text:
The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution
Constraints on Base and Rate Structure*
In constraining any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest.
As we have noted, traditional normative tax theory applies external criteria for economic efficiency and equity to evaluate alternative taxing arrangements. In the standard comparisons among alternatives, the problem is posed in equi-revenue terms. Government is presumed to require some exogenously determined amount of revenue per period, with the analysis having as its purpose the identification of that taxing arrangement that will generate such revenue most effectively as measured against the criteria chosen. In all essential respects, the standard analysis is institutionally vacuous. No attention is paid to possible feedback effects that specific tax instruments may exert on government itself in determining how much revenue it seeks to raise. By contrast, such possible interdependencies between the form of tax instruments and the behavior of governments in demanding revenues become central to any constitutional approach, including specifically one in which a Leviathan model of governmental process is adopted.*33
To emphasize the dramatic difference that the change in assumptions about political process makes, it will be useful to summarize the "principles" for tax structure that emerge from the orthodox analysis. As noted, government is implicitly assumed to require a fixed amount of revenue per budgetary period, an amount that presumably will finance some efficient or optimal quantity of public goods and services, considered independent of the spending side of the account. In this framework, the ideally efficient tax is taken to be the lump-sum levy which, by definition, exerts no behavioral influence.*34 Since persons do not adjust their behavior in any way in response to the tax, there can be no excess burden, no inefficiency that is tax-induced. Furthermore, within groups of taxpayers that are biologically homogeneous (with respect to features that cannot be modified by behavioral adjustment, features such as age, sex, race, and measured natural capacities and skills), the lump-sum tax must be uniform over separate persons. Hence, the central criterion of horizontal equity, equal treatment for equals, is satisfied along with that of economic efficiency.
The lump-sum tax serves as an analytical benchmark in the orthodox normative theory despite the widespread acknowledgment that it does not exist in practical reality. When it is recognized that all taxes must exert some behavioral influence, efficiency and equity criteria may come into conflict in the evaluation of alternative arrangements. On strict efficiency grounds, separate persons should be taxed in accordance with their separately predicted behavioral responses. Overall, excess burden is minimized only when the least responsive persons are taxed more heavily than are those who are more responsive. In such a case, however, equals, as measured by pretax situations, may not be treated equally, and equity considerations dictate uniformity of treatment regardless of behavioral response. Similarly, equity considerations may suggest relative differences in the tax treatment of "unequals" that run counter to the requirements for strict economic efficiency. If, for example, persons at lower ranges of the income or wealth scales should prove to be less responsive to tax than persons at the upper ranges, efficiency norms would suggest regressive rate schedules. Only such schedules would minimize excess burdens in this setting. However, equity norms might indicate that regressive rate schedules should be rejected out of hand and that persons should be confronted with rates that are at least proportional or possibly progressive in relation to pretax measures of tax base.
This orthodox normative evaluation of the characteristics of tax structures depends critically on the equi-revenue postulate, one that is untenable when we substitute a revenue-maximizing government for the passively benevolent politics implicitly assumed in the standard treatment. At the constitutional stage of decision in the Leviathan model, potential taxpayers will recognize that government may be held back in its fiscal appetites only by limits on tax bases and on allowable rate structures. Even the analytical benchmark, the idealized and abstract lump-sum tax, loses its "efficiency" features in constitutional perspective.*35 If indeed a tax could be located that exerts no behavioral influence, and if a revenue-maximizing government should be granted access to such a source of funds, all persons would be totally vulnerable to the fiscal authority, with all potential economic value subject to overt confiscation in the taxing process.
As actual tax institutions rather than the idealized models are evaluated, the constitutionally derived efficiency ranking becomes quite different from that which emerges from the orthodox equi-revenue comparison. By contrast, the constitutional perspective tends to be consistent with and hence to reinforce the equity norms that emerge from the more limited, and more naive, orthodox discussion. The principle of horizontal equity, equal treatment for equals, or, put simply, uniformity of treatment for similarly situated persons, becomes a feature of any tax structure that can begin to constrain Leviathan's exactions. If government is constitutionally required to follow precepts of generality in its fiscal dealings with citizens, the revenue potential that could possibly be derived from sophisticated discrimination among separate persons and groups of taxpayers is foreclosed.
Much the same conclusion arises with respect to rate schedules that confront the potential generators of tax base. If we make the plausible assumption that the potential taxpayer secures diminishing relative marginal utility from generating taxable base, whether this base be money income, money outlays, or specified items of spending or earnings, it follows that government can maximize revenue collections only by imposing an ideally regressive tax-rate schedule. Hence, a constitutional constraint against regressive schedules can serve to limit government's taxing power, defined in gross revenue terms. Note that the requirement for uniformity or generality in tax treatment among persons as well as the possible requirement that rate schedules be nonregressive become possible characteristics of an efficient "tax constitution," quite apart from any explicit introduction of external norms for tax equity or tax justice.
Over and beyond constitutional constraints on rate schedules, some limitations on the allowable bases for tax may be desired. In the orthodox normative theory, comprehensiveness in the actual bases of a tax is a highly ranked attribute of a fiscal structure. The logical support for such comprehensiveness is straightforward. To the extent that individuals, as potential taxpayers, are allowed to shift from taxable to nontaxable options, excess burden arises which represents deadweight loss to the community. Furthermore, to the extent that some potential taxpayers shift into nontaxable options while others do not, inequities seem to be created. Within an equi-revenue frame of reference, the argument for comprehensiveness in tax base is valid. But in the constitutional perspective taken in our analysis, the traditional support for tax-base comprehensiveness disappears.
Our purpose in this chapter is to examine in somewhat more formal terms the revenue-maximizing model of government and to analyze possible tax-base and tax-rate constraints that will serve to keep fiscal excesses within tolerable limits.
3.1. Government as Revenue Maximizer Subject to Constitutional Tax Constraints
As Knut Wicksell noted, no persons would approve the imposition of taxes, either at a constitutional or a postconstitutional stage of decision, unless they anticipate securing some benefits from the goods and services that they expect government to finance with the tax revenues collected. Taxes are coercive instruments that allow governments to levy charges on persons without any corresponding expression of current willingness to pay. Furthermore, even in the most effective models of political democracy, the consent of only a majority of the members of a representative assembly is needed for tax legislation.
Perhaps at one period in history it may have seemed reasonable to rely on the operation of majority rule in legislatures to hold governmental fiscal activities in bounds. And, of course, majority-rule models remain in formal theories of collective decision making and in popular discussions of democracy. However, confronted with public sectors of modern scope and bureaucracies that demonstrably possess power quite apart from specifically legislated authority, the democratic-limits model of governmental fiscal restraint becomes increasingly naive. Some of the reasons for questioning the efficacy of electoral constraints were discussed in Chapter 2. A more acceptable model for rational constitutional choice would seem to be one in which the political-bureaucratic process, as it is predicted to operate postconstitutionally, involves the maximization of revenues within tax constraints that are imposed through the fiscal constitution.
Such a model of political process, one that may be termed a model of Leviathan, has been introduced in Chapter 2. The citizenry has no effective control over government, once established, beyond the constraints that are imposed constitutionally. It is assumed that such constraints are binding, but that postconstitutional or in-period fiscal decisions within these constraints are made entirely by the budget-maximizing or revenue-maximizing politicians-bureaucrats.*36
Our stylized constitutional choice setting is characterized by the further and familiar assumption that each person has well-defined predictions about the aggregate level and the distribution of incomes and consumption patterns in all postconstitutional periods, but that he possesses no knowledge about his own future position within the distribution or about the characteristics of his own taste pattern.*37 The general, nonindividualized knowledge is sufficient to allow the person to make some estimate, within broad limits, both of the "efficient" levels of budgetary outlay on public goods, and of the aggregate revenues that might be obtained under alternative tax arrangements. Since the individual remains ignorant concerning his own predicted income or tastes, he cannot identify a cost share for himself under any particular tax system. He cannot, therefore, predict whether, postconstitutionally, he might prefer a larger or a smaller public-goods quantity than that which he predicts would be "efficient" for the whole community. Hence, each individual, rationally, will prefer institutions that generate roughly the "efficient" quantity, , given an independent estimate of the costs of provision. The actual outlay on desired public goods and services is defined by
where a is the predicted proportion of tax revenue spent on actually providing goods and services desired and R is aggregate tax collections or revenues. Throughout the analysis of the model to be discussed in this chapter, the value for a will be taken to be exogenous, by which we mean that it is fixed by the operation of constraints other than those here analyzed.*38 As we have indicated, a is such that
Hence, the outlay on desired public goods and services is some direct function of total revenue raised, and the problem that the individual faces at the constitutional stage is to organize tax arrangements so that the revenue raised, when adjusted by a, will yield the quantity of public goods and services estimated to be "efficient" at the given estimated new costs—costs that will, of course, be dependent on the value of a.*39 Thus, R will be chosen so that
The characteristic assumption of the Leviathan model is that, in each postconstitutional budgetary period, government will attempt to maximize total revenue collections (and hence total spending) within the constitutionally appointed tax regime. That is, government will make
where R* is the maximum revenue that can be raised from the tax regime and is a function of b, the tax base, and r, the allowable rate structure to be imposed on this base. Formally, the problem facing the individual at the stage of constitutional choice is to select b and r so that
3.2. Tax-Base and Tax-Rate Constraints in a Simple Model
Initially, we restrict the analysis to a single individual who is assumed to be exercising his constitutional choice between only two potential definitions of the tax base—one that is fully "comprehensive" and another which falls short of this limit. We shall relax these assumptions later, but at this point the simplification is convenient. It is immaterial for our argument precisely what the noncomprehensive base is and whether the tax is levied on the "uses" or the "sources" side (i.e., whether it might be an income tax or an expenditure tax). Let us consider a simple model in which labor is the only factor of production. Suppose, further, that the noncomprehensive tax base is money income derived from labor effort in the market, and that the comprehensive base includes such money income and also the imputed money equivalent of the individual's nonmarket production of valued end products, including leisure; in other words, the comprehensive base is full income or potential income. The question to be examined is whether the person would prefer a tax constitution that embodies the comprehensive base over the one that restricts the base of tax to money income.*40
The situation may be depicted as shown in Figure 3.1. The indifference curves, labeled with i's, indicate the individual's preferences as between money-income-earning activity, Y, and, say, leisure activity, L. These preferences exhibit the standard properties.*41 As is customary in orthodox tax analysis, in this introductory discussion we ignore income-effects feedbacks generated by the provision of public goods. The pretax situation is characterized by a relative trade-off between L and Y that reflects the productivity of income-earning activity. The initial pretax equilibrium is at E (Y0, L0) on i0.
Consider next the prospect that the individual would face if the government acquires access to the fully comprehensive tax base. In such an event, the individual would be exploitable up to the full limits of his potential income-earning ability over and beyond some minimal subsistence. Apart from this minimum, all of the "income equivalent," 0Ya, is potentially available for governmental use. The government bent on maximizing revenue could levy a tax that expropriated the individual's maximum potential earnings beyond the allowed subsistence level.*42
Since it is inconceivable that anyone could ever anticipate an "efficient" public-sector-private-sector mix that would require all potential income above subsistence for governmental purposes, it seems clear that a potential taxpayer-beneficiary would not select the comprehensive tax base if he predicts postconstitutional governmental behavior of the type that we have postulated. He will seek instead to impose constitutional constraints on the fisc, on the ability of government to tax. He can do so, in our simple case, by allowing the government to levy an income tax only on the ordinary sources of earnings—only on money incomes. The maximum revenue that can be secured from this narrowed tax base is depicted by YmYa in Figure 3.1. Clearly, if the government imposes a tax on money income with revenue in excess of YmYa, the individual would be better off by ceasing to earn income at all; he would improve his position by switching to position La. If limited to the money-income base, therefore, the government can secure revenues only up to this new maximum limit, YmYa, and it can secure this amount only if it levies an "ideally" structured regressive tax, in which the rate for each level of Y is equal to the slope of im. This would involve creeping down im to the maximum revenue equilibrium shown in the limit at Em, allowing the taxpayer a minute slice of surplus to ensure that his final equilibrium in the neighborhood of Em is preferred to La.
Recognizing this prospect, the potential taxpayer may wish to impose the further constitutional constraint that the rate schedule should not exhibit regressivity. This choice would clearly emerge if the money-income base, together with the predicted value for a and the revenue-maximizing regressive rate schedule, should be predicted to generate outlays on desired public goods and services in excess of predicted efficient levels of provision. If, for example, the government should be required to stay within the confines of a rate structure that exhibits proportionality, at the least, it would effectively be confronted with a locus of potential equilibria along the individual's "price-consumption" curve for varying "prices" of Y, depicted by LaKE in Figure 3.1. The revenue-maximizing arrangement in this case is shown where a line drawn parallel to LaYa is tangent to the price-consumption curve, indicated at K, with the associated revenue-maximizing proportional rate of tax on Y being YkYa/0Ya, and the revenue collected being YpYa. The precise characteristics of this case and the analytic resemblance to familiar results in price theory can be isolated by appeal to the corresponding partial equilibrium diagram shown in Figure 3.2.*43
Curve DD in Figure 3.2 indicates the individual's demand for the income-yielding activity; this curve might be derived from a preference mapping exhibiting the properties depicted in Figure 3.1. Confronted with the requirement that it must levy a proportional tax, what tax rate will the revenue-maximizing government select? The question is clearly analogous to that asked about the behavior of the monopoly firm that seeks to maximize profits, with the same answer. We derive a "marginal revenue" curve, MR, in Figure 3.2, and the quantity of Y at which revenue is maximized is determined by the intersection of this curve with the horizontal dollar-price line (which is marginal cost), indicating a posttax equilibrium level of money income at Y1 and a revenue-maximizing tax rate of t*. (Note that, when evaluated in the money-income numéraire, the cost of earning a dollar of income is simply a dollar. The "consumer's surplus" area between the demand curve and the cost curve in Figure 3.2 measures the utility value of money income relative to that of leisure, again evaluated in the numéraire, over and above that of leisure.)
The construction reveals the precise analogy between our model of postconstitutional governmental process and monopoly theory—in an analytic as well as a conceptual sense our model is appropriately designated a "monopoly theory of government." The revenue-maximizing tax rate, t*, can be derived algebraically as follows. We know that R = tY1, where t is the proportional tax rate and R is tax revenue. Further,
and DP/P = t. Therefore,
and differentiating,
Setting (8) at zero, we have
and substituting t* in (7), we have
Hence, as we might expect, maximum revenue is directly related to the initial size of the taxable base and inversely related to the value of the elasticity coefficient.
As we have indicated, the revenue raised from the given base under a proportional tax is less than that which might be raised under an ideally regressive rate structure. We are then led to ask what might be the influence of a progressive rate structure on revenue. In its dealings with a single taxpayer, the revenue-maximizing government will have no incentive to shift from the equilibrium proportional rate to any rate structure that embodies progression, since this latter would imply increasing rather than declining marginal rates of tax with income. The revenue effect can be demonstrated most easily by thinking of the simplest of all progressive rate structures, one that involves only two marginal rates, with the first being zero. Consider such a structure, sometimes called a degressive one, where income over some initial range, Ye, is wholly exempted from tax. With this additional constraint, the revenue-maximizing proportional rate on remaining units of income falls and total revenue collections fall correspondingly.
Diagrammatically, this result can be indicated by drawing the new marginal revenue curve, MRd, over the range where the nonzero proportional rate is to be applied—as in Figure 3.2, with the maximum rate being td*, with equilibrium total income at Yd. Observation of Figure 3.2 reveals that the revenue-maximizing degressive structure generates less total revenue than under the strict proportional tax and, also, that the excess burden is smaller. Under proportionality, the excess burden is measured in Figure 3.2 by the area ABC. Under the postulated degressive structure, excess burden falls to AHF.
Not all forms of progression yield this result for the change in excess burden. For example, a linear progressive rate schedule (of the form shown by line ST in Figure 3.2) will yield a revenue-maximizing marginal rate, t*, that is equal to the revenue-maximizing proportional rate, with the same posttax equilibrium income at Y1. Note that, in this case, the total revenue obtained under progression is a constant share of that which would be obtained under proportionality where the marginal rate levied at income Y1 would be applied over the entire income range. Hence, under the rate structure, ST, total revenue raised under progression is one-half that raised under proportionality. Note that the excess burden in the two cases is identical.
It may be useful to summarize the basic arguments of this section. We have observed that the constitutional decision-making calculus of the taxpayer-beneficiary, operating under the expectation of a Leviathan-like postconstitutional fiscal process, involves his opting for institutional devices that will limit the revenue-raising potential of the tax system. We have explored in some detail two ways that might accomplish this purpose. One is by limiting the size of the tax base—increasing the size of the tax base will be, beyond a point, clearly undesirable. The other is by imposing constitutional constraints on allowable rate structures on any given base. These constraints may rule out the imposition of regressive rate schedules. The argument stems, of course, both from the constitutional perspective within which our whole analysis is developed, and from the unconventional, but uncomfortably plausible assumptions that we have made about the predicted working properties of the political process.
3.3. One among Many
In the simple model analyzed in the preceding section, attention was focused on the single individual's choice calculus. This model need not be nearly so restrictive as it might appear, since we have examined choice in a constitutional setting, where the chooser is not expected to know just what his own position will be in subsequent postconstitutional periods. Nonetheless, we have neglected the problems that arise when the individual recognizes that, regardless of what his own position might be, he will be one among many taxpayers, with differences in public-goods preferences and in tax-base characteristics.
