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This Court's holding in Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 , that a determination of patent invalidity is not res judicata against the patentee in subsequent litigation against a different defendant overruled to the extent that it forecloses an estoppel plea by one facing a charge of infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid, and in this infringement suit where because of Triplett petitioner did not plead estoppel and the patentee had no opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of such a plea the parties should be allowed to amend their pleadings and introduce evidence on the estoppel issue. Pp. 317-350.
422 F.2d 769, vacated and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Robert H. Rines argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Richard S. Phillips, Paul J. Foley, and Nelson H. Shapiro.
William A. Marshall argued the cause for respondent University of Illinois Foundation. With him on the brief were Charles J. Merriam and Basil P. Mann. Sidney G. Faber argued the cause for respondent JFD Electronics Corp. With him on the brief were Jerome M. Berliner, Robert C. Faber, and Myron C. Cass.
Assistant Attorney General McLaren argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Gray, Peter L. Strauss, Howard E. Shapiro, and Walter H. Fleischer. [402 U.S. 313, 314]
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Donald R. Dunner, James B. Gambrell, and W. Brown Morton, Jr., for the American Patent Law Association; by Theodore W. Anderson for the Automatic Electric Co.; by Harold F. McNenny, John F. Pearne, and Walther E. Wyss for the Finney Co.; and by Joseph B. Brennan and Richard D. Mason for the Kawneer Co., Inc.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent University of Illinois Foundation (hereafter Foundation) is the owner by assignment of U.S. Patent No. 3,210,767, issued to Dwight E. Isbell on October 5, 1965. The patent is for "Frequency Independent Unidirectional Antennas," and Isbell first filed his application May 3, 1960. The antennas covered are designed for transmission and reception of electromagnetic radio frequency signals used in many types of communications, including the broadcasting of radio and television signals.
The patent has been much litigated since it was granted, primarily because it claims a high quality television antenna for color reception. 1 One of the first infringement suits brought by the Foundation was filed in the Southern District of Iowa against the Winegard Co., an antenna manufacturer. 2 Trial was to the court, and after pursuing the inquiry mandated by Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 -18 (1966), Chief Judge Stephenson held the patent invalid since "it would have been obvious to one ordinarily skilled in the art and wishing to design a frequency independent unidirectional [402 U.S. 313, 315] antenna to combine these three old elements, all suggested by the prior art references previously discussed." University of Illinois Foundation v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412, 419 (SD Iowa 1967) (footnote omitted). 3 Accordingly, he entered judgment for the alleged infringer and against the patentee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit unanimously affirmed Judge Stephenson. 402 F.2d 125 (1968). We denied the patentee's petition for certiorari. 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
In March 1966, well before Judge Stephenson had ruled in the Winegard case, the Foundation also filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois charging a Chicago customer of petitioner, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. (hereafter B-T), with infringing two patents it owned by assignment: the Isbell patent and U.S. Patent No. Re. 25,740, reissued March 9, 1965, to P. E. Mayes et al. The Mayes patent was entitled "Log Periodic Backward Wave Antenna Array," and was, as indicated, a reissue of No. 3,108,280, applied for on September 30, 1960. B-T chose to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court to [402 U.S. 313, 316] defend its customer, and it filed an answer and counterclaim against the Foundation and its licensee, respondent JFD Electronics Corp., charging: (1) that both the Isbell and Mayes patents were invalid; (2) that if those patents were valid, the B-T antennas did not infringe either of them; (3) that the Foundation and JFD were guilty of unfair competition; (4) that the Foundation and JFD had violated the "anti-trust laws of the United States, including the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as amended"; and (5) that certain JFD antenna models infringed B-T's patent No. 3,259,904, "Antenna Having Combined Support and Lead-In," issued July 5, 1966.
Trial was again to the court, and on June 27, 1968, Judge Hoffman held that the Foundation's patents were valid and infringed, dismissed the unfair competition and antitrust charges, and found claim 5 of the B-T patent obvious and invalid. Before discussing the Isbell patent in detail, Judge Hoffman noted that it had been held invalid as obvious by Judge Stephenson in the Winegard litigation. He stated:
B-T sought certiorari, assigning the conflict between the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits as to the validity of the Isbell patent as a primary reason for granting the writ. 4 We granted certiorari, 400 U.S. 864 (1970), and subsequently requested the parties to discuss the following additional issues not raised in the petition for review:
In Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), this Court held:
In its brief here, the Foundation urges that the rule of Triplett be maintained. Petitioner B-T's brief took the same position, stating that "[t]hough petitioners stand to gain by any such result, we cannot urge the destruction of a long-accepted safeguard for patentees merely for the expediency of victory." Brief for Petitioner 12. The Government, however, appearing as amicus curiae, urges that Triplett was based on uncritical acceptance of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, since limited significantly, and that the time has come to modify Triplett so that "claims of estoppel in patent cases [are] considered on a case by case basis, giving due weight to any factors which would point to an unfair or anomalous result from their allowance." Brief for the United States 7. The Government's position was spelled out in a brief filed more than a month after petitioner B-T filed its brief.
At oral argument the following colloquy occurred between the Court and counsel for B-T:
Triplett v. Lowell exemplified the judge-made doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, ordaining that unless both parties (or their privies) in a second action are bound by a judgment in a previous case, neither party (nor his privy) in the second action may use the prior judgment as determinative [402 U.S. 313, 321] of an issue in the second action. Triplett was decided in 1936. The opinion stated that "the rules of the common law applicable to successive litigations concerning the same subject matter" did not preclude "relitigation of the validity of a patent claim previously held invalid in a suit against a different defendant." 297 U.S., at 644 . In Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912), the Court had stated that it was "a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual." 7 The same [402 U.S. 313, 322] rule was reflected in the Restatement of Judgments. Restatement of Judgments 93 (1942). 8
But even at the time Triplett was decided, and certainly by the time the Restatement was published, the mutuality rule had been under fire. Courts had discarded the requirement of mutuality and held that only the party against whom the plea of estoppel was asserted had to have been in privity with a party in the prior action. 9 As Judge Friendly has noted, Bentham had attacked [402 U.S. 313, 323] the doctrine "as destitute of any semblance of reason, and as `a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench' . . . ." Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (CA2 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964) (quoting 3 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 579 (1827), reprinted in 7 Works of Jeremy Bentham 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843)). There was also ferment in scholarly quarters. 10
Building upon the authority cited above, the California Supreme Court, in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), unanimously rejected the doctrine of mutuality, stating that there was "no compelling reason . . . for requiring that the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation." Id., at 812, 122 P.2d, at 894. Justice Traynor's opinion, handed down the same year the Restatement was published, listed criteria since employed by many courts in many contexts:
Bernhard had significant impact. Many state and federal courts rejected the mutuality requirement, especially where the prior judgment was invoked defensively in a second action against a plaintiff bringing suit on an issue he litigated and lost as plaintiff in a prior action. 11 The trend has been apparent in federal-question cases. 12 The federal courts found Bernhard persuasive. As Judge Hastie stated more than 20 years ago:
Of course, transformation of estoppel law was neither instantaneous nor universal. As late as 1961, eminent authority stated that "[m]ost state courts recognize and apply the doctrine of mutuality, subject to certain exceptions . . . . And the same is true of federal courts, when free to apply their own doctrine." Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 Tul. L. Rev. 301, 304 (1961) (footnotes omitted); see also, 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice § 0.412 1., pp. 1803-1804 (1965). However, in 1970 Professor Moore noted that "the trend in the federal courts is away from the rigid requirements of mutuality advocated herein." Id., Supp. 1970, at 53. The same trend is evident in the state courts. 14 [402 U.S. 313, 327]
Undeniably, the court-produced doctrine of mutuality of estoppel is undergoing fundamental change in the common-law tradition. In its pristine formulation, an increasing number of courts have rejected the principle as unsound. Nor is it irrelevant that the abrogation of mutuality has been accompanied by other developments - such as expansion of the definition of "claim" in bar and merger contexts 15 and expansion of the preclusive effects afforded criminal judgments in civil litigation 16 - which enhance the capabilities of the courts to deal with some issues swiftly but fairly.
