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Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
Securitization theory's core contention—the social construction of security as a
"speech-act"—is perceptive and productive, yet insufficiently attentive to
societies engulfed in profound existential uncertainty about their own survival.
Such societies are immersed in what I call "deep securitization," whereby
widespread public discourses explicitly frame threats as probable, protracted,
and endangering the very existence of the nation/state. Under deep
securitization, to politicize is to securitize, sectors intensely intertwine, political
legitimacy's object is the polity/identity itself, and securitization steps are
typically nonbinary and nonlinear. Empirically, if some securitizations are
deeper than others, Israel's is one of the deepest. In this paper, I examine this
exceptionally apt though little-examined case for securitization theory. Israeli
public discourse abounds with "existential threats," depicting the Jewish people
and polity as invariably endangered. The article analyzes the securitization of
demography and its linkage to geography and democracy in the Israeli-Jewish
discourse and praxis.
Securitization theory (ST), engendered in the early 1990s by the Copenhagen School,
holds that security's meaning is closely related to its social construction (Buzan et al. 1998;
Waever 1995; Waever et al. 1993). ST's original formulation posits securitization as a "speech-
act": a discourse that generates social reality. More specifically, securitization starts with a
"securitizing move," that is, a "discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an
existential threat to a referent object." This discourse may then be accepted by its audience as
ST also emphasizes the flipside of securitization, namely desecuritization: "the shifting of issues
out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Buzan
et al. 1998:4).
ST became a fountainhead for theorization and case studies, and, like any progressive
research field, generated robust polemics (Balzacq 2011; Guzzini and Jung 2004; Huysmans
1998a; Mcdonald 2008). This article joins in the effort to advance ST by introducing "deep
securitization mainly within the performative understanding of language (Vuori 2008). My focus
is on the social actors' discourses—deciphering their talk and text, while being attentive to their
social context (including political behavior). This paper does not purport to explain why
securitizers securitize—why do certain actors interpret and frame matters as (existential) threats
while other actors do not (Sjöstedt 2013). A multivariate approach, integrating agential reflexive
motivations and structural, often habitual, causes (such as cultural values and norms) can help
The theoretical section suggests that we may discern various securitizing moves along
scale (what is at stake?), scope (who securitizes and how much?) and sort (what are the threats?).
Deep securitization is defined and identified through its distinct scale and scope: threats are
explicitly framed as probable and protracted, endangering the very existence of the nation/state
and that discourse is incessantly and widely employed by the society. Locating these instances is
contextualized through polls and the study of socio-political behavior. The paper further suggests
four key feature of deep securitization: politicization often requires securitization, security
sectors intensely intertwine, political legitimacy's object is the polity/identity itself, and the
If some securitizations are deeper than others, Israel's is one of the deepest. The
empirical section examines Israel from the perspectives of its Jewish population—who
overwhelmingly subscribe to Zionism, that is, to the Jewish people's right to found and sustain
an independent Jewish state—and investigates what and how they securitize. ST, which has been
richly applied to Europe and North America (cf. Wilkinson 2007), may benefit from such an
empirical extension. Israel provides an exceptionally apt, though little-examined, case study
(Lupovici 2014, forthcoming) since its public discourse abounds with "existential threats,"
depicting the Jewish people and polity as invariably endangered (Abulof 2009). This paper
examines the Zionist "deep securitization triangle" of geography, democracy and demography,
I argue that demographic dominance has been regarded as a paramount goal of Zionism,
and, in the past decade, its securitization has been intensified. The "demographic demon" is
conceptualized as a threat to the very existence of the Jewish state and, at the same time, to the
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
ideal of a "Greater Israel" and to Israel's capacity to remain democratic. Since demography
dominates Israel's "deep securitization triangle," attempts to desecuritize it, through the
securitization of either geography or democracy, have failed, with profound geopolitical and
democratic implications. The apocalyptic vision of loss of a Jewish majority was among the
factors driving the Gaza Disengagement Plan (2004/5) and illiberal legislation (2009-).
Methodologically, while I use corpus linguistics to ascertain diachronic trends in the salience and
Theoretical Discussion
Studying deep securitization requires ascertaining its distinct place in ST. The first
evincing the need to investigate deep securitization; the second section defines deep
securitization; and the final section points to deep securitization's key features.
much of ST should be precisely about that. After all, "the exact definition and criteria of
saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects" (Buzan et al. 1998:25). ST's yardstick for
criterion: that the issue is presented as an existential threat" to either the state (sovereignty) or the
society (identity). While "uttering the word security" is itself not required, the threat must be
framed as a matter of "survival," providing "priority of action 'because if the problem is not
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure'" (Buzan et al.
Moving on from theory to practice, however, it is not quite clear how strict this "fairly
demanding criterion" really is. For example, does former British PM Tony Blair's 2004
statement that Britain had reached a "crunch point" in its dealing with immigrants, and that "we
will neither be Fortress Britain, nor will we be an open house" (Cowell 2004) fit the "existential
threat" criterion of the securitizing move? On the one hand, Blair's statement does not refer to
immigration as threatening Britain's existence or very survival, thus defying the discursive
criterion ST clearly stipulates. On the other hand, securitization studies abound that refer to such
societal identity (e.g. Waever et al. 1993; Watson 2009). But does Blair's assertion that certain
immigrants may "incite hatred against the very values this country stands for" amount to an
argument that Britain or British identity per se is in peril? We are left with creeping ambiguity as
empirical study of securitization has effectively foregone its "fairly demanding criterion." Few
threat to the referent object's survival (be that object a state or society). Tellingly, whenever the
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
phrase "existential threat" figures in ST literature it typically refers to the scholarly discourse
Huysmans (2006) showcases this difficulty in his analysis of the EU's security framing of
immigration. He alludes to "existential" politics / insecurity / threats more than 120 times, yet
none of these references is taken from the EU discourses examined. If migration has indeed been
"transfigured into events and developments that existentially endanger the independent identity
and functional autonomy of a political unit" (Huysmans 2006:51), should we not expect explicit
public discourse on how "immigration endangers our existence"? To my mind, this omission
emanates from the empirical fact that explicit discourses of this kind are (still) rather rare.
Strictly (existentially) speaking, the EU discourse has exhibited scant securitization in the past
decade. 2
Seemingly, to address this dissonance between ST's theoretical postulation and empirical
investigation, we can opt to either reassert the "existential" threshold or else forgo it. However,
the former virtually means expunging the bulk of empirical securitization studies to-date as
theoretically inapposite, forsaking invaluable insights; the latter comes with a cost of losing ST's
The same applies to Buzan et al. 1998, who conclude their mostly theoretical work in an
illustrative discourse analysis of the EU. Here too there is no explicit reference to "existential"
Boswell 2007. Indeed, Huysmans (2006:147) highlights his concept of 'security rationality' as
seeking to go beyond mere 'discourses of danger,' noting that by turning linguistic practice from
description to performative acts, ST "over-emphasize[s] the importance of linguistic practice." It
is rather those bureaucratic technological "little security nothings" that we should pay closer
attention to (Huysmans 2011).
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
considering both the blurred boundaries and the importance of ST's "demanding criterion," a
move—might be better. 3
The spectrum of securitization, and of securitizing moves in particular, spans three key
parameters: scale, scope and sort. Scale pertains to what the securitizers hold to be at stake; it
concerns both the referent object and the severity of the (explicit or implicit) threat. As for the
referent object, ST posits mid-level securitization as being about either societal identity or state
sovereignty. I propose an expansion to four main referent objects: identity, polity (often the state),
authority (regime/government) and policy. As for the threat severity, we should probe how
imminent and protracted is the danger (a potentially passing crisis or a long-term threat), what is
the probability assigned to the threat and, most importantly, what are the involved perils (damage
to the referent object or its utter extinction). Threat severity is the touchstone of deep
securitization, in which probable and protracted threats are explicitly framed as endangering the
very existence of the referent object, which is typically, not necessarily, identity or polity, not
merely authority or policy. However, deep securitization is discerned not only by scale but
Abrahamsen 2005. Williams (2003:521) suggests "a continuum running from risk to threat."
Bigo (2002) frames discourses and practices pertaining to sub-existential threats as constituting
"governmentality of unease."
