text:
1. Missouri's compulsory counterclaim rule does not require a client to litigate a claim for legal malpractice in response to an attorney's motion to enforce an attorney's fee lien in the underlying action that gave rise to both the malpractice claim and the attorney's fee lien.
2. The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only to those issues that were necessarily and unambiguously decided in a prior adjudication.
3. A non-class action aggregate settlement is a settlement of the claims of two or more individual claimants in which the resolution of the claims is interdependent. Key features of interdependency are a condition that a specific percentage of claimants must accept the settlement and an allocation among the claimants of a maximum aggregate settlement fund under which each claimant cannot accept or reject his or her share of the settlement without affecting the other claimants' settlement shares.
4. In determining whether to order documents to be filed under seal, the district court should balance the parties' and the public's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information contained in the documents against the public policy of having court records open to public scrutiny. The district court's determination to seal documents is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Appeal from Johnson district court; JAMES F. VANO, judge. Opinion filed April 3, 2009. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
William J. Skepnek, of Skepnek Fagan Meyer & Davis, P.A., of Lawrence, argued the cause, and Trey T. Meyer and Mark T. Emert, of the same firm, and Steven M. Smoot, of Smoot Law Firm, P.C., of Houston, Texas, were with him on the brief for appellants.
Daniel E. Hamann, of Deacy & Deacy, LLP, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Dale L. Beckerman and Spencer J. Brown, of the same firm, were with him on the brief for appellees Davis, Bethune & Jones, L.L.C. and Grant L. Davis.
Cathy J. Dean, of Polsinelli Shalton Flanigan Suelthaus PC, of Kansas City, Missouri, and Todd A. Gangel and Lori C. McGroder, of Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., of Kansas City, Missouri, were on the brief for intervenors/appellees Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and Eli Lilly and Company.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOHNSON, J.: Jerome S. Tilzer, individually and as plaintiff ad litem for Rita Tilzer, Todd A. Tilzer, and Jill Jokelson, (hereafter collectively referred to as Tilzers) appeal the granting of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Grant L. Davis and Davis, Bethune & Jones, LLC, (hereafter collectively referred to as Davis), in this legal malpractice action. Tilzers raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether Tilzers' legal malpractice claims are compulsory counterclaims to Davis' motion to enforce an attorney lien in a prior Missouri state court action and therefore barred by res judicata in the present action; (2) whether Tilzers' claims are barred by collateral estoppel based upon the litigation in the Missouri action; (3) whether the district court erred in ruling that the "Global Settlement" in the Missouri action was not an "aggregate settlement" within the meaning of Rule 4-1.8(g) of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 4-1.8[g]); and (4) whether the district court erred in ordering certain documents to be sealed. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the confidential settlement documents be filed under seal. However, the court did err in holding that Tilzers' claims were compulsory counterclaims in the Missouri action and that collateral estoppel applied to the aggregate settlement issue. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
In September 2001, Rita Tilzer hired attorney Grant L. Davis and his firm Davis, Bethune & Jones, L.L.C., to represent her in an action against drug manufacturers Eli Lilly and Company and Bristol-Meyers Squibb Company for negligently enabling pharmacist Robert Courtney to dilute her cancer drugs. The lawsuit was one of several hundred individual suits filed in Jackson County, Missouri, by cancer patients or their surviving family members; Davis represented many, but not all of the plaintiffs. After Rita Tilzer died in January 2002, her husband and children were substituted as plaintiffs. Derek E. Jokelson, an attorney from Philadelphia and son-in-law of Rita Tilzer, acted as cocounsel for Tilzers after being admitted pro hac vice in the Missouri proceeding. Jokelson is not a named defendant in the Kansas malpractice action.
After commencement of the trial in another patient's separate case in October 2002, the pharmaceutical companies offered a settlement proposal. After mediation, a settlement agreement was reached in which all plaintiffs who had filed a lawsuit against the companies were eligible to "opt in." Under the agreement, titled "Global Settlement," the defendants would establish a settlement fund of not less than a specified amount and not more than a specified amount, with the exact amount to be determined through binding arbitration.
The Missouri trial judge, Judge Lee Wells, appointed two special masters. One was a former circuit court judge and the other was a former Missouri Court of Appeals judge. Judge Wells worked with the special masters to develop a system for evaluating the individual claims, apparently with a view to avoiding the Global Settlement being classified as an aggregate settlement. Essentially, the special masters would apply uniform standards to each claimant who had opted in to the settlement and would determine the amount of money each claimant would receive from the settlement fund.
Tilzers opted in to the settlement agreement and completed the applicable claim form. The documents that Tilzers signed included an agreement to keep the terms of the settlement confidential. The special masters established the dollar amount to be awarded to Tilzers, and Judge Wells approved that award, despite Tilzers' objection. On November 24, 2003, the pharmaceutical companies filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, requesting that the court order Tilzers to execute a dismissal with prejudice and otherwise comply with the terms of the agreement. Two days later, Davis filed a motion to enforce an attorney's lien in the Missouri case.
Tilzers opposed the motion to enforce settlement, arguing that the agreement was "(1) illegal and unethical on its face; (2) [was] in violation of Rule 4-1.8(g); and (3) [had] been obtained through deceit and fraud in factum." At a December 22, 2003, hearing, Tilzers acknowledged that a formal response to the attorney's lien motion had not yet been filed, but advised Judge Wells that Tilzers' arguments in opposition to Davis' attorney's lien motion would track Tilzers' response to the drug companies' settlement enforcement motion. With the parties' consent, the judge continued the hearing on Davis' attorney's lien motion to January 2, 2004.
On December 30, 2003, Tilzers filed a counterclaim against Davis, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and breach of contract. Tilzers asserted the same claims in a separate action filed in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas prior to January 2, 2004. That separate federal court action was subsequently dismissed for lack of complete diversity.
At the scheduled motion hearing on January 2, 2004, Tilzers sought a continuance to allow for discovery on its counterclaim. Tilzers expressed concern that the legal malpractice claim might later be deemed a compulsory counterclaim to the motion for enforcement of the attorney's lien, and, if so, Tilzers asserted that they were entitled to fully litigate the matter, including the right to conduct discovery and to submit the question to a jury. Judge Wells expressed a desire to conclude the Missouri case and denied the continuance. However, the judge informed the parties that he did not intend for his ruling on the attorney's lien motion to foreclose any future legal malpractice action. The Tilzers withdrew from the hearing to avoid a later claim that they were collaterally estopped on their legal malpractice claims. The court heard the testimony of Grant Davis and Jerome Tilzer.
In its January 14, 2004, order, the court granted Davis' motion on the attorney's lien and memorialized its order granting enforcement of the settlement agreement. Judge Wells specifically found that the Global Settlement was not an aggregate settlement within the meaning of Rule 4-1.8(g), because of the methodology developed by the court and special masters. The court also found no credible evidence of any misconduct by Davis.
The Tilzers did not appeal the Missouri trial court's rulings. On April 5, 2004, Tilzers dismissed their counterclaim. Approximately 3 weeks later, Tilzers filed the instant legal malpractice action in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, claiming breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and fraud arising from Davis' representation in the Missouri action. Tilzers specifically alleged that the Missouri settlement agreement was effectively an aggregate settlement and that Davis had failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 4-1.8(g).
During discovery in the Kansas malpractice action, Tilzers filed a motion to compel the testimony of Grant Davis, to which they attached documents containing information which they had agreed to keep confidential in the Missouri proceeding. The pharmaceutical companies intervened to request that the Kansas court order that any documents, pleadings, or other materials containing the terms of the Missouri settlement agreement be filed and maintained under seal. Over Tilzers' objection, the Kansas court granted the intervenors' motion.
Davis filed a summary judgment motion, claiming that the malpractice claims were compulsory counterclaims to the motion to enforce his attorney's lien in the Missouri action and, accordingly, were now res judicata in the Kansas action. Further, Davis argued that the aggregate settlement question, as well as the other claims of legal malpractice, were litigated as defenses to the motion to enforce the attorney's lien in the Missouri proceeding, and, therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel also precluded relitigating the issues in the current proceeding. The Tilzers responded with their motion for partial summary judgment, asking the court to find that Davis participated in the making of an aggregate settlement without providing Tilzers with the disclosures required by Rule 4-1.8(g).
The Johnson County District Court granted summary judgment to Davis, finding that all of Tilzers' claims arose from the attorney-client relationship in the Missouri action for which Davis had sought to enforce an attorney's fee lien. The Kansas court interpreted the Missouri compulsory counterclaim rule as requiring Tilzers' malpractice claims to have been asserted in the Missouri action, and, accordingly, found Davis "entitled to summary judgment on the codified res judicata claim preclusion grounds." Further, the Kansas court determined that Tilzers were collaterally estopped from relitigating the aggregate settlement question.
The Kansas court denied Tilzers' motion for partial summary judgment, reasoning that because "the amount that each of [Davis'] clients would receive [under the settlement] was not and could not have been known by the lawyers prior to the announcement to all of the opted in claimants . . . this could not be an aggregate settlement contemplated by the rules of professional conduct."
Tilzers filed a timely appeal of the summary judgment rulings, and the case was transferred to this court, pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c).
Procedurally, this case involves the review of the district court's rulings on summary judgment motions, the standard for which has been stated as:
"'"'Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied.' [Citations omitted.]"'" Smith v. Kansas Gas Service Co., 285 Kan. 33, 39, 169 P.3d 1052 (2007).