We may first consider whether or not our earlier results concerning tax-base limitations will hold in this setting. We may look at a highly simplified two-person illustration. In Figure 3.3, we assume that two persons, A and B, will earn identical amounts of money income in some pretax or no-tax equilibrium, in the amount Y0. (Recall that, under our constitutional-stage assumptions, the individual will know only that the two persons will have the characteristics depicted; he will not know which of the two positions he will personally occupy.) The two persons are predicted to differ substantially in their response to the imposition of a tax on the limited or money-income base, with leisure (and/or other valued end products) exempted from tax. This differential responsiveness is indicated by the slopes of the "demand curves" for money income, as shown by Da and Db.
The first point to be noted here is that so long as any responsiveness at all is predicted, the argument for the noncomprehensive base developed earlier holds without qualification. Each of the two persons whose preferences are depicted in Figure 3.3 will be protected against the exploitation potential of government that would be present under the full income as opposed to the money-income tax scheme.
Let us now examine the revenue-maximizing government's predicted taxing behavior in this two-person situation. If the government could treat A and B differently, and separately, and if it could levy a proportional tax on the money income of each person (we assume that a regressive schedule is not allowed), it would impose a tax rate of ta on A and a rate of tb on B. This sort of differential treatment would, under almost all circumstances, allow scope for the extraction of more revenue from the community than would be possible if the government were constitutionally required to levy the same proportional rate on each person, or, stated more generally, to confront each person with the same rate structure or schedule.
On the assumption that positive revenue is extracted from both persons in the uniform-rate case, that uniform rate will lie strictly between ta and tb (tb > t > ta). The revenue-maximizing uniform proportional rate, t, is determined in Figure 3.3, where the "market" marginal revenue curve, MRm, cuts the dollar-price line, with "price" set at the intercept of the vertical drawn from this intersection and the aggregate "demand curve," Dab.
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the requirement that all persons in the community be confronted with the same tax-rate schedule, or, in other words, that persons be treated uniformly, becomes an institutional means of reining the revenue-seeking proclivities of Leviathan. Such an argument for uniformity, which is related to but different from the more familiar "horizontal equity" norm, has not, to our knowledge, been developed in normative tax theory. With respect to horizontal equity, it is perhaps interesting to note that no constitutional rationalization for this principle, per se, emerges from our analysis.
The construction in Figure 3.3 can also be used to illustrate a proposition that seems at variance with that reached in models that assume institutional fixity. In the latter conventional framework, the behavior of individuals within the structure of given tax institutions is analyzed, and any attempt on the part of one person or group of persons to avoid or to reduce tax payments, through recourse to nontaxable sources or uses of income, is interpreted as imposing an external cost or diseconomy on less responsive taxpayers and/or on public-goods beneficiaries.*44 Behavior in reducing tax liability generates costs for others in the community by making higher rates of tax and/or lower rates of public spending necessary than would otherwise be required.
But now consider the same issue in our constitutional framework. An individual seeks to limit the revenue potential of Leviathan, while remaining uncertain as to his own position. In such a case, he is benefited by the fact that at least some taxpayers in the community will be able to reduce tax liabilities by shifting into nontaxable options because this will lead to a lower revenue-maximizing uniform tax rate. This result may be shown easily, as in Figure 3.3. Compare the revenue-maximizing uniform rate, t, with that rate which would be revenue-maximizing if the two taxpayers were predicted to be equally responsive in the manner indicated by Db. The uniform rate would rise to tb, with higher revenue collections by government. Therefore, B benefits by virtue of the fact that A responds along Da rather than Db, thereby ensuring that the tax rate is t, not tb. To the extent, therefore, that a person in constitutional choice predicts that some members of the whole set of taxpayers will be able to shift to nontaxable sources or uses of income in postconstitutional periods, his own concern about the fiscal exploitation of Leviathan is correspondingly reduced.
As a final point in this section, we want to consider whether or not our earlier result concerning the relationship among progression, proportionality, and maximum revenue holds in the many-person setting. Recall that, in the one-person setting, the introduction of any progressive features into the tax-rate schedule would tend to reduce the potential maximum revenue that government might extract from the single taxpayer. The problem in the many-person setting becomes much more complex because both the differing behavioral responses and the differing pretax levels of income must be taken into account, within the requirement that uniformity in tax treatment be preserved. Recall that, in the simple two-person setting depicted in Figure 3.3, tb > t > ta, where ta and tb were revenue-maximizing proportional rates upon the two persons treated in isolation from each other, and where t was the revenue-maximizing proportional rate uniformly imposed on both persons. Can total revenues be increased above those raised by rate t if government is allowed to or required to introduce progression? By lowering the rate over some initial ranges of income, revenue collections from A, the most responsive person, will increase. But offsetting this increase in collections from A, there must be, over this range of incomes, a reduction in collections from B, who must be treated uniformly. Beyond this limit, however, collections from B may be increased by setting some rate above t. Whether or not the increase in revenue collections exceeds or falls short of the decrease clearly depends on the relative elasticities of the two persons' "demand curves" where they cut the horizontal at s + t, the revenue-maximizing proportional rate of tax. If the person designated as A in Figure 3.3 is much more responsive to the reduction in tax below t than B is to the increase in tax above t over the higher income ranges, progression may increase revenues above those raised by uniform proportionality. In other cases, this increase may not be possible.*45 The limitations imposed by dealing with a two-person model should be stressed here. What is of importance is the tax-adjustment elasticities of different groups of taxpayers. In terms of the representation in Figure 3.3, the addition of a third person equivalent to A would increase the likelihood that progression would be revenue-enhancing. On the other hand, adding a third person equivalent to B would reduce such a prospect. This result suggests that the relative revenue-generating properties of revenue-maximizing proportional and progressive rate structures depend critically on the distribution of taxpayers among the separate response groups, with separate levels of taxable income.
3.4. Tax Limits and Tax Reform
We have argued that the bases for taxation, as well as the rate structure, will be constrained constitutionally by the person empowered to choose among tax arrangements who does not know his own position and who adopts a revenue-maximizing model for the behavior of government in postconstitutional periods. Our analysis provides support for the noncomprehensiveness of the allowable tax base. To the extent that activities which yield value to taxpayers remain outside the allowable reaches of the fiscal authority, the appetites of Leviathan are checked. Persons may resort to nontaxable options, and in the knowledge that they will do so, government necessarily curbs its revenue extraction.
The danger of allowing government access to revenue-raising instruments that generate budgets in excess of those necessary for financing some roughly efficient levels of public goods and services has been central to our model. We should, however, recognize that constitutional tax constraints might, through time, prove to be overly restrictive. In this case, postconstitutional pressures will surely arise for escape through constitutional-style adjustments designed to widen the bases and to allow for more flexible rate structures, to move generally from specificity to comprehensiveness. Empirically, it will always be difficult to distinguish between genuine constituency demands for a relaxation of such constraints and the ever-present demands of the revenue-seeking politicians-bureaucrats. For the latter group, and for their spokesmen, efforts will tend to be directed toward widening bases, toward increasing the number of sources upon which taxes may be imposed. "Tax-reform" advocacy on the part of the "bureaucratic establishment" will tend to be centered on "tax-base erosion." Indeed, one indirect test of the empirical validity of our model of the political process lies in the observed lack of reformist concern about relative rates of tax within tax-law limits that currently exist.
In the discussion of proposed tax-base changes, the attitudes of the traditional normative tax theorist and the members of the taxpaying public differ more sharply than anywhere else. Our analysis is helpful in "explaining" the attitudes of the taxpayers. For example, they are likely to react negatively and emphatically to proposals to move toward taxation on the basis of full income, as, for example, by including the imputed rental values of owned residences in the base for personal income tax. The normative tax theorist, who advocates such inclusion from reasoning based on equi-yield comparisons, responds to taxpayers by arguing that overall rates of tax may be lowered simultaneously with the widening of the base. But the taxpayers may be implicitly, but correctly, rejecting the equal yield postulate, in their predictions that any widening of the tax base must open up further taxing possibilities for a revenue-seeking government.
Illustrations might easily be drawn from American fiscal experience. For example, in late 1979, a proposal was widely discussed aimed at the introduction of a broad-based value-added tax with offsetting reductions in payroll taxes and individual and corporate income taxes. If such a proposal is adopted, it may be predicted that, ultimately, the value-added tax would be used to generate revenues greatly in excess of the revenue reductions under other taxes. In fact, of course, almost any widely advocated tax change tends to be justified in terms of its greater "efficiency," or its greater "fairness," springing from the extension of the tax base. As our analysis indicated, if our perception of postconstitutional political process bears any relation to reality at all, it is precisely on such grounds that the change should be rejected.
Appendix: Progression in the Multiperson Setting
The question of interest here is this: Can a progressive tax system raise more revenue than the revenue-maximizing proportional system, when there are many taxpayers? We have already shown that the revenue-maximizing proportional system always gives more revenue in the single-taxpayer case, or equivalently in the many-taxpayer case when all taxpayers are identical. Is this true more generally?
To investigate this question, we examine a simple two-person example, denoting the two individuals by A and B. We shall assume that B is "richer" than A—that Yb exceeds Ya at all tax rates. We further assume, for analytic convenience, that the individuals' demand curves for nonleisure activity have constant elasticities. We can therefore write
Y0i is i's pretax income
so that
and Dp = t, p0 = 1, by assumption. The individually revenue-maximizing proportional rates, ti*, can be derived by maximizing tiY1i in each case by simple calculus. On this basis, we obtain
The uniform proportional tax rate that maximizes revenue, t*, is obtained by maximizing the expression
which yields
From (4), it is clear that t* is a weighted average of sorts of ta* and tb* and must lie between ta* and tb*.
In fact, recalling that Yb exceeds Ya by assumption, a necessary condition for progression to yield more revenue than the revenue-maximizing proportional rate is that
If this is not so, a departure from t* by lowering the rate for earlier units of income or raising the rate on later units of income (to B) must reduce revenue. From this it follows directly, using (2), that
To derive sufficient conditions, consider the revenue-maximizing "progressive" rate structure, which consists of two rates: t1 over the range in which both pay tax and t2 in the range where B only pays tax. Any additional progression must lose revenue. We can examine aggregate revenue in this case and determine the conditions that must hold for t2 to exceed t1. Accordingly, we examine
Setting (8) and (9) at zero, we have the equation system
where y = Y0b/Y0a (> 1). Thus, we have
For t2* > t1*, therefore, we require that
Since 1 < y < ∞ (by construction), (12) requires that hb/ha be less than three-fourths, or that ha be at least one-third larger than hb.
We should note that if ha is too large relative to hb, then the revenue-maximizing arrangement in the proportional tax case may ignore A entirely and simply levy tb*, and the progressive tax system becomes "proportional" anyway. That is, we require that t* < 1/ha (since at t = 1/ha, individual A ceases to pay tax entirely). In other words, we require that
That is,
Combining (12) and (13), we can specify the general requirement on hb and ha as
For y in the neighborhood of unity, we require ha to be more than twice as large as hb. As y becomes very large, we require only that ha be more than one-third larger than hb—but not more than twice as large, since then the tax system will force A to earn no taxable income at all.
It is however clear that, for any value of y, there is a value of hb/ha that satisfies (14). Progression can therefore yield more revenue than proportionality, under the appropriate relative values of hb and ha.
It is interesting at this point to contrast the results under the simple two-tier rate structure with those that emerge under a progressive tax system in which the marginal tax rate is a linear function of Y1. Such a "linear" progressive tax is depicted in Figure 3.4 by the line SM. Now, under such a rate structure, the largest amount of revenue in the two-person case that could conceivably be obtained is exactly one-half of the maximum revenue obtainable under a regime in which the revenue-maximizing proportional rates, ta* and tb*, are imposed on A and B, respectively. This situation is depicted in Figure 3.4—the revenue obtained from B is at most ½Rb*, from A at most ½Ra*.
Let the revenue under this "linear progressive" rate structure be RL. Then
Let the revenue derived from the revenue-maximizing uniform proportional rate structure be Rp. Then we know that B can be treated as if he were identical with A, so that Rp must be greater than or equal to 2Ra*; and A could be ignored entirely, so that Rp must be at least as great as Rb*. In other words,
Suppose that 2Ra* Rb*. Then
so that
If, on the other hand, Rb* 2Ra*, then
In the two-person case, then, the linear progressive tax derives unambiguously smaller revenue than the revenue-maximizing uniform proportional system.
We can add a third party, C, where Rc* > Rb* > Ra* by construction. Then, by analogous reasoning,
Let 3Ra* 2Rb* Rc*. Then
And similarly, if Rc* 3Ra*, 2Rb*, or 2Rb* 3Ra*, Rc*. More generally, it can be shown by induction that
(where RLn is the linear progressive rate for n taxpayers). Assume that RLn < Rpn. Then
Now, Rpn+1 must exceed Rpn, since Rpn is feasible (one could simply ignore individual n + 1). Moreover, Rpn+1 must exceed Rn+1*, since Rn+1* is feasible. Therefore,
So ; and since the result is true for n = 2, and n = 3 it is true for all n, by induction. Thus, the "linear progressive" schedule always derives less revenue than the revenue-maximizing proportional rate structure.
A third variety of progression is worth mentioning here. This is the degressive system mentioned in Chapter 3. Any such system, combining a flat exemption with a uniform proportional rate, must raise less revenue than the revenue-maximizing uniform proportional rate structure, since less revenue is obtained from each and every taxpayer.
Notes for this chapter
Some of the central ideas developed in this chapter were initially presented in a more general format in our paper "Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan," Journal of Public Economics, 8 (December 1977), 255-74.
Modern public-choice theory has incorporated the effects of tax instruments on public-goods supply in a constitutional choice approach. Almost exclusively, however, the public-choice model for constitutional fiscal choice has embodied the assumption, explicitly or implicitly, that postconstitutional budgetary decisions conform to the public-goods demands of the median voter or his representative in a legislative assembly. For this approach, see James M. Buchanan, Public Finance in Democratic Process (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967). The analysis in this book differs critically from the public-choice theory analysis, in that we substitute a revenue-seeking Leviathan for the demand-driven and essentially passive government which that analysis assumes.
If the spending side of the account is taken into account, the ideally efficient tax becomes the Lindahl tax price. In one sense, the element of coercive taxation is removed in this "fiscal-exchange" approach. The latter approach is, however, not properly classified as falling within the orthodox tax analysis summarized here. For a discussion of the fiscal-exchange approach, as it is contrasted with the orthodox, see James M. Buchanan, "Taxation in Fiscal Exchange," Journal of Public Economics, 6 (July-August 1976), 17-29.
In its most general meaning, "efficiency" must be related to conceptual agreements among all members of the community. At the level of standard policy discussion, it is relatively easy to translate the familiar Paretian criterion into such consensual terms, especially when the possibility of actually organizing a set of compensations is allowed. In constitutional choice, however, the consensual definition of efficiency (i.e., an efficient position or rule is one upon which no agreement for change can possibly be reached) does not readily map into familiar concepts in modern welfare economics. An "efficient" tax arrangement, one that would emerge from agreement at a constitutional state of deliberation, need not, and normally would not be expected to, satisfy orthodox criteria for efficiency defined at the in-period or postconstitutional level.
There are evident similarities between our model and that developed by William Niskanen in his theory of bureaucracy. See his Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971).
In the most extreme setting for constitutional choice, we may assume that the individual is in some Rawlsian "original position" and behind the "veil of ignorance." See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). We do not need to impose such rigid requirements, however, for the constitutional setting to be relevant. Somewhat more plausibly, we may assume only that the individual is highly uncertain about his own future position. See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
The use of tax constraints to ensure that the value of a will be high will be specifically analyzed in Chapter 7.
The interrelationships among , a, and various aspects of tax institutions will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 4.
The analysis holds equally for the case where the comparison is between a more comprehensive and a less comprehensive base, even when the former is itself less comprehensive than the "ideal," when defined in the orthodox terms.
By the assumptions of the model, the individual cannot predict his precise preference pattern as between money-income-earning and alternative activity in postconstitutional periods. All that is required for our analysis here is that these preferences are predicted to be standard.
It should perhaps be noted at this point that we are assuming that the revenues collected, as these accrue to the agents of government, are not included in the comprehensive base of the tax itself. In the simple conception of Leviathan as the ruling class or monarch, the assumption here is tantamount to allowing the king to be exempt from taxation. In a dominant majority conception of political process, the comprehensive tax may be presumed to fall on all income, but not on the special benefits, transfers, and so on, that accrue to members of the majority coalition as a result of disbursements from total revenues collected.
The construction in Figure 3.1 can be used to demonstrate how the constitutional choice setting under our political assumptions transforms the familiar excess-burden argument made in support of a comprehensive tax base. A solution at point K, in the traditional argument, is shown to be inferior to that which might be attained with a comprehensive base or general tax that will yield the same revenue, producing an ideal solution at a point such as H in Figure 3.1, which may lie on a higher indifference curve than K. This argument must presume, however, that the government, once empowered to levy the comprehensive base tax, will, in fact, restrict its attempt to raise revenue to the collections dictated by the equi-yield comparisons. The partial equilibrium version, based on the Marshallian demand-curve construction, can be used to illustrate the revenue-maximizing regressive rate structure, but because of income-effect feedbacks on demand, more restrictive assumptions must be made. For similar reasons, the area under the demand curve cannot accurately reflect consumer or taxpayer surplus; nor can the standard welfare triangle measure welfare loss accurately, except in the case where the income-consumption curve in Figure 3.1 is a horizontal line. We set such problems as these aside in the analysis here since they have no particular relevance to our discussion.
For an explicit discussion in such an externality setting, see James M. Buchanan, "Externality in Tax Response," Southern Economic Journal, 33 (July 1966), 35-42.
Algebraic derivation of the conditions under which different results apply is presented in the appendix to this chapter.
End of Notes
Return to top
The cuneiform inscription in the Liberty Fund logo is the earliest-known written appearance of the word "freedom" (amagi), or "liberty." It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 B.C. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash.


