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The Federal Unemployment Tax Act established a cooperative federal-state scheme to provide benefits to unemployed workers. The Act requires employers to pay an excise tax on wages paid to employees in "covered" employment, but entitles them to a credit on the federal tax for contributions paid into federally approved state unemployment compensation programs. The Act, in 26 U.S.C. 3309(b), exempts from mandatory state coverage employees of, inter alia, "an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches." A number of California churches and religious schools, including religious schools unaffiliated with any church, brought suit in Federal District Court to enjoin the Secretary of Labor from conditioning his approval of the California unemployment insurance program on its coverage of plaintiffs' employees, and to enjoin the State from collecting both tax information and the state unemployment compensation tax. The District Court conducted various proceedings and issued several opinions and orders extending over almost a year and a half, in one of which proceedings it rejected the Federal Government's argument that the court was barred from granting injunctive relief by the Tax Injunction Act, which provides that district courts "shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain" the assessment or collection of any state tax where "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy" may be had in the courts of such State. Ultimately, as pertinent here, on the ground that the benefit entitlement decisions for employees of the religious schools unaffiliated with churches risked excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the court permanently enjoined the state defendants from collecting unemployment taxes from such schools but did not issue an injunction against the federal defendants as to the schools because it had no information as to what [457 U.S. 393, 394] response the Secretary of Labor would make to the court's conclusion that the state defendants could not constitutionally impose state unemployment taxes on the employees of such schools. The court said that if the Secretary instituted decertification proceedings against California for failing to collect the taxes on behalf of such employees, the parties could apply to the court for further relief.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 419.
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 81-228, United States et al. v. Grace Brethren Church et al.; and No. 81-455, Grace Brethren Church et al. v. United States et al., also on appeal from the same court.
Harriet S. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States et al. in Nos. 81-228 and 81-455. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Mark C. Rutznick, and F. James Foley.
Jeffrey M. Vesely, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellants in No. 81-31. With him on the briefs were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, and Edmond B. Mamer, Deputy Attorney General.
William Bentley Ball argued the cause for appellees in Nos. 81-31 and 81-228 and appellants in No. 81-455. With him on the brief for Grace Brethren Church et al. were Philip J. Murren and Robert L. Toms. Donald A. Daucher filed a brief for the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod et al.Fn
Fn [457 U.S. 393, 395] Nathan Z. Dershowitz and Marc D. Stern filed a brief for the American Jewish Congress as amicus curiae. [457 U.S. 393, 396]
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question presented by the parties to these appeals is whether certain state and federal statutes violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment 1 by requiring religious schools unaffiliated with any church to pay unemployment insurance taxes. We do not reach this substantive question, however, holding instead that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, 2 deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to hear these challenges. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below.
Last Term, in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981), this Court considered statutory and constitutional challenges to provisions of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. 3301-3311 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Because the present claims involve the same provisions that we interpreted in St. Martin, we recount only briefly the substance and legislative history of the relevant statutes before turning to the facts in the present cases.
In FUTA, 3 Congress has authorized a cooperative federal-state scheme to provide benefits to unemployed workers. [457 U.S. 393, 397] The Act requires employers to pay an excise tax on wages paid to employees in "covered" employment, 4 but entitles them to a credit of up to 90% of the federal tax for contributions they have paid into federally approved state unemployment compensation programs. 5 One of the requirements for federal approval is that state programs "cover" certain broad categories of employment.
Until 1970, 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(8) excluded from the definition of covered employment "service performed in the employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or other [tax exempt] organization." Pub. L. 86-778, 533, 74 Stat. 984. As a consequence, such organizations were not required to pay either federal excise taxes or state unemployment compensation taxes. In 1970, Congress amended FUTA to require state plans to cover employees of nonprofit organizations, state hospitals, and state institutions of higher education, thus eliminating the broad exemption available to nonprofit organizations. 6 See 3309(a)(1). At the same time, Congress enacted 3309(b) to exempt from mandatory [457 U.S. 393, 398] state coverage a narrow class of religious and educational employees, i. e., Congress exempted services performed
The plaintiffs in these cases, a number of California churches and religious schools, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor from conditioning his approval of the California unemployment insurance program on its coverage of the plaintiffs' employees, and to enjoin the State from collecting both tax information and the state tax. 8 For the purposes of [457 U.S. 393, 399] evaluating their statutory and constitutional claims, the District Court divided the plaintiffs into three classes of employers: Category I represents those schools that are part of the corporate structure of a church or association of churches; Category II includes schools that are separate corporations formed by a church or association of churches; and Category III includes schools that are "operated primarily for religious purposes, but which [are] not operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches, i. e., an independent, non-church affiliated religious school." Supplemental Opinion, reprinted in App. to Juris. Statement in No. 81-31, p. 71 (J. S. App.). 9
On September 21, 1979, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the State, restraining it from collecting the state unemployment tax from the Category I plaintiffs. See id., at 51. The basis for the court's order was its conclusion that the plaintiffs were exempt from mandatory state coverage under 3309(b)(1), and alternatively, that if they were not exempt under the terms of FUTA, collection of the tax from the plaintiffs would involve excessive governmental entanglement with religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See J. S. App. 58-65.
In the same opinion, the District Court rejected the Federal Government's argument that, because the state remedy was "plain, speedy and efficient," the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, barred the court from granting injunctive relief. Considering first the availability of injunctive relief [457 U.S. 393, 400] from the state courts, the court concluded that state statutory and constitutional provisions 10 made such relief "at best, [457 U.S. 393, 401] uncertain." J. S. App. 66. The court then concluded that a state suit for a refund was an inadequate remedy because the plaintiffs claimed not only that their property had been taken unlawfully, but also that the "very process of determining whether any tax is due at all results in a violation of their First Amendment rights." Id., at 67. Because this First Amendment injury was "irreparable" once the taxes had been collected, only an injunction against collection of the tax could remedy the plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, because there existed no "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy in the state courts, the District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to grant injunctive and declaratory relief.
In a supplemental opinion filed June 2, 1980, the court clarified its earlier opinion, stating expressly that the preliminary injunction covered only Category I plaintiffs. See id., at 71. For the same reasons that it had granted the initial preliminary injunction, however, the court extended the preliminary injunction to Category II plaintiffs. The court continued to deny relief to the Category III plaintiffs after concluding that they were not covered by the statutory exemptions in 3309(b) and that the risk of excessive governmental entanglement with religion was too small to violate the Establishment Clause. J. S. App. 77-79. 11 [457 U.S. 393, 402]
Finally, on April 3, 1981, the court filed a second supplemental opinion ruling on all of the plaintiffs' motions for permanent injunctions enjoining the State from collecting unemployment compensation taxes and the Federal Government from conditioning approval of the state unemployment compensation programs on their inclusion of the plaintiffs' employees. See id., at 1. Considering first the statutory claims, the court concluded that Category I and Category II schools, but not Category III schools, are exempt from coverage under 26 U.S.C. 3309(b) and the corresponding state provision, Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 634.5(a) (West Supp. 1982). J. S. App. 3-15. 12 The court also found that the benefit entitlement decisions for employees of Category III schools risk excessive governmental entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id., at 25-33. 13 Consequently, the court held that "constitutional considerations bar the application of the scheme" to the Category III plaintiffs. Id., at 33.
Based on these findings, the court issued orders permanently enjoining the federal defendants from requiring state unemployment insurance programs to cover Category I and Category II schools as a precondition for federal approval of the state programs, id., at 47, 51, and permanently enjoining [457 U.S. 393, 403] the state defendants from "collecting, or attempting to collect, unemployment compensation . . . taxes" from the Category I, II, or III schools. Id., at 47, 50. The court expressly held Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 634.5(a) (West Supp. 1982) unconstitutional. See J. S. App. 45, 46. The court did not issue an injunction against the federal defendants as to Category III schools because it
An initial matter requiring our attention is whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear these appeals. 15 Congress has provided that
In McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975), we stated that 1252 was an unambiguous exception to the policy of minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court. Indeed, the "language of the statute sufficiently demonstrates its purpose: to afford immediate review in this Court in civil actions to which the United States or its officers are parties and thus will be bound by a holding of unconstitutionality." Id., at 31. Moreover, this Court has appellate jurisdiction under 1252 "when the ruling of unconstitutionality is made in the application of the statute to a particular circumstance, . . . rather than upon the challenged statute as a whole." Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 102 -103 (1947) (discussing the predecessor to 1252, Act of Aug. 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 751). See United States v. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., 404 U.S. 561, 563 (1972) (per curiam); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 293 (1981). Finally, 1252 provides jurisdiction even though the lower court did not expressly declare a federal statute unconstitutional, so long as a determination that a statutory provision was unconstitutional "was a necessary predicate to the relief" that the lower court granted. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 26 , n. 2 (1980). 16
In the present case, the District Court did not expressly hold 3309(b) of FUTA unconstitutional as applied to the Category III appellees, 17 but the effect of its several opinions [457 U.S. 393, 406] and orders was to make "the United States or its officers . . . bound by a holding of unconstitutionality." McLucas v. DeChamplain, supra, at 31. For example, while discussing the Establishment Clause claim of the Category III schools, the District Court held:
As we noted above, the District Court declared Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 634.5(a) (West Supp. 1982) unconstitutional and enjoined the state defendants from collecting state unemployment compensation taxes from the Category III schools. 19 In the course of granting this declaratory and injunctive relief, the court expressly rejected the Federal Government's argument that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, deprived the court of jurisdiction. See J. S. App. 65-69. Consequently, before reaching the merits of the appellees' claim, we must decide whether the District Court correctly ruled that it had jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act to issue declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Tax Injunction Act states simply that the district courts "shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the . . . collection [457 U.S. 393, 408] of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." It is plain from this language that the Tax Injunction Act prohibits a federal district court, in most circumstances, from issuing an injunction enjoining the collection of state taxes. Although this Court once reserved the question, 20 we now conclude that the Act also prohibits a district court from issuing a declaratory judgment holding state tax laws unconstitutional.
