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SASC - Fort Macleod - Solo Event #11Fort Macleod Airport
About this event
This is the eleventh SASC Solo Event of the season, for those that wish to take part in the championship the details are below.
Details on the season championship and other scheduled events can be found here:
Event Registration
Fort Macleod Airport
• $30 – Members1 Online (cutoff is 60hrs before event starts)
• $40 – Members1 Late Sign Up Fee (cutoff is 18hrs before event starts) or Onsite (e-transfer payment email@example.com)
• $40 – Non-Members Online (cutoff is 60hrs before event starts)
• $60 – Non-Members Late Sign Up Fee (cutoff is 18hrs before event starts) or Onsite (e-transfer payment firstname.lastname@example.com)
CASH WILL NO LONGER BE ACCEPTED AT ANY SASC EVENTS. Online payment via credit card, pre-paid credit card or Visa debit card is preferred, however on site e-transfer payments (send to firstname.lastname@example.com with passworth as "Southern") will also be accepted, a screen shot of the e-transfer must be shown to the workers at the onsite checkin.
1. Members of either the SASC or another WCMA Affiliated Club. Membership cards are to be shown at the on-site check in in order to be eligible for discount. No card, no discount, no exceptions.
$50 – Single
$75 – Family
Sign up for a membership here:
Daily Itinerary
Fort Macleod
7:30am – Course Setup
9:00am – On-Site Mandatory Check-In (with timing vehicle) & Vehicle Tech Inspection Close
9:15am – Guided Course Walk (aka Rookie Course Walk)
9:45am – Mandatory Drivers Meeting
10:00am – Timed Runs Begin
~4:00pm – Timed Runs Finish, Takedown & Cleanup
1. Anyone that has not checked in with the timing vehicle prior to 9:00am will not be allowed to run that day, no exceptions. Online registration is different from the on-site check-in with the workers in the timing vehicle.
2. Noise must be kept to a minimum prior to 10:00am, no unnecessary driving, no revving engines etc.
Championship Format
For those that wish to take part in the championship please read the following. Please note that participation in the championship is not mandatory.
1. STREET - All street classes
2. STOUR – All Street Touring (ST) classes, Classic American Muscle (CAM) classes and Solo Spec Coupe (SSC)
3. PREPMOD – All Prepared classes, Street Prepared (SP) classes, Street Modified (SM) classes, Modified classes and SSR
6. OPEN/CHALLENGE – The catchall/fun class (PAX of 1.0)
1. A Rookie is defined as someone who is a 1st year regular participant. Previous year random/occasional participation still allows for Rookie qualification. 3rd year participant no longer qualifies for Rookie, regardless of the number of events. Any 1st year regular participant does not qualify for 2nd year Rookie participation.
Scoring will be based on a best 7 of 14 events format and a minimum of two (2) scores must be used from each venue (Fort Macleod & YYC). Scoring within each of the above superclasses will be based on PAX/RTP of the applicable class. All of the day's count as a single event except practice events.
PAX/RTP values can be found here: https://www.autoxandtrack.com/scca-autocross-2018-pax-index-comparison/
Top 1 driver from each of the above mentioned superclasses will receive a jacket
Top 3 drivers from each of the above mentioned superclasses will receive a trophy
Sound Policy
We have a strict sound policy; The measurement will be taken at a point where the vehicle can reasonably be expected to be under load at full throttle. The measuring point will be 50 feet from the edge of the course using an ANSI Type 2 sound meter set to "A" weighting, "Slow" response. The microphone will be placed 3-4 feet above ground level, positioned perpendicular to vehicle direction of travel. Measurement will be taken at a minimum of 1 sound station but usually 2, rules apply for both stations.
If a vehicle registers a reading between 91.0-92.9dB the driver(s) will be given a courtesy warning that they are near the limit.
If a vehicle registers a reading at 93.0dB or greater the driver must make a mechanical change to the vehicle (ex. install a turn-down1, install a silencer, close an exhaust valve(s)2 etc.), the mechanical change must be shown to and accepted by the Event Chair or other SASC Executive member prior to the next run. A "mechanical delay" is permissible to make this change. If during the next run the driver(s) registers a second reading at 93.0dB or greater that vehicle will not be allowed to continue running (for both drivers in case of a two driver car).
Vehicles that register below the 92.9dB maximum in the measured section(s) of the course but are found to be excessively loud (eg. exhaust backfire, tire squeal etc.) in other sections of the course may also not be allowed to continue running if so deemed by the Event Chair or other SASC Executive member.
Please note that this also applies to showroom stock vehicles, we are aware that there are a very small handful of unmodified cars (ex. Porsche 911 GT3 and Ford Mustang 350R) that can exceed the 92.9dB maximum, these vehicles must still adhere to the sound policy.
Drivers of vehicles that blow over within their first two runs will receive their money back should they be unable to make a successful mechanical change and not able to continue their runs in a different vehicle. If the vehicle blows over after the first two runs refunds will not be issued.
Our sound policy is based on the SCCA's which can be found in Appendix 1 of the rules located here: https://www.scca.com/pages/solo-cars-and-rules
1. Turndowns can only be installed pointing directly upwards, downwards, or rearwards, pointing the turndown 90° away from the sound meter is not allowed.
2. Exhaust valves that are adjustable electronically via the push of a button inside the vehicle are acceptable.
Rules & Regulations
• No alcohol or drugs at the venue, zero tolerance
• No stunting/drifting/burnouts/hooning at any of our events
• You must obey all posted speed limits and drive respectfully on surrounding roads, those seen stunting, speeding or driving recklessly will be banned from future events
• This is a volunteer based sport, in order to drive you must also work, those that don't work their assignment both in the morning and afternoon will be banned from future events
• When competing, your personal vehicle insurance is void, if you attempt to make a claim that is considered insurance fraud. In the event of an incident the SASC will fully cooperate with insurance companies. The SASC carries insurance to protect the venue.
The ASN Autoslalom regs can be found here:
Valid helmets for Autoslalom competition in the 2018 season are:
• Snell 2015 SA, or 2015 M
• Snell 2010 SA, 2010 SAH, or 2010 M
• Snell 2005 SA, or 2005 M (expiry 31.12.2018)
• SFI Foundation 31.1/2015
• SFI Foundation 31.1/2010
• SFI Foundation 31.1/2005 (expiry 31.12.2018)
• ECE 22.05 (10 years from manufacturing date of helmet)
Starting in 2018 all helmets must pass a tech inspection, acceptable helmets will have a sticker affixed allowing their use in the 2018 season.
SCCA Rules & Car Classing Information can be found here:
Tech & Helmet Inspection
All vehicles will be checked by the Tech Steward or designate before they are allowed to compete, once a vehicle passes tech inspection a sticker is affixed to the inside of the windshield allowing the vehicle to compete for the duration of the 2018 season. A Tech Inspection includes but is not limited to:
• Vehicle is in the correct class
• No loose objects inside the passenger compartment
• Static brake test
• Battery is secure (no bungee cables/cords allowed)
• No leaks
• No excessive wheel play
• A valid helmet (a sticker will be affixed to the helmet after inspection, sticker is valid for the duration of the 2018 season)
The vehicle owner/driver is still ultimately responsible for the condition of the vehicle and must ensure that it is safe to operate.
Event requirements
Please bring a completed and signed vehicle self-inspection form with you to the event. Forms must be handed in to workers during on-site check in.


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Greek colonnade / WED 10-31-12 / Macbeth recipe / Eternally nameless Chinese principle / Banned book of 1955 / Australian city named for naturalist / Aleph follower
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
Constructor: Stu Ockman
Relative difficulty: Medium
THEME: WITCHES' BREW (64A: "Macbeth" recipe) — theme answers are a very incomplete list of ingredients from the WITCHES' BREW in "Macbeth"; each ingredient is clued [64-Across ingredient]:
Word of the Day: Peter GELB (59D: Peter ___, general manager of the Met) —
Peter Gelb (born 1953[1]) is an American arts administrator. He is currently General Manager of the Metropolitan Opera in New York City. (wikipedia)
GELB (really???) is not going to be known as anybody who is not a hardcore NYC opera aficionado). So the solving the puzzle basically involves getting enough crosses to infer an answer creepy enough to sound like a brew ingredient, and those crosses really aren't very pleasing—there's a slew of mediocre short fill in this thing. Plus, these theme answers hardly form a cohesive group. They are merely four of a much, much longer list of ingredients. These four allowed for symmetrical grid placement, I guess. Doesn't seem like a tight enough grouping to justify building a puzzle around. These ingredients just seem too arbitrary. Thumbs up to PROBOSCIS (3D: Notable nose) and BISHOPRIC (37D: Seat of a Catholic official), though. Very worthy long Downs.
Had only one real struggle—the LEG in LIZARD'S LEG. I had HAH instead of HEH at 55D: Villain's chuckle and had noooo idea who GELB was, and since it's not as if LIZARD'S LEG is something very famous, I had to exhaust possible LA- words before I realized the "A" was wrong. Switched to "E" and answer was obvious (despite the fact that GELB looked like a wrong answer).
- 7A: Billy of "Titanic" (ZANE) — I feel like he was somebody in the '90s (for instance, he was "The Phantom" in 1996), but now ... I don't know. I could picture him clearly, but it took me many seconds to retrieve the name.
- 19A: "From my cold, dead hands!" sloganeer (NRA) — they adopted that Heston bull*$&% as their *actual* slogan? Oh ... turns out the slogan (not originally the NRA's, but definitely popularized by that org.) preceded Heston's famous anti-Gore speech. Alrighty.