text:
Pacific Affairs is pleased to offer four samples of our publication for your perusal.
You will need Adobe Reader to view these documents, if you do not have it installed you can get it at no cost here.
Volume 79, Issue 2, Summer 2006
Volume 79, Issue 3, Fall 2006
(Special Issue: The Other Binary: Why Japan-North Korea Relations Matter)
Volume 82, Issue 2, Summer 2009

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Skip to comments.Winds Wallop Wapello, Iowa, Grain Bins
Posted on 06/26/2013 12:50:11 PM PDT by stillafreemind
WAPELLO, Iowa -- The winds came to Wapello on Monday. Damages to trees and some roofs were evident around the Wapello area. Probably the most devastating damage hit grain bins in this rural area. Farmers Elevator and Exchange sits along highway 61. They had two grain bins succumb to the high winds. A 200,000 bushel grain bin was totally disintegrated while a second bin of the same size was seriously damaged. The second bin was close to being lifted off of its foundation too.
(Excerpt) Read more at news.yahoo.com ...
Climate change!! Bush's fault!
Yeah buddy..it's quite a miracle that Bush could do so many wrong things that have lasted for so long.
Sorry about your friend. A relative of mine was about 17 miles from Muscatine. She was home for the storm and the outer part of her roof came off. She didn't even realize it until family showed up and said, "You ok? You lost your roof."
Extended solar minimums have been known to bring unusual fluctuations toward both cold and warm while most noticeably toward cold. I've seen some interesting dust devils on the Rockies this summer—nearly like small dust tornadoes that run up to a couple of miles or so.
Thanks..he was in the car dealership..body man. They said he was going to retire this coming December..guess the Lord needed him more.
Sorry about your relative's house..just like the bins..its expensive, even if you have insurance. But you simply cannot beat the MidWest for neighbor helping neighbor..can ya?
That area really is full of good people. Within hours of the storm, family was there to tarp the outside of the roof and it will be repaired.
I saw the photos of the autoshop. What a rotten deal.
And so odd because it wasn't a big tornado. But I guess it was big enough.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.