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
temporal extent to which their discourse of dangers pervades the society. In some cases,
securitizers are few and far between, in both societal space and historical time. In other cases,
they seem to be virtually everywhere, and always. In the span between these poles, deep
Deep securitization thus scores high in both scope and scale: Securitizing moves are
prolonged and widespread; and threats are depicted as invariably endangering the very survival
of the collective. Note that my definition of deep securitization is stipulative and ostensive, not
real or nominal (Schiappa 1993). It delineates the phenomenon as sufficiently narrow to facilitate
an accurate identification of its distinct instances and broad enough to allow comparison and
Comparatively speaking, most securitizations are usually not very deep. For example, just
before the 2002 French presidential elections, the founder and former president of the Front
republic, the state is decomposing" (Mcneil 2002). Still, while making surprising electoral gains,
the overwhelming majority of the French public (82% in the second round) rejected his views.
Further, the "decomposing" French body politic seems to bear very specific cultural meaning for
Le Pen and his supporters, probably not amounting to the corporeal disappearance of the country.
Compare that to the securitizing moves by ousted Maldives president Mohamed Nasheed, who
declared that "if carbon emissions continue at the rate they are climbing today, my country will
Acute crises engender discourses of danger. However, such securitizing moves, even
when entailing explicit references to "existential threats," often fall short of deep securitization in
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
both scale and scope. For example, economist and author Will Hutton admonished that "the
combination of private debt and the public finance deficit constitutes an existential threat to the
Irish State" (Keena 2010), and the Italian and Spanish premiers forewarned that if their countries
could not go to the markets to rollover their debt, "there would be an existential threat to the euro
in the short to medium term" (Steven and Paul 2012). Their statements attest to great concern in
light of a grave economic crisis. Still, this discourse, while occasionally crossing the "existential
threshold," is rather limited in scale and scope. For now, most European publics have refrained
from framing this crisis as an existential threat, and the meaning of the latter is usually not
literal—for example, even in a worst case scenario, Hutton did not envision the disappearance of
Moreover, in the examples above, as in most cases, securitizations rarely stretch over
more than a couple of months or a few years, seldom immersing the whole society for decades.
Thus, although ST reads security as a process, securitization studies often focus on crises that
span a relatively short period (e.g., Hansen 2011). Deep securitization thus provides an extreme
My definition of deep securitization draws on scale and scope, not sort. Deep
securitization must involve prolonged and widespread public discourse on probable and
protracted threats to the very existence of the nation/state. However, the sort of security sectors
evoked can vary substantially; it may be military and political, but also economic, societal, and
even environmental. Indeed, most deep securitizations entail multiple types of threats. Moreover,
as discussed below, deep securitization typically involves dynamic interplay between these
varied sectors.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
dynamics, a methodological note is due: how are we to gauge securitization's scale, scope and
sort? Here, the study of deep securitization offers no novel answers. As in most ST studies
working within the performative understanding of language, the task is optimally done by
drawing on discourse / content analyses, as well as on public opinion polls, utilizing non-
Still, I would like to briefly draw attention to two points. First, studying securitization
through discourse readily involves "abduction," which posits that analyzing social conduct is
predicated on "the hermeneutic task of penetrating the frames of meaning which lay actors
themselves draw upon in constituting and reconstituting the social world" (Giddens 1993:163).
Lay language becomes key in deciphering "the motives and intentions, that people use in their
everyday lives, and which direct their behavior" (Blaikie 2010:89; Ong 2011). We must be as
attentive as possible to what the people themselves have in mind when uttering "danger!" and
not assume deep securitization unless that natural language actually meets the abovementioned
Second, ST has much to gain from mixed methods research, and especially from Modern
a large body of natural language, and it can greatly aid the task of ascertaining securitization's
dynamic scope: establishing the salience and resonance of the discourses of danger. Qualitative
discourse analysis can then help establish securitization's scale and sort (Abulof 2013).
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
If deep securitization is an exception to the rule, what does this exception involve and
what can it tell us about the rule? This section examines some of the main theoretical
implications of living "under deep securitization," pointing to its features and resonance with
recent ST insights. Deep securitization amplifies, and helps refine, four key ST features and
"normal politics" is immersed in the discourse and praxis of "existential threats," one can hardly
make issues part of public policy without framing them as posing "existential threats." Deep
securitization is thus characterized by intense competition among and between securitizers (often
securitization discourses and practice does not mean that any securitizer is bound to succeed.
Securitizing moves are prone to a "boomerang effect": they might be perceived as excessive or
as an expression of helplessness, spinning out of their speakers' control and damaging their
By making securitization the rule rather than the exception, deep securitization shares
much with the "national security state," in which discourses and practices of danger in the name
of "national security" are institutionalized by the state (the paradigmatic case being the post-
WWII US) (Hogan 1998). Campbell (1998:12, 166ff) notes that such dynamics lend themselves
to identifying the state with "national security" to such an extent that "should the state project of
security be successful in the terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist… The
constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state's identity or
partaking in deep securitization—positing "peace" as the ultimate existential threat to the state.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
Note moreover that whereas in civic nations (such as the US) the "national security/interest" is
typically defined in terms of what protects the state; in ethnonational states (e.g. Sri Lanka,
Bulgaria), the state interest is often defined in terms of what protects the (ethnic) nation.
combined into a synergetic whole. Deep securitization thus takes a multisectoral approach,
whereby "actors will generally reintegrate sectors in their own processes of securitization. Threat
perceptions in one sector are shaped by a unit's primary fears, even if these stem from other
sectors" (Buzan et al. 1998:196, 197-198). In the case of deep securitization, these multisectoral
dynamics also means that desecuritizing one sector often implies securitizing another. For
example, desecuritizing terrorism may entail securitizing the coping countermeasures (framing
turn, desecuritizing moves are often themselves securitized—discursively and practically framed
as existential threats.
the one hand, macrosecuritization's level of analysis goes beyond the nation/state unit, as it
"cover[s] securitisations that speak to referent objects higher than those at the middle level (for
example, 'universal' religions or political ideologies; one or more of the primary institutions of
international society) and which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level
Buzan and Waever 2009:257. This above-mid-level emphasis clearly emanates from
macrosecuritization's reference to regional security complex and security constellations.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
separate concerns, issues and conflicts that achieve strong securitisation separately from the
below the high-level referent object it can meet deep securitization half-way. In both cases,
discourses of acute threats to an all-important referent object permeate the society; and while
Buzan and Waever do not highlight the "existential" threshold, their empirical illustrations
(GWOT, Cold War) suggest that as well. Deep securitization's emphasis on the nation/state level
may moreover be contextualized via larger, high-level, macrosecuritization. Indeed, the latter
also involves such "exclusive universalism" as nationalism, highlighting "the need to make the
Self secure" (Buzan and Waever 2009:263), and implying deep securitization's next feature.
Third, deep securitization's gravity accords a particularly somber and complex meaning
to political legitimacy. One of the key contributions of the Copenhagen School was to re-
"existential speech" with the "extraordinary act" through social legitimation. Still, this theme
was not fully developed (Stritzel 2007). It became much more pivotal and nuanced in the more
recent sociological approach to ST, which focuses on "the legitimacy of agents involved and
words used" (Balzacq 2011:3). While the Copenhagen School emphasizes speech and act, ST
Buzan et al. 1998:189. Still, in principle, deep securitization may pertain to both the individual
as well as with regions and even humanity as a whole. Indeed, these referent objects, and levels
of analysis, often intertwine. Here, however, my focus is on mid-level deep securitization.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
sociologists study the social context of both, as well as the social space between them, in
particular the socio-political legitimation of emergency measures (Mcdonald 2008; Vuori 2008).
With deep securitization, the object of legitimation goes deeper than the social
acceptance of securitizers, their securitizing moves and proposed measures; it is (also) about
deliberatively justifying the very existence of the collective. Along the main unit-level referent
objects, the social actors may distinguish threats to authority (e.g. democracy) and to policy (e.g.
multiculturalism) from threats to polity (e.g. the state) and identity (e.g. ethno-national
attachment). Since the legitimacy of the latter is often taken for granted, securitizers may
rhetorically associate with it their specific referent objects so at to imbue them with greater
legitimacy (Vaughn 2009). This discursive task is more daunting with deep securitization, since
its goal and object of legitimation are not merely authority and its policy, but polity and identity
as well. Consequently, debates about authority or policy often become securitized in terms of
polity or identity.
speech and act, its erosion should undermine securitization. Conversely, when legitimation is
part and parcel of the coping measures, indeed of justifying the threatened "existence" itself, the
measures. The incomplete (or absent) legitimation for a collective identity or collective polity
intensifies its members' perception of insecurity (as existential uncertainty), and hence its
threat. Importantly, if the insecure polity is ethno-national, political legitimation lends itself to
justifying both the ethnic community ("the people," understood genealogically) and the state,
legitimating each other: the state must exist to preserve the people, and the people must persist
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
(often with an assured majority) to sustain the state. This mode of "societal security [which] is
often about nations and their survival" greatly challenges liberal democracy (Buzan et al.