Initially, we observe that the Act divests the district court not only of jurisdiction to issue an injunction enjoining state officials, but also of jurisdiction to take actions that "suspend or restrain" the assessment and collection of state taxes. Because the declaratory judgment "procedure may in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation is ended," Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943), the very language of the Act suggests that a federal court is prohibited from issuing declaratory relief in state tax cases. 21 Additionally, because there is little practical difference between injunctive and declaratory relief, we would be hard pressed to conclude that Congress intended to prohibit taxpayers from seeking one form of anticipatory relief against state tax officials in federal court, while permitting them to seek another, thereby defeating the principal purpose of the Tax Injunction Act: "to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern [457 U.S. 393, 409] as the collection of taxes." Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981). 22 As JUSTICE BRENNAN [457 U.S. 393, 410] stated in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 , n. 17 (1971):
Consequently, because Congress' intent in enacting the Tax Injunction Act was to prevent federal-court interference with the assessment and collection of state taxes, we hold that the Act prohibits declaratory as well as injunctive relief. Accordingly, the District Court in these cases was without jurisdiction to declare the California tax provision unconstitutional or to issue its injunction against state authorities unless the appellees had no "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" in the state courts.
Last Term, in Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, this Court had occasion to consider the meaning of the "plain, speedy and efficient" exception in the Tax Injunction Act. After reviewing previous decisions 24 and the legislative history of the Act, 25 the Court concluded that the "plain, speedy and efficient" exception requires the "state-court remedy [to meet] certain minimal procedural criteria." 450 U.S., at 512 (emphasis in original). In particular, a state-court remedy is "plain, speedy and efficient" only if it "provides the taxpayer with a `full hearing and judicial determination' at which she may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax." Id., at 514 (quoting LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312 N. E. 2d 252, 255-256 [457 U.S. 393, 412] (1974)). 26 Applying these considerations, the Rosewell Court held that an Illinois tax scheme, requiring the taxpayer to pay an allegedly unconstitutional tax 27 and seek a refund through state administrative and judicial procedures, was a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act. In reaching this holding, the Court specifically relied on legislative Reports demonstrating congressional awareness that refunds were the exclusive remedy in many state tax systems. 28
The holding in Rosewell reflects not only Congress' express command in the Tax Injunction Act, but also the historical reluctance of the federal courts to interfere with the operation of state tax systems if the taxpayer had available an adequate remedy in the state courts. As this Court stated in Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871), long before enactment of the Tax Injunction Act:
With these cases and principles in mind, we turn to the California provisions to determine whether there exists a "plain, speedy and efficient" state remedy for the appellees' claim.
There is no dispute that appellees in the present cases can seek a refund of the California unemployment tax through state administrative and judicial procedures. Once a taxpayer has sought from, and been denied a refund by, the appropriate state agency, see Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 1176-1185 (West 1972 and Supp. 1982), 30 he may file an action [457 U.S. 393, 414] in Superior Court for a refund of the taxes paid, raising all arguments against the validity of the tax. Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 1241 (West Supp. 1982). If the taxpayer is unsuccessful at trial, he may appeal the decision to higher state courts and ultimately seek review in this Court. Nothing in this scheme prevents the taxpayer from "rais[ing] any and all constitutional objections to the tax" in the state courts. Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U.S., at 514 . As the Court in Rosewell noted, the "Act contemplates nothing more." Id., at 516, n. 19. 31 Moreover, assuming that the appellees' constitutional claims are meritorious, an issue on which we express no view, there is every reason to believe that once a state appellate court has declared the tax unconstitutional the appropriate state agencies will respect that declaration. See Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 28 Cal. App. 3d 230, 236, 104 Cal. Rptr. 558, 562 (1972) (noting that while the "relief afforded may not `prevent or enjoin' or otherwise hamper present or future tax assessment or collection effort . . . [i]t will be presumed that [457 U.S. 393, 415] the governmental agency will respect a judicial declaration concerning a regulation's validity"). Accordingly, it appears that Rosewell is directly applicable to the present cases, and that the District Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appellees' claims.
The appellees contend, however, that the California refund procedures do not constitute a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" because their claims can be remedied only by injunctive relief, and that such relief is unavailable in California courts to restrain the collection of state taxes. See n. 10, supra. Injunctive relief is necessary, the appellees claim, because prior to state judicial review, the employer must meet certain recordkeeping, registration, and reporting requirements, see Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 1085, 1086, 1088, 1092 (West 1972 and Supp. 1982), and potentially is subject to administrative benefit eligibility hearings 32 in violation of the appellees' First Amendment rights. The appellees thus fear that their constitutional rights will be violated before they have an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the unemployment tax scheme in state court.
This argument is unpersuasive. First, nothing in the California scheme precludes the appellees from challenging the unemployment tax before a benefit eligibility hearing is held for one of their former employees. As soon as an employer makes its first payment to the state unemployment insurance fund, it may file for a refund and, after exhausting state administrative remedies, seek a judicial determination of the constitutionality of the tax. 33 If the employer ultimately prevails [457 U.S. 393, 416] on his constitutional argument, the state taxing authorities can be expected to respect that court's holding in future administrative proceedings. See Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, at 236, 104 Cal. Rptr., at 562. Thus, before any entanglement from the benefit eligibility hearings occurs, the appellees should be able to challenge the constitutionality of the state unemployment insurance taxes.
Second, while an employer may be subject to some recordkeeping and reporting requirements, or even a benefit eligibility hearing, pending the resolution of its constitutional claims in state court, it will be subject to the same burdens even if it seeks relief from the federal courts. Thus, whatever harm the appellees may suffer pending resolution of their constitutional claims, that harm is not reduced by seeking relief in federal court. Stated differently, there are no apparent advantages to federal-court relief that make state-court remedies less than "plain, speedy and efficient." 34
Finally, we must keep in mind that at the time that it passed the Tax Injunction Act, Congress was well aware that refund procedures were the sole remedy in many States for unlawfully collected taxes. See S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937); H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). 35 Carving out a special exception for taxpayers [457 U.S. 393, 417] raising First Amendment claims would undermine significantly Congress' primary purpose "to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes." Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U.S., at 522 . 36 Because we do not believe that Congress intended federal injunctions and declaratory judgments to disrupt state tax administration when state refund procedures are available, we decline to find an exception in the Tax Injunction Act for the appellees' claims. 37 Accordingly, because the appellees could seek a refund of their state unemployment insurance taxes, and thereby obtain state judicial review of their constitutional claims, we hold that their remedy under state law was "plain, speedy and efficient" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, and consequently, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to issue injunctive or declaratory relief. 38 [457 U.S. 393, 418]
Despite the absence of jurisdiction in the District Court, the federal defendants urge us to consider the merits of the appellees' First Amendment claims because of the "public interest in, and the Secretary's need for, a definitive interpretation of 26 U.S.C. 3309(b)." Brief for United States 21. The Government bases this argument on our decision in McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S., at 32 , in which we held that "whether the District Court did or did not have jurisdiction to act, this case is properly here under 1252." See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763 , n. 8 (1975).
The Government's argument is unavailing, however, for in McLucas and Salfi, some federal trial court had jurisdiction, 39 [457 U.S. 393, 419] whereas in the present cases, no federal district court had jurisdiction. If this Court were nonetheless to reach the First Amendment issues presented in these appeals, the litigants would have sidestepped neatly Congress' intent and our longstanding policy "to limit drastically" federal interference in the administration of state taxes when a "plain, speedy and efficient" state remedy is available. 40 Accordingly, we do not reach the appellees' First Amendment claims.
The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] The Act provides:
[ Footnote 3 ] FUTA was enacted originally as Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 639.
[ Footnote 4 ] See 26 U.S.C. 3301.
