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The Financial Claims Scheme
- Sheena Horn
- 2 years ago
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1 The Financial Claims Scheme An Assessment of the scheme s broader economic impact August 2013 An independent report prepared for Challenger Limited by the Australian Centre for Financial Studies. The principal authors of this report are Professor Kevin Davis, Research Director, and Martin Jenkinson, Research Officer at the Australian Centre for Financial Studies.
2 Contents The Financial Claims Scheme... 1 Executive Summary Introduction Rationale for Deposit Insurance and the Financial Claims Scheme An Assessment History and Design of the Financial Claims Scheme Distortions arising from the FCS The Scheme s Impact on Household Asset Allocation The Impact of the FCS on other Financial Products and Institutions Money Market Funds (Cash Management Trusts) Finance Companies Life Insurance Products Annuities Friendly Societies Corporate Bonds Mortgage and Property Trusts Self-managed Superannuation Funds Product Innovations and the Financial Claims Scheme Conclusions Reference List Appendix 1 Financial Claims Scheme for General Insurance Appendix 2 Deposit Insurance Scheme Price and Coverage: International Comparison Appendix 3 Deposit Insurance Scheme Caps: International Comparison (Coverage Levels as of year-end 2010) Appendix 4: The Financial Claims Scheme and Portfolio Choice
3 Executive Summary Government backed bank deposit insurance schemes have been globally accepted as a means for promoting financial stability and protecting deposits of households unable to assess bank default risk. Australia s deposit insurance scheme, the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) which was introduced subsequent to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, has been somewhat unique by international standards with a maximum insurable amount as large as any other offered without requiring an ex-ante fee for the protection - until the August 2013 announcement by the then Labor Government foreshadowed the introduction of an ex-ante fee. The FCS is also relatively unique in the priority afforded to APRA for recovery of amounts paid to insured depositors in the event of an ADI liquidation. This virtually eliminates the potential cost of the FCS to the taxpayer (although exposure to more general bail-outs remains) and removes much of the rationale for an ex-ante fee on fair insurance cost grounds. But such a fee may be motivated instead by the benefits which a guarantee of rapid access to funds which the FCS provides, together with the possible costs to APRA of facilitating an open resolution of a troubled ADI prior to failure (such as through a subsidised takeover). The potential financial stability benefits provided by the FCS come at a cost. As well as the reduced level of market discipline of banks by retail depositors (from perceptions of safety), there is also an impact on demand for alternative investment products. While other factors have also played a role, the size of institutions like cash management trusts and finance companies which compete directly with banks for household funds have decreased significantly since the introduction of the FCS. During this time term-deposits held by households have increased considerably both on an absolute basis and relative to other forms of investments. The scheme has also created competitive distortions between longer-term investments issued by institutions not covered by the FCS, and financially engineered products offered by ADIs which are economically equivalent and receive the government guarantee. For example, annuities offered by non-prudentially regulated organisations are at a clear disadvantage when the same investment can be created through a series of government guaranteed ADI term deposits. As demand for risk free income streams for retirement increases the potential size of the competitive distortions caused by the scheme grows. The FCS also works against the development of a retail corporate bond market, since investors can, by diversifying across banks, invest large amounts in risk free term deposits. Regulatory changes and competition for funds has led to substantial increases in term deposit interest rates on offer, amplifying this effect. Competitive imbalances are also evident amongst retirement investment vehicles; while the large deposits of institutional superannuation funds (held indirectly on behalf of many individuals) are ineligible for the 3
4 guarantee, deposits held by a self-managed superannuation fund are covered by the scheme. The potential distortions also affect lending markets. To the extent that the FCS means that ADIs are able to raise retail funding at lower rates than other intermediaries, they have a competitive advantage in competing for loan business and in investment markets. Unless regulators (APRA) or uninsured depositors and bond holders of the ADIs inhibit such actions, ADIs can engage in higher risk lending and investment activities based on retail funding at risk free rates, whereas other intermediaries would find these higher risk activities reflected in their funding costs. The competitive distortions caused by the FCS suggest that a case for an ex-ante fee for the guarantee can be made. However determining the appropriate size of the fee is problematic particularly given the likelihood that blanket guarantees provided during the GFC have entrenched a general belief that an implicit government guarantee extends beyond the FCS. A fee solely based on insured deposits would not offset this potential competitive advantage of (particularly large) ADIs. There is also merit in reducing the maximum cap for insured deposits. Very few households have deposits above $50,000, and the aggregate amount of insurance coverage can be increased by spreading deposits across ADIs. An alternative (but also using a lower cap), given the emphasis in the FCS on providing ready access to funds, would be limit coverage of the scheme to transactions (at-call) accounts of retail depositors. Providing the option of protection (for a fee up to some specified limit) for unsophisticated investors with temporary large balances or SME businesses with larger operating balances to meet payrolls etc., could be considered if that type of protection was seen as being within the scope of the scheme. While a deposit insurance scheme such as the FCS can enhance financial stability and enhance transactional liquidity for households unable to assess bank default risk, the structure of the FCS requires a review to mitigate the competitive distortions created by the scheme in its current form. 4
5 1. Introduction The Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) has been in operation in Australia since October 2008, with the current $250,000 cap on deposit amounts guaranteed applying since February There has, to date, been no fee charged for provision of the guarantee, with an ex post funding model applying. Should an ADI fail and APRA be unable to recoup amounts paid out to insured depositors from remaining assets of the ADI, then the Treasurer may impose a levy on other ADIs to cover any shortfall. The FCS also provides for compensation of general insurance policy holders should a general insurer fail (See Appendix 1 for details). This has attracted less attention and appears to have less spillover effects to other parts of the financial sector, and is consequently not considered further in this report. Absence of a fee for such deposit insurance, until the announcement of a planned fee of 5-10 basis points in early August 2013, 1 is relatively uncommon in an international context, and Appendix 2 provides recent information on fees charged for deposit insurance in other countries. The size of the cap is also relatively high by international standards, although many countries increased the level of coverage after the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Appendix 3 provides comparative information. In this report the extent of likely distortions to financial markets arising from the FCS, in terms of allocation of resources, competitiveness of non-bank providers of financial services, and financial product innovation is examined. In section 2 rationale for deposit insurance schemes (of which the FCS is the Australian example) is considered. In section 3, the history behind the introduction of the FCS in its current form is reviewed and reasons for its current design features are outlined. Section 4 then provides an analysis of the likely social and private benefits and costs which arise from the current FCS structure. The empirical relevance of these effects is considered in Section 5 which focuses upon household financial asset holdings and in Section 6 which examines the impact on competing financial products and institutions. Section 7 concludes by identifying potential changes to the design of the FCS which could be considered to reduce the financial sector distortions identified in the earlier sections. In undertaking this analysis it is important to note that the FCS is only one factor creating distortions in financial markets, and also that empirical assessment of its effects is complicated by the disruptions to financial markets caused by the GFC and subsequent 1 The Government will progress a recommendation from the Council of Financial Regulators, which includes the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, to establish a dedicated Financial Stability Fund to help meet any future cost of the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS), as well as the cost of other resolution activities that protect depositors. The dedicated Fund will build gradually over time to a target size of 0.5 per cent of total deposits protected by the FCS. Establishing the Fund is expected to have a net positive impact on the budget of $733 million over the forward estimates, from 1 January