- 47D: Australian city named after a naturalist (DARWIN) — first thought: "DARWIN was a nudist?" I always get "naturalist" and "naturist" confused. Just an Al away.

subset: commoncrawl


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Joan Fontcuberta Work from Landscapes Without Memory. There is also a great review here. "Rather than venturing out into nature, Joan Fontcuberta creates plausible, even spectacular landscapes using Terragen, a computer program originally created for military and scientific uses that turns maps into images of three-dimensional terrain. For these three works, Fontcuberta scanned details of […]
Archives for posts tagged 'false'
Joan Fontcuberta
Saturday, 7 November 2009
Adrien Missika
Tuesday, 27 October 2009
Adrien Missika Work from Standing Waves and Postcards. Spend time on his website, the vast majority of his works are excellent. "Notions of authenticity and artificial images are at the heart of Missika's work. He subtly explores the relationship between the viewer and the world and depictions thereof. While his works reflect the visual symbolism […]
Simen Johan
Wednesday, 1 July 2009
Simen Johan Work from Until the Kingdom Comes. Great articles here, here, and here. "In Until the Kingdom Comes, Johan presents animals using escapism and fantasy to construct identity and purpose. Similar to his earlier work of children, this series explores our predilection towards imagination and emotion, rather than reason. Using digitally manipulated photography and […]


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Network: Starz
Episodes: 10 (hour)
Seasons: One
TV show dates: August 10, 2013 — October 19, 2013
Series status: Ended/cancelled
Performers include: Max Irons, James Frain, Rebecca Ferguson, Janet McTeer, Ben Lamb, Amanda Hale, Tom McKay, Aneurin Barnard, David Oakes, Faye Marsay, and Eleanor Tomlinson.
TV show description:
This historical drama takes place in 1464 England, before the Tudor dynasty ruled the country. War has been ravaging throughout the land over who is the rightful King of England. It is a bitter dispute between two sides of the same family, The House of York and The House of Lancaster.
The story is told through the perspectives of three different, yet equally relentless women — Elizabeth Woodville, Margaret Beaufort, and Anne Neville. They all use their skills in pursuit of the English throne.
King Edward IV (Max Irons) is the young monarch from the House of York who deposed the Lancastrian Henry VI. He's crowned King of England with the help of master manipulator Lord Warwick (James Frain), otherwise known as "The Kingmaker." Edward is always trying to do what's right for the country, himself, and his family. He is a strong leader and fierce soldier on the battlefield yet his trusting and forgiving nature can lead to his downfall.
When Edward falls in love with Elizabeth Woodville, Warwick's plan to control the throne comes crashing down. Incensed by the loss of Edward's ear, Warwick vows to have him replaced — even if it means using his daughters for his nefarious scheme.
Elizabeth Woodville (Rebecca Ferguson) is a young commoner from the House of Lancaster with angelic beauty and high intellect. She becomes widowed when her first husband is killed in a battle. Elizabeth is left to fend for herself with two young boys — until fate introduces her to the noble King Edward IV from the House of York. They fall madly in love and, after a secret wedding, she becomes Queen of England. At the outset of their lives together, Elizabeth's motives are pure, but once she finds herself on the throne, she sees the dangerous forces surrounding her in perilous politics of the day and becomes fiercely protective of her family.
The mother of Elizabeth, Jacquetta Woodville (Janet McTeer) is brilliantly sharp and manipulative. Her keen insight into court-life is the acumen that propels her daughter into power. Having already established herself as a leading lady in the court of Margaret d'Anjou (the former Queen of England), Jacquetta is no stranger to the perilous climb to the throne.
Anthony Rivers (Ben Lamb) is the brother of Elizabeth, and the eldest son of their parents Richard Woodville and Jacquetta. Anthony is protective of his sister and his family, and the only man at court whom Elizabeth can fully trust. Though he is a noble man, he will stop at nothing to keep his sister on the throne.
Margaret Beaufort (Amanda Hale) is a loyal Lancastrian, and a cousin to the deposed King Henry VI. She suffered a difficult childhood, being raised by a loveless and vindictive mother, Lady Beauchamp. In her darkest hour she turned to God for comfort. She now believes she has been sent a sign that her young son, Henry Tudor, is destined to be King. Margaret's terrifying determination to see her son take the throne borders on madness and she is willing to lay down her own life, or even kill, for what what she believes is destiny.
Jasper Tudor (Tom McKay), the second son of Owen Tudor and Catherine of Valois, is a diehard Lancastrian, and extremely loyal to his roots. When his elder brother Edward died, he swore to protect Margaret of Beaufort, Edward's wife, and her young son Henry Tudor. Jasper is very close to his sister-in-law Margaret. Many suspect that their relationship reaches far beyond friendship.
The brothers of King Edward IV are Richard (Aneurin Barnard), the Duke of Gloucester, and George (David Oakes), the Duke of Clarence. Youngest brother Richard is trustworthy, honorable, and an ambitious man who's also a highly regarded military commander. He's fiercely loyal to Edward while George is hungry to take the title of King at the first opportunity. He's a ruthlessly ambitious man who deeply resents the power his brother possesses.
The timid daughter of Lord Warwick, Anne Neville (Faye Marsay) has dreamed of the royal life. As she's grown older, Anne has begun to understand the danger that wearing the crown presents. Those who possess it must always guard themselves against those trying to take it. And those who want their hands on it will lie, cheat and kill to make it happen. Anne is not sure if constantly living in fear is the life she wants to lead.
Anne's sister is Isabel Neville (Eleanor Tomlinson), the eldest daughter of Lord Warwick. She's a strong-willed girl who shares her father's powers of manipulation. She knows that her primary duty is to marry well, ensuring the safety and security of her family. This results in Isabel sacrificing her own happiness to wed George in an arranged marriage and a loveless union.
Episode #10 — The Final Battle
Henry Tudor begins to recruit an army of French convicts. Richard III remains confident that his reign is unthreatened provided that Lord Stanley is on his side.
Following the death of his only son and heir, Richard casts his barren wife Anne aside in favour of his niece, Elizabeth of York. Anne demands that Elizabeth be referred to as "the bastard Elizabeth" but this decree is ignored. An embittered Anne dies of tuberculosis.
Elizabeth's mother is angered by events and warns of the curse they cast on Prince Edward's killers — that his children and their children will be struck down prematurely. This could include the young Elizabeth's children should she marry Richard.
Lady Margaret Beaufort is equally angered by Elizabeth's flirtations with King Richard, who has been promised to Henry Tudor once he regains the throne for the House of Lancaster. Margaret is also frustrated at being held under house arrest by her husband Lord Stanley, who she perceives to be against her son.
As Henry Tudor crosses the Channel with his raggedy army, a solar eclipse signals to all that a change is coming. Richard knows that his throne is at stake and Margaret sees the sign as a message from God that Henry must become king. She defies her house arrest to ride to Bosworth field where she pleads with Stanley to fight against the king. He refuses to state which side he will declare for.
Henry Tudor arrives and the battle commences at Bosworth. Tudor is clearly outmatched by the king's forces — until Stanley finally declares in favour of Tudor. Stanley's men slay Richard.
As Stanley kneels to offer Henry the crown, Beaufort declares herself "Margaret Regina," ordering her husband to remain kneeling before the mother of the king.
First aired: October 19, 2013.
What do you think? Do you like The White Queen TV series? Do you think it should be cancelled or renewed for another season?


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The protectors of the style of Disney hand-drawn animation that Walt, Roy O, and their team, worked so hard to develop are getting worried about the box office numbers for The Princess and the Frog. Rhett Wickham at LaughingPlace.com is calling for all Disney Fans to respond by going out en mass to see the film this weekend.
While I think that's a good idea, a stronger showing against Alvin & the Chipmunks would give the suits more confidence to greenlight future hand-drawn products. However, there are some unforeseen circumstances that are making an impact.
More pre-teen kids, boys and girls, are being taken to see Avatar than people expected. This is cutting into Disney's take. James Cameron has a couple of the things that Walt possessed; a love of new technology with the ability to harness it for story telling and the ability to tap into what the public wants, even before the public knows they want it. There's no one in Burbank who can do that right now. They're all up in Emeryville.
The Princess and The Frog also presented Disney a marketing challenge. How hard should they push the "first black princess" angle? How would they show it's not just a story for girls, while still being a princess movie? They chose to let the PR people handle the first one and I think they dropped the ball on the second just a little.
The Princess and The Frog has a lot going for it and certainly shows that Disney still has the ability to make hand-drawn style animation magical. But it also had enough flaws, a week second act and too many characters, that it didn't really generate great word of mouth, particularly when up against Avatar.
If you need a reason to go see The Princess and The Frog this weekend, do it for Roy E. Disney. Roy spent much of the later part of his career attempting to revive the art of animation at the Walt Disney Company. He played the rebel when necessary, but mostly kept his mouth shut when it came to the movies Eisner and Iger were making. Now, we get a return to Hand-Drawn animation and it runs into the one thing that it couldn't possibly defeat, the spirit of Walt.
Update: Roger Ebert noticed the similarity between what Cameron is doing and Walt Disney too.


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Just weeks after signing a large licensing deal with leading indy label representative ICE, Facebook has continued its march into the world of music with the news that it has now added Warner Music Group into the mix, the last major label that was not yet working with the social network.
Facebook has signed a wide-ranging licensing deal that covers all of Warner Music's recorded and published music catalogs. Music from these can now be used in "social experiences" on Facebook, Instagram, Messenger and Occulus. (WhatsApp for now is not included.)