To the extent we are called upon to interpret statutory provisions, we will exercise unlimited review. Genesis Health Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 285 Kan. 1021, 1031, 181 P.3d 549 (2008). However, we accord deference to the district court's determination of which, if any, documents or pleadings are to be filed under seal, and we will review that determination for an abuse of discretion. Cf. In re Tax Appeal of City of Wichita, 277 Kan. 487, 513, 86 P.3d 513 (2004) (district court has discretion over discovery matters and any decision made by the court in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion).
The district court agreed with Davis' argument that Tilzers' malpractice claims in the Kansas action were barred by res judicata based upon Missouri's compulsory counterclaim rule. That rule provides in relevant part:
"(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim that at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." 1 Mo. Court Rules § 55.32 (2008).
Citing to Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis v. Gaertner, 655 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Mo. App. 1983), the Kansas court found:
"Under the plain meaning of Rule 55.32(a) and the interpretation given to that language by Missouri courts, a claim for damages based upon negligent performance of services arises from the same transaction as does a claim for non-payment for those same services. Thus, in an action by an attorney to recover fees from a client, a malpractice claim by that same client would be a compulsory counterclaim."
Tilzers' arguments had focused on whether Davis was an "opposing party" within the meaning of the rule, rather than challenging whether the malpractice claims arose from the same transaction that gave rise to the attorney's fee lien. The district court acknowledged Tilzers' argument that Gaertner is distinguishable because it was an independent collection action, where the malpractice claimant was the named defendant and the party seeking unpaid fees was the plaintiff, i.e., they were unquestionably "opposing parties." Here, in contrast, Davis was not a party to the underlying action. Tilzers contended that the distinction was critical because a counterclaiming defendant in an independent collection action possesses procedural benefits which were unavailable to Tilzers in the motion proceeding, such as the right to conduct discovery and the right to a jury trial.
The district court rejected the argument, finding that in applying the counterclaim rule in Missouri, an attorney seeking to enforce an attorney's fee lien in the underlying lawsuit is just as much an opposing party to the client (or former client) as if the attorney had brought a separate lawsuit against the former client to collect the fees. For support under Missouri precedent, the district court cited to Hemme v. Bharti, 183 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Mo. 2006), for the proposition that
"The counterclaim rule is not limited to claims by a defendant against a plaintiff–Rule 55.32(a) does not use those labels. So it is possible for co-parties in some circumstances to be 'opposing parties,' for example, when one co-party brings a claim for its own damages against another co-party. In that circumstance, they would be opposing parties–though both originally are co-defendants–and, thus, would be subject to the compulsory counterclaim rule."
Hemme involved a personal injury action in which the plaintiff and defendant had been codefendants in a previous action. In the prior case, the personal injury defendant (then codefendant) had cross-claimed for indemnity and contribution, but the personal injury plaintiff (then codefendant) had not cross-claimed for the personal injury being claimed in the current personal injury lawsuit. The trial court found that the personal injury claim was compulsory in the prior action and therefore barred by res judicata in the current action. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[t]he compulsory counterclaim rule does not require a defendant against whom a cross-claim for indemnity, contribution or apportionment of fault is asserted to set forth her claim for injuries against her cross-claiming co-defendant in a response." 183 S.W.3d at 595. In the dictum quoted by the Kansas court, Hemme was explaining that the compulsory counterclaim statute was not textually limited to plaintiffs and defendants, so that a possibility remained that co-parties could be "opposing parties" under some circumstances. However, the opinion did not stretch so far as to suggest that a nonparty to an action could trigger the compulsory counterclaim statute by filing a motion to enforce a lien against the judgment rendered in that action.
Although the Kansas court recited that Missouri law would govern the claim preclusion issue, it relied heavily on an opinion from the New Mexico Court of Appeals, Computer One, Inc. v. Grisham & Lawless, P.A., 141 N.M. 869, 873, 161 P.3d 914 (Ct. App. 2007), rev'd 144 N.M. 424, 188 P.3d 1175 (2008), which involved similar facts and a similar compulsory counterclaim statute. There, the law firm representing Computer One in a contract action entered into a settlement agreement. Computer One refused to comply with the settlement, claiming the law firm did not have authority to enter into the agreement. The law firm withdrew and subsequently filed notice of a charging lien against the settlement proceeds. The other party to the contract dispute sought court enforcement of the settlement agreement. The trial court found that the law firm was authorized to enter into the agreement and ordered its enforcement.
Computer One objected to the attorney's fee charging lien, arguing that the fees were unreasonable and excessive and renewing the claim that the firm never had authority to enter into the settlement agreement. The court dismissed Computer One's objections as untimely filed and ordered disbursement of the settlement funds including payment of the attorney's fee lien.
Over a year later, Computer One brought a legal malpractice claim against the firm, asserting negligence in handling their claims and settlement negotiations. The firm moved for summary judgment, arguing that the malpractice action was precluded because it was a compulsory counterclaim to the charging lien. The firm also argued that the malpractice allegations were substantively the same as the defenses asserted against the charging lien, and therefore those allegations could not be relitigated. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the law firm, reasoning that Computer One met the definition of an "opposing party" to the firm's charging lien, even though the charging lien was filed in the underlying lawsuit. 144 N.M. at 428.
Subsequent to the district court's memorandum decision in this case, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that an "opposing party" under that state's compulsory counterclaim law, Rule 1-013(A), "'must be one who asserts a claim against the prospective counterclaimant in the first instance.'" 144 N.M. at 430. Since the lien was asserted in the underlying litigation and not in a separate collection action naming Computer One as the defendant, the adversarial requirement had not been met. The Supreme Court further explained:
"The notion of fair notice implicit in Rule 1-013(A) follows one's status as an opposing party. Nothing in that rule speaks about 'degrees of hostility' or a 'sufficiently adversarial' relationship, or other terms susceptible to a variety of interpretations, as a substitute for being an 'opposing party.' Nothing in Rule 1-013(A) would force a compulsory counterclaim on one who is not first a 'party.' Given the grave consequences of Rule 1-013(A), we think that rule is better served by a sense of certainty and predictability implicit in the notion that one must first be a 'party' before one can be an 'opposing party.' . . . [A]n attorney does not transform his former client into either, merely by taking steps to secure attorney fees in the same underlying proceeding.
"On the other hand, if the Firm had wanted to file a separate suit for breach of contract against Computer One for its attorney fees, then . . . Computer One would have had to press its legal malpractice allegations simultaneously as a compulsory counterclaim. [Citation omitted.] The Firm chose not to do so." Computer One, 144 N.M. at 431.
While the New Mexico precedent is not binding authority, its reasoning is persuasive, especially in light of Missouri case law establishing the methods by which attorneys may recover fees from their clients: (1) By proceeding against the client; (2) by proceeding against the defendant, either by motion in the original case or in an independent proceeding; or (3) by proceeding against the judgment itself. Nelson v. Massman Const. Co., 120 S.W.2d 77, 89 (Mo. App. 1938). By moving to enforce an attorney's fee lien in the underlying action, Davis was proceeding against the judgment itself, not against the former client. Such an action does not transform the former client into an "opposing party" for purposes of the compulsory counterclaim rule. To invoke that rule, Davis had to file an independent action against Tilzers, i.e., had to become a "party" in the first instance.
In conclusion, the district court erred in finding that Missouri's compulsory counterclaim rule required Tilzers to assert their legal malpractice claims as a response to Davis' motion to enforce an attorney's fee lien in the underlying Missouri lawsuit. Summary judgment on the issue of claim preclusion is reversed.
Alternatively, the Kansas court found that Tilzers were precluded from relitigating the aggregated settlement issue in the present case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. That doctrine operates to preclude the reconsideration of issues that were actually litigated in the prior proceeding, in contrast to claim preclusion which bars the assertion of claims which should have been brought in the prior proceeding. See Hollida v. Hollida, 190 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Mo. App. 2006). Thus, although we have found that Tilzers' malpractice claim was not barred in the present case, we must also determine if Tilzers can assert their aggregate settlement issue as a basis for that claim in Kansas. Cf. Computer One, 188 P.3d at 1184-85 (issues litigated in defending against attorney's fee lien precluded in subsequent malpractice action).
The district court applied Missouri law to the collateral estoppel question. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186, 84 S. Ct. 242 (1963) (Full Faith and Credit Clause of United States Constitution requires State enforcing foreign judgment to apply rendering state's law if more preclusive than that of enforcing state). The parties do not challenge that choice of law. The Missouri test has been stated as:
"In deciding whether collateral estoppel applies, the following four factors are considered: (1) is the issue in the present case identical to the issue decided in the prior adjudication; (2) was there a judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; (3) is the party against whom collateral estoppel asserted the same party or in privity with a party in the prior adjudication; and (4) did the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit[?] The doctrine applies only to those issues that were necessarily and unambiguously decided. [Citation omitted.]" State ex rel. Johns v. Kays, 181 S.W.3d 565, 566 (Mo. 2006).
Tilzers concede that the first factor (identical issue) and the third factor (identical parties) were both met in this case. They challenge the applicability of collateral estoppel based upon the second and fourth factors, asserting that the Missouri court did not enter a judgment on the merits and that Tilzers did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in that proceeding.
