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Soc. Sci. 2017, 6(1), 9; doi:10.3390/socsci6010009
Marriage Formation in Context: Four Decades in Comparative Perspective
Department of Sociology, University of Utah, 380 S 1530 E RM 301, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA
Academic Editor: Graham Crow
Received: 28 August 2016 / Accepted: 11 January 2017 / Published: 17 January 2017
Marriage formation is deeply embedded in societal context. This study documents trends towards lower marriage rates and delayed marriage in Europe and the US. Using time series analyses, it shows the relevance of economic and gender context in understanding marriage formation. The study extends previous work by including more countries, a longer time period, and by examining changes in predictors of marriage patterns over time. Analyses show that the association between economic context and marriage rates weakens over time, but the role of gender equality and policy context remain stable. Differences in age at first marriage across policy clusters are diminishing. Although greater gender equality is consistently linked to later marriage entry, the link between economic context and age at first marriage is changing. Changes in predictors of cross-national marriage patterns over time strongly suggest the institution of marriage itself is changing.
Keywords:marriage rate; marriage age; trends; welfare state; economic context
1. Introduction
Many scholars and commentators have discussed the family changes that have occurred since the 1960s. In both Europe and the United States, marriage age has increased and marriage rates have fallen. Even when we set changing access to marriage for non-heterosexual couples aside, alternatives to marriage have become both less stigmatized and more common. What some call "traditional" marriage is still central to definitions of family and part of public discourse.
The interpretation of changes in marriage patterns largely depends on the underlying understanding of marriage as an individual arrangement or a heterosexual marriage to be a core societal institution [1]. Often, discussions of change are framed as marriage decline [2,3,4]. When seeking the underlying causes of the changes, increasing emphasis on individual autonomy and tolerance towards marriage alternatives [5] have been used as two factors to explain changing behavior at both the individual and aggregate level. There is also an extensive body of research that has studied family transitions, seeking to identify what shapes individuals' decisions to marry, have children, and separate or divorce, often focusing on their individual economic circumstances [6]. Family transitions, such as marriage formation, are deeply embedded in societal context, and the role of context remains understudied. Understanding how different contextual aspects shape marriage formation allows insights into the nature of social change underlying trends in marriage formation, and also provides a basis for speculation about the future of marriage.
Kalmijn [7] provided a very valuable study of trends in marriage, cohabitation and divorce in 37 European countries from 1990 to 2000. Differences across European countries were in part explained by differences in gender roles and religiosity. Additionally, higher levels of women's employment and high levels of unemployment were linked to lower marriage rates. Kalmijn's pioneering study covered a relatively short period (1990–2000), and as a result, most of the observed variation was between rather than within countries, which made identifying possible causal relationships all the more difficult.
This paper seeks to improve our understanding of how macroeconomic circumstances, gender relations, and policy regimes shape heterosexual marriage rates and timing, and how these mechanisms may have changed over time. This paper cannot fully address issues of shifting values, but instead addresses to what extent economic circumstances and other contextual factors help explain the marriage "retreat". Moreover, it specifically tests whether the effect of the economic and socio-political context on marriage formation patterns has shifted over time or whether countries' marriage patterns converge. This paper makes two key contributions. First, it maps trends in marriage formation in a broad range of advanced industrialized countries over four decades of rapid change, expanding on Kalmijn's 2007 study that covered only one decade. Since the countries share many similarities, it is all the more interesting to understand existing differences in marriage patterns. This is an essential first step for a broader assessment of both the current state and the future of marriage. Second, it systematically examines the changing relationship between economic and socio-cultural context and marriage formation patterns. It examines four decades of trends in marriage formation patterns in 22 European countries and the United States using cross-sectional time series analyses. This paper integrates the comparative welfare state approach, comparative gender inequality research, and marriage formation research. The longer time frame also allows for examination of whether the link between socio-economic context and marriage behavior has changed over time, perhaps reflecting changes in the institution of marriage. Mapping the changing impact of context on marriage rates and average age at first marriage over time provides important bridges between the literatures on political and social change, as well as family change. In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the theoretical background, followed by a brief description of measures and analytic strategy. I then turn to a presentation of results and finish with a summary and conclusions.
2. Background
2.1. Marriage Formation and Economic Circumstances
Much of the research on the association between economic circumstances and demographic trends has focused on fertility behavior [8,9].The economic foundation of marriage has been a key element of sociological research on marriage formation. Men's economic potential has been seen as a prerequisite for marriage, and unemployment as a barrier to the transition to marriage [10]. As a result, any trends undermining men's economic stability may have a negative effect on marriage transitions.
Studies showed that male employment and favorable economic circumstances uniformly increased men's likelihood of marriage [11,12,13,14,15]. Social change in women's economic circumstances, most prominently increased labor force participation and earnings capacity, has been linked to reduced marriage rates. There is some evidence that women's increased economic resources allowed them access to alternative life course options, including the decision not to marry [12,16,17,18,19]. Similarly, in examining both partners' economic circumstances, only men's economic circumstances seemed to affect a couple's probability of transitioning into marriage, but women's economic circumstances had no effect [14]. There is contradictory evidence that found that the lack of economic resources for both men and women reduces entry into marriage [20,21]. Others found rather similar associations between economic well-being and marriage entry for men and women [22,23].
One possible reason for the inconsistent findings for the association between women's economic activity and marriage at the individual level across different types of studies is that the financial autonomy that reduced women's pressure to get married was offset by women's increased financial resources, which make them more attractive partners for potential spouses [11,24,25,26].
Oppenheimer's [13,26] theory of marriage timing provides a framework that argued against the idea that economic opportunities discouraged women from entering marriage. Instead, the theory suggested that modern labor markets, longer duration of education, and female labor force participation merely resulted in delayed marriage due to the increased difficulty of assortative mating and men's eroding economic positions, addressing both the micro and macro levels. Since both men's and women's marriage-related attributes (e.g., family orientation, economic potential) remain unclear until later in adulthood [22,24,27], finding a match is more difficult.
Economic up- and downturns at the societal level are associated with individuals' marriage prospects [28,29]; the economy does not only shape people's present economic circumstances, it also affects their perspective on the future and their sense of economic insecurity, such as the fear of job loss or unemployment experiences. Another example to underline the link between macro-level economic circumstances and marriage transitions is the case of political change in Germany in the 1990s. Around the time of German unification, a time of sweeping societal change, East German marriage and fertility rates went down, but both remained stable in West Germany. East Germany experienced dramatic changes in the economic context, especially the rapid rise in economic uncertainty that went beyond individuals' economic positions, which in turned seemed to (temporarily) reduce East Germans' willingness to engage in the long-term commitment associated with marriage and parenthood [30].
There is little in Oppenheimer's approach to suggest that the effects of the economic context will change over time. However, the social pressure of entering marriage is decreasing cross-nationally, in part because of the growing acceptance and prevalence of non-marital cohabitation [31]. As a result, decreasing rates of marriage and later marriage entry can become self-reinforcing, which some scholars have dubbed as a retreat from marriage. This implies that the economic context, such as unemployment rates or gross domestic product (GDP), is less and less predictive of a country's marriage patterns over time.
2.2. Marriage Formation and Socio-Cultural and Policy Context
Numerous studies found evidence for a subjective financial threshold to marriage. Financial and residential independence were perceived as a prerequisite for marriage, which was associated with a specific lifestyle [21,32,33], and poor men and women were found to be half as likely to be married as those with incomes three times the poverty level [33]. Cohabitation may be an alternative or a bridge to marriage for those who believe that they cannot "afford" marriage [21,24,34]. Unfortunately, lack of sufficient data on cohabitation in most countries currently precludes comprehensive comparative analysis of the formation of cohabitation.
The relationship between economic circumstances and marriage formation has been widely investigated at the individual level, but it is also important to look at the aggregate level. Societal standards about financial thresholds for marriage entry imply that even if a couple did not subscribe to the ideas of economic "standards" associated with marriage, they likely faced these expectations from others in their social networks [35] and they might have "behaved" according to societal standards. The impact of economic uncertainty and economic opportunities on marriage decisions and timing transcends the individual level. Unemployment does not only affect the behavior of those who have experienced it. High unemployment rates, especially for men, may deter even those who are currently in stable employment from marrying. Similarly, women's economic independence and high levels of labor force participation may shape women's outlook on their career potential and human capital investments beyond their individual circumstances.
Of course, economic circumstances are not the only factor shaping marriage timing and marriage rates. Values and attitudes towards family and gender issues have been used as explanatory factors in the analysis of marriage transitions, mostly at the individual level. The observed increase in the proportion of women who work outside the home, for example, has been portrayed not only as a reflection of the improved opportunities for women in the workplace but also as evidence of a shift in attitudes with marriage and family taking a less central position [36]. Those with favorable attitudes towards marriage were found to be more likely to marry [37], and a shift in these attitudes may delay marriage and reduce marriage rates. Moreover, there is some evidence that the decrease in marriage entry may not be caused by increased societal barriers but by reduced preference for marriage [15]. However, some argue that marriage delays may be mainly due to more time spent in education [38].
Axinn and Yabiku [39] found that the role of societal (or even neighborhood) norms regarding marriage matter beyond individual-level factors [40]. Institutional features and relative importance of marriage in society, for example, may play an important role in shaping marriage formation behavior. If marriage is easily reversible, i.e., divorce is easy to achieve, then the entry barrier may not be very high, which should result in higher marriage rates and younger age at marriage. Preston and Richards [41] found that in more Catholic areas, marriage rates are lower because the high stakes associated with Catholic marriage encourage a delay in marriage.
Marriage is a gendered institution and has often been linked to more traditional patterns of behavior compared to non-marital relationships [42,43,44]. Ono [45] showed that gender differentiation at a societal level changed the mechanisms of marriage formation at the individual level, implying that, in the absence of gender equality, women may avoid marriage if they have the means to do so. Greater gender equality, especially concerning political power, also has the potential to increase women's independence further and result in a lower propensity for women to enter marriage or in the delay of marriage until later adulthood. This relationship needs to be examined at the macro level, and testing for possible changes over time in this relationship can be indicative of the evolution of marriage towards becoming a more egalitarian institution.
The policy context can be seen as a special case of the socio-cultural context. Some aspects of women's position in society, i.e., gender equality or the level of labor force participation, can be seen as realized policy goals [46]. In addition to the societal features discussed above, countries can be grouped into policy clusters that share similar characteristics, focusing on entire policy packages [47]. National policy context is more than the sum of economic circumstances and individual values, and shapes the relationship between states, markets, families, and individuals [47,48,49]. There are many possibilities to both measure and categorize policy contexts. For this study, I rely on the comparative welfare state approach [47,48], which distinguishes between Social Democratic, Liberal, and Conservative regimes.
The Conservative policy framework seeks to maintain existing structures by supporting a gendered division of labor with an expansive set of social and economic policies, particularly seeking to strengthen the "traditional" family. The Liberal regime has been characterized as taking a "laissez-faire" approach with only limited state interventions in both the economic and private spheres. This is not to imply that socially liberal positions are endorsed, but rather that the importance of market relations and individualistic decision making is emphasized. There have been numerous efforts in the United States to strengthen marriage. But, marriage promotion is focused primarily on the poor population and has the goal of poverty prevention [50,51]. The Social Democratic welfare state is dedicated to equality, through the redistribution of wealth in the population but also through active efforts to reduce gender inequality and to support families through state-supported childcare. Countries are categorized based on relative consensus in the field. The Netherlands has often been considered an example of a hybrid case and has been categorized inconsistently [52]. Although some suggest the categorization as Social Democratic welfare state [53], I follow others who have treated this country as part of the Conservative cluster due to its fit with the continental European cluster [54].
More recently, scholars have suggested that these three policy types may not be enough to capture the policy circumstances in Europe. Rather than classifying the countries of Southern Europe as "weak" cases of the Conservative regime, Ferrera [55] suggests that this group of countries be treated as a cluster by itself. Whereas traditional family values are at least as central in countries like Spain, Greece, and Italy as they are in their northern counterpart countries of Esping-Andersen's Conservative policy group, the state support is a lot weaker and less generous. One of the reasons for this may be the ongoing reliance on strong family ties, which are considered as central and not in need of state support.
The transitional economies of Eastern Europe warrant separate consideration. During the time of state socialism, the state was regulating all aspects of life in these countries. After the revolutions of 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the introduction of a largely capitalist market economy, state provision declined drastically. Although the extent of the transition to market capitalism varies in these countries, all of them share the legacy in which women used to be fully incorporated into the economy which undermines, at least ideologically, the idea of a primary male breadwinner. This legacy may also imply that men's economic circumstances are less central to marriage formation trends in these countries.
As the five policy clusters differ in the level of emphasis on traditional family arrangements and gender equality, they also differ in the level of women's labor force participation. In Conservative and Southern policy regimes, traditional employment structures are (at least indirectly) encouraged, and women's low labor force participation levels match those policies. At the other end of the spectrum, Social Democratic welfare states encourage women's equality in society and women are participating in the labor force at high levels. Liberal and Eastern regimes fall somewhere in the middle, as there are few explicit family policies, and work-family issues are left largely to market forces. Women participate in the labor force at high levels, be it out of tradition (in the Eastern policy regime), or economic necessity.
Similar to the expectation of the decreasing role of economic context outlined above, it can be expected that global trends towards gender equality and cultural change [56] will, in the long term, reduce cross-national differences, and result in a decreasing effect on the predictability of marriage entry and marriage age, particularly in the policy context. Recent trends towards fewer children and aging populations [57] also imply a pattern of partial convergence but not a lack of cross-cultural differences.
3. Data and Methods
I analyze marriage formation from 1961 to 2005 (the panels are unbalanced, and the number of observations varies across countries). Although the Great Recession provides an interesting example of a widespread increase in unemployment rates and economic uncertainty, the depth and extent of the economic downturn warrant separate analyses and are beyond the scope of this paper. I examine marriage rates in 23 countries, as well as average age at first marriage for women in 20 countries, as information on age at first marriage is not available for Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. Table 1 provides information about countries and sample sizes; Table 2 provides the distributions of the included variables. Data were obtained from different sources, including Eurostat, the statistics office of the European Communities, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Program, and the United States Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
3.1. Measures
3.1.1. Marriage Measures
I examine two different marriage measures: marriage rates and age at first marriage. Marriage rates are crude marriage rates, which are the number of marriages per 1000 population. Age at first marriage is the average age at first marriage for women.
3.1.2. Economic Context Measures
I examine the effect of male unemployment rates to test whether a possible erosion of male economic security undermines nuptiality. Male unemployment is measured as the percentage of men unemployed among the civilian labor force. The civilian labor force excludes institutionalized populations (i.e., those in hospitals or prisons) and those who are in the military; this measure is based on OECD data. I further include a measure of female labor force participation to assess how women's overall economic independence affects marriage rates. Female labor force participation is measured as the percentage of women between the ages of 15 to 64 who are employed. The level of female labor force participation can also be interpreted as a measure of women's economic opportunity since it provides insights into the relative difficulty or ease of women entering paid work. I also include the GDP per capita, with US dollar purchasing power parity, provided by the OECD, which captures the economic outlook for the population in general.
