court presumably would assert that such a construction narrowed the application of the aggravating factor in a manner that satisfied constitutional standards. And if the defendant cited decisions in which the same state court had held that other murders were "especially heinous . . . or depraved" because the victim was 21, 40, 55, or 75 years old, this Court apparently would refuse to read the cases on the ground that the defendant was not entitled to "challeng[e] the proportionality review of the Arizona Supreme Court." See ante at 778 (quoting Walton, ante at 655).
[ Footnote 15 ] Similarly, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a capital sentence unless the defendant is found to have killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). It may be that the laws of many States require a similar finding. But the adequacy of the procedure by which that finding is made is a question of federal as well as state law.
[ Footnote 16 ] The presumption of correctness is also inapplicable if "the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing," 2254(d)(3), or if "the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding." 2254(d)(6).
[ Footnote 17 ] The Arizona Supreme Court in Gretzler summarized prior Arizona decisions in support of its conclusion that the (F)(6) circumstance would be established if the murderer "relished" the killing or employed "gratuitous violence." But those prior decisions did not use the terms "relish" or "gratuitous violence"; for the most part, they simply recounted the facts of the case and then concluded that the murder was "especially cruel . . . or depraved." Prior to the decision in Gretzler, Jeffers had no notice that the Gretzler factors would be accorded any particular significance in determining whether the (F)(6) factor had been established. [497 U.S. 764, 805]
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Wildwalks Images
Entering into the Jamison Valley via the popular Golden Staircase, this walk climbs one of the most recognisable landmarks in the Jamison Valley – The Ruined Castle. A beautiful rock formation that offers great views over the valley as far as Wentworth Falls and Katoomba. Explore some of the history of the coal mining in this part of the Jamison Valley.
Total climbing: 666m
7.9 km Return
5 hrs
Hard track
With quite significant hills, this is a great walk is for the day-walker looking for something more challenging than the average Katoomba cliff top walk. With fantastic views at Botting's Lookout, from the top of the Ruined Castle, and especially good views from Mt Solitary, this walk is well worth the time invested.
Total climbing: 1048m
11.7 km Return
8 hrs 45 mins
Experienced only
This is a very popular, full day walk, in the Katoomba Area, offering great views of the valley. The walk follows the edge of the cliffs, through the undergrowth, from the Scenic Railway to the Ruined Castle. There are great views to enjoy from the Ruined Castle. Arrive back in time to catch the Scenic Railway back up, or be prepared for the walk up Furber Steps, an alternate exit.
Total climbing: 963m
12.4 km Return
7 hrs 30 mins
Hard track
One of the longer day-walks in the Katoomba area, this track goes from the very popular Scenic World to the fantastic lookout on top of the Ruined Castle and then on to the amazing Mt Solitary. Be prepared for a long, but amazing, day of viewing the Jamison Valley. Make sure you are back to catch the train up in time, or be prepared to walk out one of the alternate routes, either via Furber Steps or via the Golden Staircase.
Total climbing: 1345m
16.2 km Return
11 hrs
Experienced only
This is the two day version of this popular and challenging walk. This walk passes popular sights including the Landslide, Ruined Castle, Mt Solitary and Wentworth Falls, and is a great way to explore the Jamison Valley. Water is rarely available at the campsite, with the Kedumba River being the only source of reliable water in the middle of this walk.
Total climbing: 2135m
29.2 km One way
2 Days
Experienced only
Circling the Jamison Valley, this spectacular three day walk is packed with great views and beautiful scenery. From Scenic World the walk heads around the base of the cliffs before climbing up to the Ruined Castle and then Mt Solitary. Walkers can rest in the sheltered Chinaman's Gully campsite overnight (don't expect water). Day two takes a rough track across Solitary and down to the Kedumba River. On the third day, the walk climbs to King's Tableland and the beautiful and amazing Wentworth Falls.
Total climbing: 2147m
29.3 km One way
3 Days
Experienced only