The list of artists in the Warner stable is massive: it includes iconic names like the Eagles and early Madonna (pre 2010) through to Ed Sheeran, Nina Simone and Jay-Z.
Facebook has been working on a more comprehensive music licensing policy for months, some believe as it gears up to take a bigger step into music services itself.
But before anything like that can even be considered, though, it has had to sort out royalties around music that appears on Facebook already. A Warner spokesperson confirmed to me that it's not disclosing any terms. But reports have estimated that the prices of these deals are in the hundreds of millions of dollars to cover Facebook's 2.1 billion registered users.
Warner was the last big hold-out among the world's "big three" biggest labels, alongside Sony and Universal Music, which had yet to sign on to working with Facebook, something it highlighted when commenting on today's deal.
"The team at Facebook is creating a truly innovative product and is showing real commitment to its participation in the growth of the music business," said Eric Mackay, EVP, Global Digital Strategy, Warner/Chappell, in a statement. "We've taken our time to arrive at the best possible deal, one that recognises the value that music creates on social networks, while empowering our songwriters to reach audiences around the world, in a way that will spark creativity and conversation among their fans. Our incredible catalogue of songs will be represented throughout Facebook's platforms and we're excited to work together to create new opportunities for both our songwriters and Facebook's users."
In addition to Warner/Chappell, labels associated with WMG include Asylum, Atlantic, Big Beat, Canvasback, East West, Elektra, Erato, FFRR, Fueled by Ramen, Nonesuch, Parlophone, Reprise, Rhino, Roadrunner, Sire, Warner Bros., Warner Classics and Warner Music Nashville.
This is a very significant deal: it will mean that Warner Music will now be able to collect royalties on tracks that are used in videos and messages; and those posting content on Facebook and its network of social sites will be doing so in the legal clear.
For now, this covers just organic content from consumer users, but it sounds like the two will also be exploring how to bring this into advertising and other paid posts as well.
"Under the partnership, WMG and Facebook will continue to work together to develop new products that enable users to personalize their music experiences across Facebook, Messenger, Instagram and Oculus," Warner said in a statement, with the commercial aspect highlighted specifically by Ole Obermann, Warner Music Group's Chief Digital Officer.
"Our partnership with Facebook will help expand the universe of music streaming and create supplementary revenue for artists," he said. "Fan-created video is one of the most personal, social and often viral ways that music is enjoyed, but its commercial potential is largely untapped. This collaboration will lead to new possibilities for our artists, while enhancing the user experience across Facebook, Instagram and Oculus, and enabling people to communicate and express themselves using the music they love."
This is the latest in a string of music partnerships that Facebook has signed in recent months. Others include an agreement with Universal Music Group over user-generated videos; a deal with Sony/ATV; and a licensing deal with Kobalt, HFA/Rumblefish and Global Music Rights.
Separately, Facebook also has also pursued a secondary route of giving creators access to "no-name" music via a new service it's launched called Sound Collection.
Facebook has so far declined to comment on its longer-term ambitions in the world of music, but it has long been rumored to be interested in building its own streaming service, along the lines of Spotify, Pandora, and Apple Music.
More generally, as Facebook has faced a drop-off in user growth in mature markets, it's been looking for more ways to engage those users it already has, in competition with a plethora of rival social media services and dozens of other digital distractions, from Netflix to games to fiddling with your smart home appliances.
As Spotify — which is now preparing to go public — has shown, there is a lot of potential customer loyalty and scale in building successful standalone streaming services. It could be that Facebook is taking a page from that playbook and sees music as one potential way of helping to strengthen its own community efforts — community being the keyword at Facebook these days
"When Facebook and music come together, we have the power to bring people closer together," said Tamara Hrivnak, Head of Music Business Development and Partnerships, Facebook, in a statement. "Music brings to life the happy, the sad, the throwback and the funny in all the moments and messages we share with friends. We are delighted to partner with Warner, its artists and songwriters, and welcome them to our platforms."
We'll update this post as we learn more.


text: I didn't want to make another small release, but since interest in Sonic 1 seems to have spontaneously exploded, I don't suppose it will stay relatively unnoticed if I keep putting this off. SonED2 V1.03 v1.02 This version does away with the Sonic 1 sprite saving error. There was a mistake in the save routine related to the support I tried to add for the "Remember Sprite State" flag in 1.01. It's been fixed so the sprites save with proper ID and proper flag setting, so there shouldn't be any disappearing/wrong sprites in the level in newly-created files. V1.00 disabled the flag during load, and enabled it during save for all sprites. V1.01 corrupted some sprites and didn't save the flag. Loading files generated with either of those two versions will load the currupted data. Bad sprite settings will need to be corrected manually, however, all sprites' "Remember Sprite State" flag can be set to the default value for that object type by holding SHIFT and pressing 0 v1.03 This version is a quickfix to remove some early development code that was mistakenly included, which caused pressing 1, 2, 3, or 4 to effectively alter the editor's level size setting without correcting the level data array, meaning that accidental keypresses (and subsequent saving without correcting the issue) would cause loss/corruption of data. Ctrl+Arrows is and has been the proper method for resizing a level (for Sonic 1, Sonic 2's level system requires them to stay at a fixed size) ------------------------------------------------------- So that there aren't a million threads with the word "SonED2" in them, this is the one place for posts that have strictly to do with SonED2. However, as always, and as with all of my projects: -I won't answer questions or talk about future releases -I won't answer questions that are covered in the documentation -I won't answer otherwise retarded questions -I won't honor "feature requests". Any such request will more likely end up on a "not-to-do list" -I won't distribute sourcecode full or in-part for any reason whatsoever -The publicity of SonED2 (or any other project of my own) is a courtesy, not a service Moreover: -SonED2 is not a "ROM Editor", It edits individual files. Some extraction tools for the original games are provided, but ROM images are not and will not be -SonED2 is not "for disassemblies". I will not provide materials or information regarding any existing "disassembled"/"reverse-engineered" code -SonED2 is a data editing tool. It will not "cause your ROM to crash" and it will not "cause ASM errors". It is the user's responsibility to manage the use of their created/modified data, and to understand how to do exactly that; Anyone without a fair level of understanding of basic software/hardware principals has no business whining about what they think the problem is. Applying new data to any program is not a SonED2-related matter More statements will be added to the above if necessary. Anything not listed may be up for discussion


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The arrest of Essam el-Erian, the deputy leader of the Brotherhood's political arm, the Freedom and Justice party, was the latest in a wide-ranging crackdown of both the Islamist group's leaders and its rank-and-file members since the ouster of President Mohammed Morsi, who also hails from the Brotherhood.
Morsi, himself in detention, has been held at an undisclosed military location since the July 3 coup. He is facing charges of inciting supporters to murder his opponents while in office. Morsi's trial is due to begin Nov. 4. It is not yet clear if the 62-year old ousted president will appear in court.
El-Erian is also one of the defendants in the Morsi trial. He is accused of inciting Brotherhood followers to break up anti-Morsi protesters gathered outside the presidential palace late last year.
In photographs broadcast on state television following his arrest, the 59-year-old el-Erian is wearing a white galabiya, the traditional male robe, and a skullcap, and flashes a smile to the cameras. He is the latest senior Brotherhood leader arrested on warrants from state prosecutors who accuse the group's key figures of crimes ranging from inciting violence to providing weapons to supporters and threatening public order.
The official state news agency MENA said el-Erian was arrested after a raid on an apartment in the eastern suburb of New Cairo, where he had been hiding. He was later transferred to the Torah prison complex in southern Cairo, where most of the group's arrested leaders are held.
The agency said he will be interrogated at Torah on accusations of inciting violence in a number of anti-government protests.
While Morsi was in power, el-Erian frequently spoke publicly, often causing a stir as he turned from a moderate to a hard-line member of the group.
During a large-anti-Morsi demonstration last December outside the presidential palace, el-Erian went on a Brotherhood-affiliate television channel to ask supporters "in the tens of thousands, to besiege those thugs." At least 10 people died in subsequent clashes outside the palace.
While in hiding, el-Erian distributed messages to followers, urging them to denounce the coup and demand Morsi's reinstatement. In a recent pre-recorded message aired on the Al-Jazeera satellite news network, el-Erian criticized the military and the interim authorities and called on supporters, including students, to keep up their protests.
Hours after el-Erian's arrest, pro-Muslim Brotherhood student protesters stormed the administrative building of Al-Azhar Islamic university. They smashed windows and equipment while besieging the office of university's chief and other administrators.
The assault prompted university officials to call the police to break up the rowdy protests. Riot police forces entered the campus and freed the officials, security officials said. The university, where the Brotherhood has a strong base, has been scene to near-daily protests. Wednesday's protest, however, was the first time students threatened the university president; although they had besieged the administrative building before.
Mahmoud Salah, one of the protesters, denied the violence was the work of the students. He accused authorities of planting troublemakers among them to stir the violence. "Our protests are peaceful," he told The Associated Press. "We are against the coup."
Salah said police forces stormed the campus with armored vehicles and arrested students.
Television footage of the university showed damage inside the offices. Graffiti covered building walls, including one message inside that read: "CC Killer," referring to Egypt's military chief Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi.
Following Morsi's ouster, the country's new, military-backed authorities cracked down on the group, arresting hundreds of Brotherhood figures and putting top leaders on trial. The authorities are seeking to show through the prosecutions that the Brotherhood fueled violence during Morsi's one-year presidency and after the coup.