Fourth, deep securitization's steps are nonbinary and nonlinear. In its simplified version,
securitization seems to entail a chain reaction of three distinct, binary steps in linear sequence: a
securitizing train leaves the rhetorical platform, picks up a sufficient audience along the way to
its final, extraordinary, destination. According to this view, the speech (securitizing move) can
either pertain or not to existential threats; if it does, then the audience may or may not accept its
validity; if it does, emergency measures may or may not transpire; if they do, security is
The actual process is obviously far more complicated. Securitization steps are not binary,
but span a spectrum. This applies, as discussed above, to the securitizing move, but equally so to
audience acceptance. For one, the audience is always heterogeneous (Leonard and Kaunert 2011;
Salter 2008). Moreover, the boundaries between speakers and audience (often implying elite and
general public, respectively) are often blurred. For example, on the one hand, we typically resort
to public opinion polls to gauge audience acceptance, but the respondents may very well regard
their answers as shaping public opinion, rendering them speakers as well. Being a securitizer is
thus a matter of degree. The same goes for the "extremity" of the coping measures. Deep
securitization often requires "the routinization of practices (i.e., habitus)," since the perverseness
practices" (Balzacq 2011:16). Thus, securitizing agents may try to avoid presenting measures as
"emergency" or as "breaking the rules." In fact, the very prospect of audience acceptance is often
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
thought to rely on prior persuasion of the public that the coping measures are far from
Securitization's steps are also nonlinear—they are essentials rather than stages—
involving a host of inner interactions. For example, securitizing moves may "skip" audience
acceptance to arrive at the measures directly; alternatively, leaders may be driven by their
public acceptance may result from measures taken without prior securitization, inverting the
progression of speech-act into act-speech dynamics. For example, the 1956 decision by the US
and Britain to withdraw their offer of loans to help pay for the building of the Aswan dam
prompted Nasser's turn to the USSR and the nationalization of the Suez Canal (Borzutzky and
Berger 2010). This, in turn, enabled the British government to effectively securitize the situation
in the media—framing Nasser as "a second Hitler"—leading to the 1956 Suez Crisis (Shaw
In light of its four features, and before moving on to the case study, it is worth
the typical understanding of security as defense against threats. The former approach regards
security as socio-cognitive self-confidence in the viability of a collective polity and the validity
of a collective identity, the latter pertains to ST's "societal security" and to the "ontological
security" approach (Steele 2007). Contra to IR usage (Rathbun 2007), this existential certainty
does not refer to the intentions and capabilities of the Other, but to the Self. Securitization is thus
endowed with the ontological task of mitigating the existential Angst, arising from death being
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
Turning from theory to practice, few case studies lend themselves to ST as well as Israel
(which here, unless otherwise stated, refers to its Jewish/Zionist society). This section examines
securitization in Israel (and Palestine before that) from the perspectives of its Jewish, and mostly
by the Jewish diaspora. Although I occasionally address critics of Zionism, I focus on Zionists,
analyzing their securitization(s) before, and mainly after, the 1948 establishment of the State of
Israel. Despite subscribing to Jewish political independence, Zionists have often diverged, but
most factions have been immersed, multifariously, in deep securitization, with a strong emphasis
on demography. 7
The Jewish society is seemingly embroiled in what some call "siege mentality" and
others, "crusader anxiety." In particular, the collective memory and trauma of the holocaust and
the ongoing clash with the Arab/Muslim world have arguably fostered collective angst (Bar-Tal
2013; Wohl et al. 2010). This Zionist "culture of threat" has provided a fertile ground for
securitizations of the deepest sort. Elite and public alike have framed military threats, such as
Arab invasion, terror, and more recently the Iranian nuclear project, as endangering the very
existence of Israel (e.g. Ram 2009). Zionist deep securitizing moves moreover encompass non-
Henceforth, for brevity, and without political prejudice, "Palestine" indicates the area west of
the Jordan River, including territories that Israel captured in 1967, the West Bank, and the Gaza
Strip. The latter was partially transferred to the Palestinian National Authority in 1994, with
Israel withdrawing from it in 2005.
Polls indicate that 80%-90% of Israeli Jews consider themselves "Zionist" (Arian and Keissar-
Sugarmen 2012:69).
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
Zionist deep securitization is the work of structure and agents alike, and has been neither
static nor monolithic: social actors have dynamically shifted their securitizing moves across
sectors, and—while this paper focuses on securitization rather than on its flipside—quite a few
Zionists have occasionally aimed at desecuritization. Still, in order to legitimate their call, even
such "agents of desecuritization" often resort to (deep) securitizing moves of other sectors, and
Surprisingly, very few ST studies have examined the case of Israel (Lupovici 2014,
forthcoming). This section seeks to help fill this empirical gap by looking at Israel's deep
securitization, focusing on one of its key facets: the "demographic demon." To be sure, the
demographic threat has occasionally yielded to other prominent securitizations, such as the threat
of terror. The Oslo peace process, which was partly driven by the demographic imperative,
collapsed once terrorism surged, during the second Intifada. 8 Still, within Israel's securitization
In 1925, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, a Revisionist Zionist leader, stated, "The goals of Zionism can
be precisely summarized in a single sentence: 'The creation of a Jewish majority in the land of
Israel'" (The Jewish Chronicle, 19 June 1925). Three years later Jabotinsky (1972 [1928]:278)
Slater 2001. On the reflection of this sentiment in Zionist discourse see, for example, Moshe
Arens, "Terror and Demography," Haaretz, 9 December 2003.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
commented, "We're running a race against the Arabs, which of us is going to breed faster in this
land. The Arab 'horse' is now leading by far." The geo-demographic imperative, and the fear of
typically pertains to an ethnic, rather than a religious, Jewish majority; democracy, while
occasionally harboring liberalism, is more often procedurally interpreted; finally, the geography
of Greater Israel extends to the West Bank and the Golan Heights (and for a few, well beyond).
For the most part, demography served as the base of this securitization triangle and its most
important part; the geographic / democratic sides were at times regarded as legitimating values,
democracy. The Peel Commission's proposal on dividing Palestine (1937/8) is an early case in
point. Both opponents and proponents securitized demography to boost their arguments.
Jabotinsky objected to the proposal since it allocated only 17% of the land to a Jewish State, and
much more is needed to absorb the millions of European Jews, whose existence is increasingly
perilous; Labor leaders argued that by not incorporating land densely populated by Arabs, the
plan actually aids the existential imperative of creating a Jewish majority in the future state
(Galnoor 1995).
The demographic consideration often challenged the democratic. This tension came to a
head with the idea of "transfer": a coercive expulsion or "encouraged" emigration of Arabs from
territories designated to the Jewish State (Morris 2004:39-64). While Zionist references to
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
Transfer predate the British Mandate, these were few and far between; and the idea was often
discredited as impractical and immoral (Karsh 2005). A more substantial discourse emerged in
reaction to the Peel Commission's suggestion of "an exchange of population," which initially
incited endorsement by some leaders, not least Ben-Gurion, Zionism's foremost leader, who
extolled its merits in clear existential terms. Still, partly due to British rethinking, this qualified
endorsement subsided, and the idea was ultimately watered down (Galnoor 1995:166-181; Kats
The Zionist acceptance of the 1947 UN partition plan (55% of Palestine to the Jewish
State), and the subsequent 1949 decision to halt the military advancement (leaving about 78% to
Israel), were likewise driven by demographics. David Ben-Gurion explained: "the IDF could
easily occupy the whole territory between the Jordan River and the sea, but what kind of state
shall we have? Assuming there are elections and Deir Yassin [a 1948 massacre of around one
hundred Arab villagers] is not our policy, we will have a Knesset [Israeli Parliament] with an
Arab majority. Between the Greater Israel and a Jewish State, we have chosen a Jewish State"
(Knesset discussion, 4 April 1949). Notably, during the 1948 War, Transfer resurfaced again,
Israel's clear Jewish majority within the relatively well-recognized 1949 borders was
eroded by the 1967 war and its territorial gains. One of the first Zionist leaders to fathom this
trend as an existential threat to the survival of Israel as both Jewish and democratic was Pinchas
Sapir (Labor), Minister of Finance (1963–74): "We always wanted a Jewish State, and we had
not arrived to this land to labor and spill our blood for a binational state… close your eyes for a
moment and get the picture: one Arab and one Jew" (Labor Secretariat, 9 November 1972; see
Arnon Soffer (1988). Still, at the time, Zionist elite and public alike rarely read this writing on
the wall. Most Labor leaders dismissed the demographic perils. Some, like Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan, argued that it is not imminent: "if the question before me now was whether to
grant citizenship to a million Arab or relinquish the territories, I would prefer to give up the
territories, but that question is not up for today" (Labor Secretariat, 12 April 1973). Others, like
Minister Shimon Peres, held that "our path, and that of our forefathers, is that faith is always
stronger than statistics" (Labor Secretariat, 9 November 1972). The Israeli "audience"
overwhelmingly rejected both the demographic securitizing move and the coping measures
demon" did not infiltrate Israel. However, since the mid-1980s, and especially following the First
Intifada (uprising) in 1987, a change gradually transpired: the Zionist left began emphasizing the
loss of a Jewish majority as an existential drive for territorial compromise. In 1987, Shimon
Peres, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, faithfully acknowledged that "demography is more
dangerous than geography" (Yedioth Ahronot, 25 October 1987). On the same year, in a
parliamentary discussion on "The Demographic Danger that Threatens the Jewish People," left-
wing Members of Knesset (MKs), such as Amira Sartani (Mapam), warned against retaining the
occupied territories: "What is the answer to the demographic question?... This is an existential
question! Some are trying to establish facts on the ground [settlements]. If we follow this path
there will be neither a Jewish state, nor a democratic state!" (11th Knesset session 280, 13
January 1987).