The second collateral estoppel factor was considered in Wilkes v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 92 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Mo. App. 2002), which stated:
"A judgment on the merits is one rendered when it is determined which party is in the right after argument and investigation, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or technical point, or by default, and without trial. [Citation omitted.] Where there is a question of whether a previous decision went to the merits of the case, no preclusive effect is given to the earlier decision."
Wilkes found that the requirement of a judgment on the merits of an issue was satisfied in a summary judgment where the court's memorandum of decision reflected that it had considered and resolved the issue. 92 S.W.3d at 121.
Tilzers argue that Wilkes is distinguishable because the parties in that case had filed a petition and an answer and had engaged in discovery. In contrast, the Tilzers point out that they filed a counterclaim which was dismissed without a responsive pleading. They claim that "[t]here was no argument or investigation, no judicial determination of which party was in the right." We disagree.
In challenging the enforcement of the settlement agreement, Tilzers explicitly argued that the Global Settlement was invalid because it was an aggregate settlement within the meaning of Rule 4-1.8(g). The Missouri court rejected that argument, finding that the settlement was not an aggregate settlement within the purview of Rule 4-1.8(g). With respect to the attorney's fee lien motion, Tilzers' counsel clearly advised Judge Wells that part of the defense to the motion was that Davis violated the disclosure requirements of Rule 4-1.8(g). Given that those disclosure requirements are only triggered by an aggregate settlement, Tilzers were simply advancing the same issue, i.e., whether the Global Settlement was an aggregate settlement. In short, the issue was clearly argued to the Missouri court.
Granted, Judge Wells did explicitly state that it was not the court's intent to foreclose a subsequent malpractice action by ruling on the motion to enforce the attorney's fee lien. However, the Missouri court clearly considered the issue of whether the Global Settlement was a Rule 4-1.8(g) aggregate settlement and resolved that issue adversely to the Tilzers, i.e., the court made a "judicial determination of which party was in the right" on that particular issue. Moreover, the Missouri court offered its reasoning for that decision. In other words, consistent with Wilkes, the Missouri court entered a judgment on the merits of the aggregate settlement issue.
To the extent Tilzers complain about the posture of the pleadings in the case at the time of judgment or the lack of an opportunity to fully investigate the issue prior to judgment, they are challenging whether the issue was ripe for a judgment on the merits. However, that query does not affect the second factor of whether the Missouri court did, in fact, enter a judgment on the merits.
In analyzing the fourth factor or element of collateral estoppel, i.e., whether Tilzers had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the Missouri lawsuit, the Kansas court noted that Missouri courts look at an additional four factors to resolve this step, to wit:
"(1) did the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted have a strong incentive to litigate the prior adjudication; (2) does the second forum afford the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted procedural opportunities not available in the first action; (3) is the prior judgment, upon which collateral estoppel is based, inconsistent with one or more prior judgments; and (4) was the forum in the first action substantially inconvenient to the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted[?]" Wilkes, 92 S.W.3d at 122.
The third and fourth factors are not in play in this case. There was no prior inconsistent judgment, and the Missouri proceeding was not inconvenient for the parties.
On the first factor, the Kansas court rejected Tilzers' argument that they did not have a strong incentive to litigate the issue in the Missouri lawsuit because that action was not the "'proper forum to fulfill their rights.'" The court opined that Tilzers "strongly wished to litigate the issue of the aggregate settlement," but that they "just wished to litigate the issue in this court, not in Missouri." That rationale appears to overlook that the aggregate settlement issue was simply a component of Tilzers' overarching claim that Davis had committed malpractice in representing them in the Missouri action. Tilzers "strongly wished" to fully litigate their entire claim of malpractice in a manner consistent with the procedural and substantive rights which would have been available to them in a separate malpractice lawsuit. Once Judge Wells clarified that he was going to rule on the motion to enforce the attorney's fee lien without a full litigation of all of the malpractice allegations and without prejudice to further litigation on the question of malpractice, the Tilzers had scant incentive to partially litigate their claim on the aggregate settlement subissue.
The Kansas court acknowledged that Tilzers had "a stronger argument on the second factor"–that the Kansas proceeding offered procedural opportunities not available in the Missouri action. Nevertheless, the district court determined that Tilzers did have some discovery opportunities in Missouri and that they had failed to identify any witness or document that was not available to them in Missouri. That rationale is unpersuasive.
The short time line in the motion proceedings made meaningful discovery impracticable. Moreover, it is counterintuitive to declare that the unavailability of discovery is not prejudicial unless the complaining party can identify the witnesses and documents that would have been discovered. One of the purposes of the discovery process is to enable a party to learn of those witnesses and documents which will be useful in the litigation. On the other hand, Tilzers do not explain how having a jury as the factfinder or having discovery to obtain additional facts would have affected Judge Wells' ruling on the legal effect of the Global Settlement. Nevertheless, there can be no question that the independent lawsuit in Kansas offered Tilzers procedural opportunities that were unavailable to them in the Missouri proceedings on Davis' motion.
Additionally, the collateral estoppel doctrine in Missouri only applies "to those issues that were necessarily and unambiguously decided" in the prior adjudication. See Kays, 181 S.W.3d at 566. While Judge Wells unambiguously ruled that the Global Settlement was not invalid as an aggregate settlement, his ruling on the issue in the context of the attorney fees motion is less straightforward. More importantly, however, a ruling on the aggregate settlement issue does not appear to have been necessary for Judge Wells' decision on Davis' attorney's fee lien motion.
The Missouri court announced that its order enforcing the attorney's fee lien would not affect Tilzers' malpractice claims against Davis. Apparently, the court viewed the task presented by the attorney's fee lien motion to be a calculation of the amount of fees that Tilzers contracted to pay Davis and a determination of the reasonableness of those fees. In that event, the aggregate settlement issue was only relevant, if at all, to the question of whether Tilzers were entitled to an offset against Davis' attorney's fee lien based on malpractice. If the Missouri court was declining to rule on the malpractice claim, it had no reason to reach the subissue within that claim regarding any violations of the disclosure requirements of Rule 4-1.8(g). In other words, the ruling on the aggregate settlement issue was gratuitous and unnecessary to the decision rendered on the attorney's fee lien.
Perhaps more fundamentally, Rule 4-1.8(g) is a rule of professional conduct defining an unethical conflict of interest for an attorney representing two or more clients in a particular action. It is not a statutory provision governing the validity of settlement agreements, i.e., rendering aggregate settlements unlawful as a matter of law. Indeed, if all of the plaintiffs in the Missouri lawsuit had been represented by separate counsel, Rule 4-1.8(g) would not have applied, regardless of the terms of the settlement.
Likewise, compliance with the ethical rule is not necessarily a condition precedent to the enforcement of an attorney's fee lien. The preamble to the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) Rule 226 (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 391) explains the scope and function of the rules, clarifying that an ethical violation does not establish a per se claim for malpractice:
"Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the rules can be subverted when they are involved by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the rule." KRPC (Preamble-Scope) 2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. at 395.
Likewise, this court has opined:
"An attorney's violation of the ethics rules cannot create a cause of action to adverse litigants or even to clients. This is because the ethics rules do not impose a legal duty on the attorney owing to either a client or a third party. Occasionally, attorney conduct which violates an ethics rule may also violate an independent legal duty and a cause of action may ensue. It is the violation of the independent legal duty, not the ethics rule, that gives rise to a cause of action." OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 260 Kan. 305, Syl. ¶ 1, 918 P.2d 1274 (1996).
Thus, even in the Kansas malpractice action, a finding that Davis violated Rule 4-1.8(g) is unnecessary. Obviously, the Missouri action was not an attorney disciplinary proceeding, and an interpretation of the applicability of the ethical rules was not required. Accordingly, the Kansas district court erred in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The Kansas district court's decision included a denial of Tilzers' motion for partial summary judgment on the question of whether Davis participated in making a Rule 4-1.8(g) aggregate settlement without making the requisite disclosures. The district court found that the Global Settlement was not an aggregate settlement because the information required to be disclosed under the rule was not and could not have been known. We disagree with the analysis. The lack of information would actually support a finding that it was an aggregate settlement.
To review, Missouri Rule 4-1.8(g) provides that an attorney representing two or more clients is not to participate in an aggregate settlement of the clients' claims, unless each client has given a written, signed, and informed consent to the settlement. To obtain the consent, the attorney's disclosure to the clients is to include the existence and nature of all of the claims and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
The parties acknowledge that neither Kansas nor Missouri has any law specifically defining an aggregate settlement. We have located no assistance from the law of any of our sister states. We note that Tilzers cite to Straubinger v. Schmitt, 348 N.J. Super. 494, 792 A.2d 481 (2002), and Davis cites to Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tex. App. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999), but find neither case to be sufficiently on point to assist with interpreting whether the terms of the Global Settlement constituted an aggregate settlement.
Although not cited by either party, we note that the American Law Institute (ALI) has recently completed a 5-year project on the development of the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, issuing its Tentative Draft No. 1 on April 7, 2008. The ALI distinguishes between class action and non-class action aggregate settlements, defining the latter as follows:
"Definition of a Non-Class Aggregate Settlement
"(a) A non-class aggregate settlement is a settlement of the claims of two or more individual claimants in which the resolution of the claims is interdependent.
"(b) The resolution of claims in a non-class aggregate settlement is interdependent if:
(1) the defendant's acceptance of the settlement is contingent upon the acceptance by a number or specified percentage of the claimants; or
(2) the value of each claim is not based solely on individual case-by-case facts and negotiations." Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.16, p. 322.