Calls for reconciliation that would return the Brotherhood - which dominated elections after the 2011 fall of Hosni Mubarak - to the political system have gone nowhere, with neither side giving ground.
El-Erian's arrest came just hours after three judges presiding over a trial of nearly three dozen Brotherhood members, including its top spiritual leader and its chief financier, stepped down on Tuesday after security agencies refused to let the defendants attend the courtroom sessions.
The move was a sharp pushback from within the judiciary over the conduct of the trial amid criticism by the Brotherhood that wide-ranging prosecutions of its leaders, including Morsi and the group's spiritual guide, Mohammed Badie, are only vengeful show trials.
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text:
|Llewellyn's 2019 Daily Planetary Guide
|Yoga for the Creative Soul
|The Pure Heart of Yoga
One of the leaders of the contemporary earth spirituality movement, Patricia Monaghan (1946 - 2012) had spent more than 20 years researching and writing about alternative visions of the earth. Raised in Alaska, where much of her family still lives, she considered herself blessed to have learned the ecology of the taiga, the subarctic forest, in her youth. She was a writer and reporter on science and energy-related issues before turning her attention to the impact of mythic structures on our everyday lives.
The worldwide vision of the earth as feminine—as a goddess, called Gaia by the Greeks—led her to recognize the connection between ecological damage and the oppression of the feminine in Western society. Much of her work since that time had explored the question of the role of feminine power in our world, in an inclusive and multicultural way.
An avid traveler, Patricia had researched earth spirituality and goddess worship on three continents, and traveled widely in Europe, especially in Ireland. She held dual US/Irish citizenship and edited two anthologies of contemporary Irish-American writing.
Patricia was member of the resident faculty at DePaul University's School for New Learning in Chicago, where she taught science and literature She passed from this world in November 2012 and is survived by her husband, Dr Michael McDermott.


text:
I knew our Leadership Development Program has graduations. I knew our Child Sponsorship Program has graduations. But I had no idea that our Child Survival Program (CSP) has graduations, until I saw this precious little gem…
The kids obviously take the graduation ceremony very seriously. (Or maybe they're simply concentrating on holding such a large diploma.)
I distinctly remember my first graduation ceremony … 6th grade. I marched across the stage to get my diploma and then gathered with my class on three tiers of bleachers and sang "Country Roads" by John Denver. Even after 21 years I still remember every word to that song. I wonder what these CSP graduates will remember about their graduation.
How about you? What do you remember about your first graduation? Anything interesting?


text:
Terada, "Seeing Is Reading"
Legacies of Paul de Man
Seeing Is Reading
Rei Terada, University of California, Irvine
De Man's notion of phenomenality is compared with the idea of material vision attributed to him in the recent reception of his work, and with ideas of mental 'seeing' or the impossibility thereof in the work of Elaine Scarry and Timothy Bahti. These various critical constructions of literary phenomenality reinstate transcendental models of mind for divergent ends. De Man's material vision, in contrast, may be understood on the model of Kant's use of hypotyposis, as a figure for the analogy to which we rightly resort when dealing with speculative propositions about cognition. This essay appears in _Legacies of Paul de Man_, a volume of _Romantic Circles Praxis Series_, prepared exclusively for Romantic Circles (http://www.rc.umd.edu/), University of Maryland.
What do we see in reading? It might seem that "see" is a murky word, one whose conflation of sensory perception with cognition makes it a poor lens for the inspection of either. This suggestion, common in the last twenty years' work on lyric, takes its cue from Paul de Man's emphasis on the discontinuity of phenomenal and cognitive processes. In "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," de Man finds that in the Third Critique Kant needs "a phenomenalized, empirically manifest principle of cognition on whose existence the possibility of . . . an articulation [between conceptual and empirical realms of discourse] depends,"1 but instead registers "a deep, perhaps fatal, break or discontinuity" between "language as a performative as well as a cognitive system" and "the powers of transcendental philosophy" (AI 79). This discontinuity "becomes apparent in the text" (AI 79) as what de Man calls "a material vision," "purely material, devoid of any reflexive or intellectual complication" (AI 82, 83). De Man goes on to propose that the "equivalence . . . in the order of language" of Kant's material vision is "the prosaic materiality of the letter" (AI 90, 89). For Kant's purposes, then, "a material vision" is the very opposite of the "phenomenalized, empirically manifest principle of cognition" that the aesthetic was supposed to provide; material vision is the Dantean hell that de Man writes for Kant as a parody of his desire for "phenomenal cognition." "No degree of obfuscation or ideology," de Man writes, "can transform this materiality into the phenomenal cognition of aesthetic judgment" (AI 90). In tracing the possible impacts of de Man's remarks on material vision, then, we might begin by remembering that for de Man, the foundering of Kant's transcendental system in material vision is a failure of redemption, the failure of materiality to "transform." As such, material vision is the manifestation in de Man's late work of his lifelong analysis of renunciation.2 The anticlimactic sinewave of which de Man's notion of materiality is part is tonal evidence for how de Man reception might interpret it: the message of the larger narrative is that we are (only) what we are, that the world is what it is—which is not to say that we know what it is.
De Man distinguishes a linguistic function from "perception" in another way in "Resistance to Theory." Here de Man stipulates that "linguistic terminology"—the terminology of "literary theory"—"considers reference as a function of language and not necessarily as an intuition. Intuition implies perception, consciousness, experience, and leads at once into the world of logic and of understanding with all its correlatives, among which aesthetics occupies a prominent place."3 De Man is doing a lot, probably too much, in this single sentence. He disarticulates linguistic functioning from all other faculties conceived as a network. Reference is not only "not necessarily . . . an intuition" or perception, but not necessarily part of the "world of logic and of understanding" either, if that world is construed as a complete set of "correlatives." In this context the discontinuity between seeing and reading would be typical of the always possibly contingent relations between kinds of mental acts.
The contrast between kinds of mental acts, however, is not as stark as it might at first seem. The objects of seeing are perceptual and intuitive; the products of linguistic functions are "not necessarily" so. By de Man's own logic, his carefulness is not a direction to purge the word "seeing" from literary theory.4 The aesthetic concept of the phenomenalization of thought is not the only possible meaning of the word "seeing"; still less is it what seeing actually is.The word "seeing," in all its ambiguity, is split between perceptual and cognitive, literal and figurative, meanings, and only our own interpretation can unify and hence aestheticize it. In itself, I'll suggest, it represents what we know—and don't know—of perception and cognition more accurately than "perception" and "cognition" do, while the attempt to use "seeing" narrowly, over and against "reading," tends to entangle itself in aesthetics. Not that there is, after all, a passageway between perception and cognition. Rather, in coming to the place where such a passageway is needed and missing, we find ourselves in a difficulty for which "seeing" can be a rather honest figure, one that does not necessarily resemble aesthetic ideology's appropriation of it.5
If we take de Man's readings of Kant seriously, then after our discovery of aesthetic ideology we are called upon to go beyond transcendental philosophy's elements. Beyond, and not simply back to empiricism: de Man leaves us with a materialism "more radical" than that of empiricism (AI 121) in that it is found even at the heart of form. Although it is compatible with an unredemptive formalism, however, this materialism should not be made to serve retranscendentalizing operations. Frances Ferguson criticizes de Man for putting the mind in the position of always needing to start over, and compares him to Adorno in this respect.6 She is right, and that's one thing for which we may value de Man: the position to which de Man returns us (from which, he reveals, we have never yet actually budged) is the de facto condition of epistemology, and a cause for neither celebration nor disappointment. From Blindness and Insight on de Man presents this reality of our epistemological circumstances steadily and urbanely, without ascending into hysteria or theology. I worry that the current direction of the reception of de Man's ideas about materiality, in contrast, invents a new, philosophically reactionary transcendentalism that erodes de Man's legacy, or at least the attitude of resilient skepticism that is part of what I would like de Man's legacy to be.
For the editors introducing Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory (2001), the constellation of ideas around "materiality" inspires the project of an alternative to the Third Critique, one that seems not to give up on transcendentalism but to reformulate it. They see opportunities in the a priori. "Whatever inscription designates, it conjures sheer anteriority," they suggest; "it does not deliver us to any immediacy of reference, [or] to any historical narrative that presumes to encode such, but to mnemonic programs that appear to precede and legislate these" (viii).7 De Man's work is called "the portal for a wide-ranging interrogation into how 'the event' operates in history, and what intervention in the order of inscription entails" (xii-xiii). "Intervention" is depicted as the storming and occupation of the imperial palace of faculties:
By way of de Man's late work on "materiality" a project emerges that relates less to a "seventies" venture in theory than to still future and proactive investigations of and interventions in the hypertextual relay systems and programs out of which the "human" (and nonhuman) appears constituted, temporalization produced and managed, the "sensorium" altered, the virtuality of the present and the technicity of inscription brought to a point of passage or crossing. (xiii)
Editors Cohen, Cohen, and Miller remodel the infrastructure of the Third Critique. De Man appears as an "engineer" who approaches "the archive, the prerecordings out of which experience is projected and semantic economies policed" (ix). CCM cite the career of Benjamin as another example of arche-engineering on the production lot of phenomenality, "where this trajectory finds an ultimate articulation as a radical (re)programming of the (historial) archive out of which the sensorium' would be alternatively produced" (x). Still, "experience is projected," and "the sensorium' . . . produced," out of the engineer's workplace. Engineering has a polemical meaning in the history of literary theory; this engineer seems to be the short-circuiter of structuralism's empiricist base. If Levi-Strauss is the anti-engineer of inductive reason, assembling significance from observable surfaces, in Material Events the engineer enters the studio at night and with a few keystrokes changes what is projected on the screen—the blockbuster known as SensoriumRedux. That the archive, and the source code, are external, and that there is no way to infer archive from screen, does not dilute the strictly transcendental nature of the fantasy.