Obviously, these mutations in estoppel doctrine are not before us for wholesale approval or rejection. But at the very least they counsel us to re-examine whether mutuality of estoppel is a viable rule where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent once a federal court has declared it to be invalid. 17 [402 U.S. 313, 328]
The cases and authorities discussed above connect erosion of the mutuality requirement to the goal of limiting relitigation of issues where that can be achieved without compromising fairness in particular cases. The courts have often discarded the rule while commenting on crowded dockets and long delays preceding trial. Authorities differ on whether the public interest in efficient judicial administration is a sufficient ground in and of itself for abandoning mutuality, 18 but it is clear that more than crowded dockets is involved. The broader question is whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue. The question in these terms includes as part of the calculus the effect on judicial administration, but it also encompasses the concern exemplified by Bentham's reference to the gaming table in his attack on the principle of mutuality of estoppel. [402 U.S. 313, 329] In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources. To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the prior suit, the defendant's time and money are diverted from alternative uses - productive or otherwise - to relitigation of a decided issue. And, still assuming that the issue was resolved correctly in the first suit, there is reason to be concerned about the plaintiff's allocation of resources. Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or "a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure." Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952). Although neither judges, the parties, nor the adversary system performs perfectly in all cases, the requirement of determining whether the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard.
Some litigants - those who never appeared in a prior action - may not be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their position. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d, at 811, 122 P.2d, at 894. Also, the authorities have been more willing to permit a defendant in a second suit to invoke an estoppel against a plaintiff who lost on the same claim in an earlier suit than they have been to allow a plaintiff [402 U.S. 313, 330] in the second suit to use offensively a judgment obtained by a different plaintiff in a prior suit against the same defendant. 19 But the case before us involves neither due process nor "offensive use" questions. Rather, it depends on the considerations weighing for and against permitting a patent holder to sue on his patent after it has once been held invalid following opportunity for full and fair trial.
There are several components of the problem. First, we analyze the proposed abrogation or modification of the Triplett rule in terms of those considerations relevant to the patent system. Second, we deal broadly with the economic costs of continued adherence to Triplett. Finally, we explore the nature of the burden, if any, that permitting patentees to relitigate patents once held invalid imposes on the federal courts.
Starting with the premise that the statutes creating the patent system, expressly sanctioned by the Constitution, 20 represent an affirmative policy choice by Congress to reward inventors, respondents extrapolate a special public interest in sustaining "good" patents and characterize patent litigation as so technical and difficult as to present unusual potential for unsound adjudications. Although Triplett made no such argument in support of its holding, that rule, offering the unrestricted right to [402 U.S. 313, 331] relitigate patent validity, is thus deemed an essential safeguard against improvident judgments of invalidity. 21
We fully accept congressional judgment to reward inventors through the patent system. We are also aware that some courts have frankly stated that patent litigation can present issues so complex that legal minds, without appropriate grounding in science and technology, may have difficulty in reaching decision. 22 On the other hand, this Court has observed that issues of nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 present difficulties "comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in such frames of reference as negligence and scienter, and should be amenable to a case-by-case development." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S., at 18 . But assuming a patent case so difficult as to provoke a frank admission of judicial uncertainty, one might ask what reason there is to expect that a second district judge or court of [402 U.S. 313, 332] appeals would be able to decide the issue more accurately. Moreover, as Graham also indicates, Congress has from the outset chosen to impose broad criteria of patentability while lodging in the federal courts final authority to decide that question. 383 U.S., at 10 . In any event it cannot be sensibly contended that all issues concerning patent validity are so complex and unyielding. Nonobviousness itself is not always difficult to perceive and decide and other questions on which patentability depends are more often than not no more difficult than those encountered in the usual nonpatent case. 23
Even conceding the extreme intricacy of some patent cases, we should keep firmly in mind that we are considering the situation where the patentee was plaintiff in the prior suit and chose to litigate at that time and place. Presumably he was prepared to litigate and to litigate to the finish against the defendant there involved. Patent litigation characteristically proceeds with some deliberation and, with the avenues for discovery available under the present rules of procedure, there is no reason to suppose that plaintiff patentees would face either surprise or unusual difficulties in getting all relevant and probative evidence before the court in the first litigation.
Moreover, we do not suggest, without legislative guidance, that a plea of estoppel by an infringement or [402 U.S. 313, 333] royalty suit defendant must automatically be accepted once the defendant in support of his plea identifies the issue in suit as the identical question finally decided against the patentee or one of his privies in previous litigation. 24 Rather, the patentee-plaintiff must be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that he did not have "a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue his claim the first time." Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (Mass. 1960). This element in the estoppel decision will comprehend, we believe, the important concerns about the complexity of patent litigation and the posited hazard that the prior proceedings were seriously defective.
Determining whether a patentee has had a full and fair chance to litigate the validity of his patent in an earlier case is of necessity not a simple matter. In addition to the considerations of choice of forum and incentive to litigate mentioned above, 25 certain other factors immediately emerge. For example, if the issue is nonobviousness, appropriate inquiries would be whether the first validity determination purported to employ the standards announced in Graham v. John Deere Co., supra; whether the opinions filed by the District Court and the reviewing court, if any, indicate that the prior case was one of those relatively rare instances where the courts wholly failed to grasp the technical subject matter and issues in suit; and whether without fault of his own the patentee was deprived of crucial evidence or witness in the first litigation. 26 But as so often is the case, no one [402 U.S. 313, 334] set of facts, no one collection of words or phrases, will provide an automatic formula for proper rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end, decision will necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity.
We are not persuaded, therefore, that the Triplett rule, as it was formulated, is essential to effectuate the purposes of the patent system or is an indispensable or even an effective safeguard against faulty trials and judgments. Whatever legitimate concern there may be about the intricacies of some patent suits, it is insufficient in and of itself to justify patentees relitigating validity issues as long as new defendants are available. This is especially true if the court in the second litigation must decide in a principled way whether or not it is just and equitable to allow the plea of estoppel in the case before it.