Under this definition, interdependency is the key. The commentary notes that the definition incorporates the two settlement characteristics that render claims interdependent: (1) collective conditionality and (2) collective allocation. The former suggests that a settlement conditioned on the acceptance of a specific percentage of claimants is an aggregate settlement. The latter establishes the existence of an aggregate settlement if the value of each claim is determined by any method other than on an individual basis. The ALI also recognizes the possibility of "multiclaimant nonaggregate settlements," which it defines as a settlement where the defendant is "willing to negotiate an individual, fact-specific settlement for each claimant without setting a cap on the aggregate damages or insisting that a set percentage of the potential claimants agree to the settlement." Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.16, p. 325.
The ALI provides a helpful illustration:
"An attorney represents 100 plaintiffs complaining of various injuries caused by an allegedly defective drug manufactured by Defendant. During settlement negotiations the attorneys for the plaintiffs and Defendant individually assess each claim with a goal that the total settlement would equal $1 million. Defendant agrees to the settlement only if at least 95 percent of all of the claimants agree. The settlement is an aggregate one under subsection (b)(1), even though the amounts were individually negotiated, because Defendant has conditioned its acceptance of the settlement on a set percentage of claimants agreeing to the settlement and because Defendant placed a cap on the collective settlement." Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.16, p. 325-26.
Similarly, Tilzers point us to the ABA definition, which states that "an aggregate settlement occurs 'when two or more clients who are represented by the same lawyer together resolve their claims or defenses or pleas.'" ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, p. 51:377 (2006). The ABA Manual notes that "a settlement of a group of related claims is an aggregate settlement unless (1) a particular amount is negotiated on behalf of each individual plaintiff, and (2) each plaintiff is free to accept or reject the offer without affecting anyone else's settlement." ABA/BNA, p. 51:378.
Under the ALI definition, the Global Settlement had both characteristics of interdependency which define an aggregate settlement. There was collective conditionality because the pharmaceutical companies were granted the right to opt out of the settlement if fewer than all of the covered plaintiffs accepted the proposed settlement. Although Judge Wells attempted to circumvent the conditional allocation characteristic by appointing special masters to individually assess each claim, the Global Settlement contained a maximum amount that the defendants would pay into the settlement fund and provided for an across-the-board minimum payment to all opt-in claimants. In other words, each claimant did not receive individualized, fact-specific damages, but rather each claimant received an individualized, fact-specific allocation of a proportion of the capped settlement fund, subject to a minimum award for every participant.
Likewise, the Global Settlement runs afoul of the ABA guidelines. A particular amount of damages was not negotiated on behalf of each individual plaintiff. Rather, a percentage of the total settlement fund was established for each individual plaintiff. Thus, the amount awarded to one plaintiff directly affected the amount of the other plaintiffs' awards. More importantly, each plaintiff was not free to accept or reject the special masters' proffered award, as poignantly illustrated by Judge Wells' order forcing Tilzers to accept their calculated share of the pot.
Therefore, notwithstanding the concerted effort of Judge Wells and the special masters to devise a mechanism to avoid labeling the Global Settlement as an aggregate settlement, the defining characteristic of interdependency remained intact. The terms of the Global Settlement contained all of the important features of an aggregate settlement.
The Kansas district court was seduced by Judge Wells' opinion that the Global Settlement could not be an aggregate settlement because the information that Rule 4-1.8(g) required to be disclosed to obtain an informed consent was not available to Davis. However, that dearth of information was the direct result of the interdependent characteristics of the Global Settlement, i.e., the information could not be ascertained because the arrangement was an aggregate settlement. Rather than establishing a non-aggregate settlement, the unavailability of the information required to be disclosed by Rule 4-1.8(g) simply corroborated that it was an aggregate settlement and rendered it impossible for Davis to obtain an informed consent under the rule. The district court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous.
Finally, Tilzers challenge the district court's granting of the intervening drug companies' motion to maintain the confidentiality of the settlement agreement reached in the Missouri action. Tilzers base their complaint upon the public's interest in knowing the details of the settlement agreement.
Tilzers do not dispute that they entered into and personally signed a confidentiality agreement on at least two of the documents involved in the Missouri settlement and that the Missouri court memorialized the confidentiality agreement by entering appropriate protective orders in that proceeding. Accordingly, they acknowledge that the intervenors have a contractual right to have the settlement terms remain confidential. Nevertheless, they suggest that private contract rights must always give way to the public interest, and they contend that the intervenors failed to show any public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the settlement agreement.
First, we ascribe more significance to an entity's rights under a court-approved settlement agreement than Tilzers would suggest. In deciding whether information should be sealed, a court should consider the interests of the party seeking confidentiality, as well as the public's interest. Cf. In re Tax Appeal of City of Wichita, 277 Kan. 487, 514, 86 P.3d 513 (2004) (in deciding whether to permit discovery, court should balance the interest in obtaining the information against the resisting party's interest, as well as the public interest in maintaining confidentiality of the material). Obviously, the intervenors had an interest in shielding all of the terms of their current settlement offer from future plaintiffs.
In addition, the law and policy of this State is to favor out-of-court settlements of disputed claims. See, e.g., Bright v. LSI Corp., 254 Kan. 853, 860, 869 P.2d 686 (1994) (recognizing a strong public policy supporting settlement); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 461, 618 P.2d 788 (1980) ("Settlements between injured parties and tortfeasors are favored in the law."). As the intervenors and Davis point out, it is unlikely that a settlement would have been reached in this case without the confidentiality provision. Certainly, settling over 300 individual lawsuits without trial is in the public interest.
In contrast, Tilzers do not contradict the intervenors' argument to the district court that publicizing the settlement terms would not advance Tilzers' claims of malpractice in the Kansas case and maintaining the confidentiality of the settlement terms would not impede the pursuit of the legal malpractice action. Instead, Tilzers simply declare that the impact upon them of the partial sealing of documents "has no significance." We take that as a concession that the court order sealing certain documents did not prejudice Tilzers in the prosecution of their legal malpractice action.
The overarching theme of Tilzers' impassioned argument on this issue appears to be that the public has a right to know that the pharmaceutical companies orchestrated an illegal settlement of a highly publicized and emotional case. Tilzers are in the wrong venue to make that argument. This is a legal malpractice action, where the most that will be established is that Tilzers' own former attorneys breached a legal duty by laboring under a conflict of interest among several clients involved in a single settlement agreement. The legality of the pharmaceutical companies' actions in proposing the settlement will not be implicated in any manner. Judge Wells' ruling that the settlement agreement was legal and valid will not be overturned. In short, Tilzers should have attempted to shine the light of public scrutiny upon the Missouri proceedings, rather than attempt to circumvent the Missouri court's protective orders in this Kansas proceeding.
In conclusion, we find that the Kansas district court's order sealing those documents that contained confidential information about the Missouri settlement agreement was not an abuse of discretion. However, the district court's granting of Davis' summary judgment motion is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
DAVID J. KING, District Judge, assigned.


text:
Has Morsi "Climbed on to the Roof?"
HERNDON, Va., Dec. 11 (UPI) — HERNDON, Va., Dec. 11 (UPI) — The joke is told about a man asking a neighbor to check on his cat and elderly mother while he travels. Later, he called the neighbor to inquire about his cat. He was stunned when his neighbor simply said, "It died."
Getting over his initial shock, he told his neighbor he should have been more circumspect in delivering news of the cat's death. The man suggested the neighbor should have first explained the cat climbed on the roof and wouldn't come down; firemen came to rescue it; they carried it down; only to have the cat suddenly leap out of the fireman's arms to its death below.
With a sigh, the man then inquired about his mother, to which the neighbor responded, "She had climbed on to the roof … "
The moral of the story: To blunt the full impact of bad news, it should be delivered piecemeal.
It is a lesson Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi ignored in delivering to his people the bad news of his Nov. 22 decree. Stripping them of constitutional rights, he gave himself full authority to legislate without governmental oversight, ostensibly until a mostly Islamist drafted constitution — failing to protect the rights of minorities or the media — is voted on and passed.
In the end, public protest forced him to rescind the decree.
In an instant, Morsi's decree had converted a fledgling democracy into a full-blown dictatorship with powers not even previous President Hosni Mubarak enjoyed during his nearly three-decade rule.
Morsi should have sought the advice of Presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Vladimir Putin of Russia on how best to transition a democracy to a dictatorship. He would have learned tricks that enabled them to make that transition, avoiding the opposition Morsi encountered.
As oil revenues poured into Russia's state treasury — improving the standard of living for the average citizen — many failed to heed Putin's piecemeal grab for power.
Lost within their euphoria was Putin's effort to slowly increase his power and decrease theirs. Bit by bit he began taking away from them rights that democracy had given.
Governors were no longer elected but appointed by Putin (although this changed after Putin reaped the benefit of his own men in positions of power). Killings of anti-Putin journalists went unsolved.
As his constitutionally limited term in office was ending, Putin maneuvered his prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, into office while intimidating opponents. When Medvedev won election as president, he immediately appointed Putin to replace him as prime minister — obviously in a prearranged deal allowing Putin to retain power.
Corruption flourished in Russia as Putin supporters were allowed to benefit from their support. Constitutional amendments were passed to enable Putin to serve again as president for a longer term.
The day Medvedev stepped down as president following Putin's re-election, President Putin reappointed him prime minister. Human rights were restricted by direct prohibition or imposing extraordinarily high fines for violations.