[ Footnote 5 ] See 26 U.S.C. 3302 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Each state program receives annual approval after the Secretary of Labor finds that it complies with federal statutory standards. See 26 U.S.C. 3304(a), (c) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). The federal standards for the state programs are contained in 3304 and 3309. If a state plan complies with federal standards, the State is authorized to receive a federal grant to administer the state plan. See 29 U.S.C. 49d(b); 42 U.S.C. 501.
[ Footnote 6 ] See Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-373, 104 (b)(1), 84 Stat. 697. Under 3309(a)(2) and 3304(a)(6)(B), such nonprofit organizations were given the option of either making the same contribution to the state unemployment compensation fund required of other employers, or reimbursing the fund for unemployment compensation payments actually made to the nonprofit organizations' former employees.
Although nonprofit organizations were covered by federally approved state unemployment compensation laws, they continued to be exempt from the federal excise tax on wages because the definition of "employment" in 3306(c)(8), excluding services performed for such organizations, remained unchanged.
[ Footnote 7 ] In its place, Congress substituted an unrelated provision.
[ Footnote 8 ] This litigation grew out of two suits, one filed in the District Court by Grace Brethren Church et al. (Case No. CV 79-93 MRP), and the other filed in state court by the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod. The Secretary [457 U.S. 393, 399] of Labor successfully removed the Lutheran Church case (Case No. CV 79-162 MRP) to the District Court, which consolidated the cases for trial.
[ Footnote 9 ] Category I and II schools comprise schools from the Lutheran Church case, see Order (filed Apr. 3, 1981), reprinted in J. S. App. 49, as well as some of the schools from the Grace Brethren case. See Order (filed Apr. 3, 1981), reprinted in J. S. App. 45. Category III schools include only schools from the Grace Brethren case. See J. S. App. 46.
[ Footnote 10 ] California Un. Ins. Code Ann. 1851 (West 1972) provides:
More recent decisions, however, have held injunctive relief to be precluded. See Modern Barber Colleges, Inc. v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 31 Cal. 2d 720, 723, 192 P.2d 916, 918 (1948) (holding that a provision in the Unemployment Insurance Act, similar to 1851, prohibited injunctive relief, leaving the taxpayer only with the option to pay the tax and seek a refund); Aronoff v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 177, 180, 383 P.2d 409, 411 (1963) (holding that Cal. Const., Art. XIII, 15, and Cal. Rev. & Tax Code Ann. 19081 (West 1970) preclude issuance of an injunction to prevent collection of additional income taxes). Relying on Aronoff, a District Court of Appeal held that Cal. Const., Art. XIII, 32 (which, in 1974, became the successor to 15), and the corresponding statutory provision, Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 1851 (West 1972), prohibit the courts from enjoining the collection of unemployment insurance taxes. Lorco Properties, Inc. v. Department of Benefit Payments, 57 Cal. App. 3d 809, 815, 129 Cal. Rptr. 312, 315 (1976). Recently, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 27 Cal. 3d 277, 279, 611 P.2d 463, 464 (1980), the California Supreme Court held that under Cal. Const., Art. XIII, 32, a taxpayer was barred from seeking relief compelling the [457 U.S. 393, 401] state tax board to adjust the taxpayer's real property assessments. The court expressly held that there were no equitable exceptions to this rule, id., at 282, 611 P.2d, at 466, and reaffirmed the importance of the state policy to permit the uninterrupted collection of taxes. Cf. Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 28 Cal. App. 3d 230, 236, 104 Cal. Rptr. 558, 562 (1972) (noted without approval in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, and holding that a taxpayer could seek declaratory relief to challenge the validity of a tax regulation, but that such relief could not "`prevent or enjoin' or otherwise hamper present or future tax assessment or collection effort").
[ Footnote 11 ] The court also rejected the arguments offered by the Category III plaintiffs that imposition of the tax violates the Free Exercise Clause, and that the unique statutory treatment of Category III plaintiffs violates equal protection. J. S. App. 78.
[ Footnote 12 ] The court held alternatively that if the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of 3309(b) were correct (i. e., Category I and II schools were not exempt from coverage), then that provision violated the First Amendment because it caused excessive governmental entanglement with religion by requiring "[i]ntrusive monitoring of the activities of employees of religious schools in order to determine whether or not those employees are exempt from unemployment insurance . . . taxes" and by requiring "[i]nvolvement of state officials in the resolution of questions of religious doctrine in the course of determining the benefit eligibility of discharged employees of religious schools." Order (filed Apr. 3, 1981), reprinted in J. S. App. 45, 46; Order (filed Apr. 3, 1981), reprinted in id., at 49, 50.
[ Footnote 13 ] The court again rejected the plaintiffs' argument that statutory coverage of Category III schools violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, id., at 16-25, and found it unnecessary to reach the Category III plaintiffs' equal protection claim. Id., at 35.
[ Footnote 14 ] See J. S. App. 11-12; Juris. Statement in No. 81-228, pp. 4, n. 2, 6, n. 5. The Category III schools are parties only in the Grace Brethren case, the suit originally filed in federal court. See n. 8, supra.
The Grace Brethren appellees filed a cross-appeal (No. 81-455) claiming that the District Court erred in holding that FUTA and the corresponding California statutory provisions do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The cross-appeal, however, is unnecessary to preserve this argument since under this Court's Rule 10.5 "an appellee, without filing a cross-appeal, [may] defend a judgment on any ground that the law and record permit and that would not expand the relief he has been granted."
The plaintiffs in the Lutheran Church case have filed a brief in support of the judgment below. Because, however, neither the State nor the Federal Government appealed from that part of the judgment involving the Lutheran Church plaintiffs, we do not address their claims.
[ Footnote 15 ] In our order setting these cases for oral argument, we postponed the question of jurisdiction until consideration of the merits. See 454 U.S. 961 (1981).
[ Footnote 16 ] In Clark, the Court of Claims simply ordered relief based on its earlier decision in another case. In that earlier decision, the court had declared the challenged statutory provision unconstitutional. See Gentry v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 1, 546 F.2d 343 (1976), rehearing denied, 212 Ct. Cl. 27, 551 F.2d 852 (1977).
[ Footnote 17 ] See Order (filed Apr. 3, 1981), reprinted in J. S. App. 45, 46 (holding Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 634.5(a) (West Supp. 1982) unconstitutional, but making no direct reference to 3309(b)).
[ Footnote 18 ] The court's analysis of Category I and II schools also demonstrates that it believed FUTA, as applied to Category III schools, to be unconstitutional. In its discussion of Category I and II schools, the court held that if it were to follow the Secretary's interpretation of 3309, i. e., if no exemption existed, then FUTA would be unconstitutional as applied to those schools in part because of the excessive governmental entanglement in the benefit eligibility hearing. See n. 12, supra. Since the court also found an entanglement problem with respect to benefit eligibility hearings for Category III schools, and since there is no statutory exemption for those schools, it follows that the District Court must have believed that FUTA was unconstitutional as applied to the Category III plaintiffs.
[ Footnote 19 ] No federal tax is involved in this case, for the services performed for Category III schools are exempted by 3306(c)(8) from the definition of employment for which the federal excise tax must be paid.
[ Footnote 20 ] See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943).
[ Footnote 21 ] In enacting the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress recognized the substantial effect declaratory relief would have on legal disputes. Thus, while Congress perceived declaratory judgments as a device to reduce federal-court abuses associated with injunctions, Congress also recognized that declaratory relief would "settle controversies," S. Rep. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934), and permit the federal courts "the power to exercise in some instances preventive relief." H. R. Rep. No. 1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934).
[ Footnote 22 ] To be sure, in enacting the Tax Injunction Act, Congress considered primarily injunctions against state officials because that form of anticipatory relief was the principal weapon used by businesses to delay or avoid paying state taxes. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone). Moreover, it is arguable that Congress' failure to mention the Declaratory Judgment Act, enacted only three years earlier, indicates that Congress intended the Tax Injunction Act to prohibit only federal injunctive relief. Nevertheless, the legislative history of the Tax Injunction Act demonstrates that Congress worried not so much about the form of relief available in the federal courts, as about divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction to interfere with state tax administration.