6 regulatory changes. Financial decisions of the retail sector (to whom the FCS particularly applies) are also distorted by taxation arrangements which provide incentives for investments in owner-occupied and investment properties, equities, superannuation (where there is also a significant compulsory component), and the financing of investments by leverage. Financial sector adjustments since the introduction of the FCS have also been affected by changes in bank (and other financial) regulation together with a reassessment of the desired level and type of risk-taking by both financial institutions and investors. 2. Rationale for Deposit Insurance and the Financial Claims Scheme Deposit insurance involves (generally) government establishment and operation of a scheme which provides depositors in approved institutions with a guarantee of safety of funds invested up to some capped amount. 2 In some countries, guarantee schemes also operate to provide limited protection to investors in other financial products. In Australia, the FCS also provides for limited protection of policy holders with general insurance companies (but not life assurance companies). Internationally, the provision of government guarantees over financial products other than deposits is infrequent. On the other hand deposit insurance has become common internationally, prompted in part by the views of international agencies about its importance as part of the core financial infrastructure for financial stability. Originally introduced in the USA on the 1 st of January , but adopted by few other countries over the next forty years, it has since been adopted virtually universally. The traditional rationale for government provided deposit insurance schemes is twofold. One is the perceived benefits in terms of financial system stability arising from the exposure of deposit taking institutions to runs by depositors and the potential for contagion (or spillovers) to other institutions. That exposure reflects the first-come first-served nature of the deposit contract such that early withdrawers obtain full value, but their actions can create a need for banks to liquidate assets at discounted prices threatening bank solvency and reducing the probability of late withdrawers receiving full value. Incentives exist for depositors to thus join a run, and potential spillovers arise from the inability of depositors to identify whether the cause of a run is specific to that institution or reflects more general issues also likely to affect other banks. The decline in the incidence of bank runs in countries such as the USA which had adopted deposit insurance no doubt contributed to its more widespread implementation in the latter part of the twentieth century. 2 Schemes are generally government run (or backed) because a private insurance scheme may itself be subject to risk of failure. Participation of designated types of depository institutions is also generally compulsory to avoid problems of adverse selection (participation only by institutions which turn out to be high risk) and free-riding (where poorly informed depositors incorrectly assume that all institutions are participants). 3 6
7 The second rationale for such schemes is to provide uninformed retail investors with a safe haven for their savings. Deposit insurance removes the need for such investors to gather information about the risk of depositing with a particular bank, which they would be unable to adequately assess anyway. It also provides peace of mind about the safety of funds which have been deposited. The distinction between such retail depositors and more informed wholesale depositors, who should be better able to assess bank risk, is a major reason for placing a cap on the size of insurance of individual deposits. Depositors with large amounts of funds to place are assumed to provide market discipline over banks by demanding returns on their deposits commensurate with their assessment of the risk of the bank. The rationale for government insurance of deposits rather than other forms of household savings (such as superannuation balances or life insurance company policies and annuities) reflects three factors. One is the historical context and the relative risk and disruption of bank failure compared to that of other institutions. A second factor is the role of (some) bank deposits in the payments system. A third is the complication that some, but not all, of those other savings forms involve exposure to market risk rather than having fixed contractual obligations of the product providers. As the demand by retirees for risk free income streams from investment of savings (outside of superannuation) grows, the anomaly of, and distortions arising from providing insurance over bank long-term term deposit-type products but not over other similar products provided by prudentially regulated non-banks becomes increasingly relevant. This is a clear example of where regulation on institutional classification basis rather than an economic function basis can induce competitive imbalances and market distortions. A further consideration in the development of deposit insurance schemes has been the objective of providing depositors in a failing bank with rapid access to their funds. Because bank deposits also function as money, long delays in depositors being able to access their funds in a failed bank can, when they have few other liquid assets, have significant implications for individual consumption and welfare and for the viability of business customers with payment obligations to others. The consequent disruption to consumption and income streams can have deleterious consequences for economic activity and business continuity even if the amounts owed are eventually paid in full. The importance of the Early Access Facility for Depositors (EAFD) was highlighted in the explanatory memorandum accompanying the introduction of the Financial Claims Scheme legislation on October 15, cd2bc99654a/upload_pdf/ pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22legislation/ems/r3096_ems_7f78f6b6-bda bd9f- 7cd2bc99654a%22 7
8 2.1 An Assessment There are two problems with the traditional rationale for capped deposit insurance schemes. The first relates to their role in preventing bank runs. While retail depositors may still run on a bank where there are concerns about deposit safety, modern bank runs are likely to involve wholesale, relatively well informed, creditors and depositors refusing to rollover short term funding or withdrawing deposits generally via electronic transactions. Thus, while deposit insurance, capped at some level of deposits, is likely to reduce certain sources of bank runs (such as retail depositor uncertainty), it is not, of itself, a solution for preventing runs and achieving financial sector stability. Moreover, a relatively small cap covers most retail deposit amounts (as shown later) and thus removes incentives for virtually all retail depositors to run (unless concerns about disruptions caused by delayed access to funds are an issue). The second problem is that the existence of an explicit cap may have little credibility if there is widespread belief that government will not countenance the failure of (at least some) banks. Investor decisions are then premised on the existence of implicit guarantees over all deposits in banks believed to be protected, removing or reducing the extent of market discipline and providing a competitive advantage in fund raising to such institutions. Actions such as the temporary introduction of blanket government guarantees on all deposits during the GFC tend to reinforce such perceptions, reducing the credibility of government assertions that (uninsured) depositors are at risk in the future. This is particularly an issue in the case of large banks which are designated as systemically important either at the global level (G-SIBS) or the domestic level (D-SIBS). 