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This article deals with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, an agency of the Federal government of the United States, that violate human rights.
- 1 General principles
- 2 Torture and rendition
- 3 Police training
- 3.1 General Accounting Office investigation
- 3.2 Legislative exemptions to the prohibition on U.S. assistance to foreign police
- 3.3 U.S. assistance provided to foreign police
- 4 Human experimentation
- 5 Assassination and targeted killing
- 6 See also
- 7 References
General principles
In 2003, Patricia Derian, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights in the Carter Administration wrote, "Through these U.S. military and intelligence agencies the United States government is sending a dangerous and double message. If this continues, it will subvert our entire human rights policy."[1]
In understanding the CIA's role in human rights, there are challenging problems of ethics. John R. Stockwell, a CIA officer who left the Agency and became a public critic, said of the CIA field officers: "They do not meet the death squads on the streets where they are actually chopping up people or laying them down on the street and running trucks over their heads. The CIA people in San Salvador meet the police chiefs, and the people who run the death squads, and they do liaise with them, they meet them beside the swimming pool of the villas. And it is a sophisticated, civilized kind of relationship. And they talk about their children, who are going to school at UCLA or Harvard and other schools, and they do not talk about the horrors of what is being done. They pretend like it is not true."[2]
Florencio Caballero, a former Honduran Army interrogator, said that he had been trained by the Central Intelligence Agency, which the New York Times confirmed with US and Honduran officials. Much of his account was confirmed by three American and two Honduran officials, and may be the fullest given of how army and police units were authorized to organize death squads that seized, interrogated and killed suspected leftists. He said that while Argentine and Chilean trainers taught the Honduran Army kidnapping and elimination techniques, the CIA explicitly forbade the use of physical torture or assassination.[3]
Caballero described the CIA role as ambiguous. "Caballero said his superior officers ordered him and other members of army intelligence units to conceal their participation in death squads from CIA advisers. He added that he was sent to Houston for six months in 1979 to be trained by CIA instructors in interrogation techniques. "They prepared me in interrogation to end the use of physical torture in Honduras - they taught psychological methods", Mr. Caballero said of his American training. "So when we had someone important, we hid him from the Americans, interrogated him ourselves and then gave him to a death squad to kill."
Torture and rendition
Following the September 11 attacks, the CIA engaged in the torture of detainees at CIA-run black sites[4][5][6] and sent detainees to be tortured by friendly governments in a manner contravening both US and international law.[7][8][9][10]
The existence of black sites was first published by The Washington Post in November 2005 following reports by human rights NGOs.[11] US President George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operated by the CIA during a speech on 6 September 2006.[12][13][14]
Administration officials, including Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo[15], as well as prominent legal scholars such as Alan Dershowitz)[16], publicly defended and justified the use of torture against terrorism suspects.
Torture techniques
There are balancing assertions that CIA personnel attempted to minimize abuses by foreign governments who practiced torture before any involvement with CIA.[citation needed] There is evidence that CIA has funded academic research, unwitting in some cases, which was then used to develop harsh interrogation techniques.[17]
Enhanced interrogation techniques
From 2002-2007, as part of the War on Terror, CIA personnel employed so-called "Enhanced interrogation techniques", a variety of coercive and abusive interrogation techniques that are widely judged to constitute torture.[4][5][18][19][20] Various officials of the George W. Bush administration have argued that "harsh" techniques such as waterboarding are not torture, or the end objectives of the War against Terror justify those means. There has been considerable domestic and international protest against these practices. The United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Torture, Human Rights Watch, and American legal scholars have called for the prosecution of Bush administration officials who ordered torture, conspired to provide legal cover for torture, and CIA and DoD personnel and contract workers who carried it out.[21]
Torture and harsh imprisonment accusations (as well as documented examples) were not limited to the recent War on Terror. Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB defector, was held in stark conditions of solitary confinement in a clandestine CIA facility in the continental US from 1966 to 1969.[22]
Waterboarding is a method that gives the subject the sensation of drowning, and may cause permanent damage to the lungs and other parts of the body. Some individuals being waterboarded, who may have had preexisting cardiac or respiratory disease, have died under the method.
The CIA used waterboarding, and other interrogation techniques against three suspected Al-Qaeda members, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.[23][24]
Finding of War Crimes culpability
In 2007, Red Cross investigators concluded in a secret report that the Central Intelligence Agency's interrogation methods for high-level al Qaeda prisoners constituted torture which could make the Bush administration officials who approved them guilty of war crimes, according to the book ""Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals,"" by Jane Mayer a journalist for The New Yorker.[25]
According to the book, the report of the International Committee of the Red Cross found that the methods used on Abu Zubaydah, the first major al Qaeda figure captured by the United States, were "categorically" torture, which is illegal under both United States law and international conventions to which the U.S. is a party. A copy of the report was given to the CIA in 2007. For example, the book states that Abu Zubaydah was confined in a box "so small he said he had to double up his limbs in the fetal position" and was one of several prisoners to be "slammed against the walls," according to the Red Cross report.[25] The CIA has admitted that Abu Zubaydah and two other prisoners were waterboarded, a practice in which water is poured on the nose and mouth to create the sensation of suffocation and drowning.
Training in torture
On 24 January 1997, two CIA manuals were declassified in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by the Baltimore Sun in 1994. The first manual, "KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation", dated July 1963, is the source of much of the material in the second manual. The second manual, "Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual - 1983", was used in at least seven U.S. training courses conducted in Latin American countries, including Honduras, between 1982 and 1987. Both manuals deal exclusively with interrogation and have an entire chapter devoted to "coercive techniques."[26][27] These manuals recommend arresting suspects early in the morning by surprise, blindfolding them, and stripping them naked. Interrogation rooms should be windowless, soundproof, dark and without toilets. Suspects should be held incommunicado and should be deprived of any kind of normal routine in eating and sleeping. The manuals describe coercive techniques to be used "to induce psychological regression in the subject by bringing a superior outside force to bear on his will to resist."[28]
While the US manuals contained coercive measures, they did not rise to the level of what is generally defined as torture. Torture, however, has been culturally a part of authoritarian South American governments, especially in 1973-1983 (Dirty War). Argentina had learned such methods from the French in Operation Charly and its secret services trained the personnel of other South American countries. It is not clear to what extent field personnel and leadership of agencies of the Federal government of the United States (notably the CIA, Defense and State Departments, AID) were aware of this, condoned it, or actively assisted it.[citation needed]
In 2007, the chief Argentinian interrogator, Ernesto Guillermo Barreiro, was arrested in the United States.[29] It is not clear whether he will be deported, held, or extradited. The other two arrested were Peruvians, Telmo Ricardo Hurtado and Juan Manuel Rivera Rondon, accused of having participated in the massacre of 69 peasants in an Andean village in 1985, when President Alan García was trying to suppress the Maoist Shining Path guerrilla movement. Garcia was the President of Peru again from 2006 to 2011.
CIA involvement ranged from no knowledge, to knowledge but no participation, to knowledge with the suggestion that less brutal techniques were appropriate, to participation or observation.[citation needed]
Rendition and disappearance
Extraordinary rendition is the process of clandestinely moving a prisoner from where he was captured, to an interrogation center in a country not subject to US law regarding extreme methods of interrogation. Some reports indicate CIA personnel operated the prison and performed the interrogations, while others state that while the CIA delivered the prisoner, third-country intelligence personnel did the actual interrogation. The Wikipedia Category:Black sites details the list of known or suspected black sites where CIA prisoners may be detained. Known or suspected aircraft used to transport prisoners are in Rendition aircraft.
A claim that the black sites existed was made by The Washington Post in November 2005 and before by human rights NGOs.[11] US President George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operated by the CIA during a speech on 6 September 2006.[12][13][14]
2007 status of ghost detainees
A 50-page Human Rights Watch report, "Ghost Prisoner: Two Years in Secret CIA Detention," contains a detailed description of a secret CIA prison from a Palestinian former detainee who was released from custody the previous year. Human Rights Watch has also sent a public letter to U.S. President George W. Bush requesting information about the fate and whereabouts of the missing detainees.[30]
"President Bush told us that the last 14 CIA prisoners were sent to Guantanamo, but there are many other prisoners 'disappeared' by the CIA whose fate is still unknown," said Joanne Mariner, terrorism and counterterrorism director at Human Rights Watch. "The question is: what happened to these people and where are they now?"[31]
In early September 2006, 14 detainees were transferred from secret CIA prisons to military custody at Guantánamo Bay. In a televised speech on 6 September 2006, President Bush announced that with those 14 transfers, no prisoners were left in CIA custody.