Both the Senate and House Reports, as well as the congressional debates of the Act, expressly rely on the congressional purpose underlying the Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. 1342, which divests the district courts of jurisdiction of any suit to "enjoin, suspend, or restrain the operation" of any public utility commission order. See S. Rep. No. 1035, supra, at 2; H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 1415-1417 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone). The legislative history of the Johnson Act, in turn, makes clear that its purpose was to prevent public utilities from going to federal district court to challenge state administrative orders or avoid state administrative and judicial proceedings. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 125, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1933) (in support of the Johnson bill, declaring that a utility "will be required, in all cases where a State has set up a public utility commission, to proceed before that commission if it has any complaint. It can appeal from this State board to the State courts and, if it is dissatisfied with the final judgment of the supreme court of the State, it can take an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States"); id., at 33 ("It is the jurisdiction which Congress has given to Federal courts to pass on matters of State regulation which holds up the laws of the States, prevents the officials of the States from doing their duty, and robs the people of the benefit which would accrue to them, if the commissions which they have set up by law in the various States were permitted to perform their duty"); H. R. Rep. No. 1194, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (in opposition to the Johnson bill, declaring that it "seeks to withdraw completely from the district courts of the United States all jurisdiction in suits relating to orders of State administrative boards or commissions affecting rates chargeable by public utilities"); 78 Cong. Rec. 1916 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Johnson); id., at 1918 ("the object is to make [the utilities] subject to [457 U.S. 393, 410] the jurisdiction of the laws of our States; to give them their rights in every instance to the trial of the question fact first before the public-utility commission, to give them every legal right they have, and if any right that is guaranteed by the Constitution is infringed upon at all, then, of course, the legal right of appeal ultimately from the highest tribunal in the State to the United States Supreme Court"); id., at 8324 (remarks of Rep. Mapes) ("It is simply a question as to whether or not States are going to be allowed to perform their proper functions in the supervision and fixing of rates, without interference of Federal law. It is a question as to whether or not Congress is going to continue to permit the utilities in important cases to thwart the will of the States and the State authorities. . . . This bill will only deprive the lower Federal courts of the jurisdiction they now have over rate cases"); id., at 8328 (remarks of Rep. Lewis) ("The Johnson bill absolutely abolishes the jurisdiction of the United States courts in rate cases"); id., at 8338 (remarks of Rep. Tarver) ("The Johnson bill contains but one substantive proposition, and that is to divest the district courts of the United States of jurisdiction in public-utility rate cases"); id., at 8419 (remarks of Rep. Hancock) ("the Johnson bill seeks to [save time and money] by divesting the Federal courts of all jurisdiction in public-utility cases except the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States after the final decision of the State court of last resort").
[ Footnote 23 ] This Court has long recognized the dangers inherent in disrupting the administration of state tax systems. See, e. g., Dows v. City of Chicago, [457 U.S. 393, 411] 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1871) ("It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public").
[ Footnote 24 ] See Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74 (1976); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 625 (1946); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S., at 300 -301.
[ Footnote 25 ] See 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone); S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). The Court also relied on the legislative history of the Johnson Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. 1342 (prohibiting federal-court interference with orders issued by state administrative agencies to public utilities), on which the Tax Injunction Act was modeled.
[ Footnote 26 ] See also 450 U.S., at 515 , and n. 19, 517 (making clear that some opportunity to raise constitutional objections is the most important consideration); S. Rep. No. 1035, supra, at 2 (under the Tax Injunction Act, a "full hearing and judicial determination of the controversy is assured. An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is available as in other cases").
[ Footnote 27 ] The plaintiff in Rosewell had claimed that requiring payment of the county property tax violated her equal protection and due process rights.
[ Footnote 28 ] See S. Rep. 1035, supra, at 1 (state "statutes generally provide that taxpayers may contest their taxes only in refund actions after payment under protest"); H. R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937).
[ Footnote 29 ] See also Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 282 (1909) (holding that "the illegality or unconstitutionality of a [457 U.S. 393, 413] state or municipal tax or imposition is not of itself a ground for equitable relief in the courts of the United States. In such a case the aggrieved party is left to his remedy at law, when that remedy is as complete, practicable and efficient as the remedy in equity"); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.S. 481, 488 (1913) (holding that federal courts will not enjoin the collection of unconstitutional state taxes where the taxpayer "ha[s] a plain, adequate and complete remedy" at law); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, supra, at 299 (holding that the same "considerations which have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional cases, require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment procedure"); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103 (1981) (noting that the Tax Injunction Act, "and the decisions of this Court which preceded it, reflect the fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and state governments that is essential to `Our Federalism,' particularly in the area of state taxation").
[ Footnote 30 ] Apparently, California taxpayers cannot raise their constitutional challenges in the administrative tax refund proceeding unless an appellate court already has sustained such a challenge. See Cal. Const., Art. III, 3.5, which provides in part that
[ Footnote 31 ] Significantly, the California administrative and judicial scheme for challenging a tax assessment is remarkably similar to the Illinois scheme that we upheld in Rosewell as "plain, speedy and efficient." See 450 U.S., at 508 -509, and nn. 6, 7. In fact, the California tax scheme is more favorable to the taxpayer than the Illinois scheme in that it requires the State to pay interest on improperly collected taxes. See Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 1242 (West Supp. 1982).
This Court has not hesitated to declare a state refund provision inadequate to bar federal relief if the taxpayer's opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state proceedings is uncertain. In Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946), the taxpayer could not raise his constitutional challenge in the administrative proceedings, and appeal to the state courts was discretionary with those courts. Consequently, because "there [was] such uncertainty concerning the New Jersey remedy as to make it speculative," id., at 625, the Court held that the taxpayer could seek declaratory relief in federal court.
[ Footnote 32 ] Under Cal. Un. Ins. Code Ann. 1256 (West Supp. 1982), a former employee can collect unemployment benefits only if he has not been dismissed for "misconduct" or has not "left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause."
[ Footnote 33 ] Part of the appellees' argument for the necessity of injunctive relief rests on the premise that payments to the state fund are made only after a benefit eligibility hearing has been held. Under 26 U.S.C. 3309(a)(2) and 3304(a)(6)(B), however, the States are required to give nonprofit organizations, including the appellees, the option either of making regular contributions to the state unemployment insurance fund or of reimbursing the [457 U.S. 393, 416] fund for payments actually made to the employers' former employees. The nonprofit organizations are not required to choose the reimbursement method, however, and can make regular payments to the fund in advance of any employee being discharged.
[ Footnote 34 ] Our conclusion that the state-court remedy is plain, speedy and efficient is reenforced by our observation that it took the appellees in these cases over two years to obtain injunctive relief in federal court.
[ Footnote 35 ] The dissent errs when it states, without authority, that the Tax Injunction Act is not applicable to these cases because of the "layers of review that must be exhausted in the California system." Post, at 422, n. 4. Certainly, nothing in the legislative history of the Act suggests that requiring a taxpayer to seek a refund first through administrative procedures makes the state remedy less than "plain, speedy and efficient." [457 U.S. 393, 417] Moreover, the legislative history of the Johnson Act, after which the Tax Injunction Act was modeled, see n. 22, supra, makes clear congressional intent that a state remedy is "plain, speedy and efficient" even though a utility must proceed first through administrative and then judicial proceedings in order to challenge the constitutionality of utility rates. See S. Rep. No. 125, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1933).
[ Footnote 36 ] In addition, there seems to be no principled basis for limiting the appellees' argument to First Amendment claims. Any employer required to pay state taxes in a manner allegedly violating the Equal Protection Clause, for example, might argue that the absence of state injunctive relief permitted the infliction of an irreparable injury that could be remedied only by a federal injunction.
[ Footnote 37 ] We also reject the appellees' argument to the extent that it assumes that the state courts will not protect their constitutional rights. As we stated in another context: "[W]e are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 , n. 35 (1976).
[ Footnote 38 ] The state defendants also argue that because the Federal Government is an indispensable party to this action, and could not be compelled to submit to state-court jurisdiction, the state courts could not afford the [457 U.S. 393, 418] appellees complete relief. Consequently, the state defendants reason, the Tax Injunction Act does not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction. See Brief for Appellants State of California et al. 35. The error in this argument is its premise; as St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981), demonstrates, the Federal Government need not be a party in order for the appellees to litigate their statutory and constitutional claims.
Finally, none of the parties suggests that we avoid the jurisdictional bar of the Tax Injunction Act by restricting our review to the appellees' challenge to 26 U.S.C. 3309(b), and disregarding their challenge to the corresponding state provisions, 634.5(a), (b). Such a suggestion would be untenable since, after all, the state provisions were enacted in order to comply with federal statutory requirements, and consequently are identically worded to the federal provisions. Thus, a challenge to FUTA would be a direct effort to "enjoin, suspend or restrain" state tax officials from collecting unemployment taxes from the appellees. Alternatively, if the challenge to FUTA would not affect the actions of state officials, there would be serious doubts whether the appellees were injured by FUTA's provisions. Accordingly, we vacate not only the District Court's judgment with respect to the appellees' state claims, but also its judgment regarding the constitutionality of FUTA.
[ Footnote 39 ] In both of those cases, the question was whether a single district judge or a three-judge district court had jurisdiction. In the present cases, by contrast, the issue is whether the federal courts or the state courts have jurisdiction.