An examination of the economic consequences of continued adherence to Triplett has two branches. Both, however, begin with the acknowledged fact that patent litigation is a very costly process. Judge Frank observed in 1942 that "the expense of defending a patent suit is often staggering to the small businessman." Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641 (CA2 1942) (concurring opinion). In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 669 (1969), we noted that one of the benefits accruing to a businessman accepting a license from a patentee who was threatening him with a suit was avoiding "the necessity of defending an expensive infringement action during the period when he may be least able to afford one." Similarly, in replying to claims by alleged [402 U.S. 313, 335] infringers that they have been guilty of laches in suing on their patents, patentees have claimed that the expense of litigating forced them to postpone bringing legal action. See, e. g., Baker Mfg. Co. v. Whitewater Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1008, 1014-1015 (CA7 1970). In recent congressional hearings on revision of the patent laws, a lawyer-businessman discussing a proposal of the American Society of Inventors for government-sponsored insurance to provide funds for litigation to individual inventors holding nonassigned patents stated: "We are advised that the average cost for litigating a patent is about $50,000." 27
This statement, and arguments such as the one made in Baker Mfg., supra, must be assessed in light of the fact that they are advanced by patentees contemplating action as plaintiffs, and patentees are heavily favored as a class of litigants by the patent statute. Section 282 of the Patent Code provides, in pertinent part:
Statistics tend to bear this out. Patent suits constitute between 1% and 2% of the total number of civil cases filed each year in the District Courts. 29 Despite this relatively small figure, and notwithstanding the overwhelming tendency to try these suits without juries, 30 [402 U.S. 313, 337] patent cases that go to trial seem to take an inordinate amount of trial time. 31 While in 1961 a Senate staff report stated that the "typical patent trial, without a jury, was completed in 3 days or less," 32 recent figures indicate that this description of the time required is today [402 U.S. 313, 338] inaccurate. 33 And time - particularly trial time - is unquestionably expensive.
As stated at the outset of this section, the expense of patent litigation has two principal consequences if the Triplett rule is maintained. First, assuming that a perfectly sound judgment of invalidity has been rendered in an earlier suit involving the patentee, a second infringement action raising the same issue and involving much of the same proof has a high cost to the individual parties. The patentee is expending funds on litigation to protect a patent which is by hypothesis invalid. These moneys could be put to better use, such as further research and development. The alleged infringer - operating as he must against the presumption of validity - is forced to divert substantial funds to litigation that is wasteful.
The second major economic consideration is far more significant. Under Triplett, only the comity restraints flowing from an adverse prior judgment operate to limit the patentee's right to sue different defendants on the same patent. In each successive suit the patentee enjoys the statutory presumption of validity, and so may easily put the alleged infringer to his expensive proof. As a consequence, prospective defendants will often decide that paying royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable to the costly burden of challenging the patent. [402 U.S. 313, 339]
The problem has surfaced and drawn comment before. See, e. g., Nickerson v. Kutschera, 419 F.2d 983, 988 n. 4 (CA3 1969) (dissenting opinion); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d, at 641-642 (concurring opinion). In 1961, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights published a staff study of infringement and declaratory judgment actions terminated in the district courts and courts of appeals during 1949-1958; the report showed 62 actions commenced after an earlier determination that the patent in suit was not valid. It also noted that the "vast majority" of such suits were terminated without a second adjudication of validity. 1961 Staff Report 19. It is apparent that termination without a second adjudication of validity was the result of a licensing agreement or some other settlement between the parties to the second suit. It is also important to recognize that this study covered only cases filed and terminated; there were undoubtedly more suits that were threatened but not filed, because the threat alone was sufficient to forestall a challenge to the patent.
This is borne out by the observations of the President's Commission on the Patent System and recent testimony on proposals for changes in the patent laws. Motivated by the economic consequences of repetitious patent litigation, the Commission proposed:
In the Senate hearings, a member of the President's Commission remarked:
Two Terms ago in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969), we relied on both lines of authority to abrogate the doctrine that in a contract action for unpaid patent royalties the licensee of a patent is estopped from proving "that his licensor was demanding royalties for the use of an idea which was in reality a part of the public domain." 395 U.S., at 656 . The principle that "federal law requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by a valid patent," 395 U.S., at 668 , found support in Sears and Compco and the first line of cases discussed above. 43 The holding that licensee estoppel was no longer tenable was rooted in the second line of cases eliminating obstacles to suit by those disposed to challenge the validity of a patent. 395 U.S., at 663 -668. Moreover, as indicated earlier, we relied on practical considerations that patent licensees "may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery." 395 U.S., at 670 .
To be sure, Lear obviates to some extent the concern that Triplett prompts alleged infringers to pay royalties on patents previously declared invalid rather than to engage in costly litigation when infringement suits are [402 U.S. 313, 346] threatened. Lear permits an accused infringer to accept a license, pay royalties for a time, and cease paying when financially able to litigate validity, secure in the knowledge that invalidity may be urged when the patentee-licensor sues for unpaid royalties. Nevertheless, if the claims are in fact invalid and are identical to those invalidated in a previous suit against another party, any royalties actually paid are an unjust increment to the alleged infringer's costs. Those payments put him at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other alleged infringers who can afford to litigate or have successfully litigated the patent's validity.
This has several economic consequences. First, the alleged infringer who cannot afford to defend may absorb the royalty costs in order to compete with other manufacturers who have secured holdings that the patent is invalid, cutting the profitability of his business and perhaps assuring that he will never be in a financial position to challenge the patent in court. On the other hand, the manufacturer who has secured a judicial holding that the patent is invalid may be able to increase his market share substantially, and he may do so without coming close to the price levels that would prevail in a competitive market. Because he is free of royalty payments, the manufacturer with a judgment against the patent may price his products higher than competitive levels absent the invalid patent, yet just below the levels set by those manufacturers who must pay royalties. Third, consumers will pay higher prices for goods covered by the invalid patent than would be true had the initial ruling of invalidity had at least the potential for broader effect. And even if the alleged infringer can escape royalty obligations under Lear when he is able to bear the cost of litigation, any royalty payments passed on to consumers are as a practical matter unrecoverable by those who in fact paid them. Beyond all of this, the [402 U.S. 313, 347] rule of Triplett may permit invalid patents to serve almost as effectively as would valid patents as barriers to the entry of new firms - particularly small firms.
Economic consequences like these, to the extent that they can be avoided, weigh in favor of modification of the Triplett mutuality principle. Arguably, however, the availability of estoppel to one charged with infringement of a patent previously held invalid will merely shift the focus of litigation from the merits of the dispute to the question whether the party to be estopped had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in the first action. Moore & Currier, supra, n. 7, at 309-310. It would seem sufficient answer to note that once it is determined that the issue in both actions was identical, it will be easier to decide whether there was a full opportunity to determine that issue in the first action than it would be to relitigate completely the question of validity. And, this does not in fact seem to have been a problem in other contexts, where strict mutuality of estoppel has been abandoned.
It has also been suggested that 35 U.S.C. 285, which allows a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party "in exceptional cases," 44 and 35 U.S.C. 288, under which a patentee forfeits his right to recover costs even as to the valid claims of his patent if he does not disclaim invalid claims before bringing suit, work to inhibit repetitious suits on invalid patents. But neither of these provisions can operate until after litigation has occurred, and the outlay required to try a lawsuit presenting validity issues is the factor which undoubtedly forces many alleged infringers into accepting [402 U.S. 313, 348] licenses rather than litigating. If concern about such license agreements is proper, as our cases indicate that it is, the accused infringer should have available an estoppel defense that can be pleaded affirmatively and determined on a pretrial motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8 (c), 12 (c), and 56.
As the preceding discussion indicates, although patent trials are only a small portion of the total amount of litigation in the federal courts, they tend to be of disproportionate length. 45 Despite this, respondents urge that the burden on the federal courts from relitigation of patents once held invalid is de minimis. They rely on the figures presented in the 1961 Staff Report: during the period 1948-1959, 62 federal suits were terminated which involved relitigation of a patent previously held invalid, a figure constituting about 1% of the patent suits commenced during the same period. The same figures show that these 62 suits involved 27 patents, indicating that some patentees sue more than once after their patent has been invalidated. Respondents also urge that most of these 62 suits were settled without litigation. 1961 Staff Report 19. But, as we have suggested, this fact cuts both ways.