The Russian people effectively fell asleep at the wheel while Putin drove the country back toward Soviet dictatorship. His nostalgia for those "good old days" was evident by Putin's outlandish claim the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the greatest disasters of the 20th century!
Only now do the Russian people seem to be waking up to what they have allowed to be done to them.
In Venezuela, Chavez has slowly dismantled his country's democratic engine. Early in his "rule," he created the false perception an outside threat existed, rallying the public's nationalistic spirit by claiming a danger existed of a future invasion by the United States.
He accused the United States of pressing regional influence and, ludicrously, using subliminal messaging to do so.
He bought Russian arms to defend against an invasion never to come.
Ironically, he allied himself with Islamic extremists, opening doors to an ilk who, absent a U.S. presence in the world, would be directing their violence against Venezuelans as Islamic non-believers.
All the while he has been chipping away at the freedoms of his people, silencing most critics as he transitioned Venezuelan democracy to a dictatorship.
Again, high oil revenues helped Chavez "buy" votes in subsequent elections for president.
Morsi found himself a "wannabe" dictator lacking the financial assets to lull his people into a similar euphoric state. The economy has suffered immensely due to the Arab Spring turmoil. To Egyptians, daily survival is paramount so they remained sensitive to any governmental change — especially one replacing democracy with a dictatorship overnight, whether temporary or not.
While the move was a calculated risk, it was one Morsi believed he could achieve. Recent successes had given him confidence — i.e., subordinating military influence to that of the president, dismissing senior generals, helping to negotiate a cease-fire to stop recent hostilities between Israel and Hamas, etc.
Those actions had gained Morsi domestic and international acclaim. He knew the Muslim Brotherhood supported him. He also knew he had the military's support as the army stood to gain unprecedented powers under the constitution.
Interestingly, the military "dragon" Morsi had earlier slain would be resurrected — even more powerful — under the new constitution. Having repressed the Muslim Brotherhood under Mubarak, the army would now defend it under Morsi.
But Morsi's failure to heed Putin's and Chavez's success in moving more slowly by way of "a thousand cuts" — i.e., "creeping normalcy" — instead opting to do it with one major negative change raised the ire of protesters who then took to the streets to stop Egypt's march toward an Orwellian society.
Rescinding the decree, Morsi may simply opt to pursue the Putin/Chavez approach later. It will take time to determine whether, ultimately, democracy is dead or, politically, Morsi is by having climbed on to the roof.
(James. G. Zumwalt, a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, is author of "Bare Feet, Iron Will — Stories from the Other Side of Vietnam's Battlefields," "Living the Juche Lie — North Korea's Kim Dynasty" and "Doomsday: Iran — The Clock is Ticking.")
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
© 2012 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Read more...

subset: commoncrawl


text:
Dublin's tech tigerland
Future proof: Facebook employees Ziad Traboulsi, from Lebanon, and Mats Lyngstad, from Norway, at the Dublin office. photograph: alan betson
New Dubliners: Katrin Nagel, from Germany, and Thijs van der Haak, from the Netherlands, at Google. photographs: alan betson and eric luke
New Dubliners: Alessandra Verri, Susana Prieto Fermin and Luca Baldelli at PayPal. photographs: alan betson and eric luke
Economic crisis? What's that? Young Europeans are flocking to Dublin to work in the mini boom town created by Facebook, Google, PayPal and others
Dublin 2013: a booming industry. Hundreds of young people signing contracts for new jobs with decent salaries. They have perks, bonuses and brilliant social lives. They recommend their friends for jobs, and they get hired too. Friday-night beers top off another great week. Here's to the weekend, when they take off down the country to go surfing or pub-crawling in Cork and Galway.
Apparently some kind of economic crisis is going on, but in Dublin's tech sector, where Facebook, Google, Twitter, LinkedIn, eBay, PayPal and Microsoft reign, the only way is up.
Emigration is inevitable for many Irish graduates, but multibillion-dollar tech companies taking advantage of Ireland's low corporate-tax rate are about immigration. Young Europeans are moving to Dublin to bask in a mini boom town, encouraged by a determined recruitment drive.
Grand Canal Dock, Dublin's most prosperous district, wears this success well. Daniel Libeskind's theatre sits in the same neighbourhood as a bring-your-own-beer warehouse that hosts parties; rollerbladers grind on benches next to restaurants serving perfect brunches. Positivity seeps from Facebook and Google's office blocks.
Skating in the corridor
At Facebook's European headquarters, on Hanover Quay, 25 languages are spoken. Employees get 25 days' holiday a year, not including public holidays. New parents are offered not only 26 weeks paid maternity but also two weeks' paid paternity leave. The company pays for monthly gym membership and health insurance, with reductions for dependents. As at Google, meals and snacks are free.
It's a good deal, and the people working there know it. Young Europeans stroll around in casual clothes, cracking jokes, walking past an office wall graffitied by visitors.
And people skate down the corridor. Ziad Traboulsi, a 24-year-old from Beirut, grabs a weird-looking skateboard by the lift. "Have you tried this one yet?" he asks Mats Lyngstad, also 24, from Trondheim, in Norway. "No, I haven't tried that one." That particular skateboard is "a Facebook thing", Tradoulsi says. He moved here in September 2010. Four people he recommended for jobs have been hired.
Traboulsi works in user operations, "making sure they have a cool experience on the site". Lyngstad moved here last April. It's his first job, and it involves talking to advertising clients and agencies in Norway and helping them use Facebook as an advertising platform.
There's something familiar about their confidence and contentment. They sound awfully like Irish 24-year-olds from seven years ago.
Lyngstad and Traboulsi are here because of their language skills, which tech companies need so much they import young workers from Europe. Irish people work here, too, obviously, but the boom in recruitment looks offshore.
John Dennehy recently started a project called Make IT In Ireland, working with tech employers to fill jobs. "There's a skills gap . . . Ireland has become the HQ for the biggest tech companies serving customers in Europe, and that creates a huge demand for language skills in things like tech support and customer service. So you need German speakers, Norwegian speakers, Dutch."
Dennehy works a charm offensive in Europe to counteract the bad-news story of Ireland. The tech companies based here need people with languages, and they need them now.
"Ultimately, if you can't get the people, you can't grow. If we can get someone to move to Dublin, that means one extra hire for a tech company. On average, their salaries will be €47,000."
In the tech-sector, the line between work and play is blurred. "Most of my friends are in Facebook, Google, and my flatmate works at LinkedIn," Lyngstad says. Traboulsi nods. "Same. These companies are really very linked; we're always living together, hanging out together. My girlfriend is from the office [Facebook]. Your social life is very linked to your work.
"We typically go out several days a week, and on Friday after work everyone stays out until 1am, 2am. Because everyone's coming from abroad, it's sort of a university or college experience. Most people don't know a lot of other people when they come here, so it ends up being a very close circle."
Of course, ultimately it's all about the work. You're less likely to leave your desk and go home when the office is a cross between the future and Tom Hanks's apartment in Big.
'Even the lunch breaks are smart'
Katrin Nagel, a 32-year-old German, is a senior account manager in "large customer sales", managing businesses partnerships for Google. She moved to Dublin in April 2010 and says Google is the smartest company you could work for.
"Even the lunch or coffee breaks are just the smartest way for easy information- and knowledge-management, and team-building throughout and between all departments, as you meet your friends, enjoy amazing food and discuss [the] latest projects, new innovative ideas."
Nagel worked in France for three years before moving to Dublin, and like many foreign tech workers she lists the ability to live close to her workplace as a big perk.
Nagel's Dutch colleague Thijs van der Haak, who is 35, moved to Dublin in April 2005. He manages a team of online marketing consultants tasked with acquiring high-value advertisers for the Benelux market.
"I think Dublin is a great place to start your career and get some international experience, so I would definitely recommend it. I already got my best friend from the Netherlands to marry an Irish girl."
He initially intended to stay for one or two years. Seven and a half years later, he's still in Dublin, describing his long-term plans as "open".
Is it all so perfect? Off the record, and in hushed tones, some Googlers talk about how unnerving they find Google's company enthusiasm can be, about how entire professional and social lives revolve around the Google ecosystem, about the long hours and stress associated with being part of a company that demands a lot from its employees.
'We are touching the future'
But even the naysayers acknowledge that the company rewards them handsomely for their work, and the dominant sentiment is one of possibility and endless expansion. They're working in an exciting sector, on the tools of the future. Their chief executives are household names. Their companies are cool.
When Twitter advertised a post for a PR person in Dublin, it was retweeted with enthusiasm and envy, like a spot on the bench of a Premiership team, or a job as a rock star's roadie.
"Working for the tech sector, we feel – I don't know how to say it – we feel alive," says Alessandra Verri, a 36-year-old from Calabria, in southern Italy, who moved to Dublin in 2005 and is a lead team-leader at PayPal. "We feel we are touching progress and the future. We are dealing every single day with something a couple of years ago would have seemed weird."
Such boundless enthusiasm among employees can become overpowering, as can the companies' careful message management. At both PayPal and Facebook, an Irish staff member sits in on the Irish Times's interviews with employees. Google's employee interviews are conducted by email (not the norm for journalistic research), at the company's request. Twitter declines to offer employees for interview.
Yet the employees are emphatic about the informality and lack of hierarchy within the companies. Employees at PayPal's office in Ballycoolin Business Park, near Blanchardstown, in Dublin 15 offer strikingly similar responses to the question, "Do you notice any professional or workplace differences in Ireland?" They speak about managers sitting next to other employees and how employees are involved in making decisions.