Police training
Before 1973, Administrations were principally concerned with a Communist threat of subversion, to be met with host country internal security forces such as the police.[32] Police and military roles were blurred.[33] US assistance to foreign police began in the 1950s,[34] and increased in the early 1960s when the Kennedy administration became concerned about growing communist insurgent activities and established a public safety program within the Agency for International Development (AID) to train foreign police.[35] By 1968 the United States was spending $60 million a year to train police in 34 countries in areas such as criminal investigation, patrolling, interrogation and counterinsurgency techniques, riot control, weapon use, and bomb disposal[36] The United States also provided weapons, telecommunications, transportation, and other equipment. In the early 1970s, the Congress became concerned over the apparent absence of clear policy guidelines and the use of program funds to support repressive regimes that committed human rights' abuses. As a result, "the Congress determined that it was inadvisable for the United States to continue supporting any foreign police organizations".[36] Both the CIA and military intelligence with Counterintelligence Force Protection Source Operations[37] may have intelligence collecting relationships with local police.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, under the Department of State representatives at any embassy is expected to be aware of all contacts between US personnel and local law enforcement organizations. The 1973 legislation significantly limited police training of all sorts, partially in response to human rights concerns.
The majority of this training went to Latin America, but some did go to countries elsewhere in the world, according to Senator Alan Cranston,[34] especially those with narcotics or terrorism problems. Cranston cited six reasons why the Congress, in 1974, banned police training, after learning of training and equipping "police in Iran, Vietnam, Brazil, and other countries were involved in torture, murder, and the suppression of legitimate political activity":
First, training was provided to so-called friendly anti-Communist regimes, without regard to whether they were dictatorships or not.
Second, law enforcement efforts were subordinated to U.S. counterinsurgency goals. As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted, U.S. training included such topics as counterinsurgency techniques, weapons use, and Communist ideology. This also meant, in practice, reinforcing the control of recipient countries' militaries over the police.
Third, and this is clearly borne out in the Langguth book,[38] U.S. trainers were not always the best America had to offer.
Fourth, U.S. intelligence agencies were given an important role in the development and execution of these programs.
Fifth, police training was not placed in the broader context of administration of justice, with its emphasis on judicial and prison reform.
And, finally, human rights was rarely a factor in policy considerations at the time.
Cranston went on to say,
This ban remained virtually ironclad until 1985, when Congress authorized the President to support `programs to enhance investigative capabilities conducted under judicial or prosecutorial control' in functioning democracies in the Western hemisphere.
As a result, the Department of Justice--together with the State Department and the Agency for International Development--established the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program ICITAP. Operational responsibility was left entirely to ICITAP under the supervision of officials in the Deputy Attorney General's office, with policy guidance provided by the Department of State.
In principle, training and assistance to police, as opposed to military organization, is against US law, but the relevant law allows Presidential waiver of most provisions. A GAO report[36]
... provides information on (1) the legislative authority for providing assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies and personnel, (2) the extent and cost of U.S. activities, and (3) experts' opinions on the management of these programs.
General Accounting Office investigation
In 1973 and 1974, the Congress enacted legislation forbidding U.S. agencies from using foreign economic or military assistance funds to assist foreign police, but it subsequently granted numerous exemptions to permit assistance in some countries and in various aspects of police force development, including material and weapons support, force management, narcotics control, and counterterrorism tactics. The 1974 prohibition did not apply to the use of other funds by agencies such as the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) or United States Department of Transportation (DOT) to train or assist foreign law enforcement personnel.
No government agency is in charge of calculating the cost. However, the General Accounting Office identified 125 countries that received U.S. training and assistance for their police forces during fiscal year 1990 at a cost of at least $117 million.[39]
The prohibition did not apply to Drug Enforcement Administration DEA and Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI assistance to combat international narcotics trafficking.
During fiscal year 1990 at a cost of about $117 million, the GAO estimated the major programs were: U.S. programs providing :
- United States Department of State(DOS)International Narcotics Control($45 million) Antiterrorism Assistance ($10 million)
- Department of Justice ICITAP ($20 million)
- United States Department of Defense's (DOD) national police forces assistance ($42 million).[40]
Current and former State Department and other government officials, and academic experts who have been involved in assistance to foreign police forces, stated that the U.S. government lacks:[41] a clear policy, or program objectives, on the role of U.S. assistance to police forces in the new and emerging democracies, a focal point for coordination and decision-making, and a means for determining whether individual programs and activities support U.S. policy or contribute to overall U.S. interests.
They noted that each program is managed individually, and the only place that coordination is occurring is at the U.S. embassy in the country.
Scope and methodology on investigation on CIA training assistance
The US General Accounting Office obtained information on CIA training and assistance provided to foreign law enforcement personnel, reviewed the legislative authority for providing this training and assistance, and identified efforts to coordinate these activities. They did not review program implementation in recipient countries. They interviewed officials and obtained records from AID and the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, in Washington, D.C.; reviewed legislation and agency legal opinions on foreign police assistance; interviewed academic and legal experts on current U.S. assistance to foreign police; and reviewed literature published on foreign police assistance and AID's public safety program.[42]
Legislative exemptions to the prohibition on U.S. assistance to foreign police
Congressionally approved exemptions generally authorize activities that benefit a specific U.S. goal, such as countering the terrorist threat to U.S. citizens overseas or combating drug trafficking.[43][44] Exemptions were also extended by:
- The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 - for Haiti[45]
- International Security and Development Assistance Authorizations Act of 1983 - antiterrorism program to allow training in relation to aviation security, crisis management, document screening techniques, facility security, maritime security, protection for VIPs, and handling of detector dogs.[46]
- International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 - El Salvador & Honduras[47]
It also expanded the judicial reform program and the police training exemption to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1988 the Congress further expanded the judicial reform program to allow police assistance to promote investigative and forensic skills, develop law enforcement training curricula, and improve administration and management of law enforcement organizations. This act specifically prohibited the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. armed forces from providing training under this program.[47]
Maritime subjects were exempted from the section 660 prohibition, as well as the prohibition for any country that has a long-standing democratic tradition, does not have armed forces, and does not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. The act permitted such countries to receive any type of police assistance.
- International Narcotics Control Acts
This series of acts approved certain police assistance activities in Latin America and the Caribbean for narcotics control purposes. The 1988 act expanded DOD's role and allowed it to provide training and weapons and ammunition in fiscal years 1989 and 1990 to foreign police units that are specifically organized for narcotics enforcement in eligible countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. This act also allowed economic support funds to be provided to Colombian police for the protection of judges, government officials, and members of the press against narco-terrorist attacks. The 1989 Act extended DOD's authority to train police units in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in fiscal year 1990, if the units are only for narcotics enforcement. It also allowed DOD to provide, in addition to weapons and ammunition, other defense articles such as helicopters, vehicles, radios, and personnel gear. The 1990 act authorized DOD to continue to train and equip police forces in the Andean region.[48]
- Urgent Assistance for Democracy in Panama Act of 1990 - after the U.S. invasion of Panama, the Congress significantly enhanced the U.S. role in the development of the new police force in Panama. T.[49]
- The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for 1991 - Eastern Caribbean exemption[50]
Other exceptions to police assistance prohibition
In addition to the exemptions previously discussed, there are other authorities that waive the prohibition on assistance to police forces of foreign countries. For example, the President may authorize foreign assistance when `it is important to the security interests of the United States'. This allows the President to waive any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, including section 660.[51]
U.S. assistance provided to foreign police
Antiterrorism assistance
This aims to improve foreign governments' antiterrorist capabilities to better protect U.S. citizens and interests.[40] In 1990, the U.S. provided assistance to 49 countries at a cost of nearly $10 million. Sixty-two percent of the funds were spent in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe, and less than $500,000 was used to purchase equipment. The Department of State manages the program and contracts with other U.S. government agencies, state or local police departments, and private firms to conduct the training. The Federal Aviation Administration,[40] U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the U.S. Marshals Service are regular trainers. In compliance with legislative requirements, most training takes place in the United States.
International narcotics control
One of the objectives of the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) international narcotics control training program is to strengthen host country enforcement and interdiction capabilities.[citation needed] During fiscal year 1990, INM provided a minimum of $45 million in training and equipment to foreign police, principally in Mexico, Jamaica, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Pakistan, Thailand, and Turkey. These are all narcotics producing and trafficking countries.
INM reimburses other U.S. government agencies, primarily the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Customs, and Coast Guard, to conduct the actual training. DEA provides narcotics investigative training, Customs teaches air, sea and land port search procedures, and Coast Guard teaches courses in maritime interdiction. Other agencies may also be requested to train on a reimbursable basis in areas where they have specific expertise. For example, DOD provides helicopter training to police in drug trafficking countries. Training is conducted both overseas and in the United States and is reviewed and approved by INM.[48]
In addition, DOD used military assistance funds to train and equip narcotics enforcement police in several drug producing and trafficking countries. Documents provided by DOD show that in fiscal year 1990, DOD provided training and equipment with a value of at least $17 million to Mexico, $1.3 million to Bolivia, $10 million to Colombia, $1 million to Ecuador, and $1 million to Peru. DOD officials informed us that training and equipment valued at more than these amounts may also have been provided. However, documentation was not available at the Washington, D.C., agency headquarters level that specified the amounts for law enforcement activities. The equipment provided consisted of UH-1 helicopters and spare parts, ammunition, small arms, riot control equipment, radios, and miscellaneous personal gear.