5 Designing policies to overcome distortions arising from perceived implicit guarantees is a difficult and ongoing policy task, including introduction of contingent liability and bail-in provisions for some forms of bank liabilities. However, the ability of governments to extend such loss-sharing arrangements to uninsured deposits as a means of returning institutions to solvency is politically limited as experience in mid-2013 with such proposals in the case of Cyprus demonstrates. 6 The possible existence of widespread perceptions of implicit levels of depositor protection extending beyond the boundaries of the explicit cap, make it difficult to analyze the implications, and desirable design changes, of the FCS in isolation. Thus, for example, investor portfolio readjustments during and after the GFC towards bank deposits may have reflected perceptions of implicit guarantees as much as the explicit protection provided by 5 G-SIB (D-SIB) stand for (respectively) Globally (Domestically) Systemically Important Bank. 6 While large, uninsured, depositors in several Cypriot banks had part of deposits converted into equity, the fact that many such deposits were foreign-owned reduced the domestic political complications. 8
9 the FCS. 7 Nevertheless, in more normal times, the explicit cap does serve as a psychological signal which potentially influences retail investor portfolio decisions, and thus warrants explicit consideration. A further implication is that it may not be possible to consider government risk-bearing and appropriate pricing of fees of explicit guarantees separately from consideration of implicit guarantees. More generally, however, the increased role of wholesale investors as potential sources of bank runs (particularly if it is believed that they do not perceive that implicit guarantees exist) means that it is more relevant to consider the design of deposit insurance schemes such as the FCS from the context of the safe haven role in conjunction with the objective of rapid access to funds, rather than in terms of prevention of bank runs and financial stability. 3. History and Design of the Financial Claims Scheme 8 Table 1 provides a timeline of important events in the lead-up to the introduction of the FCS in Australia. Australia (together with New Zealand) had been an outlier internationally in not having an explicit deposit insurance scheme (although relatively few countries had insurance policy holder protection schemes). The need for a deposit insurance scheme was considered by the Wallis Inquiry (1997) and rejected, based partly upon the existence of depositor preference arrangements in Australia. Because depositors have priority over other bank creditors in insolvency, the risk of there being a shortfall of assets sufficient to imply losses for bank depositors was seen as sufficiently low to obviate the need for a deposit insurance scheme. The failure of HIH Insurance in 2000, the introduction of a compensation scheme for policy holders, and the recommendations of the subsequent Royal Commission, brought the issue of protection arrangements to a head. In particular, the credibility of Government statements that there were no implicit guarantees for depositors or policy holders was challenged. Concerns that an explicit scheme could create moral hazard concerns became of less import if there was widespread belief that implicit guarantees existed. Following the Davis Report (2004), commissioned by the Treasurer to examine the case for, and potential design issues, of financial system guarantees, there was a long period of consultation and debate before legislation was eventually brought forward for planned introduction into Parliament in the week commencing 13 October That legislation with an insured deposit cap of $20,000 (reduced from previously recommended $50,000 7 The initial blanket guarantee effectively replaced any implicit guarantee with an explicit guarantee, and whether subsequent reductions in explicit coverage changed perceptions of implicit guarantee coverage is open to question. 8 Turner (2011) provides an overview of the history of the Financial Claims Scheme 9
10 after lobbying by the banks) was overtaken by events following the failure of Lehman Brothers, widespread international introduction of bank guarantees, and concerns about depositor nervousness and financial system stability. On 12 October 2008, the FCS was legislated, an unlimited guarantee of bank deposits introduced, with the guaranteed amount subsequently capped at $1 million on 28 October In late 2011, after a review of the scheme which was foreshadowed at the time of the schemes introduction, it was announced that the cap would be reduced to $250,000 per depositor in a failed bank, and this was implemented in February 2012, and remains the case today. Table 1 A timeline of introduction and changes to the Financial Claims Scheme Date April 1997 Action The Wallis Report investigates the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme but deems it unnecessary due to alternative deposit protection mechanisms in place. - Financial System Inquiry, 1997 May 2001 September 2002 Government introduces the HIH Claims Support Scheme, a compensation scheme for policy holders of the failed HIH insurance company APRA provides a submission to the HIH Royal Commission including an argument for consideration of a broad financial sector deposit insurance scheme. - Future policy directions for the regulation and prudential supervision of the general insurance industry, 2002 April 2003 HIH Royal Commission recommends introduction of a policy holder protection scheme. - Report of the HIH Royal Commission, 2003 March 2004 The Davis Report assesses the case for government support for individuals affected by the failure of prudentially regulated institutions and the potential design characteristics of any such scheme. - Study of Financial System Guarantees, 2004 November 2005 Council of Financial Regulators recommendation for introduction of a Financial Claims Scheme Council of Financial Regulators Failure and Crisis Management in the Australian Financial System, 2005 June 2008 September 2008 Announcement of planned introduction of a Financial Claims Scheme capped between $20,000 and $50,000 The failure of US investment bank Lehman Brothers (which filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection) severely disrupted global financial markets and governments and regulators worldwide responded by introducing government guarantees over bank debt, enhancing 9 A guarantee could be purchased for deposits over $1 million on similar terms to the guarantee facility available to banks for the issue of new debt securities in wholesale markets. At its peak, $24.1 billion of large deposits was insured under this scheme, with maximum maturities permitted of 5 years for term deposits and to October 2015 for at call deposits. At June 2013, $2.4 billion still remained under guarantee. 10
11 depositor insurance, and introducing other support and protection mechanisms. October February 2010 December 2010 May 2011 September 2011 August 2013 The Australian Government introduced the Financial Claims Scheme in conjunction with a guarantee scheme for bank debt. The guarantee of deposits was initially unlimited but reduced to a cap of $1,000,000 on 28 November Government announces Guarantee scheme for new debt issues and large deposits to be closed on 31 March 2010 Government announces that the Financial Claims Scheme is to remain as a permanent feature of the financial system The Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) releases their recommendations for the Financial Claims Scheme following a review of the scheme. The most significant recommendation stemming from the review is a reduction in the cap to between $100,000 and $250,000 Government announces a reduction in the Financial Claims Scheme cap to $250,000 to apply from 1 February Government announces plans to introduce a levy of 5-10 basis points on insured deposits at ADIs to be paid into a Financial Stability Fund While the level of the guarantee cap has changed over time, other features of the FCS have remained unchanged until the recent announcement of a planned introduction of a fee on banks of 5-10 basis points per dollar of insured deposits. Prior to that announcement, there had been no fees charged for the guarantee, with the scheme being described as ex post funded. This meant that if a bank failed and APRA (the operator of the scheme) was unable to recover funds paid out to insured depositors from the assets of the bank in liquidation, the Treasurer could impose a levy on other ADIs to recoup those amounts. The logic behind the absence of a fee was primarily that, on actuarial grounds, there was virtually zero risk of APRA not recovering amounts paid out from the assets of the bank. This reflects (a) the probability of an ADI being placed into liquidation (b) the balance sheet structures of ADIs and (c) priority rankings of claimants in liquidation. If an ADI fails, APRA pays out insured depositors and then stands at the head of the priority queue of claimants on the failed ADI s assets. 