Is de Man's work a "portal" to this project?8 There is fascination with the a priori in de Man, but there is irony toward it, too. Arguably, his work on "reference prior to designating the referent" (RT 8) and the "autonomous potential of language" (RT 10) show such an ambivalent fascination. In "Kant and Schiller" de Man speaks of "the historicity a priori" of the textual event (AI 133); the ever-expanding motion of the unfolding textual event is pursued to a logical extreme in "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant" (AI 77-79). Part of de Man's point, however, is that this is not a wave that can be caught. His vision of "the saturation of the tropological field as language frees itself of its constraints" (AI 79) adapts the problem of plenitude in Neoplatonic metaphysics that he considers in his early work: the infinite generativity that would seem to be required of an infinitely powerful being ends in the existence of everything—a blow to unity and value whose damage, according to Lovejoy, the "great chain of being" is inadequate to repair.9 In his early "Criticism and the Theme of Faust," de Man condenses quotations from Lovejoy to conclude that "rationality, when conceived as complete, including all arbitrariness, becomes itself a kind of irrationality....The world of concrete existence...is no impartial transcript of the realm of essence....It is, in short, a contingent world.'"10 De Man's narrative here discovers materiality at the end of power as the anticlimax of an investigation into the a priori.
Similarly, a strongly "critical"-sounding passage of "Resistance to Theory" defines "literary theory" by its movement from "meaning" and "value" to "the modalities of production and of reception of meaning and of value prior to their establishment" (RT 7). Thus semiotics is, at least in principle, a more theoretical discourse than interpretation. De Man's conclusion, though, is that for the very reason that the logical conclusion of semiotics (for example, in Greimas) is a transcendental system applicable "to the generation of all texts," it rejoins the aesthetic project (RT 14). Only "reading," rather than any properly critical—in linguistic terms, grammatical—investigation, is "a negative process in which the grammatical cognition is undone" (RT 17). Literary theory has no exemption from aestheticization by virtue of its theoretical or specifically literary nature: that literary theory shifts to "modalities of production and of reception of meaning and value" makes it theoretical, but this is not necessarily a compliment to literary theory. Rather, it shows that literary theory remains susceptible to aesthetic ideology. Passages like this one should qualify the claim that the enterprise of "proactive investigations" into the general operation or generation of textual events "emerges" from the late de Man with his imprimatur. Still less does de Man write about intervening in or reprogramming mnemonic structures and the sensorium. Not only does he not mention the possibility of intervention in mnemonic and sensory structures; it's hard to reconcile such a possibility with his assertion that the linguistic structure that, he finds, disarticulates the Third Critique, cannot be mobilized by any drive (AI 147).11
The notion of the sensorium as film studio (in the head or in the world), replete with engineers, set designers, directors, and projectionists, is one of western metaphysics' favorite motifs—the fantasy production lot of the aesthetic project. In this case politically progressive, it is in any case philosophically regressive. I do not find this motif advocated in de Man, and it can be found in the most undeManian places—in the startlingly strange perceptual literalism of Elaine Scarry, for example. Scarry takes the position opposite to contemporary deconstruction on "seeing" and "reading": she believes that in reading we "see" mental images that surpass the vivacity of nonliterary imagining, images that "somehow . . . acquire the vivacity of perceptual objects" (5). (As she notes, many philosophers and cognitive psychologists don't think "mental images" exist, but some do, and she does [258-259n6].) The verbal arts "displac[e] the ordinary attributes of imagining," Scarry asserts in Dreaming by the Book,
—its faintness, two-dimensionality, fleetingness, and dependence on volitional labor—with the vivacity, solidity, persistence, and givenness of the perceptible world . . . . this comes about because we are given procedures for reproducing the deep structure of perception, and because the procedures themselves have an instructional character that duplicates the "givenness" of perception. (38)
In another passage from Dreaming By the Book, "imaginary vivacity comes about by reproducing the deep structure of perception . . . . what in perception comes to be imitated is not only the sensory outcome (the way something looks or sounds or feels beneath the hands) but the actual structure of production that gave rise to the perception; that is, the material conditions that made it look, sound, or feel the way it did" (9). In approximating the material conditions of perception, texts make readers feel as though they are having particular perceptions and not just material visions of letters. This feeling is what Scarry calls seeing a mental image.
In "Kant and Schiller," de Man shows how Schiller's sublime forms a symmetrical set of chiasmi that allows for safe travel in the universe. Scarry is extravagantly Schillerian in her attachment to imitation as play and in her equanimious, symmetrical transfers;12 flowers (and other small diaphanous things) are her ultimate imaginable objects because they already resemble mental images—they are the entry points to her aesthetic Paradiso. Scarry even cites Schiller's Aesthetic Education as an authority on this point: Schiller, she notes, "places the flower in the space of passage between material and immaterial," contributing to the "explanation of the easily imagined as something that can enter the mind precisely because it is always already in a state of passage from the material to the dematerialized" (63).
What does Scarry's apparatus have in common with Cohen, Cohen and Miller's? Surprisingly much, considering their contrary critical lineages and ideological aims. Scarry, too, pursues the post-Kantian project of securing the prosaic conditions, or "actual structures," of what she believes to be the sensory effects of reading. Moving from an investigation of textual effects to the conditions of possibility of the sensorium, her argument recalls eighteenth century arguments from the very existence of multiple senses to a supersense that supports them. For her, the fact that "verbal art, especially narrative, is almost bereft of any sensuous content" (5) only suggests an alternate, subterranean route to sensuous content—"miming the deep structure that brings the sensation about" (256n6). While she does not believe that we can alter the structure itself, she does believe that we can manipulate it for our own ends. Primary among the methods that Scarry claims enable such mimesis are the suppression of the sense of volition—the imaginer likes being given "direction" by someone, as this makes the content seem "given," therefore real—and a "sequence of coherent steps for constructing the image" (20). Scarry, too, is a programmer. Imagining under authorial direction is more than a way of being open to a mere illusion of sensation. Her version of mimesis is strong enough for virtual worldmaking: it is a repeatable method for stimulating in the body an image that responds to the content of a particular idea. If the methods are sleights of hand, they are sleights that provoke physiological responses and specifiable perceptions. For her, the fact that texts have their own sensory properties as ink shapes on paper does not interfere with their power to evoke images related to their semantic content. Rather, the sensory fact of their materiality rubs off on the mental images the words conjure, much as the ongoing sensory experiences of the dreaming body may contribute to the reality effects of dream content.13 Like Cohen, Cohen, and Miller, Scarry organizes her work through cinematic metaphors, down to two of her section titles, "Making Pictures" and "Moving Pictures." For the utterly nondeManian, indeed aesthetically ideological Scarry, then, language is again "material production" that elicits a "perceptual outcome" (20) in a "projective space" (14).
De Man, in contrast, reads Kant partly in order to give an account of a relatively straightforward attempt at aesthetics, one that does not conceal its limits. In "Kant and Schiller," de Man both points out how Schiller edits Kant's troubled Third Critique into a system that raises fewer questions, and admires Kant for his relative inability to paper over its problems. Just after having discussed Schiller's channeling of the "organic, sensory," "chaotic," and "concrete" elements of discourse into a symmetrical exchange with order and system, de Man writes:
Here, the comparison to make with Kant is with Kant's statements about figuration, about what he calls hypotyposis, which is the difficulty [my italics—RT] of rendering, by means of sensory elements, purely intellectual concepts. And the particular necessity which philosophy has, to take its terminology not from purely intellectual concepts but from material, sensory elements, which it then uses metaphorically and frequently forgets that it does so . . . . At any rate, hypotyposis for Kant is certainly a problem for understanding, and a very difficult problem that again threatens philosophical discourse; whereas here it is offered by Schiller as a solution, again in the form of a chiasmus, for a similar opposition. (AI 153)
What Schiller offers as a solution, Kant, to his credit, sees as "the difficulty," which he calls hypotyposis. The thinking of hypotyposis, then, could be a model for the realization of aesthetics' limits and the self-critical registration of this realization.
Literally, hypotyposis is a sketch, an outline, thus "form" with an emphasis on the emptiness, as Rodolphe Gasché observes (207). The rhetorical tradition uses this spatial figure of outline as an analogy for crisp verbal description. Hypotyposis is "clear explanation and almost visual presentation of events as if practically going on," writes Cicero (quoted in Gasché 207). The only thing that becomes clear in such definitions is that hypotyposis is as thin referentially as a term of art could be. The invocation of hypotyposis implies exactly nothing about how hypotyposis gets done. Nor do we even know exactly what its effects are, for hypotyposis is a figure whose effects are themselves described figuratively, with an "as if." In that way, it's close to what I mean by "seeing" and, as I'll explain later, what de Man means by "materiality." These are placeholders in language for something we do not know anything about, even whether it actually exists or not.