3.1.3. Socio-Cultural Context Measures
The family and gender related aspects of context are measured by two different measures. First, crude divorce rates (the number of divorces per 1000 population) represent the relative ease (or difficulty) with which individuals can exit a marriage, and are consequently a reflection of how protected the institution of marriage is. Measures of ease of marriage entry and measures of the cultural centrality of marriage are not readily available. Second, the gender equality measure is based on the average of two frequently used measures of women's position in society.
The first component of the gender equality measure is the ratio of the gender-related development index (GDI) and human development index (HDI). Using the GDI by itself is not a measure of gender inequality, since gender inequality becomes apparent only by comparing the unadjusted HDI with the gender adjusted GDI. Both are composite indices that combine life expectancy, education (adult literacy and enrolment in different levels of education), and estimated earned income per capita. The gender-related development index adjusts the HDI to reflect inequalities between men and women in these three dimensions. The creators of these measures suggest that the ratio of both measures is an approximate, yet imperfect, measure of gender inequality in a society [58]. I use the inverted ratio, so higher values indicate greater equality.
The second component of the gender equality measure is the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), which reflects women's relative power in society. It is a composite that reflects gender inequality in parliamentary representation, economic participation (the index includes gender inequality in the positions of legislators, senior officials, and managers, as well as women's representation in professional and technical positions), and women's power over economic resources, the latter being measured by comparing female and male estimated earned income. Unfortunately, these measures were only collected from 1995 onwards. As a consequence, I create a time invariant average for each of the countries by creating the average of the first available measure and the measure from 2006 for the GDI/HDI ratio and the GEM. Since the GDI/HDI ratio and the GEM tap into slightly different but related aspects of gender equality and are scaled differently, I standardize both measures before they are averaged for my overall equality measure. Again, higher values indicate greater equality. For Germany, the earliest GEM available is from 1996, and for Iceland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia the earliest are from 1998. GEM 2006 is not available for Luxembourg and France. Instead, I used data from 2007 (France) and 1999 (Luxembourg). It would be preferable to have measures of gender empowerment and gender inequality prior to 1995 but I find that between 1995 and 2006, the relative order of countries with respect for gender empowerment has changed little: nine out of the ten countries with the highest level of gender empowerment in 1995 are still counted among the top 10 in 2006. Although there has been a change in the GDI/HDI ratio, the relative position of countries with respect to gender equality has remained relatively stable.
3.1.4. Policy Context Measures
I include a measure of policy regime, which categorizes the sample countries into five policy groups. I distinguish between Liberal, Conservative, Social Democratic, Southern, and Eastern countries (see Table 1). I also allow for trends over time, by including an indicator for year. The countries considered in the analyses have different population structures, which could pose a problem given the fact that I am examining crude marriage rates. In supplemental analyses, I included the proportion of individuals 65 years or older. This indicator is significantly associated with lower rates of marriage but does not systematically affect the other findings. The present paper will not explore the independent effect of population structure in more detail as the population age is linked in complex ways to not just marriage patterns but also to the welfare state/policy context. I explore these issues in a separate study. In the examination of change in the association between context and marriage patterns over time, I create interaction effects with the aforementioned contextual factors and time in years. For detailed distributions for the measures used in this paper see Table 2.
3.2. Analytic Strategy
I proceed in three analytic steps. I first show average marriage rates and age at first marriage for all countries and document how marriage rates and age at first marriage have changed over time. In a second step, I use multivariate regressions to examine the extent to which economic and socio-political context matter for trends in marriage formation. In a third step, I illustrate how the association between economic context and marriage timing varies over time.
The multivariate analyses rely on time-series-cross-sectional feasible generalized least square (FGLS) models with panel corrected standard errors and first-order autocorrelation (see Beck and Katz [59] for a discussion about model selection for panel data). Standard errors are panel corrected (PCSE), adjusting for the contemporaneous correlation of the errors among countries. Although point estimates from ordinary least square OLS regressions would be unbiased, they are inefficient. This panel correction accounts for the panel structure of the data, but not serial dependency. Because the observations are repeated over time, the errors will be serially autocorrelated. A common solution to the serial autocorrelation problem is to employ a first-order autocorrelation (AR(1) correction) to the observations, relying on a Prais-Winsten transformation so as to not lose the information from the first observation which does not have an antecedent [60,61]. In this paper, I use panel specific AR1 corrections, since it is unlikely for autocorrelation patterns to be identical across all countries. In the resulting FGLS models, the time-variant independent variables are lagged; economic context measures are lagged by one year since it can be assumed that the link between economic circumstances and marriage behavior is rather direct. For the divorce rates, the one time-variant measure of socio-cultural context is lagged by three years, reflecting the slower response of an individual's marriage behavior to changing cultural context.
4. Results
Figure 1 presents trends in marriage by country over time. Figure 1a illustrates both the average marriage rate each year for all countries combined (in bold), as well as the trends in marriage rates for each country. Figure 1b shows the trends in average age at first marriage.
Figure 1 illustrates that in all countries marriage rates have dropped by a small to moderate amount over the recent decades, yet there is no drastic decline. In most countries, marriage rates peaked in the late 1960s to early 1970s and declined somewhat more steeply after that. In the 1990s, marriage rates seem to stabilize for the majority of countries, and even increase for some countries.
The two spikes observed in the late 1980s are Austria (1987) and Sweden (1989), where policy changes resulted in unique incentives to be married that year. In Austria, newlyweds used to receive a government grant, but this policy was discontinued in 1988. The increase in marriage rates in 1987 in Austria can easily be interpreted as a direct reaction to the anticipated policy change [62]. In Sweden, the drastic changes in survivor benefits that would result in more generous benefits for those married by a certain date (among other conditions) sparked a dramatic rise in marriage in a country with otherwise very low marriage rates [63]. Both of these examples show that marriage behavior responds to policies that shape the attractiveness of marriage.
The second panel in Figure 1 shows that while marriage rates have declined, marriage age has increased; in 1960, the average age at first marriage for women was around 23 years, with relatively little variation across nations. Over time, it has increased to an average age of about 28 years, with greater variation across countries. In the 1960s the standard deviation in women's average age at first marriage across all countries was about 0.5 years, compared to a standard deviation of more than 1.7 years in the most recent years of data. Again, the spike that can be seen in 1989 is the average age at first marriage in Sweden, at the same time when that country also saw a phenomenal increase in marriage rates due to a limited time marriage incentive. There is no comparable spike for Austria, which suggests that those who married in the peak year were not dramatically different from those who entered marriage in other years. In Sweden, however, it seems that the change in pension laws motivated a very different group of Swedes to marry; presumably those who were older and were living with their partners without the intent of getting married were it not for the financial incentive of the policy change. In the remainder of the paper, I show results from multivariate regressions. It is important to keep in mind that these results present important multivariate descriptive evidence, but they do not provide causal explanations.
In Table 3, I examine the impact of economic context, socio-cultural context, and policy context. I find that the role of economic context is substantial: there is a negative association between male unemployment and marriage rates. Taken apart from other contextual dimensions, a higher level of gender equality is associated with higher marriage rates. The distinction between the policy regimes is pronounced: looked at apart from other factors, Social Democratic countries have significantly lower marriage rates than all other policy clusters.
For age at first marriage, I find a positive association between male unemployment as well as GDP and delayed marriage. Higher levels of female labor force participation are negatively linked to age at first marriage (even when the US is excluded). Both higher divorce rates, a possible measure for ease of marriage exit, and higher scores on the gender equality index are associated with lower age at first marriage. Just as with the findings for marriage rates, the differences between the policy clusters are substantial: the age at marriage is highest in Social Democratic countries compared to all other policy clusters except the Liberal countries. Excluding the US observations does not significantly alter the results for either marriage rates or marriage timing. The effect sizes become smaller, but the overall direction of the effects is the same. As expected, marriage rates decline and age at first marriage rises over time.
In a second analytic step, I examine whether there is evidence that associations between the three contextual dimensions and marriage formation change over time. I find some evidence that contextual effects attenuate over time. Table 4 illustrates that, in line with expectations, the negative association between male unemployment and marriage rates is weakening over time, as indicated by a positive interaction with time. The association with GDP is no longer significant once its impact is allowed to vary over time. The differences in marriage rates across different policy regimes and the positive link between gender equality and marriage rates, however, are stable over time, contrary to expectations for cross-national convergence and a corresponding weakening of contextual effects.
The results for age at first marriage are more complex. I find that the effect of male unemployment is significant and negative once it is allowed to change over time and that the direction of the association between marriage age and the main effect of GDP is negative, once it also is allowed to vary over time. This is in contrast to findings presented in Table 3 and will be further explored below. Similar to results presented in Table 3, higher divorce rates are associated with earlier marriage, but this effect is rapidly diminishing over time. Once allowed to vary over time, gender equality no longer has a significant effect. Moreover, the results in Table 4 suggest that the differences in age at first marriage across policy clusters vary over time. The nature of this change will be explored below. In a final step, I illustrate the effects of GDP and welfare state context on marriage timing to better understand the change over time.
Figure 2 illustrates the changing effect of a one unit change in GDP on age at first marriage for each year. Higher levels of economic prosperity are associated with earlier marriage until 1990 and are not statistically significant from 1991 to 2001. In the most recent years, higher levels of GDP are associated with later marriage.
In keeping with the results from the tables, the Social Democratic policy cluster is used as the reference category in Figure 3. The difference between Social Democratic and Conservative countries is slightly increasing and significant from 1961 through 2005. The differences between Social Democratic countries and Southern and Liberal countries respectively were not significant from the 1960s until the mid (Southern countries) to late (Liberal countries) 1970s, although they have been increasing since. This suggests at least partial divergence in age at first marriage. In contrast, the large difference in age at first marriage between Social Democratic countries and Eastern European countries has been slightly decreasing over the decades examined here.
5. Discussion
In this paper, I document marriage rates and age at first marriage for 23 countries spanning roughly the last four decades of the 20th century. I show that there is a trend towards lower marriage rates and delayed first marriage age in Europe and the United States. Using multivariate time-series analyses, I find that marriage formation is sensitive to variation in economic as well as cultural and policy context, even when detailed population composition is taken into account. Policy differences in rates and marriage timing go beyond differences in economic and gender equality structures.
The nature of the link between economic context and age at first marriage is changing. These findings are in line with Oppenheimer's theory of marriage timing, with economic change resulting in longer searches. Higher GDP in more recent years can be seen as an indicator of the "modern" labor market structure which, according to Oppenheimer, is linked to later marriage. The finding that male unemployment is increasingly associated with marriage delays provides empirical support for the notion that men's economic instability may be a key source of slowed transitions into marriage in more recent times.
The effect of socio-cultural and policy context on marriage rates is stable, suggesting that there are persistent cross-national differences in the rates of marriage driven by policy circumstances, perhaps due to variations in policy incentives to marry or other institutional structures that foster alternatives to marriage. For age at first marriage, the discrepancies between policy clusters are mostly diminishing over time. One possible explanation for diminishing differences across welfare states is the trend towards prolonged educational careers and later entry into stable careers, as suggested by Oppenheimer. Due to the increased globalization of labor market and isomorphism in education structures, these factors matter regardless of policy regime.
Although the paper accounts for detailed population age structures, alternative measures of marriage formation should be explored in future research as they become available. Despite the limitations in the measure of marriage rates, this study speaks to the larger debate about the future of the institution of marriage.
6. Conclusions
As economic context loses predictive power for marriage rates, the finding that in recent years both male unemployment and higher GDP are associated with marriage delays, suggests that those concerned with a further increase in marriage age (and subsequent lower marital fertility potential) do not have a clear-cut avenue to achieve this goal, as both the lack of economic stability and greater overall prosperity are linked to delays. Economic context aside, policy clusters matter for understanding marriage formation, and additional research is needed on how specific policies shape marriage rates and timing.
This study was supported in part by a National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Award (SOC-DDRI 0525873).
Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflict of interest. The founding sponsors had no role in the design of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, and in the decision to publish the results.
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Figure 1. Trends in Marriage Rates and Average Age at First Marriage, 1961–2005. (a) Marriage Rates; (b) Marriage Age.
Figure 2. Change in the Association between GDP and Average Age at First Marriage (Effect of 1-unit change is shown). Note: Any non-linearity is due to rounding errors. Only effects that are significant at the 0.05 level are displayed.
Figure 3. Change in the Difference between Policy Clusters in Average Age at First Marriage. Note: Any non-linearity is due to rounding errors. Only effects that are significant at the 0.05 level are displayed.
|Policy Cluster
|Year Range
|Liberal N = 100
|United Kingdom
|United States
|Conservative N = 251
|Switzerland *
|Social Democratic N = 181
|Iceland *
|Norway *
|Southern N = 123
|Eastern N = 52
|Czech Republic
Note: * indicates countries for which information is available on marriage rates, but not average age at first marriage.
|Std. Dev.
|Crude Marriage Rate
|Number of marriages/1000 population
|Average Age at First Marriage
|Women's mean age at first marriage
|Male Unemployment Rate
|Percentage of those in civil employment who are unemployed
|Female Labor Force Participation
|Percentage of women between the ages of 15 to 64 who are employed
|Gross domestic product per capita (based on US dollar purchasing power parity)
|Divorce Rate
|Number of divorces/1000 population
|Gender Equality
|Average of standardized Gender-Related Development Index/Human Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure (both measures standardized; higher values indicate greater equality)
Note: 1 For the analyses of age at first marriage the number of observations is 511.
|Crude Marriage Rates
|Age at First Marriage
|Economic Context
|Male Unemployment Rate
|−0.037 **
|0.019 *
|Female Labor Force Participation
|−0.019 *
|0.0300 *
|Socio-cultural Context
|Crude Divorce Rate
|−0.136 **
|Gender Equality
|0.541 **
|−0.323 +
|Policy Context
|1.830 **
|0.810 **
|−1.420 **
|Social Democratic (Ref.)
|2.053 **
|−2.036 **
|0.784 *
|−3.468 **
|−0.0671 **
|0.091 **
|−10.040 +
|31.750 **
|N = 707, 23 countries
|N = 511, 20 countries
Note: Crude divorce rate is lagged by three years, the economic indicators (male unemployment rate, female labor force participation, and GDP), are lagged by one year. These models include a dummy indicator for the peak year in Sweden and Austria. Models also include controls for the proportion of the population in the age groups 0–15, 15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–49, 50–59, and 60–69. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
Table 4. Panel Corrected Prais-Winsten Models for Marriage Rates and Age at First Marriage with Trends over Time.
|Crude Marriage Rates
|Age at First Marriage
|Economic Context
|Male Unemployment Rate
|−0.092 **
|−0.059 +
|Male Unemployment Rate * Time
|0.002 +
|0.002 *
|Female Labor Force Participation
|Female Labor Force Participation * Time
|−0.186 **
|GDP * Time
|0.005 **
|Socio-cultural Context
|Crude Divorce Rate
|0.398 *
|−0.435 **
|Crude Divorce Rate * Time
|0.013 **
|Gender Equality
|Gender Equality * Time
|Policy Context
|1.973 **
|Liberal * Time
|−0.105 **
|0.956 *
|−0.700 +
|Conservative * Time
|−0.051 **
|Social Democratic (Ref.)
|Social Democratic * Time (=Overall Time Trend)
|−0.101 **
|0.122 **
|1.895 **
|Southern * Time
|−0.108 **
|−5.575 **
|Eastern * Time
|N = 707, 23 countries
|N = 511, 20 countries
Note: Crude divorce rate is lagged by three years, the economic indicators (male unemployment rate, female labor force participation, and GDP), are lagged by one year. These models include a dummy indicator for the peak year in Sweden and Austria. Models also include controls for the proportion of the population in the age groups 0–15, 15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–49, 50–59, and 60–69. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics, + p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
© 2017 by the author; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).