Even accepting respondents' characterization of these figures as de minimis, it is clear that abrogation of Triplett will save some judicial time if even a few relatively lengthy patent suits may be fairly disposed of on pleas of estoppel. More fundamentally, while the cases do discuss reduction in dockets as an effect of elimination of the mutuality requirement, they do not purport to hold that predictions about the actual amount of judicial time that will be saved under such a holding control decision [402 U.S. 313, 349] of that question. Of course, we have no comparable figures for the past decade concerning suits begun after one declaration of invalidity, although a number of recent, significant examples of repeated litigation of the same patent have come to our attention. 46 Regardless of the magnitude of the figures, the economic consequences of continued adherence to Triplett are serious and any reduction of litigation in this context is by comparison an incidental matter in considering whether to abrogate the mutuality requirement.
It is clear that judicial decisions have tended to depart from the rigid requirements of mutuality. In accordance with this trend, there has been a corresponding development of the lower courts' ability and facility in dealing with questions of when it is appropriate and fair to impose an estoppel against a party who has already litigated an issue once and lost. As one commentator has stated:
Res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses that must be pleaded. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (c). The purpose of such pleading is to give the opposing party notice of the plea of estoppel and a chance to argue, if he can, why the imposition of an estoppel would be inappropriate. Because of Triplett v. Lowell, petitioner did not plead estoppel and respondents never had an opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of such a plea on the grounds set forth in Part III-A of this opinion. Therefore, given the partial overruling of Triplett, we remand the case. Petitioner should be allowed to amend its pleadings in the District Court to assert a plea of estoppel. Respondents must then be permitted to amend their pleadings, and to supplement the record with any evidence showing why an estoppel should not be imposed in this case. If necessary, petitioner may also supplement the record. In taking this action, we intimate no views on the other issues presented in this case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] The Foundation claimed that all of the Isbell patent's 15 claims except numbers 6, 7, and 8 were infringed by one or more of Winegard's 22 antenna models designed for receiving television signals.
[ Footnote 3 ] The District Judge held:
[ Footnote 4 ] See Petition for Certiorari 13. The grant of certiorari was not limited to the validity vel non of the Isbell patent.
[ Footnote 5 ] See also Nickerson v. Kutschera, 419 F.2d 983, 984 (CA3 1969); id., at 984-988 (Hastie, C. J., dissenting); Nickerson v. Kutschera, 390 F.2d 812 (CA3 1968); Tidewater Patent Development Co. v. Kitchen, 371 F.2d 1004, 1006 (CA4 1966); Aghnides v. Holden, 226 F.2d 949, 951 (CA7 1955) (Schnackenberg, J., concurring); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 290 F. Supp. 308, 317-319 (CD Cal. 1968) (holding that Triplett did not bar an infringement suit defendant's motion for summary judgment on res judicata grounds because (1) the statements as to mutuality of estoppel were dicta, and (2) the Triplett rule conflicted not only with more recent precedent in the estoppel area but also with the spirit of certain provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted six years after Triplett was decided); Nickerson v. Pep Boys - Manny, Moe & Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221 (Del. 1965). In the latter case, Judge Steel imposed an estoppel on facts somewhat similar to those before us. He analyzed the cases relied on in Triplett, id., at 221-222, and concluded: "[f]rom the standpoint of the precedents [it cities], . . . Triplett v. Lowell does not rest upon too solid a foundation." Id., at 222. Cf. Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 543, 372 F.2d 969 (1967); Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 281 F. Supp. 704, 707-708 (EDNY 1968).
[ Footnote 6 ] In rebuttal, counsel for petitioner made it clear that he was urging a "modification" of Triplett.
The instant case is not one where the parties have not briefed or argued a question that the Court nevertheless finds controlling under its authority to notice plain error. See Rule 40 (1) (d) (2), [402 U.S. 313, 321] Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States; Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717 (1962). Rather, given what transpired at oral argument, the case is like Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). There, after granting certiorari, we asked the parties to brief and argue the continued validity of The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). The petitioner, who would have stood to gain if The Harrisburg perished, argued that that decision should be overruled, but strongly maintained that it was unnecessary to do so in order to afford her relief. Respondent, of course, argued that The Harrisburg should be left intact. The United States, appearing as amicus curiae, urged the Court to overrule The Harrisburg, and that was the result.
Moreover, in a landmark decision involving an important question of judicial administration in the federal courts, this Court overruled a prior decision of many years' standing although the parties did not urge such a holding in their briefs. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 66 , 68-69 (1938). See also R. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 281-282 (1949). While the question here is hardly of comparable importance, it is a significant one, in the same general field, and it has been fully briefed and argued by the parties and amici. See Moragne, 398 U.S., at 378 -380, n. 1; cf. NLRB v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 337 U.S. 656, 661 -662 (1949).
[ Footnote 7 ] See also 225 U.S., at 130 -131; Stone v. Farmers' Bank, 174 U.S. 409 (1899); Keokuk & W. R. Co. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301, 317 (1894); Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 549, 552 (1887). Bigelow also spent some time discussing one of the many exceptions to the mutuality requirement, 225 U.S., at 127 -128. These "exceptions" are described in Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 Tul. L. Rev. 301, 311-329 (1961), and Note, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1010, 1015-1017 (1967).
[ Footnote 8 ] Under the topic head "persons not Parties or Privies," 93 provides:
[ Footnote 9 ] Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396, 398 (1872); Jenkins v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 89 S. C. 408, 71 S. E. 1010 (1911); United States v. Wexler, 8 F.2d 880 (EDNY 1925); Brobston v. Darby Borough, 290 Pa. 331, 138 A. 849 (1927); Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S. E. 314 (1927); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N. Y. 305, 183 N. E. 506 (1932); Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (Super. Ct. 1934); see also Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 19, 9 N. E. 2d 758, 760 (1937). In the latter case, the New York Court of Appeals stated:
[ Footnote 10 ] The principle was attacked in Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 Va. L. Rev. (n. s.) 241, 245-247 (1923); Comment, 35 Yale L. J. 607, 610 (1926); Comment, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 93, 94 (1934); Note, 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 565, 570-573 (1941); Recent Decisions, 27 Va. L. Rev. 955 (1941); Recent Cases, 15 U. Cin. L. Rev. 349 (1941). Cf. Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 Yale L. J. 299, 303 (1929); Comment, 23 Ore. L. Rev. 273 (1944); Recent Cases, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 889 (1941).
[ Footnote 11 ] For discussion of the "offensive-defensive" distinction, see generally Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 27, 43-76 (1964); Note, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1010 (1967). See also Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957); Note, 68 Col. L. Rev. 1590 (1968); Note, 52 Cornell L. Q. 724 (1967).
[ Footnote 12 ] In federal-question cases, the law applied is federal law. This Court has noted, "It has been held in non-diversity cases, since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, that the federal courts will apply their own rule of res judicata." Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946). See also Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1723, 1739, 1745 (1968); id., cases cited at 1739-1740, nn. 62-64.