In §59 of the Third Critique, "On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality," Kant glosses "hypotyposis" as "exhibition [Darstellung], subiectio ad adspectum." He also specifies what hypotyposes are not: "mere characterizations, i.e. designations of concepts by accompanying sensible signs [bloße Charakterismen, d.i. Bezeichnungen der Begriffe durch begleitende sinnliche Zeichen]" such as "words, or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) signs [Worte, oder sichtbare (algebraische, selbst mimische) Zeichen]." Hypotyposes have intuitive content: they are schemata or symbols. A schema, in turn, is what mediates the assimilation of intuitions by concepts of understanding. And what is a schema? It's a rule. So far, the analysis of hypotyposis simply gives exhibition in general, as opposed to description, but explains what counts as exhibition only circularly. —What kind of a rule is a schema? Well, it is, for example, the rule that effects must follow causes in time, or the rule that substance has to have duration. Schemata are the rules of the classical natural world: if concepts are linked to intuitions through schemata, they're linked through their common fitness for that world. (A schematic hypotyposis might be, for example, a Euclidean proof.) So we can now say about hypotyposes that when they are schematic, they are natural, that is, they are plunged in space and time and in the natural world. But hypotyposes—I return now to §59—can also be symbolic:
Symbolic exhibition uses an analogy . . . in which judgment performs a double function: first it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the formal object is only a symbol. Thus a monarchy ruled according to its own constitutional laws would be presented as an animate body, but a monarchy ruled by an individual absolute will would be presented as a mere machine (such as a hand mill); but in either case the presentation is only symbolic. For though there is no similarity between a despotic state and a hand mill, there certainly is one between the rules by which we reflect on the two and on how they operate. This function has not been analyzed much so far, even though it very much deserves fuller investigation; but this is not the place to pursue it. Our language is replete with such indirect exhibitions according to an analogy, where the expression does not contain the actual schema for the concept but contains merely a symbol for our reflection. Thus the words foundation (support, basis), to depend (to be held from above), to flow (instead of to follow) from something, substance (the support of accidents, as Locke puts it), and countless others are not schematic but symbolic hypotyposes; they express concepts not by means of a direct intuition but only according to an analogy with one, i.e., a transfer of our reflection on an object of intuition to an entirely different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond.
[einer Analogie . . . in welcher die Urtheilskraft ein doppeltes Geschäft verrichtet, erstlich den Begriff auf den Gegenstand einer sinnlichen Anschauung[,] und dann zweitens die bloße Regel der Reflexion über jene Anschauung auf einen ganz andern Gegenstand, von dem der erstere nur das Symbol ist, anzuwenden. So wird ein monarchischer Staat durch einen beseelten Körper, wenn er nach inneren Volksgesetzen, durch eine bloße Maschine aber, (wie etwa eine Handmühle) wenn er durch einen einzelnen absoluten Willen beherrscht wird, in beiden Fällen aber nur symbolisch vorgestellt. Denn, zwischen einem despotischen Staate und einer Handmühle ist zwar keine Unlichkeit, wohl aber zwischen der Regel über beide und ihre Causalität zu reflectiren. Dies Geschäft ist bis jetzt noch wenig auseinandergesetzt worden, so sehr es auch eine tiefere Untersuchung verdient; allein hier ist nicht der Ort sich dabei aufzuhalten. Unsere Sprache ist voll von dergleichen indirecten Darstellungen, nach einer Analogie, wodurch der Unsbruck nicht das eigentliche Schema für den Begriff, sondern bloß ein Symbol für die Reflexion enthält. So sind die Wörter Grund (Stütze, Basis), Abhängen (von oben gehalten werden), woraus fließen (statt folgen), Substanz (wie Locke sich ausdrückt: der Träger der Accidenzen) [,] und unzählige andere nicht schematische, sondern symbolische Hypotyposen[,] und Ausdrücke fürBegriffe nicht vermittelst einer directen Anschauung, sondern nur nach einer Analogie mit derselben, d.i. der Übertragung der Reflexion über einen Gegenstand der Anschauung auf einen ganz andern Begriff, dem vielleicht nie eine Anschauung direct correspondiren kann.]
Kant's examples of the equally symbolic corporeal and machinic presentations of monarchy might be said to reveal that symbolic hypotyposis all too conveniently imports qualities from the presentable to the unpresentable through the lie of poetry. The question arises why, in that case, Kant thinks symbolic hypotyposis is hypotyposis at all. What it is about the symbolic that merits comparison to the schematic, and makes it a kind of intuitive presentation? A monarchy, an animate body, and a "handmill"—whatever that is—are unlike; a monarchy is not an entity whose properties are completely definable. While it's fair to say that a monarchy must be answerable to the laws of physics, it's also fair to say that we don't know exactly how, because "the monarchy" itself is an approximation—if not an opaque name, then one that is dark around the edges. If someone tells us that it is at least an organization of bodies, however, then when we imagine its workings, we do so by using our concepts of other organizations of bodies. We don't have to know or be able to know what a tyranny is in order to be able to understand if someone tells us (wrongly or rightly) that, like a pepper grinder, it is operated by a single will.14 The hypotyposis indicates the schema to which disparate concepts are connected as an otherwise unpresentable cause is to its effects. Kant's text even illustrates hypotyposis by hypotyposis: His verbal comparison between the comparison between tyrannies and pepper grinders, on one hand, and symbolic and schematic hypotyposes, on the other, shows by symbolic hypotyposis how symbols and schemata are both hypotyposes. The proof concerning demonstration is not demonstrated directly: discourse and method occur together, method being talked about in discourse.15 My point is not that therefore, all is discourse; rather, this is the end of the line, and whatever conclusion one draws will be partly a matter of attitude. In this place, repeatedly, the philosophy of language takes a leap of faith, and claims to plug into natural science: it bids to become a natural science of language, grounded in necessity, as in Descartes, Russell, early Wittgenstein, or Chomsky. This is the place where philosophers start saying, with regard to analogy, that it really seems.16
One's degree of faith in the reality of analogy is not so much an interpretation as a decision. Hypotyposis, or any construct that serves its placeholding function, is a black box. For de Man, I would suggest, such a construct is not a solution but a "difficulty of rendering." We do not know what is there, or whether anything is there that is not a mere artifact of the terms of the problem; we do not know what real seeming consists in, or whether it consists in anything. We can only agree with Kant that if it is somewhere, there is where it should go.
Now, Derrida argues in "Typewriter Ribbon" that "materiality" is, like hypotyposis, a word to put down when one can go no further. In "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," de Man casts his characterization of Kant's description of the ocean as a catachretic act of nomination: "the only word that comes to mind is that of a material vision" (AI 82). In "Kant and Schiller" de Man again struggles to nominate "something [properly unnameable—RT] which one could call a progression—though it shouldn't be—a movement, from cognition, from acts of knowledge, from states of cognition, to something [again—RT] which is no longer a cognition but which is to some extent an occurrence, which has the materiality of something that actually happens" (AI 132). Noting de Man's appeals "to what he himself says he calls text'" (TR 336) and "what is called materialism'" (AI 128, quoted in TR 350), Derrida proposes that "materiality" for de Man is whatever fills "the place of prosaic resistance" (TR 350), "a very useful generic name for all that resists appropriation"(TR 353), or, going even further, "the name, the artifactual nomination of an artifactual figure . . . . a sort of invention by de Man, one could say, almost a fiction produced in the movement of a strategy" (TR 352-353). In this case the materiality of language is de Man's X at the spot where aesthetics cannot be completed.
Various philosophical choices may then be made. The resort to algebra—"here is where something should go"—leads to a literature in which indexicals and names are the foundations of knowledge: a new metaphysics, potentially, or a deconstructive nominalism.17 It also opens the way to negative theology, a recentering of metaphysics on the void (the path of Lacan and Zizek). Cohen, Cohen, and Miller continue to treat materiality as part of a realm "out of which experience is projected." They take their difference from Kant to mean that experience would be projected differently, and in this sense, seem to go on as though the transcendental system could be made to work to new ends. De Man's conclusion at the end of "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant" is that the loss of "the architectonic unity of the system . . . marks the undoing of the aesthetic as a valid category" and "undoes the very project of such a philosophy" (AI 89). A forward-thinking literary theory, I would suggest, would not read in this conclusion the possibility of something like a transcendental philosophy persisting but no longer being predictable or unified,18 or persisting in ruins whose debris could be taken up and used for other purposes, or turned against itself, not least because one cannot turn against itself a machinery whose very existence is dubious. Rather, because Kant leaves a question mark at the most important place in his system, the transcendental philosophy will not have been something so substantial as to have produced debris. It will have been a plan for a system that never got finished. One can keep trying to revise and finish it, but that makes sense only if you wish it worked. If you are relieved that it doesn't work, the issue is still open, but for the moment, it makes more sense to say: So much for that. That way lies a renewed empiricism, not eighteenth-century empiricism, but a radical empiricism strong enough to encompass formalism.19
The attraction of the Cohen-Cohen-Miller model is its speculative liberation theology:
We will take the position for the sake of argument and because it is interesting to consider, that what remains unengaged in de Man's text addresses the possibility of intervention in the mnemonic, the programming of the "historial," and a treatment of "materiality" that compels a rethinking of technicity and the "sensorium" on the basis of inscription. Among other things it would be an approach, given the "materiality of inscription," to the notion of the "virtual" and toward a rendering virtual—and hence, toward alternative histories to those programmed by inherited regimes of definition and perception (viii).
The desire of this position lies in its ambition to reach into the structures that produce history and the sensorium, thereby arriving at a means of generating histories and sensoria, potentially for all. Changing the past is a crucial revolutionary desire for which Benjamin is a very good keynote. I do not mean to derogate it in the slightest by suggesting that it has been given most serious expression in the mode of impossibility. Rendered possible, it is no longer the same desire, no longer revolutionary but totalitarian. The idea of possibly intervening in regimes of definition and perception is downright frightening (it also opens up the black comic possibility of a Charlie Kaufmanesque nightmare of botched interventions), and with good reason "remains unengaged in de Man's text." As far as I can tell, the Cohen-Cohen-Miller angle on materiality is the wrong end of materialist criticism: it retranscendentalizes materialism rather than understanding materialism as something that detranscendentalizes form.