Investigative and international police training
In FY1986, AID transferred funds to DOJ to design, develop, and implement projects to improve and enhance the investigative capabilities of law enforcement agencies in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. This was part of AID's effort to reform judicial systems. Using these funds, DOJ established the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).[52] Operating under State Department oversight, ICITAP has conducted criminal justice sector needs assessments in the region and has expanded its training to include basic police management and police academy development. In fiscal year 1990, ICITAP received $7 million from the Department of State for its regional program. It trained more than 1,000 students from the Caribbean, Central and South America and sponsored 7 conferences. Training includes police management, criminal investigation, crime scene search, and forensic medicine courses. Except for students sent to training programs in the United States, ICITAP training takes place overseas.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also provides limited training for foreign law enforcement officials.[52] Each year approximately 100 international police officials attend the 11-week college level course at the FBI National Academy that includes studies on management and forensic sciences. The FBI pays for the training and subsistence, but does not pay for the students' transportation. Over the last 10 years, more than 1,100 foreign police officials from 89 countries have graduated from this course.
Using its own funds, the FBI created two training courses:
- Training for Mexican police to better assist the United States in its investigations. Mexican officers receive a 3-day course in basic law enforcement techniques to include crime scene management, collection and preservation of evidence, hostage negotiations, forensic science, and investigative techniques. Since 1987, over 400 Mexican border police have been trained. FBI officials stated that the FBI plans to establish a training school in Mexico during 1992 at an estimated cost of about $250,000 annually, excluding salaries.
- The second course developed by the FBI for foreign police was to provide mid-level management training for police officials from the Pacific Island nations. The 4-week course includes first-line supervision, investigative techniques, and hostage negotiations. During 1991, 52 students graduated from the course held in Guam at a cost to the FBI of about $35,000. About 50 students are expected to attend this course during the spring of 1992.
The FBI also provides other training and assistance to foreign police as requested, but the cost is unknown.[52] For example, the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime provided training to Canadian police. The Criminal Investigative Division conducted a training seminar for officers from Italy's three national law enforcement agencies on the use of sensitive investigative techniques such as the operation of confidential sources, undercover operations, and electronic surveillance. The FBI also furnishes on-the-job assistance to governments who request help during particularly difficult or sensitive investigations.
Counterterrorism and military assistance
DOD supplies a limited amount of military training and assistance to police officials. During fiscal years 1986 and 1987, DOD trained and equipped the El Salvadoran and Honduran police to counter urban terrorist activities.[52][53]
This assistance was authorized in response to the murder of U.S. Marines by terrorists in El Salvador and was managed and delivered by the U.S. Army Military Police. The assistance consisted of training in counterterrorism techniques and the supply of police vehicles, communications, weapons, and other equipment. This effort cost $19.8 million, of which $17 million was provided to El Salvador.
In fiscal year 1990, DOD spent $6.4 million in previously authorized but unused military assistance funds to purchase needed equipment and weapons for Panama's newly formed national police force. Items procured included police vehicles, communications equipment, small arms, and personal gear. This assistance was a one-time, emergency program.
DOD has an ongoing military assistance program to support Costa Rican police. In fiscal year 1990, DOD supplied $431,000 in military equipment and $232,000 in military training to the Costa Rican Civil Guard to help them carry out their responsibility to protect the border regions of the country. DOD provided equipment such as vehicles, personnel gear, and radios, and military training in areas such as coastal operations. Additionally, DOD conducted technical training courses in equipment maintenance and medical skills among others.[53]
DOD, along with the United Kingdom, supports the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System[54][not in citation given] that was formed after the U.S. intervention in Grenada. The Security System is composed of a few permanently assigned military officers, but largely depends upon island nation police officers who can be called up for military duty in case of emergency. The United States equips and trains these personnel to prepare them for such an eventually. In fiscal year 1990, DOD provided $4.2 million in military assistance funds that were used to purchase equipment such as jeeps, small arms, uniforms, and communications gear. DOD also provided $300,000 for training in special operations, rural patrol, field survival, and surveillance, as well as technical courses in communications, navigation, maintenance, and medicine.
Difficulties in determining cost and extent of assistance
Since some agencies fund assistance out of their own budgets, without necessarily having a line item for police assistance, the GAO "could not accurately determine the extent or cost of assistance to foreign police" In the GAO estimates, "some double counting of students may be occurring and agencies may not be differentiating between assistance provided to police and assistance provided to the military." This might happen when "the agency supplying the training and the agency paying for the training may both include the trainees in their reporting systems, such as when ICITAP pays for students attending the FBI academy."
While the DOJ was asked to calculate information on its work with foreign police, it could not assign a dollar value to items including "travel expenses, salaries, and expendable items such as course materials." H.[55] "Also, GAO could not always determine whether a student was a police officer or a military member because some agencies do not collect such data, DOD officials informed us that once they receive permission to train police in a specific activity they do not provide a further accounting breakdown. For example, training provided to the Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System was for law enforcement personnel, although a few trainees may have belonged to military organizations."
Human experimentation
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Project MKULTRA, or MK-ULTRA, was the code name for a CIA mind-control research program that began in 1950, involved primarily with the experimentation of drugs and other "chemical, biological and radiological" stimuli on both willing and uninformed subjects.[56]
Rockefeller Commission
In December 1974, The New York Times reported that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s. The report prompted investigations by both the U.S. Congress (in the form of the Church Committee) and a presidential commission (known as the Rockefeller Commission). The congressional investigations and the Rockefeller Commission report revealed that the CIA and the Department of Defense had in fact conducted experiments to influence and control human behavior through the use of psychoactive drugs such as LSD and mescaline and other chemical, biological, and psychological means. Experiments were often conducted without the subjects' knowledge or consent.
MK-ULTRA was started on the order of CIA director Allen Dulles, largely in response to alleged Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean use of mind-control techniques on U.S. prisoners of war in Korea. The goal of the experiments was to study mind-control in order to develop methods of interrogation and behavior modification and manipulation, as well as to develop a possible truth drug.
MK-ULTRA research ultimately proved useless to the CIA and they have abandoned the program. Because most MK-ULTRA records were deliberately destroyed in 1973 by order of then CIA Director Richard Helms, it is difficult if not impossible to have a complete understanding of the more than 150 individually funded research sub-projects sponsored by MK-ULTRA and related CIA programs.
Following the recommendations of the Church Committee, President Gerald Ford in 1976 issued the first Executive Order on Intelligence Activities which, among other things, prohibited "experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested party, of each such human subject" and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission. Subsequent orders by Presidents Carter and Reagan expanded the directive to apply to any human experimentation.
Assassination and targeted killing
Targeted Killing
At least since World War II, a distinction has been drawn between assassination of civilian leaders, and targeted killings of leaders of fighting organizations. Some cases were blurry, such as the British-Czech Operation Anthropoid, the killing of uniformed SS officer Reinhard Heydrich, the acting Reichsprotektor of The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. A failed attempt, by British troops, to kill Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was clearly aimed at a military leader, as was the successful shooting down of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.
CIA has admitted being involved in assassination attempts against foreign leaders. Recently, there have been targeted killings of suspected terrorists, typically with missiles fired from unmanned aerial vehicles, in a manner that a number of legal authorities believe was a legitimate act as opposed to a prohibited assassination.
Of the cases cited, it appears that no CIA personnel or even directly controlled foreign agents personally killed any leader, but there certainly were cases where the CIA knew of, or supported, plots to overthrow foreign leaders. In the cases of Lumumba in 1960/61 and Castro in the 50s and 60s, the CIA was involved in preparing to kill the individual. In other cases, such as Diem, the Agency knew of a plot but did not warn him, and communications at White House level indicated that the Agency had, with approval, told the plotters the US didn't object to their plan. The gun or poison, however, was not in the hands of a CIA officer.
CIA personnel were involved in attempted assassinations of foreign government leaders such as Fidel Castro. They provided support to those that killed Patrice Lumumba. In yet another category was noninterference in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) Coup d'état in which President Ngo Dinh Diem was killed.
A distinction has been drawn between political assassinations and "targeted killing" of leaders of non-state belligerents.[citation needed]
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Perhaps the best-documented account of CIA-sponsored assassination plans were against President Fidel Castro of Cuba.
According to columnist Jack Anderson,[57] the first attempt was part of the Bay of Pigs Invasion operation, but five more teams were sent, the last apprehended on a rooftop within rifle range of Castro, at the end of February or beginning of March 1963. Anderson speculated that President Fidel Castro may have become aware of it, and somehow recruited Lee Harvey Oswald to retaliate against President John F. Kennedy.[58]
Maheu was identified as the team leader, who recruited John Roselli, a gambler with contacts in the Italian American Mafia and Cuban underworlds. The CIA assigned two operations officers, William King Harvey and James O'Connell, to accompany Roselli to Miami to recruit the actual teams.