[ Footnote 13 ] See, e. g., Lober v. Moore, 135 U.S. App. D.C. 146, 417 F.2d 714 (1969); Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88, 92-95 (CA3 1969); Seguros Tepeyac, S. A., Compania Mexicana v. Jernigan, 410 F.2d 718, [402 U.S. 313, 326] 726-728 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969); Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 378 F.2d 876, 878-879 (CA5), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (CA4 1965); Kurlan v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 625, 628-629 (CA2 1965); United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-730 (ED Wash., Nev. 1962), aff'd as to res judicata, sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404-405 (CA9 1964); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., supra, at 954-956; Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.2d 870, 872-873 (CA6 1959); People v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 232 F.2d 474, 477 (CA10 1956); Adriaanse v. United States, 184 F.2d 968 (CA2 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 932 (1951); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298, 302-305 (Md. 1967); Mathews v. New York Racing Assn., Inc., 193 F. Supp. 293 (SDNY 1961); Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298 (Mass. 1960).
[ Footnote 14 ] See cases cited n. 9, supra. A most recent canvass of cases is presented in Note, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1010 (1967).
The Supreme Court of Oregon was the most recent state court to adopt Bernhard. Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Ore. 1, 474 P.2d 329 (1970); see also Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370, 376-377 (Alaska 1970); Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 56, 451 P.2d 814, 822 (1969); Pat Perusse Realty Co. v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 238 A. 2d 100 (1968); Sanderson v. Balfour, 109 N. H. 213, 247 A. 2d 185 (1968); Home Owners Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448, 451-455, 238 N. E. 2d 55, 57-59 (1968) (approving use of Bernhard by a defendant against a previously [402 U.S. 313, 327] losing plaintiff); DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N. Y. 2d 141, 225 N. E. 2d 195 (1967); Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N. W. 2d 741 (1964); Lucas v. Velikanje, 2 Wash. App. 888, 471 P.2d 103 (1970) (lower state appellate court held that State Supreme Court would follow Bernhard in an appropriate case); Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co., 20 Mich. App. 140, 173 N. W. 2d 777 (1969); Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N. J. Super, 96, 232 A. 2d 470 (1967); Lynch v. Chicago Transit Authority, 62 Ill. App. 2d 220, 210 N. E. 2d 792 (1965).
[ Footnote 15 ] See F. James, Civil Procedure 552-573 (1965); Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1723, 1724 (1968).
[ Footnote 16 ] See Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353 (CA4 1965); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439 (1962); Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S. E. 314 (1927); Vestal, supra, n. 15, at 1724; Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 683 (1966).
[ Footnote 17 ] We agree with the Government that Congress has not approved the Triplett rule, either by its failure to modify that rule over the years, see Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 241 -242 (1970); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 -70 [402 U.S. 313, 328] (1946); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 -120 (1940); by anything that transpired during the preparation for and accomplishment of the 1952 revision of the Patent Code; or because in rem invalidity provisions, see n. 34, infra, have disappeared from recent proposals for reform of the patent statute.
[ Footnote 18 ] Professors Moore and Currier point out that one of the underpinnings of the general concept of res judicata is the prevention of harassment of some litigants by the repeated assertion of the same or different claims against them by others, and that this problem is simply not present where the person asserting an estoppel was not a party (or privy to a party) in the earlier suit. They then argue that "the doctrine of judicial finality is not a catchpenny contrivance to dispose of cases merely for the sake of disposition and clear up dockets in that manner." Moore & Currier, supra, n. 7, at 308. On the other hand, Professor Vestal argues that "[j]udges, overwhelmed by docket loads, are looking for devices to expedite their work. Preclusion offers an opportunity to eliminate litigation which is not necessary or desirable." Vestal, supra, n. 15, at 1724.
[ Footnote 19 ] But see United States v. United Air Lines, supra; Zdanok v. Glidden Co., supra; Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 25, 28-37 (1965); Vestal, 50 Iowa L. Rev., at 55-59; cf. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 Col. L. Rev. 1457 (1968); Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 433, 448-454 (1960); Note, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1010 (1967).
[ Footnote 20 ] U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 8.
[ Footnote 21 ] The Court of Claims has stated:
[ Footnote 22 ] See Nyyssonen v. Bendix Corp., 342 F.2d 531, 532 (CA1 1965); Harries v. Air King Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 164 (CA2 1950); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (SDNY 1911).
[ Footnote 23 ] The Triplett rule apparently operates to defeat a plea of estoppel where a patent has been declared invalid under provisions other than 35 U.S.C. 103, the section defining nonobviousness of the subject matter as a prerequisite to patentability and giving rise to many technical issues which it is claimed courts are poorly equipped to judge. Under 101 and 102 of the 1952 Act, patentability is also conditioned on novelty and utility. Some subsections of 102 - each of which can result in the loss of a patent - involve completely nontechnical issues. Yet the breadth of Triplett would force defendants in repetitious suits on a patent invalidated on one of these grounds to repeat proof that may be simple of understanding yet expensive to produce.
[ Footnote 24 ] See nn. 34-35, infra.
[ Footnote 25 ] See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d, at 956; Teitelbaum Furs, Inc., 58 Cal. 2d, at 606-607, 375 P.2d, at 441; cf. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540-541 (CA2 1965).
[ Footnote 26 ] It has been argued that one factor to be considered in deciding whether to allow a plea of estoppel in a second action is the possibility that the judgment in the first action was a compromise verdict [402 U.S. 313, 334] by a jury. This problem has not, however, been deemed sufficient to preclude abrogation of the mutuality principle in other contexts. Nor would it appear to be a significant consideration in deciding when to sustain a plea of estoppel in patent litigation, since most patent cases are tried to the court. See n. 30, infra.
[ Footnote 27 ] Hearings on Patent Law Revision before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 616 (1968) (statement of Henry J. Cappello, President, Space Recovery Research Center, Inc., and consultant on patent policy for the National Small Business Association) (hereafter 1968 Senate Hearings).
[ Footnote 28 ] Hearings on Patent Law Revision before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 103 (1967) (statement of James W. Birkenstock, Vice President, I. B. M. Corp.) (hereafter 1967 Senate Hearings).
It is significant that the President's Commission identified as one of its primary objectives "reduc[ing] the expense of obtaining and litigating a patent." "To Promote the Progress of . . . Useful Arts" In an Age of Exploding Technology, Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System 4 (1966) (hereafter Commission Report). Judge Rich of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, whose public reaction to the Commission Report was mixed, did agree that "[l]itigation being as expensive as it is, no one embarks upon it lightly." Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 641, 644 (1967).
[ Footnote 29 ] In fiscal 1968, 71,449 civil actions were filed in the federal district courts, 857 of which were patent suits. In fiscal 1969, 77,193 civil suits were filed; 889 involved patents. In fiscal 1970, 87,321 civil suits were initiated, 1,023 of which involved patents. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968, Table C-2 (1969); Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1969, Table C-2 (1970); Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1970, Table C-2 (temp. ed. 1971) (hereafter Annual Report 1968, etc.).
[ Footnote 30 ] Most patent cases are tried to the court. In fiscal 1968, 1969, and 1970, the total number of patent cases going to trial and the number of patent cases going to juries were, respectively: 1968 - 131, 2; 1969 - 132, 8; and 1970 - 119, 3. Annual Reports 1968-1970, Table C-8.
[ Footnote 31 ] The table below compares patent cases tried to the court during fiscal 1968, 1969, and 1970 with all nonjury civil cases tried during the same years. It reveals several facts: (1) something over 90% of all civil litigation is concluded within three full trial days, but less than half the patent cases are concluded in such a period of time; (2) whereas between 1.2% and 1.7% of civil nonjury trials in general require 10 or more trial days, between 14.7% and 19% of the patent cases tried to the court require 10 or more days to conclude; and (3), while the three-year trend in the district courts appears to be toward more expeditious handling of civil cases tried without a jury in terms of an annual increase in the percentage of cases concluded in three trial days or less and an overall decrease in the percentage of cases requiring 10 or more days, the trends in patent litigation are exactly contrary.