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
PM Yitzhak Shamir replied to this and akin arguments: "People exaggerate what's called
the demographic problem … This problem has been with us for thousands of years, since the
Israelites entered their land at the time of Joshua. Yet despite this problem we still exist"
Jewish and Zionist past ("we nonetheless made it here"), remained substantial. Still, the
mounting securitization of demography aided the Oslo peace process. This prospect of
relinquishing control over most of the Arab population in the territories and the great USSR
immigration wave of the early 1990s alleviated the demographic securitization during that
Public discourse on the "demographic demon" culminated following the collapse of the
peace process and the outbreak of Second Intifada (2000). This securitizing surge was facilitated
undermining its Jewish majority. Coupled with rising terror, economic downturn, and seeming
delegitimization of the Jewish state, Israeli Jews increasingly saw their state teetering over the
abyss (Abulof 2014, forthcoming). In 2002, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon diagnosed the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as "an existential, cancer-like threat … I don't believe the Palestinians
face an existential threat, we are the ones facing it" (Haaretz, 30 August 2002).
Demography played a major, though obviously not the sole, role in this gush of
existential uncertainty and deep securitizations, often entailing routinized extraordinary measures.
The salience and severity of parliamentary, public, and media discourses regarding the
demographic crisis rose dramatically. What follows is a detailed analysis of the Zionist
securitization of demography in the 2000s, first regarding the "external" demographic threat in
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
the 1967 occupied territories, and then the "internal" demographic threat of Arab citizens living
To visualize this diachronic discourse, the chart below (Figure 1) employs corpus
linguistics to reflect, via word frequency, trends in the framing of both overall "existential
threat(s)/danger(s)" and "demographic threat(s)/danger(s)" over the last two decades in Haaretz
daily, Israel's oldest and most influential newspaper. 9 The trends often converge, and we may
reasonably presume this correlation to be symbiotic. Interestingly, however, these trends also
diverge at important historical junctures; notably, when overall securitization abated (2003-2005),
demographic securitization became most acute. Overall securitizing moves peaked at the height
of the Second Intifada (2002), in the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War (2006), and with the
swelling discourse on the Iranian nuclear threat. Demographic securitizing moves, however,
gradually mounted during the peace negotiations and the Second Intifada, reaching a zenith
during the Disengagement Plan (2004/5), and then subsided significantly (2006-2008)—only to
regain some momentum under the second and third Netanyahu governments (2009-). The
Haaretz was used for this measure, as it provides the most comprehensive and accurate
digitized historical archive among Hebrew newspapers. Findings from the Jerusalem Post,
Israel's main English newspaper, correlate closely with Haaretz's figures for both overall
"existential threat/danger" (r=0.66) and "demographic threat/danger" (r=0.7). The qualitative
discourse analysis includes other Hebrew newspapers, chiefly Yedioth Ahronoth (online Ynet),
and Maariv (online NRG). As discussed below, both the political left and right play an active role
in the Israeli deep securitization regarding the demographic threat.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
distinctly interpreted the "demographic demon" and its implications. Each also tied together
for Israel's Jewish and democratic, and thereby legitimate, nature—a condition endangered both
demographically (by the dwindling Jewish majority) and geographically (by West Bank
settlements). These three demographic securitizations are analyzed below with representative
The first kind of securitization leverages the demographic threat to encourage "voluntary
transfer" of Arabs. The agents of this securitizing move come mostly from the ranks of the far
right, such as MK Aryeh Eldad (National Unity Party), who regarded such a transfer as
debunking those "who argue that the demographic demon is soon about to defeat us" (YNET, 11
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
November 2003). But even dovish leaders, like Major General (ret.) Shlomo Gazit, the former
envoy to the PLO negotiation talks, argued that desperate times call for desperate measures, for
At the other end of the spectrum stands the so-called radical left. It seemingly aims at
desecuritization, since "it is scary to hear Jews speaking of demography," especially in the name
of the ethno-national (and by implication non-democratic) Jewish State, which should give way
to a binational one. However, in order to legitimate this move, its speakers often end up invoking
another deep securitization: "I share the anxiety of the Jewish public in Israel. It is justified … A
bi-national framework is the only one that allows disengagement between Jewish existence and
Thus, while both securitizations regard demography as an existential threat to Israel, their
motivations and practical conclusions differ: the former prefers geography (Greater Israel) to
democracy; the latter favors democracy over the Jewish state. In between the two, making up the
overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews (70%-80% in recent polls), are those who clearly prefer a
Jewish majority over Greater Israel. For most Israeli Jews (about 60% in recent polls), this
means a "two states for two peoples" solution. 10 The demographic rationale is simple: territorial
compromise is existentially imperative, since "the biological clock is vigorously ticking towards
Yaar and Hermann 2013 (see especially findings for December 2011, January 2012 and
December 2012). For similar findings during the 1960s-1990s see Arian 1995:66, 213.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
the not-so-distant hour in which there will be an Arab majority between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean Sea," a time that will mark "the end of Israel as a Jewish state." 11
The 2005 Gaza Disengagement Plan illuminates the mounting, and increasingly intricate,
securitizing demography: "one cannot have a state that is both Jewish and democratic, and also
rule over all parts of the land of Israel" (Likud party general assembly, 26 September 2005).
Basi, head of the Disengagement Administration, for example, argued, "[I]f we would like to
maintain a state that is both Jewish and democratic, we have to narrow the geography in order to
strengthen the demography" (Haaretz, 5 July 2005). Journalist Ari Shavit made clear that "the
Disengagement Plan is a national rescue plan. If not implemented, the Jewish homeland will face
an existential demographic danger. Hence, the moral standing of the Disengagement Plan is that
contributing significantly to its acceptance among the Jewish-Israeli public. Indeed, in the 2000s
the demographic securitization intensified to such an extent that even agents of demographic
descuritization could not avoid referring to it, paradoxically contributing to the omnipresence of
Amnon Dankner (editor), Maariv, 6 December 2003. According to an official Israeli statement,
Jews have already lost their majority in Palestine, with 5.9 million out of a total of 12 million
(Haaretz, 16 October 2012).
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
the "demographic demon" in the public discourse, and indicating its overwhelming audience
acceptance. 12
For opponents of the Disengagement Plan, the demographic securitization posed a sore
challenge. In response, they adopted two main desecuritizing moves. First, some tried to
factually deny and neutralize the demographic danger by depicting it as "voodoo demographics,"
arguing that official statistics are unreliable and that the actual number of Palestinians in Gaza
and the West Bank is far lower (Zimmerman et al. 2006). This argument found moderate
resonance among the political right, but it was not accepted by most experts or by the greater
primarily geography and democracy. Advocates of Greater Israel insisted that the entire land of
Israel belongs to the Jewish people and that to yield parts of it was to betray the people and place
it all in existential danger (Inbari 2007). The slogan of the disengagement opponents, "Jews
legitimate both Jewish identity and the Jewish polity. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, one of the
prominent leaders of the Religious-Zionist public, explained that "obviously the land of Israel is
above any referendum" (Haaretz, 9 November 2004). Thus, for some disengagement opponents,
the existential threat to sacred geography allows, even sanctifies, breaking the rules of the
democratic game, including violent clashes with the security forces implementing disengagement.