Anderson's story appears to be confirmed by two CIA documents, the first referring to an Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency conspired to assassinate Fidel Castro. The story first appeared in Drew Pearson's column and has since appeared in Jack Anderson's column. "While the columns contained many factual errors, the allegations are basically true.[59] Second, a declassified memo from Howard Osborne, director of the CIA Office of Security, dated 15 February 1972, in the "CIA Family Jewels" series, from to the Executive Director, speaks of John Roselli, then serving time in a Federal penitentiary in Seattle, Washington, with deportation scheduled at the end of his sentence.[60] While the CIA was aware "Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene in his behalf. The DCI at the time, John McCone, decided to take a calculated risk and accept the consequences of possible disclosure. Two articles by Jack Anderson discuss the plot, as well the Washington Post Sunday magazine, Parade
Individuals who were aware of this project were: Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Richard M. Bissell Jr. (Deputy Director for Plans (DDP)) Colonel J.C. King (Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, DDP), Colonel Sheffield Edwards, William Harvey, and James P. O'Connell. Also included were Robert A. Maheu (former FBI agent, public relations agent who did work for the CIA, and later an aide to Howard Hughes), and his attorneys Edward P. Morgan and Edward Bennett Williams.
On 26 February 1971, Osborne arranged with the Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to flag any deportation. INS confirmed they did this again for 1972.
Cuba's former counterintelligence chief, Fabian Escalante, reviewed more than six hundred CIA plots to assassinate Fidel Castro, a project code-named Executive Action, in his book Executive Action: 634 Ways to Kill Fidel Castro. [61]The various plots, some of which were abandoned, included the use of cigars (poisoned or exploding), poison pills hidden in a cold-cream jar, the use of Caribbean molluscs containing explosives and a custom-made diving-suit infected with a fungus that would cause a debilitating skin disease. The assassination attempts started under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower and continued under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Most attempts were made during Richard Nixon's presidency. When Castro travelled abroad, the CIA cooperated with Cuban exiles for some of the more serious assassination attempts. In 2000, when Castro was due to visit Panama, a plot was hatched to put explosives under the podium where he was due to speak. Castro's personal security team discovered the explosives before he arrived.[62][63]
In summary, CIA, Embassy, and other US personnel, up to White House level, were aware of yet another coup being planned against President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. While the US had no direct participation in the coup, the plotters were told, in a deniable way, that the US did not object to it. No documentary evidence has surfaced that the US knew that Diem and his brother were to be killed, and it is unclear that all the Vietnamese plotters knew or agreed to it. President John F. Kennedy was aware of the coup plans, but apparently had not considered the hazard to Diem.
According to the Pentagon Papers, the final US loss of confidence in Diem began when his government violently suppressed a protest on Buddha's Birthday, 8 May 1963. Up to that point, the majority Buddhists had not been very politically active, even though Diem had given preference to the Catholic minority. Quickly, however, the Buddhists put a "cohesive and disciplined [political] organization" into action. By June, the situation moved from dissidence from a religious group to a "grave crisis of public confidence".[64]
Then-Ambassador Frederick Nolting had tried to persuade Diem to moderate government action against Buddhists, but with no success. While Nolting was on leave, President John F. Kennedy appointed Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. as the new Ambassador. In June 1963, senior leaders began, for the first time, to discuss the effect of a coup to remove Diem. Nolting and the US military in Vietnam, however, argued that Diem was keeping chaos at bay. Nolting left permanently in mid-August, but the assurances from Diem died with multiple August 21 night raids on Buddhist temples in many parts of Vietnam. Two days later, a US representative was approached by generals considering a coup. On 23 August, the first contact with a U.S. representative was made by generals who had begun to plan a coup against Diem. They were told that the U.S. had determined that Diem's brother, who had led the raids on the Buddhists, could not stay in any kind of power, and that, "then, we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved."
A White House tape of President Kennedy and his advisers, published this week in a new book-and-CD collection and excerpted on the Web, confirms that top U.S. officials sought the 1 November 1963 coup against then-South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem without apparently considering the physical consequences for Diem personally (he was murdered the following day). The taped meeting and related documents show that U.S. officials, including JFK, vastly overestimated their ability to control the South Vietnamese generals who ran the coup 40 years ago this week [November 2003].
The Kennedy tape from 29 October 1963 captures the highest-level White House meeting immediately prior to the coup, including the President's brother voicing doubts about the policy of support for a coup: "I mean, it's different from a coup in the Iraq or South American country; we are so intimately involved in this ...[65]
An 8 May 1973 memorandum[59] states that "An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam. The allegations were determined to be without foundation."
Nevertheless, the Pentagon Papers observed,
For the military coup d'etat against Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. must accept its full share of responsibility. Beginning in August 1963 we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government. In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green light to the generals. We maintained clandestine contact with them throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans and proposed new government. Thus, as the nine-year rule of Diem came to a bloody end, our complicity in his overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our commitment in an essentially leaderless Vietnam.[64]
The Church Committee concluded it had "solid evidence of a plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba [the first elected Prime Minister of the Republic of Congo]. Strong hostility to Lumumba, voiced at the very highest levels of government may have been intended to initiate an assassination operation; at the least it engendered such an operation. The evidence indicates that it is likely that President Eisenhower's expression of strong concern about Lumumba at a meeting of the National Security Council on 18 August 1960, was taken by (Director of Central Intelligence) Allen Dulles as authority to assassinate Lumumba. There is, however, testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials, and ambiguity and lack of clarity in the records of high-level policy meetings, which tends to contradict the evidence that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba. In a footnote, the Committee cited an unnamed official as saying he had heard Eisenhower order the assassination."
Approval discussions and meetings
The week after the August 18 NSC meeting, a presidential advisor reminded the Special Group of the "necessity for very straightforward action" against Lumumba and prompted a decision not to rule out consideration of "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba." The Special Group is one of the many names for the often-reorganized committee that approved CIA covert action proposals. It has been called the 303 committee, Special Group (counterinsurgency), Operations Advisory Group, 5412 committee, and Forty Committee. "The following day, Dulles cabled a CIA Station Officer in Leopoldville, Republic of the Congo,* that "in high quarters" the "removal" of Lumumba was "an urgent and prime objective."
Shortly thereafter the CIA's clandestine service formulated a plot to assassinate Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point that lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were delivered by the CIA to the Congo Station. There is no evidence that these instruments of assassination were actually used against Lumumba.
Events overtaken by events
In the meantime, Lumumba was dismissed from his post by Congolese President Joseph Kasa-Vubu, an act of dubious legality; in retaliation, Lumumba attempted to dismiss Kasa-Vubu from the presidency, an act of even more dubious legality. On 14 September, a coup d'état endorsed by the CIA and organized by Colonel Joseph Mobutu removed Lumumba from office.
Lumumba was killed, in 1961, by forces under the control of the President, Moise Tshombe of Katanga, a province that had declared its independence of the Republic of the Congo. Lumumba was taken by Katangan soldiers commanded by Belgians, and eventually shot by a Katangan firing squad under Belgian leadership.
Planning in the clandestine services
The independent Republic of the Congo was declared on 30 June 1960, with Joseph Kasa-Vubu as President and Patrice Lumumba as Prime Minister. It shared a name with the neighboring Republic of the Congo to the west, a French colony that also gained independence in 1960, and the two were normally differentiated by also stating the name of the relevant capital city, so Congo (Léopoldville) versus Congo (Brazzaville).
Larry Devlin became Chief of Station in Congo in July 1960, a mere 10 days after the country's independence from Belgium and shortly before Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba's two-month term in office, dismissal from power and ultimate execution. In his memoir, Devlin reveals that late in 1960, he received instructions from an agent ("Joe from Paris") who was relaying instructions from CIA headquarters that he (Devlin) was to effect the assassination of Lumumba. Various poisons, including one secreted in a tube of toothpaste, were proffered. The directive had come from the CIA Deputy Chief of Plans Dick Bissell, but Devlin wanted to know if it had originated at a higher level and if so, how high. "Joe" had been given to understand that it had come from President Dwight D. Eisenhower, but Devlin to this day does not know for sure. Devlin writes (and has recently said in public speaking engagements) that he felt an assassination would have been "morally wrong" and likely to backfire and work against U.S. interests. In the event, he temporized, neglecting to act, and Lumumba was ultimately murdered by his enemies in Katanga, with Belgian government participation. U.S. intelligence was kept apprised.
The United Nations Security Council was called into session on 7 December 1960 to consider Soviet demands that the U.N. seek Lumumba's immediate release, the immediate restoration of Lumumba as head of the Congo government, the disarming of the forces of Mobutu, and the immediate evacuation of Belgians from the Congo. Soviet Representative Valerian Zorin refused U.S. demands that he disqualify himself as Security Council President during the debate. Dag Hammarskjöld, answering Soviet attacks against his Congo operations, said that if the U.N. forces were withdrawn from the Congo "I fear everything will crumble."