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Joseph Campbell Quotes About IgnoranceQuotes about: Ignorance
Apocalypse does not point to a fiery Armageddon but to the fact that our ignorance and our complacency are coming to an end. The exclusivism of there being only one way in which we can be saved, the idea that there is a single religious group that is in sole possession of the truth—that is the world as we know it that must pass away. What is the kingdom? It lies in our realization of the ubiquity of the divine presence in our neighbors, in our enemies, in all of us.
The world, as we know it, is coming to an end. The world as the center of the universe, the world divided from the heavens, the world bound by horizons in which love is reserved for members of the in-group: that is the world that is passing away. Apocalypse does not point to a fiery Armageddon but to the fact that our ignorance and complacency are coming to an end.
Joseph Campbell
- Born: March 26, 1904
- Died: October 30, 1987
- Occupation: Writer
- Cite this Page: Citation

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Getting the Lead Out
Cars aren't the only hybrids out there. Hybrid batteries, or more exactly Advanced Batteries, are getting a lot of attention, and money: $2 billion in the stimulus bill, to be exact. What are they? Axion Power, A company in New Castle, Pennsylvania is replacing some of the lead in the traditional car battery workhouse, the lead-acid battery, with activated carbon. The end result: a battery that lasts up to four times longer, a key battle in building batteries for electric and hybrid cars–something even Steve Jobs hasn't been able to figure out: building a battery that lasts longer than it takes to watch two movies.