subset: commoncrawl


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A tank is a vehicle used in army and military, it is an armoured fighting vehicle designed for front line combat. Tanks usually have heavy firepower, good battlefield maneuverability provided by a powerful engine and tracks and a strong armour. Usually the main armament of tanks is mounted in a turret. Tanks are considered to be a mainstay of modern 20th and 21st century ground forces and a key part of the combined arms combat. Modern tanks are a versatile mobile land weapon system platforms that happen to have a mounted large-calibre cannon which is known as a tank gun in a rotating gun turret which is supplemented by mounted machine guns or other such weapons which include rockets or anti tank guided missiles. Tanks have heavy vehicle armour which does the job of providing protection for the crew, the weapons of the vehicle and propulsion systems as well as provide operational mobility due to its use of tracks rather than wheels, which helps in allowing the tank to move more comfortably on rugged terrain and adverse conditions such as mud and also remain positioned on the battlefield in advantageous locations.
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Spring Break Adventures at LBV Planetarium March 13 -14
Visitors to the Texas A&M International University Lamar Bruni Vergara Planetarium don't have to go far to have an undersea adventure, learn the secrets of the sun, travel billions of years to the future or explore the planets and moons of the solar system. During spring break, the LBV Planetarium will be open to the public on Tuesday, March 13 and Wednesday, March 14.
For all four of the special show times, the LBV Planetarium has lowered its general admission ticket price to $4. As a special treat for visitors, each ticket holder will receive a free LBV Planetarium keychain, until supplies last.
"Kaluoka'hina, The Enchanted Reef," scheduled for Tuesday at 3 p.m., takes audiences on an underwater humorous adventure that is entertaining and exciting. This family entertainment feature film transports viewers to a tropical coral reef as Jake, a young sawfish and his buddy Shorty, a lively reef fish, try to restore the magic of their enchanted home after a volcanic catastrophe breaks the spell.
"Secrets of the Sun," scheduled for Tuesday at 4 p.m., is an intimate look at the role the sun plays in the life of the solar system-from the nuclear forces churning at the heart of the sun to the mass ejections of solar material into surrounding space. Audiences will experience the power of the sun and its impact on the planets and Earth. The feature traces the life cycle of the sun, going back to its beginnings and moving forward in time.
"The Future is Wild," scheduled for Wednesday at 3 p.m., shows audiences a glimpse at what the future might look like five million years from now. The show features a cast of strange and amazing creatures, ranging from tiny insects to eight-ton squids that have replaced human beings. It also explores how the climate might change with a massive new ice age and how the continents could move around creating a huge land mass. To make sure everything in the film is possible, the film is based on hypotheses from an international group of specialists in biology, climatology, and geology.
"New Horizons," scheduled for Wednesday at 4 p.m., allows audiences to explore the solar system from breathtaking landscapes to violent volcanic eruptions to Saturn's rings as they follow a comet as it travels through interplanetary space. The show takes viewers to the surface of all the planets and shows what life would be like on those worlds. On each of the exotic stops, real data and images from modern space probes are transformed into stunning 360-degree photo-realistic animation.
University offices will be open Monday-Wednesday, March 12-14, and closed for Spring Break Thursday and Friday, March 15-16. Classes are suspended for Spring Break March 12-16.
The LBV Planetarium will be closed Friday, March 16 and Saturday, March 17. It will reopen to the general public on Friday, March 23.
For more information and show schedule, visit the LBV Planetarium's Web site at tamiu.edu/coas/planetarium or 956.326.2444 or e-mail email@example.com
Journalists who need additional information or help with media requests and interviews should contact the Office of Public Relations, Marketing and Information Services at firstname.lastname@example.com


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That's better. My apologies; following an entry titled 'Last Post' with the sudden and total disappearance of this blog may, just possibly, have created a misleading impression. Don't worry. The blogging will continue until morale improves.
The fact is I'd decided that, as I am pretty much specialising in creating and hosting WordPress sites these days, it was kind of embarrassing that my own blog was still hosted by someone else. Up to now it's been a free WordPress.com site. This is a fantastic service if you just want to blog, but if you install WordPress on your own server you can create a really capable website. Which is exactly what I'm doing for a lot of people these days – in fact I'm on the verge of officially launching it as a business. More of this… shortly.
Anyway I hit a snag while changing the domain name I.doubt.it to point to the new version, which meant that most readers could see neither. It was a simple problem, but I'd no time to fix it because it happened just before I left on a visit to the Netherlands to see the big Heironymus Bosch exhibition. Of this too I hope to speak in the near future.
But for now, a happy Paddy's Day to all of you in places where it's still Paddy's Day. Here in Ireland it's been over for some hours, and I'm off to bed.