In his thoroughly brilliant book Ends of the Lyric, Timothy Bahti draws a distinction between "seeing" and "reading" using the example of Shakespeare's Sonnet 43:
When most I wink, then do my eyes best see,
For all the day they view things unrespected,
But when I sleep, in dreams they look on thee,
And darkly bright, are bright in dark directed.
Then thou, whose shadow shadows doth make bright
How would thy shadow's form form happy show
To the clear day with thy much clearer light,
When to unseeing eyes thy shade shines so!
How would, I say, mine eyes be blessèd made,
By looking on thee in the living day,
When in dead night thy fair imperfect shade
Through heavy sleep on sightless eyes doth stay!
All days are nights to see until I see thee,
And nights bright days when dreams do show thee me.
Bahti notes that the poem's chiasmi of repeating words can be noticed even by a reader who doesn't know English, as in line 4: "darkly bright . . . bright, are bright . . . bright in dark." "So far, this is only seeing, not reading," he remarks (33). Others depend on semantics, like line 1's "most I . . . eyes best" (34). We could say that the chiasmus can be filled in with intuitive or symbolic content—literal or figurative seeing—while the chiasmic form channels us toward understanding ("seeing" in a metaphoric sense), that "dark, bright, bright, dark," is like "most, I, eyes, best." But "reading," Bahti asserts, "necessitates the distinction of sense as meaning from sense as the sense-perception of vision, the precise distinction of actual letters seen and actual letters not seen (no longer seen) but read acting" (38). He continues, "reading would appear' [at the end of the poem] if it were something one could see, but instead one can only read the vanishing of sight" (39). Bahti figures reading as seeing plus interpreting minus seeing, so the end of the process recedes over the horizon, under the line at the end of the column/poem: sublime. Described as though it were given, the perceptual process of seeing is made to provide ballast for reading-in-abstraction-from-seeing, an "end" of lyric in a reading remaining to be seen. There is a double sense of "reading" here: as participle, reading is what we do as we see and interpret; as abstract noun, it is the never wholly attained end product of seeing, interpreting, and learning not to see.
The assumption is that texts and reading, like tyrannies, are not phenomenal entities and processes, while pages and retinal activities, like pepper grinders, are. We are so used to thinking metaphysically, whether in deconstructive or in humanistic subgroups—especially those of us who work on lyric—that it is hard to imagine any other way of approaching seeing and reading. But what if texts and tyrannies and retinal activities were on the same level—were alike empirical entities, not aesthetic ones, only subject to more or less complex inspection? If there were, it would become evident that inspection itself is a difficulty all the way down (or up).
Daniel Dennett, in a typically brisk fifteen-page treatment of a vast question, in this case an essay called "Seeing is Believing—or Is It?," asks how we know when we've seen something. What Dennett poses as "the nature of takings'" is none other than the question of seeing and reading—the question of whether and when "a state of the nervous system" is to count as a "perception" (340,337). How do we know we've seen something? We remember it, so we believe we've had a perception; or we took a photo, and believe that the photo is a picture of what we perceived. "One of the reasons people tend to see a contrast" between belief and perception, according to Dennett, "is that they tend to think of perceptual states as much richer in content than mere belief states" (341). Not always: Scarry, stressing mental images, thinks of ordinary perceptual states as richer than what Dennett calls belief states (memories, conjurings), but thinks of literary belief states as being as rich as ordinary perceptual states. Bahti, stressing texts, understandably thinks of interpretations, belief states, as richer than the perceptual states of seeing letters. For my argument, though, it doesn't matter which way the values go. What matters is the dualism and its tendency to obscure "what happens in the middle," which in Dennett's opinion is everything. "No sane participant . . . would claim that the product of perception was either literally a picture in the head or literally a sentence in the head. Both ways of talking are reckoned as metaphors" (342), he remarks. "We should be leery of metaphor," he goes on, "but is there any alternative at this point?" (343). In the end, Dennett argues, "the idea that we can identify perceptual—as opposed to conceptual—states by an evaluation of their contents turns out to be an illusion" (352).
In illustrating this point, Dennett calls upon the classical celebration of hypotyposis as a presentation modeled on vision: "After all"—he channels an interlocutor—"perceptions are like pictures, beliefs are like sentences, and a picture's worth a thousand words. But," he goes on, "these are spurious connotations. There is no upper bound on the richness of content of a proposition" (341). The allusion to the rhetorical tradition is not casual: much of Dennett's discussion constitutes a commentary on metaphoric transfer from the perspective of empirical studies of perception. For the eliminativist Dennett, who believes that only technological obstacles prevent consciousness from being analyzed into directly or indirectly observable material elements, analogies between perception and cognition are not effectively ideological. Rather, it is the concept "cognition" that makes it sound as though there were supernatural substances or forces immune in principle to even the most powerful and indirect observation. For Dennett cognitions are in principle observable, while under the current scientific understanding, perception is scarcely less enigmatic than cognition. A cognition is like a perception not because it's as plain as day but because it's as clear as mud. Thus it is neither illuminating nor mystifying to compare cognition to perception. Because there is no nonmetaphorical way of talking about what even a perception is, seeing—in the ambiguous, sense-conflating sense—after all better represents the state of knowledge regarding perception and cognition than a distinction between "perception" and "cognition" which can be made logically but cannot be grounded in any difference in content.
Perceptions are like pictures, beliefs are like sentences—and perceptions are like sentences, and beliefs are like pictures. Until we know more, a thousand words on the topic are not yet worth a dime. As a deconstructive materialist writing in the wake of Paul de Man, I would rather tell you that than "burden the system with extra machinery," as Dennett puts it, "—scene-painting machinery or script-writing machinery" (344). Either kind of machinery resubscribes to systems of mind that understate the complexity, not only of reading, but of the very idea of sensory perception, which nonetheless remains the only channel epistemology gets.
Works Cited
Amiran, Eyal. "After Dynamic Narratology." Style 34 (Summer 2000), 212-226.
Bahti, Timothy. Ends of Lyric: Direction and Consequence in Western Poetry. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997.
Brodsky, Claudia. Lines of Thought: Discourse, Architectonics, and the Origin of ModernPhilosophy. Durham: Duke UP, 1996.
Burt, E. S. Poetry's Appeal: Nineteenth-Century French Lyric and the Political Space. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999.
Butler, Judith. "Competing Universalities." Contingency, Hegemony, Universality:Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. Ed. Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek. London: Verso, 2000. 136-181.
Caruth, Cathy and Deborah Esch, eds. Critical Encounters: Reference and Responsibility inDeconstructive Writing. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1995.
Chase, Cynthia. Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.
Clark, David L. "How to Do Things with Shakespeare: Illustrative Theory and Practice in Blake's Pity." In The Mind in Creation: Essays on English Romantic Literature in Honour of Ross G. Woodman. Ed. J. Douglas Kneale. Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1962. 106-133.
Cohen, Tom. Anti-Mimesis from Plato to Hitchcock. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994.
---. Ideology and Inscription: "Cultural Studies" after Benjamin, de Man, and Bakhtin. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.
Cohen, Tom, Barbara Cohen, and J. Hillis Miller. "A Materiality Without Matter'?" In MaterialEvents: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory. Ed. Tom Cohen, Barbara Cohen, J. Hillis Miller, and Andrzej Warminski. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2001. vii-xxv.
De Graef, Ortwin. Serenity in Crisis: A Preface to Paul de Man, 1930-1960. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1995.
de Man, Paul. "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant." Aesthetic Ideology. Ed. Andrzej Warminski. Minneaplois: U of Minnesota P, 1996. 70-90.
---. Critical Writings 1953-1978. Ed. Lindsay Waters. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989.
---. The Resistance to Theory. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986.
Dennett, Daniel. "Seeing is Believing—or Is it?" In Perception. Ed. Robert Schwartz. London: Blackwell, 2004. 337-353.
Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Trans. Eric Prenowitz. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996.
---. "Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2)." In Material Events. 277-360.
Ferguson, Frances. Solitude and the Sublime: Romanticism and the Aesthetics of Individuation. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Gasché, Rodolphe. The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant's Aesthetics. Stanford UP, 2002.
---. "In-Difference to Philosophy: de Man on Kant, Hegel, and Nietzche." In Reading de ManReading. Ed. Wlad Godzich and Lindsay Waters. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989. 259-294.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.
Lovejoy, Arthur. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of An Idea. New York: Harper & Row, 1936.
Mizumura, Minae. "Renunciation." Yale French Studies 69 (1985) 81-97.
Riggs, Sarah. Word Sightings. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Scarry, Elaine. Dreaming By the Book: Imagining Under Authorial Instruction. Boston: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2001.
Schiller, Friedrich. Werke. Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1963.
Terada, Rei. "De Man and Mallarmé between The Two Deaths.'" In Meetings with Mallarmé inContemporary French Culture. Ed. Michael Temple. Exeter: U of Exeter P, 1998. 107-125.
Van Fraassen, Bas C. The Empirical Stance. New Haven: Yale UP, 2002.
Warminski, Andrzej. "As the Poets Do It': On the Material Sublime." In Material Events. 3-31.
1Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant, in Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warminski (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996), p. 73. Henceforward AI.