More elusive was the position of opponents of disengagement in the name of democracy.
While accustomed to framing liberal democracy as a potential threat to the Jewish state, they
See, for example, B. Michael, "Jewish or demographic," Yedioth Ahronot, 20 May 2005.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
now criticized disengagement as subversive to this same democracy. Their argument was
twofold: procedural and substantive. Procedurally, some submitted that the decision on the
Disengagement Plan had been adopted improperly, and that such a significant issue required a
Haetzni, explained that whatever the procedure, the plan constituted a severe violation of key
liberal-democratic values: "It's first and foremost a blow to democracy. One cannot decide to
Finally, some opponents securitized the disagreement itself as facilitating a "war among
brothers." Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun, one of the moderate leaders of Religious Zionism, distilled this
idea: "I see black, I see red, I see a war among brothers … How many more trials can the
foundations of Israeli society withstand? Why, we don't know when the whole thing might begin
to crumble … An internal rift destroyed us at the time of the First Temple and at the time of the
Second Temple. That's the only thing for which there is no divine promise. And here the danger
is truly an existential one" (Haaretz, 26 January 2005). This securitizing move was fairly well
accepted by the Israeli audience (though firmly rejected by the government). An opinion poll
revealed that about half the Israeli Jewish public, mostly opponents of the plan, believed that
plan was carried out with broad public backing (Yaar and Hermann 2013, May 2005). It appears
that only this territorial retreat—along with the West Bank Separation Barrier and the relative
wake of the disengagement and with the decline of Palestinian violence, many Israeli Jews have
come to believe that sans annexation, Israel's continuous control over the territories is actually
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
compatible with democracy (Yaar and Hermann 2013, January 2012 and December 2012). This
prevalent view may help explain the 2013 electoral difficulties of Tzipi Livni, a centrist leader,
who became the champion of securitizing demography for territorial compromise: "whoever
hinders the two-state solution may bring about Israel's nightmare: there will no longer be a
rationale: "True, we have a demographic problem. But it's not about the Palestinian Arabs in the
territories, but about Israeli Arabs… even if they integrate among us marvelously, and reach
35%-40%, the Jewish State is gone, becoming instead a bi-national state… our raison d'état is a
Jewish and democratic state, and in order for democracy not to cancel out Jewishness, we must
retain a Jewish majority" (Haaretz, 17 December 2003). MK Effi Eitam preceded him in
identifying "Israeli-Arabs… [as] an elusive existential threat. And elusive threats are by nature
like cancer, a disease most people die of because their diagnosis was too late" (Haaretz, 22
March 2002).
Framing Israel's Arab citizens as a demographic threat to the existence of the Jewish state
was nothing new; however, like the external Palestinian threat, it peaked in the 2000s following
the Second Intifada, particularly in the aftermath of the "October 2000 Events," a wave of
violent protests by Israeli Arabs during which 13 citizens were killed, shot by Israeli police
officers. There is vast evidence of the audience acceptance of this internal demographic
securitization. The rate of Jewish Israelis who believe that "Israeli Arabs constitute a risk to the
state's existence" rose from 26% in January 2000 to 50% in June 2002. Interviewees pointed to
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
Arab-Israeli society as the main source of (internal) threat, both to the state's security and to its
Jewish character (Sagiv-Shifter and Shamir 2002; NRG, 20 April 2005; Arian 2003).
"They want to preserve the conflict," argued Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun (2003:167), "and to ruin the
state from within, so that both a Palestinian state will be founded and Israel will cease to be a
Jewish state, God forbid." In response to the Future Vision documents published by Israeli Arab
organizations, which called for the annulment of the Jewish character of Israel, dovish journalist
Avirama Golan argued that "Israel cannot accept this demand, since it means giving up our home"
(Haaretz, 6 December 2006). 13 Journalist Avraham Tal wrote that it is no accident that Israeli
Arab statements amount to "an internal challenging of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state …
This week, leaders of the Arab minority in Israel declared their own war on the Jewish nation-
The securitization of Israeli Arabs in the 2000s eroded public support for certain liberal-
democratic principles. In a series of polls, most Jews thought Arabs should be barred from the
position of Prime Minister and from participating in fateful decisions, such as defining state
borders. One-third even thought that "Arabs should not be allowed to be elected." About a
quarter demanded denying Israeli Arabs their right to vote, to hold demonstrations, and to appear
This securitization also prompted extraordinary measures and attempts to routinize them.
These measures were epitomized by the effort to undermine the so-called legislative revolution
Golan previously emphasized that the Left should "take up the demographic glove and throw it
to the garbage can" (Haaretz, 17 February 2004).
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
of the 1990s, which sought to solidify human and civil rights in Israel. Two early manifestations
were easing the disqualification of Arab parties and candidates (15 May 2002) and freezing the
"gradual nationalization procedure" for Palestinians marrying Israeli citizens (12 May 2002;
The public discourse surrounding the legislation was underscored by existential rhetoric.
One side presented such laws as undermining the foundations of equality and democracy, and
even as racist (Haaretz, 11 and 13 May 2005). Haaretz editor Amos Shocken attacked the
May 2005). On the other side, Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland, head of the National Security
Council, argued that "the Nationality Law is the way to overcome the demographic demon"
(Haaretz, 3 March 2005). And PM Sharon noted reassuringly that "there's no need to hide
behind security considerations. We must have a Jewish state" (Haaretz, 4 April 2005). At the
same time, "a senior figure in the Ministry of Finance" argued, with respect to a new policy of
cutting child allowances, that it was meant to help deal with the internal demographic threat: that
"we are turning the graph around to protect the Jewish majority" (Haaretz, 24 January 2005).
This was only the tip of the iceberg. The 2000s also saw a series of policies to encourage
Jewish childbirth, Arab emigration, and Jewish immigration, all reverberating strongly in the
public discourse. For example, the National Council for Demography was reconvened in 2002
with the minister in charge Shlomo Benizri (Shas) clarifying its goal as once again to deal with
the "demographic threat" by highlighting "the beauty of large Jewish families." "We are the
majority in this land," he continued, "and we have every right to retain our character and the
character of the Jewish state, and even to preserve the Jewish people" (Haaretz, 1 November
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
Efforts to desecuritize the internal demographic threat emphasized that "when Israel uses
demographic reasoning against its own citizens, it ceases to be Jewish and democratic" (Haaretz,
18 May 2005). However, as in the case of the external demographic threat, the attempt to
securitizing the coping measures as gravely threatening Jewish morality was equally doomed
since the vast majority of Israel's religious Jews have subscribed to the securitization of internal
even by centralists, such as Yair Sheleg, as "liberal fanaticism, which might also bring about the
destruction of the national homeland, even if not in the immediate term" (Haaretz, 29 July 2004).
Concurrently, the Supreme Court was securitized by being portrayed as a stronghold of liberal
legislation. MK Yariv Levin (Likud party), one of the forces behind the more recent legislation
efforts, stated that the Israeli justice system is driven by a "left-wing agenda, and most of all
constitutes a threat to our ability to guarantee our existence" (Eretz Yisrael Shelanu, 10 October,
Lieberman, head of the Yisrael Beiteinu ("Israel is our Home") party, who was vehement that
"there's a significant section of the Israeli population, which defines its identity on the basis of
the aspiration to bring about the destruction of the state of Israel" (YNET, 17 August 2006).
state crucially contributed to the massive electoral success of his party, which climbed from 3
seats in 2003 to 11 in 2006 and to 15 in 2009 (in 2013 it united with the ruling Likud party).
Lieberman and other right-wing and centrist MKs were able to place on the agenda, and
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
sometimes to amend, legislation designed to limit the freedoms of Israeli Arabs (Haaretz, 17
November 2011).
It should be noted that the securitization of demography also led to actual transformations
in political geography. Chief among these was the construction of the West Bank Separation
Barrier as a possible border between Israel and a future state of Palestine in such a way as to
include as many Jewish settlers as possible on the Israeli side (Jones 2009). Concurrently, more
and more voices, right-wing and centrist, called for handing over Arab-Israeli villages and
townships to the future Palestine in exchange for retaining West Bank Jewish settlements (Ariʾeli
2006). Finally, during the 2000s, the idea of Transfer resurfaced. To-date, no Zionist party has
explicitly endorsed the forceful explosion of Arabs, from either the West Bank or Israel, in order
to cope with the demographic danger. Still, public support for Transfer, especially if depicted as
"voluntary," has increased, though remaining a minority position (Zureik 2003). Objections are
often driven by practical, not moral, considerations (e.g. Yaar and Hermann 2013, March 2002).
same time, its novelty still leaves much room for theoretical refinement and empirical extension.