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Req. No
Job Title
Clinic Patient Rep - Nursing Float Pool
CHRISTUS Trinity Mother Frances
Administrative Support
CHRISTUS Trinity Mother Frances Tyler Woodgate Centre
1001 East SE Loop 323
Tyler, TX 75701
USView On A Map View Other Locations
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Clinic Patient Rep - Nursing Float Pool Job in Tyler
Job Description
***Float Pool Position***
Greets, instructs, directs and schedules patients and visitors. Serves as a liaison between patient and medical support staff. May assist with various duties within the clinic. Verifies insurance benefits and assist with referrals. Collects payments and prepares cash for deposits.
- Financial: Responsible for determining, collecting and posting co-pays and deductibles; for address prior balances and establishing payment plans as directed by policy and procedure; for directing patients to appropriate financial counselors as needed; for ensuring accuracy in daily reconciliation/cash management process for site/unit.
- Safety: Responsible for prevention of injury or harm to self; for ensuring safe work environments for others.
- Policy Development: Assist Supervisor/Manager/Associate Director/Director in determining clinic specific policies related to front end operations.
- Decision Making: Decision will require knowledge and understanding of system policies; assists leadership as needed.
- Problem Solving: Reviews material to see if necessary information is on hand and is accurate. Assist other employees and/or patients with problems, as needed.
- High school diploma or equivalent
- Three or more years of experience in a health care organization
- Ability to operate 10 key calculator by touch, telephone, computer, copier, and fax machine
- Excellent interpersonal and communication skills and good math knowledge essential
- Knowledge of managed care preferred
- Some College preferred
- ICD9 and CPT coding (advanced skills) preferred
- Experience with charge posting or collections preferred
Work Type:
Per Diem As Needed


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... I finally have my wifi working, and my raspberry can be moved... if it helps anyone I have kernel:
... and downloaded:
Code: Select all
Linux RaspberryPi 3.10.25+ #622 PREEMPT Fri Jan 3 18:41:00 GMT 2014 armv6l GNU/Linux
..after removing all instances of 8188eu.ko on my system.
Code: Select all
I have an old(ish) rasbian weezy version... 2013-05-25
I have rebooted and still working!
good luck to everyone


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Greenbelt Litigation Attorneys
Business or Commercial Litigation Law is a branch of the legal system that deals with settling disputes related to business contracts, bankruptcy issues, antitrust, fraud, mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance, and more.
It is a complex and comprehensive branch of law that consists of constant changes and moving parts. It is our job, as business litigation experts, to stay on top of those changes and provide your business with the best possible business litigation representation.
Our Greenbelt trial litigation attorneys assist you when you need it most.
How A Business Litigation Attorney Helps
A Business Litigation Attorney is capable of supporting you through any type of legal issue related to your business. They can not only handle litigation, but can also assist with alternative resolution methods such as mediation, arbitration, and negotiation. Which method is best for resolution of a specific issue will be determined by you and your attorney together, and it may require more than one type before an outcome is reached.
Regardless of the type of assistance you need, the commercial litigation attorneys of Kevin Byrnes are dedicated to getting the resolution you desire in the most economically sound way possible. We can not only assist with new cases, but can also aid you in matters that may not have been adequately resolved previously.
When to Contact a Business Trial Lawyer
While many Greenbelt, MD businesses wait until they have an issue that requires legal help, one of the best times to find the right business litigation lawyer for you is when you don't need one. Most businesses will need legal assistance at some point in time, so having a business litigation attorney that you trust already selected and available to you will save you time, money, and may be the difference between keeping your business and starting over at square one.
By interviewing and selecting Commercial Litigation Lawyers prior to the necessity of having one, you are able to compare options and make an informed decision on which firm is best to represent you. Trying to frantically find an attorney to represent you once a matter has arisen not only means that you will have limited choices on which attorneys are available, but you will not have adequate time to properly research and select an attorney that you feel is best suited to your business interests.
It also means that your litigation attorney will be at a disadvantage, because they now not only have to handle the matter at hand, they also have to take the time to learn about your business and your practices. By selecting an attorney ahead of time, they will already be familiar with you, your business, and how you operate, and will thus be able to be proactive in providing you with a strong defense.
Medical Practice Litigation Lawyer
Medical Practices are commonly faced with legal issues, due to the nature of their business. Kevin E. Byrnes is a dedicated Business Litigation Attorney experienced in assisting medical practices with their legal needs.
If you are a Greenbelt medical practice that has not selected a litigation attorney, or if you are unhappy with your current representation, then reach out to Kevin Byrnes to discuss how he can assist your practice.
Request a Consultation
Your Business Litigation Attorney is someone who will be by your side and help you protect your business when things go awry. It is important that you select someone that you are confident will protect your interests to the fullest extent of the law, that you are comfortable with, and that you trust. That is why we offer all businesses a Free Initial Consultation with an experienced and dedicated Washington, DC Business Litigation Attorney.
Contact us today at (202) 902-8399 to Request a Consultation with an Experienced and Dedicated DC Litigation Attorney.