[ Footnote 40 ] Similarly, the state defendants' reliance on Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980), is misplaced. In that case, the District Court had held unconstitutional a federal statute that the parties had not challenged. We held that because there was no case or controversy on that issue, the District Court had exceeded its jurisdiction for that issue. Id., at 367. Nevertheless, because of the holding of unconstitutionality we concluded that we had jurisdiction under 1252 to "review the `whole case.'" Id., at 368. That review, however, was restricted to those issues over which the District Court had had jurisdiction, and we vacated that portion of the judgment holding the federal statute unconstitutional. Ibid.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.
Appellee Grace Brethren Church filed suit against the United States Secretary of Labor and other defendants in the United States District Court for the Central District of California claiming that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act violates the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The District Court held the Act unconstitutional. Pursuant to a federal statute providing for expedited review in cases of this kind, 1 the defendants appealed directly to this Court, bypassing [457 U.S. 393, 420] the Court of Appeals precisely as Congress intended. Recognizing the need for prompt review of a constitutional question affecting the nationwide operation of a federal statute, the Court holds that this special jurisdiction was properly invoked. It then reaches the curious conclusion that, because some of the defendants are California taxing authorities that administer this cooperative federal-state program in that State, Congress intended that only state courts could pass on the constitutional validity of this federal statute. 2 Neither the language nor the legislative history of the Tax Injunction Act requires such a strange result.
The Tax Injunction Act provides that federal district courts "shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain" the activities of state taxing authorities. The preclusion of federal injunctive relief was a response to a specific problem that concerned Congress in 1937. In the States in which taxpayers were required to challenge a tax assessment in a refund suit, only taxpayers that could sue state taxing authorities in federal court could obtain injunctive relief. The privileged taxpayers were primarily the foreign corporations that could invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. These federal suits were objectionable not only because of this discrimination but also because state treasuries often were deprived of tax revenues while the federal suits were adjudicated and because the federal suits involved only state-law questions that were more appropriate for state-court resolution. See S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1937); 81 Cong. Rec. 1416-1417 (1937) (Sen. Bone); see also Rosewell v. LaSalle [457 U.S. 393, 421] National Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 533 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
A literal reading of the Tax Injunction Act manifestly does not preclude the declaratory judgment entered in this litigation. Nor do the concerns that gave rise to its enactment require such a bar. Appellees' challenge is based on the Federal Constitution and is directed at a federal-state program administered according to federal requirements. Only federal questions are involved.
In Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 , the Court recognized that equitable considerations can in some cases provide adequate justification for federal courts to withhold declaratory relief when the Tax Injunction Act precluded injunctive relief. In the intervening 40 years, this equitable doctrine has been sufficient to protect state tax laws from unnecessary federal interference. Today, however, the Court confronts a situation in which the challenge to a state tax does not implicate these concerns. 3 Ironically, the absence in these unusual cases of the traditional justification for a ban on declaratory relief seems to spur the Court to revise the Tax Injunction Act to preclude declaratory as well as injunctive relief. To accomplish this revision, the Court must ignore the plain meaning of the statute and the limited concerns that gave rise to its enactment. The Court instead relies upon the legislative history of the Johnson Act, ch. 283, 48 Stat. 775, see ante, at 409-410, n. 22, even though that statute was enacted before the Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955. Even if that suspect analysis could be overlooked, the fact remains that, after the Declaratory Judgment Act was on the books for three years, Congress did not see fit to bar declaratory relief when it expressly precluded injunctive relief in the Tax Injunction Act. The avoidance of [457 U.S. 393, 422] a decision on the merits in this litigation hardly seems worth the Court's nimble exercise in lawmaking. 4
The Court has both the power and the duty to decide the merits. I therefore respectfully dissent.
[ Footnote 1 ] Title 28 U.S.C. 1252 provides:
[ Footnote 2 ] A further irony is that the Secretary of Labor, who is certainly the principal defendant even if not an indispensable party, could remove such an action if it were filed in state court. Indeed, with respect to one of the actions consolidated in the District Court, the Secretary did just that.
[ Footnote 3 ] Indeed, to the extent that equitable considerations are implicated they favor the procedure followed in these cases whereby expedited review in this Court is available.
[ Footnote 4 ] There is an independent reason why the Tax Injunction Act does not preclude federal declaratory relief in this litigation. When one compares the layers of review that must be exhausted in the California system with the direct appeal to this Court provided by 28 U.S.C. 1252, one surely cannot conclude that the state system provides the "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy that Congress intended for the resolution of the federal questions these cases present. [457 U.S. 393, 423]
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OPINION: They dig coal so the world can run
E.J. Dionne Jr. is a syndicated columnist for The Washington Post.
There is a dispiriting and heartbreaking sameness about how we respond to mining disasters.
We celebrate the stoic sturdiness of mine workers who pursue their craft with pride, bravery and full knowledge of the risks it entails. Then we get to the questions about what might have been done to avert the disaster. What was the role of the company that ran the mine? What are the responsibilities of lawmakers and government regulators whose job it is to devise and enforce rules to protect those who, as an old union song put it, dig the coal so the world can run?
We went through exactly this cycle after the Sago Mine catastrophe that took 12 lives in January of 2006. Later in the year, Congress passed the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act. The law strengthened the Mine Safety and Health Administration's staff, increased penalties for violations and, as The Washington Post reported, "led to a higher number of citations and penalties - and more challenges by companies."
That last phrase is important. Companies just don't like regulation, and Don L. Blankenship, the chief executive of Massey Energy Co., has a history of challenging the regulators in every way he can.
Massey's Upper Big Branch Mine in Montcoal, W.Va., site of last Monday's disaster, has been cited for safety violations 1,342 times since 2005. Eighty-six of those citations involved failing to follow a mine ventilation plan to control methane and coal dust - 12 of them coming last month alone.
Blankenship views this as the cost of doing business. "Violations are unfortunately a normal part of the mining process," he said in a radio interview with West Virginia Metro News. "There are violations at every coal mine in America and UBB (Upper Big Branch) was a mine that had violations." Congress will no doubt have hearings on this and we will learn just how "normal" Massey's operation of Upper Big Branch was.
Blankenship is also a poster child for why we need campaign finance laws, and why recent moves by the U.S. Supreme Court to weaken them are so dangerous. Blankenship spent $3 million to help elect a justice to the West Virginia Supreme Court, who then twice provided the key vote that set aside a $50-million jury verdict against Massey.
Fortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled last year that judges must disqualify themselves in cases involving litigants from whom they received large campaign contributions. But the margin on that case was only 5-4. Chief Justice John Roberts, one of the dissenters, argued that the majority's decision "will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however groundless those charges may be." No, don't question those judges, even when their campaigns get 3 million bucks.
That particular case concerned fraud, not mine regulation. But there's a pattern here to which we should pay heed, and it involves power. Too often, regulations are discussed in the abstract as a "burden" on companies that expend substantial sums to resist them. Only after disasters such as this one do we remember that regulations exist for a reason, that their enforcement can, literally, be a matter of life and death.
We will eventually learn what went wrong at Upper Big Branch and whether the safety violations were part of the problem. But then what will we do?
In the 30th anniversary edition of his classic book "Everything in Its Path," the sociologist Kai Erikson reflects on the meaning of an earlier West Virginia mining country disaster that he wrote about so powerfully: the 1972 flood in Logan County's Buffalo Creek.
Pondering his research in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Erikson concludes that we live in "a world in which the most vulnerable of people end up taking the brunt of disasters resulting both from natural processes and from human activities." Perhaps the world will always be this way. But can't we bend it toward justice, at least a little bit?

subset: commoncrawl


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The last time we took a look at Israeli startup Yedda was in January 2006. Today they've left private beta and are allowing anyone to use the service.
Yedda is a question and answer service, comparable to Yahoo Answers, Wondir, Google Answers and Oyogi. With the exception of Google Answers, all of these services, including Yedda, are free, and go to great effort to leverage the community to ensure quality answers.
Yahoo Answers seems to have gotten the model mostly right, and they announced the 10 millionth answer back in May (a recent email from Yahoo says they are up to 30 million answers, and Comscore says they had 14.3 million unique visitors in July). Oyogi and Wondir seem to be in a traffic funk, while Google will have a very hard time competing based on their pricing model. Note that wondir may also be changing their business model – see the notice linked from this page.
Yedda is doing a number of things differently than the other guys, and one feature in particular stands out. If you would like to answer questions, you can register, via tags, on topics that you feel you are qualified to discuss. Yedda will then reach out to you via email (or RSS or IM) when questions come in that you might want to answer. I've registered myself under a few different topics, and it seems to me that I'm more likely to read an email asking for my help than remember to go to the site and browse for questions. That may give this small startup the edge it needs to carve out a successful niche for itself.
Another feature I like is that they allow users to post questions of any length, and include pictures. The other services don't allow this. Yedda also has a flat hierarchy (v. Yahoo Answers, which forces a category assignment), and tag suggestions based on a semantic analysis of the question. Finally, they will keep a question "fresh" until answered. What all this means: Yedda is making a real effort to help people get questions answered, and then using those completed questions in the future to help others.