Following a U.N. report that Lumumba had been mistreated by his captors, his followers threatened (on 9 December 1960) to seize all Belgians and "start cutting off the heads of some of them" unless Lumumba was released within 48 hours.
According to the Church Committee report:
In February 1960, CIA's Near East Division sought the endorsement of what the Division Chief [James H. Critchfield] called the "Health Alteration Committee" for its proposal for a "special operation" to "incapacitate" an Iraqi Colonel believed to be "promoting Soviet bloc political interests in Iraq." The Division sought the Committee's advice on a technique, "which while not likely to result in total disablement would be certain to prevent the target from pursuing his usual activities for a minimum of three months," adding: "We do not consciously seek subject's permanent removal from the scene; we also do not object should this complication develop." ... In April [1962], the [Health Alteration] Committee unanimously recommended to the DDP [Deputy Director for Plans, Richard M. Bissell Jr.] that a "disabling operation" be undertaken, noting that the Chief of Operations advised that it would be "highly desirable." Bissell's deputy, Tracy Barnes, approved on behalf of Bissell ... The approved operation was to mail a monogrammed handkerchief containing an incapacitating agent to the colonel from an Asian country. [James] Scheider [Science Advisor to Bissell] testified that, while he did not now recall the name of the recipient, he did remember mailing from the Asian country, during the period in question, a handkerchief "treated with some kind of material for the purpose of harassing that person who received it." ... During the course of this Committee's investigation, the CIA stated that the handkerchief was "in fact never received (if, indeed, sent)." It added that the colonel: "Suffered a terminal illness before a firing squad in Baghdad (an event we had nothing to do with) not very long after our handkerchief proposal was considered."[66]
Although some sources[67] depict this operation as an assassination attempt on Iraqi Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim, other sources note that this interpretation is inaccurate or unsupported by evidence,[68][69][70][71][72] as the notion that the CIA sought the target's assassination is refuted by the plain meaning of the text itself. In addition, it is unlikely that Qasim was the intended recipient of the handkerchief, as CIA officials would likely have remembered an attack on the Iraqi head of state. While Qasim was not a colonel but a brigadier general and did not openly promote Soviet interests in Iraq, the pro-Soviet head of Iraq's "People's Court," Colonel Fahdil Abbas al-Mahdawi, fits the above description perfectly.[68][73] Qasim effectively banned the ICP in January 1960, but Mahdawi remained a crucial conduit between Qasim's government and several communist-front groups—including the "Peace Partisans," which was allowed to operate in public despite being formally outlawed in May 1961—and was known for his outspoken praise for Fidel Castro as well as his trips throughout the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, and China.[68][69] In 1991, former high-ranking U.S. diplomat Hermann Eilts told journalist Elaine Sciolino that Mahdawi had been the target.[70]
Mahdawi and some of his family members were stricken with a serious case of what Mahdawi dubbed "influenza" in 1962, but it is unknown whether this ailment was related to the CIA's plan to poison him; Nathan J. Citino observes that "the timing of the illness does not correspond exactly to that of the 'incapacitating' operation as described in the cited testimony."[69]
An Inspector General report of investigation of allegations that the Agency was instrumental in bringing about the assassination of Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic. Trujillo was effective head of government at the time of his assassination in 1961.
Conditions leading to a desire, by Dominicans, appeared to begin Johnny Abbes, took control the Intelligence Military Service (the secret police), and the country developed more internal violence and increasingly isolated from other nations. This isolation compounded Trujillo's fears, prompting him to worsen his foreign interventionism.
To be sure, Trujillo did have cause to resent the leaders of some nations, such as Cuba's Fidel Castro, who assisted a small, abortive invasion attempt by dissident Dominicans in 1959. Trujillo, however, expressed greater concern over Venezuela's president Rómulo Betancourt (1959–64). An established and outspoken opponent of Trujillo, Betancourt had been associated with some individual Dominicans who had plotted against the dictator. Trujillo developed an obsessive personal hatred towards Betancourt and supported numerous plots of Venezuelan exiles to overthrow him. This pattern of intervention led the Venezuelan government to take its case against Trujillo to the Organization of American States (OAS).
This development infuriated Trujillo, who ordered his foreign agents to plant a bomb inside Betancourt's car. The assassination attempt, carried out on 24 June 1960, injured but did not kill the Venezuelan president.The firestorm caused from the incident inflamed world opinion against Trujillo. The members of the OAS, expressing this outrage, voted unanimously to sever diplomatic relations and to impose strong economic sanctions on the Dominican Republic.[74]
Finally on the night of the 30 May 1961, Rafael Trujillo was shot to death on San Cristobal Avenue, Santo Domingo. He was the victim of an ambush plotted by a number of Dominicans. According to American reporter Bernard Diederich, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had supplied some of the guns used to kill the president.[75]
In a report to the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, CIA officials described the agency as having "no active part" in the assassination and only a "faint connection" with the groups that planned the killing.[76] but the internal CIA investigation, by its Inspector General, "disclosed quite extensive Agency involvement with the plotters."[59][77]
According to an 86-page portion of the Rockefeller Commission investigating the CIA's domestic activities that was removed at the behest of the Ford administration and did not become public until 2016:
[Richard] Bissell [Deputy Director of Plans for the CIA] also testified that there was discussion within the Agency of the possibility of an attempt on the life of President Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia which "progressed as far as the identification of an asset who it was felt might be recruited for this purpose. The plan was never reached, was never perfected to the point where it seemed feasible." He said the Agency had "absolutely nothing" to do with the death of Sukarno. ... He stated that no assassination plans would have been undertaken without authorization outside the Agency, and that no such authorization was undertaken for plans against either Lumumba or Sukarno. ... Since no evidence was found to bring the Sukarno and Lumumba matters within the scope of the Commission's investigative authority, no further investigation in these two areas was undertaken.[78][79]
In 1984, a CIA manual for training the Nicaraguan Contras in psychological operations and unconventional warfare, entitled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War", became public.[80] The manual recommended "selective use of violence for propagandistic effects" and to "neutralize" (i.e., kill) government officials. Nicaraguan Contras were taught to lead:
... demonstrators into clashes with the authorities, to provoke riots or shootings, which lead to the killing of one or more persons, who will be seen as the martyrs; this situation should be taken advantage of immediately against the Government to create even bigger conflicts.
The manual also recommended:
... selective use of armed force for PSYOP [psychological operations] effect. ... Carefully selected, planned targets — judges, police officials, tax collectors, etc. — may be removed for PSYOP effect in a UWOA [unconventional warfare operations area], but extensive precautions must insure that the people "concur" in such an act by thorough explanatory canvassing among the affected populace before and after conduct of the mission.[81]
The CIA claimed that the purpose of the manual was to "moderate" activities already being done by the Contras.[82]
Romania and Lithuania
In May 2018, The European Court of Human Rights[83] ruled that the countries of Romania and Lithuania[84] were involved in torture activities perpetrated by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The two countries were found to have run "black site" torture rooms and detention facilities[85] therefore committing grave human rights abuses. In Romania, the secret facility was located at Northern Bucharest. In Lithuania, the black site was a guesthouse in the capital city of Vilnius which operated as early as 2002. In December 2014, the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence filed a report which included torture details involving Saudi Arabian nationals Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri[86] suspected of masterminding the bombing of the US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole in Yemen and Abu Zubaydah,[87] an alleged Al Qaeda terrorist. The European tribunal said the "two high-value prisoners" were "subjected to maltreatment and arbitrary incarceration at the CIA black site. Hence, the Lithuania and Romanian governments violated the Eastern Convention of Human Rights' ban on torture. Authorities in Lithuania also permitted the transport of Zubaydah to a secret prison in Afghanistan for additional abuse. In a separate decision, the European court learned Romania was knowledgeable of Nashiri's torture by the CIA in its own country.[88][89]
See also
- Senate Intelligence Committee report on CIA torture
- CIA's Use of vaccination program in hunt for Osama bin Laden
- ^ The Pentagon and the CIA Sent Mixed Message to the Argentine Military, George Washington University National Security Archive, 2003-03-28, Electronic Briefing Book No. 85
- ^ Stockwell, John (October 1987), "The Secret Wars of the CIA, a lecture", Information Clearing House
- ^ Lemoyne, James (2 May 1987), "Honduras Army linked to death of 200 civilians", The New York Times
- ^ a b McCoy, Alfred (2007). A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. Henry Holt & Co. pp. 16–17. ISBN 978-0-8050-8248-7.
- ^ a b Larry Siems (2012-04-20). "How America Came to Torture Its Prisoners". Slate. Retrieved 2014-10-26.
- ^ This article incorporates public domain material from the United States Government document "Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 December 2014. Retrieved 9 December 2014.CS1 maint: Archived copy as title (link), United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence". Retrieved on 2014-12-09.
- ^ Charlie Savage (17 February 2009). "Obama's War on Terror May Resemble Bush's in Some Areas". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 2016-07-23. Retrieved 2010-01-02.