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Our "Compact", originally uploaded by julesberry2001.
Clue 2:
The manual for the truck boasts than it can pull a boat, but then our Nissan Micra used to do that and it could also do 50mpg with a tandem on the roof. Happily we already have mud going up to the door handles. Today we head out into the wilds. I wonder if there will be more or less internet there.
Posted By jules to jules' pics at 9/23/2009 07:22:00 AM


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Posted by Editor on 03/21/07
EMD Serono Cyclelogik 2007 Team
EMD Serono Cyclelogik racing announces its 2007 roster today. Building on its 2006 success of 53 podium finishes and 21 victories, the team hopes to have a big impact on racing in Ottawa and the surrounding area by strengthening both its women and men's teams.
Returning riders include Mike Flavell and Sarah Coney, who both represented Ontario at the Canadian Championships. The team is excited for the prospects of some of its new riders as well, including Chloe St-Arnaud Watt and Keir Plaice. The team hopes to add to these strong results in 2007 with new riders on both the senior men and women and master men and women teams.
Known in 2006 as Serono Cyclelogik Racing, the team will now race under the name EMD Serono Cyclelogik, reflective of corporate level changes with its returning title sponsor. As a reflection of EMD Serono's commitment to both this team and overall health and wellness as it specifically pertains to Multiple Sclerosis, the team will once again participate in MS Tours in Ottawa, the Outaouais, and Toronto.
"We had a great season in 2006 both in terms of the team's results and our success in building awareness of the importance of leading a healthy and active lifestyle. By enhancing our investment in the team, we hope to build on our commitment to amateur athletics and to supporting people with Multiple Sclerosis across Canada" commented Bernard Fortier, National Training Manager for EMD Serono.
Following a few early season classics, the team will host its own race, the Calabogie Road Classic on April 28th. After a successful inaugural race last year, the team will be back at the Calabogie Motorsports Park for a multi-category regional race. More info is available on the race at www.cyclelogikracing.com.
The team will then shift focus towards major Ottawa events such as the Ottawa Bicycle Club (OBC) Grand Prix and the Italian Festival Grand Prix. Beyond Ottawa, the focus will primarily be Ontario and Quebec Cups, Provincial Championships and major regional races, including Green Mountain in Vermont and the National Championships.
In addition to EMD Serono and Cyclelogik, the team is pleased to welcome back returning sponsors, including Maxxis, Time, Smith, Endurance Nutrition, Wavertree, Opus, HyperNet, Westboro Chiropractic, and Otto's Subaru. In addition, the team is proud to welcome new sponsorship support from Solefit Orthotics, Casco, and Sugoi Canada.
Full Roster:
Senior Men: Mike Flavell, Dom Guiver, Keir Plaice
Master Men: Paul Chedore, Dan Coldrey, David Gazsi, Andrew Kruger, Alistair Scott, Andrew Lees, Ian Fraser, Stephen Riby, Mark Roundell, Tom Stevens
Women: Stephanie Adams, Cathy Allison, Sarah Coney, Margot Hall, Lisa O'Connor, Jen Simpson, Chloe St-Arnaud-Watt.
|Return to Canadian Cyclist homepage | Back to Top


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Jared Paul Stern
Jared Paul Stern has written for the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, the New York Times' T magazine, GQ, WWD, Vogue, New York magazine, Details, Hamptons magazine, Playboy, BlackBook, the New York Post, Bergdorf Goodman magazine and Luxist among others. The founding editor of the Page Six magazine, Kempt, and UrbanDaddy's Driven, he has also served as a judge for everything from the International Best Dressed List to the Ford Supermodel of the World contest. He is currently writer-at-large at JustLuxe and contributes to CNN Style, A Continuous Lean, Airows, AskMen, Maxim, Man of the World and Petrolicious. He covers cars, style, spirits, and luxury travel, among other topics. Stern currently divides his time between Kennebunkport, Maine, San Miguel de Allende, Mexico and New Orleans. In Kennebunkport he publishes the Sea Salt dining guide. He can be found on Instagram @jaredpstern.