If there is room for an independent service in this space, Yedda may be in a good position to win.
Give it a try. There is already some good beta user content on the site. A good place to start is to review the questions about Yedda itself, here.


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China set a record with its investments around the world in 2012. And in the United States, China shattered its previous investment record.
Before people start panicking, it's important to know: This is not a bad thing.
First, let's put it in perspective. Chinese investment is still very, very small as compared to the size of the U.S. economy. At the national level, the stock of investment is barely $50 billion—which sounds large, but is negligible compared to a stock of American wealth of more than $60 trillion.
No one's "taking over" anything. In fact, more Chinese investment is a good thing. It creates jobs; it benefits companies, and it should be welcomed. It also gives us more leverage to push for a more open Chinese market, which continues to be a major problem.
Globally, the U.S. can compete and win with China in terms of economic influence, but we have to be willing to play. We have to be willing to expand our trade and investment in both directions.
The Heritage Foundation offers the only public dataset of Chinese outward investment, tracking the country's investments of $100 million or more since 2005. Using our interactive map, you can see where the flow of investment is going—by country and by sectors, including technology, transportation, agriculture, real estate, metals, etc.
>> Use the China Global Investment Tracker's Interactive Map
Energy continues to attract the most Chinese money, while North America became the most popular destination for Chinese firms in 2012. Australia also remains a top destination for Chinese investment.
Protecting America
Now, while additional investment that supports American jobs is welcome, we have to be smart. We need to make sure that Chinese companies doing business here don't undermine competition, because they get so much support from their government. If our laws are adequate to do this, we should not hesitate to enforce them. If they need to be modified, that process will take some time, so we should start now.
There are protections in place for U.S. interests, and if these need strengthening, then the U.S. government should address those needs. America already has a structure in place to:
- Safeguard technology: The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is tasked with keeping foreign entities from acquiring technology that could harm American interests. It should continue to investigate and bar any transactions it finds harmful.
- Ensure that Chinese firms behave differently here than at home: The Securities and Exchange Commission is currently responding to a failure to disclose financial information by some Chinese firms that sell stock here. This kind of action must continue. Chinese entities operating in the U.S. or selling stock here must follow American law or be forced to depart.
Chinese investment in the U.S. is no reason to get nervous. It boosts our economy and should prompt us to secure top-flight trade and investment agreements across the Pacific and around the world.
It's also important to note that this trend won't last forever. North America has jumped to the forefront of Chinese business activity, but this development is likely to be temporary: The pattern over time is for Chinese enterprises to move as a group from region to region. The U.S. should take this opportunity both to welcome Chinese investment and to respond to it according to our laws and values.
Quick Hits:
- Yesterday, President Obama signed a law that will give him and future Presidents and their spouses armed Secret Service protection for life.
- "Vice President Joseph Biden will deliver his recommendations for comprehensive gun violence legislation on Tuesday," reports The Huffington Post.
- You have apps on your phone—what about apps for your car?
- What's in store for the next Treasury Secretary? National Journal has some expectations.
- Join us today at noon ET for a Google+ Hangout to talk about the money for Hurricane Sandy relief—or whatever else Congress is throwing into the bill.


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1748: Marretje Arents, for the Pachtersoproer
2 comments June 28th, 2020 Headsman
On this date in 1748, three instigators of a riot hanged in an Amsterdam public square, while worse fates befell those who came to see it.
It was only a few days earlier that the Pachtersoproer (English Wikipedia entry | Dutch) had torn apart the homes of nineteen tax collectors and magnates in the capital. These violent protests against inequitable taxation and oligarchical power had actually begun in Friesland and Groningen, the northernmost provinces of the Low Countries, before spreading to Amsterdam.
Marretje Arents (English Wikipedia entry | Dutch), a fishmonger supporting four children while her husband was abroad as a soldier in the East Indies, was seen on that Monday, June 24th, clad in a distinctive red chintz exhorting rioters to wreak revenge on the grandees and helping to ransack at least one house. According to the chronicle (1740-1752) of Abraham Chaim Braatbard, she spat at one agent,
Today we are the boss and tomorrow we will come to you at the town hall. Then we will see what we will do with all of you, gentlemen land-thieves … [then, lifting her skirt] Now you can clean my ass, because that's all I have left for you.
This bold and public flaunting of an insurrectionary intent was not accompanied by a political achievement more lasting than a couple of days' looting. When Arents simply turned up on June 27th at her market stall to go about her usual business just as if she hadn't been trying to overturn it all three days before, she was arrested for sedition. Of course, there must have been hundreds of others who either weren't identified or weren't deemed worth making an example of who did go right back to their normal lives, nursing their grievances in customary silence.
Marretje Arents's voice is heard in the annals, at the cost of her life.
By the next day at noon, she and two other perceived leaders of the disturbance,
Mat van der Nieuwendijk [see comments] and Pieter van Dordt, were publicly hanged at the Waag op de Dam.* Over the brattle of drummers charged with drowning her incitements to the crowd, she was still heard to keep out her cries for rebellion until the moment the rope closed her throat.
Revenge, my dear citizens, assist me. For you now let me die so shamefully, while I have not fought for myself. I did it for the whole country, against the tyranny of the tenants, who tormented us citizens and forcibly took our money and good for the lease.
She would not have had to outlive her hanging more than a few minutes to see it. As the next of the riotous "captains" was strung up, a disturbance broke out in the packed square. It's not certainly recorded whether this was a wave of sympathy responding to Marretje Arents, or the chance surge of a large crowd jostling for position, or something else besides — but suddenly the host of onlookers stampeded, crushing their fellows underfoot and pushing others into the Amstel River. Braatbard guessed that some 200 souls might have lost their lives for the sake of this triple execution … but whether 3 lives or 203, the important thing to the Low Countries' rulers was that the Pachtersoproer did not re-emerge.
* The Waag, or weigh-house, served the bustling commercial district that grew up around Dam Square at the heart of Amsterdam. It was demolished in 1808 under French occupation.
Painting of Dam Square from the late 1600s, by Dutch master Gerrit Berckheyde. The weigh-house in the middle of the square presents an obviously suitable landmark for an affair like a public execution; just as well, since by this time its original function had been ceded to a new and larger weigh-house which still survives as the city's venerable Waag. It was in the latter building that the dissection was performed that Rembrandt immortalized in The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp.
On this day..
- 1393: Karsten Sarnow, Stralsund mayor - 2019
- 2006: Sedley Alley - 2018
- 1906: Four Egyptians for the Denshawai Incident - 2017
- 1680: The wife of Abdullah Celebi, and her Jewish lover - 2016
- 1816: Five Ely and Littleport rioters - 2015
- 1927: Jindrich Bazant, killer rake - 2014
- 1776: Thomas Hickey, plotting against George Washington - 2013
- 1844: Gabriel de la Concepcion Valdes, "Placido" - 2012
- 1899: Ologbosere, of the Benin Empire - 2011
- 1890: Major Panitza, by Stefan Stambolov - 2010
- 1578: Five sodomite monks, by Calvinist Ghent - 2009
- 1905: Henri Languille, a man of science - 2008
Entry Filed under: 18th Century,Capital Punishment,Death Penalty,Execution,Hanged,History,Netherlands,Public Executions,Revolutionaries,Rioting,Women
Tags: 1740s, 1748, amsterdam, june 28, marretje arents, mat van der nieuwendijk, pachtersoproer, pieter van dordt, tax revolt


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Every fabric choice, every line, every stitch is our obsession.
Ah, the Roaring Twenties.
While I obviously didn't have the privilege of living in that amazing period in history, I can only imagine what a wonderful time everyone had. With great economic growth and widespread prosperity, the United States augmented its standing as the richest country in the world.
And they absolutely dressed the part for every occasion.
When most of us look back at the 1920s, all we see are images in black and white. But as someone who has studied all the eras in our nation's past, I can tell you that it was possibly the most colorful period we've ever experienced, especially when it came to dress.
The men were fashion-forward people, aiming to exude an impression of superiority and dominance. And, despite the fact that most of the people were working class, they projected a sense of style rarely seen in present times.
Today, subtle hints of this era are back.
As seen in Mark Wahlberg's great new series Boardwalk Empire, the characters bring the Roaring Twenties style of dress backto life. No one pulls it off better than the leading man himself, Nucky Thompson, played splendidly by Steve Buscemi.
Bold fabrics and some serious colors dominate the series, and these trends have slowly re-emerged into our present-day dress code among those who put fashion at the top of their list.
For example, take the three-piece suit. Nearly extinct for many years, this classic styling is roaring back. The trend oozes with class and style, and combined with the wide variety of bold colors and fabrics available in men's clothing today, it's a blueprint for success.
At David August, we're not waiting for 2020 to bring back this classic design. Our client list, which includes the likes of Will Smith, Robert Downey, Jr., Terrence Howard and others, has already stepped to the plate to order up some of these retro designs.