text:
API Documentation
Warning: this page is out of date!
This page is for legacy apps running the 1.0 version of the Translation Cloud API. We strongly recommend users migrate to the Translation Cloud API version 2.0.
Read more on the latest documentation here.
View a list of available API calls and their specifications. Select a specific call below.
Available API calls:


text:
Job posting guidelines
If you'd like to post a job opening to the BYU CocoaHeads group, please follow these guidelines. They are meant to help you get a more favorable response to your email.
Strongly encouraged to include:
- Company name
- Job description
- Hours expected
- Required skills (what is necessary)
- Desired skills (beneficial, but not required)
- Remote or on-site work location
- App description
- Target audience
- Brief overview
- Compensation (salary, per hour wage, stock, etc)
- We understand that most positions compensate based on experience, but give us a ballpark number. Perhaps an average of what your existing developers get paid? Or what you're willing to offer an experienced developer?
- Saying "competitive" does not tell us anything
- Contact information
Recommended to include
- Benefits offered (medical? dental? vision?)
- Company information (apps in the store, etc)
- Company financial info
- Is the company profitable?
- What sources of funding do you have? (investors vs bootstrapping)
Recommended to avoid
- Marketing hype
- Using words like "guru", "all-star", "ninja", etc are sure ways to get your email ignored or ridiculed. We are software engineers, not Mountain Dew-guzzling martial artists who tap at keyboards
- Explicitly saying that you're not looking for rockstars or ninjas is just as bad, because then we feel like you're patronizing us. Just tell us what you're looking for.
- Requiring an NDA before you'll tell us what the idea is. You're asking us to enter into a legal agreement just so we can have the sort of conversation you'd have in a café. It's insulting and is a major turn-off. You're willing to trust us to build the app for you; surely you can trust us enough to tell us what it is. If you don't trust us with your idea, what possible reason could we have for trusting you when you say your idea is The Next Big Thing?
- Saying it'll "build our resumes". This makes it sound like you're doing us a favor by posting the opening. You're not. We get these sorts of things all the time. We have no trouble "building" our resumes.
Things to understand
- Programmers are, by definition, logical people. Therefore, attempting to sway our emotions in order to get us to work for you is not a good idea. Convince us. Why should we listen to you instead of the other offer that got posted yesterday?
- iOS developers are in short supply. If you're looking to hire one at an hourly rate, offering less that $50/hour is a good way to get laughed at. Experienced developers can easily charge several times that amount.
- Developers prefer to make money. Offering a percentage of sales almost never provides that. Here's an example: Let's say you make a deal with a developer to write an app that you'll sell for $4.99 and that he'll get 25% of sales. Let's also say that this app takes 100 hours to complete (it's a simple app). Apple is going to take 30%, so each sale will get you $3.49. Of this, the developer will get 87¢. Let's say the developer normally charges $100/hour. That means that in order to break even on doing your app, you'd have to sell 11,452 copies of the app. That's for a simple app. Are you sure your app will be that popular?
Good posting:
Acme Apps is looking for an iPhone developer to help build an app targeting goth teenagers. We need someone who can start on February 30 and who can commit to at least 3 months of full-time work. You'll need to attend the occasional in-office meeting, but you're welcome to work wherever you like.
The app itself will need to leverage features like Google Maps, audio recording, databases, speech-to-text, and image recognition. Knowing how to interact with RESTful web services would also be a major bonus.
Compensation would be $200 per hour, which would include medical benefits, pension, 401k, and employee stock purchase plan. If you are interested, please contact Inigo at firstname.lastname@example.com.
Acme Apps is a very successful company with 13 apps in the store, including Fart Master 9000, iSpyOnYou, and Toss the iPhone!.
- Other excellent job postings:
- Infuse Medical
Bad Postings:
- IS EVERY HOUR DEW-THIRTY FOR YOU? MegaMobile is looking for ROCKSTAR app developers who live for the thrill of 48-hour code jams! Email us at firstname.lastname@example.com to let us know when you want to start!
- Any email (even one that contains good information) that starts with: "AmazingApps is seeking a highly motivated & passionate individual to work as an iPhone Developer... a true iOS development rock star!" (From an actual email; company name has been changed)