Total patent non-jury trials. . . 129 124 116
Approx. % of non-jury civil cases concluded in 3 trial days or less. . . . . . . . . . . 92.2 92.8 93.1
Approx. % of non-jury patent cases concluded in 3 trial day or less. . . . . . . . . . . . 49.6 46.8 44.0
Approx. % of non-jury civil trials taking 10 or more trial days to conclude. . . . . . . . . 1.7 1.2 1.3
Approx. % of non-jury patent trials taking 10 or more trial days to conclude. . . . . . 14.7 15.3 19
Source: Annual Reports 1968-1970, Table C-8.
[ Footnote 32 ] An Analysis of Patent Litigation Statistics, Staff Report of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1961) (Committee Print) (hereafter 1961 Staff Report).
[ Footnote 33 ] See n. 31, supra. The 1961 Staff Report also noted that during the "fiscal years 1954-58 . . . nine [patent] trials consumed 20 or more days." Id., at 2. Further examination of recent figures from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts indicates that this statement would also be of questionable validity today. In fiscal 1968, 38 civil trials that took 20 days or more to try were terminated. Of these, five, or about 13%, were patent cases. The comparable figures for fiscal 1969 are 28 civil trials requiring 20 or more days concluded, seven (25%) of which were patent cases. In fiscal 1970, 32 such civil cases were terminated; seven, or about 22%, of these suits were patent cases. Annual Reports, 1968-1970, Table C-9.
[ Footnote 34 ] "Estoppel and cancellation
[ Footnote 35 ] "Cancellation by court
[ Footnote 36 ] See, e. g., Hearings on General Revision of the Patent Laws before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1967-1968); 1967 Senate Hearings, [402 U.S. 313, 342] supra, n. 28. In House Hearings, testimony on in rem invalidity provisions covered the full spectrum of opinion. The Patent Section of the American Bar Association was opposed. House Hearings 464-465. The Department of Justice favored it. Id., at 622. The Judicial Conference of the United States approved the provision in principle. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Feb. and Sept. 1968, p. 81. Testimony in the Senate Hearings was also varied.
[ Footnote 37 ] Although these bills died in committee, it is noteworthy that by ascribing binding effect to the first federal declaration of invalidity, some of the proposed provisions went beyond mere abrogation of Triplett's mutuality principle. Had the statutes been enacted as proposed, see nn. 34-35, supra, the question of whether the patentee had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of his patent in the first suit would apparently have been irrelevant once it was shown that the patentee had received notice that the validity of his patent was in issue.
[ Footnote 38 ] See generally Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 -230 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: The Search for a Unitary Theory, 35 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 512 (1967).
[ Footnote 39 ] United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 357 , 370 (1888); see also Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400 -401 (1947); Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 92 (1941); A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 -155 (1950) (concurring opinion).
[ Footnote 40 ] See also Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 389 (1948); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 -492 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 455 -459 (1940); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
[ Footnote 41 ] In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), the defendant in an infringement action was permitted to counterclaim for treble damages under 4 of the Clayton Act by asserting that the patent was invalid because procured or enforced with knowledge of fraud practiced on the Patent Office, "provided the other elements necessary to a [monopolization case under 2 of the Sherman Act] are present." Id., at 174.
[ Footnote 42 ] See MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 407 (1947); Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Mfg. Co., 329 U.S., at 398 -401; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., supra; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
[ Footnote 43 ] See Sears, 376 U.S., at 229 -231; see also Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 58-59 (CA7 1970); Kraly v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1349 (ND Ill. 1970).
[ Footnote 44 ] Including, apparently, a suit on a patent previously held invalid and as to which the second court can find no reasonable argument for validity. See Tidewater Patent Development Co. v. Kitchen, 371 F.2d 1004, 1013 (CA4 1966); Dole Valve Co. v. Perfection Bar Equipment, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 122 (ND Ill. 1970).
[ Footnote 45 ] See nn. 31-33, supra, and accompanying text.
[ Footnote 46 ] See, e. g., cases cited n. 5, supra; Brief for Petitioner B-T 13-14; Brief for the United States as amicus curiae 28 and 32 n. 12. [402 U.S. 313, 351]
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text:
Read the full story here Web Link posted Thursday, April 10, 2008, 11:10 AM
Town Square
School board learns more about parcel tax, but decides to hold off
Original post made on Apr 10, 2008
Read the full story here Web Link posted Thursday, April 10, 2008, 11:10 AM
Comments (15)
a resident of Valley View Elementary School
on Apr 10, 2008 at 6:18 pm
If a parcel tax is approved by the voters to preserve current programs during the state fiscal crisis, will the tax be repealed when the state restores full funding? What do you think?
a resident of Amador Valley High School
on Apr 10, 2008 at 10:46 pm
No Way. Once they have it, they will always want it. And they will want the amount to go up from there.
Did anyone watch the workshop the other night? Casey talked about the tax like it would be a slam dunk! And indicated that in order for a parcel tax to pass, a citizens group would need to be formed to put up the $80-90,000 to run the campaign! The district can only put out 'neutral' literature but you can bet there will be plenty of money spent by the district. And the unions. But I was dumbfounded by the expectations that community members would step forward with that much money to pay for the campaign!
a resident of Oak Hill
on Apr 10, 2008 at 11:29 pm
Was watching the Livermore School District board meeting on one of the local channels a while ago and they mentioned making their parcel tax permanent. One person connected to the board felt they would have no problem making the tax permanent.
Mary hit it out of the park.... Even if the state funding returned to "normal" the PUSD parcel tax would probably be used to fund new programs that would "need to be funded" if the state funding returned to the delimma it's in at the present time. Don't forget - the 50+ new programs the "Dream Team" came up with are floating around out there somewhere.
a resident of Amberwood/Wood Meadows
on Apr 11, 2008 at 8:52 am
This is also my opinion I related in another thread. Economies go up and down always, in cycles. Feeding the money pit is not a solution when the economy is down. Who wants more taxes when the economy is down? And once the parcel tax gets a foot in the door, you can bet there will be calls in the future to make it permanent. School districts need more flexibility with the funds they already get. Write your State legislature representatives and let them know this.
a resident of Another Pleasanton neighborhood
on Apr 11, 2008 at 12:45 pm
Everybody should make it clear to the legislatures that they should not be giving out any raises at the state level, including the union strong prison guards, if they are going to not give raises to teachers or worse, cut school spending. They are making a STRONG messages that our schools are not as important as the other state employees and I think that is totally wrong. The state has been given the responsibility to fund the schools and should be one of their highest priorities, if not the top priority.
Every school district is having budget problems because of what the state is currently proposing. From these actions, the state legislature is essentially raising our taxes without telling us since they are telling all the school districts to get a parcel tax. I personally do not think we have a revenue problem (I know my state taxes which are due next week did not go down this year and in fact went up from my previous year's taxes). If the state legislature gives ANY raise to any state employee and at the same time cuts funding to the schools, their action proves that they do not value education and the schools.