10 Because banks (but to lesser extent mutual ADIs) have significant uninsured deposit and other debt liabilities, the probability that the value of assets of the failed bank would have declined to such an extent as to not cover insured liabilities (and thus enable full reimbursement of APRA) is extremely low. Also, the likelihood of an ADI being placed into liquidation, and thus triggering a payout to insured depositors, is also perceived as low. High capital ratios (with higher values for mutuals partially offsetting their lower use of other debt and uninsured deposit funding), APRA supervision and early action to effect an open resolution of a failing ADI (by takeover), and 10 This priority ranking was introduced in the Financial System Legislation Amendment (Financial Claims Scheme And Other Measures) Bill Previously, all depositors ranked equally with first priority. 11
12 (ADI management would argue) prudent management of ADIs, all combine to suggest a low probability of failure. With these ingredients suggesting a low probability of failure, and extremely low loss to APRA (and thus the government) in the event of failure, an actuarially fair fee for insurance provided by government approaches zero. In fact the provider of the first line of insurance is other claimants and stakeholders on the bank (uninsured depositors, debt holders, shareholders) who rank below APRA (standing in place of insured depositors) in the event of a bank liquidation, and would suffer larger losses if that priority ranking were not in place. In principle, this implicit provision of insurance to insured depositors, should be reflected in demands for higher promised returns on uninsured deposits and debt issued by ADIs. However, to the extent that such stakeholders perceive that there are implicit government guarantees of ADIs which reduce the risk of liquidation and thus losses to zero, this mechanism will not operate, with ADIs thus benefitting from the perception of implicit guarantees. Arguably, this effect is more relevant for those ADIs which are designated D-SIBs. These considerations thus suggest four possible intertwined arguments for charging a fee for the FCS protection of insured deposits. One relates to the potential benefits of rapid access which the FCS provides to insured depositors in a failed ADI. Even though, without the scheme, depositors would still most likely receive their funds back in full, the liquidation process could take some considerable time. The benefits from avoiding such disruption are substantial and could warrant imposition of an ex ante fee for providing this benefit. However, the probability of such an event (a liquidation) happening are, arguably, miniscule but this reflects two other features of depositor protection which can justify fees. One is the role played by APRA in ensuring the smooth exit of a troubled ADI via takeover and thus avoiding its liquidation. Benefits to insured depositors (and other creditors) from such a process can be argued to exceed those from the rapid access arrangements which would otherwise come into play if the ADI were placed into liquidation. Hence, fees could be justified on the basis of both benefits to depositors and competitive advantages to ADIs relative to other financial institutions subject to different resolution and liquidation arrangements. A third argument relates to the benefits in the form of reduced likelihood of retail depositor runs resulting from the existence of the FCS. If the psychological effect of the FCS is to largely remove the probability of runs, banks benefit from the reduced cost of risk management (such as the need to hold higher liquid asset reserves). The fourth argument relates to the possible role of implicit guarantees. If widely perceived to exist, these give a competitive advantage to the ADIs involved, and a fee could be justified on competitive neutrality grounds. Even though uninsured depositors and debt 12
13 holders are effectively the insurer of first resort in event of failure, they may not demand higher returns on funds provided because of a view that implicit guarantees mean that they will not be called upon to incur losses. But demonstrating that there are such perceptions and that they reduce bank funding costs below what they would be on a stand alone basis reflecting their low-risk basis is problematic. 4. Distortions arising from the FCS Explicit provision of free (or underpriced) insurance to a major class of assets (such as provided to retail deposits via the FCS) would be expected to create distortions to investor portfolio preferences unless either (a) the assets were inherently risk free even in the absence of the insurance or (b) there existed widespread belief in implicit government insurance arising from unwillingness to let the issuing institutions (ADIs) fail itself a major encompassing source of distortion. The distortion arises from the competitive advantage provided to ADIs in raising funds in the form of retail deposits relative to other institutions raising funds in different forms from the same investor group. The potential distortion is not limited simply to deposit-like investments. It can distort loan and securities markets because guaranteed institutions can raise funds for risky lending and investment at a lower cost than competitors. Also, because the FCS affects risk-expected return characteristics of deposits it thus can alter the competitive position relative to other risky assets. Appendix 4 illustrates using standard textbook type analysis of portfolio choice. More generally, the competitive distortion may affect the risk-taking behavior of other competing financial institutions. For example, such institutions may respond to the fact that their lending-borrowing spreads are reduced relative to ADIs (who can raise funds at a lower rate) by adopting higher leverage in search of a comparable return on equity to ADIs. Also important is the extent to which ADIs can design guaranteed financial products which are very close substitutes for those produced by other institutions not covered by the FCS. One important determinant of the extent and nature of distortion will be how competitive conditions between ADIs affect the pricing of guaranteed deposits. In this regard, a major issue is the existence of a somewhat segmented market. Institutional (wholesale) investors face an inelastic supply of risk free investment opportunities in the form of bonds issued by the sovereign government. 11 Retail investors face a highly elastic supply of risk free investment opportunities in the form of guaranteed bank deposits. While there is a cap on guaranteed amounts per depositor at any one bank of $250,000, retail investors can place 11 Financial engineering can extend the available supply of close substitutes to some degree, such as by using cross-currency interest rate swaps to convert cash flows from a bond issued by an overseas government into known domestic currency amounts, or by purchase of credit default swaps from a high ranking counterparty to provide default protection on a high quality bond investment. 13