Susana Prieto Fermin, from Barcelona, says, "The main [difference] is the focus that PayPal puts on the employees and how every decision that is made, we're made part of it. The boss is not just someone who is above you in the hierarchy." Verri says, "The treatment and the respect towards employees is the most important difference."
Even though these companies are desirable workplaces, the seats aren't all taken. Facebook's European headquarters in Dublin has nearly 60 vacancies. That number of jobs being created in Dublin would be headline news any other day, if it wasn't just rolling recruitment.
In an ideal situation, the young Irish people emigrating right now could be up for the jobs John Dennehy is trying to sell to Europeans. But it's all about languages, an aspect of Ireland's education system that can't compete. "There's a long-term need to address that skills gap through education," Dennehy says, "but there's also a short-term need. The only way to address that short-term need right now is to bring in people outside of Ireland."
Eimear O'Neill is a recruiter at Facebook and previously had a similar role at Google. She describes Facebook's "pretty comprehensive relocation package", explaining how it sets up people in Dublin, sorting out their flights, shipping their belongings, offering them a few weeks of accommodation before they find their own place. "Pretty much all of the people we hire are relocating from somewhere."
When O'Neill hires someone, they're added to a Facebook relocating group page, so before they move to Dublin they can chat online with other people who've moved from their country or elsewhere. Like the product, Facebook's office environment is social.
"We had a party when we hit one billion users. They're great at organising a lot of social events. We have Friday drinks as well, where they open that big fridge down there and fill it with beer. We have our evening meals here on Friday and have a few beers, so it's a really social place to work. So if you are relocating from other countries you have, I suppose, a ready-made group of friends. A lot of the guys in Facebook will hang around with the Nordic team or Spanish team or German team in Google, Microsoft, Twitter, LinkedIn."
PayPal couples
Back at PayPal, Verri is talking about how she moved to Dublin in 2005 after completing a PhD in politics. When she interviewed with PayPal, she was seven months pregnant with her second child. She says that back in Italy she probably never would have been called for an interview if a company had known that. She went on to refer her husband for a job at PayPal. He has been working there for two and a half years."I feel lucky," she says.
In 2006, Susana Prieto Fermin, a 36-year-old from Barcelona, was living with her Irish husband in Germany. "We put our CVs out there to see what the market was in Ireland and Spain, and in 2006 Ireland was booming, so we were getting loads of calls."
When she thinks about Ireland now, she thinks long-term. Four years ago, having lived here for just two years and yet to have children, she would have been less certain. "Now that we have a family and the prospects of a career are so bad in Spain and are booming here in PayPal, we are recruiting all the time and there are loads of career opportunities."
Luca Baldelli, who is 32 and from Perugia, moved to Dublin in January 2008, planning to learn English and then apply for a job. He is now a team leader for risk operation, managing 15 people who review transaction activity on PayPal accounts. "When I came it was just an adventure, so I was waiting to see how it goes. It went well. I developed in my role . . . I consider I have a career."
Baldelli's partner also works at PayPal, and they have a young daughter. "We're more than happy to stay where we are at the moment."
He has recommended Dublin to friends, some of whom have moved. "I always advise people that it's difficult in the beginning, but as soon as you get into a company and see the respect where you work, there's much more regard here than back in Italy."
And what of that wider economic context? They're aware, but it's just not their world. "I think about that very often," says Ziad Traboulsi. "I saw some statistic that 1,000 Irish people are leaving every week with emigration. But I think the reason why we come in is that it doesn't take anyone else's job; it's because of the language skills. So it might be sort of a bubble, but I was reading another statistic that Irish people are the happiest in the world."
Traboulsi was offered work with Facebook in other cities but turned it down. After less than a year, Lyngstad also sees himself settling in. "For the foreseeable future . . . I'm going to stay in Ireland."
Culture shock: What's different about Ireland?
Ziad Traboulsi, Facebook Aged 24, from Beirut, Lebanon
"It was mainly not knowing anyone here, starting from scratch. But after the first few months, when you get adjusted, it's a really great place to live."
Susana Prieto Fermin, PayPal Aged 36, from Barcelona, Spain
"The biggest adjustment was around the way food is perceived. For me [as a Spaniard], we could spend hours at a table just having our coffees or eating."
Luca Baldelli, PayPal Aged 32, from Perugia, Italy
"In terms of people, I didn't have to adjust, because I think Irish people are like Italians: outgoing and friendly."
Alessandra Verri, PayPal Aged 36, from Calabria, Italy
"I'm from the south of Italy. We have a proper spring and a proper summer, which is not the case in Ireland. After a while you get used to that. It's important to know you always bring a jacket with you to cover yourself from the rain."
Thijs van der Haak, Google Aged 35, from the Netherlands
"Sinks with separate taps for hot and cold water. Irish people asking me, 'How are ya?' if really they are just saying hello and are not expecting me to give them a detailed statement of how I'm doing."
Katrin Nagel, Google Aged 32, from Germany
"I sold my car before I moved to Dublin, and bought a bike and a waterproof jacket for cycling to work every day, which is the biggest luxury of all."


text:
All Is Lost (Robert Redford) - DVD Review
Review by Rob Carnevale
ROBERT Redford delivers a tour-de-force in JC Chandor's gripping All Is Lost, the type of film that offers up cinema at its most visceral and pure.
A survival drama that pits one man against the ocean, this is on a par with films like Gravity for the way it impresses as a piece of spectacle that never loses sight of the human emotions at its core. But what makes it all the more impressive is the performance that anchors it, a near wordless and extremely physical piece of acting that rewards screen veteran Redford with one of the best roles of his esteemed career.
The film hits the ground running. A lone sailor is awoken from his sleep somewhere in the Indian Ocean by a bang that turns out to be a shipping container rubbing against the side of his vessel. Unfortunately, the container has breached the side of his boat and water has started to pour in.
The man successfully patches this up but finds the damage is more widespread than at first thought: it has cut him off from the rest of the world as his electronics are largely fried.
What ensues is an increasingly desperate attempt to find land, or even rescue, that becomes increasingly hampered by the elements.
Chandor, whose first film was the astute and equally gripping financial drama Margin Call, here takes the audience on a similarly engrossing journey. And it's not always a comfortable watch.
Just as the director slowly, and often mercilessly, strips hope away from its central character, so too does the audience begin to fear for the worst. For every minor success the man enjoys, there's another hardship to set him back just around the corner. Little mistakes prove costly; minor victories are all too fleeting.
Redford, for his part, conveys this journey in brilliant fashion, especially given the near-wordless way in which he has to do so. This is extremely physical cinema that finds the actor having to convey a lot through very little, while being bashed repeatedly by rain, wind and waves. There are heart-stopping moments, throughout, all of which slowly wear the character down.
And while we never get to find out much about him, his journey is utterly involving. You'll root for him even when the odds seem insurmountable.
Chandor, for his part, conveys the enormity of the task facing the man with considerable aplomb. His film always feels real and authentic, expertly capturing the sea at both its most beautiful and terrifying. There are times when it's intimate and claustrophobic, during the moments below deck, but it can be epic as Redford battles the elements. You cannot underestimate the size of the technical achievement here, especially given the size of the budget when compared to bigger films like Gravity or Life of Pi.
What's more, the film doesn't loosen its grip on your attention until the very final reel, which offers a fitting conclusion to a memorable journey. It's a stunning film that deserves to place both Redford and Chandor in awards contention.
Certificate: 12A
Running time: 106mins
UK Blu-ray & DVD Release: April 28, 2014


text:
SAN RAMON — The city council voted 4-1 Tuesday night to not hold its popular Fourth of July aerial fireworks show in 2013.
The cost and public safety concerns were cited as the main reasons for not bringing back the show.
Councilman Dave Hudson was the dissenting vote. He said a majority of residents who responded to a city survey said they wanted fireworks.
"I think the Fourth of July may be the No. 1 holiday in this valley," he said. "There's a whole generation of children that is going to lose this. It's dead for next year, but someone needs to say we need to bring this back in some form."
A record crowd of more than 30,000 people showed up for the 2011 Fourth of July fireworks show causing safety concerns, which prompted the city to cancel the show for last summer.
Contact Jason Sweeney at 925-874-2123. Follow him at Twitter.com/Jason_Sweeney.


text:
This is what was there. Love the rooster centerpiece, so I wanted to use it again.
Lindsay @ Southern Lovely for Show and Share
Roeschel @ DIY Showoff for DIY Fall Festival
Yvonne @ Stonegable for Tutorials - Tips and Tidbits Thursday
Lindsay @ Southern Lovely for Show and Share Thursday
Kathy @ A Delightsome Life for Home and Garden Thursday
Richella @ Imparting Grace for Grace at Home
Susan @ Between Naps On The Porch for Tablescape Thursday
Pamela @ From My Front Porch To Yours for Treasure Hunt Thursday


text: Media and Public Relations We're instrumental in bringing greater visibility and recognition to Saint Michael's. Our mission is accomplished through initiating and facilitating relationships and communication with our greater Saint Michael's community, and our constituencies throughout New England, nationally and internationally. Internal media resources for College news and events are compiled weekly in "Saint Michael's This Week". A campus calendar of weekly events is produced monthly. To submit a Saint Michael's College event that occurs off campus that is open to the public, submit your event to Mark Tarnacki at email@example.com. Media and Public Relations Contacts: Mark Tarnacki Staff Writer 802.654.2795 email@example.com


text:
WILLIAMSBURG, Va. (AP) – Ariya Jutanugarn weathered the wind and kept her lead Friday in the LPGA Tour's Kingsmill Championship.