This article has demonstrated a mismatch in the literature between the theoretical "demanding
criterion" of "existential threats" discourse and the empirical analysis of case studies that
typically fall short of such discourses. To help rectifying this mismatch, the paper theoretically
hones our conceptualization of securitization and empirically examines an apt case study.
securitization, ST's blurred boundaries can be clarified along a spectrum of securitization's scale
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
(referent object and the severity of the threat), scope (the extent to which discourses of dangers
pervades the society) and sort (the security sectors evoked). I proposed that deep securitization is
discerned by its scale and scope—prolonged and widespread public discourse on probable and
protracted threats to the very existence of the nation/state—and further outlined deep
standing, albeit volatile, preoccupation of both leaders and the general public, frequently holding
the "demographic demon" as endangering the very existence of the Jewish State.
This case also exhibits deep securitization's four key features. First, to bring the matter of
the survival of the ethno-national project (Israel as a Jewish State, not the state per se). Second,
typically try to legitimate their call by securitizing geography and democracy—all within the
"macrosecuritization" of the Jewish people/state. Third, the Zionist object of legitimation is the
state (not merely its government and conduct), and its erosion is itself securitized, framed as an
existential threat that calls for extraordinary measures. Fourth, the steps of Zionist securitization
of demography are often nonbinary and nonlinear: the securitizers and desecuritizers of
demography are not necessarily elites, and their attitudes vary substantially; the coping measures
are occasionally routinized; and policy-makers often seem to be initially driven by presumed
"audience acceptance" to adopt measures, which in turn boost their securitizing moves. Finally,
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
this case study suggests that in the framework of deep securitization, we may indeed interpret
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Waever, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre (1993) Identity, Migration, and
the New Security Agenda in Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Watson, Scott D. (2009) The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and
Sinking Boats. Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics. New
York: Routledge.
Williams, Michael C. (2003) Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics.
International Studies Quarterly 47:511-531.
——— (2011b) Securitization and the Liberalism of Fear. Security Dialogue 42 (4-5):453-463.
Wohl, Michael J. A., Nyla R. Branscombe, and Stephen Reysen (2010) Perceiving Your Group's
Future to Be in Jeopardy: Extinction Threat Induces Collective Angst and the Desire to
Strengthen the Ingroup. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36 (7):898-910.
Yaar, Ephraim, and Tamar Hermann (2013) War and Peace Index, June 1994-October 2013.
Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University.
Abulof / Deep Securitization and Israel's "Demographic Demon"
Zimmerman, Bennett, Roberta Pollack Seid, and Michael L. Wise (2006) The Million Person
Gap: The Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza. Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat
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Zureik, Elia (2003) Demography and Transfer: Israel's Road to Nowhere. Third World Quarterly
24 (4):619-630.


text:
British High Commission Recruitment 2019/2020 and Latest Update
=>> CHAT Right HERE with Our Representative - Immediate Response
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This page will guide you on latest information about how to apply for British High Commission (BHC) job offers in Nigeria for graduate and undergraduate. In this article, you'll learn about the company description, application skills, requirements and qualifications.
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Available Vacant Positions
♦ Office Manager – NCA Joint Border Task Force Project
Location: Lagos
Salary: N610,536 Monthly.
Deadline: 18th June, 2019.
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Salary: NGN 812,470 monthly.
Deadline: 21st June, 2019.
♦ Senior Press and Public Affairs Officer
Location: Abuja
Salary: N790,125/month
Deadline: 14th June, 2019.
Additional Information
Please complete the application form in full as the information provided is used during screening.
- Please check your application carefully before you submit, as no changes can be made once submitted.
- The British High Commission will never request any payment or fees to apply for a position.
- Employees recruited locally by the British High Commission in Abuja are subject to Terms and Conditions of Service according to local employment law in Nigeria.
- All candidates must be legally able to work and reside in the country of the vacancy with the correct visa/work permit status or demonstrate eligibility to obtain the relevant permit.
- The responsibility lies on the successful candidate to;
- Obtain the relevant permit
- Pay fees for the permit
- Make arrangements to relocate
- Meet the costs to relocation
The British High Commission do not sponsor visas/work permits except where it may be local practice to do so.
- Employees who are not eligible to pay local income tax: e.g. certain third-country nationals and spouses/partners of UK diplomats will have their salaries abated by an equivalent amount.
- Information about the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Competency Framework can be found on this link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-service-competency-framework Please note: AA=A1, AO=A2, EO=B3, HEO=C4, SEO=C5
- Reference checking and security clearances will be conducted on successful candidates.
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text:
"OVERRATED" Julian Newman HITS HALFCOURT SHOT MID-GAME AND FORCES OVERTIME!! 30 POINTS & 7 THREES!
- Published: 20 January 2018
- Julian Newman Dropped 30 points and 7 crazy three pointers VS Dunnelion HS facing overrated chants that they have now become used to. Julian Newman hit a shot from half court (just inside in the line) MID-GAME and went CLUTCH MODE hitting three free throws to send the game into overtime after a crazy comeback effort . Downey was without 2 of its starters and faced a trigger happy ref.
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Hoop Journey is committed providing basketball fans consistent exclusive content on a daily and weekly basis! We are dedicated to producing High Quality footage and mixtapes of the top high school talent in the country, potential NBA stars, and much more. Hoop Journey produces the Best basketball documentaries on YouTube. Hoop Journey strives to bring you the highest quality content on all things basketball.
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- Sport
Comments • 1 055
- Rania abdulrab 3 days back
Who won I don't get it
- Nicole Pham 3 days back
5:57 im just hearing people say overrated and im just watching the man eating a bag of chips
- Dmitri Scares The Hawk 4 days back
How is that a travel what
- MaddoxA Wiggins 6 days back
They always hate on Julian . Just Stop the hate and just watch his work ethic .
- Mark Perfecto 6 days back
Damn bruh why is there so much hate for one player like why should they be talking If they ain't putting work into the game there not the ones playing so they should shut up. Julian Newman is a great player and thank god I don't have to play against him. Like damn bro this stuff needs to calm down
- RJ Peck 4 weeks back
number zero rah
- Michael Hickman 4 weeks back
This looks like low level JV basketball.
- B4rstIlluzionZ 4 weeks back
I don't get the reason why people call him overrated... Why?
- dead sec 4 weeks back
Julian's dad can't be yelling like that if Julian makes it into the NBA
- steflova1021 1 months back
Hi 👋 is your sister a trash
- Alicia Arias 1 months back
Hey! I saw Melo in the thumbnail; what's this boooty cheeks shii I'm watching?
- Pxss Gt 2 months back
Bruh did the last shot not count!?!?! I SLOWED DOWN THE DAMN TIME AND HE SHOT BEFORE THE WHISTLE THIS REF GOTTA GO
- Hunter Dallas 2 months back
Jaden and that guy I see😂💀
- cRaIgThE bEaSt Sub to braydino 2 months back
Lol they is the wannabe duke
- Papi Chelo 2 months back
Ofc they had to add lamelos face some how in the vid, either in title or thumbnail lmao😂😂😂
- Keyshawn White 2 months back
Why does Julian Newman dribble so hard
- cree_https 2 months back
He finna be the new Stephen Curry if he keeps this up.
- Truly Luke 2 months back
The only thing holding him back is his height
- Whegean Scott 2 months back
I dare anybody yellin overrated to keep dude from dropin 1000 on your head like shut tf. He not the greatest obviously but them overrated chants are extra af and really not needed. If you can't clamp bro shut the fukk up simple fukkin concept
- Henry Dinh 2 months back
They just jelous man
- Alecia Mcdonald 2 months back
Who fucking won
- Soar Snipez KID 2 months back
1:36 dats freakin curry range damn🔥🔥
- Sander Hovland 2 months back
8:45, is he cusddling w/ newmans hair?¿
- FaZe Yams 2 months back
He trash he should try being a well rounded player that gets he teammates buckets
- Ryuga L-Drago 2 months back
He's good but not as good as people say he is
- Jayden Silguero 2 months back
Who else thought number 5 looked like YMW melly 😂
- xXKing_TVXx 2 months back
what is the opposing teams number 15 tryna show like that dude got 100% no muscle like at all 0:09
- Olivia Ramirez 2 months back
They be saying overrated but they are the ones that are dunking and do all tricks
- Raul Garrido Rodriguez 2 months back
The new stephen curry -> julian newman
- Simone Pedersen 3 months back
1.) Just because he gained attention by social media doesn't mean that he's over rated, it just means that he was noticeble and had ties
2.)If he's "overrated" why is the making almost all his three's from beond the NBA 3point line?