2 The classic discussion is Minae Mizumura's "Renunciation," Yale French Studies 69 (1985), 81-97; see also Ortwin de Graef, Serenity in Crisis: A Preface to Paul de Man, 1930-1960, especially pp. 90, 93, 171-172. My attempt to think about this was "De Man and Mallarmé between The Two Deaths,'" in Meetings with Mallarmé in Contemporary French Culture, ed. Michael Temple (Exeter: U of Exeter P, 1998, pp. 107-125, 247-250). Maybe one could say that the "necessary degradation of melody into harmony . . . of metaphor into literal meaning" in Blindness and Insight (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983, p. 136) decomposes further in the late texts, from literal meaning into letters.
3The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986), p.8. Henceforward RT.
4 Complementarily, there is no warrant to treat thematics of materiality as particularly material instances of language. For a similar caution about the thematics of "form," see Eyal Amiran, "After Dynamic Narratology," Style 34 (Summer 2000), 212-226.
5 For other considerations of "seeing" as a figure of something other than transparency, see David L. Clark, "How to Do Things with Shakespeare: Illustrative Theory and Practice in Blake's Pity." In The Mind in Creation: Essays on English Romantic Literature in Honour of Ross G. Woodman. Ed. J. Douglas Kneale (Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1962, pp. 106-133); and Cynthia Chase, Decomposing Figures:Rhetorical Readings in the Romantic Tradition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986).
6Solitude and the Sublime: Romanticism and the Ethics of Individuation (New York: Routledge, 1992).
7 Tom Cohen, Barbara Cohen, and J. Hillis Miller, "A Materiality without Matter?" Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2001). Many arguments of "A Materiality without Matter?" also occur in Tom Cohen's Anti-Mimesis from Plato to Hitchcock (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994) and Ideology and Inscription: "Cultural Studies" after Benjamin, de Man, and Bakhtin (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998). What I argue here is true of Cohen's books as well. It is the collective enterprise of the Material Events conference and volume, however, that more explicitly shapes the scholarly conversation about de Man. For a different perspective on de Man's materiality, see Cathy Caruth and Deborah Esch's collection Critical Encounters: Reference and Responsibility in Deconstructive Writing (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1995).
8 Derrida's Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996) would seem to be a more substantial inspiration.
9 See especially "The Chain of Being and Some Internal Conflicts in Medieval Thought," in The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea (New York: Harper & Row, 1936), pp. 67-98.
10 Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, pp. 331-332, quoted in de Man, "Criticism and the Theme of Faust," Critical Writings 1953-1978, ed. Lindsay Waters (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989), 81-82.
11 E.S. Burt deals with a similar problem, de Man's emphasis on the one-way arrow of the time of inscription, by identifying that time with a revolutionary drive toward the future, i.e., revolution as something other than intervention (Poetry's Appeal: Nineteenth-Century French Lyric and the Political Space ([Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999], pp. 185-186). For other thoughts on the irreversibility of inscription see Jacques Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2) ('within such limits')", in Material Events, p. 320 (henceforward TR); and Andrzej Warminski, "As the Poets Do It': On the Material Sublime," in Material Events, especially pp. 10-11.
12 Natural symmetry forms the basis for Scarry's equally ideological idea of justice in On Beauty and Being Just (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999).
13 In poet-critic Sarah Riggs's book Word Sightings (New York: Routledge, 2000), it is the sensory experience of our failing struggle to produce any mental image that is credited to the idea of the mental image and thus helps to substantialize its absence—a phantom limb model.
14 Alternatively, my not knowing what a handmill is demonstrates Kant's point over again. The handmill is a Riffaterrean object, a generic object that does not contribute anything beyond its illustrative function, yet can function even though we don't know what is doing the illustrating, because we understand enough of the terms in the mutually implicated network of references of which it is part. The handmill, like any other single term, can be an example whose content is bracketed: there is nothing in this handmill.
15 Claudia Brodsky brilliantly analyzes the discourse-method interdependence in Descartes in Lines of Thought: Discourse, Architectonics, and the Origin of Modern Philosophy (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1996).
16 The corresponding moment in Schiller is when (in de Man's translation of Schiller's essay "On the Sublime") "even the imaginary representation of danger, if it is at all vivid, suffices to awaken our sense of self-preservation, and it produces something analogous to what the real experience would produce'" (Werke [Weimar: Hermann Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1963], 20:181, quoted in de Man's translation in AI 143). "Analogous is an important word," de Man comments (AI 143).
17 Thanks to Benjamin Bishop for thought-provoking ideas on indexicals.
18 Judith Butler's discussion of the two possible senses of "transcendental" is helpful: "In the Kantian vein, 'transcendental' can mean: the condition without which nothing can appear. But it can also mean: the regulatory and constitutive conditions of the appearance of any given object. The latter sense is the one in which the condition is not external to the object it occasions, but is its constitutive condition and the principle of its development and appearance" ("Competing Universalities," in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left [London: Verso, 2000], p. 147). Inscription for CCM is transcendental in the second sense; as Butler notes, such a transcendental condition can be "considered to have a historicity—that is . . . considered to be a shifting episteme which might be altered and revised over time" (147). Like post-Lacanian political philosophy, CCM's use of inscription, and perhaps also Derrida's in "Typewriter Ribbon," uses the second model of transcendental condition to fold historical contingency into a priori form and power. But since such a folding is the goal of Kantian aesthetics in the first place, and nontranscendental ways of conceiving the relation between contingency and form are available, second-tier transcendentalism often looks as though it were motivated by the desire to preserve first-tier transcendentalism.
19 Gasché gives an eloquent, comprehensive and rather shocked account of de Man's project as having the goal of breaking the text into a "radically irreducible empiricalness of . . . agencies and instances" ("In-Difference to Philosophy: de Man on Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche," Reading de Man Reading, ed. Wlad Godzich and Lindsay Waters [Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989], p. 282). Gasché himself is so deeply formalistic that he just cannot take an empirical philosophy seriously: "it is a longstanding philosophical truth that empiricism is capable of explaining everything except explication itself, that is, the difference that explication makes . . . . If they ['the nonphenomenal material and formal properties' of language] are empirical qualities, pragmatic properties, they will never be able to elevate themselves to the thought of difference. If they are universal and general properties, then they are properties that make the difference, and all that has been achieved is a, perhaps, more sophisticated philosophical questioning of philosophical difference" ("In-Difference" 292). But there are of course answers from radical empiricism that from its (perhaps incommeasurable) perspective deal with these complaints. For a recent version see Bas C. Van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale UP, 2002).


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FONTENEAU, JEAN, better known by the name of Jean Alfonse, French navigator; b. 1484 in a village in Saintonge; d. 1544 at La Rochelle.
At the age of 12 he joined the merchant service at La Rochelle, which was to become his home port and his place of residence. He sailed on coastal vessels to ports in Spain and Portugal. While still young he married a Portuguese girl, Valentine Alfonse. Following the custom of nicknames, he was given his wife's name, which finally replaced his own. It is this surname, together with his knowledge of Portuguese, which has given rise to the belief that he was a native of Portugal. The voyages which he undertook for commercial reasons seem to have taken him to the Baltic in the north and to the Mediterranean in the south; in the east, he sailed the coasts of Africa, visited the Red Sea, and even got as far as Japan. In addition he familiarized himself with the coasts of America, from Nova Scotia to the Antilles.
We almost certainly owe to him the invention of the "jeannette," a small sail placed at the top of the main mast to facilitate the manoeuvring of ships. He was a sailor, and an outfitter of ships when the opportunity occurred; he quickly acquired the title of master navigator with the reputation of never having lost a vessel. It was because of this reputation that he was chosen as "captain and pilot of King François I," to lead to Canada La Rocque de Roberval's expedition, which left La Rochelle 16 April 1542. It was probably on the return trip, at the end of the summer, that he ventured on a cruise in search of the northwest passage to China. He passed through the Strait of Belle-Isle, and seems to have got as far as Davis Strait, being the first Frenchman to reach what was later to be called Baffin Bay. He was back in La Rochelle in May 1543. War having broken out with Spain, he armed as a raider and captured some enemy ships. The following year, not knowing that peace had been signed in September, he took a few more prizes; but he was attacked off Cape Saint-Vincent in Portugal by Menendez and his squadron, who chased him as far as La Rochelle; there, in the ensuing battle, he fell mortally wounded.
Jean Fonteneau (Jean Alfonse) has left the following writings: La cosmographie avec l'espère et régime du soleil du nord par Jean Fonteneau dit Alfonse de Saintonge, capitaine-pilote de François 1er . . . , 2e èd., P. L. G. Musset (Recueil de voyages, XX, Paris, 1904). "Routier de Jean Alphonse," in Hakluyt, Principal navigations (1903–5), VIII, 275–83. Les voyages avantureux du Capitaine Ian Alfonce (Poitiers, 1559),. Champlain, Œuvres (Laverdière). Anthiaume, Cartes marines, I, passim (see Alfonse). Biggar, Early trading companies. Harrisse, Jean et Sébastien Cabot. Hoffman, Cabot to Cartier. La Roncière, Histoire de la marine française, III (1908). Sixteenth-century maps relating to Canada: a check-list and bibliography, ed. T. E. Layng (PAC pub., 1956). Voyages of Cartier (Biggar), which reproduces Jean Alfonse's description of his voyage to Canada.
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Cite This Article
Gustave Lanctot, "FONTENEAU, JEAN, Jean Alfonse," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 1, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed September 23, 2023, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/fonteneau_jean_1E.html.
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|Author of Article:
|Gustave Lanctot
|Title of Article:
|FONTENEAU, JEAN, Jean Alfonse
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|University of Toronto/Université Laval
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