- ^ "Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques". 30 December 2004. Retrieved 2 January 2010.
- ^ "New CIA Docs Detail Brutal 'Extraordinary Rendition' Process". Huffington Post. 28 August 2009. Retrieved 2 January 2010.
- ^ Fact sheet: Extraordinary rendition, American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved 29 March 2007 (in English)
- ^ a b Priest, Dana (2005-11-02), CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Washington Post, retrieved 2007-02-19
- ^ a b Bush: Top terror suspects to face tribunals, CNN / AP, 2006-09-06, archived from the original on 2006-09-11, retrieved 2006-09-06
- ^ a b "Bush admits to CIA secret prisons", BBC News, BBC News Online, 2006-09-07, retrieved 2007-04-15
- ^ a b Grey, Stephen (2006), Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program, St. Martin's Press, ISBN 978-0-312-36023-8
- ^ Yoo, John (4 January 2005), "Commentary: Behind the 'torture memos', As attorney general confirmation hearings begin for Alberto Gonzales, Boalt Law School professor John Yoo defends wartime policy", UC Berkeley News
- ^ Dershowitz, Alan (20 September 2002), "Legal Torture? Civil Libertarian Believes Torture Will Be Used In War On Terrorism", 60 Minutes
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- ^ Dean Baquet (2014-08-07). "The Executive Editor on the Word 'Torture'". New York Times. Retrieved 2014-10-26.
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- ^ David Brooks (2014-12-12). "Shields and Brooks on the CIA interrogation report, spending bill sticking point". PBS Newshour. Retrieved 2014-12-14.
[T]he report ... cuts through the ocean of euphemism, the EITs, enhanced interrogation techniques, and all that. It gets to straight language. Torture — it's obviously torture. ... the metaphor and the euphemism is designed to dull the moral sensibility.
- ^ Calls for Prosecution
- The Editorial Board, NYT (2014-12-21). "Prosecute Torturers and Their Bosses". The New York Times. Retrieved 2014-12-26.
- Kenneth Roth (2014-12-12). "The CIA torturers should be prosecuted". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2014-12-13.
- Wiener, Jon (2014-12-12). "Prosecute John Yoo, Says Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky". The Nation. Retrieved 2014-12-15.
- ^ Bagley, Tennent H. (2007), Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games, Yale University Press
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- ^ a b New York Times, 11 July 2008, "Book Cites Secret Red Cross Report of C.I.A. Torture of Qaeda Captives" https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/11/washington/11detain.html
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- ^ CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 161-162 (1985)
- ^ Anderson, Jack (18 June 1971), "6 Attempts to Kill Castro laid to CIA", Washington Post: B7
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- ^ Escalante, Fabian (1 September 2006). Executive Action: 634 Ways to Kill Fidel Castro. Ocean Press. p. 232. ISBN 1920888721. Retrieved 3 January 2019.
- ^ Campbell, Duncan (26 November 2016). "Close but no cigar: how America failed to kill Fidel Castro". The Guardian. Retrieved 3 January 2019.
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- ^ a b "Chapter 4, "The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May–November, 1963",", The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, Beacon Press, 1971, pp. 201–276.
- ^ Prados, John (3 November 2003), JFK and the Diem Coup, George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 101
- ^ United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1975-11-20). "Alleged Assassination Plots involving Foreign Leaders". p. 181. Retrieved 2016-02-01.
- ^ See, e.g., Wise, David (1991-04-14). "A People Betrayed: Twice before, Washington let Kurds die to promote foreign-policy designs. Now it's the Bush Administration doing the deed". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2016-02-01. cf. Mitchel, Timothy (2002). Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. University of California Press. p. 148. ISBN 9780520928251.
One of [Critchfield's] first actions, in February 1960, according to a later Congressional investigation, was an attempt to murder the president of Iraq, General Abd al-Karim Qasim.cf. Wilford, Hugh (2013). America's Great Game: The CIA's Secret Arabists and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Basic Books. p. 290. ISBN 9780465019656.
They did, however, entertain various suggestions for covert action against the new Iraqi leader, Abd al-Karim Qasim, among them a scheme proposed by the CIA's Health Alteration Committee involving a poisoned handkerchief.cf. Weiner, Tim (2008). Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. Doubleday. p. 163. ISBN 9780307455628.
Another failed assassination plot, using a poisoned handkerchief ... was endorsed all the way up the CIA's chain of command.cf. Blum, William (2003). Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II. Zed Books. p. 98. ISBN 9781842773697. cf. Powers, Thomas (1979). The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA. Knopf. pp. 160–164. ISBN 9780394507774.
- ^ a b c Gibson, Bryan R. (2015). Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 17–18, 27. ISBN 978-1-137-48711-7.
- ^ a b c Citino, Nathan J. (2017). "The People's Court". Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in US-Arab Relations, 1945–1967. Cambridge University Press. pp. 210–219, 223. ISBN 9781108107556.
- ^ a b Scliolino, Elaine (1991). The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis. John Wiley & Sons. p. 161. ISBN 9780471542995.
The target was Colonel Fadhil Abbas al-Mahdawi, the brutal, pro-Soviet head of the People's Court who had been targeting pro-American Iraqis, according to Hermann F. Eilts, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who spent most of his career in the Arab world.
- ^ Citino, Nathan J. (2006). "Oil and Arab Nationalism in U.S.–Iraqi Relations, 1958–1961". The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 268. ISBN 9780742553811.
The officer may have been Qasim's cousin, Fahdil 'Abbas al-Mahdawi.
- ^ West, Nigel (2017). Encyclopedia of Political Assassinations. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 205. ISBN 9781538102398.
Although Qasim was regarded as an adversary by the West, having nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had joint Anglo-American ownership, no plans had been made to depose him, principally because of the absence of a plausible successor. Nevertheless, the CIA pursued other schemes to prevent Iraq from coming under Soviet influence, and one such target was an unidentified colonel, thought to have been Qasim's cousin, the notorious Fadhil Abbas al-Mahdawi who was appointed military prosecutor to try members of the previous Hashemite monarchy.
- ^ For more on the "revolting tactics" of Mahdawi's "People's Court," see Makiya, Kanan (1998). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, Updated Edition. University of California Press. pp. 50–51. ISBN 9780520921245.
- ^ "The Assassination of Rafael Trujillo". warfarehistorynetwork.com. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
- ^ Bernard Diederich. Trujillo. The Death of the Goat. Little, Brown, and Co, 1978. p. 88. ISBN 0-316-18440-3.
- ^ Justice Department Memo, 1975; National Security Archive
- ^ "THE DETENTION OF AP PHOTOGRAPHER BILAL HUSSEIN". Archived from the original on 2012-02-01. Retrieved 2016-10-24.
- ^ "Summary of Facts: Investigation of CIA Involvement in Plans to Assassinate Foreign Leaders". United States President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States. 1975-06-05. pp. 6–8. Retrieved 2017-07-14.
- ^ Prados, John; Jimenez-Bacardi, Arturo (2016-02-29). "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975; Removed Section on CIA Assassination Plots". National Security Archive. Retrieved 2017-07-14.
- ^ "Declassified Army and CIA Manuals", Latin American Working Group, 2006-07-30, retrieved 2006-04-26
- ^ James Bovard (2004-06-04), "Terrorism Debacles in the Reagan Administration", The Future of Freedom Foundation, retrieved 2006-04-27
- ^ "International Law PSCI 0236 > International Law PSCI 0236 > Introduction", middlebury.edu, retrieved 2006-09-05[permanent dead link]
- ^ "European Court of Human Rights". International Justice Resource Center. 2014-07-10. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
- ^ "Inside Romania's secret CIA prison". The Independent. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
- ^ News, A. B. C. (2009-12-22). "REPORT: Two CIA Black Site Prisons in Lithuania". ABC News. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
- ^ "Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri". Human Rights First. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
- ^ "How Did Abu Zubaydah Lose His Eye?". The New Yorker. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
- ^ "CIA rendition victims challenge Romania and Lithuania at Europe's human rights court". www.amnesty.org. Retrieved 2018-06-24.
- ^ "European court finds Romania and Lithuania complicit in CIA torture". POLITICO. 2018-05-31. Retrieved 2018-06-24.


text:
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Seesmic Desktop 0.7
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- Operating Systems 10.5 / 10.6
- File Name SeesmicDesktop-0.7.air.zip
- MD5 Hash 8965b97086f477180e87d726ece52458
- File Size 2.38 MB
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subset: commoncrawl


text:
AnnouncementDied in a Blogging Accident has lived up to its name and died... in a blogging accident. That is to say it has concluded. You can still re-live the magic by clicking here to start at chapter 1. For genuine criticism of XKCD, please click the top link to the right (XKCD Isn't Funny).
Friday, November 18, 2011
Comic 979: Randall Attempts Poetry...and Fails
Title: Wisdom of the Ancients; alt-text: All long help threads should have a sticky globally-editable post at the top saying 'DEAR PEOPLE FROM THE FUTURE: Here's what we've figured out so far ...'