text:
School registration and yearly updates are online and will be done through Bay Parent Portal. Please refer to the categories on the Parent Portal page and select the option that applies to you. If you need any further assistance, please contact your student's Zoned School or Student Services @ 767-4311.
Parent Portal is a complete on-line system which allows the parent access to their student's information including, but not limited to, student schedules, grades, discipline, and attendance.
For the very best user experience, you will need to use FireFox or Google Chrome as your browser.
Kindergarten Immunization Update
A fifth dose of poliovirus vaccine is required if the fourth dose was administered prior to the fourth birthday. (DOH: 2011 Immunization News Archive)
Kindergarten Immunization Requirements
Registration Overview
This is an overview of registration requirements. For further information, refer to Bay District School Board Policy. Policy citations are cited in parenthesis following each requirement.
Age Requirement
In order to be eligible for kindergarten admission, a student must have attained the age of five (5) years on or before September 1 of the current school year (7.101).
Students under the age of 18 may only be enrolled by a parent or guardian.
Required Documents for Registration:
Two proofs of address:
*if moving from out-of-state, parents may take the current shot record to the Health Department to have it transferred to an official Florida shot record (Form 680).
Medical Exam
Each student shall, within thirty (30) school days of initial admission into Bay County Schools, provide evidence of a medical examination conducted within the previous twelve (12) months pursuant to laws and rules of the State Board of Education (7.101).
Medications or Allergies
No medication (prescription or non-prescription) will be dispensed at school without written parental/guardian permission. All medications (prescription or non-prescription) must be registered on the Bay County School Board Permission to Administer Medication form (only one medication per form) and must be signed by a licensed physician or other licensed practicing health care provider. Note this form must be renewed at the beginning of each school year (7.302).
Permission to Administer Medication
Transfer Students from Non-Public School Programs
A student entering a district school from a nonpublic school or program shall meet the General Admission and Enrollment Requirements. If the student is transferring from a nonpublic school which is not state or regionally accredited, or from a home education program, the student shall be assigned to a grade by the school principal based on placement evaluation (7.101).
Controlled School Choice Program
A choice request will need to be filed only if the parents or legal guardian's desire the student to change schools. Before completing a choice request, the student must be registered at his or her zone school.
Contact us:
School Choice/Zoning Department 850.767.4328
To start your child's new year off on the right foot, please be reminded that all new and existing families are required to update your student's information online through your Parent Portal account. Your receipt of your child's school placement letter does not take the place of this requirement.
Existing Parent Portal users with no address changes can complete this in the comfort of your home or anywhere that you can access the internet. Go to www.bay.k12.fl.us and click on the Parent Portal icon on the Bay District Schools home page.
Parents new to Bay District Schools or those without a Parent Portal account need to complete online registration. This registration can be done at your assigned school site.
No more of those tedious registration cards with the tiny blanks to be filled in!
The following are all benefits of your participation in this electronic registration process and Parent Portal usage:
Complete the process today!
All students entering 7th grade are required to have a Tdap booster. You can check with your healthcare provider or the Florida Department of Health in Bay County to make sure your student's immunizations are up to date. Immunizations are free of charge at the health department. Please bring updated shot records to your student's school no later than August 18th. For further information you may contact the Florida Department of Health in Bay County at 872-4455.
Executive Director/Equity Coordinator
Human Resources and Employee Support Services
Non-Discrimination Statement


text:
"They shouldn't be teaching kids how to use guns. What happens when they get older? They might become like that Connecticut killer." Cal Castille, 24, of Houston
"Im sorry, this non-sense just cracks me up." NY Firearms.com website response to criticism of NRA's Youth Day Event
Houston Texas: How has the murder of school children and their teachers at Sandy Hook School effected the NRA? Well this year the NRA topped off it's mega convention by enticing children as as young as 3 to fire weapons at their Youth Day event. They even offered each child a free six-month membership in the NRA. The Daily Mail Online reports that 12 year old Will Marshall from Florida, "has been a member of the NRA for 11 years and owns four guns." In other words, Will has been a member of the NRA since he was one year old.
In spite of the fact that statistics show us that a gun in the house is a danger to the occupants – particularly children -the firearms industry has created a vividly colorful variety of rifles designed specially for children. It could not be clearer that arming children is a goal of the weapons industry and the NRA.
"I want an AR-15 and a M1911. I like how they look." said Samuel aged 11, of Nederland, Texas at the NRA Youth Day event for kids at their national convention.
"Looking at some of them, the same age my little boy who was killed in his classroom, it makes you think." Neil Heslin, who lost his 6-year-old son Jesse Lewis in the Sandy Hook massacre.
"If that alarm goes off and the glass breaks and the dog starts barking, what's the instinct that most people are going to have, in regards to, 'Am I going to run across the house to get the gun, or am I going to run over here to help the screaming kid?' And if I'm going to go to the kid anyway, and I have an extra gun and an extra safe, why not put it in their closet?" Convention speaker Rob Pinkus.
Meanwhile the NRA convention featured a sexily clad, "ex-girlfriend" shooting target that bleeds when shot.
"This reprehensible product stokes the fire of relationship violence which already claims far too many of our mothers, daughters and sisters." Laura Cutilletta, a senior staff attorney at the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence.
The company that creates this lifelike shooting target, Zombie Industries, calls their bleeding product "The Ex". Zombie Industries responded to harsh criticism from the public by changing the name to "Alexa."
As reported by the New York Daily News, "the NRA welcomed its youngest lifetime member, 3-year-old Elaih Wagan, whose grandfather purchased the membership." At the same time anti-gun protesters read the names of gun victims directly across the street from the venue.
The Washington Examiner reported that the event drew more than 86,000 people and that the NRA sold over $1 million in souvenirs.
Note: The day the NRA convention opened, a man walked into Houston's George Bush Intercontinental Airport, fired two bullets into the ceiling and was shot in the shoulder by Homeland Security. The man then shot himself in the head and died instantly. His suicide note read, "The monster within me was getting stronger and while I could not save myself I could save others."
Between 2000 and 2009, almost 300,000 people died by gunfire in the U.S. — almost 4,000 American citizens have been killed by guns since the Sandy Hook massacre.
Following is a list of children involved in gun incidents since Dec. of last year:
UPDATE: Friday June 7, Prescott Valley, Ariz. — Authorities in northern Arizona say a 4-year-old boy has accidentally shot and killed his father at a Prescott Valley home.
UPDATE Monday June 3, Las Vegas, The family of a four year old shot in the head over the weekend held a vigil for her outside University Medical Center Monday night. Sofia Trujillo is expected to survive. Police say her mother's boyfriend Manuel Mata III shot her and killed her mother Maria Flores and her half sister Elizabeth Gomez.
UPDATE May 31, Brooklyn NY, An 11 year old girl was waiting for her aunt outside her Bedford-Stuyvesant home when a gunman walking down the street opened fire at two men standing outside of another residence, police said. A stray bullet pierced Tayloni's throat, ricocheting down her spine before lodging in her back. She may be paralyzed for life.
UPDATE: Fri May 31, Tyler Texas, On Wednesday, a two-year-old Texas boy named Trenton Mathis accidentally shot and killed himself with a handgun he found sitting on his great-grandfather's nightstand. Trenton would have been three years old in July.
UPDATE: May 19, Asheboro, N.C. — Randolph County deputies said a 2-year-old boy accidentally shot and injured himself when he found a handgun at his home Saturday afternoon.
UPDATE : Sat May 18, North Carolina, A toddler found a handgun in his parents' bedroom, put it in his mouth — and the gun went off. He is expected to survive.
UPDATE: Weds May 15 An 11 year old boy dies after being shot by 4 year old in Lake City Fla.
UPDATE: Tues May 14 A 5-year-old boy who was shot in the head at a Denton home Saturday morning died Monday afternoon in a Dallas hospital
UPDATE: Sunday May 12, Wilkes_Barre, PA, a 3 year old boy is shot in the hand.
UPDATE: TULLAHOMA, Tenn. – A 13-month-old child remains hospitalized, and her father is behind bars after police said the girl was shot in the chest.
Friday. May 10. Camden, New Jersey. 11-Year-Old New Jersey Boy Shoots 12-Year-Old In The Face
Thursday. Thursday, May 9. Corsicana, Texas. 2-year-old Texas boy shoots himself in the head with father's handgun
Tuesday, May 8. Houston, Texas: Boy, 5, accidentally shoots brother, 7, in northeast Houston
Tuesday, May 8. Tampa, Florida: 3-Year-Old Fatally Shoots Himself With Uncle's Gun
Sunday, May 6. Indianapolis, Indiana: Police: 4-year-old boy grabbed gun, shot himself in hand
Saturday, May 5. Oakland Park, Florida: 13-Year-Old Boy Shoots 6-Year-Old Sister In Florida
Thursday, May 2. Yuma, Arizona: Arizona 3-year-old fatally shoots himself in face with grandma's gun
Thursday, May 2. Cumberland County, Kentucky: 5-year-old Kentucky boy fatally shoots 2-year-old sister
Tuesday, April 30. Mountain Village, Alaska: 5-year-old shot, killed by 8-year-old brother in remote Alaska
April 9, 2013: Boy, 4, shoots and kills playmate, 6
April 8, 2013: Tennessee deputy's wife killed by 4-year-old child handling gun
February 24, 2013: 4-year-old killed himself with dad's gun in N. Houston
February 22, 2013: Boy, 2, accidentally shoots self after finding gun in mother's purse
February 5, 2013: 3-year-old S.C. boy killed after mistaking pink handgun for toy
January 24, 2013: Four-year-old Ohio boy shoots himself dead with father's gun 'he didn't know was real'
January 10, 2013: Child playing with gun accidentally shoots self
December 25, 2012: Father arrested after son, two, grabbed his gun from table and shot himself in Christmas Day tragedy
December 5, 2012: Minneapolis boy, 4, finds gun, shoots brother, 2,
Daily Banter, NY Daily News, Wall Street Journal, FOX news, CBS, NBC, NYFirearms.com, Daily Beast, NY Times, Washington Examiner, Houston Chronicle