The 17-year-old Thai player missed three short par putts early, but rolled in a 45-footer and two others for birdie on the wind-swept River Course in an even-par 71 that gave her a one-stroke lead at 7 under.
A day after shooting a 64, Jutanugarn started with a three-putt bogey on her first hole and, with the wind making it difficult to control the ball, said she tried to play safer than normal, and found that didn't work.
"It make me want to go back to my game on the back nine,'' the normally aggressive player said.
A birdie at the par-5 seventh – her 16th hole of the day – gave her the outright lead, and she finished with two pars.
Stacy Lewis and Angela Stanford, both a shot back after 68s, had the best rounds of the day. Both played early and came off the course saying the wind was picking up.
"The wind's not dying down out there so it's going to be tough this afternoon,'' Lewis said.
She was right, mostly, but the players who managed best were able to make moves on the leaderboard.
Suzann Pettersen, the 2007 winner, and Sandra Gal shot 69 and found themselves in a tie for fourth when two-time Kingsmill champion Cristie Kerr.
Kerr chunked a chip shot and bogeyed the final hole.
"It's a round where you needed to kind of stay around the lead and not take yourself out of it,'' she said. "It was tough conditions, so I would have liked to shoot 1 under today for sure, but I didn't hit it that great today compared to yesterday.''
Pettersen agreed the conditions were difficult, but not as bad as some made it sound.
"I like it when it's tough. It's very challenging,'' she said. "Like I said, you can't really back off. You can't really bail out. Once you decide on a club, you've got to hit the shot you're seeing, otherwise you could be three clubs short or two clubs long. For me, it just sharpens my focus a lot.''
Stanford, along with Natalie Gulbis the only players to make all nine cuts at Kingsmill, started with a three-putt bogey and felt fortunate to be able to duplicate the 68 she had Thursday.
"Overall it seems like it was Groundhog Day,'' she said. "I hit 14 greens again and had 29 putts again and got up and down every time again, so interesting that they seem like carbon copies of each other.''
The more difficult conditions, however, made Friday's 68 more impressive.
"Today I felt like I got the most out of today,'' Stanford said.
Lewis, who started at 8:36 a.m., said the wind was affecting balls in flight, and on the green.
"It was blowing when we started but it was probably midway through the front nine when it really started to blow pretty good,'' said Lewis, who was ranked No. 1 earlier this year. "It's drying out the course so the downwind holes, it's releasing on the greens and it's definitely affecting some putts.
"It's just one of those days you've got to grind it out, take your pars and go to the next hole.''
Lewis expected the afternoon to be especially challenging for Jutanugarn, a long-hitting whose style is to go aggressively at the pins. That approach helped her card nine birdies in the first round.
"She plays without fear,'' Lewis said. "She swings at it hard and she hits it and she goes and finds it. … It will be a little different in the wind, so I think maybe she'll bring it back a little bit, hopefully.''
Jutanugarn, who leads the Ladies European Tour money list and has finished no worse than fourth in her three prior starts on the LPGA Tour, surely turned heads with how she turned it around after a balky start in the second round.
She hopes the weekend brings more surprises.
"I think I have to focus on every chance to even have a chance to hit the shot, but I don't think I'm going to win tournament or I'm going to lose tournament,'' she said. "Everybody have a chance to win, so I still have chance to win, too.''


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Canucks defenceman Jason Garrison adjusts on the fly
Defenceman Jason Garrison has quickly embraced playing in a hockey-crazy city and understands the pressures placed on him and the Canucks to perform. After a slow start, the reliable White Rock native 'rarely' has a bad shift or game, according to coaches.
Photograph by: Rich Lam , Getty Images
DALLAS - Dan Hamhuis recalls asking general manager Mike Gillis last summer about the new guy.
"I didn't know that much about Jason," Hamhuis says. "The goals were the glaring thing about him, but (Mike) talked more about the defensive side of his game — being a big, strong guy, good in front of the net and in the corners. He said if we got the goals, it's a bonus."
Given the longtime-listener-first-time-caller hysteria when Jason Garrison managed just one goal and two points in his first 15 games, the Canucks' fan base seemed to have different expectations.
For $27.6 million over six years, Garrison should be the next Al MacInnis or, at least, the next Adrian Aucoin. The 28-year-old from White Rock scored 16 times from the blue-line for the Florida Panthers last season, and for the kind of dough the Canucks paid for the free agent, people in B.C. weren't going to accept one goal less. Well, they might, but only because this National Hockey League season was shortened to 48 games.
"People are looking for one thing and one thing only and they're missing the 10 other things he does so well," associate coach Rick Bowness says. "That's wrong. Jason is a great guy to coach because you know what you're going to get from him every night. He's so reliable, such a competitive guy. For anyone to sit there and just look at his points, they're missing a lot from what he brings to the table.
"He's reliable every shift, plays on the power play, kills penalties, plays against the other team's best players. He very rarely has a bad night, very rarely has a bad shift."
And now Garrison is starting to score, too.
The six-foot-two, 220-pound defenceman has two goals, four assists and a plus-seven rating in the last seven games. Through 43 games, Garrison's personal boxscore prorates to 13 goals, 26 points and a plus-32 rating over a full season.
The Garrison-Hamhuis partnership on defence, formed 25 games ago when Kevin Bieksa first left the lineup because of a groin injury, has become the Canucks' best and most trusted.
In the 2-1 shootout loss to the St. Louis Blues on Tuesday, when several Canucks looked small but Garrison did not, Hamhuis logged a season-high 28:33 of ice time and Garrison played 25:09.
The workload was due partly to Monday's "lower body" injury to Bieksa, which has left the Canucks without any right-shot defencemen. Did we mention that Garrison, a lefty, has built his fine season while playing out of position?
"You have certain expectations but you don't know how it's going to pan out or how it will affect you until you're in that situation," Garrison says of his many adjustments, especially to the fanatical hockey market. "So, living it, it was what I expected. It's a different market, more expectations. It's a pressure-filled market. But guys on this team, they love that and everyone wants to play here.
"I'm definitely happy (with my season). There's always room for improvement and I'm not complacent about the numbers I have now. I want more. I want to contribute more offensively."
Garrison was removed from the power play for a while because he was hesitant to shoot and when he did fire missiles from the point, they rarely hit the net.
He admits it wasn't because of a lack of confidence in his shot, but a lack of confidence about his standing on a new team. He would receive the puck on the power play and see former NHL scoring champions Henrik and Daniel Sedin awaiting passes.
"You're just trying to fit in," Garrison says. "And obviously with Danny and Hank, you want to put the puck in their hands as much as possible. That was kind of what was going on. But I was told by players and coaches to shoot the puck as much as I could, so that's maybe more my mentality now."
In the last seven games, he has registered 17 shots — nearly 2½ per night. In the first 15 games, that average was 1½ shots.
Both Garrison and first-unit power-play pointman Alex Edler are getting their shots away quicker.
The power play, stunningly ineffective in the middle of the season when it scored twice in 20 games, is 6-for-22 the last seven games.
There has never been an issue, at least to the Canucks, about Garrison's even-strength play.
"He's a smart player and he's not high risk, even though he puts up a lot of big numbers," Hamhuis says.
"It's a little tougher for him being on that right side because it's a double adjustment for him.
"We sit beside each other on the plane, and this was since before we were D-partners. I was talking to him (early in the season) about how things were going because it's a tough start when you're not getting the numbers and trying to learn a new system in the defensive zone. I'm sure that stuff was bothering him, but he didn't let it get the best of him. He is a calm, smart guy. Look where it has got him now."
BIEKSA SENT HOME: After travelling to Dallas, where the Canucks end their five-game road trip Thursday, Bieksa was sent home Wednesday to Vancouver to be fully evaluated by medical staff. The Canucks expect that Bieksa won't be out long ... With extra blue-liners Andrew Alberts and Cam Barker playing because of the Bieksa and Chris Tanev (ankle) injuries, the Canucks called up from the AHL journeyman Derek Joslin. "Because of the lockout, he never had the chance to have a training camp with us," assistant general manager Lorne Henning said of the 26-year-old. "But he's a good skater with NHL experience in San Jose and Carolina and a good depth defenceman."


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The British Academy of Film and Television Arts Los Angeles announced Monday morning that Oscar-winning director Kathryn Bigelow ("The Hurt Locker") and Academy Award-winning actor Ben Kingsley ("Gandhi") will be honored at the 2013 BAFTA Los Angeles Britannia Awards.
The ceremony will take place Nov. 9 at the Beverly Hilton Hotel and will air the following evening on BBC America.
PHOTOS: Billion-dollar movie club
Bigelow ("Zero Dark Thirty") will receive the John Schlesinger Britannia Award for excellence in directing, while Kingsley, last seen in "Iron Man 3," will receive the Albert R. Broccoli Britannia Award for worldwide contribution to entertainment.
George Clooney was previously announced as the recipient of the Stanley Kubrick Britannia Award for excellence in film.
Additional honorees will be announced in the coming weeks.