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It doesn't matter where you look, you're bound to bump into a couple of anime elves. Some of them are mischievous, others are kind and a few of them are just magical. They come in all sizes and live in diverse worlds. Come on in, it's time to meet some interesting characters!
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Brussels, 24 February 2010
Commission responds to calls for stronger EU border management agency
The Commission today made proposals to strengthen European Union's border management agency, Frontex. The proposals include reinforcing the legal framework to ensure full respect of fundamental rights during Frontex activities and enhancing the operational capacity of Frontex to support Member States. With the new proposal Member States would put more equipment and more personnel at the Agency's disposal. Frontex would be able to co-lead border patrols operations with EU Member States. It would also be allowed to provide technical assistance to third countries and deploy liaison officers in third countries.
Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström said: "'Today's proposal will pave the way for more solidarity and better cooperation between EU countries. This will give us the opportunity to better deal with irregular immigration and human trafficking, while at the same time strengthening the safeguards to guarantee full respect of fundamental rights. I hope that the European Parliament and Council will move quickly to turn this proposal into law, so that the Agency can get the human and technical resources that it needs."
Cooperation between EU countries on managing immigration through the EU agency Frontex has so far been limited by its lack of resources and of insufficient coordination between national authorities, according to evaluations carried out by the Commission and by an independent evaluation. Frontex is a key tool for maintaining an area without internal borders and helps EU countries to coordinate border patrols over air, land and sea.
Today's proposal would ensure that Frontex can provide appropriate technical and human resources in the framework of joint border patrols. EU countries would have to ensure that a pool of equipment such as boats and planes are at the disposal of the Agency, which would also be able to gradually buy or lease equipment.
The proposal also introduces an explicit requirement for all border guards taking part in operations to have been trained in fundamental rights, with the aim to safeguard that all immigrants are met with full respect of fundamental rights and in particular the principle of non-refoulement.
The operational capacity will be enhanced by clarifying the respective roles of Frontex and the participating Member States, while respecting the principle that each Member States remains responsible for controlling its section of the external border; specific provisions are proposed concerning the operational plan, the evaluation of the operations and incident reporting schemes.
Frontex will continue to be able to coordinate joint operations, returning immigrants to their country of origin. Safeguards are put in place to make sure that these return operations are carried out in full respect of fundamental rights. For example, an independent monitor shall be present during such operations and report to the Commission on the compliance by Member States with EU law and a code of conduct that sets out the fundamental rights standards to be respected.
The proposals now have to be debated and approved by the European Parliament and EU governments in the Council.
Frontex was set up in 2005 to coordinate EU Member States' border control operations on the EU's external borders. Frontex is based in Warsaw and has 220 employees. It gets €80 million from the EU annual budget.
Frontex coordinates cooperation between national border patrollers, provides training for border guards, centralises surveillance data from EU countries, and assists Member States in carrying out joint return operations.
At the European Council of 10-11 December 2009, EU governments agreed on a new work programme for the EU in the area of justice and home affairs, based on a Commission proposal earlier in the year ( IP/09/894 ). EU governments called on the Commission to propose improvements to Frontex, as part of the Stockholm Programme, at the European Council on 10-11 December 2009 ( MEMO/08/84 )
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Fund set up for injured Harlequin's co-owner
Eve Reshetnik-Brauner, the co-owner with husband Mikl of Harlequin's Gardens in Boulder who was struck by a car and seriously injured last month, is out of intensive care and healing well, according to friends and staffers at the garden center. In the meantime, a fund has been set up to help with her recovery expenses. You can donate with PayPal on the Harlequin's website, harlequinsgardens.com, or by mail to Eve Reshetnik, 1600 Spruce Ave., Longmont, CO 80501. Please mark the donations "Gift."
Showing some love at Mod Livin'
Hair, fashion, mod furnishings, a DJ and new art — what could make a Saturday better? Making it all benefit CASA, short for Court-Appointed Special Advocates, the program whose trained volunteers help make sure the needs of children in the foster-care system are met. So the place to be from 6:30 to 8:30 p.m. Feb. 8 is Mod Livin', 5327 E. Colfax Ave., for its Modern Love celebration. Limited-edition prints from such local bright lights as Joshua Wills, Aaron Ray, Crystal Allen and Michael Lindau (pictured above) will be on sale, and libations as well as vintage soul sounds from of deejay Adam Hester will be served. modlivin.com
This just in: warm welcome in icy town
A huge rockslide on U.S. 55o hit Ouray about like it did sister city of Silverton, meaning visitors from the south, and all the dollars they would have spent, were basically cut off. But access from the north is still open, and so the ice-climbing hamlet with the year-round hot springs has declared the weekend of Feb. 8-9 "Rocky Road Shop Ouray Weekend." You know what to do. ouraycolorado.com