Don't be fooled into believing what some of the school board members say when they say a parcel tax gives us more control and less reliance on the state. The parcel tax they are talking about is around $4M. The school district budget is over $120M. Unless the board members intend to come back for an even greater tax later, like politicians seem to do, this additional tax, which should really be coming from the state, will not really give us stability.
a resident of Vintage Hills
on Apr 11, 2008 at 1:13 pm
Has anybody heard if the superintendent paid back his interest-free loan for his house? When he was hired I read that one of his benefits was an interest-free loan to purchase a house. I remember it being $200,000 or $250,000 but cannot remember. My guess is that the district did not receive any equity in his home with this interest free loan so the superintendent has also made money on his house thanks to the taxpayers. If he has not paid off this loan yet, I would hope that he feels strongly about our kids, like he says he does, and pays it back right away so the district can have use of that money. That would show a real Community of Character trait.
a resident of Birdland
on Apr 12, 2008 at 7:07 pm
No, he has not. The superintendents loan remains interest free until 18 months after he leaves the district.
In addition to the salary of $227,000 per year he receives some pretty good benefits:
10 holidays per year (more if another state holiday occurs on a weekend)
24 days of vacation per year (5 weeks)
$5,000 per year for life insurance
$10,000 per year into a tax sheltered annuity
$1,000 per month as a transportation allowance for use of his personal vehicle
Once retired receives taxpayer paid medical, dental and vision insurance for himself and his spouse until he reaches 65.
Posted by Tom, a resident of the Downtown neighborhood, on Feb 19, 2008 at 10:18 am
a resident of Another Pleasanton neighborhood
on Apr 12, 2008 at 9:23 pm
The state will never return money redirected at the state level and costs will continue to rise. Good schools need funds to run and this community, as well as every other community in the state who can afford it has been supplementing CA public education for years. We try and educate every one. We try to encourage students to think. It's not the place where we want to skimp on the quality of teachers or materials. The amount of money one would save by cutting back on the superintendent's salary is a drop in the bucket compared to what's needed by the schools. Shouldn't the person in charge of a school district such as this be able to live in the community he works in? Good enough to work here but not good enough to live here? The profit from education is the product and the product is what the students learn. In the long run they will give back many fold what their community has given them in the way of productive citizens.
Anybody ever ask themselves why foreign nationals want their children to have an American public school education, including college?
a resident of Another Pleasanton neighborhood
on Apr 12, 2008 at 9:46 pm
Bottom line: reform is needed at the state level, no question about that, but mismanagement from a government entity is NO EXCUSE for our local school board to approve the mismanagement of our district's funds.
It is easy to see that lately, Casey and staff have not been all that fiscally responsible with Pleasanton taxpayers' funds (approving pay raises and not long after that, issuing layoffs of much needed reading specialists is just not all that smart) ....... and that is INDEPENDENT of what the state does.
We have no control over the governor's actions, nor have we control over the state's legislature's actions, but WE CAN have a say over what goes on in Pleasanton, and what Casey and his staff have proposed is simply unacceptable.
a resident of Another Pleasanton neighborhood
on Apr 13, 2008 at 7:12 am
There are three board of trustee seats up for re-election (terms expire in December 2008) - if three new, competent people get in and replace the incumbents, that would give them a majority, and they alone could make decisions to undo some of what Casey has proposed. Hopefully this time around, the community will not support the incumbents. And hopefully, the community will say no to a parcel tax because the numbers are not accurate, they include pay raises for an already highly paid superintendent.
a resident of Amador Valley High School
on Apr 13, 2008 at 8:06 am
Amen.....Well said.....
"approving pay raises and not long after that, issuing layoffs of much needed reading specialists is just not all that smart"
"what Casey and his staff have proposed is simply unacceptable."
Amen.....Well said.....I want to vote for you Resident!!!!
"hopefully, the community will say no to a parcel tax because the numbers are not accurate, they include pay raises for an already highly paid superintendent."
I want to vote for you Resident!!!!
That is the problem with these posts, I would like to know who I agree with.
It is unfortunate that we know we cannot be public or our kids may be at risk.
Resident for President of the secret Society of Parents!!!
Resident for President! Resident for President! Resident for President!
a resident of Downtown
on Apr 13, 2008 at 12:30 pm
To "Normal funding", I believe it makes sense to have our leaders in our community (guess this fits into another topic out a school board member not living in our community). I don't know if it is wise to give a large loan like this for a house, interest-free, and no equity position in the house. I am sure the superintendent has made quite a bit of money on the house that has been subsidized by the taxpayers but we get none of the profits of the house. I have also heard that he has another house up in the mountains that he bought since being a superintendent here.
a resident of Another Pleasanton neighborhood
on Apr 13, 2008 at 1:08 pm
We can argue that point but it was minor one compared to the big picture.
Personalities aside, do you we want to attract top notch people or not? We are the MOST affluent midsize community in the country. We want excellent people to be able to work and live here. At least I do.
a resident of Vineyard Avenue
on Apr 13, 2008 at 2:18 pm
I want to know how much PSUD spends on existing technology and updating it every 3-4 years. Do we really need kindergarteners and first graders sitting in front of computer screens at the same time we are considering cutting their reading specialists? I have read over and over again that technology is the black hole that just keeps sucking the funds away from other vital programs. Updating a complete lab full of computers (33 at the elementary level) every 3-4 years must be costly. Is that really more important than reading, math, science, music....? Just a thought that maybe the list of possible cuts was pretty narrow in scope. I know that one board member wanted to look beyond the possible cut list which was compiled by teachers, administrators, and some community members.
a resident of Fairlands Elementary School
on Apr 13, 2008 at 2:49 pm
I think the superintendent has made a significant strategic error. If he had responded to the communities concerns about administrative raises and freezing salaries, as well as a few of the other concerns, the community would have been reassured by the responsiveness. Instead a lack of confidence has built which will work against any efforts toward a parcel tax.
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Common Ground
By Sherry Listgarten | 2 comments | 1,320 views
Labor unions win big in Sacramento
By Tim Hunt | 5 comments | 1,040 views

subset: commoncrawl


text:
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Instead of having to search for super useful threads like these, I felt it was a good idea having a forum dedicated to kiteboarding tips and tricks.
If there's a thread you feel is especially useful describing some aspect of kiting, use the "Report this post" button at the top right of every post. It's a upside down triangle with an exclamation point (!) in it. I will be notified and will move the topic if appropriate.
For examples of appropriate threads, refer to what those already found in this forum.


text:
Dear Cover Letters For An Entry-Level Social Media Position At Field & Stream Magazine,
My fiancée wants a small wedding, but my parents are insisting on inviting all of my extended relatives. Her family is small to begin with, so if all these extra people come from my side, it will feel very imbalanced, which is especially uncomfortable because her parents are paying. How can I make everyone happy?
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text:
Guest blogged by Jon Ponder, Pensito Review.
This is not a joke. Two Republican U.S. senators who disgraced themselves with extramarital affairs have signed on as sponsors of the Federal Marriage Amendment, which would prohibit same sex marriage anywhere in the United States.
The senators are David Vitter of Louisiana, who admitted he consorted with prostitutes over a long period of time, and Larry Craig of Idaho, who pleaded guilty to a charge of soliciting sex in a men's room.
The amendment states, "Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman."
Both Vitter and Craig were 2007 nominees to Pensito Review's GOP Adulterers Hall of Fame.


text:
Blizzard Working Hard on 'Loot 2.0', Exclusive Merch at SD Comic Con, Blue Posts, Code of Conduct Clarifications
In-game Store Preview - User Interface, Strings
Patch 5.4 - Tier 16 Warrior Set
Keep in mind that this is just a preview and the final sets may be different! This is especially true for this set, as it is still a little buggy.