Stanley Kramer: Hollywood's Moral Compass
Lindsay Lohan's 'The Canyon's' tanks at New York City theater
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PHOTOS: Faces to watch 2014 | Movies
ENVELOPE: The latest awards buzz
DOCUMENTARIES: 10 best of 2013, and a new crop in 2014


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Struggles remain for victim of anthrax attack
11 years after opening anthrax letter, a Quincy woman still has questions
The wreckage of the World Trade Center was still smoldering when the letters began arriving at media outlets and the offices of two US senators. By the end of the anthrax attacks, five people were dead. Seventeen others were infected but survived. The first bioterror attack in American history came and went quickly, fading into the shadow of 9/11's mass destruction of airplanes, buildings, and lives.
But Casey Chamberlain will never forget. The Quincy resident rarely discusses what happened when, as a young NBC employee, she opened one of the anthrax-laced letters. But she recently spoke to the Globe about her ordeal, saying she wants people to remember that there were two sets of terrorist victims: those killed in the Sept. 11 attacks, and those infected soon after with anthrax.
Moreover, she wants to make sure it never happens again.
The days following Sept. 11, 2001, were hectic for 23-year-old Chamberlain, who was working as a desk assistant for the "NBC Nightly News" at 30 Rockefeller Plaza in Manhattan. The country was in shock, and in New York, frantic callers were flooding the network, seeking information about the attacks.
"We had so many victims' families calling," she says.
Chamberlain, a former Barnstable High School class president who had graduated from UMass Amherst in 2000, was also responsible for opening mail for anchor Tom Brokaw. "Tom would get all different kinds of mail, from love letters to hate mail," says Chamberlain, now 34. "They were often the ramblings of angry viewers or compliments from fans."
In one such stack, on Sept. 18, was an envelope addressed in block letters. Chamberlain opened it, and to her surprise found "some brown, granular stuff" — a cross between sand and brown sugar, she recalls. At the top of the letter was "09-11-01" and, in capital letters it read:
Chamberlain remembers thinking, "OK, someone's just pulling a prank or it's a crazy person." All mail was to be saved, so she emptied the sand-like substance into the trash can, and placed the letter in a pile for Brokaw's personal assistant, Erin O'Connor.
Ten days later, Chamberlain came down with severe flu and nausea. Her glands and face were hugely swollen. She had worn a skirt to work the day the letter arrived, and remembers scratching her leg, which was now covered with what looked like black bug bites.
One curious symptom: "I could actually feel something circulating through my body."
She had just started taking Accutane, a drug prescribed for acne, and her doctor thought she was having a reaction to it. He prescribed the antibiotic Cipro.
O'Connor — who handled the letter after Chamberlain — had developed a lesion on her collarbone. Brokaw sent O'Connor to one of his doctors, an infectious disease specialist who had worked in Africa. "He saw it and he knew right away what it was," Chamberlain recalls. A biopsy came back positive for anthrax.
The word "anthrax" was not much a part of the American vocabulary. Few doctors had ever seen a case. At first, Chamberlain says, no one at NBC — including herself — realized that she had been infected. "I was 23," she says. "I wasn't going to talk to Tom Brokaw about being sick."
But on Oct. 5, 2001, a photo editor at a Florida tabloid died from inhaling anthrax spores that had also come through the mail, heralding the after-shock of 9/11: bioterrorism. Investigators then learned of the NBC letter, and that Chamberlain, who was the first to open it, was infected. As it turned out, her black "bug bites" were anthrax lesions.
Lucky to be alive
When Chamberlain was finally diagnosed, she told only family and a few friends, including Josh Weiner, now a producer for the "Today" show, who has known Chamberlain since their early days at NBC.
Her life "was completely turned upside down," says Weiner, who grew up in Brookline. "She's been through a lot, and Casey's a fighter with a lot of resilience.
"If there's any long-term takeaway, I think it's that Casey's even closer with her family and friends than ever before. She's definitely stronger. In many ways, I think she feels like a survivor."
Indeed, Chamberlain is lucky to be alive.
"If I had gone like this," she says, inhaling deeply, "I would have died."
Instead, she contracted the less severe cutaneous strain, which enters the body through a cut or sore on the skin.
Anthrax bacteria release toxins that can cause swelling, internal bleeding and tissue death. Inhalation anthrax has a high mortality rate because the toxins easily enter the lungs and bloodstream and spread quickly. Of the 22 cases of anthrax in 2001, 11 were inhalation, 11 were cutaneous. Of the 11 who inhaled the spores, five died, six survived. All of the cutaneous cases survived.
Chamberlain's New Jersey apartment was also tested, and a number of spores found. Nearly everything in it, and in her boyfriend's apartment — furniture, bedding, dishes, TVs, clothes — was put in barrels and burned. They were allowed to keep a small box of items, mostly pictures.
The NBC newsroom was also taken apart, scrubbed and rebuilt. Though the letter did eventually reach Brokaw, he was not infected. "I actually handled the letter but most of the residue was gone by then," he said in an e-mail to the Globe this week.
The FBI concluded that the spores came from the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md. The agency has called the case one of its longest and most complex, and closed it after chief suspect Bruce Ivins, an Army biodefense expert, committed suicide in 2008. But many, including members of a National Academy of Science panel, have questioned the FBI findings, which they say relied on circumstantial evidence.
The agency had previously focused on another scientist, Steven Hatfill, who was eventually cleared. Hatfill sued the Justice Department and the FBI and in 2008 won a $5.8 million settlement.
Anxious, hyper, forgetful
Today, Chamberlain, who ran cross country, played the violin, and was on the student council in high school, continues to lead a full life: She has a healthy, lively 6-year-old daughter, a cozy home in Quincy she shares with partner Craig Ruiter, a new dog, and a job as an administrative assistant at Massachusetts General Hospital.
But she still lives with the legacy of the letter. She says she has symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder, including some depression and anxiety. "It definitely made me much more of a worrywart," she says.
She also suffers from short-term memory loss, difficulty focusing at times, and a periodic ringing in her ears.
"My memory was always really great," says Chamberlain, and her long-term memory is still good. "But if I am trying to recall things I was just discussing in conversation, that is often forgotten."
And though she tries to hide it, Chamberlain says she is "far more anxious in different situations than I ever was in the past."
Her parents agree. "She gets anxious about things, a little more hyper than she used to be," says her father, Donald, a social work administrator. "She sometimes complains that she can't remember stuff. She's always been driven and active and hyper, but I feel it's gotten a little worse."
Her mother Cynthia Chamberlain, a medical technologist, says that the past couple of years have been especially difficult for their daughter. "We're not sure why, but it seems now that it's almost worse than right after the event," she says. "It's been worrisome. She does struggle and some days she is really down."
Her daughter worries constantly, she says, "about minutia that would never have crossed her mind when she was in New York."
After going to the grocery store, for example, Chamberlain may worry about whether she was nice enough to the clerk. Or whether her daughter might have offended someone while playing. Always high energy, Chamberlain may have "a million things to get done today," says her mother. "But she won't get them all done because she's more scattered than she ever was."
Since 2002, Chamberlain and some other survivors have participated in a National Institutes of Health study on the long-term effects of anthrax exposure. The study is ongoing and no results are yet published. But principal investigator Dr. Mary Wright says that some victims still suffer serious symptoms, chiefly fatigue and memory issues.
"This has really changed their lives," says Wright. "Prior to infection, they felt they had very good memories. They have also had an uncharacteristic fatigue. These are people who worked 20 hours a day and never missed a day."
While some have noticed an improvement over time, others have not, Wright says.
Some survivors, including Chamberlain, also met annually with the FBI in Washington, D.C., until the case was closed.
"It was nice to be around people who understand what happened," she says. "There were so few of us, unlike the 9/11 families who had huge numbers of people."
Among some of the survivors, nagging questions remain. The FBI built its case on Ivins' access to and deep knowledge of the anthrax spores, his late working hours during that period, and his alleged mental instability.
Chamberlain isn't entirely satisfied with the criminal case's conclusion since Ivins died before he could be arrested and tried. "But in my mind, he would have been convicted in a courtroom," she says.
Her mother, who also attended the FBI sessions, believes the attacks were the work of more than a lone scientist. "I suspect he was involved, but I don't think it's possible for one person to do all that. I think there's definitely someone out there who knows more than has ever been revealed."
Chamberlain remained at NBC until June 2007. She loved New York and her job, working her way up to executive assistant for the executive producer of the "Nightly News." But she wanted to move with her daughter back to Massachusetts to be closer to her family.
Josh Weiner admires the way Chamberlain has come to terms with what happened, and has gotten her life "back on track."
"Even though it was a pivotal, traumatic life event, Casey's never let this define her," he says. "She's not 'the anthrax girl' or anything. It's just something that happened to her, and Casey's moved on."
Chamberlain remains in occasional touch with Brokaw, who recalls the time as "traumatic, because of all the uncertainty. No law enforcement official or physician initially believed it was anthrax. Casey and Erin were misdiagnosed for 10 days."
In a Newsweek story in 2010, Brokaw wrote of his assistants: "The emotional wounds will always be with them, wounds brought on by a craven attack meant for me. That they paid the price is a guilt I will carry forever."
In a recent e-mail, he added: "It was so unfair that these two brave women had to endure a life-threatening exposure because some idiot was trying to attack me. We've all moved on now, but it remains a cautionary tale about the dangerous world in which we live."
Bella English can be reached at email@example.com