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In Manitoba, Van Extras has created a niche market by being a true customized commercial van upfitter. Throughout the years, we have always worked with the customer to develop solutions to their specific needs rather than trying to make the customer needs fit our existing product line. The customization process starts with the sales inquiry right through engineering and design with the customer and finally to product implementation. This ensures that our customers receive the best product to satisfy their needs.
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Roebuck, 'cricket's premier journalist', remembered by Aus greats
Shaken by the news of noted columnist Peter Roebuck's suicide in South Africa, Australian players, current and former, paid tribute to him with former captain Steve Waugh saying that the Englishman was "without a doubt, cricket's premier journalist."
- Former Somerset captain and writer Roebuck dead at 55
- Police confirm Peter Roebuck committed suicide
The 55-year-old Roebuck, who was in South Africa to cover Australia's ongoing series against Proteas, plunged to his death from his hotel room in Cape Town after being reportedly questioned by police over allegations of sexual assault.
Australian team members, including captain Michael Clarke, vice-captain Shane Watson and former skipper Ricky Ponting, offered condolences to Roebuck's other journalist colleagues.
Clarke said he was woken in the middle of the night to the news and was left shocked.
Image: Peter Roebuck
'He was never afraid to tackle the big issues in world cricket'
Team batting coach Justin Langer described Roebuck as a "great writer" and a "talent lost".
Ponting, who was severely criticised by Roebuck during the 2008 'Monkeygate' scandal, also offered condolences, telling Roebuck's colleagues that he was sorry for the loss.
Tributes also poured in from former Australian cricketers. Ex-skipper Steve Waugh lavished praise on the former county cricketer, who captained Somerset.
Waugh said Roebuck was "without a doubt...cricket's premier journalist."
"He was never afraid to tackle the big issues in world cricket and would often be a lone voice if he believed strongly in the cause," Waugh was quoted as saying by The Sydney Morning Herald.
Image: Steve Waugh
'He didn't write articles which he thought would make him popular'
"As a captain I would always be keen to read Peter's take on the previous day's play. He had the unique knowledge, instincts and gut feel that enabled him to interpret body language, detect the subtle duels and tussles that would often be a precursor to a more defining moment," he said.
Mark Taylor, whom Waugh succeeded in 1999, said Roebuck's writing was objective.
"He didn't write articles or say things which he thought would make him popular," said Taylor.
"Not every player, me included, agreed with what he said all the time. We did know it wasn't based on a whim, it was based on a lot of experience," he said.
Image: Mark Taylor
Greg Chappell throws light on Roebuck's philanthropy
Greg Chappell, also a former India coach, said not many know about Roebuck's charity work for aspiring cricketers, who didn't have the means to pursue their passion.
"Something like 250 kids in cricket-playing countries around the world, underprivileged kids, are being educated through the LBW Trust, and that was from his vision," Chappell said.
"He had a very distinctive style and was a well-thought-of commentator and writer on the game."
Another former captain Ian Chappell also praised Roebuck for his fearless writing.
Image: Greg Chappell
'I always enjoyed his opinions'
"We didn't talk so much about the game, more about things around the game, like corruption -- he always had pretty good contacts -- and things like Zimbabwe, which he felt pretty strongly about," Ian Chappell said.
"We'd talk about players a bit, and I always made a point of seeking him out because I enjoyed his opinions ... he was a damn good writer, a colourful writer and he brought other things in life into it."
Image: Ian Chappell