Okay, there are several things that make this strip suck. The first one should be obvious to all of you, but I'll say it anyway.
This comic is UGLY.
I'm not even talking about ugly in the traditional "xkcd is stick art" sense. I mean that having a "poem" (if you want to call it that) as the first panel and a guy yelling at a computer as the second panel just looks BAD. But the problem is, I can't think of a way to improve the formatting, at least not as the comic stands now. There's too much text to be used as a caption, which means that formatting it this way is truly the best Randall could do with what he gave himself.
But this leads into the second problem with today's comic. The image is nothing but post-punchline dialogue. Randall said all he needed to say in his little poem, and the second panel probably should've been condensed to alt-text. Unfortunately, that means that this comic, at its core, is simply text. And it's not just any text; it's a POEM. A bad poem, but a poem nonetheless (note the "artistic" separation of the single sentence). It should properly read, "Never have I felt so close to another soul, and yet so helplessly alone, as when I Google an error and there's one result: A thread by someone with the same problem and no answer last posted to in 2003." The touches of purple prose and the format of the presentation bump this simple sentence into poetry status (despite the lack of rhyme or meter). Those interested in the humanities would call this free verse.
Get that? This comic, minus the PPD, is a poem. It's a journey into Randall's self-proclaimed most hated of studies: the humanities. xkcd, a comic of "romance, sarcasm, math, and language," has sunk so low as to use POETRY (and nothing else) as today's update.* That's...shocking, to say the least. I don't know what to make of it.
Okay, onto the third and final problem of today's strip. In addition to being a poem with PPD, this comic is using referential humor (a nice way of saying it's GOOMHR-bait). If readers laugh, it's that "ah heh heh, I've totally been there" laugh that's not really prompted by true humor, but simply a situation that the reader happens to recognize. It's like people laughing at "the cake is a lie." That's a game reference, not a joke, and this comic is doing the exact same thing. We're supposed to like it because we've all experienced this (I actually have, but that doesn't make the comic any funnier). But that's no substitute to actual humor.
* I actually don't have a problem with humanities or poetry. They might not have long-term career value, but they're not as worthless as Randall so ardently proclaims. My issue with this is not that poetry is being used, but that it's being used by RANDALL MUNROE in place of an actual comic.
11 comments:
Why? Poetry is LANGUAGE.ReplyDelete
- AnonymousNovember 18, 2011 at 6:59 PM
Poetry is to language as drawing is to geometry, I guess.ReplyDelete
I like that comparison.ReplyDelete
Except that drawing isn't really a part of geometry (strictly, though, yes), whereas poetry is part of language.ReplyDelete
I posted this in the comments of the previous review: Randall discovers the reason why sites like StackOverflow were created. And does so several years late, as usual.ReplyDelete
- AnonymousNovember 18, 2011 at 11:12 PM
Roses are redReplyDelete
Violets are blue
Randall is great
Can't you be too?
- AnonymousNovember 19, 2011 at 3:00 AM
I think if the poem were somehow spread across a larger picture as a series of text boxes, with each text box leading the eye toward another area of the picture in a sequence... and if that sequence told the same story as the poem did, this would be a great comic...ReplyDelete
I can't imagine what the picture would be of, but that's how I'd have formatted it.
- AnonymousNovember 19, 2011 at 7:00 AM
The jarring leap from delicate poetry to a guy leaping to his feet and shaking the monitor in a display of unrestrained frustration is obviously a humour device. The problem is the poem stinks, so it doesn't really work. You only know it's a poem because it looks like one. I don't think there are many readers who would be affected by it to the point that the sudden change offers a significant shift in emotional bearing.ReplyDelete
I actually laughed at the alt-text. The phrase "DEAR PEOPLE FROM THE FUTURE," in all caps like that, just strikes me as funny.ReplyDelete
- AnonymousNovember 23, 2011 at 11:40 PM
Actually I thought it was funny cause I have experienced it. There's a lot of humor based on shared experience. Maybe you could see it if you got the stick out of your self righteous ass.ReplyDelete
- AnonymousJanuary 6, 2012 at 10:42 AM
You, sir, are a presumptuous imbecile.ReplyDelete


text:
For Cooking Rice:
- Basmati Rice-2 cups(I use Tilda)
- Cinnamon Sticks-2-3 small 1/2''pieces
- Cardamom pods-4
- Cloves-5
- Bay leaf-2
- Water-4 cups
- Lemon juice-1tbsp,freshly squeezed
- Ghee-2tbsp
- Salt to taste
- Chicken-750gm,medium pieces
- Turmeric powder-a couple of pinches
- Chilly powder-1/2tsp
- Black Pepper-1/2tsp,crushed
- Garam masala-1/2tsp,freshly crushed
- Salt to taste
- Onion-3,thinly sliced
- Ginger-1tbsp,crushed
- Garlic-1tbsp,crushed
- Green Chilly-10-12(adjust as per ur tolerance level)
- Tomato-2,big size,chopped
- Turmeric powder-a couple of pinches
- Coriander powder-2tsp
- Garam masala-1tsp
- Mint leaves-1/4cup,chopped
- Coriander leaves-a handful,chopped
- Lemon juice-1tbsp
- Oil/ghee-as required
- Salt to taste
For Masala Preparation:
For Masala Preparation:
- Clean and wash the chicken pieces.Drain out the excess water completely.
- Marinate the chicken pieces with marination ingredients.Keep aside for at least 30 minutes.
- Shallow fry the marinated chicken pieces in oil,not more than 5 minutes,including both sides.Keep them aside.
- Heat oil in a pan, add crushed ginger,garlic and green chillies.Stir fry for 1-2 minutes.Add sliced onion and saute till it turns light golden colour.
- Add chopped tomatoes and saute well.Add turmeric, coriander,garam masala powders and mix well with all the ingredients and saute until the raw smell of the spices disappears.
- Once the raw smell is gone,add the shallow fried chicken pieces,mix well .Add some water and cook covered in medium-low heat until all the water is absorbed and the chicken pieces are coated with the masala.
- Add chopped mint leaves,coriander leaves and combine well.Sprinkle a pinch of garam masala and add 1tbsp fresh lemon juice and mix well.Switch off the heat.
For Cooking Rice:
- Wash and soak the rice in water for20-30 minutes.Drain the water completely.
- Heat ghee/oil in a pan and add half the quantity of whole spices and add the rice.Saute the rice for few minutes.
- Boil the required amount of water in a vessel with the remaining whole spices,bay leaf,salt.Add the sauteed rice to this and cook covered till the rice is done and the water is completely dried.Sprinkle a few drops of lemon juice over the rice.Allow to cool and keep aside.
- Take a greased vessel,spread the chicken pieces along with the gravy in the bottom.Now add a layer of cooked rice over this.Drizzle ghee and sprinkle garam masala powder,fried onions and chopped coriander leaves and mint leaves in between the layers.Repeat this process 3 or 4 times,depending on the quantity of the rice and chicken.
- You can also bake this in a preheated oven for 15-20 minutes.Cover the vessel with aluminum foil.
- Reserve some nuts,raisins and fried onions for final garnishing before serving.Mix thoroughly.
- Do not overcook the rice.Once it is cooked, allow it to cool by spreading it in a tray or big vessel.
- You may use crushed shajeera along with your garam masala powder in chicken masala.
- Make sure that the chicken masala should not be watery.
- you may use ground poppy seeds while making the chicken masala.


text:
Here's a simple, colorful side dish.
- Yield
- Serves 4
- 1 pound fresh asparagus, ends trimmed, each stalk cut diagonally into thirds
- 1/2 teaspoon vegetable oil
- 1/2 cup finely diced red bell pepper
- 1 tablespoon low-sodium soy sauce
- 1/2 teaspoon oriental sesame oil
- 2 teaspoons sesame seeds, toasted
- Cook asparagus in large pot of boiling salted water until crisp-tender, about 3 minutes. Drain. Rinse asparagus under cold water. Drain well. (Can be made 1 day ahead. Wrap in paper towels and chill.)
- Heat vegetable oil in large nonstick skillet over medium-high heat. Add bell pepper and stir 1 minute. Add asparagus and sauté until heated through, about 2 minutes. Add soy sauce and sesame oil; toss until asparagus and bell pepper are coated, about 1 minute. Transfer to platter. Sprinkle with sesame seeds.
Per serving: calories, 50; total fat, 2 g; saturated fat, 0; cholesterol, 0


text:
We've just presented the historical estimates of real GDP per capita developed by Angus Maddison at the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. Figure 1 summarizes all graphs of our previous post and illustrates the inherent mastery of the GDP evolution after WWII. The rate of real economic growth jumped by a factor of 10 between 1940 and 1950. If to extrapolate the linear trend observed after 1950 into the past, the level of real GDP per capita intercepts the time line between 1920 and 1940. Does that mean that there was no or negative real economic growth in the 19th century or the rate of economic growth after 1950 has been dramatically biased? If to extrapolate the growth rates observed before 1940, the current level of real GDP per capita in developed counties would have been below $15,000 or even $10,000. Does that mean that the rate of price inflation has been highly underestimated since 1940?