3.) Just cuhz other people are good too doesn't mean that he's not🤦🏽♀don't be mad cuhz he's in the come-up
- the master 3 months back
1.000 comms
- Xochitl Grimm 4 months back
that's super fuckin trashy to shout during someone's free throws
- Xochitl Grimm 4 months back
he's really good. just because he can be an arrogant prick sometimes doesn't mean his skills are overrated
- BBsHyperrr 4 months back
Bro he didn't high five his dads hand 🖐 0:50
- Genesis Serrano 4 months back
On his free throws I only heard eyahhhhhhhhhhh
- Genesis Serrano 4 months back
I've seen them tell overrated chants but what does it mean
- Javen Alexander 5 months back
1:56 Thats funny y'all fast forwarding 😂😂😂😂
Exactly 1000 comment
I'm gonna me this a 1000 comment
- Akash Sathyamoorthy 5 months back
Crowd shouldnt chant overrated when they'd get cooked by him lmao
- oChungAttack 6 months back
Julian "I swear I'm tough" Newman
- Burdigz 09 6 months back
- Snared Plays 6 months back
Julian no IQ😂 no passing skills
- Savannah C 6 months back
His dad (the coach) looks spooky or something 🤭👀
- HokageFinessin ひ 6 months back
i guess ill be the 1000th comment .
- Iamdeasha 6 months back
Y'all saying he Cocky and stuff but honestly that's half of the basketball players. Y'all don't be saying nun when others shoot and do sum. If I was shooting from where he was and had his handles, I'll be cocky too. He not that tall, so of course all he basically can do really is shoot threes. He just tryna do what he love and people hate that he been doing it since he was little and how good he got💯💯


text:
How did Virginia Tech lose to Old Dominion?
How did Virginia Tech lose to Old Dominion?
Well my Sooners played a great 4th quarter, only losing by 3, while being down 45-24 at one point late in the game. My other team, Michigan, played a full 60 minutes very well. They have a tough test this week as Wisconsin comes to Ann Arbor this Saturday.
As an Alabama fan, Kyler Murray should win the Heisman
Another great weekend for the Irish. Big test against Syracuse next week. Two more wins and Notre Dame should be playoff bound.
Crazy MNF game last night. Would be cool to see this rematch in the Super Bowl, but I see one of those teams being one of the powerhouses that dominates the regular season only to go one and done in the playoffs.
Rooting for Sean McVay and the Rams though to make it there.
There are currently 1 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 1 guests)


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Weatherford is a city in Texas. There are 937 homes for sale, ranging from $5K to $13.4M. Weatherford has affordable 2 bedroom listings.
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Brooks Co. Officials Confirm Incident with Buses Transporting Weslaco Students
NEAR FALFURRIAS – The Brooks County Sheriff's Office confirms charter buses occupied by students with the Weslaco Independent School District were hit by "projectiles" Wednesday night.
The incident happened in the Falfurrias area as the buses were returning from San Antonio.
Officials say two out of three buses were hit causing the windows to crack.
Deputies say the glass stayed in place and did not fall onto the bus.
No students or teachers were injured.
Brooks County sheriff's deputies will be back at the scene Thursday to try and determine where the "projectiles" came from.
Weslaco ISD posted a statement, see below.
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text: WHITWELL — Elisha Barnett, 60, passed away Sunday, April 21, 2019. He was preceded in death by his daughter, Brittany Barnett; parents, AB and Frances Barnett; sisters, Willie Carol Warrick, Dorothy Howard; brothers, Harold Barnett, Ronald Barnett, Paul Barnett. Those left to cherish his memories are his wife of 38 years, Phyllis Henry Barnett; stepson, Alan (Shannon) Rollins; sisters, Patricia Hix of Florida, Geraline Copeland, Jackie (Jeff) Morrison of Whitwell; step grandchildren, Cory Rollins, Caitlin Rollins, Zachary Rollins; nieces, nephews and a host of friends. Family will receive friends, 12 noon to 8 p.m. Tuesday, April 23, 2019, Funeral services will be at 1 p.m. Wednesday, April 24, 2019, in the funeral home chapel with Rev. Roy Terry officiating. Interment at Whitwell Memorial Cemetery. Share photos and memories at www.whitwellmemorialfuneralhome.com Arrangements are by Whitwell Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. (423)658-7777.


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- Mar 05, 2019
- 0 comments
- by Kessel Run Games Inc.
Ditch the digital world and try gaming in the "first person". Kessel Run Games is out to promote "live action" gaming experiences by allowing our customers to compete with their friends and family in the same room! Its with that spirit in mind we've decided that for the next week, everything we offer is 25% off*. That includes online, pre-orders and in-store orders.
Stop-by our web store and use coupon code "March Madness 25" store-wide or "March Madness 15" for singles, or better yet come by the store and see whats new on the shelves. *Exception (because there are always exceptions - 15% off all MTG / Pokémon Singles and affiliated sealed product) Share this with your friends! Sale starts at Midnight!


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562 Results for Two Pennies
View 471 - 480 results for two pennies comic strips. Discover the best "Two Pennies" comics from Dilbert.com.
Sunday March 09,
Tags #eargarette, #smoking breaks, #downside, #cigarette for ear, #ear mint, #15 min break
Dilbert is working with a device. He says to Dogbert, "I call my invention the 'Eargarette.'" Dilbert puts it behind his ear and says, "It's a cigarette for your ear!" Dilbert continues, "It allows non-smokers to take smoking breaks." Dogbert asks, "Is there any downside?" Dilbert responds, "What?" Dogbert says, "Never mind." Dilbert is in a meeting with The Boss and Wally. Dilbert says, "We've been working for fifteen minutes straight. I need an eargarette break." Dilbert and Wally are standing outside. Both have eargarettes in their ears. Dilbert asks, "What?" Wally replies, "What?" Dilbert asks again, "What?" Back in the meeting, Dilbert offers Wally, "Ear mint?" Wally replies, "Two, please."
Sunday May 04,
Tags #smarter not harder, #important looking document, #pretend to be angry, #avoid people, #more problems, #shirt toothpaste color, #smells minty
Asok walks into Wally's cubicle and says, "Wally, can you teach me to work smarter, not harder?" Wally reaches for a stack of papers and says, "Grab an important-looking document and follow me." As they're walking, Wally says, "Walk briskly and pretend to be angry about what you're reading." Asok makes a mean face and says, "Grrrr." A co-worker approaches Wally and Asok and says, "Hey, Asok, would you help me...?" Wally and Asok both stare at their papers and say, "Grrrr." The co-worker continues, "Never mind." Wally says to Asok, "As a rule, people try to avoid anyone who has more problems than they do." Wally continues, "Lesson two: make sure your shirt and your toothpaste are the same color." Wally points to his shirt and says, "This baby is covered with toothpaste stains, but you'd never know it." Asok exclaims, "Wow!" Wally continues, "And how often do you need to launder a shirt that smells minty?" Asok exclaims, "Never!"
Sunday June 01,
Tags #revenue projections, #email, #reading email, #song, #multi task, #stupid nbinder, #slow down, #comprehend, #reading goes quickly
Alice enters Bob's office and asks, "Bob, can I have your revenue projections?" Bob replies, "No. I'm reading my e-mail. I can't do two things at once." Bob turns and says, "But I offer you this song instead." Bob dances and sings, "Ooh-waa-waa! I'm single-task Bob. I'm single-task Bob." Bob continues dancing and singing, "I can't multitask. I can only do one job." Alice yells, "Just give me the stupid binder that on your desk!!" Bob sits back down with his arms on his hips and says, "Sure. And I guess my e- mail can just read itself, right?" Once Alice leaves, Bob says to himself, "Reading goes quickly when you don't slow down to comprehend."
Sunday July 27,
Tags #surplussed ted, #absorb function, #2 jobs one salary, #absorb his funtion, #osmosis, #symbiosis, #syneregy, #key learning, #tragic series, #monkey brained
"I surplussed Ted. You'll need to absorb his function." "Absorb his function?" "Are you telling me to do two jobs for one salary?" "No, I'm telling you to absorb his function.. in an absorptive fashion." "..Using osmosis, symbiosis, and synergy." "Can you change reality by inventing new names for ordinary things?" "I sure hope so. Otherwise my entire career has been a.. a.." "Tragic series of monkey-brained mistakes?" "Key learning."