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Looking Ahead to CDA 2.0!
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I hope to provide you with up to date information you can use about the new CDA 2.0 process.The new process will be launched on June1. In the meantime, those who have begun working on the Professional Resource File can rest assured that these will still be accepted and reviewed until
December 1 of this year, even if you happen to apply for your CDA
after May 31. If you do not plan to begin work on your file until after
May 31, you will be assembling the new Professional Portfolio. This will look different and will include different resources than the Professional Resource File. For example, the resource collection will only consist of 10 items instead of 17, but some of these will have sub-parts with additional items. There is a new format for the Statements of Competence.This is the new title for what used to be the Competency Goal Statements. Candidates will still provide information about how they are meeting each of the Functional Areas through their work in the classroom, but there is a new format that interconnects with the Resource Collection. Also, each Functional Area is no longer addressed separately, but instead collectively within each of the Competency Goals.
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James Fowler is a retired US Navy Senior Chief, with a Master's degree in Environmental Science, majoring in Nature Writing from Antioch University New England. He's been writing poetry for more than 15 years and is the editor of Heartbeat of New England plus other chapbooks and has his own poetry printed in numerous journals.
He recently signed a contract with Cyberwizard Productions to publish his first novel, "The Healer" book one of the five book fantasy series, "The Silenian Wars."
Living in Charlestown, N.H., Jim leads our 2nd Saturday Poetry Open Mic series each month and runs a Monday morning Poetry Workshop. The next Workshop will start in September 2011.


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When the CEO's presentation is approaching or a company's event is occurring, and if you think power point is boring... Take a look at our Prezi presentation...
|Scooped by Heather Mcintyre
Leuk om ideeën te krijgen en te creëren.
Prezi isn't new but it is still pretty innovative. I recommend using just to stick out from the PowerPoint crowd. You will really stick out if you use it as creatively as they did in this video.


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The company, which two years ago deployed an extensive public affairs campaign for which it was roundly criticized, has bulked up again on lobbying, direct mail, public relations, targeted advertising to lawmakers and other key Beltway-bound constituencies.
Brand experts and analysts say as Microsoft approaches the start of its new fiscal year on July 1, it's likely to increase spending on all forms of marketing, including advertising. With $42 billion of cash on hand, most say it won't be a problem. Microsoft has already touted a plan to support software developers and vendors with $2 billion in incentive programs over three years.
"I think they'll be spending more than usual," said Mark Anderson, publisher of the Strategic News Service, an online newsletter. Mr. Anderson predicted the $2 billion figure could double to $4 billion over three years to support all of the company's marketing efforts.
Microsoft executives declined to specifically comment on plans for fiscal 2001.
Spending increases aside, how should Microsoft act in the second phase of the case?
"Well, what they are going to do and what they should do are probably two different things," commented John Diefenbach, partner at Wolff Olins, a brand consultancy. "I'd raise the question about whether Bill Gates should be the profile of the company . . . should Microsoft become more about a company than a man?"
Mr. Diefenbach said he believes Mr. Gates should maintain a low profile and that the company should focus on products.
Mr. Anderson disagreed with that approach: "I think that the company will continue to project an ever-more statesmanlike image and Bill will be projecting that image as well. You'll see more of it in the future."
Allen Adamson, managing director, Landor & Associates, New York, gives Mr. Gates a B+ for his conduct and performance during the recent flood of media coverage. "The best thing he can do is to say, `Let me tell you about this new technology.' They should put Gates in product ads talking about the products and not the issues."
Jordan Goodman, financial analyst, said polls show the ads Microsoft has run have resonated with consumers. "People admire [Gates]."
Mr. Goodman's advice? "I'd tell consumers, `Don't worry, we'll work this out and your product won't be harmed.' " Further, he believes people are on Microsoft's side, "I don't see the protests, people are not screaming, `We need more operating systems,' " contrary to the Justice Department's bid for consumer choice.


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Among the many delights of the England v New Zealand Test series was the absence of any obvious sledging.
I knew it was possible for teams to be aggressive and dominant without resorting to personal abuse which is neither funny nor mature, but that will of course change when the obnoxious Aussies arrive in this country for the Ashes later this summer.
It's very likely they will be far too good for a maddeningly inconsistent England side, but that won't stop them acting like playground bullies, led by captain Michael 'we're going to break your arm' Clarke.
A law to stop the thuggish behaviour of David Warner and co is needed, but's that as likely to arrive as an invite to the England dressing room for Piers Morgan.
What do you think?
E-mail email@example.com


text: I can not get this to work! The first time I uploaded my movies it automatically put them in alphabetical order even though that's not the way I presented them. Then I created a playlist and put them in the order that I wanted but the minute I paste the files into my IPAD they create their own order, alphabetical again! Then I tried to trick it by putting a letter in front of each movie title ... example A. TERMINATOR B. L.A. CONFIDENTIAL C. HALLOWEEN D. GLADIATOR .... etc etc ... AND I put them in order, but the second I paste them into the the IPAD the order is all mixed up, except this time it's not even alphabetical it's almost random except that many letters of the alphabet are together but many are not Then I tried a similar system using numbers preceeding each title and that didn't work either! At first I tried all these with a small sample of movies like 4-5 and it seemed like it was going to work, but when I put a large sample in it doesn't work at all. Does anyone have any ideas on how to put my movies in a specific order? Thanks!


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Black Doily for the Dragon
The wick sits in its nose, so when you lit it, it looks as if the dragon is spitting fire. So great!
The lamp sits on the table in our living room and the dragon doesn't only spit fire, but also soot and to protect the table from gathering black spots all the time I made a black doily for underneath the dragon, so the soot spots aren't visible. I found the pattern at Le Blog de Anne.
This week my Speculaas Recipe was featured by Rooted in Thyme! So nice an authentic Dutch Recipe is liked by people from other countries.


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This is a Souvenir Photo packet from Arizona's Renowned Grand Canyon Petrified Forest and Painted Desert.
It contains 12 pictures and unfolds to 28 3/4"
Designed to be mailed to friends or family, the inside flap has the text Greetings from with 2 lines to be filled in if it was mailed.
I'm guessing it might be from the late 1940's.
Below the Greetings From on the flap is the text LAP-47 A Mike Roberts Color Production Berkley 2, Calif.
It's in excellent Condition!
Free Shipping is included for this item in the United States.
- Availability: 1
- Model: 032PP
Write Review
This is a previously owned product. Any flaws or defects are noted in item description.