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CRS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, July 31, 2000
From WikiLeaks
About this CRS report
This document was obtained by Wikileaks from the United States Congressional Research Service.
The CRS is a Congressional "think tank" with a staff of around 700. Reports are commissioned by members of Congress on topics relevant to current political events. Despite CRS costs to the tax payer of over $100M a year, its electronic archives are, as a matter of policy, not made available to the public.
Individual members of Congress will release specific CRS reports if they believe it to assist them politically, but CRS archives as a whole are firewalled from public access.
This report was obtained by Wikileaks staff from CRS computers accessible only from Congressional offices.
For other CRS information see: Congressional Research Service.
For press enquiries, consult our media kit.
If you have other confidential material let us know!.
For previous editions of this report, try OpenCRS.
Wikileaks release: February 2, 2009
Publisher: United States Congressional Research Service
Title: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
CRS report number: RL30623
Author(s): K. Alan Kronstadt, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Date: July 31, 2000
- Abstract
- The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 ended South Asia's condition of "existential" deterrence. Both countries now have overt nuclear postures, and U.S. concerns in the region have focused on preservation of global nonproliferation regimes and related efforts, prevention of an arms race in South Asia, and movement toward reconciliation between India and Pakistan, especially on their mutual differences over the area of Kashmir.
- Download


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The volcanic islands of Hawaii have been pushing forth from the sea for centuries, the lava flows expanding their footprint on the surface. Today's Nice Price or Crack Pipe VW Passat wagon looks like it's been covered in lava, but would its price make you blow your top?
Yesterday, nearly 59% of of you were willing to embrace your inner Eric Bana and awarded the rare in the US '74 Aussie Ford Falcon XB with a fair dinkum Nice Price win. The other 40% apparently feeling that its price was full of didjeridu.
Today's Passat doesn't seem to be full of anything but awesome, although its exterior has been texture coated like a stucco house, giving it the appearance of something extruded from a Stegosaurus' pucker button. It's what's underneath however, that makes this Vee-Dub totally non-shitty.
There was a time when VW's Chairman, Ferdinand Piëch, wanted to move the People's Car company into a price strata that only people of means could afford. The large and in charge Phaeton would eventually top the brand and more than doubled the lead VW price point. Bridging that ode to excess was the job of the existing B5 Passat - heir to the throne of the working German's family sedan, the original Passat, or Dasher as it was so ironically anointed in the US.
The Passat at the time had already grown in size and accouterments offered over its predecessors, but its selection of engines - all stingy fours and capable sixes - did not serve to justify the new price tag that Piëch envisioned. That meant up-kitting the car's mechanicals, and that entailed wedging under its bonnet the company's then-new staggered bore W8 engine.
This 2003 Passat wagon not only sports the 4-litre, 270-bhp conjoined eight, but also the company's 4Motion all-wheel drive system with Torsen center differential. In between W8 and 4WD it touts a six speed manual, most likely with a rubbery shift lever feel, if every other VW on the planet is anything to go by.
So this 84,000 mile Passat has the mechanical goods, but it also is something special in the looks department. The seller has coated it in matte black pebble-tex, perhaps in the hope that, like a golf ball's dimples, the surface irregularities would make the car fly faster. Whatever the reason, this wagon, which also has been denuded of badging, bumper brightwork and other extraneous, and required for legal operation elements, now has the appearance of a very emo leper.
Heavily tinted windows and tail lights enhance the monochromatic presentation, and that dark glass masks the fact that the interior - all gray leather and reliable VW ergonomics - is as stock as they come. To its detriment, the seller notes that some of that leather - notably on the back seat - is torn, and the CD player doesn't work any more. Of course who uses CDs these days?
The side-view mirror knob is probably also useless as the aerodynamic door mirrors have been replaced with a small chrome job that appears to be off of a little girl's bike. Wheels are 17-inch, are made out of steel, and are painted blacker than the bottom of the La Brea tar Pits. Those rims sit on inch and a quarter spacers that push them out past the boundaries of the pebbled arches and probably wreak havoc on both the suspension's geometry and its long-term durability. Despite that, the seller claims the car to now be in perfect mechanical condition.
Volkswagen's dalliance with the upper crust did not pan out as Piëch had envisioned, and both he and the W8 Passat - after only 10,000 cars - are no longer in VW's portfolio. This Passat represents about the ultimate expression of the B5 platform - biggest motor, all wheel drive, wagon body - that one could find, but the customizations that it has endured might be seen as too individualistic and hence may detract from its appeal to the masses.
The seller is hoping someone will show up with a mass of cash for this Passat - $10,999 to be exact. What do you think, is that a price that would make this high-end VW with its custom pebble paint a stone-cold deal? Or, does that make this a Passat that should be passed on?
You decide!
eBay or go here if the ad disappears. H/T to Buffcoat and Beaver for the hookup!
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