Sunday September 21,
Tags #nano bit project, #Dilbert, #take over, #everyone busy, #face in allaegators, #one cracker a day, #cracker time, #quitting tomorrow, #four problems
Alice: "I don't have time to work on the nanobit project." The Boss: "No problem. Tell Dilbert I said he should take over." Two minutes later Dilbert: "I'm way, way too busy." The Boss: "Fine. Tell Wally to do it." Two minutes later. Wally: "I'm up to your face in alligators!" The Boss: "Okay, okay... hand it off to Asok." Two minutes later. Asok: "But already I only have time to eat one cracker a day." The Boss: "Tell Ted I said.." Ted: "Sure, I'll do it. No problem." Asok: "Mmm.. cracker time." Ted: "I'm quitting tomorrow." The Boss: "I solved four problems today!"
Sunday July 28,
Tags #frequent grocery club, #memebership, #Card, #engineer spittle, #carry card, #inconvienced, #junk mail list, #charge me same
Dilbert is at the checkout line of a supermarket. The cashier asks him, "Are you a member of our frequent grocery club?" Dilbert responds, "No, what is it?" The cashier replies, "You get a membership card that entitles you to discounts." Dilbert says, "Let's see if I have this straight..." Dilbert continues, "I'll be inconvenienced by having to fill out a form and carry your stupid card around..." Dilbert continues, "And in return, you'll put me on a junk mail list, and charge me the same as the grocery store across the street?" Dilbert yells, "AND YOU EXPECT ME TO BE HAPPY ABOUT IT?!!" The customer in line behind Dilbert says, "But it's free!" The cashier says into the intercom, "Cleanup on register two.. it's engineer spittle."
Sunday September 22,
Tags #full service broker, #stick broker, #brokers know stocks, #earn trust, #direct approach, #garbage, #biggest commission
Dilbert walks into the office of a Full Service Broker. The Broker introduces himself to Dilbert, "I'm Bob Weaselton, your full-service stockbroker." Bob continues, "There are two ways we can go here." Bob continues, "Option one: I act as if brokers know which stocks are better than others." Bob continues, "Then I'll earn your trust by comparing your portfolio to misleading benchmarks." Bob continues, "But I prefer a more direct approach." Bob continues, "Option two: I sell you whatever garbage earns me the biggest commission." Dilbert comes home and says to Dogbert, "Would you do me a favor and lie to me?" Dogbert responds, "Nice haircut."
Sunday November 10,
Tags #red color, #presentation, #yellow, #set standards, #background colors, #metero, #pointy haired, #managing nitwits, #ear hole
Dilbert points to a slide and says, "And then I would end the presentation with this." The Boss is sitting next to two other pointy-haired people. He says, "Whoa! I don't like the look of that background color." The Boss continues, "Red says danger. We don't want to scare our customers." Dilbert responds, "Um.. okay. How about yellow?" The second pointy-haired person says, "Yellow? Are we saying we're cowards?" The third pointy-haired person says, "What we need is a committee to set some standards for background colors." Dilbert responds, "What we need is a meteor to pulverize you three pointy- haired, micro-managing nitwits." After the meeting, Wally asks Dilbert, "If you didn't move your mouth, how did it get out?" Dilbert responds, "It came out of my ear hole."
Sunday May 06,
Tags #new guy, #cheese, #parmesan cheese, #truck loads, #offer, #world o cheese exhibit, #weird obsession, #cheese obsession, #cheeseboy, #wally leather, #leather products
The Boss enters Dilbert's cubicle with a new employee, The Too Helpful Guy. Dilbert and the Too Helpful Guy shake hands. The Too Helpful Guy asks, "Do you like cheese, Dilbert?" Dilbert answers, "Um...Yes, I guess so." The Boss leaves and Too Helpful Guy continues, "I'll send two truckloads of parmesan cheese to your house!" Dilbert replies, "Thanks...But I don't need that much cheese." Too Helpful Guy replies, "Message Received!" He continues, "I'll send you some bread and a fondue set too." The Too Helpful Guy holds out two slips of paper and Dilbert stares at them. The Too Helpful Guy says, "Here are two tickets to the World-O-Cheese exhibit in Wisconsin." The Too Helpful Guy continues, saying, "Your new nickname will be 'Cheeseboy' to reflect your weird obsession." Wally enters the cubicle and says to Too Helpful Guy, "Hi. I'm Wally." Too Helpful Guy holds out his hand and asks, "Wally, do you like leather products?"
Sunday May 27,
Tags #recommend vendor, #internal debvelopers, #play out, #outside vendor, #clueless weasel, #begin work, #sign contract, #internal weasels complain, #use, #steaming mounds, #worthless code, #plan too much, #practiced yesterday
Dilbert stands before the Boss giving a presentation. Dilbert says, "...And that's why I recommend using this vendor." The Boss asks, "Why don't we use our internal developers?" Dilbert replies, "Let me explain how this will play out." Dilbert begins drawing a diagram on the board. Dilbert says, "Step One: We select an outside vendor because our internal developers are clueless weasels." Dilbert continues, "Step Two: We sign a contract and begin work." Dilbert says, "Step Three: Our internal weasels complain to our VP and she order us to use them." Dilbert continues drawing a complex diagram on the board. Dilbert says, "Step Four: The outside vendor sues us while our weasels grunt out steaming mounds of worthless code." Dilbert returns home to Dogbert. Dilbert asks Dogbert, "Do I plan too much?" Dogbert says, "Is this the conversation we practiced yesterday?"


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|Herbs and botanicals dietary supplements H.R. 1599, the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015, amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to food produced from, containing, or consisting of a bioengineered organism, the labeling of natural foods, and for other purposes; all provisions relating to dietary supplements. False advertising associated with dietary supplements Bill No. TBD, the Free Speech About Science Act, amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act concerning the distribution of information on legitimate scientific research in connection with foods and dietary supplements, and for other purposes.
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TL-600S LED light adopts the touch screen technology , could adjust brightness accurately. TL-600S LED light adopts digital display screen that allow you easier to view the battery power.
Supports external direct-current power input that convenient you for a long time use. (the power adapter is included). Two color temperature plates are configured and suitable for use under different environments. Equipped with Mini Ball Head , with 1/4' screw can be installed on the tripod, 360 degree adjust the Angle of light. With Carrying bag , could put all accessories into one bag and easy to carry outside.
Color Temperature:3200K/5600K (Could be adjusted). Power Source: NP-F550 battery (Battery Included). 2 x TL-600S video light (Daylight). 2 x Light Stand (2M). 2 x Mini Ball Head.
US/EU/UK/AU available , please leave us message which plug you want! Travor is one of the leading photographic companies not only in China, but the entire world. We specialize in producing accessories for digital cameras, including LED video lights, Macro LED Ring Flash Light , Vertical Battery grip, Camera Flash Speedlite, Portable Led Studio , Camera Lens Hood, Lens Filter, Lens Cap, and photographic accessories. Founded in 2006, Travor grew quickly and became the supplier of choice for reputed photographic equipment distributors and retailers in Europe and North America.Known for the outstanding performance of our products at bargain price points, we export millions of units worldwide annually. Over 200 dealers among more than 70 counties have chosen us. What are you waiting for? Product Certifications: CE, FCC, RoHS. We are cooperating with many big companies, such as B&H. What are the terms of payments you offer? How long will it takes to deliver goods? What kind of packaging you offer? What kind of transportation methods you offer?
We also can deliver your goods by air and sea as your request. For all your inquiries about our products, we will reply you in detail within 24 hours. We have well-trained and professional sales & after-sale services persons who can speak English fluently. We can print your own logo on product and packaging.10cm x 56cm x 75cm (3.94in x 22.05in x 29.53in). Product Dimensions: Length: 0in, Width: 0in, Height: 0in, Weight: 0 pounds. Package Dimensions: Length: 0in, Width: 0in, Height: 0in, Weight: 0 pounds. We reserve the right to cancel any order for any reason at any time. We are not responsible for undeliverable addresses.
Message us for return instructions. All of our items, unless otherwise stated, will only run on 120 volts. Please check to make sure your country complies with these specifications. We will work with you to resolve any problem you may have. The item "Travor 2pcs/Kit Photography LED Video Light Camera Studio Lighting + Stands" is in sale since Saturday, May 25, 2019.
This item is in the category "Cameras & Photo\Camera & Photo Accessories\Camera & Camcorder Lights". The seller is "happier-u-today" and is located in CN. This item can be shipped to United States.