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Welcome to {Kid}ding Around Friday
{Kid}ding Around Friday is the place to share your kid-related posts about:
Crafts, Milestones, Homeschooling, Kid-Friendly Food, Pregnancy, Decorating, Photography,
A Funny Story, Great Deals, Organization and more!
1. Follow your hosts, Katie & Amanda (first 2 links).
2. We'd love for you to grab our adorable little button.
4. Enjoy reading through some of the other posts and make new friends!
Each week we will feature a few posts from the previous week.
By submitting a link, you are granting Katie and I permission to use the photos from your post.
Isla's first Halloween
Seriously, could Isla get any cuter? Great job making her costume, mama!
Noah, Jaws, Pretend Play...OH MY!
I completely know where you're coming from girl friend. I LOVE teaching Noelle, playing games, reading, doing puzzles - but pretend play is so not my favorite.
Ready in a Flash: Chicken Enchiladas
Looking good! I love an easy meal (that's also delicious).
Since the holiday season is coming up and we are two busy ladies, we are going to take a break from {Kid}ding Around Friday until after the new year. This will be the last link up until then. If you don't have a specific post you want to share this week, go ahead and link up your main blog. We hope you have a wonderful time enjoying the holidays with your family and we look forward to reading all about it!


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You know I love a good bucket list and with that comes, and right up there are new year's resolutions. I'm still working on my list but lately, I've been hearing of people who decide on one word as a theme for the year ahead and I couldn't help but be drawn to that. Especially since I can never pick just one of anything – ask me for a "favorite" of fill-in-the-blank and you're likely to get 7 different answers each qualified with the circumstances for when the answer is a favorite. So just settling on one of something is hard for me.
When I thought of "light", I was considering it in all of its forms. I could use a little lightness of spirit – the past couple of months seemed to be so full of all kinds of things going on, that I could definitely lighten the load a little bit. Feel a little lighter, actually be a little lighter, pack a little lighter, schedule a little lighter, take things to heart a little more lightly… By being lighter in all of those things, I think I could make some more room for things that actually deserve to take up more space.
And there's also light in its more traditional sense. I see things and remember things with a lot of light in them but that doesn't seem to come across as much as I would like when I see my own descriptions – or for me, more importantly, when I see my own pictures. So working on having those align more is also at the top of my list – I feel lucky to have so many lights in my life, I just want to do them justice.
So there you have it – 2013 will be all about light – what will it be for you?


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Rise and shine, pop culture fans! Rub your eyes, get to stretchin', and pour yourself a hot cup of coffee because it's time to start your day off right with a little OK! Wake Up Call. It's better than the blaring ring from your alarm clock, right?
Here are some things to know today:
Kris Jenner is releasing a cookbook of Kardashian-Jenner favorite recipes. Apparently her grandchildren love her grilled cheese sandwiches. (People)
Wait, is someone at the Environmental Protection Agency playing Kim Kardashian's new game? (Us Weekly)
Miley Cyrus just tweeted two very strange pictures—one of them being topless. (E!)
He's not the first celebrity to dislike the social media tool, but you should know that Prince Harry says he hates Twitter. (Just Jared)
Take a look at these gorgeous pictures of Keri Russell. (PopSugar)
Louie's 5th Season will only have seven episodes. (Vulture)
J.K. Rowling spills on her book writing plans! (Perez Hilton)


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The radical left always eats itself
A statement by the (Trotskyite) Committee of the Fourth International:
The petty-bourgeois Revolutionary Socialists (RS) group has endorsed the candidate of the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Mohamed Mursi, against Ahmed Shafiq in the second round of the June 16-17 Egyptian presidential elections. The presidential elections are the first since mass working class protests toppled US-backed dictator President Hosni Mubarak last year.
In a May 28 statement titled "Down with Shafiq... Down with the new Mubarak" the RS claim that a vote for the Islamist Mursi would be a means to defend "democratic and social gains" of the revolution against the "counterrevolutionary candidate" Shafiq. The latter was the last prime minister under Mubarak.
The RS write that a "victory of Shafiq in the second round means a great loss of the revolution." They "therefore call on all forces of reform and revolution and all other candidates affiliated with the revolution to form a national front against the candidate standing on the side of the counterrevolution."
The statement calls upon the MB to make a pledge to form a presidential coalition with Nasserist candidate Hamdeen Sabahi and the liberal Islamist candidate Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh as vice presidents and to choose a prime minister from outside the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the MB.
The RS' support for the MB, a government of national unity with right-wing figures, and the fraudulent framework of the US-backed "democratic transition" once again exposes the counterrevolutionary role of the petty-bourgeois "left."
Can't make this stuff up.
Incidentally, the decision to support Morsi was controversial among the RS — many inside the movement wanted to boycott. The RS have been one of the more interesting movements in Egypt since the revolution. While they are tiny, they appear to have the discipline to stay on message and be much more vocal than their numbers would normally allow. But for a movement that does not believe in electoral democratic politics their stance is a little strange. Perhaps it's best explained by the fact that if Shafik wins, they will be the first easy target for the regime to go after.
[Via the very talented Evan Hill]


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A very touchy (no pun intended) subject in the transgender community is how "male admirers" fit in, or don't. It's a true, "damned if you do, damned if you don't subject." If course a huge majority of trans women covet the attention from a man for any number of reasons. Some transgender women seek a male for companionship, or for validation or sexual needs.
Over the years though, the term "admirer" has been known in very negative terms. In my own life I can see why with my limited contacts with "admirers". Fair or not, the majority of my experiences were on line "back in the day" when I was seriously transitioning for the first time. As I have written in Cyrsti's Condo, I tried to give each gender an equal look. Before I did anything in the process, I had to get past the validation factor. Like any other cross dresser trying to "pass" over the years I fantasized about being on the arm of a man to further the process. As I transitioned though, I wondered about a guy accepting me for what I am and vice versa.
Turned out, that was difficult. I went on a couple main line paid dating sites which were tough to navigate because of their lack of any transgender groups at all. In other words, their sites were set up in strict gender binaries only. Men wanting women, women wanting women, men wanting men etc. After a while I would change groups every week ago, because I could. The results? Two one and done dates and numerous "no shows". So you guess I can I'm reasonably biased against admirers and that is wrong. Why? Being trans I should be the last to stereotype any other group, specifically admirers, as I read in this post from Salon called, "I'm attracted to Trans Women":
"The heteronormative world in which we live had successfully convinced me that being attracted to transgender women meant I had a fetish. I began questioning my sexuality and even my masculinity. I didn't even know what to call my sexual orientation. Finally one day, after hours of searching, I came across two terms that described what I was feeling. Trans-attraction and trans-orientation.
Neither one is official or common, but their use is growing due to the increasing demand for a way to categorize people who are attracted to transgender people. When I saw these words, a feeling of relief washed over me: I was not alone. I don't always describe myself as trans-attracted, but the label helped me feel like I had a place in the queer community and it helps others understand my sexuality."
The simple act of the matter is we probably are facing most of the same obstacles to relationships with men as genetic women. The sexual tension is always there but how do you build a relationship around it? Talk to most any single woman of any age at all and she will bemoan the lack of quality men in the dating pool.
The sad part about all of this admirer drama is we trans women do provide certain positives we can bring to a relationship. Which is another subject.
On the bright side Shelle, one of regular visitors here in Cyrsti's Condo, has a great success story I want to pass along. She found a male type person in the most unlikely of places. Because she didn't quit. Follow the link above for the story. I totally respect Shelle, because I can't tell you how many other trans girls I have interacted with who told me they had tried all the sites I was on with no luck and they quit them. Then they wondered why they were sitting at home by themselves - miserable.
One way or another, admirers represent a very unique dynamic in our community with their own set of gender/sexuality issues. Only they can decide if they want a transgender woman for more than a one night stand in a cheap motel. There I go with another stereotype, sorry!
Wednesday, October 23, 2013
Transwoman Admirer out of the Closet
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Bucket List Friday
Well, it's the most anticipated shopping day of the year...Black Friday. "Back in the day" when I had a cross dressing femin...
In all the posts recently when we have "skirted" the issue on compliments from all people including cross dressers, transgender wo...
Way back in the day, even before I started HRT, I had a couple of serious relationships to consider. As I thought them through though, I had...
Last night of course was New Years Eve and Liz and I had a wonderful time. We went to two different places rode the new Cincinnati streetc...