text:
The Share Buttons are not showing in my home page.They were showing before, but I dont know what happen. I already drag them to enable them, and they show in the Live Preview. I also checked the box to show buttons on Front Page, Archive Pages, and Search Results. I don't know what else to do.
Thank you.
Becoming Eve
The blog I need help with is becomingeve.net.


text:
The Flash film by Warner Bros. and DC Comics.
Petitioning: Hollywood, Warner Bros, DC Comics
Petitioner: Cory Morr started on June 30, 2010
I'm starting this petition around the world to help support actor Christopher Pine or Chris Pine (Captain Kirk in the 2009 Star Trek film) to have the opportunity to screentest as the superhero The Flash by DC comics and Warner Bros.
The Flash was created in 1939 by comic book writers Gardner Fox and Harry Lampert. The Flash started with Golden Age Flash Jay Garrick in 1939, then Barry Allen the Silver Age Flash in 1956, Wally Wast (Kid Flash 1 and Barry's nephew) in 1985 and then Bart Allen (Kid Flash 2, Barry's grandson and Impluse) in 2006. The Flash film will will surround the Silver Age Flash,"Barry Allen" based on Geoff Johns's recent Flash comic books about Barry Allen (Ex. Flash: Rebirth).
Barry was killed off in 1985 during the Infinite Crisis of Earth where he battled Reverse Flash Zoom (Eobard Thwane). Barry Allen is a foresics police lab scientist for the government. He lives in a fictitious mid-western city called,"Central City" Missouri. But, travels to another fictious mid-western city called,"Keystone City" where his nephew Wally West lives. While in his lab on a rainy thunderstorm night, Barry Allen is struck by lightning, thrown into a rack of highly radioactive chemicals that discharge all over his body. Barry Allen undergoes a molecular atomic transformation in his DNA. The lightning bolt and radioactive chemicals simultaneously charge his electrons to a super accelerated rate. The same circumsances occurs too with Wally West as a young boy at age 10. This situation gives Barry Allen the ability of superhuman speed.
The Flash's superspeed comes from a faster then light energy field that controls all aspects of the Flash's powers called the,"SPEED FORCE." The Flash can run speeds at the speed of light (other times faster), can vibrate his molecules to move through solid matter, use kenetic energy (friction heat) to generate sonic boom explosions, and can break certain laws of Physics containing the ability to time travel. Endowed with his new found speed powers he fights crime and Central City's worse enemies as The Flash A.K.A THE FASTEST MAN ALIVE.
Barry Allen transforms as The Flash by his magical costume ring he retains on a daily basis. The Flash races across time and space to save the people of the world.
I can't think of any good actor that is amazing enough, capable, talented and successful to play Barry Allen/The Flash than actor Chris Pine.
Chris Pine has been rumored as Hal Jordan/Green Lantern before Ryan Reynolds and was casted and rumored for even Captain America (Marvel) before Chris Evens was casted for that; however, I believe it's Chris Pine's turn to show the fans what he is really capable of. I think Chris Pine would indeed typecast well as Barry Allen/The Flash. Chris Pine looks like Barry Allen, has those Barry blue eyes and can pull it off.
Hollywood these days is so blunt they don't see a good actor right in their faces like Chris Pine. So I ask your support in regard to this petition. Ask your family, siblings, friends and other Flash or comic book geeks to sign this petition. Help support actor Chris Pine for The FLASH film as Barry Allen. Chris is a good guy and his ability to play Barry Allen/The Flash is substantial. Let's get The Flash film up and running already.
Thank you, Cory Morr. P.S. Let's get The Flash up and running pronto!


text:
Refrigerator Garden Pickles Recipe
Popular Videos
- 6 cups sugar
- 6 cups white vinegar
- 1/4 cup celery seed
- 1/4 cup mustard seed
- 2 tablespoons canning salt
- 10 medium carrots, halved lengthwise and cut into 2-inch pieces
- 3 medium cucumbers, sliced
- 3 medium sweet red peppers, cut into 1-inch pieces
- 2 large onions, halved and sliced
- 1 bunch green onions, cut into 2-inch pieces
- In a Dutch oven, combine the first five ingredients; bring to a boil, stirring to dissolve sugar. Meanwhile, place the remaining ingredients in a large bowl.
- Pour hot liquid over vegetables; cool. Transfer to jars, if desired; cover tightly. Refrigerate for 6-8 hours before serving. Store in the refrigerator for up to 1 month. Yield: 7 pints.
Reviews forRefrigerator Garden Pickles
My Review
Average Rating
"Very delicious, easy to prepare, and looked beautiful in the jars. I cut the recipe in half, and used a bit less sugar. I let them sit in the fridge for one week, and they were delicious! I'll definitely make them again, but next time I'll omit the 'celery seed' and the 'mustard seed', but I'll use 'pickling spice' instead (since it contains a little more 'pickling' spices, and will add even more flavor to this already delicious recipe.) I'll also add some fresh dill into the jars before closing them."
"This was easy and everyone loved them will make over and over again"
"This is so yummy! Great for eating alone, topping burgers, hot dogs, you name it! One of our church cookbooks has the same recipe in it. I figured the veggies would soak up more of the liquid than it did so we saved the liquid & are going to make this again, since its a lot of sugar. Just re-boil it & immerse veggies again. Next time, we want to add more cucumbers & less of some of the other veggies. Because there's so much liquid, you probably could add more veggies than recipe calls for."
"i make a very similar pickle with lots of sliced hot peppers, whole garlic to taste. the sweet hot combo is very good"


text: By Rushil Dutta April 17 (Reuters) - Most Southeast Asian stock markets ended lower on Monday as concerns over overseas geopolitical risks drove investors to safer assets, with Singapore dropping 1 percent. Already bruised by worries over North Korea and upcoming French elections, global investor sentiment took a further hit on weak U.S. economic data. Though a raft of Chinese economic data earlier in the day beat market expectations, they failed to enthuse investors who had already been optimistic following a recent string of positive numbers out of the country. Similarly, strong March export figures from Singapore did little to lift the dour mood following the central bank's cautionary tone last week. Singapore fell nearly 1 percent to its lowest since end-March, led by losses in the industrials and financial sectors. The city-state's biggest banks, DBS Group Holdings and United Overseas Bank, lost about 1 percent each. Palm oil plantation firm Golden Agri-Resources was the biggest loser on the index. Thai shares ended 0.9 percent lower, dragged by energy and industrials stocks. "Institutional investors, who play a major role in the Thai stock market, have turned out to be net buyers, but I think a lot of concern from the external front pressures the buying spree," said Teerada Charnyingyong, strategist at Phillip Securities. The Philippine main index fell 0.5 percent after having gained 0.6 percent last week, its third straight weekly gain on the back of strong net foreign inflows. Analysts said the spell of recent gains had led to profit-booking. Megaworld Corp, which was one of the biggest gainers last week, was among the worst performers on the index. Vietnam shares ended more than 1 percent lower, while Indonesia shares fell 0.7 percent. Malaysia was the sole gainer, with a marginal 0.2 percent rise. For Asian Companies click; SOUTHEAST ASIAN STOCK MARKETS Change on day Market Current Previous Close Pct Move Singapore 3138.3 3169.24 -0.98 Bangkok 1575.91 1589.5 -0.85 Manila 7588.53 7629.64 -0.54 Jakarta 5577.487 5616.545 -0.70 Kuala Lumpur 1733.93 1730.99 0.17 Ho Chi Minh 710.83 718.45 -1.06 Change on year Market Current End 2016 Pct Move Singapore 3138.3 2880.76 8.94 Bangkok 1575.91 1542.94 2.14 Manila 7588.53 6840.64 10.90 Jakarta 5577.487 5296.711 5.30 Kuala Lumpur 1733.93 1641.73 5.62 Ho Chi Minh 710.83 664.87 6.90 (Reporting by Rushil Dutta; Editing by Amrutha Gayathri)


text:
As per the description:
This paper has been developed to aid IT professionals in the process of migrating to Microsoft Office Excel 2007. Here you will find descriptions of the primary functional differences and how those variances might affect workbooks. This paper also explains some of the more common issues that may arise during migration and offers solutions where applicable. Additional resources are provided to help diagnose any issues that are not described in this paper.
This entry was posted on Tuesday, March 13th, 2007 at 13:30 and is filed under Uncategorized. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.