This is a major paradox of the historical GDP time series. Can anybody explain it?


text:
Can Joe Gibbs bag Clinton Portis?: Rumors are flying about a Portis-for-Bailey deal that would solve Washington's running back issues. The trade would reportedly also involve a draft pick going to the Broncos. Could this really happen?
If Gibbs can get Portis that would be huge, and I have to ask, do the Broncos have an unlimtited supply of thousand yard rushers? they never seem to miss a beat with their running back changes.
posted by jbou at 11:07 AM on February 23
Could this really happen? Absolutely. The question is, if it does happen, can Joe Gibbs make it work? Gathering talent hasn't been the problem in Washington (unless The Ole Ball Coach was selecting said talent) for the past few years. Getting the players to play together in an organized fashion has been a bit of a sticky wicket though. hee hee. stickey wicket, oh man...
posted by lilnemo at 12:50 PM on February 23
This certainly has a great deal to do with Portis running his mouth about boycotting training camp if he doesn't get his contract reworked. Denver has certainly had tons of success just adding a rookie now and then to become their starter, and I really liked what I saw of Quentin Griffin in the latter part of last season. Still, it would be a hell of a risk to give up on a RB of Portis's quality over a few words, shutdown corner involved or not. I think this leans heavily to the 'Skins, and I'll be waiting for that March 3 announcement.
posted by wfrazerjr at 01:20 PM on February 23
As an aside, the Broncos have given notice to dope-smoking running back Mike "I Swear It Was Second-Hand" Anderson that if he plans to stay in Denver, he should expect a fat pay cut. Not surprisingly, Anderson has asked for his release.
posted by wfrazerjr at 01:29 PM on February 23
And a little more information by way of a column by Adam Schefter of the Denver Post. Can you tell I'm jazzed we're talking football?
posted by wfrazerjr at 01:33 PM on February 23
do the Broncos have an unlimtited supply of thousand yard rushers? From wfrazerjr's link: "There's also Clinton Portis, Quentin Griffin, Reuben Droughns and Ahmaad Galloway to consider in the backfield." The answer is clearly yes. I think those guys are breeding back there.
posted by yerfatma at 02:12 PM on February 23
I wonder about this move for Washington. Yes, Portis looks like a wonderful back. Isn't there just a twinge of "is he a product of Denver's system?" to worry about, though? I mean, not to be cynical -- but Olandis Gary looked like a legitimate star when he was starting for the Broncos, too.
posted by jeffmshaw at 02:57 PM on February 23
I think Olandis Gary could still be a legitimate star, if someone would just give him the damned ball more than four times a game. I think Denver just has a nose for sniffing out badasses come draft day. Also, bear this in mind: On a recent Los Angeles-bound flight from the Pro Bowl in Hawaii, former Oklahoma and current Dallas Cowboys safety Roy Williams said his former college teammate and Broncos running back Quentin Griffin is the closest thing he has seen to Barry Sanders. Now I wouldn't say Roy Williams is a venerable expert just yet, but the man's word carries some credence. If he and the Broncos think Griffin can handle the load, I don't think I'd be willing to bet against them.
posted by wfrazerjr at 04:09 PM on February 23
do the Broncos have an unlimtited supply of thousand yard rushers? Any team interested in drafting a RB this year should get a mole in the Broncos war room and snipe them away. With the Broncos track record, the Redskins could trade for Quentin Griffith and expect similar results.
posted by YukonGold at 04:29 PM on February 23
It looks like Joe Gibbs has taken one step closer to being committed. The trade (as I understand it) would include Clinton Portis in exchange for Champ Bailey and a second round pick. I think this trade is questionable if you're a Redskins fan. All Joe Gibbs has to do is look around the league and see that teams are succeeding with running backs taken in later rounds. Just last year the Broncos got Quentin Griffin in the fourth round and he had a breakout game against Indianapolis, and is slated to replace Portis if the trade goes through. In 2001, Travis Henry was a second round pick and Rudi Johnson was a fourth round pick--both had productive years last season. How many great cornerbacks are there in the NFL? Whatever the number, one thing is certain--there are far fewer great cornerbacks than great running backs. Knowing that, why doesn't Gibbs just draft a running back with the second round draft pick he's willing to give up to obtain Portis? That solves two problems (better running game and strong pass defense) instead of creating one (filling the void left by trading an all-pro corner).
posted by pwilly at 11:03 AM on February 24


text:
In this digital world, secure android device becomes more and more important. On one hand, data leakage happens all the time, and people always lost data due to diverse account. On the other hand, people usually lost android device due to steal, robbery, etc. If you ever meet such kind of problem, it is urgent to knowledge about android device protection. In this article, you will learn valid tips to protect your android phone or tablet.
1.Do not save your password while you log in websites or other online service. Especially when it comes to credit card information, as it will cause major problem if the information gets out. Hence, log out after you made a payment or entered card information for android data protection.
2.Apply to screen lock and encryption. Commonly, you could set pattern, PIN or password to lock your screen. If you set PIN or password to lock screen, do not make passwords visible while input. In the meantime, set up SIM card lock to secure android phone.
3.Lock your app. Most people may be conscious of screen lock. However, most of people ignore the significance of app lock. Therefore, do not forget to lock central app.
4.Secure the network. Do not connect unknown public WiFi as there is a great possibility that someone take advantage of it to hijack your phone.
5.Run anti virus app. You will be able to discover various anti virus program on the market, rely on one that suits your case.
6.Keep a habit to backup important files termly. For your information, Android Manager is a good option for backup data and manage data.
7.Only download apps from trusted official source. Unreliable download may cause damage to your phone or tablet substantial.
8.Keep operating system and apps update. OS and app update comes with better experience and better security. In the mean time, upgrade from trusted source.
9.Keep away from SMS threat. Sometimes, the link contained at SMS from unknown sender may be harmful. Therefore, do not click the link that received from unknown resource.
10.Turn off bluetooth when not in use. Believe it or not, hackers can find a way to stole your data via bluetooth.
Note: If you still lost data unfortunately, rely on Android Phone Recovery to get data back.
Related Articles:
Tuesday, March 1, 2016
Valid Tips to Secure Android Device and Data
2 comments:
- AnonymousMay 10, 2016 at 5:27 AM
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text:
Trail Time
With only one person overseeing more than 40 of O'ahu's hiking trails, the state gets extra help from an unexpected source.
On a typical weekend, more than 400 people hike to Manoa Falls. The 0.8-mile route through lush rain forest, culminating in a 100-foot waterfall, draws residents and tourists of all fitness levels. Over the past two years, the popular hiking trail has also attracted another kind of visitor—convicted felons wielding chainsaws and machetes.
|The ease of the Manoa Falls trail is due in part to inmates such as Christopher Martinez (at left) and Orlando De Mello and O'ahu trail and access specialist Aaron Lowe (right). photo: Sergio Goes
Don't worry. These inmates have good reason to be there. They're working for Na Ala Hele, the state Department of Land and Natural Resources' Trail and Access Program. The state established the program in 1988, but with only 10 full-time staffers overseeing more than 265 miles of dirt trails statewide, Na Ala Hele is chronically short staffed.
Trail and access specialist Aaron Lowe manages more than 84 miles of trail on O'ahu, from Mokule'ia to Maunawili. For years, he relied heavily on weekend volunteers to assist with trail projects that could be completed in a day or two. But when the number of visitors to Manoa Falls started to climb in recent years (due largely, he says, to the closure of Sacred Falls in 1999), Lowe realized he needed more help maintaining popular trails and turned to an unlikely labor source, the O'ahu Community Correctional Center.
"It's very important we maintain these trails to a safe level and keep them in good shape, cleared of trees and branches and well-marked to prevent any type of risk or injury," Lowe says. "If you can maintain a trail to that high a level, it allows people to enjoy what's around them, rather than having to pay attention to every footstep."
Three to four times a week, Lowe and four inmates work eight-hour shifts, laying gravel at Manoa Falls, building a two-mile fence for the soon-to-be reopened Poamoho Trail or sharpening tools at the forestry division's Makiki base yard. The Department of Public Safety pays inmates 50 cents an hour, but it's up to the inmates to select the forestry workline over others.
"Rumor has it that we're one of the tougher worklines for inmates," Lowe says. OCCC doesn't allow just any inmate to handle power tools, he notes. The facility picks nonviolent offenders who are on community status, or allowed to work in the community with proper supervision. In addition to making trails safer for their users on O'ahu, the program often proves therapeutic for inmates.
"I love it, actually, just being out in the wildness—it's calm and peaceful," says inmate Orlando De Mello, who has participated in the program for more than a month. "It can be hard work, but it's better than other jobs where we just weed-whack on the side of the freeway. There's a bond between yourself and the land, and there's pride in being part of taking care of it."