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2 reviews for Replenishing Serum with Moisture Surge
I am absolutely in love with this Tri-C complex serum. I'have been using it for over two months and I can see amazing results in my skin condition. My uneven skin tone went away and I can definitely see reduction in my fine lines.The vitamin C rejuvenates the skin and gives it an amazing glow.
After countless other products I have finally found the best anti-aging serum. After the first application I saw and felt immediate results giving me the firmness, hydration, and glow that I have been looking for in a product. I highly recommend this product and already sharing this with my friends.


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No resolutions this year. I think I did pick a goal, but I can't remember it. This year I'm just kinda rolling with it, and that's nice for a change.
Until recently we were managing daily swims, which was SO nice, and also essential. We're adapting to the bee thing too, getting better at remembering the new rules. Summer is settling, the mania is dying down. Time for adventures.
Listening to: UB40, because - summer!
Drinking: raw milk in our coffee
Enjoying: organising different corners of our home
Loving: Salt water swimming pools
Anticipating: River swims
Wearing: Sunblock, though clearly not enough...
Reading: Blackbringer - Laini Taylor
Watching: Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt
Eating: fresh plums
I hope 2016 is off to a good start for you! Do you have goals/resolutions this year? I may come up with some yet...


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Caipirinha Recipe
How To Make A Caipirinha
Made with Cachaça, the refreshing Caipirinha it Brazil's national cocktail. The cocktail's exact origins are unknown, but it is a century old.
Ingredients In The Caipirinha:
- 2 oz Cachaça
- 1 ea Whole lime, in wedges
- 2 tsp Extra fine white sugar
Caipirinha Directions:
- Combine all ingredients in rocks glass.
- Muddle
- Top with crushed ice.
- Enjoy.
Yield: 1 Cocktail


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While the first three tracks, "She's On Fire," "I Wish You Would" and "Let it Roll," have a bit of a country flavor, the choruses are big and will have you singing along in no time. The title track, which is also the first single, is a brilliant piano rocker that brings to mind the Beatles' epic "Hey Jude": "Did you fall for a shooting star / one without a permanent scar / And did you miss me while you were looking for yourself out there?" Just a sampling of the chorus shows this band has grown up fast. And that's not where the hooks end. The best track on this album is "Hopeless," an absolutely riveting rock ballad that shows off the incredible vocal skills and the raw emotion that should draw the listener in. "Respect" is a John Mellencamp, all-American rocker-type song, and "Mississippi" has the pulse and groove worthy of any major motion picture soundtrack.
There are very few duds here, if that's even what you'd call them. Fans of good rock & roll and solid songwriting should pick up Drops of Jupiter. Just don't let anyone borrow it; you may never see it again.
~Mike Farley
Other Train reviews:
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Swakopmund Cities and Towns
Swakopmund may not be its official capital, but it's Namibia's adventure and extreme sports capital. A popular holiday destination, it is a coastal city more geared towards tourists than Windhoek. Its appeal includes a pleasant summer climate, the seaside setting, its distinctly German flavour and the myriad adventure activities on offer. Swakopmund is a convenient gateway and ideal stopover for trips heading south into the Namib Desert and the Fish River Canyon; or northwards along the Skeleton Coast into Damaraland and on to Etosha Park.
* Swakopmund Highlights
- ∞Beaches and seaside lifestyle
- ∞Adventure activities: skydiving, hot air ballooning, scenic flights, sandboarding, horse trekking into the desert, quad biking and more
- ∞Fishing and cruising
- ∞Visits to Cape Cross seal colony
- ∞Distinct German character: architecture, cuisine, heritage, locals, visitors and cultural influences
- ∞Historical mining tours
- ∞Cultural tours to local villages
A visit to this interesting city is a strange throwback to colonial times, especially in the quiet season when it feels almost surreal, as if you've stepped back in time in an ancient Germanic city. Buffered between the sweltering Namib desert and the icy Atlantic Ocean, Swakopmund overflows with holiday-makers and buzzes with activity during the peak summer season (December and January). Its a favourite place with the locals as it's generally cooler, giving a much-needed respite from the sweltering heat experienced in the interior.
Things to Do in Swakopmund
One of the great things about Swakopmund is that it offers both adrenalin-pumping pursuits and leisurely sightseeing excursions. You can take in some hectic quad-biking across the sand dunes ... or drive to the desert to see the almost prehistoric welwitschia plants.
Founded in 1892 when Namibia was colonized by the Germans, Swakopmund has retained much of this European influence. of the architecture with its domes, turrets and towers destinctly reflects German grandeur from bygone days. There's also a very European-style café culture with loads of small sidewalk eateries and diners. You'll also find most of the locals speak fluent German.
Besides a wealth of adventure and adrenalin activities, from quad biking to paragliding and scenic flights to duneboarding, there are many popular sights and attractions worth a visit, including:
Rössing Mine
The world's largest open-cast uranium mine, situated about 55km east of Swakopmund, is a huge contributor to Swakopmund's economy. Tours are around 3 hours long and only available twice a month, so please enquire in advance.
Haus Hohenzollern
Established as a hotel in 1906, this is an exceptional example of German architecture, with intricate details and embellishments. Today, it is sectional title apartments.
Otavi Railway Station
This turn-of-the-20th-Century Otavi Railway is in the city centre.
The Woermann House
Dating back to 1905, this stately building was erected as offices and living quarters for the Damara and Namaqua Trading Company. Later renamed Woermann, Brock & Co, this retail company still trades in Swakopmund and other towns in Namibia.
Hansa Brauerei
On the southern side of town, you'll find the Hansa Brewery,established by the German settlers' and still contributing to the daily diet of the local folk.
Welwitschia Desert Trip
This odd looking shrub grows in the Namib Desert. It's said to have only two leaves which curl and twist. These prehistoric plants receive water from the sea mists from the icy Atlantic and live for over 1,000 years.
Swakopmund Museum
Situated next to the lighthouse, this museum is a treasure-trove of all thing botanical, with displays depicting the enormous variety of Namibian/desert vegetation as well as the wealth of wildlife that make this area their home.
The Lighthouse
This town landmark was built by the Germans in 1903.
Getting There
By road: It's about a 4 hour drive from Windhoek. Regular buses service this route and road transfers are available.
By air: The closest airport to Swakopmund is in the town of Walvis Bay, a 30-minute drive away. Air Namibia offers regional flights and international arrivals Cape Town, Johannesburg and further afield.
Related Locations Namib Desert & Sossusvlei Dunes
Sossusvlei epitomizes the exquisite desert experience of Namibia, with its endless sea of dunes. The blazing-ochre Sossusvlei dunes rise up over 320m tall, making them some of the world's highest sand forms. These forever-shifting dunes are constantly reshaped by the winds into the sandy valleys, slopes and peaks of the ancient Namib. The reds, oranges, yellows and caramel browns of the soft dunes, and the bleached whites and washed-out pastel shades of the pans, are continuously transformed as the seasons turn and the light plays on the desert landscapes - glowing at dusk and dawn.
More about Namib Desert & Sossusvlei Dunes
Related Locations Namibia
Famous for its arresting desert scenery and outstanding game viewing, Namibia is one of Southern Africa's top travel destinations. Its most captivating attraction, the ancient Namib Desert, presents endless ochre dunes and parched salt pans, whilst the game viewing gem of Etosha National Park offers a world-class safari experience. Natural wonders include the Fish River Canyon, Etosha Pan, Sossusvlei, Waterberg Plateau and the fertile Caprivi Strip.
More about Namibia