Renowned for our style, attention to detail and unmatched quality, our team includes the finest master tailors in the world, tailors who meticulously handcraft each piece of clothing with exquisite detail and unmatched precision. Every fabric choice, every line, every stitch is our obsession. Every accessory, from shoes and belts to ties and knitwear, are considered and planned to perfection.
The complete David August experience is like no other, from the initial meeting where measurements are taken and fabrics are chosen to the final fitting where we ensure a well-tailored fit and ultimate satisfaction. This is when our clients begin to understand the thrill of being impeccably dressed and the sense of power and pride that it brings.
Take a step forward in fashion with the guidance of the David August team, and you'll be pleasantly surprised with your new look.
All my best,
David Heil


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Aether/Transitive Dependency Resolution
An important task of Aether is to resolve transitive dependencies. This task can be split into two sub tasks:
- Determine the coordinates of the artifacts that make up the transitive dependencies.
- Resolve the files for the artifacts that have been identified in step 1.
Artifacts and their dependencies among each other form a dependency graph. So in other words, step 1 means to calculate this dependency graph and step 2 is a simple graph traversal that fetches the file for each artifact in the dependency graph. In Aether, this dependency graph can be easily inspected and extension points are provided to allow for more control over the construction of the dependency graph. To understand those extension points, we will have a closer look at the way the dependency graph is constructed.
Starting from a given root dependency like org.eclipse.aether:aether-impl:0.9.0, the repository system first reads the corresponding artifact descriptor (i.e. the POM when dealing with Maven repositories). The artifact descriptor tells about direct dependencies, dependency management and additional remote repositories to consider during the resolution. For each direct dependency, a dependency selector is given a chance to exclude the dependency from the graph. If the dependency is included, a dependency manager applies dependency management (if any). Next, the declared dependency version is expanded to a list of matching versions from the repositories. For a simple version like "1.0", the resulting list contains only that version. For a version range like "[1.0,2.0)", the version list generally contains multiple versions and is subject to filtering by a version filter. For each matching version of the dependency, a child node is added to the dependency graph. Recursion of the process for each child dependency is controlled by a dependency traverser.
The above process creates a dependency graph that often contains duplicate or conflicting dependencies or even cycles and as such is called a dirty graph. A chain of dependency graph transformers is then used to trim this graph down and to form a resolved graph.
So more technically, the dependency graph that the repository system returns to its caller is affected by instances of org.eclipse.aether.collection.DependencySelector, org.eclipse.aether.collection.DependencyManager, org.eclipse.aether.collection.VersionFilter, org.eclipse.aether.collection.DependencyTraverser and org.eclipse.aether.collection.DependencyGraphTransformer. Users of the repository system can directly control those extension points when creating the repository system session by providing implementations that fit their needs.
For example, a dependency selector can process exclusions on child dependencies, exclude optional dependencies or dependencies with certain unwanted scopes. A dependency traverser can be used to decide whether the dependencies of a (fat) WAR should be included in the dependency graph or not. The version filter can exclude specific versions of an artifact which are inacceptable in the current context, e.g. ban snapshots. Dependency graph transformers can identify and mark conflicting nodes in the dirty tree and resolve conflicting versions or scopes by pruning unwanted parts from the graph.
The class MavenRepositorySystemUtils from maven-aether-provider provides a session that mimics the resolution rules used by Maven. In case you want to customize the graph construction, feel free to have a look at the source of that class to learn about the implementation classes being used there to achieve Maven style behavior, you might want to reuse some of those for your own repository system session as well. Maven plugins can easily get access to the current repository system session via the usual parameter injection, see Using Aether in Maven Plugins for the actual code bits.


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Washington, D.C., April 7, 2010 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced administrative proceedings against Memphis, Tenn.-based firms Morgan Keegan & Company and Morgan Asset Management and two employees accused of fraudulently overstating the value of securities backed by subprime mortgages.
The SEC's Division of Enforcement alleges that Morgan Keegan failed to employ reasonable procedures to internally price the portfolio securities in five funds managed by Morgan Asset, and consequently did not calculate accurate "net asset values" (NAVs) for the funds. Morgan Keegan recklessly published these inaccurate daily NAVs, and sold shares to investors based on the inflated prices.
"This scheme had two architects — a portfolio manager responsible for lies to investors about the true value of the assets in his funds, and a head of fund accounting who turned a blind eye to the fund's bogus valuation process," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement.
William Hicks, Associate Director in the SEC's Atlanta Regional Office, said, "This misconduct masked from investors the true impact of the subprime mortgage meltdown on these funds."
According to the Commission's order instituting administrative proceedings, the SEC's Enforcement Division alleges that James C. Kelsoe, Jr., the portfolio manager of the funds and an employee of Morgan Asset and Morgan Keegan, arbitrarily instructed the firm's Fund Accounting department to make "price adjustments" that increased the fair values of certain portfolio securities. The price adjustments ignored lower values for those same securities quoted by various dealers as part of the pricing validation process. The Enforcement Division further alleges that Kelsoe actively screened and manipulated the pricing quotes obtained from at least one broker-dealer. With many of the funds' securities backed by subprime mortgages, Kelsoe's actions fraudulently prevented a reduction in the NAVs of the funds that otherwise should have occurred as a result of the deterioration in the subprime securities market.
The SEC's Division of Enforcement additionally alleges that Joseph Thompson Weller, a CPA who was head of the Fund Accounting Department and a member of the Valuation Committee, did nothing to remedy the deficiencies in Morgan Keegan's valuation procedures, nor did he otherwise make sure that fair-valued securities were being accurately priced and NAVs were being accurately calculated.
According to the SEC's order initiating proceedings, Morgan Keegan priced each portfolio's securities and calculated its daily NAV through its Fund Accounting Department. The NAV of an investment company is its total assets minus its total liabilities. An investment company calculates the NAV of a single share by dividing its NAV by the number of shares that are outstanding.
According to the SEC's order, each fund held various amounts of securities backed by subprime mortgages and lacked readily available market quotations. Therefore, the securities were internally priced using fair value methods to determine the amount that the funds would reasonably expect to receive on a current sale of the security. In SEC filings, the funds stated that the fair value of securities would be determined by a valuation committee using procedures adopted by the funds. In fact, the responsibility was essentially delegated to Morgan Keegan, which along with the valuation committee failed to comply with the funds' procedures in several ways.
The SEC's Division of Enforcement alleges that from at least January 2007 to July 2007, Kelsoe had his assistant send approximately 262 "price adjustments" to Fund Accounting. In many instances, these adjustments were arbitrary and did not reflect fair value. Despite the lack of any supporting documentation, Kelsoe's price adjustments were routinely entered into a spreadsheet used to calculate the NAVs of the funds. Kelsoe also routinely instructed Fund Accounting to ignore month-end quotes from broker-dealers that were supposed to be used to validate the prices the firm had assigned to the funds' securities.
A hearing will be scheduled before an administrative law judge to determine whether the respondents committed the alleged violations and provide them an opportunity to defend the allegations. The hearing also will determine what sanctions, if any, are appropriate in the public interest, and whether financial penalties should be imposed.
The Commission appreciates the assistance of FINRA and a task force of the securities regulators of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, Tennessee, Missouri, Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Illinois.
# # #
For more information about this enforcement action, contact:
Rhea Kemble Dignam
Director, SEC's Atlanta Regional Office
(404) 842-7610
Stephen E. Donahue
Assistant Director, SEC's Atlanta Regional Office
(404) 842-7618


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The bar chart quilt caught my eye immediately. I've thought about making something similar to this for a long time, but I never had enough vision to follow through. For that reason, I was more than happy to give this pattern a try. It's much better than I could have done on my own!
machine bound a quilt, but this one was a good candidate for it! 3 out of the 4 corners turned out beautifully. I suppose that's the best I could ask for. :)
good neighbors fabric line.)
(The red background fabric is Moda Bella Solid (9900-JR 16).)


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DOMA Repeal Bills and Holes in the Gay Rights Argument
As gay marriage proponents in Congress push to repeal the Defense of Marriage Act, opponents are exposing holes in their argument that marriage between people of the same sex is a human right.
The commonly repeated argument by same-sex marriage supporters is that gay couples should have the same rights as heterosexuals to marry the person they love. Although the argument sounds reasonable on the surface, it breaks down upon closer examination, said Dr. Richard Land, president of The Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention.
"Where do you stop? I ask same-sex proponents this all the time and they end up sputtering," said Land to The Christian Post on Thursday. "What about polygamy? 'Well that's wrong.' According to you. Who are you to impose your morality on someone else?
"What about adult siblings? With all of the dangers imposed by incest. 'Well, that's wrong.' According to you. Who are you to impose your morality on someone else?" Land said. "When you expand the definition of marriage to include same-sex relationship, you don't expand it but shatter it," he asserted.