text:
|AOL will cut as many as 700 jobs in India and 200 in the United States, chief executive Tim Armstrong told employees.
Huffington deal means cuts at AOL
NEW YORK — AOL Inc., the Internet company that agreed to buy the Huffington Post last month, said it will eliminate as many as 900 jobs as the company integrates the news website and restructures to try to return to revenue growth.
The company will cut as many as 700 jobs in India and 200 in the United States, chief executive Tim Armstrong wrote in a memo to employees yesterday. In India, 300 of the affected employees will move to outsourcing partners and continue to do work for AOL, he said.
"The changes for me today are very personal,'' said Armstrong. "AOL employees deserve a tremendous amount of credit because I don't think it's easy to go from managing decline to managing growth.''
"Our strategy remains clear: create high-quality content experiences for consumers, at scale,'' Armstrong wrote in the memo. "Today, we are announcing an organizational structure that will significantly improve AOL's ability to focus on growth.''
The company had 5,860 employees at the end of last year, according to regulatory filings.
AOL, whose sales have declined for four straight quarters, agreed to buy the Huffington Post for $315 million, aiming to increase online content to help boost advertising revenue.
Arianna Huffington, cofounder of the Huffington Post, joined AOL as president and editor in chief of a newly formed media group, which includes other AOL content. Her website will serve as the model for other journalism efforts, Armstrong said in the memo.
"AOL will invest more heavily in our in-house editorial team and transition away from a reliance on freelance journalists,'' he said.
Armstrong said he recently made a personal purchase of $10 million in AOL stock. In May, the former Google executive, who became AOL's chief executive in 2009, bought $11.1 million worth of stock.


text:
2,120,148 Total members
427 New members today
12,044 Online now
Sign up for free *
There were errors on the form, please make sure all fields are filled out correctly.
Finding sex online is safe, secure and discreet with Australia's number one sex personals site. Just register for your free account to post you own personal ad. Whatever you are looking for. Regular fuck buddies, local swingers, one night stands or even a discreet affair, you will find the biggest selection of horny adults under one roof, all looking for some sexual excitement.
Put your wallet away! Membership is free and confidential. Meet some of the filthiest guys and girls all in one place. With thousands of members online every day, you will wonder why you haven't tried online personals before.
Meeting lots of new people for sex or some wicked online fun is a great way to spice up your sex life or just get more sex. Perhaps you are recently single and don't want the pressure of another serious relationship. Maybe you are in a sexless relationship and need a little bedroom action or possibly you are a couple looking for local swingers or a third person to join in your bedroom games.
Whatever your reasons for being here, you will find more sex partners than you know what to do with here at Wicked Wombats.
We do not share, display or pass on your personal information. Your location is only used to enhance our member suggestions and who's near me application, your exact location is never revealed.
If you are looking for some naughty fun with a girl in Fernleigh or anywhere else for that matter, choose Wicked Wombats for discreet adult personals, chat and photo sharing.


text:
> rdf:text is available at: > > http://www.w3.org/2007/OWL/wiki/InternationalizedStringSpec And in snapshot form at: http://www.w3.org/2007/OWL/draft/ED-owl2-rdf-text-20080922/ which is now linked from the WG homepage. (I don't have a good architecture for these joint-WG drafts. That documents considers itself one of the 9 current OWL drafts. I'll edit that stuff by hand when we're actually ready to publish.) > We are stil discussing "facets" (i.e. things like minInclusive, = > minLength, ...) > and I would like to solicit the groups opinion whether we think they=20 > should be included in the datatype or not. I can explain the issue in = > more=20 > depth at the f2f. Yes, I believe it's on the agenda now. -- SandroReceived on Tuesday, 23 September 2008 11:48:55 UTC
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Tuesday, 6 January 2015 21:47:52 UTC


text:
The work of perfecting the look and feel How to Change the Look and Feel of Your Windows 10 Desktop How to Change the Look and Feel of Your Windows 10 Desktop You just upgraded to Windows 10 and you're wondering how you can customize and personalize it. We help you turn your desktop into a virtual Windows experience, one step at a time. Read More of your Windows desktop is never done. For some, changing the background wallpaper is enough to quench the itch of customization. For others (like me) looking for the next best way to customize your desktop experience is something of a passion.
One of the greatest exercises in customization is creating a live and interactive Windows background. Programs like highly popular Windows application Rainmeter Your Complete Guide to Windows 10 Customization Your Complete Guide to Windows 10 Customization You decorate your office – why not your computer? Find out how to make Windows look just the way you want. Make your computer your own, with free tools. Read More are a godsend for the customization geek that enjoys spending hours creating an immersive desktop.
But why spend hours fiddling with Photoshop, when with these simple tricks you can have an impressive live background in minutes.
Install Rainmeter
Once you installed and launched Rainmeter, it will work in the background and can be accessed in the system tray near the Taskbar clock.
Before messing with Rainmeter, it's best to familiarize yourself with its features. The Rainmeter manager has three categories: Skins, Layouts, and Settings. The skins menu holds all of your icon packets and tools and will be used the most when customizing your desktop. You can add new skins and folders to this menu in This PC > Documents > Rainmeter > Skins.
Rainmeter uses INI files to create custom icons and skins. The best feature of INI files is their easy editing, as INI files open with any text editor and their parameters are easily changeable.
1. 3D Sound Visualizer Effect
Our goal is to imitate the visualizer effect seen below.
The foreground of the wallpaper obscures the Rainmeter sound visualizer, which creates a cool 3D effect with the wallpaper. Although it may seem complicated, the process for this is both easy and lightweight on your computers processing power.
Step 1: Pick a Background
Pick a wallpaper Need A New Wallpaper? These 5 Awesome Sites Will Get You There Need A New Wallpaper? These 5 Awesome Sites Will Get You There Your choice of desktop wallpaper says a lot about who you are. So, if your wallpaper is an expression of who you are, where can you find wallpapers that fit your personality? Read More that has both foreground and background elements from the get-go. The example above shows a white and blue mountain with a blue sky, which goes perfectly with the white sound bars. Color scheme is also important, but not necessary.
I've picked out a minimal wallpaper from Simple Desktops, which provide hundreds of free, minimal desktop wallpapers. In order to facilitate the process, create a folder named cut in the Rainmeter Skins location (This PC > Documents > Rainmeter > Skins) and save your wallpaper to this folder.
The simpler the background, the better; this particular desktop wallpaper is only composed of three colors and uses one color as the foreground. This will make it easier to edit, so we can create the proper 3D effect.
Double-click the wallpaper to open the Windows 10 gallery. Right-click Wallpaper > Set as > Set as background to set the first layer of your background.
Step 2: Cut out Foreground
In order to block off the parts we want, create a copy of your wallpaper and edit it by erasing the background of the image. Download an image editor Clipping Magic: Remove The Background From Any Photo In Just A Few Clicks Clipping Magic: Remove The Background From Any Photo In Just A Few Clicks Removing the background from a photo is something Photoshop pros can do in their sleep, but if you find the process hard – and Photoshop expensive – you can be forgiven. Thanks to Clipping Magic,... Read More and erase the background from the wallpaper. I am using GIMP, a free and dynamics image editor GIMP: A Quick Walkthrough Of Everyone's Favorite Open Source Image Editor GIMP: A Quick Walkthrough Of Everyone's Favorite Open Source Image Editor Read More . You can use a wand or color select tool An Idiot's Guide to Photoshop, Part 2: Useful Tools & Tips An Idiot's Guide to Photoshop, Part 2: Useful Tools & Tips This chapter, we will go through some useful tools and tips not mentioned in the first part. You will learn how to use these important tools "on-the-go" and see them in action. Read More to select and cut the background from the image.
Once you've cut out the background, save or export the file as a PNG Know When to Use Which File Format: PNG vs. JPG, DOC vs. PDF, MP3 vs. FLAC Know When to Use Which File Format: PNG vs. JPG, DOC vs. PDF, MP3 vs. FLAC Do you know the differences between JPG and PNG, or MP3 and FLAC? If you don't know which file formats to use, let us guide you through their distinctions. Read More in order to preserve its transparency. If the part you cut out looks white or black in a thumbnail, don't fret; your image is still cut out. Name this edited file anything you'd like, but try to name it something you can remember.
You can view the file extension in the file name under Windows key + X > Control Panel > Appearance and Personalization > File Explorer Options > View > Uncheck Hide extensions for known file types.
Step 3: Create the INI File
Next step is to create the INI file, which will add our newly made background onto the background. In our cut folder, right-click in the window and select New > Text Document. Open the file and add the following:
[Rainmeter] Update=-1 [Background] Meter=Image ImageName=wallpaperfilename.png W=resolutionwidth H=resolutionheight
The Update=-1 parameter prevents the background from updating automatically, which decreases the processor use of the skin. The Background parameter lists the type of meter (ergo Rainmeter) and references your edited wallpaper. Change wallpaperfilename.png to your wallpaper's actual file name.
The W and H parameters stand in for your monitor resolution which you can check here. Replace resolutionwidth and resolutionheight with the appropriate numbers.
When you're done, go to File > Save As and save the file under whatever name you prefer with the added extension .ini at the end.
If every parameter is correctly entered, Rainmeter will be able to read the INI file and show up in your Configuration panel. Click on the drop-down menu beside your cut folder and double-click the INI document to load the skin.
Next, adjust the Rainmeter settings for your cutout wallpaper.
Set the Position to On desktop and the Load Order to 2. The position will set where the wallpaper should be placed, and the load order will layer your skins so they achieve the desired effect. Check the Click through option to dismiss right-click options.
Note: Opening the Rainmeter options will temporarily hide your task bar behind your edited wallpaper. Rainmeter assumes you are editing your skins content. Close your Rainmeter options to reveal the Taskbar properly.
Step 4: Download the Sound Visualizer Skin
To finish the effect, download a Rainmeter sound visualizer skin. I prefer using Fountain of Colors for its extensive customization options and sleek design. Download and run the MRSKIN file to get started.
Load the Fountain of Color INI file in your Rainmeter settings. Place the skin on or near the cutout area of your wallpaper. Change the Load order to 1 so it's loaded before your cutout and change its Position to Bottom.
Optional: Fountain of Colors makes it very easy to change the color of the visualizer, creating dynamic color ranges for an enhanced look. In the Rainmeter program, open Fountain of Colors > SettingsWindows > SettingsWindow.ini to access the settings.
The easiest way to pick an aesthetically pleasing color for your sound visualizer, is to toggle the Wallpaper colors – Avg option, which gives your sound visualizer the average color of your wallpaper.
Step 5: The Product
Here is the effect without the visualizer color change or layering.
Here is the effect after color change and layering.
You should have the desired effect with your own background and sound visualizer. If not, remember to check the layering settings in the Rainmeter window.
2. Mouseover Background Change Effect
This effect is great for adding a mouse over feature to your desktop.
Download the popular Honeycomb Rainmeter skin, which comes with preset icons and background. Simply install and load Honeycomb's INI files to create the mouseover effect.
A more difficult method is shown below, which allows for custom icons and backgrounds along with the addition of logo PNG files. Nevertheless, it is very similar to the 3D Rainmeter effect method.
It may take a little longer, but learning the ins and outs of Rainmeter is an invaluable skill, which opens up a world of customization opportunities.
3. Video Wallpaper
For those who would rather have continual movement in their background, you can play videos as your wallpaper using VLC. Usually treated as a top-notch video and music player 6 More VLC Media Player Features You Must Try 6 More VLC Media Player Features You Must Try VLC is a media player more powerful than you might realize. Are you using it to its full potential? Here are some pointers. Read More , VLC also has the capability to set videos as wallpaper. It's as easy as opening up a simple video in VLC and going to Video > Set as Wallpaper. Here's an excellent example by reddit user /u/teebane.
While this is just one method of creating a live wallpaper, there are many others available to suit your needs and wants How to Set Live Wallpapers & Animated Desktop Backgrounds in Windows How to Set Live Wallpapers & Animated Desktop Backgrounds in Windows Live wallpapers can be added to any Windows operating system since Windows XP, although it has become increasingly harder. We show you what your options are in Windows 10, 8, and 7. Read More .
Breathe Life into Your Desktop Background
Why settle for a boring, static background when you can make your desktop experience that much more dynamic? All of these methods have been thoroughly tested for both performance and low processor usage, so you can enjoy your live wallpaper without much lag on your computer. I'd like to thank the sub-reddit community of /r/rainmeter, which provides continually updated inspiration for new Rainmeter skins and techniques.
What live desktop features would you absolutely love to have on your PC? Let us know in the comments below!
Leave a Reply
need some help. the rendered picture is always on top of the background and the visualizer skin. i set to load order 2 but its still on top of everything thanks in advance
Hi! Im just a 11 year old kid wanting to pimp up his laptop background since its my last year of Primary school! Thanks alot! Works soo well and its actually really simple. Did it with no help needed! If a 11 year old did it then everyone can!
i realized that i'm using a jpeg image when i change it to png it finally works!!
this is cool but now i cant use any of my desktop icons because they are hidden behind the background image! also how do you get that starry look on the visualizer?
Would love to learn how to do this for the mac. Thanks for info~
Any way to do this on a mac?
Thank You
Thanks man.