14 funds with over 100 ADIs, enabling coverage of over $25 million per investor under the FCS. While there is some scope for retail investors to access government bonds and for wholesale investors to hold risk-free investments in a large number of small amounts across ADIs, there would appear to be relatively limited linkages between the two markets. That lack of linkage is reinforced by the impact of Basel III liquidity requirements which treat short term deposits from financial and wholesale investors as being less stable for meeting liquidity regulation requirements. 12 There are three potential outcomes regarding the pricing (ie interest rates) of guaranteed deposits. At one extreme, a lack of competition among ADIs for retail deposits and inability of retail depositors to readily access alternative risk free investments could lead to interest rates being set below the true risk free interest rate. That outcome seems unlikely, at least for term deposit products, because of the risk free arbitrage opportunity available to the ADIs (of attracting retail deposits and investing in higher yielding government debt or other low risk assets). 13 A second possible outcome is that deposits are priced at the correct risk free rate of interest. If that does occur, then other investments which carry (actual or perceived) default risk will need to provide a higher expected return commensurate with that risk. While that would not provide any competitive advantage to banks in fund raising, it would provide them with a competitive advantage in loan and investment markets. A risky asset portfolio could be held, implying some risk to depositors who, however, provide funds at the risk free rate due to the government guarantee. In practice, in Australia, there are considerable difficulties in identifying what is the true risk free rate of interest. A relatively small supply of government debt, together with overseas and domestic demand for that debt for liquidity and collateral purposes has, arguably pushed observed yields below a true risk free rate reflecting time preference. 14 And it is readily observable, in Figure 1, that the third outcome of risk free interest rates on bank deposits being higher than risk free rates on government debt of equivalent maturity has occurred There are also issues here related to the extent to which deposits by collective investment vehicles are treated as wholesale rather than on a look through basis as a collection of smaller retail deposits. 13 For at call deposits, also offering transactions services, this argument is less applicable. 14 There is no readily available risk free arbitrage strategy for retail investors to profit from the gap between risk free deposit rates and government bond rates, since that would involve short selling government bonds to invest in bank deposits. 15 Given the absence of a continuous series for short term government treasury rates, 3 month bank bill rates have been used in the figure. Since bank bill rates will typically exceed treasury note rates, the short term yield spread shown understates the extent to which deposit rates new exceed treasury rates. Over the period May 2009 (when Treasury note issues recommenced) to May 2013, the 90 day bill rate exceeded the Treasury Note rate by an average of 23 basis points. 14
15 Figure 1 Wholesale - Retail Deposit Spreads Sep-1992 Sep-1995 Sep-1998 Sep-2001 Sep-2004 Sep-2007 Sep month spread (Bank bills less term deposits) - Average over quarter 3 year spread (government bond less term deposit) - Average over quarter Source: RBA Bulletin Table F2 Although beneficial for depositors, this outcome has potentially significant adverse consequences for the Australian economy. Other institutions or borrowers seeking funds from the retail market will need to offer returns benchmarked against the risk free retail deposit rates on offer. Loan interest rates will reflect the rates paid on deposits by banks and other potential lenders will be constrained in their ability to compete due to their higher cost of funds. This latter effect is related to, but not dependent upon, another form of distortion often cited in the literature on deposit insurance. This is the potential for moral hazard in the form of incentives for ADI owners (and managers) to increase the level of risk taking by the ADI. Free, or underpriced, insurance means that expected risk adjusted returns to ADI equity holders are increased when the ADI adopts a higher risk asset portfolio (even if there is no higher expected return on that portfolio). The reason is that the equity holders capture any upside if the investments are successful, while (a) their downside is limited to their amount invested and (b) the ADI cost of deposit funding is not increased due to higher risk taking. The potential for greater losses is borne by the deposit insurer. In the jargon of finance, the provision of deposit insurance by a government is akin to providing the equity holders with a put option giving them the right to put the assets of the bank to the government at a strike price equal to the amount owed to insured depositors. Such risk-taking incentives can be realised in two main ways. One is to increase the leverage of the bank (ie operating with a lower capital ratio). The other is to increase the riskiness of assets acquired / loans granted by the bank. Risk weighted required capital ratios attempt to offset this moral hazard problem by linking required capital to the size of risk weighted 15
16 assets. While this moral hazard issue, and its control, is important, it is not considered further in this report. It is possible to consider distortions arising from the FCS along a number of different dimensions. One is the impact on the size and competitive position of non-bank financial institutions and markets. Another is by consideration of the effect on particular types of financial products including innovations in product design to exploit the guarantee. A third is the impact upon pricing of financial products. A fourth is in terms of the impact upon household demand for various financial products. 16
17 5. The Scheme s Impact on Household Asset Allocation It is difficult to assess definitively the impact of the FCS on the financial investment decisions of the household sector because (a) there have been significant other disruptions in financial markets since the time of its introduction, and (b) there is a paucity of official statistics available providing adequate detail. For example, bank deposit figures published by APRA do not give a division of household deposits into at-call and term deposits, nor by size categories. 16 However, one vitally important point needs to be noted. While it has been shown earlier that the FCS design enables individuals to obtain guarantees over very large sums of money by diversifying deposit holdings across ADIs, this is an option relevant only to quite wealthy investors. For the vast majority of households, actual and potential holdings of bank deposits are relatively small. The Davis Report (2004, Table 6.3) estimated that 94-98% of retail depositors had deposit balances in any one bank of less than $50,000 and that a coverage limit (cap) of $250,000 increased this coverage to % of retail depositors. Subsequent studies have produced consistent information, and in announcing the reduction in the cap to $250,000 in September 2011, Treasurer Swan indicated that this would provide full coverage of around 99 per cent of deposits. Connelly et al (2012) examine the HILDA data for 2010 and find that the median level of household bank deposits was $9,000 and the average level was $41,200. In the mid-year economic and financial outlook (Treasury, 2013) noted that at 31 August 2012 deposits eligible for coverage under the FCS were $646.5 billion, which suggests an average level of deposits per capita of around $30,000. Further evidence can be found in data from the HILDA Survey, from which the RBA has extracted information on household financial asset holdings. As shown in Table 2, while most individuals have a bank deposit account, the median amount held even for the top percentile is only $18,000. One relevant feature of that data is the small proportion of individuals with life insurance 17 where a number of products such as annuities have similar characteristics to deposits 16 Much more detailed information is publicly available from APRA on characteristics of superannuation fund accounts. 17 It would appear that these figures do not include group insurance provided through superannuation. 17