Patch 5.4 - Flex Raid Queue UI
The Flex Raid queue has been added to the PvE finder UI.
Battle.Net Desktop Client Beta
Another wave of invites went out today, but this time the invite email had a new line in it! Be sure you are opted in for the test.
Originally Posted by Blizzard EntertainmentIn addition, closed-beta invitees who download and use the app during the closed-beta period will receive something cool from Blizzard and the Battle.net team in thanks.
Blue Posts
Originally Posted by Blizzard EntertainmentArena Skirmishes
Really? Must have missed that in the Patch Notes.
They are not planned to return with patch 5.4 at this time, this is why you didn't see it in the patch notes. We do plan on bringing them back in the future, we simply don't have a set date for when that will be, though.
If I may; why not? It's not hard to implement.
From an outside perspective, I can see why you would assume that. To the outside observer, bringing skirmishes back into the game should be as simple as flicking a switch to reactivate the old system. The issue is that it's sadly not that simple because while it may have functioned just fine with a previous version of the game, that doesn't guarantee that it will work now.
We hope to have skirmishes back soon, but we cannot make any promises on when that will be for the moment. (Blue Tracker / Official Forums)
Patch 5.4 Arena Changes
1. You cant play with random bad friends if you are serious because you will lose alot of rating
If you don't want to or cannot play with you're friends because your afraid of them ruining your rating, then there is unfortunately nothing that can be changed with the game to help with your particular dilemma. Even the old system didn't allow for this because you would also be afraid of them tanking your team and personal ratings.
2. seen what happend rbgs? wintrade wintrade wintrade someone will find a way to abuse it
We do take actions against cheating players, as has been seen in the past. Just because these actions are not made visible to the public does not change the fact that we take cheating very seriously. If you would like to report information regarding cheats or hacks, you can send it directly to firstname.lastname@example.com. We will be keeping an eye out for any abuse of the new system and take action where necessary.
If you want, jump onto the PTR to test the system once it's up and running. If you find any ways in which it can be abused, then please feel free to report it to us so that we can look into it.
3. this is only good for casuals or pve'ers that want to do pvp, not for the real pvpers its just gonna ruin it.
Please elaborate on why you think that this is so bad for the "real PvP'ers". In the long run this increases the pool of potential players greatly. This means that queue times will drop, the number of end of season rewards will increase and there will also be a larger competition for those rewards as well.
Not only for the above reasons is this good for high-end PvP'ers, but the people you deem as "casual PvP'ers" may end up finding a greater interest in arena if they are able to play against a greater pool of players and are able to queue with friends from other realms. This may mean that they end up becoming new high-end PvP'ers to add to that competition.
1. i just hope they implement something so that not every random i group up with for a quest or something can just queue up and ruin my rating.
That's a valid concern. I would assume (read; this isn't validated by actual facts, it's a personal thought) that there will be a prompt to enter the arena to prevent such action, declining it would mean that your personal statistics are not damaged. I will look into this and find out what kind of safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of people trying to damage ratings by queuing you up unexpectedly.
Or we need a skirmish mode.
We understand that there are lots of people that want skirmish arena back. We have plans for it to return, but unfortunately we aren't able to say when it will be back at this time. When we have more information about skirmishes coming back, we'll let you all know about it
I feel that even though this new system looks great, the feel of accomplishment of playing together as a team to reach that high rating or for some players even rank one, will be gone.
We understood that there would be some losses from introducing this new system but felt that more would be gained from it. We know that there are players that really enjoy the customization of teams and the comradery that came from them. We are still looking into options to help with preserving this feeling. Don't forget that these changes are still in early development, so keep your eyes open for new information about them.
That's very nice! Still, when you get thrown off, getting back will take approx 10 seconds it self.
The duration of the immunity may change in future iterations of the PTR, but feel free to test it out and give your feedback. (Blue Tracker / Official Forums)
Warrior (Forums / Skills / Talent Calculator)
Warrior Shield Requirements
Drede makes a lot of good points, much of which is in line with our thinking. We don't feel that looking up a macro on a website equates to player skill. He brings up a few other points (such as the HP loss) that make the current system less than ideal as well. Allowing the abilities to be usable at any time and strapping on a shield as a visual effect lets us clean up the way the ability is used while also keeping the original flavor.
The current system also has an interesting effect on balance. When you have an ability as useful as Shield Wall or Spell Reflect, but only a handful of players actually know how to use it, how do you balance that class? If you assume (probably correctly) that the average player won't bother swapping to a shield, you risk making the players who do swap too powerful. On the other hand, if you balance around the players using macros, you risk leaving everyone else behind.
It's a fascinating problem (from a design perspective) that is, ultimately, best resolved by just cleaning up how the abilities work to begin with. (Blue Tracker / Official Forums)
Paladin (Forums / Skills / Talent Calculator)
Patch 5.4 Paladin Burden of Guilt Change
A few points of clarification:
First off, we don't feel that this change is adding more crowd control to the game. As several posters in this thread have pointed out, taking Evil is a Point of View means you aren't taking Fist of Justice (which the vast majority of PvP Paladins are using in 5.3) or Repentance. You're sacrificing (or significantly weakening) one form of CC in order to gain another.
That said, it does allow access to a different form of CC. We feel it will open up some more options for Paladins in different Arena compositions. Though it may be less desirable if you're running with, for example, a Warlock or Priest, you may prefer it if you're with, say, a Rogue or Feral Druid.
We're also seeing very, very little usage out of Burden of Guilt. Right now, as I mentioned, the vast majority of PvP Paladins are using Fist of Justice. Of the remainder, most are taking Repentance. In fact, the majority of players taking Burden of Guilt are using it as Protection in PvE, and even then it's a very small percentage.
That said, we are still monitoring feedback very closely (that's what the PTR is for, after all). Hopefully this helps clear up our thinking a bit so that the discussion can continue!
The fact that there are so many forms of cc with different DRs available to different classes is exactly why so many people feel cc is out of control in pvp right now, why the heck would you intentionally make the problem worse?
This change doesn't add any more CC to the teams that are already heavily stacking it -- those teams will likely continue using Fist of Justice (or in some cases Repentance) as they are currently. It just allows the Paladin more options when they're on a team that doesn't synergize quite as well with another stun or incapacitate.
The diminishing returns issue is one we've talked about a few times. It's definitely a concern, but not one that we can really effectively address mid-expansion.
Even further, by taking the talent you can no longer use Turn Evil against Undead/Demons which I'm using now more than ever before due to the prevalence of Priests/Warlocks/DKs where it's very useful.
To clarify: you will still be able to cast Turn Evil against Undead and Demons with the talent selected. Not sure if that's what you were suggesting or not (I can see why you wouldn't want to) but wanted to make sure. (Blue Tracker / Official Forums)
Hunter (Forums / Skills / Talent Calculator)
Patch 5.4 Hunter Changes
As I've mentioned before, we're still discussing Hunter concerns. When we have an update, we will share it.
Please do not mistake silence for ignorance; we're following the discussion closely, and your constructive feedback is extremely valuable as part of the testing process. If we didn't want to hear it, we wouldn't have a PTR Discussion Forum (or even a PTR) in the first place. (Blue Tracker / Official Forums)
Blizzard Art Update
Blizzard has added more pieces to the World of Warcraft: Mists of Pandaria Art gallery.


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