Land clarified that he is not comparing same-sex marriage to incest on a moral level, but rather giving examples of what cannot be considered marriage.
On Wednesday, two separate but similar bills to repeal the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), enacted in 1996 under President Clinton, were introduced in the House and Senate. DOMA bans same-sex marriage at a federal level and protects a state's right to not recognize gay marriages performed in other states.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) introduced the DOMA repeal bill, which has 18 co-sponsors. The event marked the first time that a DOMA repeal legislation has been introduced in the Senate since it was passed.
In the House, Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) introduced the legislation, called the Respect for Marriage Act, along with 108 co-sponsors, including four openly gay House members.
All of the supporters of the DOMA repeal bill in the House and Senate are Democrats.
"Every loving couple in America deserves this (marriage) right, and no politician should stand in their way," said Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York at a news conference on Wednesday. "Marriage is the foundation for strong families; it gives couples the base they need to build a long-lasting life together, start a family, raise children and put their children on the successful path for their future."
Gillibrand, who supports gay marriage, said the ability to get married is "a basic human right."
Bishop Harry R. Jackson, Jr., an African-American pastor in Maryland who has been leading campaigns against legalizing same-sex marriage in Washington, D.C. and Maryland, disagrees that marriage is a human right.
Jackson cited the ideas of Walter Fauntroy, a civil rights activist famous for working with Martin Luther King, Jr., on what are basic human rights. According to Fauntroy, the human rights list includes: fair housing, fair job opportunity, fair and reasonable education, the right to emergency health care, and the right to due process of law.
"None of these are violated by limiting who the state sanctions to receive a marriage license," contended Jackson. "The problem with including marriage in this realm is that the character of families and marriages has a generational effect on every culture they are in."
Similar to Land, the African-American megachurch pastor made the point that the argument that people should be able to marry who they want does not hold up upon closer inspection. That logic, said Jackson, would allow people who want to marry more than one person to assert that they are being denied their "human rights."
"Therefore, I believe that the majority of Americans have been very wise in saying that they do not want gays to be discriminated against in general society but they are concern that gay marriage will produce the wrong fruit in the culture," said Jackson.
Proponents of same-sex marriage this week have been pointing to a Human Rights Campaign poll released Tuesday that found 51 percent of American voters are opposed to DOMA, compared to 34 percent that favor it.
But a Pew Research Center poll on March 3 found notably different figures on how the public feels about gay marriage. According to the Pew findings, 45 percent say they favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry, while 46 percent are opposed.
Notably, the African-American community is strongly opposed to same-sex marriage despite being overwhelmingly supporters of the Democratic Party. Sixty-eight percent of churchgoing African-Americans are against gay marriage, despite 90 percent of them supporting President Barack Obama, who favors such unions.
Last month, President Barack Obama ordered the Justice Department to stop defending the constitutionality of DOMA, significantly weakening the law and essentially giving the green light to Congress that he would not oppose a repeal of the law.
Although Obama has long expressed his opposition to DOMA, it was not until February that he took action.
Obama had said that "after careful consideration," he will "no longer assert its (DOMA) constitutionality in court." The Justice Department also called for DOMA to be subjected to a more rigorous standard to avoid discrimination against a minority group.
But a marriage analyst for Focus on the Family's political arm, CitizenLink, is not worried that DOMA will be repealed. Jenny Tyree of CitizenLink commented to CP, "We believe that there are enough marriage supporters among our elected officials that these bills will not pass.
"If the bill comes to a vote of any kind, the majority of Americans who support the traditional definition of marriage will have the opportunity to see which of their elected leaders stand by them," she warned.
Last month, House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) vowed that the House will defend DOMA. He plans on leading a bipartisan effort to defend the federal law on marriage.


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Goat anti-Rabbit IgG (H&L), TRITC conjugated, min, cross-reactivity to bovine,human, mouse IgG/serum
AS10 1229 | Clonality: Polyclonal | Host:Goat | Reactivity: Rabbit IgG (H&L)
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This antibody reacts with the heavy chains on rabbit IgG and with the light chains on all rabbit immunoglobulins based on immunoelectrophoresis.
Minimum cross-reactivity is observed to non-immunoglobulin rabbit serum proteins and bovine,human,mouse IgG/serum based on immunoelectrophoresis.
Antibody is supplied in 10 mM sodium phosphate, 150 mM sodium chloride, pH 7.2, 1% (w/v) BSA, protease/IgG free and 0.05 % (w/v) sodium azide as preservative.


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Red Adventure with Pink on White by Kayce Hughes
1 in stock
30" x 22"
Nashville artist Kayce Hughes has been dreaming up and creating colorful things as long as she can remember. A studio art major, Kayce's abstract work was featured in this year's Kips Bay Showhouse, and has garnered the attention of classic design stores like Bunny Williams Home NYC, Draper James TN and Rivers Spencer LA, as well as several talented designers including Mark D Sikes, Sara Bartholomew, Pencil & Paper Co. and Jonathan Savage.
30" x 22"
- Acrylic on 300lb. on French watercolor paper
- Original, signed by artist
- Final sale, once placed orders cannot be cancelled or refunded


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Prof. Dr. Peter Schroeder-Heister
Prof. Dr. Peter Schroeder-Heister
for Computer Science
Sand 13
Tel.: +49-7071-29-74284
Email: firstname.lastname@example.com
Room: B109 (Ground floor)
Entrance Sand 14
I am currently working on the foundations of inference, and here especially on its proof-theoretic basis, pursuing a programme which I have called "proof-theoretic semantics". This programme builds on conceptual insights of general proof theory as initiated by Gerhard Gentzen in the 1930s and further developed by others since. Unlike most approaches in proof-theoretic semantics, which focus only on systems of formal logic, is my approach especially concerned with general reasoning systems based on inference rules for atomic sentences (which are also found in inductive definitions and in logic programs). My work in logical foundations also extends from the proof-theoretic framework towards a more interactive approach, as in dialogical or game-theoretics semantics. Besides, I am also interested in general philosophical questions related to logic and logical inference, the historical development of modern logic, and questions of cognitive science in relation to meaning, deduction and inference.
Obituary Notice: Kosta Došen (1954-2017)


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Leibniz was a noted polymath who was deeply interested in philosophy as well as mathematics, among other things. From my mathematical readings I have the impression that Leibniz's stature as a mathematician has grown in the last fifty years as some of his philosophically oriented mathematical ideas have connected with modern mathematicians and mathematics. That because of Leibniz's philosophical reflections, he foresaw aspects or parts of modern mathematics. Can anyone elaborate on these connections and recommend any references?
EDIT, Will Jagy. Editing mostly to bump this to the front of active. It is evident that Jacques and Sergey have good, substantial answers in mind. Please do not answer unless you have read Leibniz at length. I kind of liked philosophy in high school and college, or thought I did. Recently, I read one page of Spinoza and gave up.


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Fred Stoller is not a leading man, but if you watch TV, you've seen him. He has appeared on "Everybody Loves Raymond," "Friends," "Dharma & Greg," "Veronica Mars" and "Scrubs."
In his new Kindle Single, "My Seinfeld Year," Stoller writes about the year he spent on the writing staff of "Seinfeld," but he devotes more space to ruminating on his upbringing and career as a perennial extra. He compares being stuck in a cycle of guest star roles to "being a foster kid who's passed around some really great foster homes. I would love for one of them to keep me, but it's a hell of a lot better than being abandoned."
The narrative jumps from scenes of Stoller on set (one particularly funny vignette involved Selena Gomez teaching the lanky Stoller to dance) to meditations on how he got where he is. He pursued a career in stand-up comedy but learned he didn't like being on the road and decided to become a character actor. Then he met Larry David, co-creator of "Seinfeld," at a party and was hired as a writer on the show in 1994, when "Seinfeld" was at the peak of its popularity. But it turned out not to be Stoller's big break; he spent only a year on the staff.
The best part of Stoller's story is the glimpse of what it's like to be a regular guy in Hollywood. You don't have to be an actor to understand how it feels to hear that phrase, "Don't call us, we'll call you."
($1.99, amazon.com)
Love can be intense — especially for teens. Swoon Reads, a new imprint under the Feiwel and Friends banner at Macmillan Children's Publishing Group, hopes to capture that passion with its new teen romance novel series.
Starting in the spring, writers will submit manuscripts to the website, and online members will read, rank and comment on posted submissions, cover designs and marketing ideas. The stories with the highest rankings will be considered for publication in print and e-book format by an editorial team at Macmillan. The imprint will publish six to 12 novels a year starting in 2014. macteenbooks.com/swoonreads
Work out your narrative skills with Figment Daily Themes, a free email service that sends an original writing exercise to your inbox every day. A recent prompt asked writers to "create an emotion using only concrete nouns and phrases that depict concrete images and sensations." To learn more, visit figment.com/dailythemes.