18 Table 2 Distribution of household financial assets Per cent of households holding assets Median value of holdings for households holding assets ($'000, September 2010 prices) Percentile Life Life Deposits Superannuation Deposits of income insurance insurance Superannuation Less than Source: RBA, Table B24 These figures suggest that the figures used in the Davis Report are still indicative of the distribution of retail deposits, and that very high levels of coverage could be achieved with a much reduced cap (eg of $50,000). Reducing the cap would thus affect only a relatively small number of investors but arguably the ones where most distortion in asset allocation from the FCS occurs. Despite the paucity of useful data, some trends relevant to investor asset allocations can be discerned. a) The share of bank deposits in household financial asset holdings has increased since 2007, reversing the declining trend over the previous decades. Some part of this change reflects valuation effects as the value of assets such as direct shareholdings and superannuation balances declined following the onset of the GFC. Table 3 illustrates. How much of the remaining effect is a result of increased bank competition for retail deposits in an attempt to alter funding mix, how much reflects portfolio reallocation due to risk aversion, and how much is due to the FCS is uncertain. Table 3 Household financial asset holdings ( ) Deposits Shares Super/Life Unfunded Super Other Sep-90 29% 10% 36% 13% 11% Sep-00 19% 19% 44% 9% 9% Sep-07 15% 27% 46% 6% 5% Sep-12 22% 16% 46% 11% 5% Source: ABS National Accounts: Financial Accounts b) The composition of deposits on the Australian balance sheets of banks has changed significantly since Figure 2 illustrates the growth of term deposits relative to current/at-call deposits since the GFC. The downturn in current/term deposits began in late 2007 and has continued since the introduction of the FCS in October While these figures relate to total (not just retail) deposits, it could be expected that the change would be even greater for retail deposits, given that business and institutional holdings of current deposits are likely to dominate that category by value. However, figures for mutual ADIs which cater almost exclusively to retail customers do not show 18
19 such a pronounced downturn (Figure 3) although this may reflect the effect of increased competition by banks for term deposits attracting such funds away from the mutuals. Ellis et al (2012, Table 1) report that household direct holdings of deposits at June 2012 were $232 million of at-call and $470 million term deposits, and that the respective growth rates between 2007 and 2012 were 8 and 14 per cent p.a. They also report that indirect holdings of deposits via superannuation and investment funds were $236 million. c) Australian households appear to hold relatively little in the way of interest bearing assets outside of deposits in ADIs. Ellis et al (2012) note, based on HILDA data, that In aggregate, households invest around two-fifths of their financial assets in interestbearing assets. Household deposits have grown strongly over recent years, although there has been no growth in interest-bearing securities. Compared with other advanced economies, the share of interest-bearing assets in household financial assets remains low in Australia. Figure 2 ADI at call deposit to term deposit ratio Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin Table D3 Figure 3 Mutual ADI at call deposit to term deposit ratio Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Bulletin Table D3 It is worth noting that the introduction of the FCS has not enabled smaller mutual ADIs to gain a larger share of the deposit market which may have been expected given public 19
20 perceptions of greater risk of mutuals relative to banks. It does appear, however, to have halted the downward slide in market share which had previously been occurring. The mutual ADI share of deposits (excluding foreign bank branches which cannot effectively compete for retail deposits) had fallen from 4.50% in December 2005 to 3.61% in December 2008, and at March 2013 was 3.54%. 18 Figure 4 Australian bank liability funding quantities Current deposits with banks Certificates of deposit issued by banks Term deposits with banks Other deposits with banks (non-current) Offshore borrowings by AFIs Source: RBA, Table D3, The Impact of the FCS on other Financial Products and Institutions As noted earlier, by changing the risk-return characteristics of bank deposits for retail investors, the FCS could be expected to affect household asset allocation decisions across a broad range of assets but particularly those which are relatively close substitutes for deposits. As also noted earlier, separating the impact of the FCS from other developments in the financial sector is problematic 6.1 Money Market Funds (Cash Management Trusts) It would be expected that money market funds such as cash management trusts would be one form of investment adversely affected by the introduction of the Financial Claims scheme since they are a close substitute for at-call and term bank deposits. This does indeed appear to have been the case, with the size of the CMT sector declining markedly since One component of this decline was the decision of Macquarie Bank to close its (large) cash management trust and transfer customers funds (subject to their approval) to a bank deposit product which would be eligible for coverage under the FCS. But even 18 These figures are calculated by subtracting foreign bank subsidiary deposits from the total of all ADIs and comparing mutual ADI deposits to that figure found in APRA s quarterly banking statistics. Unfortunately the ADI deposit statistics do not distinguish between household and other deposits. (In principle, it would be possible to construct comparative series using the monthly banking statistics, but that is beyond the scope of this work). 20
21 excluding that change, the industry has suffered gradual decline. Another reason for the decline of the sector is the declining stock of short term high quality securities available for investment. 19 During the mid-1990s money market funds grew in popularity as an alternative to bank deposit accounts Money market funds invest in short-term highly liquid securities that generally have a maturity that is less than 1 year. ASIC provides the following table as guidance on the asset classes that money market funds generally invest in. Asset Type Cash Debt and fixed income securities Mortgage Derivatives Examples Cash receivables, bank deposits, time/call deposits, negotiable certificates of deposit, discount notes, bank bills, non-australian dollar denominated cash, cash equivalent securities and other money market securities Government and semi-government securities, bills of exchange, promissory notes, notes, asset-backed bonds, corporate floating or fixed rate debts, commercial paper, treasury bills, and asset backed securities Mortgage securities, collateralised mortgage obligations and mortgage-backed securities Repurchase agreements and foreign exchange contracts. Derivatives are primarily used for hedging purposes As collective investment schemes money market funds have traditionally held some advantages over bank savings accounts. These include: Access to money market rates and other higher yielding OTC products unavailable to individual investors Expertise in assessing and managing short-term securities Offering a diversified portfolio of short-term instruments. Money market funds by definition should hold a large proportion of their total portfolio in high quality, liquid, short-term securities and should not be mistaken for fixed income funds which generally have longer-dated and, depending on the fund, riskier underlying assets. A 2012 report by ASIC 20 investigated the holdings of Australian money market funds and found that the branding of money market funds generally provided an accurate indication of the nature of the funds underlying assets. (Figure 5) 19 Not only has the stock of treasury notes on issue been low (or zero) for some time, but there has been a decline in the size of the bank accepted bill market and the commercial paper market. Banks have also reduced the relative interest rates offered on short term deposits from financial institutions. 20 ASIC Report 324: Money market funds, December
22 Figure 5 Portfolio composition of money market, enhanced money and fixed income funds, Cash 0.4 Debt and fixed income 0.2 Derivatives 0 Money market funds Enhance money market funds Fixed income funds Mortgages Source: ASIC Report 324: Money market funds, December 2012 Unlike savings accounts which can only be offered by APRA regulated banks, money market funds are collective investment schemes that are regulated by ASIC and therefore are outside the prudentially regulated perimeter. The ABS identifies the two largest subcategories of money market funds as cash management trusts (CMTs) and cash common funds. Cash management trusts, as the name suggests, follow a trust structure whereby the funds of individual investors are pooled in exchange for units in the trust. These funds are then invested in relatively low-risk liquid assets. Cash common funds are similar to CMTs but are subject to additional state regulations. There has been a significant increase in total assets held by money market funds since the mid-90s however this growth has been solely in the CMT sub-category. Figure 6 Money Market Funds Total Financial Assets Cash Management Trusts Total Financial Assets Cash Common Funds Total Financial Assets Source: ABS Cat 5655, Managed Funds, Mar 2013 While total assets managed by money market funds increased to almost $60 billion by mid The global financial crisis brought with it a significant reduction in the total assets managed by money market funds. Macquarie Group who closed their $10 billion dollar CMT in late 2008 cited the Financial Claims Scheme and improving the Group s balance sheet as 22