text:
Product Features
This completely new shoe is the eighth generation innovation serves unparalleled fit and support in this trail shoe. With superior traction, it yields agile off-road performance in the best Kanadia ever.
Durability, traction and stability come together in this trail running shoe built on a Traction outsole and extra-soft SUPERCLOUD cushioning. The air mesh upper is reinforced with synthetic overlays for an idea fit.
Key Features of Adidas Kanadia 8 TR Hiking Shoes:
- Traction outsole
- SUPERCLOUD cushioning
- Material: Textile
- Heel: 25.5mm
- Forefoot: 18mm
- Drop: 7.5mm
- Weight: 8.3 oz / 236 g
All Gear by: Adidas


text:
The following editorial appeared in today's Los Angeles Times:
The suicide attempts of five Chinese in Tiananmen Square are a direct response to Beijing's brutal repression of the outlawed Falun Gong spiritual movement over the last 18 months. The more Beijing tightens the screw, the greater resistance it will encounter. China's only choice, if it wants to prevent further escalation and gain acceptance by the international community, is to give its people greater freedom.
In Tuesday's protest, on the eve of the lunar year, five people said to be sect members set themselves on fire; one of them died. It marked a dramatic shift in Falun Gong's largely peaceful campaign of civil disobedience and comes at a time when China is trying to head off condemnation by the U.N. Human Rights Commission and burnish its image abroad in the hope of enhancing its bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics.
The campaign of repression against Falun Gong is Beijing's way of trying to maintain unity and stability in the face of economic transformation. The movement combines Buddhism and Taoism with other religious elements. But the Communist rulers see the movement as an "evil cult" and have jailed thousands of its practitioners.
Allegations of torture and even murder of Falun Gong members in police custody have rightfully led to worldwide denunciation of Beijing. For a number of years, the United States has led the push in the United Nations for a formal condemnation of China's tactics, but Washington has not won enough votes in support. The Bush administration should try again when the Human Rights Commission meets in March.
The self-burning in Tiananmen Square was the most dramatic among hundreds of protests that members of Falun Gong have staged in recent months. Clearly, China's government cannot crush the movement by force. Rather it should ease its pressure, lift the ban and deal with the sect in a manner that eases tensions.
© 2018. All Rights Reserved. | Contact Us


text:
Engine Performance problem
1988 Mercedes Benz 300e 6 cyl Front Wheel Drive Automatic 140000 miles
I bought a Mercedes 300E this past summer. I received it in a good condition with according to the owner, new plug wires (They look new) and a Valve Cover Gasket oil leak.
I'm a student so I don't have much money, I drove the car regularly until I experienced performance issues.
Mainly a HUGE loss of power and acceleration. The car takes about 15 seconds to go 0-60. It feels sluggish, when I press on gas, the engine feels like it has all this power but it's not releasing it, I got about 14-18MPG.
I started a tune-up and did:
I changed
-Spark Plugs (which needed to be changed)
-Fuel Filter
-Oil Filter/Oil
-Checked Air Filter. It's Fine
Drove the car, the problem is still persistent but now I'm getting about 22MPG.
Now today the problem is bigger, the car is taking longer to get to 60MPGs, it struggles to get acceleration. Once it makes it to 60 it's pretty smooth, but getting there (even while flooring it) is an issue.
Also, it gets wiped out by even slight hills, taking a lot of pressing on the pedal to get it going.
I've been told it could be a cap/rotor and/or the timing chain not matched perfectly.
what can I do?
have the same problem?
Tuesday, January 5th, 2010 AT 11:20 PM


text: >>"John" == John Goerzen <firstname.lastname@example.com> writes: John> I'm talking about tm, which Gnus used previously, and was a lot John> better that whatever it is that it uses now. Check your facts. Gnus never used tm, though you may have. The tm folks are now producing semi-gnus, and you should probably use that if you are so enamoured of their way of doing things. manoj -- Those for whom there is no more acquisition, who are fully aware of the nature of food, whose dwelling place is an empty and imageless release - the way of such people is hard to follow, like the path of birds through the sky. 92 Manoj Srivastava <firstname.lastname@example.com> <http://www.debian.org/%7Esrivasta/> 1024R/C7261095 print CB D9 F4 12 68 07 E4 05 CC 2D 27 12 1D F5 E8 6E 1024D/BF24424C print 4966 F272 D093 B493 410B 924B 21BA DABB BF24 424C


text: On Tue, 15 Mar 2005, Frederick Bruckman wrote: > > Well, the RAM is the same (PC2100 Kingston, two 256MB sticks) that was > > in the machine for a long time (~3 years) when that computer was my > > gaming machine. It worked flawlessly (as far as I know). > > Now, that machine is my server. The only change in the computer is a > > different hard drive, and a lack of a DVD drive (I took it out). I'm > > trying to figure out why the RAM died now, instead of earlier. It > > could just be a similarity, but I'm trying as hard as I can to find > > any connection between the two servers and their RAM issues. > > Would that be a beefier hard drive? Hard drives vary wildly in current > draw. It could be that your power supply is marginal, or failing, and > the larger hard drive pushed it over. See if the motherboard voltages > vary while the hard drive is active, or just try a different PS. ...with more wattage. Many machines these days start out with too small a power supply for "power users" of the type you'd find running NetBSD; some off the shelf "beefy" systems ship with only a 230W[!!] supply. My home server has three 7200RPM ATA HDs, a SCSI tape drive (with controller card), and a CD-ROM with an Athlon XP chip and compatible board. Anything less than a 350W makes the supply heat up like crazy (due to current overdraw). -- -- Todd Vierling <firstname.lastname@example.com> <email@example.com>


text:
Threaded Rod Din975 are a allotment of the toughest types of Threaded Rods as they are about acclimated to affix abundant pieces of barge and assorted added absolute that backpack an astute load. Lag Threaded Rods aswell accustomed as lag Threaded Rod appear in abounding sizes with diameters from ?" to 1 ? " and lengths up to 6" or more.
Lag Threaded Rods about acquire an alien hex arch and crave a nut to advice abutment the abundant weight they are advised to support.For ambience the foundation Threaded Rods in absolute places, positions are marked. Afterwards this, the they are abeyant into the holes. Accurate is afresh abounding into the amplitude about the Threaded Rods and already the accurate sets, the Threaded Rods get anchored durably into the ground. There are several types of Threaded Rods fabricated by the foundation Threaded Rod manufacturers that are acclimated for assorted purposes. Let us acquire a attending at them.
Foundation Threaded Rods serve to attach altar to accurate structures. You acquire abounding types in this category. All acquire a threaded end breadth one may attach a washer and nut for acclimation the alien load.
There is abandoned one way to adjustment bald Threaded Rod and that is through the use of a tap and die set. A tap and die set is a set of accoutrement that will accredit you to cilia a nut or aperture and cilia the Threaded Rod as well. However, for you to calmly adjustment your Threaded Rod actuality are some tap and die instructions you adeptness ambition to accumulate in mind.
Threaded Rod from Threaded Rod Supplier are an important allotment of manufacturing. There is a avant-garde ambit of applications of these in both the automatic and bartering sectors. That can be acclimated in anything, from the agronomical accoutrement to the airliners. There is a circuitous aggregate of the architecture and the automatic backdrop which accomplish the activity in a able manner.