23 the two key reasons for closing the trust. 21 The largest currently active Australian money market funds as reported by Morningstar are listed below. Fund name Net assets ($ million) TPS Cash Management Perennial Cash Enhanced Trust Russell Australian Cash A IOOF/Perennial Flex Cash & Income UCA Cash Portfolio The decline in the size of money market mutual funds since 2008 would appear to be largely due to the introduction of the FCS, and banks offering cash management account deposit products covered by the guarantee. While product specifications differ (the interest rate paid is determined by the bank rather than directly determined by investment earnings, and there may be tiered rates for different size balances rather than a pro rata entitlement) they are very close substitutes. In addition to the competitive disadvantage imposed on CMTs and money market mutual funds, there is also the potential for managers of such funds to adopt higher risk investment strategies (lower credit grade investments) in search of higher yields to offset the advantage given to bank deposits via the guarantee. 6.2 Finance Companies Finance companies and general financiers (part of the shadow banking sector) offer bank like intermediation services and are mostly outside of the APRA regulatory perimeter. While some liabilities of this group are referred to as deposits these are typically provided by wholesale investors and not covered by the FCS. Additional funding is obtained from issuing debentures and unsecured notes to both retail and wholesale investors. Debentures are fixed income securities generally issued by finance companies that are secured by the issuing company s assets. The yield on a debenture security is a function of the underlying risk, term and liquidity of the security which is determined by the characteristics of both the issuing company and the security. Unlisted and unrated debentures should command a higher yield than comparable listed and rated debentures. Unlike debentures, unsecured notes are not collateralised by the issuing company s assets. 21 Macquarie steers $10b from trust into deposit account, 23
24 Table 4 Face value of debentures on issue (S billion December 2008) Total issued Number of issuers Unlisted and unrated debentures Unlisted and rated debentures Listed and rated debentures Listed and unrated debentures Source: ASIC, Report 173 Finance companies typically provide finance for property investments and development, personal loans, leasing, equipment purchase, car financing etc. In this regard they are in competition with ADIs on both sides of the balance sheet. Given the often short-term nature of debentures and unsecured notes, finance company securities have been a viable alternative to bank deposits for investors seeking additional yield. Prior to the GFC total assets of finance companies and general financiers grew strongly to a peak of $138 billion in November 2008, but have since declined to $108 billion as at June While other borrowings (which includes funds raised by debentures and promissory notes etc) had begun to fall from a peak of $56 billion in October 2007, outstandings fell markedly from $52 billion in October 2008 (when the FCS was introduced) to a low of $36 billion in October 2009, and have recovered only marginally to $41 billion in June Figure 7 Financial assets of Finance Companies and General Financiers: ($ billion) Domestic assets Overseas assets Source: RBA, Table B10, July 2013 There are a number of factors that may have contributed to the sharp reduction in financial liabilities of Finance Companies following the GFC including the default of a number of debenture issuing organisations at the end of 2008 (and subsequently). In response to these defaults, ASIC increased the disclosure requirements and implemented a benchmarking 22 This chart is derived from data which comprises returns submitted by Finance Companies, General Financiers, Pastoral Finance Companies and Money Market Corporations. 24
25 reporting requirement for issuers of debentures. 23 Finally, because the liabilities of Finance companies are not covered by the Financial Claims Scheme, the relative risk premium required for finance company liabilities relative to bank deposits would have also increased. Reliable data on finance company debenture interest rates comparable with bank deposit rates is not readily available. However, at mid-august 2013, advertised rates by several finance companies for 3 year debentures were approximately basis points higher than those advertised by banks for 3 year term deposits. 24 It is likely that the FCS has been one contributor to the lack of growth of non-bank financiers such as finance companies which compete with banks for household savings, although recent failures of a number of finance companies are also relevant. The effect on ability to raise funds, implying a need to offer higher yields, also flows through into the ability of such institutions to offer viable competition in lending (and leasing) markets for households, small business. 6.3 Life Insurance Products Currently there are 28 Life insurance companies operating in Australia with 4 of the larger insurers owned by the four major banks. The top 5 groups represent 88% of life insurance industry. The industry has grown slowly in terms of assets under management in recent years (see Figure 8) and become more concentrated over time (Figure 9). Life insurance risk business remains one of the few market segments to record growth during 2011/12, albeit at a slightly subdued aggregate level compared to previous years, and investment-linked business in life insurance is declining with risk and annuity based products being the principal areas of potential growth. Figure 8 Life Office Statutory Fund Assets ($ billion) Source: Life Insurance Trends, March 2008 and Quarterly Life Insurance Performance, June ASIC Regulatory Guide 69 Debentures, improving disclosure for retail investors. 24 Canstar.com.au, accessed 14 August
26 Figure 9 Number of Life Insurers Operating in Australia Reinsurers Direct writers Source: APRA Insight 2013 Issue 3 Traditionally the life insurance sector was a major provider of long term savings facilities (through endowment and whole of life policies) as well as a provider of insurance. Many of those traditional policies also involved investment linked returns, making them significantly different to bank provided savings products. The relative importance of the life insurance sector has declined over recent decades, partly reflecting the emergence of alternative forms of long term savings (superannuation) and investment opportunities (managed funds). The structure of life insurance contracts has changed to much greater emphasis on term (eg annual) contracts which provide risk protection without the savings element. The provision of life insurance within superannuation has also seen a relative increase in the significance of group insurance arrangements relative to sales of individual insurance products. But another aspect of life insurance business which can be expected to grow in importance (in the absence of competitive disadvantages) is the provision of longer term income products such as annuities, catering for the running down (decumulation) of wealth to finance consumption by retirees. In general, these involve no investment risk for the purchasers, who are obtaining a fixed (or inflation linked) stream of cash flows promised by the product provider. In examining which financial products might be appropriately covered by a guarantee scheme, the Davis Report (2004) drew a distinction between products which involved market (investment) risk and those which had no such risk, but where counterparty (default) risk existed. Products such as annuities fell into this category, and were viewed as being similar to bank deposit products which are now covered by the Financial Claims Scheme. That similarity is easily seen by noting that a term annuity of (say) ten years can be replicated by a package of term deposits of regular maturities ranging up to ten years. The annuity provides a regular (say) quarterly cash flow of $X to the investor for an initial cash 26
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text:
How to ChampOne C1 Mobile Phone Register Booking Online at Rs 501 champ1india.com: ChampOne C1 Rival Of Freedom 251 At Rs 501 to Rs 251 smartphone to launch Freedom Ringing bales, challenging, a new handset in the mobile company has launched a smartphone. The name of the company for Rs 501 ChampOne C1 is lowered Android phones.
ChampOne C1 Smartphone Mobile Live Updates:
India Cheapest 4g Smartphone Mobile Champ One Android Mobile Booking Rs.501 Champ1india.com users may get form How To Register ChampOne C1 4G Mobile Online Booking official website.
ChampOne company's website at champ1india.com ChampOne C1 handset is Rs 7,999. According to the website for the first flash sale on September 2 at 11 beige This handset can be purchased at Rs 501. The registration has begun.
ChampOne C1 Mobile Specifications and Features:
In terms of specifications ChampOne C1 is a dual-SIM 4G smartphone. The 5-inch HD (720x1280 pixels) IPS display works with.
The MT-6735 1.3 GHz quad-core Mediate processor, 2 GB RAM and 16 GB of internal storage is provided. memory has no information.
ChampOne C1 8 megapixel and 5-megapixel front camera. It runs on Android 5.1 Lollipop. Power is 2500 mAh battery.
How to Booking ChampOne C1 4G Mobile in Online:
Notably, it is not working yet, the registration button. The company says that smartphone 'cash on delivery' will be available on.
ChampOne C1 Mobile Phone Unbox:
When officaly ChampOne C1 smartphone release we will update to unbox.
Note: This is the giving information above given we taken form the web search which the other websites so users may check only official websites, For any reason which like fake information or videos, news, tech, lifestyle, entertainment, sports are the we are not responsibility.

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Review: LG Optimus G Pro for AT&T
Form Performance Basics Extras Wrap-Up Comments 1
The Optimus G Pro runs Android 4.1.2 Jelly Bean with many of the same software customizations we've seen on LG's smartphones for the better part of a year.
The lock screen is fully customizable. It offers five shortcuts, all of which can be changed or deleted. You can also customize which clock appears on the lock screen, and whether or not weather data and other alerts are sent to the lock screen.
There are three home screen panels for customization out of the box, but you can delete or add screens if you wish. There are a multitude of widgets on board.
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The drop-down notification shade provides shortcuts to control the wireless radios as well as brightness, rotation, sound, and the QSlide apps (videos, notepad, calendar, calculator). The QSlide apps (more on these later), as well as the radio toggles, can be customized by the user.
The main menu is a regular old grid of apps. Thankfully, you have some flexibility as far as customizing it is concerned. You can view it with large icons or small icons (default) to fit more apps on each individual page. You can sort apps alphabetically or via install date. You can't, however, view them in list form, nor by most-frequently used. Apps can be hidden, and, even better, there's a tool that lets you delete all the AT&T-branded apps right from the main menu page in one fell swoop. Nice!
I dislike how LG treats the settings menu on the G Pro. Most Android devices have an easy-to-use Settings menu that's laid out on a single page. Rather than take that approach, the Settings menu has been broken down into four separate tabs (much like what Samsung did with the GS4). The four tabs in the settings menu are Networks, Sound, Display, and General. I never quite got the hang of which Settings tools were under which of the tabs. However, after using the G Pro for several days, I discovered that this set-up can be disabled, and the Settings menu can be viewed on a single page.
As far as performance goes, the Optimus G Pro uses a Qualcomm Snapdragon 600 quad-core processor. Despite the power needed to keep the full HD screen going, the Snapdragon 600 was up to the task and more. It chewed through everything I threw at it. Nothing fazed the processor at all. Screen transitions were smooth, apps opened quickly, and the G Pro never slowed down.
Calls and Contacts
The phone and contact apps work exactly as they do on other LG smartphones, such as the Optimus G and Lucid 2.
The dialpad is absolutely huge and provides tabbed access to call history, contacts, favorites and groups. In-call options run the standard gamut, such as add a line, send to Bluetooth, hold, or mute. You can also open the note pad and messaging apps, or toggle on/off noise reduction (which makes calls clearer for those with whom you speak.)
There are the usual home screen shortcuts for quick access to select contacts, as well as the a nice widget for a collection of your favorites. The bigger widget lets you access your top nine contacts and gives you a cool UI for interacting with them on the home screen.
As far as messaging goes, the G Pro doesn't deviate from the Android norm. It houses all the typical Google apps: Gmail, email, SMS/MMS, Google Talk, Google+, and Google+ Messenger. All of these apps functioned as designed and are well built tools for communicating with others.
Both the native Facebook and Twitter apps are pre-installed, as well as embedded in the operating system. Sharing things with your social networks is never more than a Menu button out of reach.
Last, AT&T's catch-all IM app is available. This app can work with GTalk, as well as with AOL and Yahoo. (It used to work with Windows Live, but that's now Skype, and this app doesn't handle Skype IM). AT&T's messaging app is a bit clunky as far as I am concerned, but it can be helpful if you like to see everything in one spot rather than spread across various apps.
Hands-On: LG Optimus G Pro
LG had its massive phablet on display at Mobile World Congress in Barcelona. Here's a quick look at LG's Galaxy Note II killer.
Hands-On with LeTV Max Pro
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